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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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FOREWORD

The present publication contains basic documents on arms control and disarmament developments in 1983 and is the latest in a series of volumes that have been issued annually since 1960. The work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1983 is described in its 23d annual report (see Bibliography).

The papers are arranged in chronological order, following a topical list of documents and lists of abbreviations and conferences. Other reference aids may be found at the back of the volume. These include a list of depository libraries, a bibliography, a list of persons, and an index. The papers were compiled and annotated by R. William Nary and Ruth Ihara. Janet Athos provided assistance. Useful suggestions were received from officers throughout the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A/ — General Assembly[1]
ABM — antiballistic missile
AC/ — *ad hoc* committee[1]
ACDA — Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACIS — arms control impact statement(s)
Add. — addendum[1]
ADP — automatic data processing
AEA — Atomic Energy Act
AFB — Air Force Base
AID — Agency for International Development
ALCM — air-launched cruise missile
Amb. — Ambassador
ANZUS — Australia–New Zealand–United States Treaty Organization
ASAT — antisatellite (missile system)
ASEAN — Association of South East Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand)
AWACS — airborne warning and control system
BMD — ballistic missile defense
BW — biological weapons/warfare
BWC — biological weapons convention
C.1 — First Committee of the General Assembly[1]
C^3 — Command, Control, and Communications ("see-cubed")
CAMDS — Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System
CBM — confidence-building measure
CBO — Congressional Budget Office
CCD — Conference of the Committee on Disarmament[1,2]
CD — Committee on Disarmament[1,3]
CDE — Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe)
CINCPAC — Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces (U.S.)
Con. — Concurrent
COPUOS — Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space[1]
CPD — Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
CPSU — Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CR — credit
CSB — closely spaced basing
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB — comprehensive test ban (comprehensive ban on tests)
CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty
CW — chemical weapons/warfare
DCL — Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line")
DE — directed energy
DEC — Digital Equipment Corporation
DOD — Department of Defense
DOE — Department of Energy
ELF — extremely low frequency
ENDC — Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee[1,4]
ENMOD — Environmental Modification (for hostile purposes)
ER — enhanced radiation
ER/RB — enhanced radiation/reduced blast
EURATOM — European Atomic Energy Community
FAO — Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FBIS — Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FMS — foreign military sales
FRG — Federal Republic of Germany
FTE — full-time equivalent
FY — Fiscal Year
FYDP — Five-Year Defense Program
G.A., GA — General Assembly of the United Nations
GAO — General Accounting Office
GDR — German Democratic Republic
GLCM — ground-launched cruise missile
GNP — gross national product
GPO — Government Printing Office
GSA — General Services Administration

Footnotes at end of list.

GSE — *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts
GTS — Global Telecommunication System
GWU — George Washington University
H. — House of Representatives
HEL — high energy lasers
HEU — highly enriched uranium
H.J. Res. — House Joint Resolution
H.R. — House of Representatives
IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile
ICP — International Comparison Project
INF — intermediate-range nuclear force(s)
INS — Immigration and Naturalization Service
IPEN — Brazilian Nuclear and Energy Research Institute
IRBM — intermediate-range ballistic missile
IRNF — intermediate-range nuclear force(s)
JCS — Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMCL — Joint Military Communications Link
KAL — Korean Air Line
LRINF — longer-range intermediate-range nuclear force(s)
MaRV, MARV — maneuvering reentry vehicle
MBFR — Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe)
MCL — Military Communications Link
MFN — most favored nation
MILSTAR — military satellite communications system
MIRV — multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles
MIT — Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MP — military police
MPS — multiple protective shelters
MX — missile experimental
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSTAR — navigation satellite timing and ranging
NBC — nuclear/biological/chemical
NNPA — Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (of 1978)
NOTAM — Notices to Airmen and Mariners
NPG — Nuclear Planning Group of NATO
NPT — Non-Proliferation Treaty (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)
NRC — Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSC — National Security Council
NSDD — National Security Decision Directive
NTB — nuclear test ban
NTM — national technical means of verification
OA — Operations Analysis, Office of (ACDA)
OAS — Organization of American States
OEO — Office of Economic Opportunity
OMB — Office of Management and Budget
OPANAL — Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (*Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latine*)
OPM — Office of Personnel Management
OR — Official Record
OTA — Office of Technology Assessment
P-II — Pershing II (missile)
PB — particle beam
P.L. — Public Law
PNE — peaceful nuclear explosion/explosive
PPP — purchasing power parties
PPT — parts per thousand
PRC — People's Republic of China
prt — print
pt — part
PTBT — partial test ban treaty
PV — verbatim record (*procès verbale*)
RAPS — Rajasthan Atomic Power Station
R&D — research and development
RDT&E — research development, test, and evaluation
RECOVER — REmote COntinual VERification
RERTR — reduced enrichment in research and test reactors

Footnotes at end of list.

res. — resolution
ret. — retired
RME — reduction of military expenditures
RW — radiological weapon(s)
/S-10/ — Tenth Special Session [1]
SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SALT I — agreements concluded at the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1972 [5]
SALT II — agreements concluded at the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1979 [6]
SAM — surface-to-air missile
SCC — Standing Consultative Commission
SCG — Special Consultative group
SIPRI — Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
S.J. — Senate Joint (resolution, etc.)
SLBM — submarine/sea-launched ballistic missile
SLCM — submarine/sea-launched cruise missile
SMS — Strategic Missile Squadron
SRAM — short-range attack missile
SS — surface-to-surface missile
SSBN — submarine ballistic nuclear (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine)
SSOD — Special Session (of the General Assembly) on Disarmament
START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TCDD — tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin
TIAS — Treaties and Other International Acts Series
TTB — Threshold Test Ban (Treaty)
U.K. — United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
U.N., UN — United Nations
UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNEP — United Nations Environment Program
UNESCO — United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR — United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
U.S., US — United States
USA — United States of America; United States Army
U.S.C. — United States Code
USRA — U.S. Railway Association
USSR — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST — United States Treaties series
WHO — World Health Organization
WMEAT — World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
WMO — World Meteorological Organization

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[1] Abbreviation used in documents of United Nations organs or international conferences serviced by the United Nations Secretariat.

[2] Title changed from Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in 1969 with addition of eight new members.

[3] Replaced Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1979.

[4] With addition of the eight new members in 1969, title changed to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

[5] For texts, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

[6] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

LIST OF CONFERENCES AND ORGANIZATIONS

United Nations and Affiliates

Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

Established as a 15-member body by General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII) of Dec. 15, 1972 to further the objectives of the declaration set forth in resolution 2832 (XXVI) of Dec. 16, 1971 and extended in succeeding years by General Assembly resolutions. Resolution 37/96 of Dec. 13, 1982 renewed its mandate and requested it to hold three or four 2-week sessions in 1983. *Three sessions in 1983:* Jan. 31–Feb. 9, Apr. 11–22, July 11–22, at U.N. Headquarters in New York. *Membership* enlarged progressively, as follows: 3 new members appointed by the President of the General Assembly in accordance with resolutions 3259 B (XXIX) of Dec. 9, 1974; 5 in accordance with 32/86 of Dec. 12, 1977; and, in accordance with 34/80 B of Dec. 11, 1979, 22 in 1980, 1 in 1981, and 1 in 1982. *Chairman:* Sri Lanka (Fonseka). *Rapporteur:* Madagascar (Tahindro).

Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference

Established by General Assembly resolution 3183 (XXVIII) of Dec. 18, 1983 as a 40-member non-nuclear weapons group appointed by the President of the General Assembly. Convened in 1983 by resolution 37/97 of Dec. 13, 1982. *Two sessions in 1983:* Apr. 4–7 (three meetings); July 5–8 (4 meetings). *Chairman:* Sri Lanka (Fonseka). *Vice Chairman:* Peru (1st sess.), Poland, Spain. *Non-member participant:* USSR.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Established in 1978 pursuant to paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly [1] and functioned until 1981, when terms of members' appointments expired. Revived by General Assembly resolution 37/99 K-III of Dec. 13, 1982. *Eighth session in 1983:* Sept. 6–13, U.N. Headquarters, New York. *Membership:* Representatives of 22 member states appointed by the Secretary-General, as follows: Algeria (Azzout), Argentina (Ortiz de Rozas), Cameroon (Mboumoua), China (Liang), Cuba (Tabares del Real), Egypt (El-Shafei), France (Faure), FRG (Ruth), GDR (Mueller), India (Rasgotra), Japan (Matsui), Mexico (García Robles), Nigeria (Adeniji), Norway (Vaernö), Pakistan (Shahi), Poland (Strulak), Romania (Ene), Sri Lanka (Hameed), U.K. (Mason), U.S. (Dougherty), USSR (Bykov), Yugoslavia (Golob).

Committee on Disarmament (CD)

Established in 1978 by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session to replace the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Organized along lines set out in paragraph 120 of Final Document of that session.[1] *Two sessions in 1983:* Feb. 1–Apr. 29, June 14–Aug. 30 (50 formal plenary meetings, 27 informal meetings), in Geneva. *Membership:* The 5 nuclear-weapon states (China,[2] France,[3] U.K., U.S., USSR) and 35 non-nuclear-weapon states, as follows: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt,

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Footnotes at end of list.

Ethiopia, FRG, GDR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire. *Ad Hoc* Working Groups: On *Radiological Weapons*—six meetings in 1983: Apr. 8–29, June 13–Aug. 17. *Chairman:* Sweden (Lidgard). On the *Comprehensive Program of Disarmament*—12 meetings between Feb. 16 and Aug. 19. *Chairman:* Mexico (García Robles). Non-member participants: Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portgual, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey. On *Chemical Weapons*— 23 meetings: Apr. 6–Aug. 22. National experts included in the delegations, June 22–July 22. *Chairman:* Canada (McPhail). Non-member participants: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Vietnam. *On Effective International Arrangements To Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons*—9 meetings: Apr. 26–29, June 16–Aug. 22. *Chairman:* Pakistan (Ahmad). Non-member participants: Austria, Finland, Norway.

Disarmament Commission (DC)

Established as a deliberative body and subsidiary organ of the U.N. General Assembly by the Final Act of the Tenth Special Session (par. 118),[1] to succeed original Disarmament Commission established by resolution 502 (VI) of Jan. 11, 1952. Continuation of its work mandated by resolution 37/78 H of Dec. 9, 1982. *Organizational session in 1982* (2 meetings): Dec. 13–15, U.N. Headquarters, New York. *One substantive session in 1983* (6 plenary, 7 informal, meetings): May 9–June 3, U.N. Headquarters. *Membership* (158): All states members of the United Nations. *Chairman:* Brazil (Souza e Silva). *Vice-Chairmen* (7): Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, FRG, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Tunisia. *Rapporteur:* Syria.

Department for Disarmament Affairs

Successor to the Center for Disarmament of the United Nations Secretariat, which was transformed by General Assembly resolution 37/99 K–V of Dec. 13, 1982 into a Department for Disarmament Affairs "appropriately stengthened with the existing overall resources of the United Nations" and "headed by an Under Secretary General." In accordance with the resolution it is organized so as to reflect the "principle of equitable geographical distribution."

Group of Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons

Established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 137/98 D of Dec. 13, 1982 and mandated by par. 7 to devise procedures for investigation of information on activities that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or relevant rules of customary international law. *Two sessions in 1983:* May 9–20, Aug. 22–Sept. 2, New York. *Participants* (7): Ahlberg (Sweden), Bretton (France), Ezz (Egypt), Flowerree (U.S.), Machata (Austria), Segarra (Ecuador), Sur (France).

Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament Relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces

Established in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 35/156 A of Dec. 12, 1980 and 36/97 A of Dec. 9, 1981. Five substantive sessions beginning July 12, 1982. *Chairman:* Mellbin (Denmark).

Group of Experts on the Consequences of the Israeli Armed Attack Against the Iraqi Nuclear Installations

Appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to par. 8 of General Assembly resolution 37/18 of Nov. 16, 1982. *Two sessions in 1983:* Apr. 18–22, Vienna; July 11–

Footnotes at end of list.

15, New York. *Participants:* Lindell (Sweden), Osredkar (Yugoslavia), Titkov (USSR), Vaidya (India), Van Doren (U.S.), Akinyemi (Nigeria). *Chairman:* Akinyemi.

Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets

Appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 37/95 B of Dec. 13, 1982, to undertake task of constructing price indices and purchasing power parities for military expenditures of participating states. *Two sessions in 1983 (26 formal meetings):* Mar. 7–11, Aug. 8–19, U.N. Headquarters, New York. *Participants:* Parwoto (Indonesia), Caporaso (Italy), Odeka (Nigeria), Encinas del Pando (Peru), Mateescu (Romania), Cars (Sweden), Gallik (U.S.). *Chairman:* Cars.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Board of Governors: Feb. 22, 25; June 7, 10; Oct. 6, 7, 15.
General Conference: Oct. 10–14.
Membership: 111 (Namibia, Feb. 17).
Director General: Blix (Sweden).

Preparatory Committee for a Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [4]

Convened pursuant to the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, which stipulated that a further review conference be convened not later than 1984 [1], and General Assembly resolution 37/99 H of Dec. 13, 1982. *Two sessions in 1983:* May 2–6 and Sept. 12–23, in Geneva. *Chairman:* Norway (Huslid).

United Nations General Assembly

Thirty-eighth regular session: Sept. 20–Dec. 20.
Resumed thirty-eighth regular session: Sept. 17, 1984.
Membership: 159.
Secretary-General: Pérez de Cuéllar.
President, General Assembly: Panama (Illeuca).
Chairman, First Committee: Norway (Vraalsen).

Other Multilateral Organizations and Meetings

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)

Established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).[5] *General Conference* meets in regular session every 2 years (since 1969). *Eighth regular session in 1983:* May 16–19, Jamaica. *Participants:* Members—Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. Non-members—participants included U.K. and U.S. *General Secretary:* Ecuador (Cobo).

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Meetings held originally during July 1973–July 1975 in Helsinki and Geneva. Final Act issued Aug. 1, 1975.[6] First Review Conference: Oct. 1977–Mar. 1978, Belgrade. Second Review Conference: Nov. 11, 1980–Sept. 9, 1983, Madrid. Participants: 35 states, including U.S. *U.S. delegation head:* Kampelman.

Contadora Group

Organized in 1983 by four Central American Foreign Ministers at Isla Contadora, Republic of Panama, for the purpose of achieving peace in Central America. *At least*

Footnotes at end of list.

4 sessions in 1983 (11 meetings, not all meetings reported): Jan. 8–9, Contadora; May 11–12, Panama City; July 17, Cancún; Oct. 21–22, Panama City. *Visit to 5 directly-concerned Central American countries:* Apr. 12–13. *Joint meetings with the 5:* Apr. 20–21, May 28–30, July 28–30, Sept. 7–9, Panama City. *Members:* Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela. *Directly-concerned countries:* Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua.

International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War

Jan. 13–20, 1983, Ho Chi Minh City. *Participants:* 160 scientists and experts from 21 countries and observers from FAO, UNEP, and UNESCO. Discussed long-term effects of herbicides and defoliants used by the United States armed forces during the second Indochina war, 1961–75.

Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers

Fourteenth Conference held in 1983: Dec. 6–11, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks—MBFR (Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures)

Negotiations began with preparatory talks and one round of talks beginning in Oct. 1973; three rounds of talks held in Vienna annually since then. *29th–31st rounds in 1983:* Jan. 24–Mar. 31, May 19–July 21, Sept. 29–Dec. 15. *Regular participants:* NATO—Belgium, Canada, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., U.S.; Warsaw Pact—Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, USSR. *Special status participants:* Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania, Turkey. *U.S. delegation head:* Staar (until Mar.); Abramowitz.

Non-Aligned Countries

Special Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau
One session in 1983: Jan. 10–14, Managua, Nicaragua.
Conference of Foreign Ministers
One session in 1983: Mar. 3–5, New Delhi, India.
Conference of Heads of State or Government
Seventh conference in 1983: Mar. 7–12, New Delhi, India.
Participants: 99 countries, 2 national liberation groups.
Observers and guests: A number of countries and national liberation groups; guests included U.N.-affiliated organizations, e.g., UNESCO, WHO.
Heads of Delegations to the Thirty-eighth Session of the U.N. General Assembly
One session in 1983: Oct. 4–7, in New York.

South Pacific Forum

Fourteenth South Pacific Forum in 1983: Aug. 29–30, in Canberra.

U.S.-Soviet Talks

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (INF)

Announced on Sept. 23, 1981 by Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko after consultations at the U.N. General Assembly. Three sessions in 1982: Jan.–Mar., May–July, Sept.–Nov., in Geneva. *Three sessions in 1983:* Jan. 27–Mar. 29, May 17–July 14, Sept. 6–Nov. 23.[7] *U.S. delegation: Chief:* Amb. Nitze; Deputy Chief—Glitman. *Soviet delegation: Chief*—Kvitsinskiy; Deputy Chief—Detinov.

Footnotes at end of list.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Consultations

First round in series, Dec. 15–17, 1982, Washington D.C. *Second round in 1983:* June 14–16, Moscow. *U.S. team leaders:* Kennedy, Hartman; *Soviet:* Morozov (1st round); Petrovsky.

Standing Consultative Commission

Joint U.S.-USSR body established pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding of Dec. 21, 1982 [8] for the purpose of promoting the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the SALT I agreements [9] and of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War.[10] *Two sessions in 1983:* XXIV—Mar. 16–May 13; XXV—Sept. 22–Dec. 19, in Geneva. *Commissioners:* U.S.—Ellis; USSR—Starodubov.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

Announced jointly by the United States on May 31, 1982. Two rounds in 1982: June 29–Aug. 13, Oct. 6–Dec. 1, in Geneva. *Three rounds in 1983:* Round III—Feb. 2–Mar. 31. Round IV—June 8–Aug. 2. Round V—Oct. 6–Dec. 8. Adjourned *sine die.* *U.S. delegation leader:* Rowny; *Soviet:* Karpov.

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[1] The Final Document may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 411 ff.

[2] China took its seat for the first time in Feb. 1980.

[3] France was a member of both precursor bodies, the ENDC and the CCD, but it took no part in either. It took its seat for the first time in Feb. 1979.

[4] The text of the treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1971,* pp. 7–11.

[5] The text may be found *ibid., 1967,* pp. 69–83.

[6] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found *ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–308; for the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin,* Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[7] The Soviet delegation walked out of the negotiations when the United States began deploying Pershing IIs in Europe.

[8] The memorandum may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 868–869.

[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 197 ff.

[10] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 634–635.

Executive Order 12400: President's Commission on Strategic Forces, January 3, 1983 [1]

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, and in order to establish, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended [5 U.S.C. App. I], an advisory committee on strategic forces, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. *Establishment.* (a) There is established the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. The Commission shall be composed of no more than 15 members appointed or designated by the President. These members shall have particular knowledge and expertise concerning the national security, strategic forces, or foreign relations of the United States.

(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from among the members of the Commission.

Sec. 2. *Functions.* (a) The Commission shall review the strategic modernization program for United States forces, with particular reference to the intercontinental ballistic missile system and basing alternatives for that system, and provide appropriate advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense.

(b) The Commission shall report to the President by February 18, 1983.

Sec. 3. *Administration.* (a) The heads of Executive agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Commission such information as it may require for purposes of carrying out its functions. Information supplied to or developed by the Commission shall not, to the extent permitted by law, be available for public inspection.

(b) Members of the Commission shall serve without compensation for their work on the Commission. However, members appointed from among private citizens of the United States may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the government service [5 U.S.C. 5701–5707], to the extent funds are available therefor.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Commission with such administrative services, facilities, staff and other support services as may be necessary. Any expenses of the Commission shall be paid from such funds as may be available to the Secretary of Defense.

Sec. 4. *General.* (a) Notwithstanding any other Executive Order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act,

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[1] *Code of Federal Regulations, 1983 Compilation, Title 3—The President,* pts. 100 and 101, pp. 147–148.

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as amended, except that of reporting to the Congress, which are applicable to the Commission, shall be performed by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

(b) The Commission shall terminate 30 days after the report, unless sooner extended.

RONALD REAGAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 3, 1983.

Warsaw Pact Communique, January 5, 1983 [1]

The highest representatives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, who met in Prague on January 4–5, 1983, for a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, jointly reviewed the situation in Europe against the background of the emerging complex international situation and exchanged opinions on some other international issues.

Guiding themselves by an awareness of high responsibility for the preservation and strengthening of universal peace and security and for carrying on the process of the relaxation of tension, they believe it necessary to state the following:

I.

The states represented at the present meeting drew the attention of all the countries and peoples by the Moscow (1978) [2] and Warsaw (1980) [3] Declarations of the Political Consultative Committee to the enhanced threat to peace and to the need to counter the aggravation of the international situation. Today they point out with concern that, as a consequence of the further activisation of the aggressive forces, world developments are acquiring an even more dangerous character.

The circles which would like to undermine the only sensible basis of relations between states with different social systems, peaceful coexistence, are increasingly persistent in asserting themselves. The tangible progress in improving international relations which began to influence the general development of world affairs during the 1970s has now been jeopardized. Much harm is being done to the tendency towards the relaxation of tension, which has yielded positive results for the peoples. Cooperation is being replaced by confrontation, attempts are being made to subvert the peaceful foundations of state-to-state relations, and the development of political contacts and mutually beneficial economic and cultural relations between states is called in question. The arms race is evolving into a qualitatively new and far more dangerous phase embracing all the types of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, all the types of military activity and virtually all the parts of the world.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Jan. 6, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Jan. 6, 1983, vol. III, pp. BB3–BB16.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 657–665.

[3] *Ibid., 1980*, pp. 222–230.

Long-term seats of tension come to life and new conflicts and crisis situations flare up. The efforts of the peace-loving states to find solutions to contentious problems, both on a world and on a regional scale, through equal talks between the parties concerned are being blocked and ever more unresolved international problems are piling up. The imperialist circles are pursuing a policy of strength, pressure, diktat, intervention in internal affairs and encroachment of national independence and the sovereignty of states, and seek to consolidate or recarve their "spheres of influence". They try to turn to their benefit any frictions and complications arising in relations among states, any difficulties which may beset different peoples.

Obstacles are being raised in the way of the normal development of economic, scientific and technical cooperation and economic "sanctions" and embargoes are used as a tool of politics, which makes it even more difficult to resolve the existing economic problems. The imperialist circles are trying to shift the burden of the economic crisis onto the shoulders of the peoples, including those in the developing countries. Huge military spending is becoming an even heavier burden for the peoples, regardless of the economic development levels of different countries, and slows down economic and social progress.

At the close of the 20th century mankind has been faced acutely with global problems of a social, economic, demographic and ecological character. The present-day level of the development of the productive forces, science and technology in the world is ensuring adequate material and intellectual resources for setting about practically resolving these immense problems. However, the development of international cooperation for these purposes is hampered by the forces of reaction, trying to perpetuate the backwardness of whole continents, to divide states and to set some of them in opposition to others.

The situation as a whole is thus becoming increasingly complex, international tension is escalating and the threat of war, primarily of nuclear war, is growing.

As a counter to this dangerous development of events, there is an increasingly persevering and firm resolve of the peoples, of all the progressive and peace-loving forces to put an end to the policy of strength and confrontation and to ensure the preservation of peace, the strengthening of international security, the assertion in relations among states of the principles of respect for national independence and sovereignty, inviolability of the borders, non-intervention in internal affairs, renunciation of the use or threat of force, equality, the right of the peoples to be masters of their destinies, and other commonly recognized principles.

The states represented at the conference are therefore convinced that however complex the world situation may be, there exist possibilities for overcoming the dangerous stage of international relations. The present course of development must and can be stopped and redirected in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples.

It is for the sake of this that the socialist countries, whose adherence to peace is intrinsic to the very nature of their social system, are putting on the scales of peace all their international prestige and political and economic potential.

The Non-Aligned Movement is an important factor contributing to improving the international situation. A number of other countries are also opposed to the deterioration of the international climate.

Political parties, organizations and movements of different ideological persuasions in the West and East, North and South are raising their voice against the arms race and the incitement of armed conflicts. Millions of ordinary people on all continents stage massive anti-war demonstrations to express their desire for peace.

The forces of peace are stronger than the forces of war. Everything depends on their cohesion and the purposefulness of their actions.

Relying on an analysis of the international situation, the states represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee offer an alternative to nuclear catastrophe and call for large-scale international cooperation to preserve civilization and life on earth.

II.

The task of curbing the arms race and going over to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is central to the struggle for averting war.

The American programmes for the development and production of nuclear weapons which have been approved in the recent period and which are already being carried out and also the development of weapons based on the latest scientific achievements and discoveries, including systems and means for waging war in and from space, are called upon to multiply manifold the deadly power of the U.S. military arsenal, including in Europe. This policy of an arms build-up, pursued by the United States and some of its allies to achieve military superiority, is leading to the frustration of international stability.

The drawing up of new arms build-up programmes by them is inseparable from the escalation of the strategic concepts and doctrines, such as those of the "first disarming nuclear strike", "limited nuclear war", "protracted nuclear conflict" and others. All these aggressive doctrines, which jeopardize peace, are based on the assumption that it is possible to win a nuclear war through the first use of nuclear weapons.

The states represented at the meeting stress most forcefully that any hope to unleash a nuclear war and to win it is nonsensical. There can be no winners in a nuclear war once it breaks out. It is bound to lead to the annihilation of whole peoples, to colossal destruction and to catastrophic consequences for civilization and for life on earth as a whole.

Military policy based on such hopes insuperably entails other very dangerous consequences.

First, the development and deployment of ever new systems of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction will even further loosen the stability of the military-strategic situation, escalate international tension and complicate relations among states.

Second, fresh escalation of the arms race contravenes the aim of maintaining military-strategic parity at ever lower levels—a goal of the Warsaw Treaty member states, which are opposed to military rivalry. The implementation of the above-mentioned arms build-up programmes will lead to higher levels of military confrontation. Peace will become less stable and more fragile.

Third, another round of the arms race will make nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction even more sophisticated. In this way the difficulties involved in drafting international agreements to limit and reduce them will grow considerably. For this reason the states represented at the meeting believe that it is necessary to act without delay, while there still is a possibility to curb the arms race and to go over to disarmament. They proceed here from the assumption that all the states, if they care for the destinies of their peoples and mankind at large, should have an objective interest in preventing a slide to war.

It is necessary first and foremost that the states, particularly nuclear powers, should display political will and readiness for cooperation. It is necessary that their military policies should proceed exclusively from defensive purposes and reckon with the legitimate security interests of all the states. They should not make it more complex to reach agreements leading to effective reductions in the armed forces and armaments with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

In this connection the participants in the meeting expect that after the Soviet Union unilaterally adopted the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, all the nuclear powers which have not yet done so will do the same.

In the present-day complex international situation it is particularly necessary to break the deadlock over the cause of real limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments. In this connection the participants in the meeting call for the resolute activisation of the ongoing talks and for the resumption of the interrupted talks on the entire range of questions of ending the arms race, for persevering and patient work to reach agreements on reduction and elimination of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. They support and welcome the proposals of the Soviet Union on ending the arms race and promoting disarmament.

The states represented at the meeting attach much importance to the achievement of success at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

The participants in the meeting believe that agreement between major military powers on stopping the build-up of their armed forces and armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, would become a major step towards ending the arms race. In this connection they note with satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of states and ever broader sections of the world public are advocating a freeze on nuclear arsenals today. A mutual quantitative freeze on the strategic arms of the USSR and the USA and the maximum possible restrictions on their modernisation could become one of the more tangible embodiments of this idea.

The states represented at the meeting resolutely advocate, furthermore, the drafting of a programme of stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament and, within its framework, of agreements to end the development and production of new systems of nuclear weapons, the production of fissionable materials to develop different types of these weapons, and the production of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. All this would create conditions for progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

They also believe it necessary to speed up the achievements of agreements on a number of concrete questions and in this connection call upon all the states to give a fresh impetus to talks, including those within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Committee, with a view to:

Drafting in the shortest possible time a treaty on the complete and universal prohibition of nuclear weapons tests;

Speeding up the drafting of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons;

Going over to the drafting of a convention to ban neutron weapons;

Beginning talks without delay on prohibiting the deployment of weapons of any type in outer space;

Finalising as soon as possible an international convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons;

Speeding up the solution of the question of strengthening security guarantees to non-nuclear states.

Continuing to attach much importance to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the participants in the meeting welcome the recent increase of the number of states which are parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons[4] and express the hope that the other countries, which have not yet joined it, will do so in the near future. They speak in favour of achieving an international agreement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in those countries which do not have them at the moment and on the non-buildup of these weapons in those countries in which they have already been deployed.

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[4] Printed *ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

They believe that the drafting of measures to ensure the safe development of nuclear power engineering and to prevent attacks on civilian nuclear projects with the use of any means would help to strengthen universal security and at the same time to extend international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear power.

In view of the continuous improvement of conventional weapons, which are becoming ever more formidable, it is necessary to make fresh efforts to substantially lower the present levels of conventional arms and armed forces both on a global scale and in individual regions and to conduct relevant talks for this purpose. It is also useful to resume talks on limiting the sales and supplies of conventional weapons.

In view of the growing role of navies, the participants in the meeting are in favour of beginning talks on limiting naval activities and limiting and reducing naval armaments, and also on extending confidence-building measures to the areas of seas and oceans. They advocate the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean and the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of the non-nuclear Mediterranean countries.

The participants in the meeting also reiterate their invariable position in favour of fresh efforts on an international scale for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories.

The states represented at the meeting proceed from the assumption that any agreements on reducing armaments and on disarmament should provide for proper measures to verify their implementation, including, when necessary, international procedures.

Bearing in mind that the growing military spending is directly related to the escalation of the arms race, the participants in the meeting urge the NATO countries to reach practical agreement on non-escalating military spending and on its subsequent reduction both in per cent and in absolute values. Agreement on this problem should, of course, embrace all the states having major military potentials.

The resources released as a result of cutbacks in military spending would be used to promote economic and social developments, in particular, to assist the developing countries in this field.

The participants in the meeting make a reminder that the proposals of their states on the non-escalation and substantial reduction of military spending, made jointly or individually, remain in force. They suggest that direct talks between the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the NATO member states begin without delay.

In the light of the existing situation the highest representatives of the states which have adopted the present political declaration state: There is no more important task for the peoples today than that of preserving peace and ending the arms race. It is the duty of all the governments, all the statesmen formulating the policies of their countries, to accomplish it.

III.

The strengthening of security in Europe is a major component of the task of removing the threat of war and strengthening universal peace. This is so first and foremost because vast quantities of arms, both nuclear and conventional, are concentrated on the European Continent and because the armed forces of the two military alliances are in direct contact there.

At the same time a foundation has been created in Europe by the joint efforts of states for the consistent development of relations of good neighbourliness and cooperation among them, mutual respect and trust. All the European states have learned from their own experience the benefits offered by detente. There are among them no states whose interests would not be promoted by the preservation and advancement of the achievements of detente.

In this context the participants in the meeting make a reminder of the significance which is attached to the strict observance of the treaties and agreements determining the territorial-political realities of present-day Europe. They particularly stress the importance of the jointly formulated and thoroughly agreed principles and clauses of the Helsinki Final Act, which should be strictly respected and consistently translated into reality.

Analysing the situation taking shape in Europe at present, the participants in the meeting have drawn attention to the most serious threat posed to the European nations by the intention of the NATO bloc to implement its decision to deploy new American medium-range missiles in a number of West European countries,[5] the decision reiterated in December 1982.[6] The implementation of this decision is bound to diminish trust and worsen the situation on the European Continent.

For their part the states represented at the meeting consider it a key task to prevent the emergence of another round of the nuclear arms race in Europe and to achieve the reduction and limitation of armaments. This is important to strengthen European security, to ensure the positive development of state-to-state relations on the continent and to improve the entire international situation.

The Warsaw Treaty member countries believe that the best solution would be to completely rid Europe from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical ones. They proceed from the assumption that if this truly "zero" decision cannot be reached at the moment, it is feasible to take the way of the radical reduction of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. In this respect the importance of the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe is very great. The meeting noted the contribution made by the Soviet Union in its proposals made public in Moscow on December 21, 1982.[7]

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[5] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

[6] *Ibid., 1982,* p. 922.

These talks, however, are taking place at a time when the NATO countries state their intention to begin as early as the end of 1983 to deploy new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe if agreement is not reached at the talks by that time. Given such an approach, which is equivalent to fixing an artificial deadline for the talks, it will be enough for its proponents to continue to procrastinate them so as to use the lack of agreement as a pretext to begin the actual deployment of American missiles.

The participants in this meeting believe it absolutely important for the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe to be conducted in a constructive spirit and for utmost efforts to be made to achieve concrete agreements at them as soon as possible. It is necessary for the success of the talks that no action should be taken that could complicate them but that, conversely, steps should be taken to contribute to the creation of a favourable atmosphere for their progress.

In view of the vital importance of the reduction and limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe for all the European peoples, the participants in the meeting express the hope that all the European states will contribute to progress at the Soviet-American talks on this matter and to their successful completion.

The participants in the meeting advocate the ridding of Europe from another type of weapon of mass destruction, chemical weapons. Their states are prepared to examine together with other interested states all the possible ways and means leading to the solution of this problem and to enter appropriate negotiations.

Resolutely advocating radical reductions in the nuclear arsenals in Europe and the ridding of Europe from chemical weapons, the states represented at the meeting also note the danger created for European peace by the concentration of vast quantities of conventional weapons on the continent. This danger will grow considerably if the plans for the build-up of the latest types of such weapons in Western Europe are carried out, thus further whipping up the arms race.

They speak anew in favour of the reduction of the armed forces and armaments in central Europe and believe it particularly necessary to advance the Vienna talks, which have lasted for many years now. It is the belief of the participants in the meeting that there is every condition for working out agreement at the Vienna talks as soon as possible, within not more than one or two years, and it is important that this should be done. They for their part will facilitate this in every way.

In this context the participants in the meeting advocate a practical step in reducing armed forces and armament by the Soviet Union and the United States in central Europe on the basis of reciprocity. Verification of the implementation of this step by representatives of both sides could be organized. Upon its completion the levels of the armed forces and armaments of the direct participants in the Vienna talks on both sides could be frozen until agreement is reached at the talks. The participants in the meeting proceed from the assumption that after the initial mutual reductions of the armed forces and armaments in central Europe the talks should be continued and progress should be made as soon as possible to further, large reductions.

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 917–922.

The states represented at the meeting speak in favour of proposals to establish nuclear-free zones in the north of Europe, in the Balkans and in other parts of the continent, and to turn the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation. They advocate appropriate talks on these questions.

The situation existing in Europe demands more than ever before the pooling of the efforts of states to consistently pursue a policy of detente, peace and disarmament. That is why the continuation and extension of the multilateral process initiated by the European Conference on Security and Cooperation is acquiring particular significance.

Proceeding from all this, the states represented at the meeting advocate the productive completion of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the states participating in the European conference with the adoption of a meaningful and well-balanced final document.

They attach particular importance to the achievement by the Madrid meeting of an agreement on convening a conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament in Europe, designed to make a major contribution towards lessening military confrontation, diminishing mistrust and resolving questions of reducing armed forces and armaments in that part of the world.

They consider it very important that the Madrid meeting should reiterate the determination of the states participating in it to respect and apply the principles of state-to-state relations approved in Helsinki, determine, in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Final Act,[8] measures to promote cooperation in the political, economic, humanitarian and other fields, and ensure the continuity of the general European process and its organizational framework, including the fixation of the date and venue of the next meeting of the representatives of the states participating in the European conference. They reiterate their position in favour of holding this meeting in Bucharest.

The success of the Madrid meeting would meet in equal measure, from the point of view of the present and the future, the interests of all the states participating in the European conference. That is why the decisions which the meeting should adopt can only be based on this reality and be acceptable to all.

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[8] The arms control portions of the Final Act are printed *ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–308; the entire act is in *Department of State Bulletin,* Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

The participants in the meeting declare that their states will continue, as before, to contribute in every way to the soonest possible completion of work to agree on the final document of the Madrid meeting. They expect a similarly constructive approach from the other participants in the meeting.

The states represented at the meeting are prepared to develop mutually beneficial contacts with all European states. In accordance with this, they advocate:

The continuation and extension of political dialogue and consultations at all levels and the broadest possible political intercourse. What is meant here also is the development of contacts on a bilateral and multilateral basis between parliaments, political parties, trade unions and youth, womens' and other organizations to promote peace and security in Europe;

The extension in every way of business cooperation in the trade, industrial, agricultural, scientific and technological fields without any discrimination, and confidence-building measures in economic relations. Truly boundless vistas are being opened here for cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;

The extension of the mutual spiritual enrichment of the European peoples, exchanges of artistic values, propagation of truthful and honest information and cultivation of sentiments of mutual friendliness and respect.

The states represented at the meeting share the position of the Polish People's Republic that any attempt at outside interference in questions lying solely within its competence runs counter to the commonly recognized norms of international relations and will continue to be firmly rebuffed. They strongly denounce the "sanctions" introduced by the United States and certain other Western countries against Poland. Polish internal affairs will continue, as before, to be decided solely by Poland. Socialist Poland can always count on the moral, political and economic support of the fraternal socialist countries.

In Europe, where states with different social systems have been coexisting for many decades now, only a policy of peaceful coexistence can be viable.

IV.

In exchanging opinions on other international issues, the delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic noted that the improvement of the world situation depended to a considerable extent on the elimination of the existing seats of armed conflicts and the prevention of the emergence of new ones in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions.

There are no problems, worldwide or regional, which could not be resolved fairly by peaceful means. The main thing is that everyone should recognize in practice the legitimate right of the people of every country to decide themselves, without outside interference, their internal affairs and to participate on the basis of equality in international affairs; that everyone should respect the independence and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders and respect the principle of the renunciation of the threat of use of force; that no power should try to pursue a policy of hegemony and establish "spheres of interests" or "spheres of influence".

It is the belief of the participants in the meeting that the removal of the causes of many conflicts necessitates the ultimate elimination of all the vestiges of colonialism and racism, renunciation of the policy of neocolonialism, oppression and exploitation of other peoples. This is confirmed with utmost clarity by the dangerous situation in southern Africa, where Namibia, illegitimately occupied by the South African racists, serves as a base for aggression against neighboring African countries. Fresh proof was supplied by the armed conflict in the South Atlantic in the spring of 1982.

The danger of local conflicts erupting into armed confrontation on a worldwide scale is connected to a large extent to attempts at the direct or indirect involvement of states in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania into military-political alliances and the spread of the sphere of activities of blocs to those countries. Reiterating that the Warsaw Treaty member states have no intention to extend the sphere of activity of their alliance the participants in the meeting call upon the NATO member countries to renounce the extention of the zone of action of their bloc to any part of the world, in particular the Persian Gulf.

A major contribution towards the elimination and prevention of crisis situations is being made by the Nonaligned Movement, the practical steps of which towards these goals deserve recognition and support from all the states. Such regional associations of states as the Organization of African Unity and the Arab League are also called upon to play a positive role in this respect.

The participants in the meeting believe that the initiatives of states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America aimed at establishing and promoting relations of good-neighbourliness and creating zones of peace and cooperation open a promising way to removing tension in various parts of those regions. The proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is particularly important. The resumption and successful completion of the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean would also play an important role. It is necessary to use political means to achieve solutions to problems existing in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, and to contribute towards stronger peace in Asia and the Pacific.

The participants in the meeting attach special importance to the task of resolving the most protracted and dangerous conflict, that in the

Middle East. They strongly denounce the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, and the barbarous massacre of the civilian population of West Beirut. Here Israel was encouraged to carry out its aggressive actions by those who were giving it outside assistance and support. The participants in the meeting demand an immediate and complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and the ensuring of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of that country.

They view positively the principles of the solution of the problem of settlement in the Middle East put forward by the conference of the Arab heads of state and government in Fes and express their conviction that a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East should provide: for the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including the eastern part of Jerusalem; for recognition of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to establish their own independent state; for ensuring the right of all the states in the region to a secure and independent existence and development; for termination of the state of war and establishment of peace between Arab states and Israel; for drafting and adoption of international guarantees for a peaceful settlement.

The accomplishment of these tasks calls for the convocation of an international conference with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine. The United Nations can and must play an important role here.

The states represented at the meeting advocate the cessation of the war between Iran and Iraq and the settlement of contentious problems between them through negotiations; the peaceful solution of the conflict between the countries of the Horn of Africa and other disputes in Africa on the basis of mutual respect for independence and territorial integrity; the solution of conflict situations in Central and South America by political means.

An end should be put to the policy of continuous threats and provocations against Cuba and Nicaragua and to any attempts at outside interference in their internal affairs.

The participants in the meeting positively appraise the initiation of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan through a personal envoy of the U.N. secretary general.

The eradication of underdevelopment, the gradual narrowing of the gap between economic development levels and provision of conditions for the harmonious growth of international contacts in the economic, scientific and technological fields constitute one of the basic factors of economic stability and the improvement of the international political climate.

In this context the participants in the meeting reiterate their position in favour of restructuring international economic relations on a fair and democratic basis, establishing a new international economic order, and ensuring the complete sovereignty of countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania over their natural resources. They speak in favour of the soonest possible beginning of global talks on major economic problems in accordance with U.N. resolutions.

The states participating in the meeting advocate a greater role for the United Nations in international affairs as an important forum for pooling the efforts of states to promote peace and international security and to contribute to the solution of urgent world problems.

The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee believe it necessary to reiterate their conviction that the preservation of universal peace today is inseparable from recognition of the equal rights of all the peoples and states. Peace can be firm only if it is just, with every state recognizing and respecting the legitimate rights and interests of all the others.

V.

The lessening of the threat of war is impossible without the creation of a climate of trust in relations between states. This requires, in addition to the development of political dialogue and the adoption of appropriate measures in the economic and military fields, the propagation of truthful information, renunciation of claims to the great-power status and the propagation of racism, chauvinism and national exclusiveness, of attempts to teach other peoples how to arrange their lives, and of professing violence and incitment of war psychosis.

The states participating in the meeting believe it fundamentally important to consistently observe the principles and clauses of the Helsinki Final Act relating to cooperation in the field of information so as to strengthen peace and mutual understanding among the peoples, and note the topicality of the 1978 UNESCO declaration on these matters. They strongly denounce the use of such a powerful tool of influencing human minds and shaping public opinion as the press, radio and television to propagate biased and downright slanderous news misrepresenting the situation in certain countries and their policies and fostering hostility and enmity. No state should allow such subversive activities to be conducted from its territory.

Manipulating the issue of human rights, the reactionary, imperialist forces are trying to conceal in this way their disregard for the basic rights of the working people and the vital interests of the peoples. In the recent period they have launched an extensive campaign against the socialist countries and the national liberation and other progressive movements with the purpose of justifying the policy of confrontation and the arms race, of encroachment of the independence of different states, of interference in their internal affairs, of complicating conditions for their economic development and of countering the policy of detente. This policy runs counter to the legitimate, commonly recognised rights of all the peoples and nations, primarily to their right to live.

The lessons of history are a reminder that anti-communism has always been a component of the onslaught on the democratic freedoms and rights of the peoples, and of the policy of aggression and war. The attempts to organise another anticommunist crusade result in the escalation of international tension, threatening the interests of all countries.

No one will succeed in subverting the socialist system with the help of misinformation and slander. Socialism has achieved outstanding successes in the economy and culture, in asserting equal rights and friendship of nations, in providing favourable conditions for the development of the individual, and ensures the involvement of the broad masses of the population in governing their countries and the constant development of democracy.

One of the major achievements of socialism was the formation of a new type of international relations based on voluntary and equal cooperation and internationalist solidarity of sovereign socialist states. The participants in the meeting, expressing the will of their communist parties and peoples, reiterate their resolve to continue to strengthen the cohesion of socialist countries, to develop and extend political, economic and cultural cooperation and to pool their efforts in the struggle for the cause of peace and progress.

They stressed the importance of extending economic and scientific and technical cooperation and collaboration between socialist countries on a long-term basis within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance so as to promote the economic and social development of each country, and to assist in the solution of economic problems that arise, in carrying out the programmes of building socialism and communism, and in raising the material, intellectual and cultural standards of life of their peoples. This will be a major contribution to cooperation among socialist countries in the economic field.

The states participating in the meeting stress that every people has the sovereign right to decide freely, without any outside interference, how to live and what social system to establish, just as it has the legitimate right to defend its choice.

Being aware of their responsibility for the cause of peace and international security, the socialist countries strictly separate in their policies ideological issues from problems of state-to-state relations, build their relations with capitalist states on the basis of peaceful coexistence, and consistently advocate large-scale cooperation with the developing countries. Cooperation among states regardless of their social systems meets the interests of all the peoples and the vital demand for stronger universal peace.

VI.

Given the entire multifaceted character of present-day international problems, prospects for the development of the situation in Europe and in the world at large depend to a very large extent on whether mistrust is removed and the level of confrontation lowered between the two largest military and political alliances, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO, which possess huge potentials, particularly in the field of nuclear weaponry. An armed conflict between them would have pernicious consequences for all the peoples.

The Warsaw Treaty member states have long been advocating the dissolution of both alliances, and as the first step, the dismantling of their military organizations. This proposal remains in force, and they reiterate their readiness to enter negotiations with the NATO member countries with a view to achieving an appropriate agreement, beginning with the question of scaling down military activities on a reciprocal basis.

The present-day tense situation, however, makes it impossible to wait any longer. There is a need for urgent effective measures which can already today lessen mistrust between the Warsaw Treaty member states and the NATO member states and diminish their fear of possible aggression.

The Warsaw Treaty member states do not seek military superiority over the NATO member states nor have any intention to attack them or any other country, in Europe or elsewhere. The NATO member states also declare that they have no aggressive intentions. In this situation there should be no reason preventing the adoption by the states comprising the two alliances appropriate mutual commitments of an international legal character. In the context of the present situation this would have a particularly beneficial effect on all the subsequent development of international events.

Proceeding from these considerations, the Warsaw Treaty member states, in the person of their highest representatives, address the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and on the maintenance of relations of peace.

The core of the treaty could be the mutual commitment of the member states of both alliances not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other and therefore not to be the first to use against each other any military force at all. This commitment could apply to the territories of all the other states joining the treaty, and also to their military and civilian personnel, sea-going, air and space craft and other objects belonging to them wherever they may be.

It seems proper to provide in the treaty for a similar commitment on the non-use of force by the member states of both alliances against third countries, whether those having bilateral relations of alliance with them, or nonaligned or neutral countries. Another substantial component of the treaty could be the commitment of the member states of both alliances not to jeopardise the safety of international sea, air and space communications passing through areas outside any national jurisdiction.

It seems desirable to complement in the treaty the commitment not to use military force by the commitment to conduct in the spirit of goodwill talks on effective measures to end the arms race, to limit and reduce armaments and to promote disarmament, or to contribute by other possible means to the success of such talks with a view to achieving at them practical results.

The same goal could be promoted by the commitment to examine jointly practical measures to avert the threat of a surprise attack and also to contribute to the development of mutual exchanges of military delegations and visits of naval ships and air force units.

It is important to combine the commitment not to use military force in the treaty also with provisions on strengthening the United Nations as a universal instrument of collective security. In this context it is useful to write into the treaty readiness to cooperate in enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations in performing, in accordance with its charter, tasks on the peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflict situations, on suppressing acts of aggression and on removing the threat to international peace and security.

The treaty between the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace would not, of course, limit the legitimate right of the participants in it to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. At the same time it would relieve the members of both alliances of the fears that the commitments of alliance within each of them can be used for aggressive purposes against the member states of the other alliance and that these commitments therefore pose a threat to their security.

Although the treaty of the mutual non-use of military force and maintenance of relations of peace is proposed to be concluded between the member states of the two military and political alliances, other interested European countries would have the right to participate in drafting it and to sign it.

The treaty would also be open from the outset for other willing states of the world to join as equal parties.

The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee are convinced that the conclusion of this treaty could help to overcome the division of Europe into confronting military groupings and meet the desire of the peoples to live in peace and security. They call upon the member states of the North Atlantic alliance to consider with utmost attention this new initiative and to respond to it in a constructive manner.

* * *

Having stated in the present political declaration their ideas of the ways and means of strengthening peace and preserving and extending the relaxation of international tension in the present-day conditions, the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty declare their readiness for dialogue and cooperation with all those who seek to achieve this great goal.

For the People's Republic of Bulgaria
TODOR ZHIVKOV
General secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

For the Hungarian People's Republic
JANOS KADAR
First secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

For the German Democratic Republic
ERICH HONECKER
General secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic

For the Polish People's Republic
WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI
First secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic

For the Socialist Republic of Romania
NICOLAE CEAUSESCU
General secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YURIY ANDROPOV
General secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
GUSTAV HUSAK
General secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Prague, January 5, 1983

Address by President Reagan: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union, January 8, 1983 [1]

Today I'd like to share with you some thoughts on one of the most important aspects of America's role in the world—our relations with the Soviet Union. Keeping the peace for both countries—for that matter, for all mankind, depends on our wise and steady management of this relationship.

As you know, a new leader has come to power in Moscow. There's been much speculation about whether this change could mean a chance to reduce tensions and solve some of the problems between us. No one hopes more than I do that the future will bring improvement in our relations with the Soviets and an era of genuine stability. What could be more important than reducing the danger of confrontation, increasing the prospects for enduring peace, lowering nuclear arsenals, relieving human suffering in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and elsewhere?

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 17, 1983, pp. 25–26.

With your support, this administration has embarked on an effort to restore our nation's strength, credibility, and clarity of purpose in the world. Our aim has been to ensure that America has the will and the means to deter conflict and to defend the interests of freedom. We've done this for one reason and one reason only—because a strong, respected America is the surest way to preserve the peace and prevent conflict.

In this effort, we must learn from history. We all experienced the soaring hopes and then plunging disappointment of the 1970's, when the Soviet response to our unilateral restraint was to accelerate their military buildup, to foment violence in the developing world, to invade neighboring Afghanistan, and to support the repression of Poland.

The lesson is inescapable. If there are to be better mutual relations, they must result from moderation in Soviet conduct, not just our own good intentions. In recent days, some encouraging words have come out of Moscow. Clearly the Soviets want to appear more responsive and reasonable. But moderate words are convincing only when they're matched by moderate behavior.

Now we must see whether they're genuinely interested in reducing existing tensions. We and our democratic partners eagerly await any serious actions and proposals the Soviets may offer and stand ready to discuss with them serious proposals which can genuinely advance the cause of peace.

We do not insist that the Soviet Union abandon its standing as a superpower or its legitimate national interests. In fact, we hope that the new leadership in Moscow will come to realize that Soviet interests would be improved by ending the bloodshed in Afghanistan, by showing restraint in the Middle East, by permitting reform and thus promoting stability in Poland, by ending their unequaled military buildup, as we have proposed, by reducing the most dangerous nuclear arms to much lower and equal levels.

We stand ready to work towards solutions to all outstanding problems. Now, this doesn't mean that we should neglect our own defenses. That would undercut our ability to maintain peace and jeopardize whatever chance we may have for changing Soviet conduct. But it does mean that we're always ready to sit down with the Soviets to discuss practical steps that could resolve problems and lead to a more durable and genuine improvement in East-West relations.

Next month, Soviet and American negotiators will resume talks in Geneva on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. We've proposed drastic cuts in those threatening intermediate-range forces. The

Soviets have responded in both negotiations with proposals of their own. So, a serious foundation for progress has been laid. America will negotiate energetically and in good faith to achieve early agreements providing for reduced and equal levels of forces. The Soviet leadership must understand that the way to reduce the nuclear threat is by negotiating in the same sincere spirit and not by trying to sow division between the American people and our NATO partners. That kind of negative tactic is certain to fail and can only delay real progress.

A cornerstone of our approach to relations with the Soviet Union is close consultation with our allies on common political and security issues. In this spirit, I've asked Vice President Bush to travel to Europe. Beginning at the end of this month, he will visit the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, France, and Great Britain, and at the Vatican he will meet with Pope John Paul II. In Switzerland the Vice President will meet with the negotiating teams for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, which we call START, and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces arms control talks we call INF and will attend a meeting of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

The Vice President's visit to these close friends and allies and his discussions at the Vatican and in Geneva underscore our fundamental commitment to peace and security in Europe and to genuine arms reductions.

So, the new year begins with reason for all of us to hope that if we continue to act firmly and wisely, 1983 can be a time of peaceful progress for America, for our allies, for the people of the U.S.S.R., and for the entire world.

Till next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you.

Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries Coordinating Bureau [Extract], January 14, 1983 [1]

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81. The Ministers observed the existence in Latin America of an area in which nuclear weapons are proscribed by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, [2] signed by 22 Latin-American states, but they considered that it would not be effective until conditions have been created to enable all Latin-American states to sign and ratify it and all nuclear powers respect it. The Ministers appealed to the states that have international responsibility over non-sovereign territories in the region to ratify the Addi-

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[1] A/38/106–S/15628, pp. 17–18. The meeting was held in Managua, Nicaragua.

[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

tional Protocol of the Treaty of Tlatelolco so that those territories may receive its benefits.

82. In this regard, the Ministers took note of the statements made by the Argentine Republic during the 37th session of the General Assembly on the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the region of the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands.[3]

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Interview of NATO Secretary General Luns: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, January 19, 1983[1]

Die Welt. What would be the consequences if the West allowed British and French nuclear weapons to be taken into account in the Geneva negotiations as Moscow demands, with the support of certain of our politicians?

Luns. The French and British nuclear weapons do not belong to NATO; they serve national purposes. The French quite clearly state that these weapons are only there to defend France, and they say as much in NATO . . . If they were included, it would lead to the decoupling of the United States from Europe. The Soviets have repeatedly tried with all the means at their disposal to bring about such a withdrawal. They wish to establish a hegemony in Europe. However, even worse things could happen.

Die Welt. What do you mean by that?

Luns. Then there would be the danger of war, war being the extension of politics by other means, as Clausewitz said. In such a case, it is foreseeable that there would be a war. But there are no winners in nuclear war, and the Soviets know that.

Die Welt. So if the USA disengaged from Europe, and the Soviets only had the French and British nuclear weapons to deal with, then they might think that a nuclear war could be limited to Europe?

Luns. Yes, of course.

Die Welt. President Mitterrand of France has categorically stated his support for the stationing of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, should the Geneva negotiations not bring about any result. There is no doubt that the Federal Republic of Germany has a key role to play here. Must we fear for Franco-German relations if Germany refuses the stationing of these weapons?

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[3] A/C.1/37/PV.7, Oct. 21, 1982, pp. 54–56; A/C.1/37/PV.43, Nov. 24, 1982, p. 76.

[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 6 (Feb. 1983), p. 2. The interview was conducted by Cay Brockdorff and was published in the Jan. 19, 1983, issue of *Die Welt*. The version printed here is as it was extracted in *NATO Review*.

Luns. Germany also has a key role to play as regards the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and the whole of NATO. As far as France is concerned, I do not think that the French would be very happy if that happened. But the French government would be the best judge of the consequences.

Die Welt. Assuming it became necessary to deploy these weapons and the Germans refused, would that change the face of Europe?

Luns. I am certain of it. I will go further; if that happened, then for the first time I would be seriously worried about NATO. The Americans would say that Europe obviously did not wish to defend itself, and would draw their own conclusions.

Die Welt. So you foresee the danger of NATO disintegrating in such circumstances?

Luns. I think that is a real danger.

Die Welt. There is a lively debate about nuclear deterrence going on at the moment in the Catholic church. As a practising Catholic, you must have your own views about nuclear weapons. Are these weapons immoral, as is maintained by influential circles in the Church?

Luns. Dreadful weapons have always existed. At the time, people were appalled by the development of the crossbow from the bow and arrow. One has to realize that the Alliance's nuclear weapons serve only to preserve peace. Their purpose is to deter, and up until now they have worked. It would be immoral to disarm unilaterally. That would make the world ripe for war. Aggression is immoral. War is immoral, but defence is acceptable, even to Catholic moral doctrine.

Die Welt. In the Prague declaration,[2] the Warsaw Pact countries suggested the dissolution of the military blocs, that is, the disbanding of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Luns. The Soviets have made that suggestion many times before. However, there are bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the member states of the Warsaw Pact which are more far reaching than the Warsaw Pact itself. Nothing would change as far as the East is concerned.

Die Welt. Do you mean that NATO would be disbanded, but that the East would remain a military bloc, as before?

Luns. I mean just that.

Die Welt. How should we view the other suggestions made in Prague, such as the suggestion for a non-aggression pact?

Luns. We shall examine it, but basically it is nothing new. The principle is already enshrined quite clearly in all important international agreements, for instance, in the United Nations Charter and in the Helsinki Final Act.[3] NATO has always supported the idea, and will never be the first to use its weapons. NATO will only use them to defend against attack. A nonaggression pact would really only be a cosmetic measure.

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[2] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

[3] The arms control portions of the Final Act are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308; the entire act is in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

Statement by French President Mitterrand: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [Extracts], January 20, 1983 [1]

Despite multiple tensions, peace has reigned between the two major Powers and their dialogue has been almost constant, but the equilibrium between them has never been really stable, each of them having overtaken the other in its turn; recently, this situation has deteriorated. Two examples suffice to remind us of this: the occupation of Afghanistan and the events in Poland.

For its part, Europe has seen rises in the quantity and level of the weapons stationed on or aimed at its soil. Soviet conventional superiority and the already longstanding deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles led to the perfecting of American aircraft stationed in Europe and known for that reason as "forward-based systems". The Soviet Union used this as an argument for the installation of new, more accurate mobile missiles with three heads and a range of 5,000 km. Five thousand kilometres, enough to reach Europe, not enough to reach the American continent.

The member countries of the NATO integrated military command then responded by what is commonly known as the "dual-track decision", [2] providing for the opening of negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons on the European continent, negotiations on which will depend the level of deployment of the new United States missiles with effect from December 1983. I am reiterating these facts, you are familiar with them, but we are addressing ourselves to our peoples and it is helpful to know the background to these acts in order to try to identify today's solutions.

Our peoples hate war, they and the other peoples of Europe with them have suffered from it more than enough. French thinking is governed by one simple idea: war must remain impossible and those who might consider it must be dissuaded from doing so.

Our analysis and our conviction, that of France, are that nuclear weapons—the instrument, whether one likes or deplores the fact, of that dissuasion—remain the guarantee of peace as long as there obtains a balance of forces. All things considered, it is only that balance which can lead to good relations with our neighbours and historical partners, the countries of Eastern Europe. It has been the sound basis of what has been termed détente. It has enabled you to put into effect your *Ostpolitik*. It made possible the Helsinki agreements.[3]

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[1] CD/347*. President Mitterrand spoke before the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. "Extracts" is carried from the source document, the text of which is printed in its entirety.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

But the maintenance of that balance means, in my view, that there must be no depriving whole regions of Europe of a parry to nuclear weapons specifically aimed at them. Anyone banking on "uncoupling" the European and American continents would, in our opinion, call in question the balance of forces and so the maintenance of peace. I think, and I will say, that "uncoupling" is dangerous in itself, and it is my earnest hope that the Geneva negotiations will lead to the averting of a danger that weighs singularly upon the non-nuclear weapon European partners.

That is why the common determination and the solidarity of the members of the Atlantic Alliance must be clearly confirmed if the negotiation is to succeed, the essential prerequisite for the non-installation of the weapons foreseen in the "dual track decision" of December 1979.

What we want first of all, and you too, is peace. Peace is only possible through negotiation. It is for those who negotiate to prepare the way to the indispensable harmony. It suffices for one, not to say two, of the partners to refuse this for agreement to become impossible. The conditions of the necessary balance must, therefore, be maintained, with the assurance, for the peoples concerned that they will not find themselves under the burden of foreign domination.

France is, you may believe me, conscious of that solidarity when it maintains in the Federal Republic of Germany a substantial part of the French First Army, of which it is at this very moment studying improvements in the mobility and fire-power. And France confirms that, at Berlin in particular, it is assuming and will assume all its responsibilities.

That, then, is how we see the defence of our territory and of our vital interests, at the same time as we affirm ourselves to be the loyal partner of the Atlantic Alliance and the friend, faithful and aware of his obligations, of the Federal Republic of Germany.

But let it be clearly understood—and there lies herein the expression of our differing situations deriving from the history of which we are not the makers—that France, which is not participating and will not participate in the discussions at Geneva, means to leave the negotiators free to decide their own conduct. It is for each to distinguish for himself what is good or what is lacking in the latest proposals. France, which has an interest like yourselves in the outcome of the negotiations, bases itself for their evaluation on a few simple points which I will now take the liberty briefly to restate. Firstly, one can only compare what is comparable: types of weapon, fire-power, accuracy, range. Secondly, between two countries which have the capability of destroying each other, if I may so put it, several times over—as is the case of the United States of America and the Soviet Union—and countries like my own, whose main possibility is of preventing a potential aggressor from hoping to benefit from a war, the gap is immense: there is a difference in kind . . . I can explain that in more concrete terms by saying that, if one of the two largest Powers destroyed all its medium-range missiles, it would still have thousands of rockets left, whereas France would in the same circumstances lose a decisive element of its deterrent capacity and so the guarantee of its security, which, below a certain threshold, would no longer exist. Thirdly, the French nuclear force is and will remain independent.

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[3] The arms control portions are printed *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308. The entire Final Act may be found in the *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

That independence, with all that derives therefrom, is not merely an essential principle of our sovereignty—it is on the President of the French Republic, and on him alone, that rests the responsibility for the decision—it also increases, and I would ask you to ponder this point, it also increases the uncertainty for a potential aggressor, and for him alone. As such, it makes the deterrence and by that very fact, I repeat, the impossibility of war more real.

It is for specific and serious reasons that I affirm that the French forces cannot be taken into account in the Geneva negotiation by the two over-armed Powers. By this I mean that people are now turning to France—as they did to the United Kingdom, and it is for that country to decide on its response—in an attempt to assimilate the unassimilable. We have not to be taken into account by the two over-armed Powers and, in our opinion, any arrangement based on such a calculation would be decisively dismissed by my country . . . I would add that it would, in the final analysis, be prejudicial to peace in Europe. The 38 years of peace that we have had in Europe have been due—should one say happily, unhappily—to deterrence. Of course, it is very regrettable that they should be due only to that, the balance of terror. Just think to what a pass mankind has come. It is, I repeat, regrettable that they should be due only to that and not to a more rational and more satisfactory form of collective security arrangement, which naturally remains desirable! But so long as this situation remains as it is, so long as collective security arrangements do not prevail, how could we deprive ourselves of that means of preventing a conflict?

Final Report of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War, January 20, 1983 [1]

The "International Symposium on herbicides and defoliants in war: the long-term effects on man and nature" was held in Ho Chi Minh City from 13 to 20 January 1983.

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[1] CD/349. The report was transmitted by the Permanent Representative of Cuba.

Attending the symposium were more than 160 scientists and experts from 21 countries as well as Observers from FAO, UNEP and UNESCO. The symposium discussed the long-term effects of herbicides and defoliants used by the United States army forces together with the agreement of the Saigon administration on man and nature during the second Indochina war, 1961–1975.

At the plenary sessions and working groups the scientists presented some 72 scientific reports and papers dealing with the following problems:

—The scope and nature of operation Ranch hand conducted in Vietnam from 1961–1971,

—The long-term effects of military herbicides and defoliants on man (about 29 reports) and on nature (about 43 reports),

—The results of experimental studies on herbicides in laboratories or in the field on a small scale,

—The results of studies on the consequences of herbicides from accidents occurring in factories producing them and their effects on groups of workers dealing with chemicals used in agriculture.

Scientists exchanged views, evaluated the results of studies in laboratories and in field experiments. They discussed the research work to be conducted in the near future aimed at eliminating the consequences of the indiscriminate use of herbicides and defoliants on a large scale. They also discussed the possibilities of international cooperation in the field of research.

During the time the symposium was held the scientists visited an exhibition displaying all kinds of chemical weapons used during the war and the effects of herbicides and defoliants on nature and man.

Participants to the symposium also visited the Mada—forest area, Dong Nai province (in the former Long Khanh province, war zone of South Vietnam). Here wartime destruction caused to nature remains very apparent. Mada can in effects be considered one model for experimental field studies as regards the direct and indirect effects of herbicides and defoliants on tropical inland forests, the latter including fire. The visit to the Mada forest gave participants a clear idea of the lengthy duration of effects of herbicides disturbance on the natural restoration of tropical inland forests.

At the symposium scientists were engaged in active work in a friendly atmosphere. Although most scientists met one another for the first time, their discussions and exchanges of views were conducted in an open, straightforward and frank way and in their private capacities, and this helped ensure good results for the symposium.

The majority of the participants have reached agreement on the following:

1. Operation Ranch hand was essentially a chemical war conducted with herbicides on a large scale in space and time, the first such massive employment in mankind's history of war and differed completely from explosion accidents or failures in chemical factories.

It was conducted in a tropical country and a geographical area which differs from much smaller-scale experiments in laboratories in any country in the world, or from small experiments of partial usefulness to evaluate what had happened to Vietnam and the Vietnamese people during operation Ranch hand.

The herbicide employed in operation Ranch hand included primarily:

(1) 2,4–d
(2) 2,4,5–5 (containing dioxin)
(3) picloram
(4) dimethyl arsini (cacodylic acid)

These four chemicals were applied primarily in the following three mixtures:

(1) agent orange (a mixture of 2,4–d and 2,4,5–t)
(2) agent white (a mixture of 2,4–d and picloram)
(3) agent blue (dimethyl arsinic or cacodylic acid).

According to official United States figures, about 44 million litres of agent orange were used between 1961–1970, about 20 million litres of agent white were used between 1966–1971, and about 8 million litres of agent blue were used between 1961–1971. There is no source of independent verification. It is impossible to determine how much dioxin was in the agent orange, but a conservative estimate is that the total amount was no less than 170 kg.

2. Over the last twenty-odd years, many experimental studies on herbicides and defoliants have been conducted in research bases of many countries. No full agreement has been reached yet on the results and conclusions regarding the effects of chemicals on experimental animals. However, through many years of research with admirable patience and increasingly precise methods, the majority of scientists recognize that phenoxy and certain other herbicides and defoliants used at a high dose or at a low dose for a long period of time will affect animals: they may be variously mutagenic, carcinogenic or teratogenic.

3. Studies on workers in factories over the last few years. Those studies confirm the toxicity of herbicides, especially of 2,4,5–t (2,4,5–trichloro phenoxy acetic acid) and of 2,3,7,8,-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin (TCDD) or dioxin.

The signs of immediate and long-term poisoning due to chlorophenoxy acetic substances have been described in the medical literature in which manifestations considered as characterizing such poisoning are: chlorane, porphyria cutanea tarda, asthenia, etc. In human pathology reactions to the pathogenic agents differ from one individual to another, so do the manifestations of the reactions, which render evaluation and statistics difficult.

4. The symposium reserved most of its time for the evaluation of the long-term effect of chemical warfare in Vietnam. Scientists attend-

ing the symposium highly valued the contribution made by Vietnamese scientists who, despite the limited facilities and other difficulties during and after the war, were able to overcome these problems and made valuable research contributions. The reports and suggestions made by Vietnamese scientists at the symposium provided a crucial basis for discussions in the working groups and at the plenary session. Large-scale field studies done by Vietnamese scientists in localities in Southern Vietnam as well as Northern Vietnam have provided many materials of scientific value not previously demonstrated in other countries.

5. Nature in Vietnam has been substantially damaged. This destruction is due to a complexity of reasons. The delegates agreed that the main and most important cause of this extensive damage to nature is the use of herbicides and defoliants on a large scale.

Immediately after the spraying the toxic substances exerted their direct destructive effects on the vegetation and to some extent on animals living in inland or mangrove forests, and on saline water or fresh water animals. The direct and indirect repercussions of these immediate effects have lasted until today. Time has only slowly helped to eliminate these effects, they are not yet complete, the restoration can only be slow and occurs most readily on very small areas. Photographs taken from the air or space have reflected the real state of the restoration of tropical forests sprayed with defoliants.

6. Toxic chemicals sprayed on a large scale, with a high concentration and in a large amount, have changed the composition of some soils, destroyed useful micro-organisms, and in some areas made the soil to lose fertility and to deteriorate in other ways. Many areas which had been covered with trees and other woody plants throughout the year have become savannas of low productivity with only wild grasses or a number of secondary successional plant species having little economic value, and with rodents, which are disease-carriers. Evidence from aerial photography and elsewhere indicates that some of these savannas are continuing to expand in size. Some species of precious tropical wood are facing the danger of extermination, as are some precious terrestrial or aquatic animals and algae, etc. Transforming these savannas and building them into economic zones, areas for agricultural cultivation and reforestation, are difficult problems, the solution of which is far beyond the present abilities of the Vietnamese people. Moreover, the various impacts on nature undermined the whole human life support system.

7. Toxic chemicals sprayed on the land were washed away to lowland areas, far from the sprayed areas and decomposed in time. The most dangerous among them was agent orange, which was widely used from 1961–1970. Agent orange contains an impurity, 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin (TCDD) generally known as dioxin, a very toxic and resistant substance which exists for a long time in nature. What was the amount of toxic chemicals sprayed? According to published data, more than 90,000 tons of herbicides were sprayed

including more than 57,000 tons of agent orange, containing the toxic substance dioxin. The most important thing one should know is whether there still exists dioxin in nature in Vietnam. In 1981 analysis was made of seven soil samples taken in a rural area of Ho Chi Minh City, at different depth levels. On a sample taken at a depth of 1 metre there was a trace of dioxin, with a concentration below 5PPT of soil. On wet sample on the soil surface the concentration was 15PPT of soil.

8. There are as yet not many scientific studies identifying the biological cycle of dioxin from the soil into plant, species, into food, into animals and people.

Dioxin and decomposition products, herbicides and defoliants have probably been carried to lowland areas in Vietnam and neighbour countries, and into the seas around Vietnam. Where will substances end up? How will they be decomposed? What danger will they cause? When will the dioxin be decomposed? These points could not yet be established. The opinions put forward at the symposium were only estimates which must be verified over a long period of time.

9. The evaluation of the long-term effects of herbicides and defoliants is a most difficult and complex task. It is therefore difficult to reach full agreement, since the conditions in which scientists work differ from one country to another. However, most of the conclusions of their reports have elaborated the results of experiments conducted by the majority of scientists in the world and Vietnam. Reports by Vietnamese scientists have suggested that herbicides and defoliants affected chromosomes and caused congenital abnormalities, molar pregnancies and chorio epithelioma. Vietnam war veterans exposed to toxic chemicals for a long time during the war years may pass on those abnormalities to their offspring. The rate of monsters in families of Vietnam war veterans seems to be higher than in others. Chemicals affect man's health and how they cause cancer. Herbicides penetrating into human bodies may cause long-term effects, even though the victims have already left the contaminated areas. Of course, such effects would be clearer for those who remain in the affected areas.

Many preliminary conclusions of Vietnamese scientists are new points, which were observed in the realities of Vietnamese society, and have never been dealt with or else have been only inadequately dealt with in foreign research works.

10. During the symposium scientists agreed that:

(a) Further studies should be continued for many years on the long-term effects of herbicides and defoliants used in the war on man and nature in Vietnam.

(b) International co-operation between Vietnamese scientists and their foreign colleagues is necessary to promote study and to determine the effects of herbicides and defoliants, and find measures to cope with them, in the interest of the Vietnamese people and other peoples. Thus, this international symposium in Ho Chi Minh City has had a humanitarian character, which is serving the interest of the people.

(c) Measures to cope with the effects of herbicides and defoliants are complicated and difficult. They involve many fields of science, technology, culture, economy and management and call for appropriate governmental policies. They require a high level of science and technology divorced from politics, the co-operation and commitment of the whole population, and significant investments of money and material. Unrestricted assistance from the international community in all fields related to this endeavor is an urgent necessity.

Finally, a brief separate document provides background information on the subject of the symposium and the following seven additional documents, provide official summaries of the symposium working groups:

1. Plant ecology and forestry,
2. Animal ecology,
3. Soil ecology,
4. Coastal and aquatic ecology,
5. Cancer and clinical epidemiology,
6. Reproductive epidemiology and
7. Experimental toxicology and chemistry.

News Conference Briefing by the Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations (Rowny) and the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Nitze), January 21, 1983 [1]

Ambassador Rowny. Ambassador Nitze and I have just met with the President to discuss the next rounds of our respective negotiations. The President remains convinced, and I certainly agree, that we have a good START position, one which I'm pleased to continue to pursue with the Soviets in Geneva at these negotiations.

As you know, the START proposal is the most bold and imaginative proposal that has been ever proposed in the strategic arms arena—calls for a full reduction by 50% of the deployed ballistic missiles. It's captured the attention of people here and particularly in Europe. I've heard no criticism about this being a good proposal. And it's one we should all pursue.

We've had an active and busy and fruitful period of consultations here in Washington. I expect to return to Geneva with clear instructions which will be aimed at the number one goal; that is to enhance deterrence, to achieve stability in times of crisis, and, above all, to reduce the risk of nuclear war. And all these principles, of course, will help us move our negotiations forward.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 1983, pp. 76–79.

I'm hopeful also that the Soviet delegation will return to Geneva prepared to join us in moving toward these deep reductions in a number of strategic nuclear weapons. To repeat, as you know, our proposal calls for reducing deployed ballistic missiles by a full one-half and the number of warheads on these missiles by a third and to reduce to equal levels—and the principle that we have throughout is equality, equality, equality. We don't seek superiority, and we can't settle for inferiority.

And, of course, with this has to go hand-in-hand the verifiability of these proposals at every step of the game. Therefore, I'm hopeful that the Soviet delegation will come back prepared to continue what has been a rather active and brisk period of negotiations. And I'm particularly interested that they have shown positive leanings toward these confidence-building measures which will reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Their statements that they are also interested in these have encouraged me, and I'm going to pursue these with all vigor, parallel with our own START talks. And, if it's possible to get a separate agreement on these, even before we finish START, I think that anything that we do to reduce the risk of nuclear war will be welcomed by us, and I have reason to believe the Soviets want these also.

Q. Do you still believe there's a 50–50 chance of winning an agreement this year?

Ambassador Rowny. I still remain guardedly optimistic. I like to believe that we can take them at their word. After all, they've said that, given goodwill on our side, there can be an agreement. I know we have goodwill on our side, and we're serious. Therefore, we're certainly going to strive to do our utmost to get an agreement.

Q. Do you go back to Geneva with anything new in the way of instructions, any new flexibility in your negotiating position? And also could you address the issue whether you see any linkage between Nitze's thoughts on medium-range missiles and that being held hostage in any sense to your thought?

Ambassador Rowny. Let me say, first of all, that the President in his last hour or so reiterated the basic principles, and, so, I don't look for any major shifts or anything that's going to develop between now and the time we leave. As you know, there will be a meeting next week to get the instructions and final print to dot the i's and cross the t's.

On this business of flexibility, let me tell you that one of the things that the Soviets admire about this President—and have told me so—is his constancy and that he doesn't have a proposal and then shift it. And they respect that and they say, "We can do business with a man who knows what he wants and will stay the course." [Laughter] [2]

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[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

Q. Their phrase, not yours?

Ambassador Rowny. Their phrase. And so look at the fact that they came to the negotiating table in June after we had made a proposal which is much more drastic, much deeper than the Carter proposal. They came to the negotiating table. And they have been responding—first, when we said, "We'll reduce by 50%," they said, "By 25%." Of course, they are, again, responding in launchers and not in the ballistic missiles. The way we do, we have a better unit of count. We've said, "But it's the warheads that count." And they said, "We, too, will reduce the number of warheads." Of course, they haven't told us how many. So they see the value—and, of course, they understand how the public regards this. And so I feel that they know that we have a very good proposal in the START proposal.

Q. Could you answer the second part of his question dealing with the report that the Soviets were somehow linking the INF talks to the START talks, that they, if we installed any missiles in Europe, they would pull out of the START negotiations?

Ambassador Rowny. I have asked my counterpart to take a confidentiality pledge with me that we will not discuss things that happen at the negotiating table. So I would rather not answer that question head-on because I do think once you start negotiating in the public, you lessen the chances of reaching an agreement—

Q. It's not negotiating in public. There are stories every day this week saying they're going to pull out of START if we deploy the intermediate range missiles.

Ambassador Rowny. Let me simply say that the two negotiations are part of a seamless web that Paul and I coordinate closely, and we see these as one continuum in a way. They're all related, although he has an equal and separate negotiation to mine. But let me go this far. Without getting into the confidentiality of what happened at the negotiating table, the Soviets did publicly say that if any forces were deployed in Europe, that they would have to reexamine their proposal for reductions. This is in the public domain.

Q. Do you take that threat seriously?

Ambassador Rowny. It's not a threat. I think it's a statement that they say. Yes, I take everything they say seriously, and they have said on the record, in print, and so I'm not, again, revealing anything that happened across the negotiating table. I want to make that clear.

Q. Why do you say it's not a threat?

Ambassador Rowny. They have said that if any systems are deployed in Paul's area—that is, GLCMs [ground-launched cruise missiles] and Pershings—that they cannot reduce. And you want to characterize it as a threat, that's your character; I'm just telling you that's what they said.

Q. Did they also say they would not talk anymore, negotiate?

Ambassador Rowny. No.

Q. If that's what the President said, you're going to go ahead and deploy those missiles on schedule. Doesn't that make your task sort of useless?

Ambassador Rowny. Put that question to Paul. Those forces are not my—

Q. I thought he said a little while ago about confidence-building measures—

Ambassador Rowny. Yes.

Q. Are we to understand that you are closer to some announcement on the success on that level that may be in connection with the trip of Vice President Bush to Europe?

Ambassador Rowny. No, no, I'm not trying to imply that. What I'm saying is that the President proposed certain confidence-building measures. And in the times when Mr. Andropov has put out the carrot—like his answers to Kingsbury Smith, he said, "And we can move forward in these confidence-building measures." [3] Then when the stick appeared in the *Pravda* article several days later, which was very critical of us, he still was positive about confidence-building measures. He's positive both with a carrot and a stick. I have reason to be optimistic—guardedly optimistic—that we can get an agreement in these things because I genuinely think that they want to reduce the risk of nuclear war as much as we do.

Ambassador Nitze. As Ambassador Rowny has indicated, we've just met with the President to discuss the final preparations for the resumption of the arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union.

I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a meaningful agreement to reduce the twin threats of war and intimidation posed by the growing Soviet arsenal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The President has proposed the complete elimination of this dangerous class of weapons on both the U.S. and the Soviet side. This solution which would provide for zero on their side and zero on our side constitutes the most stable, durable, and effective blueprint for peace in Europe, Asia, and the world as a whole.

President Reagan has instructed me to be vigorous and probing in my efforts to reach an agreement which meets the security requirements of the United States and of the NATO allies. The United States, together with its allies, has been tireless through diplomacy and concerted action in seeking a peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union. But so long as Soviet proposals continue to mask a desire for a dangerous military advantage, so long as Soviet pledges of peace are accompanied not by cooperation at the negotiating table but by thinly veiled threats against our individual allies, we in the West must adhere to both tracks of our policy: first, to seek fair agreements to

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 926–928.

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reduce the risk of war and second, to take those steps necessary to maintain the military balance which has kept the peace over 37 years.

I go now to Geneva hopeful that the Soviets will see the folly of seeking to divide and intimidate our alliance and hopeful that an agreement which is fair and effective can be reached. President Reagan has expressed his fullest confidence in me as a negotiator and in our allies as partners. Together we shall meet this challenge. With cooperation from the Soviet Union, we may yet make a major contribution to a lasting peace.

Q. If the United States plans to go ahead and deploy GLCMs and Pershings, and if the Soviets say they won't talk if you go ahead and do that, doesn't that make this all rather a fruitless exercise?

Ambassador Nitze. I don't think it does. Because, granted, that the Soviet Union long ago—when I say long ago, 6 months ago—said that, in the event of practical steps toward deployment becoming evident to the Soviet Union, that they would then reassess their position. [4] And when you asked them what they meant by "reassess their position," they said that might well include calling off our talks, calling off the START talks, taking measures to counteract on every step that we might take so it would be disadvantageous to the NATO allies and to ourselves. They did say that. But subsequent to that, Mr. Brezhnev made that speech before the 500 generals in Moscow. [5] And in that speech he said that practical steps had already been taken, and they haven't called off the talks.

I do not believe that it is necessarily an intention of theirs to so do. They do mention these things that they may well do in order to bring pressure on us, but it doesn't necessarily mean that they will do it.

Q. We've all read a lot in the last few days about this tentative agreement that you and your Soviet counterpart reached in the summer which the Soviets rejected, which was apparently agreement for an equal number of warheads or—not equal number of warheads—equal number of—

Ambassador Nitze. Launchers.

Q. Why do you think Moscow said no? What does that tell you about their negotiating determination?

Ambassador Nitze. It's hard for me to estimate why the Soviet Union makes decisions. I've regretted very much that they made the decision to radically reject the exploratory package which Kvitsinskiy [Yuli Kvitsinskiy, head of the Soviet delegation to the INF negotiations] and I arrived at. It wasn't an agreement. I made no offer on behalf of the United States. But Mr. Kvitsinskiy and I tried to see whether it might be possible to cut through the Gordian knot and to arrive at something which might be worthy of consideration by the two governments.

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 118–121.

[5] Moscow TASS in English, Oct. 27, 1982; FBIS *Daily Report*, Oct. 27, 1982, vol. III, pp. VI–V3.

The U.S. Government, I think, did find it worthy of consideration, although they did not agree with all the details. But the Soviet Union did not find it so.

Q. You don't see that as necessarily a sign that they still believe that it's, or that they believe very certainly that it's possible to, through the campaign they're waging, make sure that the Europeans never agree to deploy the missiles? In other words, that they can get what they have and we'll wind up with nothing?

Ambassador Nitze. I think they hope that through propaganda they can make it impossible. I don't think they can. I don't think they'll succeed in that.

Q. Are you concerned that the United States is losing the public relations war in Europe over these missiles?

Ambassador Nitze. I'm not concerned. I don't think that we are losing the propaganda war in Europe.

Q. Why not? Why don't you? I mean, there seems to be a growing peace movement. Gromyko's remarks and Andropov's remarks are getting widespread play in Europe—his criticism of the U.S. position.

Ambassador Nitze. You look at the dynamism of the peace movement and the opposition to deployment prior to the President's speech 14 months ago.[6] That was very great then. As a result of the President's speech 14 months ago, that whole trend was checked and changed. Granted, in these last few months, as a result of Mr. Andropov's statement, there's been a renewed forward movement. I think now it will be checked again by the firmness of Mr. Gromyko's position in Bonn indicating absolutely no movement in their position.

Q. Have you been told that you can go back and explore other kinds of packages for consideration with your counterparts? Have you been given that authority?

Ambassador Nitze. I've been given not only the authority, but I've been directed to explore whether there's any possibility for a major change in the Soviet position.

Q. That includes changes beyond and different from zero-zero?

Ambassador Nitze. I'm authorized to explore.

Q. Do you feel that, as you go back to Geneva, you have the necessary flexibility to reach an agreement with the Soviets?

Ambassador Nitze. I shouldn't have that. It is only the U.S. Government and the Soviet Government which are ever going to reach an agreement. I have the necessary authority to explore with my Soviet counterpart what give there is in the Soviet position.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

Q. As Ambassador Rowny said, this is inextricably wound together. Is this a situation where you're going to succeed and Rowny will succeed or both fail?

Ambassador Nitze. Frankly, I think that the time urgency is really on my negotiations. I think it's necessary that we come to a successful conclusion first.

Q. What date do your negotiations resume?

Ambassador Nitze. On the 27th of January.

Q. And the same with START?

Ambassador Nitze. No.

Q. February 2nd?

Q. Are you authorized to offer something less than zero-zero?

Ambassador Nitze. I'm not authorized to offer anything. I'm authorized to explore.

Q. Is there any consideration being given to separate negotiations on curbing cruise missiles? As you know, Mr. Rostow [Eugene V. Rostow, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] said when they were deployed that the scorpion would be out of the bottle and we're deploying them now.

Ambassador Nitze. I don't remember that remark of Mr. Rostow.

Q. At his confirmation hearings he said that.

Ambassador Nitze. I see. I wasn't aware of that. But, in any case, the question of cruise missiles is an item which is involved both in the INF negotiations and in the START negotiations because the Soviet side has put forward proposals limiting cruise missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles, in both negotiations.

Q. Do you expect to see any substantive progress before the West German elections in your talks?

Ambassador Nitze. I hope for such.

Q. You talk about give in the Soviet position. Is there any give in the U.S. position?

Ambassador Nitze. There will be if the Soviets come forward—well, wait a minute, let me change that. I'd rather start from the beginning.

The President's directive to me is to negotiate seriously, and he made that clear 14 months ago at the beginning of these negotiations. But, in order to negotiate seriously, it requires give on the Soviet side. And if the Soviet side gives, then I'm sure we will give serious consideration to any serious proposals of theirs.

Q. So we're not absolutely locked in on zero-zero?

Ambassador Nitze. I won't answer that question.

Report by the Comptroller General (Bowsher) to Acting ACDA Director George: RECOVER [Extract], January 25, 1983[1]

DIGEST

In recent years the International Atomic Energy Agency has been faced with increasing challenges in safeguarding nuclear materials against diversion for use in nuclear weapons. It now safeguards over 840 facilities with about 130 inspectors. In 1976 the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency initiated development of the REmote COntinual VERification (RECOVER) system to eventually help the International Atomic Energy Agency better use its inspectors. RECOVER, as envisioned by its designers, would remotely monitor the operational status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's surveillance cameras and containment devices. To date, the U.S. Government has allocated over $4 million to RECOVER's development. A prototype model of RECOVER has been undergoing testing at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters since December 1979.

RECOVER'S USE IN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS IS UNCLEAR

The International Atomic Energy Agency has not agreed to accept RECOVER for routine safeguards use and has indicated that its decision on acceptance can not be expected before 1984. Moreover, it has yet to specify the criteria RECOVER would have to satisfy to ensure the system's adoption by the International Atomic Energy Agency for routine safeguards use. It has strictly limited its support for the project and has been dissatisfied with RECOVER's progress, although International Atomic Energy Agency officials' attitudes towards RECOVER have become more favorable.

RECOVER's potential benefits for international safeguards are still uncertain. Although it is intended to improve International Atomic Energy Agency efficiency and effectiveness, how and to what degree these goals would be achieved remains undetermined. The initial report of an ongoing study by a U.S. national laboratory has indicated that RECOVER would be potentially cost-effective at only a small percentage of the installations under international safeguards in 1981.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials believe RECOVER could provide valuable but unquantifiable benefits. The International Atomic Energy Agency believes RECOVER may enhance safeguards credibility but not reduce routine inspections. Other opinions are split on RECOVER's benefits.

At present, the involved parties do not appear to have the basic information needed to make an informed decision on RECOVER's global benefits. Also, potential legal and political obstacles to RECOVER's routine safeguards use remain unexamined.

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[1] *RECOVER: A Potentially Useful Technology for Nuclear Safeguards, But Greater International Commitment Is Needed* (GAO/ID–83–9), pp. i–iv.

MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS ALSO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT RECOVER'S FUTURE

The RECOVER project is having difficulty in making the transition from research and development to implementation. Although the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has succeeded in developing a small prototype RECOVER system and in attracting important international interest, the program has fallen two to three years behind schedule. Milestones for RECOVER's integration into international nuclear safeguards procedures have been missed.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials recognize that delays are partially due to their Agency's lack of resources found in more technically-oriented organizations. For example, a shortage of technical staff apparently contributed to the Agency's failure to identify a flaw in the initial design of a key component.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials believe that the project should now be transferred to another agency. Other agencies, however, have had a small role in RECOVER's development and do not now appear likely to assume control of the project in the near future. All generally believe that RECOVER is not urgently needed.

Although there is general agreement that no insurmountable technical barriers block RECOVER's use, significant additional technical development is necessary before RECOVER could be used routinely for international safeguards.

Uncertainties also continue concerning the likely cost of actually implementing a RECOVER system. System cost estimates vary because the eventual size of such a system is unknown and because existing cost estimates for components are out-of-date and incomplete.

RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO recommends that the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency request the International Atomic Energy Agency to specify the criteria for its eventual acceptance of an operational RECOVER system.

Furthermore, GAO recommends that the Director assess the RECOVER program, taking into account the following factors:

—the International Atomic Energy Agency's criteria;

—results of any ongoing or completed facility studies and field tests;

—the nature and importance of RECOVER's unquantifiable benefits at various facility types;

—RECOVER's cost-effectiveness as described by the U.S. national laboratory study;

—the number and significance of facilities at which RECOVER could provide quantifiable and/or unquantifiable benefits;

—the suitability of RECOVER for worldwide, regional, and local applications; and

—legal and political issues bearing on RECOVER's international acceptance for routine safeguards use.

GAO also recommends that the Director present the results of the assessment to the International Atomic Energy Agency and request a decision regarding acceptance of RECOVER for routine safeguards use. If the International Atomic Energy Agency, following its review of the assessment, does not commit itself to eventually accepting a RECOVER system that fulfills its criteria, GAO recommends that the Director terminate all further development of RECOVER for the International Atomic Energy Agency and examine the feasibility of alternative uses for it.

GAO recommends that, concurrent with the actions recommended above, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency request assistance from the Secretaries of State and Energy, and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to determine (1) RECOVER's priority among all U.S. safeguards equipment development efforts and (2) the appropriate division of responsibilities among U.S. Government agencies for expeditiously completing RECOVER tests and studies.

Finally, GAO recommends that the Director develop more reliable and up-to-date cost estimates for RECOVER components and use these estimates to make cost projections for an operational RECOVER system.

AGENCY COMMENTS

In commenting on the draft of this report, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Departments of Energy and State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission agreed with GAO that the RECOVER system is not yet ready for operational use by the International Atomic Energy Agency. They generally agreed with the thrust of GAO's conclusions, although the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency disagreed with some of the recommendations.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency commented that the law and established practices make it inappropriate to seek criteria and a decision from an international organization regarding eventual acceptance of a research product. Also, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said that performing an assessment of the RECOVER program is not called for and that representatives of all the appropriate agencies have met and will continue to meet to discuss remote verification and to arrange an integrated approach for RECOVER efforts. GAO disagreed with the Agency's views in this matter.

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Letter From President Reagan to the People of Europe: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, January 31, 1983[2]

American and Soviet officials have just resumed negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement to control intermediate-range nuclear weapons. We have proposed and will continue to urge the Soviets to agree to ban altogether both their intermediate-range land-based nuclear missile weapons and those we intend to deploy in response to their build-up. The Soviet insistence on maintaining a nuclear threat to America's Allies while denying them the corresponding means to deter that threat remains the principal obstacle.

A way must be found to overcome this obstacle. Just as our Allies can count on the United States to defend Europe at all cost, you can count on us to spare no effort to reach a fair and meaningful agreement that will reduce the Soviet nuclear threat.

In this spirit, I have asked Vice President Bush, in the city where East meets West, to propose to Soviet General Secretary Andropov that he and I meet wherever and whenever he wants in order to sign an agreement banning U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range land-based nuclear missile weapons from the face of the Earth.

I make this offer out of a conviction that such an agreement would serve the interests of both sides and, most importantly, that the people of Europe want nothing more. I urge Mr. Andropov to accept it.

Address by Vice President Bush: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], January 31, 1983[1]

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NATO's Strategy and Current Myths

NATO's strategy has no more important goal than that of making this principle credible. If our linkage to each other is credible, we can insure deterrence. We can insure our freedom. And we can insure peace.

But the Soviet Union's unprecedented arms buildup of the last 15 years has threatened to undermine the credibility of NATO's deterrent. And the Soviets have attempted to break the linkage between European and U.S. security so essential to article 5. The Soviet buildup has been relentless and thorough, conventional and nuclear. There is no disagreement on that score. And one of its most dangerous new elements has been its monopoly on intermediate-range nuclear missiles which can strike Europe. I am speaking of weapons which could reach this room in a few minutes.

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[2] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 7, 1983, pp. 158–159. The letter was included in a speech by Vice President Bush, delivered on Jan. 31 in Berlin and printed *infra*.

[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 447. The Vice President spoke in West Berlin. The letter from President Reagan that he included in his speech is printed *supra*.

If the Soviet Union eventually succeeded in breaking that linkage—if it could separate the United States and our armed forces from the defense of our allies in Europe—our deterrence would be undermined, and with it the peace we have all maintained for nearly four decades. And that is precisely why in December of 1979, the nations of NATO—all the nations of NATO—made a two-part decision: first, to deploy in Europe NATO weapons capable of deterring an attack by Soviet SS-20s and other intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The second part of the decision was to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to reduce the level of these weapons on both sides.[2]

(As a footnote to December of 1979, it is worth remembering that was also the month the Soviet Union sent tens of thousands of its troops into Afghanistan, where over 100,000 of them remain today.)

NATO's decision was the result of exhaustive consultation. As a consequence, it was the right decision. It was the right decision then; and it is the right decision now.

It has also become a controversial decision. It has become controversial in part because of certain myths that have gained currency. Under the light of reasoning, these myths vanish, because they are shadows without substance.

- The first myth is that the deployment of these intermediate nuclear forces would change NATO's strategy. Untrue. The exact opposite is the case: The INF decision is, in fact, essential in order to maintain the strategy that has always been a bedrock of NATO—maintaining linkage between the United States and its allies that insures deterrence.
- The second myth is that this decision was somehow thrust on an unwilling Europe by the United States. Anyone who so much as reads newspapers knows this is absurd. The NATO decision was a response to widespread concern, especially in Europe, over the alarming buildup of Soviet INF forces.
- Third, we are asked to believe that the INF deployments would increase the alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons. But, in fact, we decided at the same time to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. That withdrawal has been completed. Thus, even after deploying the INF forces, there would still be fewer allied nuclear warheads in Europe than there were in 1979.
- The fourth, and last, myth is that these INF deployments would be a step toward nuclear war-fighting and to war-fighting confined to Europe alone. But NATO's policy has always been one of peace and deterrence, which depends on balance, not imbalance. As to the notion that the United States desires to confine conflict to Europe alone, well,

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

I find this proposal bitterly ironic. I can do no better than to quote from a European publication, *The Economist* of London, from a cover article entitled: "Can So Many Young People Be Wrong About the Bomb? Yes, They Can." The article said: "Nothing more justifiably infuriates the Americans than the allegation that they want to put cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles into Europe in order to have a purely European nuclear war. These missiles were originally proposed—by Europeans—for exactly the opposite reason." *The Economist* is right. Nothing infuriates the President and me more than the suggestion we are preparing to fight a nuclear war, because we are not preparing to fight a nuclear war. We are preparing to deter war.

It is the very presence of American forces that provides a guarantee of U.S. involvement in any attack on Western Europe. And that goes a long way toward guaranteeing that the Soviets will not be encouraged to launch an attack. There are in Europe about 350,000 American military personnel, who, as part of the NATO security forces, provide, in President Reagan's words, the "living" guarantee of our commitment to the peace and security of Europe. Our security is indivisible from Europe's security. An attack on you is an attack on us.

Peace Movements

From time to time I am asked what I think of the antinuclear peace demonstrators. I confess I am sometimes tempted to say, "Which ones do you mean? The ones here or the ones in the Lubyanka?" Well, my answer is this: I have great warmth for anyone who is for peace. It so happens we, too, are for peace. I also have the greatest warmth for anyone who is against nuclear war. It so happens we, too, are against nuclear war.

The NATO countries have fought and paid the price for the framework of freedoms within which those antinuclear groups march and demonstrate and speak their minds. Is there any among us who is not proud that these voices can find their fullest expression in our countries? Is there any among us who would not welcome, or even thrill to, the sight of antinuclear demonstrations in Red Square? Is there any West German who was not saddened to witness the swift and ruthless suppression of a similar movement on the other side of the wall? Franz Kafka, were he alive, might have been grimly amused by the fact that the Eastern regime even outlawed the very symbol of their movement: a Soviet statue of a man beating a sword into a ploughshare.

There have been other movements in the Warsaw Pact countries. And we remember them well. We remember East Germany in 1953. We remember Hungary in 1956. We remember Czechoslovakia in 1968. And today our thoughts are of Poland. Outside of Europe, the world has seen over 100 armed conflicts and wars since NATO came into being. Joseph Luns, our alliance's Secretary General, said, memorably: "NATO is the real peace movement."

The Need for Credible Arms Negotiations

We are always—and especially now—looking for new ways to preserve what we have won over the last four decades. That is why both elements of NATO's decision on INF are inseparable and mutually reinforcing. By that I mean just this: If we are to be credible in our arms negotiations, the alliance must be united in its determination to deploy the INF systems if necessary. Why? Because otherwise the Soviet Union will simply have no incentive at all to negotiate seriously. None whatsoever.

When he came into office, President Reagan reviewed the INF decision and endorsed it. Then, in November 1981, he announced a proposal. The United States, he said, would seek the complete elimination of these most destabilizing and threatening weapons—the land-based intermediate nuclear missiles.

The Soviet Union, in the meantime, responded with a thundering "Nyet," followed by a tremendous public offensive designed to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies. As part of that offensive, Mr. Gromyko, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, traveled to Germany recently. He spent a good deal of his time declaring that the United States is, as usual, trying to plunge the world into nuclear holocaust. I followed Mr. Gromyko's statements very closely, and I was left wondering whether he reminded Germans of the German proverb: "*Wenn der Fuchs predigt, schau auf deine Gaense.*" ("When the fox preaches, look to your geese.")

The Soviets have made proposals of their own. They said that the zero-option proposal was unacceptable. Then they said that even an interim-basing agreement would be unacceptable. One concludes that what the Soviets do find acceptable is its own monopoly of nuclear weapons aimed at the heart of Europe. Having said that, I think I can safely predict that the Soviet Union will announce tomorrow that it finds me unacceptable.

For his part, President Reagan has said that the United States will consider any and all reasonable Soviet offers at the negotiating table in Geneva. That is what we are doing right now. Ambassador Paul Nitze [head of the U.S. delegation to the INF negotiations in Geneva] [3] is meeting now with his Soviet counterpart to negotiate a treaty that will maintain NATO's security and preserve the peace.

The United States is a member of a defensive alliance. And it takes pride in having tried, since 1945, to bring about arms control through negotiations with the Soviet Union. The very first proposal for international control of atomic bombs was proposed by President Truman at the United Nations. The Baruch Plan, as it was named, called for the "creation of an international Atomic Energy Development Authority" to which all aspects of the development and use of atomic energy would have been entrusted. [4] The Baruch Plan, which called for on-site inspection of nuclear facilities, was rejected by the Soviet Union—at a time when the United States was the only nation possessing atomic weapons.

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[3] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 7–16.

Then, in 1955, President Eisenhower called for an "open skies" policy.[5] He proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately exchange blueprints of their military establishments and begin aerial reconnaissance in order to prevent surprise attack and begin a comprehensive and effective inspection and disarmament system. This, too, was rejected by the Soviet Union.

Other American presidents made some progress, however limited. President Kennedy put forward the atmospheric test ban treaty;[6] and President Nixon was able to negotiate the anti-ballistic missile treaty and SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks].[7] But these did not stop the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons.

During the past 37 years, we have been dealing with determined adversaries, who know their objective and who have moved methodically to achieve it. Their objective—not ours, but theirs—is clear military force superiority over the United States and our European allies, intended to break the security linkage that has made the NATO alliance so effective.

Yet, in spite of this, the United States has pursued a policy of unilateral nuclear restraint for more than a decade. As I mentioned earlier, in 1981 alone, the United States withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. I know of no comparable, uncompensated nuclear reduction by the Soviet Union in the entire postwar period. As a matter of fact, since the mid-1960s, the United States has reduced its nuclear arsenal worldwide by some 8,000 warheads.

During the last decade, the United States did not deploy any new ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], or any new ballistic-missile submarines, or any new bombers. But over the same period of time, the Soviet Union deployed an entire new generation of land-based strategic missiles, including three multiple-warhead, land-based systems, as well as three new submarine systems and a new bomber. In so many words, the United States has maintained a self-imposed, decade-long, *de facto* freeze during the time the Soviet Union pursued a vigorous military buildup.

On November 2, 1977, Chairman Brezhnev said: "We do not want to upset the approximate equilibrium at present . . . between East and West and Central Europe, or between the U.S.S.R. and the United States."[8] At that time the Soviet Union had about a dozen SS-20s.

But it was that old fox Lenin who said, "Facts are stubborn things." Since Mr. Brezhnev made that statement, Soviet SS-20s have been sprouting like fields of asparagus, more than 300 in all. These could not have been put there to redress some supposed military imbalance created by the West, because NATO has no comparable weapons. Indeed, the first comparable NATO weapons will only be available for deployment at the end of the year, more than 6 years after the SS-20s first appeared.

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 487–488, 501–503, 523–528.

[6] For the treaty, see *ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[7] These SALT I agreements are printed *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

[8] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 679–680.

This is why it is very difficult to believe that the Soviet Union's motives are, as it says, purely defensive. Berliners know better than most what it takes to wrest an acceptable agreement from the Soviet Union. NATO's deployments are in the headlines today, but a decade ago the headlines were about the negotiations over the very status of Berlin itself. The Soviet Union had mounted a public offensive to divide the allies then, as they have today. But the West, by negotiating in good faith, by being creative and flexible, and by remaining true to the principles which have brought us so far, was able to secure an agreement which preserved Berlin's vital interests.

The United States views its presence in Berlin as an absolutely sacred trust. Our military forces stand ready to defend the Western sectors from any threat. We are totally dedicated to the Quadripartite Agreement, [9] and we will continue to expect strict observance and full implementation of all its provisions in all sectors of Berlin, East and West. We also support fully the ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, because they provide the vital foundation for the economic prosperity and for the democracy of the Western sectors.

So one asks: Is it being intransigent to follow the same path today in our negotiations with the Soviet Union that we followed a decade ago? Or prudent?

We know that many in Europe and the United States are anxious for a rapid agreement—for a breakthrough in our arms negotiations in Geneva. Permit me, if you will, a personal note. I work very closely with President Reagan. And you can take me at my word when I say that no one is more anxious than he for a just agreement. And no one is more determined than he to achieve one.

Basic Objectives

Now permit me to ask this: Should we, in our eagerness for a rapid agreement—for any agreement, as it were—lose sight of our basic objectives, bearing in mind these are no less than security and peace? Such a question answers itself. No, we must not let our eagerness for rapid negotiating progress cause us to lose sight of or compromise our basic objectives—objectives vital to achieving an agreement which provides for the security of Europe.

First, we must reduce the nuclear threat to Europe to the lowest possible level. We would fail miserably in our responsibilities to ourselves and to our children if we merely legitimized the already awesome levels of nuclear firepower directed by the Soviets against Europe. We would fail, too, if we accepted a somewhat lower but still unimaginably destructive Soviet monopoly. And that is why we proposed the complete abolition of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Because that is how to reduce the nuclear threat to the lowest possible level.

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[9] 24 UST 283; TIAS 7551.

Second, we must bring about a balanced agreement. It cannot be acceptable to the West to concede a permanent monopoly of nuclear missiles to the Soviets without allowing NATO to deploy comparable systems to deter the threat they represent.

Third, a sound agreement must preclude artful circumvention. It is not enough merely to permit the Soviets to withdraw mobile missiles behind some artificial line, only so they can re-cross the line on short notice. Nor is it enough to give the Soviets credit for offering to eliminate some obsolete and unreliable missiles—military antiques, really. Let us all agree that we need more effective measures than that if we are to reduce the nuclear threat to Europe.

Fourth, we need an agreement which can be verified. Even with sophisticated intelligence capabilities, it is very difficult to keep track of mobile missiles. The fact is, it is easier to detect some missiles when there are supposed to be none, than it is to detect, say 60 missiles when there are supposed to be 50. That is a crucial point. All the more so when you cannot rely on your negotiating partner to be fully forthcoming in your attempts to verify the size of his arsenal.

I have spoken tonight at some length. The complexity of the issues before us is sometimes overwhelming. The number of missiles, the number of launchers, the number of warheads, their throw-weight, proposal, counter-proposal, counter-counter-proposal—these facts and numbers have, I think, obscured a much more central and much more compelling realization, because we are united by needs that supersede mathematics.

It is hard to avoid the details. But if numbers are to inform our consciousness and our reasoning, should we not consider, above all, 38? We all know what that represents: The amount of years we have lived in the peace and security that we together made possible by binding ourselves to each other. Thirty-eight years—the longest, uninterrupted peace this continent has known this century. Then our real mathematical reckoning and our most demanding task becomes: How do we diminish the deadly numbers, while seeing to it that those four decades increase?

Department of State Publication, "Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981": Summary [Extract], February 1983 [1]

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Warsaw Pact countries signed $8 billion worth of military agreements with Third World countries in 1981, down sharply from the record $15 billion in orders in 1980. Soviet and East European economic aid pledges to Third World countries also declined dramatically in 1981 to a little more than $1 billion.

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[1] Dept. of State, "Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981," Pub 9345, Feb. 1983, p. iii.

The decline in military agreements was entirely attributable to a drop from $14 billion to $6 billion in Soviet military sales, as major clients absorbed heavy equipment deliveries under previous contracts. Traditional clients in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia accounted for 95 percent of new Soviet orders. Moscow added Jordan and Nicaragua to its list of military customers in 1981. East European military sales of $2 billion (almost all to the Middle East) nearly tripled the 1980 sales record.

Soviet economic assistance dropped to a four-year low of $450 million as several major negotiations dragged on without final agreement. We do not believe this drop reflects reduced Soviet interest in its foreign economic program. Most of the 1981 Soviet economic credits went to small clients, were trade associated, and carried harder repayment terms. East European economic assistance also dropped dramatically, to $665 million.

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Article by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt): Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, February 1983 [1]

In the fourteen months since negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) began on 30 November 1981, both sides have had an opportunity to explore fully the positions of the other, and to secure an understanding of their rationale. [2] Throughout this period, the United States has maintained its willingness to forgo entirely the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II missiles, provided the Soviet Union was willing to forgo the possession of comparable weapons of its own, most notably the SS-20 missile.

The Soviet Union, to this day, has persisted in its demand that the United States forgo deployment of GLCM and Pershing II but allow the Soviet Union to retain a monopoly over the US in longer-range INF missiles. Indeed, Soviet proposals call for a reduction in US forces in Europe below current levels, while permitting the Soviet Union to maintain very substantial forces in Europe—including a large number of SS-20s—and providing no constraints on Soviet systems in the Eastern USSR which can threaten NATO Europe. The Soviets have continued constructing SS-20 bases even after proclaiming a moratorium on SS-20 deployments, and have now deployed over 330 SS-20 launchers with some 1,000 warheads.

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 6, Feb. 1983, pp. 1–5.

[2] An article by Mr. Burt on the START negotiations in Geneva appeared in *NATO Review*, vol. 29, No. 4, (Sept.) last year. [Footnote in original. The article is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 576–584.]

The Soviet Union has accompanied these inequitable negotiating proposals with a steady stream of propaganda asserting that it is the United States which is blocking progress in the negotiations. Given the nature of the United States and Soviet positions, the Soviet Union, in levelling such charges, assumes a low level of information, and a high level of credulity on the part of the Western publics. Any objective review of the positions taken by the two sides over the past year or so cannot but lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has yet to accept the principle, so basic to any arms control agreement, that limits on one side's forces must be matched by comparable limits on those of the other.

The United States, specifically, has proposed the elimination of all ground-launched longer-range INF missiles. These would include the US Pershing II and GLCM. On the Soviet side, such an agreement would call for elimination of the SS-20s, as well as the older SS-4s and 5s, which the Soviet Union presumably will be phasing out, in any case, in the not too distant future. Both sides would forgo any future systems with similar characteristics.

The US proposal applies globally, prohibiting deployments not only in Europe, but also in the United States, the Far East and all other parts of the world.

The US proposal is not a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We have made it clear throughout the negotiations that we are willing to discuss any alternative suggestions the Soviet Union wishes to put forward, and we have done so.

Unequal Restrictions

The Soviets, on the other hand, are not prepared to eliminate the category of land-based longer-range INF missiles. Indeed, they have so far shown no disposition even to accept equal restrictions on their modernized systems.

Thus, the Soviets have called for a reduction in so-called "medium-range" systems in Europe to 300. But they have counted these forces in such a way as to force reductions in current US levels while permitting the Soviet Union a modern and effective force of INF systems in Europe, including a large number of triple-warhead SS-20s. Soviet forces in the Eastern USSR would be unconstrained, and the Soviets could continue deploying SS-20s there. Let me explain how this is so.

First of all, the Soviet proposal is regional, not global. It envisages no restrictions on the continued deployment of new systems outside Europe. Given the range, and in particular, the mobility and transportability of the SS-20, regional restrictions of this sort offer Europe no protection, while actually increasing the world-wide level of armaments.

Secondly, the Soviets include aircraft as well as missiles in that 300 level and they do so in a way that includes a large number of US aircraft while excluding Soviet aircraft with similar or greater capabilities.

Thirdly, the Soviets include French and British nuclear weapons on the US side, although these systems are independent and, as national strategic retaliatory forces, have a character wholly different from the US and Soviet systems under negotiation.

The basic Soviet position is little changed by the proposal disclosed by Mr. Andropov in December (the main elements of which emerged in Geneva last fall). It would preserve the existing Soviet monopoly over the US, denying the US longer-range INF missiles while allowing the Soviets to maintain a large force of SS-20s in Europe. The Soviet position still leaves Soviet systems in the Eastern USSR unconstrained. Moreover, the Soviets have not made clear whether reduced missiles would be destroyed or simply withdrawn to the East. Withdrawn missiles would continue to pose a threat to NATO. Finally, by linking the missile ceiling to the number of French and British missiles, the Soviets have made explicit their demand to include independent French and British systems in bilateral US-Soviet negotiations, a demand which is procedurally inappropriate and substantively without merit.

Were this Soviet position to be accepted, the end result would be that the Soviet Union could keep a very large SS-20 force deployed in Europe, and it could continue unconstrained to deploy new SS-20s in the Eastern USSR. The United States, on the other hand, would have to withdraw almost all its dual capable aircraft like the F-111 and the F-4 Phantom currently stationed in Europe, and it would be prohibited from carrying out any element of the planned NATO INF modernization.

As noted, more than a year of discussion in Geneva has provided an opportunity to explore not only the positions of each side but the philosophies which underlie these positions. The United States has made clear that it seeks a balanced result which genuinely reduces the nuclear threat to both sides, which enhances stability, and which lowers the risk of conflict. The United States has put forward a proposal which meets these criteria but has made clear that it is open to other Soviet suggestions, providing they meet those basic criteria.

The key point, then, is this: the Soviet Union has not, at least as yet, offered to discuss serious and genuine reductions in its nuclear forces. Existing Soviet proposals would largely represent a shift from older to newer, more capable systems, and would appear to involve some geographic redistribution of Soviet forces of an essentially cosmetic nature.

Danger of decoupling Europe from US nuclear umbrella

Soviet proposals are based upon the concept, which is also implicit in many of the Soviet public statements, that their security is more important than the security of Western Europe. It is perhaps not remarkable that the Soviets should take this parochial view. What is remarkable is that they should expect Western Europe to concur in it and demand that the United States negotiate an accord based upon it.

No longer content with US-Soviet parity, the Soviets now have advanced a position that would make the Soviet Union as strong as all potential adversaries put together. Soviet negotiators now maintain that the Soviet Union must be granted equality not just with the United States but with all the other nuclear powers combined—with the United States, plus Britain, plus France, plus China, and presumably plus any other nation that might acquire nuclear weapons in the future.

Equality with all potential adversaries combined is a working definition of hegemony. History shows that any nation which can achieve such a position can dominate the international scene. It is worth recalling, for instance, that Britain's traditional objective, during the apogee of its Empire, was to maintain a navy larger only than any two other navies combined—a much lower margin of superiority than that now sought by the Soviet Union. A "Pax Sovietica" is something we simply will not accept.

As recent NATO and independent studies of the current military balance demonstrate convincingly, the Soviet Union enjoys a wide margin of superiority in INF systems, even if British and French, or for that matter Chinese, forces are included in the calculation. It is also clear that the British and French, as well as Chinese forces are independent nuclear deterrents, which do not serve the same function as US INF systems. Those US systems are designed to maintain a link between NATO's conventional forces and the US strategic deterrent. Similarly, the purpose of the Soviet proposals, as indeed the Soviets have made clear, is not to reduce or even limit British, French (or Chinese) forces, but rather to eliminate US INF from Europe, and thus attempt to decouple Europe from the protection of the US nuclear umbrella.

As I have noted, the Soviets have so far failed to put forward any proposal in the INF talks which provides for balanced, verifiable and reciprocal obligations for both sides—the basic criteria for effective arms control. Neither has the Soviet Union put forward any proposal which calls for genuine reductions of any scope on their side. We have not, however, given up hope that in the coming months the Soviet Union will move in constructive directions.

No increase in nuclear weapons in Europe as result of 1979 decision

The INF negotiations are part of a two-track decision taken by NATO in 1979.[3] On the one hand, it was decided, in order to open up the possibility for successful arms control, and to maintain allied security if the Soviet Union proved unwilling to accept such reciprocal limits, to move forward with the deployment in Europe of 572 ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles. And it also was decided to pursue, through arms control, reciprocal limitations on US and Soviet INF forces. It is worth noting that the 1979 decision does not mean an increase in nuclear weapons in Europe. As a result of that decision, 1,000 nuclear weapons were withdrawn in 1980 and an additional weapon will be withdrawn for each ground-launched cruise missile or Pershing II which is deployed.

The Soviet Union has sought to block these deployments without accepting meaningful constraints on its own military programmes. To achieve this objective the Soviet Union has closely co-ordinated its foreign policy, propaganda and negotiating tactics. To date, then, its efforts in Geneva have been directed toward attaining unilateral Western restraint, not mutual US-Soviet limitations. But if the Soviet Union has not already realized that these efforts have failed to break Western and Alliance unity, I expect they will so conclude in the coming months. The NATO allies have made clear that they will move forward with implementation of the decision taken in 1979 to modernize NATO INF—and only a concrete arms control result in Geneva will lead NATO to re-evaluate its requirements for INF modernization. Faced with the recognition that US deployments will go ahead on schedule, it is possible that the Soviet Union will re-evaluate and redirect its current efforts.

In the short term, this realization may lead to no more than an increase in the level of rhetoric, the specificity of threats, and the shrillness with which Western positions are denounced. Indeed, in recent weeks we have seen the beginning of such an intensified barrage of propaganda. The totally unjustified suggestion that the Soviet Union might be "forced" to adopt a launch on warning policy is one example.

Intensified propaganda may also be accompanied by proposals in the negotiations which are variations on the theme the Soviets have played so far—no NATO modernization, and no elimination of the Soviet SS-20 threat either. The Soviets may also make new threatening gestures. The Soviets may, for instance, announce an end to their current so-called moratorium on SS-20 deployments, and a resumption of construction of new sites. In fact, base construction and the deployment of new missiles has continued throughout this so-called moratorium. Yet the Soviets would hope that by explicitly announcing their intention to deploy more SS-20s and by beginning construction of even more bases, they could break Western nerve in a way they have failed to do so far. It is even possible that the Soviets might seek to interrupt the INF negotiations, in order to demonstrate their supposed dissatisfaction with alleged US intransigence. Such a move would not be inconsistent with their continued efforts to heighten Western fears and weaken Alliance cohesion. The Soviets have also threatened to deploy their own cruise missile. They apparently have had long-range cruise missiles under development for some time and could try to use the US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile—NATO's response to the SS-20—as a convenient justification for their own cruise missile programme.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

Alternatively, the Soviets might, in the coming months, address more seriously the proposals which the United States has put forward, and discuss in greater detail the specific elements of the draft treaty which the United States has tabled. The Soviets might put forward new proposals of their own, proposals which would involve for the first time, not just cosmetic adjustments of their opening position, but serious limits on their own forces, instead of continuing attempts just to block deployment of US missiles. The Soviets might, in other words, stop employing arms control as an element in their political strategy designed to block Western deployments, and begin to use the Geneva negotiations as a vehicle for achieving mutual reductions and mutual restraint.

It would, I think, be a serious miscalculation for the Soviet Union to believe that it can bully the nations of the Alliance into abandoning the December 1979 decision, or that it can mislead Western publics as to the responsibility for lack of progress in the arms control track. The substantive interests involved and the record of the negotiations are too clear for that to happen. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union demonstrates a willingness to engage in the process of mutual accommodation which must characterize any genuine negotiation, it will find the United States willing to join in the pursuit of an enduring agreement limiting intermediate-range forces, an agreement which will serve the interests of both sides, of Europe as a whole, and of mankind.

Report by Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Congress: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Strategy, and Deterrence of Chemical Warfare [Extracts], February 1, 1983 [1]

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E. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN STRATEGY

1. *A Viable Deterrence Policy: Lessening Dependence on Nuclear Weapons*

In the wake of World War II, the United States and the Western democracies developed a policy intended to prevent any recurrence of the tremendous carnage and devastation which the war had caused. To that end, the United States made clear that it would use its atomic weapons not for conquest or coercion, but for discouraging—for *deterring*—aggression and attack against ourselves and our allies.

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[1] *Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request, and FY 1984–1988 Defense Programs,* pp. 51–58, 237–239.

Today, deterrence remains—as it has for the past 37 years—the cornerstone of our strategic nuclear policy. To deter successfully, we must be able—and must be seen to be able—to respond to any potential aggression in such a manner that the costs we will exact will substantially exceed any gains the aggressor might hope to achieve. We, for our part, are under no illusions about the dangers of a nuclear war between the major powers; we believe that neither side could win such a war. But this recognition on *our* part is not sufficient to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war; it is essential that the Soviet leadership understand this as well. We must make sure that the Soviet leadership, in calculating the risks of aggression, recognizes that because of our retaliatory capability, there can be no circumstance in which it could benefit by beginning a nuclear war at any level or of any duration. If the Soviets recognize that our forces can and will deny them their objectives at whatever level of nuclear conflict they contemplate, and in addition that such a conflict could lead to the destruction of those political, military, and economic assets that they value most highly, then deterrence is effective and the risk of war diminished. It is this outcome we seek to achieve.

2. *The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Policy*

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, America's virtual monopoly of intercontinental nuclear systems meant that our requirements for conventional war were relatively small. The Soviet Union understood that under our policy of "massive retaliation," we might respond to a Soviet conventional attack on the U.S. or our allies with an atomic attack on the USSR. As the 1950s ended, however, the Soviets began developing and acquiring long-range nuclear capabilities. As their capacity for nuclear and conventional attack continued to grow, the U.S. threat to respond to a conventional, or even a limited nuclear, attack with massive nuclear retaliation became less and less credible; hence, it was not a stable deterrent. Accordingly, in the 1960s the U.S. and the NATO allies adopted the concept of "flexible response". This concept had two goals: first, U.S. nuclear planning was modified in order to provide the President with the option of using nuclear forces selectively (rather than massively), thereby restoring credibility and stability to our nuclear deterrent. Additionally, the United States and the allies hoped that by improving conventional forces, they would reduce reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or cope with non-nuclear attack.

Unfortunately, neither we nor our allies ever fully met this key goal. Thus, with our present effort to increase our conventional strength, the Reagan Administration is essentially trying to secure a long-established but elusive goal of American policy.

The greater urgency with which we have approached this longstanding policy goal stems from two incontrovertible facts. First, despite the improved conventional force posture that the flexible response doctrine prompted NATO to undertake, the Alliance has continued to rely heavily on a nuclear response. Second, the Warsaw Pact has meanwhile strengthened its non-nuclear as well as its nuclear forces to a far greater extent than has NATO, even after "flexible response" was accepted as our doctrine.

Even if we ignored the direct and indirect role of nuclear forces in deterring conventional offense (for example, by compelling the dispersal of the enemy's forces and thus reducing their effectiveness), the United States would still have to maintain nuclear forces to deter nuclear attack on itself. We must also deter nuclear attack on our allies, most of whom have no nuclear weapons of their own.

While we work toward ensuring deterrence, we need to think about and plan against possible failures of deterrence. If deterrence should fail, we cannot predict the nature of a Soviet nuclear strike nor assure with any certainty that what may have started out as a limited Soviet attack would remain confined at that level. Nevertheless, we must plan for flexibility in our forces and in our response options so that there will be the possibility of terminating the conflict and re-establishing deterrence at the lowest possible level of violence, thus avoiding further destruction.

Of course, this concept of seeking to enhance deterrence and to limit the level of destruction by having flexible and enduring forces is not new. It has been squarely in the mainstream of American strategic thinking for over two decades. Appendix A[2] contains excerpts from Annual Defense Reports over the past 20 years that demonstrate clearly the continuity in the doctrine of "flexible response."

The past decades have taught us two central lessons with regard to implementing our nuclear policy, lessons that we must continue to take into account in the years ahead:

—First, for our retaliatory threat to be seen as credible, we must be able—and be seen to have the means—to respond appropriately to a wide range of aggressive actions. If our threatened response is perceived as inadequate or contrary to our national interest, it will be judged to be a bluff;

—Second, deterrence is a dynamic effort, not a static one. In order to continue to deter successfully, our capabilities must change as the threat changes.

It is useful to recall how the nuclear forces have changed over time:

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[2] Not printed here.

By the early 1960s, the U.S. had over 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons, most of which were carried by B-47s and the then-new B-52s. The Soviet Union had fewer than 500 strategic warheads. Throughout the 1960s, our nuclear posture presented the Soviet Union with a compelling deterrent if it considered launching a nuclear strike against the United States: because of the relatively small number of weapons the Soviet Union possessed and their ineffectiveness against any U.S. strategic forces, such an attack was impossible to execute successfully. If the Soviet planner targeted our missile silos and alert bomber bases with the systems he then possessed, he found that he would deplete his nuclear arsenal while not significantly reducing U.S. retaliatory forces. In other words, his ability to limit the certain, massive retaliatory destruction of his own forces and assets was rather small. If, on the other hand, the Soviet planner targeted U.S. cities, he would have to expect a U.S. retaliatory strike against his own cities, a strike by a U.S. arsenal considerably larger and much more capable than his own, by any measure. Again, he was deterred.

During the course of the 1970s the Soviet arsenal grew both in quantity and in quality (although the U.S. qualitative edge remained). The Soviets expanded their land-based missile force and hardened their protective silos, and continued the improvement of their defenses against air attack. At the same time, the United States made a choice to restrict its improvements to the yield and accuracy of its own missile forces so as not to threaten the Soviet Union with a sudden, disarming first strike. The net result of this was to allow the Soviet Union a "sanctuary" for its ICBM force, since U.S. forces by now could not attack them effectively. The Soviets, however, did not follow our self-imposed restraint. They developed a new generation of ICBMs specifically designed to destroy U.S. missile silos, which were hardened far less than Soviet silos, and the B-52 bases. By the late 1970s, this combination of vulnerable U.S. missiles and a Soviet missile "sanctuary" had reduced the effectiveness of our earlier deterrent and eased the problems of the Soviet war planners. Now, the Soviets could envision a potential nuclear confrontation in which they would threaten to destroy a very large part of our force in a first strike, while retaining overwhelming nuclear force to deter any retaliation we could carry out.

Keeping our strategic missiles and bombers adequately protected in the face of changing enemy offensive and defensive capabilities has, therefore, required continuing adaptation, as was recognized in practice by previous Administrations. For example, previous Presidents and Secretaries of Defense began programs to equip the B-52 with cruise missiles to aid in the problem of penetrating the increasingly formidable Soviet air defenses. This Administration, recognizing that an improved penetration capability is vital to the bomber leg of the Triad, reversed the previous Administration's decision to cancel the B-1, and successfully urged the Congress to authorize the B-1B bomber, which will be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses after the B-52 cannot. We are also pursuing development of a Stealth Bomber, which will be even more effective long after the useful life of the B-1B.

The B-1B will be able to escape from its bases quickly and so be far less vulnerable to destruction on the ground than the B-52. It will also be able to penetrate the vastly improved Soviet air defenses, which soon will be able to deny reliable penetration to the B-52s. The Stealth bomber should be able to continue this penetration even more effectively and for a far longer period.

To take advantage of the current ability of the sea-based leg of the Triad, our submarine systems, to elude attack, we will be deploying the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile and the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile. The Trident II will give us both increased payload and improved accuracy, substantially strengthening the sea-based portion of our nuclear forces. The deployment of cruise missiles on selected attack submarines and selected surface forces will add to the strategic reserve force, further diversifying our strategic capabilities.

The Minuteman and the Titan II land-based missiles were designed in the 1950s and installed in the 1960s, an era when our fixed missile bases, hardened by the standards of 20 years ago, were relatively safe from attack by the imprecise Soviet ballistic missiles of the time. Today, our ground-based missiles are the most vulnerable of our retaliatory forces, and we have decided to phase out the Titan II. Four Presidents, six Secretaries of Defense, and a majority of Members in many sessions of Congress have reached the conclusion that an MX missile should be deployed to modernize our ICBM force. Because of the newly developed accuracy of the Soviet missiles, largely gained by technologies they have acquired legally and illegally from us, all have had difficulty achieving the necessary consensus on a reasonably survivable mode of basing the MX ICBM. In its last session, the Congress agreed to provide R&D funds and to reserve the decision on providing production money until a basing mode has been approved.

Protecting a command, control, and communications system for nuclear forces is particularly difficult. Yet stability of deterrence in a crisis and the effective and responsible use of our nuclear forces depend on it. The Reagan Administration has therefore given highest priority to increasing the ability of our strategic force management systems not only to survive but to remain capable of performing their basic functions throughout a sustained sequence of Soviet attacks. We are also improving the performance, coverage, and endurance of our warning and attack assessment systems. These improvements, together with the strengthening of air defenses, should help remove any misperceptions in the mind of Soviet leaders that the United States could not retaliate effectively after a Soviet nuclear attack.

We cannot overemphasize the importance of a multiplicity of survivable strategic forces. Over the last 20 years, we have maintained a Triad of land-based ICBMs, manned bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles as an effective means of preserving a stable deterrent. The unique characteristics of the independent and separate strategic components that make up the Triad bolster deterrence by acting in concert to complicate severely Soviet attack planning, making it more difficult, on the one hand, for them to plan and execute a successful attack on all these components and, on the other hand, to defend against their combined and complementary retaliatory effects. The Triad also acts as a hedge against a possible technological breakthrough that the Soviets might develop or obtain that could threaten the viability of any single strategic system. The importance of the Triad to deterrence is no more apparent than today, when each leg is in need of modernization.

3. *Nuclear Weapons Issues*

What has been said so far illustrates the complexity of the continuing task of maintaining an American nuclear force capable of surviving a Soviet attack that is aimed at destroying it. However, the maintenance of a persuasive capability to deter a Soviet nuclear attack directed solely at an ally is even more demanding. It should be most obvious in this connection that we need to be able to use force responsibly and discriminately, in a manner appropriate to the nature of a nuclear attack.

Yet, some believe that we must threaten explicitly, even solely, the mass destruction of civilians on the adversary side, thus inviting a corresponding destruction of civilian populations on our side, and that such a posture will achieve stability in deterrence. This is incorrect. Such a threat is neither moral nor prudent. The Reagan Administration's policy is that under no circumstances may such weapons be used deliberately for the purpose of destroying populations.

For this reason, we disagree with those who hold that deterrence should be based on nuclear weapons designed to destroy cities rather than military targets. Deliberately designing weapons aimed at populations is neither necessary nor sufficient for deterrence. If we are forced to retaliate and can only respond by destroying population centers, we invite the destruction of our own population. Such a deterrent strategy is hardly likely to carry conviction as a deterrent, particularly as a deterrent to nuclear—let alone conventional—attack on an ally.

To maintain a sound deterrent, we must make clear to our adversary that we would decisively and effectively answer his attack. To talk of actions that the U.S. Government could not, in good conscience, and in prudence, undertake tends to defeat the goal of deterrence.

Some of the same ambiguities cloud recent proposals that we abandon long-standing alliance policy and pledge "No First Use" of nuclear weapons in response to Soviet conventional attacks in Europe. Indeed, if the Soviets thought that we would be so constrained, they might mass forces more heavily for offensive actions and gain a unilateral conventional advantage. To reduce further the prospects of nuclear war, we must strengthen NATO's conventional forces—not exchange unenforceable and unverifiable pledges. The danger of a "No First

Use" pledge remains that it could increase the chances of war and thus increase the chances of nuclear conflict.

a. *A Prudent Approach to Nuclear Weapons*

If we are to maintain a responsible nuclear deterrent against nuclear attacks on our allies, as well as against nuclear attacks on the United States, we will need to continue to exploit our comparative advantage in technology. The movement for a nuclear freeze has been inspired in part by the mistaken belief that the United States has been steadily piling up more and more nuclear weapons. In fact, the United States has not been accumulating more weapons. The number in our stockpile was one-third higher in 1967 than in 1980. Nor have we been accumulating more destructive weapons. The average number of kilotons per weapon has declined since the late 1950s, and the total number of megatons in our stockpile was four times as high in 1960 than in 1980. With the retirement of the Titans, this total will decline even further. Moreover, the United States has had an intensive and consistent program to improve the safety of the nuclear weapons in its stockpile against accidental detonation and its consequences, as well as to improve the security of these weapons against seizure and use by terrorists or other unauthorized persons. The weapons in our stockpile today have an average age of about 13 years. It is essential that we continue to replace them with new, safer, more secure, and less vulnerable weapons.

The various proposals for a nuclear freeze would prevent us from carrying out these programs and thus improving the safety and the security of our weapons, reducing the vulnerability of our delivery systems in the face of increasing threats, and replacing systems as they reach the end of their service life due simply to their age. Such proposals, hence, would reduce the stability of our deterrent against both "accidents" and deliberate destruction.

b. *Linkage Between "Strategic" and "Non-Strategic" Nuclear Forces*

To enhance deterrence of Soviet conventional and nuclear attack against our NATO allies, we have for many years stationed substantial nuclear forces in Europe. Many of the delivery systems are equipped with dual-capable systems, which can use both conventional and—with proper authorization from the President and in consultation with the allies—nuclear weapons. These forces deter by providing both a significant combat potential (thereby denying potential Soviet hopes of a quick victory) and a clear linkage of the American strategic nuclear systems, which are NATO's ultimate deterrent force, to the defense of Europe.

The purpose of our non-strategic nuclear forces in Europe is to deter Soviet nuclear and major conventional attack on our NATO allies. This deterrence is founded on NATO's ability to retaliate against the Soviet Union from Europe, and on a clear Soviet understanding of the certainty that a conventional/nuclear war in Europe risks engagement of the central nuclear systems of the United States. All of our nuclear forces are governed by a single coherent policy that governs the linkage among our conventional, non-strategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. There is no separate U.S. policy for non-strategic nuclear weapons.

In the past five years, Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles targeted on Europe have posed a grave threat to the credibility of NATO's deterrent posture in the context of the overall Soviet force buildup. The SS-20 missile force, along with other Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces that can reach Europe, but not the United States, could give the Soviet Union meaningful coercive power in peace or in a crisis, and preclude the Alliance from achieving its objectives in the event of war.

Over the past decades the Soviet Union has sought, through both propaganda and diplomacy, to shatter the strategic unity of the NATO Alliance. A primary purpose of this effort has been to force the removal of U.S. forces, nuclear and conventional, from Europe. This would leave our European allies exposed to threats by forces of the Soviet Union, both those based in Eastern Europe and those based on Soviet territory; it would also break the linkage between the U.S. strategic deterrent force and the defense of the European members of NATO. In fact, the purpose of the close relationship between U.S. "strategic" forces and the U.S. nuclear forces deployed in Europe is to dissuade the Soviets from believing that they might be able to conduct a nuclear war in Europe from a sanctuary in the USSR.

One of the principal ploys used by the Soviet leadership in its propaganda campaign is turning facts on their head and asserting that the U.S. intends to fight a "limited nuclear war" in Europe. Nothing could be further from the truth. We recognize that the use of any nuclear weapon—whether "tactical" or intercontinental—would represent a most fundamental change in the nature of warfare. The very purpose of our effort to strengthen conventional forces is to prevent a situation in which it would become necessary to use nuclear weapons to stop a conventional attack. If it is clear to the Soviet Union that a conventional assault by them cannot produce a victory, either through a quick campaign or by outlasting NATO in a conventional conflict they would try to prolong, then no rational Soviet planner would launch such an assault in the first place. But we cannot allow our security to rest entirely on the calculations of a Soviet planner as to whether he can successfully attack and invade NATO Europe with his conventional military power. As a result, in addition to our conventional modernization and sustainability programs, the nuclear option remains an important element in deterring Soviet attack. If the Soviet leadership is aware that NATO, if attacked, will employ, if required, all means necessary to defend itself and prevent the USSR from achieving its war aims, then deterrence is strengthened and the chances of both conventional and nuclear war are reduced.

c. *Nuclear Arms Control*

It is the objective of the United States to maintain the lowest level of armaments compatible with the preservation of our, and our allies', security. While President Reagan is forced by the Soviet threat to pursue a force augmentation and modernization program, he has also undertaken a serious effort designed to reduce armaments through negotiation. In the nuclear area, the Reagan Administration took two important new arms control initiatives, on intermediate-range and strategic nuclear forces.

On intermediate-range missiles, President Reagan offered to terminate our plan to deploy ground-based cruise missiles and the Pershing II ballistic missile, if the Soviets would eliminate their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. In START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), the President proposed first-phase reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear weapons—ballistic missiles—by seeking ballistic missile warhead reductions to equal ceilings about one-third below current levels, and by reducing ballistic missiles to about one-half the current level. To enhance stability, he proposed that no more than one-half of those warheads be on land-based ballistic missiles. He also announced that we would seek equal ceilings on other elements of strategic nuclear forces in a second phase, including limits on aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight below current American levels. Since the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and START negotiations began, the President has offered additional proposals for confidence-building measures, which aim primarily at reducing the risk that misinterpretation of the other side's activities could heighten tensions or even lead to conflict.

In seeking INF and START agreements that significantly limit nuclear arms, we will not repeat the mistakes of past negotiations. Our experience with the effects of some previous arms control agreements has not been positive. They had the effect of limiting our own forces while enabling the Soviets to continue a massive arms build-up. Despite the SALT accords, [3] the Soviet Union has steadily increased its nuclear arsenal, making our missile forces much more vulnerable and our deterrent capability less stable and secure.

We need to emphasize that this Administration is not developing the Peacekeeper (MX) or any other weapon as a "bargaining chip." In its current loose usage, the term "bargaining chip" weapon has come to mean a weapon that is developed—often at great cost—for the sole purpose of then negotiating away that very weapon. That, obviously, would be an absurd procedure.

What is true, however, is that arms control negotiations must reflect the balance of power, including the forthcoming power obtainable from weapons under development. To the extent that we do make progress in modernizing our forces, the Soviet Union has a stronger incentive to negotiate in good faith, and we thus have a better opportunity to reach agreement on the control of arms. If, as we desire, the outcome of such negotiations is an outright reduction in arms, then it might be said that we build some newer weapons only to be able to withdraw more older weapons. But that is not at all the same thing as to build costly new weapons as expendable bargaining chips. Rather, we seek to have the proper mix of modern forces to ensure a stable deterrence at reduced levels and permit arms control to complement and enhance national security.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff., and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

We can never, much as we would desire it, return to the kind of world that existed before the secrets of the atom were unlocked. But we can work to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used, by maintaining the forces necessary to convince any adversary that the cost of aggression would be far higher than any possible benefit. The United States has pursued this strategy of deterrence since the dawn of the nuclear age; and since that time deterrence has preserved the peace.

The primacy of deterrence has not changed, but the conditions for ensuring it have. The Reagan Administration's strategic modernization program is designed to preserve deterrence, in the face of an evolving threat, by increasing the survivability, accuracy, and credibility of our nuclear forces, and to offer the Soviet Union an incentive for genuine arms reduction, by demonstrating our commitment to maintaining a strategic balance.

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H. DETERRENCE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE

1. *Introduction*

Our goal is to eliminate the threat of this particularly abhorrent form of warfare by obtaining a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. The United States will not be the first to use chemical weapons and does not and will not possess biological or toxin weapons. We remain committed to long-standing U.S. policy and existing treaties. However, while seeking a verifiable ban, we must be in a position to deter the use of chemical warfare against us or our allies.

The Soviet Union possesses a considerable advantage in chemical warfare (CW) capabilities that could be a decisive factor in some future conflict. In the face of this threat, we have been working to improve our protective posture. While we have recently made significant improvements in training, we still face serious deficiencies in both the quality and the quantity of our defensive equipment. Furthermore, our retaliatory capability remains inadequate since our current stockpile is composed largely of weapons and chemical agents with little or no military utility on the modern battlefield. Efforts to achieve bilateral arms control agreements between 1977 and 1980 were unsuccessful in spite of U.S. unilateral restraint since 1969. Current efforts to obtain a verifiable ban are centered in the multilateral Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, where increased pressure can be exerted on the

Soviet position on verification. Achieving a ban will not come easily, not only because the verification and compliance problems are so formidable, but also because the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate seriously so long as they perceive they have a significant advantage in CW capabilities.

Until we can achieve a verifiable ban, we must reduce the Soviet Union's incentive to use chemical weapons against us or our allies by rebuilding and maintaining an adequate CW posture of our own. Our program is structured and sized to do this and no more. Consequently, most of the resources in this program are devoted to improving the ability of our forces to survive and operate under chemical attack. Our goal is to be able to sustain combat operations in a chemical conflict while minimizing the performance decrement associated with operating in a protective posture. However, significant degradation is unavoidable. Therefore, improving our protective posture will not by itself provide an adequate deterrent because the Soviet Union would enjoy a significant military advantage if they could force us to operate in protective equipment in a contaminated environment while their troops remained relatively unencumbered. To complete our deterrent posture, we must eliminate the prospects for such a Soviet advantage by reestablishing a retaliatory capability sufficient to make them recognize that they, too, would be forced to operate with similar encumbrances.

In addition to improving our protective posture and reestablishing a credible retaliatory capability, our program includes plans for the disposal of obsolete stocks of chemical agents and munitions under safe conditions.

The overall direction for our CW program is provided by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. The Army is the executive agent for research and development, with each Service responsible for procurement, training, and Service-unique development.

2. *FY 1984–88 Programs*

a. *CW Protection*

As we move toward our goal of improving CW protection, increased emphasis in RDT&E will be placed in the medical area and upon elimination of deficiencies in current items of protection and warning. Throughout the mid-range period, development of doctrine appropriate to the chemical battlefield and use of field exercises will complement increased training activities. In FY 1984 we will continue to procure stocks of protective clothing for all forces and expand procurement of collective protection systems for all Services.

b. *CW Retaliatory Capability*

We will continue to seek Congressional approval to reestablish a credible retaliatory capability. Our proposed program is a small but critical component of our overall approach to redressing critical deficiencies and ensuring that the Soviets have no incentive to use chemical weapons against us or our allies. A chemical retaliatory capability, in conjunction with a strong protective posture, is essential. The current stockpile is clearly inadequate to provide a credible deterrent. Only a very small portion of the stockpile offers potential military utility into the 1980s. Moreover, there is serious concern about the future reliability of even this small portion due to internal munition and agent deterioration in many of the munitions. We will continue our maintenance program to attempt to preserve the serviceability of these munitions. Maintenance alone cannot, however, overcome the deficiencies of the current stockpile, nor can it provide an effective deep-target capability in the absence of the appropriate weapons. Maintenance cannot ease the logistical burdens or reverse or halt internal degradation of munitions. The program we propose would replace the current, inadequate chemical munitions stockpile with one that is more militarily effective, safer and, at the same time, substantially smaller. Our plans are to begin production of binary munitions with FY 1984 funds, which will result in initial assembly of 155mm projectiles in late 1985 and of air-deliverable Bigeye bombs in FY 1986.

c. *Demilitarization*

In recognition of the magnitude of the national problem of chemical weapons demilitarization, increased DoD-level management control will be exercised. The program will seek to dispose of those munitions that safety dictates should be eliminated first. FY 1984 funds are requested for a facility to dispose of the incapacitating and highly flammable agent BZ. A facility to dispose of the stocks on Johnston Island and facilities to destroy the rockets and mines at all other storage sites are planned. These facilities will enable us to destroy all M55 rockets and M23 mines (the most potentially hazardous items) by 1990. In parallel with these efforts, we will pursue a research and development program to identify the most cost-effective method of disposing of the remaining, less time-urgent items in the stockpile.

3. *Conclusion*

Improvement of the U.S. chemical deterrent posture is essential both to eliminate the Soviet Union's current incentive to use chemical weapons and to provide an incentive for them to negotiate seriously a comprehensive, verifiable chemical weapon ban. Both the protective and retaliatory components of our program are essential. The Soviet Union has made massive investments in chemical warfare capabilities. The current extreme imbalance in capabilities between us and the Soviets could have catastrophic consequences. We need not attempt to match the Soviet Union across the board in chemical warfare capabilities; this is a highly leveraged area in which our investments in a balanced program, consisting of both protective and retaliatory elements, will have a high payoff in restoring an adequate level of deterrence. Production of binary munitions will not add to the demilitarization problem, since the chemical agent would not be produced until after the munition had been launched toward its target. Further, binary munitions offer substantial safety and maintainability advantages over unitary chemical munitions. However, continued failure to improve our retaliatory posture will perpetuate and aggravate the current high-risk situation and probably thwart attempts to achieve a complete, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Therefore, we request Congressional support in approving and funding these essential programs.

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Interview of Soviet General Secretary Andropov: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, February 1, 1983 [1]

Question. What is your attitude to the U.S. President's letter to the people of Europe, [2] in which he proposed that the USSR and the United States sign on American terms an agreement on the elimination of medium-range land-based missiles?

Answer. First of all, I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about—and this all the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of—is the same "zero option". That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union now is already generally recognized. Really, can one seriously speak about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of this category.

It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in Geneva. That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure.

As I have already said, the U.S.S.R. will not agree to unilateral disarmament. If things are carried to the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, we shall answer this in a due way. But this would not be our choice.

The Soviet Union is for a different road. It would be best, and we suggest this, not to have in the European zone nuclear weapons at all, either medium-range or tactical weapons. And seems [as received] the United States does not agree to this, we are prepared also to such a solution under which the Soviet Union would have no more missiles than NATO already has in Europe. At the same time an arrangement should be reached on cutting to the equal levels by both sides of the number of aircraft capable of medium-range nuclear weapon delivery. Thus, there would be complete parity in missiles and aircraft, and the parity at a far lower level than now.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Feb. 1, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report,* Feb. 2, 1983, vol. 3, pp. AA1–AA2.

[2] *Ante,* Jan. 30.

The Soviet Union is prepared to sign such an agreement. Is the President of the United States prepared to sign such an agreement based on the principle of equality and equal security?

Question. The U.S. President suggests meeting with you to sign the agreement which he proposes. What can you say on this score?

Answer. We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have special significance to resolving complicated problems. This determines our serious approach to them.

For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game. A meeting between the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at developing relations between our countries, would be useful both to the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe and to the whole world.

But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's approach to the whole of this issue. This can only be regretted.

Statement by Canadian Foreign Minister MacEachen to the Committee on Disarmament, February 1, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman: may I first extend to you my congratulations on your assumption of the Chair for the first month of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. I should also like to extend to Ambassador García Robles my congratulations on his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. The peace prize is much more than a personal honour; it is a symbol of the devotion to peace that must be at the heart of our collective work.

I recall the message of the late Lester B. Pearson, a friend and cabinet colleague of mine, when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. He said that in the nuclear age nations face a choice between peace and extinction. In the twenty-five years since then, nuclear war has been avoided, but at the cost of an awesome build-up of nuclear arms. The horrible instruments of destruction, so terrifying in the 1950s, have been replaced by new and more deadly successors. The threat of a sudden, total collapse into nuclear suicide has been overlaid with an equally chilling prospect of suicide by stages, of nuclear war that could never be "won".

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[1] CD/PV.189, pp. 18–22.

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The Government of Canada believes that 1983 must be a crucial year in reviving the momentum of arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Just a little over a year ago there were no negotiations on nuclear weapons. Since then, the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and more recently have resumed talks on strategic nuclear arms (START). The emphasis not just on limitations but on reductions is most welcome.

Recently, there have been signs that the negotiating process is beginning to work. The leaders of both superpowers have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to serious negotiations. Proposals have been made by both sides, some of which have been vigorously promoted in public. A greater sense of urgency appears to be developing. In the meantime, both superpowers continue to agree informally to abide by the main provisions of the SALT agreements. [2]

This is not the forum for those negotiations, though we all realize that unless concrete progress is achieved in those talks, our collective fate will be at risk no matter how much may be achieved in this forum. What we can draw from past experience is a fundamental conclusion that must apply if arms control and disarmament negotiations—bilateral or multilateral—are to succeed.

An increase in mutual security is the only sound basis for effective arms control and disarmament. As Prime Minister Trudeau stressed at the second United Nations special session on disarmament, security in today's world cannot be achieved on a purely national basis. Attempts by one side to make gains at the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work. Security is a matter of weaponry but also of perception and confidence. Action by one side which is perceived by the other to be threatening creates or widens a gulf of suspicion. Action produces reaction, and in the end neither side achieves a long-term gain. Both suffer from the effort and the political relationship is poisoned. Arms control negotiations offer an escape from this danger only if the parties accept as their fundamental objective increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. It follows from this that an attempt by any power to develop a policy which assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity.

While this may be a home truth, it is directly relevant to the current situation. The origins and evolution of the INF talks illustrate the point.

In 1977, the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS-20 missile. The North Atlantic alliance was understandably concerned by this new threat to the territory of several European member States. Moreover the Soviet Union and the United States were at that time working towards codification of a balance in intercontinental nuclear weapons.

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[2] The SALT I agreements are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff.; the SALT II agreements, *ibid., 1979,* pp. 187 ff.

Thus, in December 1979, NATO members, including Canada, took what has become known as the "two-track" decision.[3] We agreed to deploy Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, beginning in late 1983. Canada has since been asked to help test the cruise missile guidance system. Secondly, NATO proposed negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States to limit land-based intermediate-range missile systems on both sides. So began the dynamic leading to the INF talks.

Since 1979, progress has been made, but much too slowly. The Soviet Union was sharply critical of the NATO decision to deploy new intermediate-range missiles in response to the SS-20 missiles, and initially was reluctant to take part in negotiations. Subsequently, the Soviet Union agreed to preliminary discussions in the autumn of 1980. Formal negotiations began in November 1981.

The period since November 1981 has been marked by exchanges of concrete proposals. The negotiations have been conducted seriously and have made some progress. Given the underlying need to take into account the legitimate security concerns of both sides, NATO ministers have agreed that this requirement could best be met through the elimination of all existing Soviet and planned United States missiles in this class. We have also confirmed our earlier decision to begin deploying the missiles at the end of 1983 unless there are concrete results from the negotiations. We are willing to give full consideration to any serious Soviet proposals that would enhance the chances for effective and verifiable agreements.

Recently, the Soviet Union made a proposal concerning possible reductions of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. While the proposal is unacceptable in many respects, it appears to recognize that NATO Governments have a legitimate concern about the number of SS-20 missiles aimed at the European member States, and that a reduction is necessary.

This in itself is progress. However, it is not yet clear if both sides have accepted that mutual security must be the basis of the negotiations. That is why 1983 is crucial.

Canada has a large stake in the negotiations. We intend to press vigorously the following basic approach:

> Canada places its full weight behind the negotiations. We strongly support a negotiated solution that will make deployment of the missiles in Europe unnecessary;
>
> Likewise, in the absence of concrete results in the negotiations, Canada considers that there is no viable alternative to deployment of the missiles;
>
> Every serious proposal must be seriously examined. By the same token, propaganda ploys must not be permitted to undermine serious negotiations;

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 814–816.

Statements aimed at public opinion cannot be a substitute for genuine willingness to reach an agreement;

Increased mutual security must be accepted as the fundamental consideration in the negotiating process.

Despite the obstacles, the Canadian Government is convinced that these negotiations can demonstrate in 1983 that the arms control and disarmament process can be made to work.

1983 is also a year of opportunity for the Committee on Disarmament. Public concern about the issues is high. The need for early action is clear, and mutual security is also the foundation for our work here.

I see encouraging signs in this Committee since I was first responsible for Canadian foreign policy some seven years ago.

The presence now of China and France along with the other three nuclear-weapon States is the most striking and hopeful development.

The growth in size of this negotiating body, while at first glance sobering, is also encouraging. More widespread representation from all parts of the world in a body devoted to arms control and disarmament is a positive development despite the complications this inevitably introduces for a negotiating forum. Governments in all regions have a direct interest—and a corresponding responsibility—in contributing to the global quest for a more secure world.

Working groups have been established on certain key subjects. The increasing participation of technical experts is another significant development.

These have been positive steps, but we must demonstrate to the world that this is a serious negotiating body which can produce concrete results.

How can we ensure that the real work of negotiation is pressed with vigour? The negotiating table is full of proposals, but they must be translated into agreements. The recent Prague Declaration [4] referred to the work of this Committee in an extended way. As I said in Ottawa last week, any aspects of these proposals which would lead to progress towards concrete and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements will receive our support. Today, in Geneva, I want to single out particular issues on which Canada believes progress should be made in 1983.

The pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is a fundamental nuclear issue before this Committee. We were pleased by the establishment last year of a working group in the Committee on a nuclear test ban, but we were disappointed that, having waited so long for consensus, the Committee did not move quickly to begin substantive work. I urge that this new working group begin to discharge its mandate as a matter of urgency in 1983.

Another promising avenue is the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events. Since its inception in 1976, it has been developing an international seismic data exchange system which will be an international verification mechanism forming part of the provisions of an eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. At the second United Nations special session on disarmament last year, Prime Minister Trudeau called for it to become fully operational at an early date and in advance of a treaty. Canada has committed resources to enable us to become a full participant in the exchange. We are convinced that the early entry into operation of the data exchange would be an effective way to make progress towards the objective of a comprehensive test ban.

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[4] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

This step-by-step approach can ensure that key elements of a treaty are in place even before the final political commitment to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. This process can develop a momentum toward the conclusion of a treaty and can be complementary to the necessary negotiations among nuclear-weapon States.

I take this opportunity of drawing to the attention of this Committee an equally high Canadian priority for 1983, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons through the evolution of an effective non-proliferation regime based on the non-proliferation Treaty.[5] The NPT emphasizes the non-discriminatory transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. It also provides for the de-escalation of the arms race on the part of nuclear-weapon States and for the rapid and effective movement towards disarmament. More States have adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty. However, such voluntary renunciation has not been matched by corresponding action by the nuclear-weapon States to halt the build-up of nuclear weapons. Only tangible moves by the superpowers will demonstrate the sincerity of their commitment to non-proliferation. Those of us with nuclear technology and those without must seek to persuade the nuclear-weapon States to live up to the bargain to which they are committed by the non-proliferation Treaty.

Canada is prepared to seek international consensus on the development of principles which would result in a more universal and effective approach to non-proliferation. Such principles should include a formal renunciation of nuclear explosive devices and an agreement to permit the safeguarding of all nuclear activities throughout the entire range of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is fundamental to the creation of a stable and permanent non-proliferation regime. Under such conditions, bilateral nuclear commitments could then be subsumed into a truly equitable and responsible international order.

I suggest that the time has come for genuine movement towards the realization of these objectives.

Arms control and disarmament must also extend to non-nuclear-weapon systems, some of which are as potentially horrifying as nuclear weapons.

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[5] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

The time is right for progress this year towards a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. We intend to participate vigorously along with others in seeking to realize the maximum from the present opportunity.

Continuing Canadian research on defensive measures enables us to put forward suggestions on such aspects as the verification provisions of a treaty banning chemical weapons. Canada has contributed working papers. We have allocated funds to enable Canadian technical experts to participate here in Geneva for longer periods, beginning with the 1983 session. Expertise from many countries, including non-members, has been brought to bear in this Committee on the complex issues involved. The achievements of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons again illustrate that work in this body can complement bilateral negotiations.

Another area for progress is the subject of weapons for use in outer space. This issue has been described as the first arms control problem of the twenty-first century. I urge the Committee to begin as soon as possible its essential task of defining the legal and other issues necessary to build upon the outer space legal regime. Canada contributed to this objective in a working paper tabled here last summer. Verification is likely to loom large, as it does for a nuclear test ban and a chemical weapons ban. The expanding programme of verification research in Canada will seek to identify possible solutions. We intend to participate actively in this work. It is the view of the Government of Canada that it is time to establish a working group on this subject.

I have focused on four important issues, four Canadian priorities for 1983, on which I wished to put Canada's position strongly:

> Canada will press for progress toward the objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban;
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> Canada will press for a more effective non-proliferation regime;
>
> Canada will press for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons;
>
> Canada will press for progress towards the objective of prohibiting all weapons for use in outer space.

These are issues where there are prospects for genuine progress and where progress can make a direct contribution to mutual security.

Recent years have not been propitious for negotiating on arms control and disarmament. Yet the process has continued and is again beginning to show hopeful signs. Public statements by world leaders have underlined that the arms spiral is a major world-wide danger and that the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements is vital. There is room for optimism if arms control and disarmament negotiations are based on realism. Mutual security is our common goal and objective.

Statement by Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament [Extract], February 3, 1983 [1]

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Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, it is a special honour for me to address, during my visit to Geneva, this important forum in whose work the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has participated actively and intensively ever since its accession in 1975. My visit occurs at a time when this Committee envisages changing its designation to "Conference on Disarmament". I welcome this intention because I regard the new name not only as due recognition of the practical work this Committee has performed so far but also as recognition of the growing importance of this forum, which is laying important foundations for the long-term process of arms control and disarmament by negotiating new generally acceptable agreements.

I wish you, Mr. Chairman, and all the participants every success in this work that concerns us all.

The city of Geneva is a universal symbol of negotiations aimed at strengthening peace and at banishing the horrors of war. Ever since the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in wartime, [2] this city has been inextricably linked with international arms control and disarmament negotiations. Today it is the site of several highly important arms control negotiations which people throughout the world are watching with growing expectations, this year in particular, and which they expect to yield tangible results as soon as possible.

In this context, there is an inner link between the work of the world-wide forum represented by the Committee on Disarmament and the simultaneous United States-Soviet negotiations on substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. Together with the negotiations in Vienna and Madrid, they combine to form a comprehensive dynamic negotiating process of unprecedented intensity.

The Federal Government therefore has great expectations with regard to further developments during 1983.

It is determined to contribute to ensuring that genuine progress occurs on the way to co-operation, dialogue and disarmament.

Only if this is achieved can governments and peoples devote themselves to the great tasks facing humanity: world-wide development, the struggle against hunger and poverty and protection of the environment.

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[1] CD/PV.190, pp. 8–14.

[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969,* pp. 764–765.

The policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany has from the very outset been a policy for peace. This precept is enshrined in the Basic Law, our Constitution.

Disarmament and arms control are integral parts of our security policy and that of the alliance. As early as 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany gave its allies a contractual assurance that it would not manufacture nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons. [3] So that its renunciation of the manufacture of chemical weapons can be verified, the Federal Republic has ever since then accepted international on-site inspections, which can be carried out without impairing the legitimate interest in preserving business secrets.

The peace note of 1966 by the then Federal Government [4] proposed, *inter alia,* the exchange of observers at manoeuvres—this was nine years before such a confidence-building measure was agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act. [5]

The Federal Republic of Germany is committed to a consistent policy of the renunciation of force. As early as 1954, 19 years before joining the United Nations, it stated that it would frame its policy in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and committed itself to the obligation to observe the ban on force embodied in Article 2 of the Charter.

This ban on the threat or use of force was the guiding principle of the aforementioned German peace note of 1966. It is also a fundamental element of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and our treaties with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague as well as the Basic Treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

But it is not sufficient to demand a policy forswearing the use of force, embodied in solemn declarations of principle. What matters is whether the ban on the use of force is observed in practical policy. I cannot conceal my deep concern at the fact that, especially in the past few years, this principle has been seriously violated. A major task incumbent upon everyone responsible is to settle existing conflicts by means of political solutions—here I have in mind Afghanistan in particular.

The ban on the use of force is comprehensive. It must apply between all countries and regions. It must include the use of force of every type, that is to say, it must prevent not only nuclear war but every kind of war. For my densely populated country at the interface of the two alliances in East and West, the policy of preventing war is a matter of life and death.

The principle of a comprehensive ban on the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter is the fundament of the security policy pursued by the Atlantic alliance. This comprehensive ban on force must be applied in relations between all countries and regions.

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[3] *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955, Basic Documents,* vol. I, pp. 979–984.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1966,* pp. 168–174.

[5] The arms control portions are printed *ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–305. The entire act is in *Department of State Bulletin,* Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

At its summit meeting held in Bonn on 10 June 1982, the Western alliance solemnly reaffirmed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack.[6]

We welcome the fact that, in their Prague declaration,[7] the Warsaw Pact countries took up certain points of the solemn statement by the alliance. The North Atlantic defence alliance is ready to examine whether the Warsaw Pact declaration opens possibilities for applying the principle of the ban on force embodied in the United Nations Charter even more consistently in relations among all States. A renewed binding reaffirmation of the ban on force could constitute a contribution to improving the international situation if it is observed by every State with regard to every other State without reservation and if, at the same time, practical steps are taken to put an end to the use of force where it still prevails. A consistent policy for peace requires the renunciation of the threat of force for the attainment of foreign-policy objectives. In addition, the ban on force must be given concrete substance by achieving tangible results at arms control negotiations.

Our aim is to obtain stability both in Europe and worldwide at the lowest possible level of armaments: peace with ever fewer weapons. Arms control and disarmament are the means of achieving this aim. Everyone making serious efforts to achieve progress at the current negotiations, be it in Geneva, Vienna, Madrid or New York, knows how difficult it is to eliminate distrust and reconcile conflicting interests. New efforts are needed to create confidence. Concrete measures must be agreed on that make the military conduct of States calculable and thus systematically reduce distrust.

We noted with satisfaction that the idea of confidence-building measures again met with general support at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution on this subject sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany together with 36 other countries was unanimously adopted.[8] We regard this as an encouraging sign. The principles and guidelines for confidence-building measures, which already enjoy extensive support by the international community, must now be discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are supplementing these efforts by an international symposium to be held in the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1983, which will afford scientists from all over the world an opportunity to elaborate the concept of confidence-building measures and in particular to consider their application in individual regions.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 336–337.

[7] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

[8] G.A. res. 37/100 D of Dec. 13, 1982.

Confidence-building is conditional upon maximum mutual openness. The more progress we make in this field, the more we oblige countries to confine themselves to an armament level really needed for self-defence.

We advocate transparency with regard to world-wide expenditure on armaments and to the relationship between arms spending and expenditure on economic and social development. For this reason, I proposed to the General Assembly several years ago that the United Nations establish a twofold register showing how much each industrial country spends *per capita*, on the one hand, on armaments and, on the other, on development aid. I also suggested setting up a register on world-wide weapons exports and imports so as to be able to make this "grey area" of world-wide armaments activities more transparent. The Federal Republic of Germany has up to now contributed data in three successive years to the register that already exists at the United Nations in the form of a standardized reporting system on defence expenditure. However, this system can only prove a success if the Warsaw Pact countries participate as well in future. At its thirty-seventh session the General Assembly therefore adopted a resolution calling upon all States once more to participate in this first major step towards the reduction of defence spending.[9]

Confidence-building measures are not an end in themselves; they considerably facilitate progress towards the attainment of tangible and balanced results in the field of disarmament and arms control.

In particular, this also applies to verification of the observance of treaties. If countries that sign a treaty do not possess the national means of monitoring its observance, the treaty must provide for an impartial body of experts to examine any doubts or unclarified incidents. If necessary, the countries must also be willing to grant this independent body of experts access to their territory for the purpose of its examinations.

The Federal Republic of Germany has urged reliable verification simply for the purpose of placing arms control agreements on a firm basis and hence contributing to the success of the respective treaty and of the subsequent disarmament and arms control efforts in general. I therefore welcome the remark in last month's Prague declaration to the effect that the Warsaw Pact countries proceed on the understanding that all arms control agreements must, where necessary, provide for international verification of their implementation.

I cherish the hope that this remark will soon be reflected in concrete steps in the ongoing negotiations.

The efforts undertaken by the Federal Republic of Germany serve in particular the cause of arms control and disarmament between East and West. In the past few years the Warsaw Pact has made enormous efforts to increase its conventional and nuclear forces. This deeply disturbs us because the balance has been greatly shifted, to the disadvantage of the West. Imbalance creates distrust and has an adverse impact on the endeavours for co-operation and détente.

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[9] G.A. res. 37/95 B of Dec. 13, 1982.

We are especially concerned at the Soviet Union's continuous build-up of modern land-based intermediate-range missiles, the SS 20s. The West does not yet have an equivalent capability. The Atlantic alliance, including the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, has in past years repeatedly drawn attention to this development. In the end it was forced to react by means of its dual-track decision of December 1979.[10] With this decision the Western alliance embarked on a completely new course: it was ready from the outset to make the necessary modernization of its weapons the subject of negotiations. The alliance proposed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at their mutual, world-wide renunciation of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

We regard this zero solution for both sides as the best and most desirable outcome of these negotiations. It would mean that, in an important area of nuclear arms, agreement would be reached not merely on limiting but on eliminating an entire category of weapons, in other words, genuine disarmament.

The United States, supported by its allies, will continue to make every effort to achieve as soon as possible in these negotiations concrete, balanced and verifiable results. Let there be no doubt that the West cannot accept the Soviet Union acquiring a monopoly in land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. I emphasize: we are firmly determined to achieve concrete negotiated results. Every suggestion made by the Soviet Union at the negotiating table indicating readiness substantially to reduce, that is to say eliminate, modern Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles would be a step in the right direction. Such a reduction in Soviet potential would make possible a reduction in Western modernization, based on the principles of equality and parity. This means that the West is prepared, as envisaged in NATO's double-track decision, to review its modernization requirement in the light of concrete negotiating results.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany also attaches great importance to the United States-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons. The United States has proposed making deep cuts in the arsenals of both sides with a view to establishing a stable balance at a lower level. We welcome the remark made by General Secretary Andropov in his speech on 21 December 1982 to the effect that the Soviet Union, too, is ready to agree on reductions going beyond SALT II.[11]

At the United States-Soviet START and INF negotiations, confidence-building measures in the nuclear field are also being discussed. We hope that the aim of creating more trust and transparency and thus preventing misunderstandings and wrong assessments can soon be translated into binding and verifiable agreements.

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[10] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[11] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 917–922.

Concern at the ever-increasing growth of nuclear arsenals should not blind us to the dangers posed by conventional arms.

It is imperative that—parallel to the envisaged increasing control over and reduction of nuclear potentials—all ways and means should be exploited for intensifying the dialogue on arms control in the conventional field and checking and reversing the world-wide build-up of conventional armaments: every year they deprive peoples of immense resources which are urgently needed for tackling vital development tasks.

The only forum existing at present on arms control in the conventional sphere are the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

Now it is essential to concentrate in Vienna on the key questions that are still unsettled: finding a solution to the problem of starting data on forces and reaching agreement on associated measures doing justice to the requirement of adequate verification and to the goal of confidence-building and stabilization.

We realize that, since they are confined in scope to Central Europe and in substance to force strengths, the MBFR negotiations can render only a limited contribution towards stabilizing the relationship of conventional forces in Europe. The need to complement MBFR by means of an arms control forum covering the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, is met by the project of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe within the CSCE framework. This opportunity should be taken advantage of. In an initial phase the Conference should negotiate confidence-building measures that are militarily significant, binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

We are convinced that these measures could make an important contribution to greater transparency and calculability in the military sphere and reduce the danger of surprise attacks.

At the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid we are therefore striving—within the framework of a balanced and substantive final document—for a precise mandate for convening the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

The year 1983 holds out great opportunities for the Committee on Disarmament as well. The impulses provided by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament last year need to be translated into practice.

New opportunities exist for the Committee, I feel, particularly in a field to which my country attaches no less importance than to the nuclear disarmament talks between the two Superpowers and to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. My country wishes a treaty on the complete and verifiable elimination of all chemical weapons to be concluded soon. It is high time that mankind be freed from the threat posed by chemical weapons. A comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons ban is all the more imperative now because there have recently been increasing signs of chemical and toxic weapons being used in various crisis areas on the Asian continent. I therefore appeal to the Committee to expedite its work in this field and draw up a treaty banning these weapons as quickly as possible.

I note with satisfaction that the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban have been greatly intensified during the past year. This affords a good basis for the Committee's work this year.

The indispensable prerequisites for such a ban are reliable verification procedures. As we all know, national technical means are absolutely insufficient for verifying a weapons ban. Consequently, decisive importance attaches to an international committee of experts with autonomous competence, including the right to carry out on-site inspections.

My country is the only one to have directly experienced international inspections in connection with the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons. Proceeding from this experience, we presented specific, practical suggestions in 1982 both at the second special session devoted to disarmament and in the Committee on Disarmament.[12] I appeal to the Committee to examine these proposals carefully and to use them as a basis for its subsequent deliberations so that the negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

As regards a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the fact that a working group is now dealing with questions of verification and observance of such a treaty. Great importance attaches to a comprehensive nuclear test ban in connection with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealing with the obligation of nuclear disarmament.

Precisely because a test ban is particularly sensitive in both military and security terms, its strict observance by all contracting parties must be ensured by means of reliable verification. We advocate an exchange of data from existing seismological stations; the seismological institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany are fully available for this purpose.

There is another area in which the Committee's work is well advanced and in which speed is advisable. I am referring to the prohibition of radiological weapons. We still have the opportunity to ban, for the first time ever, a category of weapons of mass destruction even before they are ready for deployment. My country's delegation, which chaired the working group on radiological weapons in 1982, will continue to strive for the early conclusion of such an agreement.

We sympathize with the proposal by a number of non-aligned countries to incorporate in an agreement banning radiological weapons a provision that prohibits attacks on civilian nuclear facilities and thus enhances the protection afforded to the facilities above and beyond the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. However, this proposal creates so many technical and legal problems that it is questionable, in my view, whether this subject should be combined with the subject-matter of an agreement on radiological weapons.

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[12] See the working paper submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on Aug. 9, 1982, *ibid.*, pp. 505–507.

Finally, great importance also attaches, in my Government's view, to arms control measures designed to prevent an arms build-up in outer space. The Committee on Disarmament will have to pay particular attention to this field as well in the future.

I wish the Committee on Disarmament and all its participants every success at this session. Here where nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, where industrial and developing countries, where members of the world's two large military alliances and non-aligned countries sit at the same table, the joint responsibility that we bear becomes apparent: we must avert the dangers posed by the arms build-up, eliminate confrontation and reconcile opposing interests by a mutual readiness for compromise. In short, we must undertake every effort to make this world safer and more peaceful. We must endeavour to create peace with ever fewer weapons.

May 1983 bring us nearer to this great goal.

The work of the Committee on Disarmament can make a major contribution.

Note by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry: Brazilian Nuclear Program, February 4, 1983 [1]

With reference to an article published by a U.S. newspaper yesterday [2] and reproduced by the Brazilian media today regarding the Brazilian Nuclear and Energy Research Institute (IPEN) the Foreign Relations Ministry hereby informs that:

1. IPEN's U.S.-supplied reactor is subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard clauses, which are contained in the safeguard agreement signed between Brazil, the United States and the IAEA. [3]

2. What the article has reported as being IPEN's reprocessing unit in reality is a laboratory for evaluating the safety of nuclear material. Its purpose is to train technicians in nuclear safety.

3. The laboratory has not handled any type of radioactive material. Should it do so, all of Brazil's international commitments regarding nuclear safeguards will be strictly complied with.

4. The Brazilian Government has and will always continue to comply with the commitments undertaken in the international agree-

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[1] Sao Paulo *O Estado de São Paulo* in Portuguese, Feb. 5, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Feb. 8, 1983, vol. VI, p. D1.

[2] The *Washington Post*, Feb. 3, 1982.

[3] 23 UST 2477; TIAS 8384.

ments regarding cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the agreement signed with the United States and the corresponding agreement establishing safeguards signed by Brazil, the United States and the IAEA.

5. The Brazilian Government reasserts the exclusively peaceful purposes of its nuclear program, which is aimed at meeting the country's technological and socioeconomic development needs.

Letter From the Soviet Union to U.N. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar: U.S. Report on Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, February 4, 1983 [1]

The Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to transmit a critique, prepared by experts from the competent Soviet organizations, of the report by the United States Secretary of State to Congress on "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan", which was circulated at the United Nations at the beginning of December 1982. [2]

The authors of the report claim that it lists "newly reported attacks" and "additional sample analysis results", which allegedly confirm earlier findings and permit new conclusions to be drawn.

However, as is shown by the critique [3] of the new report from the United States Department of State, the contents of the report do not stand up to scientific criticism. The enclosed document by Soviet experts shows the completely unfounded nature of the "new information" and "evidence" with which the United States is trying to support its lying accusations against the Soviet Union.

The political motives underlying the propaganda action taken yet again by the United States are quite obvious. As before, the aim is to divert attention from the very real chemical warfare which the United States conducted over a period of many years against the peoples of Indo-China, with serious consequences still being felt today, from Washington's plans for a large-scale build-up of chemical arsenals, and from the facts of the United States refusal to continue negotiations with the USSR on the prohibition of chemical weapons and its sabotaging of work on the relevant international agreement in the Committee on Disarmament.

It is no coincidence that it was specifically the United States which was the only country, at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, to vote against an appeal to States to accelerate the drafting and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and to refrain from producing new types of such weapons. [4]

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[1] A/38/86, Annex. The letter was annexed to a letter from Permanent Representative Troyanovsky.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 776–786.

[3] Not printed here.

Working Paper Submitted by the Group of 21 to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War, February 4, 1983 [1]

1. The greatest peril facing the world today is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, a war which would have devastating results on belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The actions of the nuclear weapon States which are engaged in a new and frenzied round of nuclear arms race and attempts by some nuclear weapon States to promote the highly dangerous concept of a limited nuclear war and to minimize the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, have greatly increased the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines which are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. Concern for common security and global survival should be the basis of international peace rather than the concept of deterrence. International peace must be based on a commitment by all States to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual annihilation.

2. The Group of 21 believes that international relations must be based on strict adherence to and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter, specially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States and on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States. The Group asserts that it is the shared responsibility of all States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war—a nuclear war. The Group of 21 cannot, therefore, accept that the security of their countries and the survival of mankind should be in continual and increasing jeopardy as a result of the actions of a handful of nuclear weapon States. Since a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind, all nations have a vital interest in the urgent negotiations of appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It is for this reason that the Group of 21 calls for multilateral negotiations in the Committee on

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[4] G.A. res. 37/98 A of Dec. 13, 1982.

[1] CD/341.

Disarmament on this subject just as it continues to emphasize the need for multilateral negotiations on item 2 of the Committee's agenda, entitled the "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament".

3. During the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, which was held in June–July 1982, not a single concrete measure for the prevention of nuclear war was adopted despite the growing popular expression of profound disquiet and anxiety all over the world concerning the dangers of nuclear war. This was mainly due to the attitudes of nuclear weapon States which failed to acknowledge that the question of the prevention of nuclear war was not a matter only of their own security concerns but of the survival of mankind as a whole. While the Group of 21 welcomes the adoption of any measures for the reduction of the risks of nuclear war which may be agreed upon by the nuclear weapon States themselves, it asserts that all nations have both the right as well as the obligation to work collectively to dispel the danger of a nuclear holocaust.

4. The Committee on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, has and should play its indispensable and unambiguous role in this regard.

5. In draft resolution 37/78–I entitled the "Prevention of Nuclear War", adopted at the recently concluded thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament has been requested "to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war". In undertaking such negotiations the Committee on Disarmament is requested to take into account the views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war which were submitted to the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament both by nuclear weapon States as well as other States, in response to resolution 36/81B of 19 December 1981, including deliberations on this item during the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament as well as proposals put forward during the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Committee would also take into account other existing proposals and future initiatives.

6. The Group of 21 is of the view that the best means by which the Committee on Disarmament can fulfil its mandate with respect to this acute and urgent task facing mankind today, would be to introduce a new item on its agenda for the 1983 session entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War". In order to undertake negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the Group would recommend the setting up of an *Ad hoc* Working Group on this item at the very beginning of the 1983 session. The draft mandate for the proposed Group as recommended in CD/309 of 11 August 1982, could be the basis for further consultations in this regard.

Statement by Vice President Bush Before the Committee on Disarmament, February 4, 1983 [1]

No city has done more than Geneva to advance man's oldest, yet seemingly most elusive, dream—to live at peace with his neighbors. This is the city of Rousseau, who taught us that man is born both free and good, a concept that has had the most profound effect upon my country and many others as well. It was near here that Voltaire made his home when his incisive, but often irreverent, mind brought down upon him the displeasure of his king. After the calamity of the First World War, the League of Nations was established and housed in this very building, in the hope that here in the free city of Geneva this embodiment of man's best intentions might prosper.

Today, the world's hopes for peace are once again focused on this city. Two vital bilateral negotiations are underway here with a single aim: to make significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and thereby to strengthen international stability and to increase the security of all states. And, in this committee, multilateral efforts are in train to deal with other urgent arms control issues: how to eliminate chemical weapons from the world's arsenals; how to effectively verify limitations on nuclear testing; how to approach the question of possible further arms control measures affecting outer space.

My message to you is simple and unequivocal: The United States will do all that it can to create a foundation for enduring world peace through arms control and through agreements that enhance international security and stability. This task is the President's highest priority, and he has asked me to tell you that we will pursue sound and workable arms control initiatives with the utmost determination. But we will not hesitate, nor should we, to differ with approaches which are not sound or do not hold out the prospect of effective, verifiable agreements.

What are the prospects for progress here in Geneva? I would like to set forth the views of the United States on the status of our efforts—both bilateral and multilateral—to advance the cause of peace by reaching agreement on effective arms control measures.

President Reagan assumed office at a time of increasing concern among the American people over the behavior of the Soviet Union and its allies. In its foreign policy, as well as in the relentless buildup of its military forces, the Soviet Union has appeared determined to advance its own interests at the expense of everyone else's. This determination was reflected in the invasion of Afghanistan, in the suppression of human rights in Poland, in the use of chemical and toxin weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in violation of customary international law and existing international conventions, and in the steady accumulation of vast amounts of modern weaponry far beyond any reasonable requirements for defense.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 448.

Clearly, this behavior required a revitalization of our own defenses, which in many measures of military power had been outstripped. The United States has undertaken this effort not with a view toward conquest or intimidation but rather to maintain our ability to deter aggression and thus to defend our vital interests and those of our friends and allies against threat or coercion. I know that President Reagan would much prefer to spend our resources on other pursuits. But we will do—we must do—what is necessary to defend our interests and preserve the peace.

Principles Guiding U.S. Arms Control Efforts

But providing the means of defense is only one aspect of insuring one's security. The Reagan Administration believes that arms control measures can be a vital part of our national security and that equitable and effective verifiable arms control agreements can increase that security. One of the first actions taken by President Reagan was to launch the most thorough review of our arms control policy ever undertaken by any new administration. A new approach to arms control was necessary to deal with the changed situation in which the United States found itself as a result of Soviet actions over a decade. Arms control had not become less important. Indeed, effective arms control had, if anything, become more important, since the military balance, at all levels, had become more unstable.

President Reagan announced the general principles which guide our arms control efforts in a statement on November 18, 1981. They are worth repeating here.

First, the United States seeks to reduce substantially the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to freeze them at high levels as has been the case in previous agreements.

Second, we seek agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. An unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can only encourage aggression.

Third, we seek agreements that will enhance the security of the United States and its allies and that will reduce the risk of war. Arms control is not an end in itself but a vital means toward insuring peace and international stability.

Fourth, we will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to insure that all parties comply.[2] In other words, we will insist that agreements must be verifiable. Otherwise, the parties cannot have confidence that all are abiding by the provisions of an agreement. This is particularly important in the nuclear area, where we have proposed deep cuts in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals. It is also vital to our efforts in this committee to ban chemical weapons and to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

Based on these objectives, my government since then has advanced a dynamic program of arms control initiatives: in our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, in the work of this committee, and—together with our allies—in the negotiations at Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. Let me now deal with those which are of particular interest to the members of this committee.

U.S. Proposals

The problem of achieving reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals is our most important challenge. The United States has met this challenge by developing what President Reagan has called the most comprehensive program of nuclear arms control ever proposed by my country. These proposals are on the negotiating table here in Geneva—in the intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF, negotiations and in the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] talks on reducing strategic nuclear forces.

The point I want to stress here is that the U.S. proposals in the Start negotiations entail deep and significant cuts in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals—a 50% cut in our strategic ballistic missiles. In the INF negotiations, we have proposed the elimination of an entire class of weapons. The proposals do so in a way which is balanced and which reduces the risk of war. This is, after all, what these negotiations are all about. Stability and security could be greatly enhanced if both sides thus reduced their arsenals, and it is precisely because of this that we are proposing such major reductions.

In the INF negotiations, there is now on the table a far-reaching U.S. proposal which would, at a stroke, ban an entire class of U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles, the systems of greatest concern to both sides. The Soviet Union now has over 600 such missiles with some 1,200 warheads, while the United States has none—zero. Under our proposal, the Soviet Union would be required to eliminate all of its ground-launched missiles of this type. These missiles—of the type referred to in the West as SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20—are in place now. The United States would be required to forgo the deployment of its roughly comparable missiles. As you know, they are scheduled to be deployed in Europe beginning this year under the decision taken by the NATO alliance.

The United States believes that any such agreement on nuclear forces must be effective and balanced; it must genuinely reduce the nuclear threat to both sides; it must enhance stability; and it must lessen the risk of conflict. Our proposal meets these criteria. Indeed, it strikes to the very heart of the problem.

Thus far, the proposals advanced in these negotiations by the Soviet Union have been designed to leave it with significant advantages, indeed, with a monopoly over the United States in longer range INF missiles. Indeed, the ideas recently advanced by General Secretary Andropov continue to have this as their aim. We will, of course, continue to give the most serious consideration to any constructive

Soviet proposal. Ours is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. However, we think the Soviet Union must recognize our legitimate security concerns in these talks.

We think ours is a moral—a moral—position. What is wrong with eliminating from the face of the Earth an entire class of new, deadly missiles? The only argument I have heard as to why we cannot eliminate this whole generation of INF missiles is that the Soviet Union opposes it; it simply says, "We're against it." I simply don't believe, in this awesome nuclear age, that that's good enough. So our challenge to the Soviet leadership is: Come up with a plan to banish these INF missiles, and let's consider openly and in frank dialogue initiatives that will achieve that moral goal.

As in he case of the negotiations on intermediate-range missiles, we are emphasizing in the START negotiations real and significant reductions in the levels of strategic armaments on both sides, down to equal ceilings. As President Reagan has pointed out, our proposals in these negotiations would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and 2,250 missiles from the combined nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

We have been encouraged by the fact that the Soviet Union is negotiating seriously—we have said that publicly, and I am very pleased to repeat it again today—and has accepted the concept of reduction, although we do not find the proposal it has tabled sufficient. It fails to focus on the more destabilizing elements of strategic forces, ballistic missiles, and particularly ICBMs, and it does not go far enough in making the kind of deep reductions in ballistic missile forces that we believe to be necessary. However, we believe that the approaches provide a basis for negotiation, and we intend to explore avenues for achieving such reductions and to pursue the negotiations seriously and constructively. Indeed, our President, upon hearing of a proposal by Mr. Andropov, recognized this seriousness of purpose. And I think this was appropriate, and people should understand that.

I will be meeting during my visit here in Geneva with the U.S. and Soviet delegations to both these critical negotiations. My purpose in doing so is to emphasize the great importance which the United States—and President Reagan personally—attaches to a successful outcome in both of them. I will pass on to our negotiators the President's hope that they will press forward with speed and energy and his wishes that their efforts will meet with success. I know that all of you deeply share this hope.

I will also, as I have in other stops on this trip of mine, make clear that I am not a negotiator. The negotiators are here in Geneva, seriously talking with their Soviet counterparts now.

Banning Chemical Weapons

Let me now turn to the work directly before this committee, to which we also attach the highest importance. The committee is confronted with numerous important issues. None has a higher priority for the United States than the efforts to ban forever an entire and different class of weapons from the world's arsenals. As President Reagan has stated, the goal of U.S. policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

The nations of the world have already prohibited the first use of chemical and biological weapons in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 [3] and have outlawed the possession of biological and toxin weapons in the 1972 biological and toxin weapons convention. [4] Like most other nations at this table, the United States is a party to these treaties; and, like most others, we are in full compliance with their provisions. Beyond the provisions of these treaties, there is an even broader moral prohibition against the use of these weapons. President Franklin Roosevelt perhaps expressed it best when he said that their use "has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind."

All forms of warfare are terrible. But these weapons are particularly to be feared, because of the human suffering they can inflict. This is why the civilized world has condemned their use. Sadly, mankind has, nonetheless, had repeated demonstrations of the cruelty and horror wrought by the use of these weapons. And now, chemical and toxin weapons are being used in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia in violation of international law and international arms control agreements. These violations are made all the worse by the fact that their victims have neither the means to deter the attacks against them nor to defend or protect themselves against these weapons.

The United States presented conclusive evidence to the world community of the facts surrounding the use of chemical and toxin weapons. Others have presented evidence as well. We did not come to our conclusions seeking confrontation or rashly, but only after the most exhaustive study. The implications that flow from the use of these weapons are so serious that many would prefer to disbelieve or simply to ignore them. But we have to face the facts.

The world's progress toward more civilized relations among states has been doggedly slow and beset at every turn by fears, ambitions, and rivalries among the nations. We cannot, therefore, allow the progress which we have made to be destroyed. To do so would be to begin a relentless slide back to a new dark age of mindless barbarism. This is what is at stake, and this is what we must prevent.

So what must now be done? The United States has already called upon the Soviet Union and its allies to stop immediately their illegal use of these weapons. I repeat that call here today. And I urge the Soviet Union and all other members of the committee to join the United States in negotiating a complete and effective and verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons, a ban that will insure that these horrors can never occur again.

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[3] Printed *ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.

[4] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 133–138.

A complete, effective, and verifiable ban on chemical weapons is long overdue. My government, therefore, would like to see the work of this committee accelerated and negotiations undertaken on a treaty to eliminate the threat posed by chemical weapons.

A number of key issues, of course, must be resolved if we are to be successful in negotiating such a treaty. In the coming days, the U.S. delegation will present to this committee a new document containing our detailed views on the content of a convention we believe could effectively—more specifically, verifiably—eliminate the chemical weapons threat. We undertake this initiative with the aim of further advancing the work of the committee and to encourage contributions and cooperation from others as well.

The key to an effective convention—one that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare forever—is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification. This principle is fundamental. Effective verification, as the world's recent experience with the use of chemical and toxin weapons shows, is an absolute necessity for any future agreement. This is why the United States seeks a level of verification that will protect civilization, ourselves, our allies, and, indeed, humanity itself. For today, the threat of chemical warfare has increased. And until an effective agreement can be achieved, the United States, just as others, must continue to insure that it can deter the use of chemical weapons against its citizens and friends. If we are to expect nations ever to forgo the ability to deter chemical warfare, those nations must have confidence that others who accept the prohibition cannot circumvent their obligations and later threaten the peace with chemical weapons. They must be certain that they will not be attacked with such weapons by any state which, like they have, has foresworn chemical warfare. In short, for us, the verification and compliance provisions of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty must be truly effective.

We know that most of the members of this committee, like we, are dedicated to accomplishing this important task. To do so will require more than our dedication; it will require greater willingness and flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies to work seriously and constructively on resolving the key outstanding issues—especially pertaining to the verification and compliance side. And such issues must be resolved if we are to expect to make genuine progress. For although some may argue that progress could be made by concentrating on the "easier" issues, or even by drafting treaty texts on them, this would be a fruitless exercise if the verification issue cannot be resolved. We will not support such a diversion of effort here.

I urge all members of this committee to begin negotiations in this session to resolve the key issues that face us in this area and to join with us in achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

Eliminating the Threat of Nuclear War

The committee is also faced with a number of nuclear arms control issues. The elimination of the threat of nuclear war is clearly of paramount importance to all of us, and the United States fully accepts its special responsibilities in this area. We are recognizing this responsibility in the most effective way we know—here in Geneva, in good faith, across the negotiating table from the Soviet Union.

At the same time, this committee has its role to play in the area of nuclear arms control. One of the major issues before it is that of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Such a ban remains a long-term goal of U.S. policy, and we will continue to work toward its achievement. The work already done in the committee by the group of scientific experts on developing a worldwide system for monitoring of nuclear explosions has been valuable. Moreover, at the suggestion of the United States, this committee formed a working group last year to study issues of verification and compliance surrounding a nuclear test ban. Verification is one area, in particular, in which the United States believes greater progress must be made if we are to make progress toward a ban on nuclear tests. Therefore, we would hope that the committee will continue its work in this area this year.

My government believes that the negotiations in this body on a convention to ban radiological weapons offer the prospect of a modest but real, genuine step forward, a step that could eliminate a potentially very dangerous type of weapon. We should take it as a cardinal rule of this committee that when there is the prospect for real progress toward an agreement, we should pursue it to its conclusion. While there are a number of issues yet to be resolved, we believe that an agreement is within the committee's grasp and that we should move ahead with all due speed to conclude the negotiations on this treaty.

I should also like to say a word about further arms control measures affecting outer space. The United States has been the leader in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. We intend to continue this leadership. Some of these activities in outer space are important to our national security and that of our allies. They help to monitor the peace, to warn of the threat of war, to insure proper command and control of our armed forces worldwide, to preserve our deterrent capability, and to assist in the verification of arms control agreements. The Limited Test Ban Treaty,[5] the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,[6] the Environmental Modification Convention,[7] and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which is one of the SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreements,[8] all have important arms control provisions affecting outer space. Some are now asking whether additional measures might be called for and, if so, what kind? The United States does not have a simple answer to this question, and we are continuing to study this issue. Clearly, the conditions do not exist which would make negotiations appropriate. We are, however, prepared to exchange views with other members of this committee, and believe the committee should address the matter in a more systematic way than it has in the past.

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[5] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[6] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.

[7] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 322–326.

[8] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff. These and following brackets are in the source text.

Conclusion

Finally, I would like to use this occasion to pay tribute to one among us here today whose tireless efforts over a lifetime of service were recently recognized when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Ambassador Garcia Robles' [Alfonso Garcia Robles, Mexican Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) and chairman of the CD *ad hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament] accomplishments are far too numerous for me to mention, but let me just say that I assure you, sir, of the full cooperation of the U.S. delegation in efforts to finish work on a realistic comprehensive program of disarmament.

There is, in closing, one thought which I would like to leave with this committee, a thought which underlies our approach to arms control and to the issues before this committee. And that is that the achievement of effective arms control agreements is difficult work. It requires dedication, persistence, tolerance, a respect for the views of others, and, above all, a faith that conflict can be prevented and that solutions, no matter how difficult, can be found. The most dangerous view for mankind, particularly in this nuclear age, is that war is inevitable. I reject this view entirely, because such a belief merely increases the inclination to make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. Let us rededicate ourselves in this committee, and in every other available forum, to the hard and serious work which is absolutely essential to prevent war.

Letter From President Reagan to the Congress Transmitting the 1982 Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, February 9, 1983 [1]

I am pleased to transmit to you the 1982 Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This report, the 22nd submitted since the creation of the agency, provides a complete review of the important work of an Agency which plays a crucial role in our country's national security program.

On September 21, 1982, I met at the White House with the three U.S. arms control negotiators, Ambassadors Rowny, Nitze, and Starr before they returned to Europe for the final 1982 sessions of the

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 14, 1983, p. 213.

START, INF, and MBFR negotiations, respectively. At that time, I outlined the following general principles which guide the formation of our arms control policies:

—Arms control must be an instrument of, and not a substitute for, a coherent security policy aimed in the first instance at the Soviet advantage in the most destabilizing class of weapons—ballistic missiles and, especially, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). We will work for agreements that truly enhance security by reinforcing peace through deterrence.

—We must seek agreements that involve substantial and militarily significant reductions on both sides.

—Agreements must be based on the principle of equality of rights and limits.

—Arms control agreements must include effective means of verification. They cannot be based on trust alone.

—Our efforts will be guided by seriousness of purpose, reflected in our willingness to seek reduction to significantly lower levels of nuclear forces based on equal, balanced levels of comparable systems.

These principles are in full accord with the basic purpose of both U.S. and NATO security policy—ensuring the peace through deterrence of aggression. Deterring nuclear or conventional attack against us or our Allies must guide our approach to defense and arms control. These principles also lie at the heart of the comprehensive and innovative arms control approaches which this Administration has adopted. In each of the three most important areas of arms control—strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and conventional forces in Europe—we have presented to the Soviet Union bold and equitable proposals which are in our mutual interest and which provide an opportunity to enhance world security and peace by significantly reducing the arsenals of both sides.

In each of these three negotiations, the United States has presented considered and equitable proposals which seek to establish a military equilibrium at reduced levels, eliminate the most destabilizing factors in the existing military balance, and enhance the security of both sides. When our national security, and that of our Allies, is at stake, we must approach arms control realistically. We do not seek agreements for their own sake; we seek them to build international security and stability. This Administration's reductions proposals for strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and for conventional forces reflect this approach. We are encouraged by the serious and businesslike conduct of these negotiations thus far. Although much hard bargaining lies ahead, I am determined to bargain in good faith until our objectives can be realized. We urge our Soviet negotiating partners equal seriousness of purpose.

The 1982 Annual Report not only includes details on all aspects of the three negotiations, but also refers to such other important elements of ACDA's responsibilities as providing expertise on both policy and technical levels for all other multilateral arms control negotiations, for our nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and for research and analysis of military budgets and arms transfers.

Address by Vice President Bush: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], February 9, 1983 [1]

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Soviet Military Buildup

I mentioned a moment ago that the two challenges we face—the worldwide recession and the unprecedented Soviet military buildup—should be looked at in the context of success, not failure. What the Soviet Union has undertaken should be viewed against the backdrop of a Western strategy of deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, that has kept the peace in Europe for 38 years, the longest such period Europe has known this century.

For over a generation now, we have lived with nuclear weapons. We have had to face enormous challenges and complexities stemming from their destructive power. This has not been an easy task for democratic societies, because our people, quite properly, believe that nuclear weapons should never be used. Thus for a generation, successive Western governments have firmly held that our safety depends on a balance of forces, not an imbalance. Our strategy, therefore, has never been one of war-fighting. Our strategy has always been one of war-preventing. And it works.

Since NATO came into being, there have been well over 100 armed conflicts outside of Western Europe. Determined that we must never permit war to break out again, we are also determined to take whatever steps we must to insure it never does. President Reagan has said, what we all know to be the case, that "there are no winners in a nuclear war—only losers."

That these steps are costly, no one disputes. As enlightened Western democracies, we would obviously rather devote the resources to other purposes. But as enlightened Western democracies, we certainly must see to it that our security is not hostage to the missiles of a state whose major postwar foreign policy achievements can be summed up with unfortunate concision: East Germany, 1953; Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Afghanistan, 1979; Poland, 1981.

Farsighted, responsible leaders and publics who recognize what is at stake are supporting the allocation of resources to the deterrent forces that will prevent the names of more countries from being added to that sad list.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 452. The Vice President spoke to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

A former British air marshal, Sir John Slessor, made the argument well when he said: "It is customary in the democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. But there is a tendency to forget that the most important social service a government can provide for its people is to keep them alive and free."

Consistent with our longstanding consensus on deterrence, the NATO alliance made a unanimous decision in December 1979 to respond to the Soviet military buildup. [2] That buildup has been thorough and relentless, conventional, chemical, and nuclear. It has been a buildup that far exceeds any legitimate requirement for defense.

Most destabilizing of all aspects of the buildup have been its deployment of SS-20 missiles, most of which are aimed at the heart of Western Europe.

This missile threatens to undermine the linkage between the American deterrent and the defense of our allies here and on the continent. A Soviet monopoly of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) could thus lead that country to believe—however mistakenly—that the United States might not respond to Soviet nuclear intimidation, or in the event of an actual attack on its allies and troops in Western Europe. At a time of rough U.S.-Soviet parity at the strategic level, the emergence of a powerful SS-20 force has given the Soviets the capability they have long sought to intimidate Western Europe.

The myth has been put forward that the American INF deployments would be a step toward nuclear war-fighting, and to war-fighting confined to Europe alone. I can do no better than to quote from the *Economist's* cover article entitled: "Can so Many Young People be Wrong About the Bomb? Yes, They Can." The editorial noted that, "Nothing more justifiably infuriates the Americans than the allegation that they want to put cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles into Europe in order to have a purely European nuclear war. These missiles were originally proposed—by Europeans—for exactly the opposite reason."

The *Economist* is right. Nothing is more infuriating than the suggestion we are preparing to fight a nuclear war, because we are not preparing to fight a nuclear war. We are preparing to deter war.

The very presence of American forces provides a guarantee of U.S. involvement in any attack on Western Europe. And that goes a long way toward guaranteeing that the Soviets will not be encouraged to launch an attack. There are, in Europe, about 350,000 American military personnel who, as part of the NATO security forces, provide, in President Reagan's words, "the living guarantee" of our commitment to the peace and security of Europe. Our security is indivisible from Europe's. An attack on you is an attack on us.

NATO's December 1979 decision had, as we all know, two dimensions, or tracks. NATO would deploy INF in Europe, but, at the same time, would try to bring the Soviet Union to the negotiating table for the purpose of making its deployment unnecessary. This was a flexible decision. To be any more flexible we'd have had to be invertebrates.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

For 3 years now, the alliance has pursued both tracks. It has done so in the face of Stakhanovite attempts by the Soviet Union to overturn it; and despite the attempts of well-meaning but mistaken Westerners who believe that one track can be pursued without the other.

Andropov Proposal

For a year after we made the decision, the Soviet Union refused even to come to the negotiating table, insisting that we first renounce our plans to deploy our deterrent forces. When the Soviets finally realized NATO was resolute, they agreed to talk. But during the year that followed, they tried, by what Mrs. [British Prime Minister Margaret] [3] Thatcher calls "bogus counting" to prove they did not even possess INF superiority. And now, General Secretary [Yuriy V.] Andropov has made public a negotiating proposal which similarly attempts to overturn the basis of the December 1979 decision. [4]

The Andropov proposal is most interesting. And most paradoxical, for the following reasons. Ever since the 1979 decision, the Soviets have claimed that a "balance" of intermediate-range forces already existed between East and West. Three years later, after deploying one SS-20 a week, while NATO deployed none, they still claim a balance exists. Some balance.

The effect of Mr. Andropov's proposal is clear: to leave the Soviet Union with more missiles pointing at Europe than there were at the end of 1981, when the negotiations began. His proposal, if accepted, would leave nearly 500 warheads aimed at Western Europe. It would leave another 300 pointed at American allies in Asia, Japan, and South Korea, as well as at the People's Republic of China. Their missiles are mobile and easily transportable and could be moved back west of the Urals from which position they would once again be poised to strike at Europe. In a nutshell, the effect of the Andropov proposal would be to achieve exactly the Soviet intermediate-range nuclear superiority which our 1979 decision was taken in order to prevent.

Soviet proposals are based on the concept—also implicit in so many of their public statements—that their security is more important than the security of Western Europe. It shouldn't surprise us that the Soviets take this view of things. But what is surprising is that they should expect Western Europe to concur in it and to demand that the United States negotiate an accord based on it.

Now, Mr. Andropov has justified this one-sided proposal on the grounds that the Soviet Union must be compensated for the existence of the British and French strategic nuclear systems. But as NATO recognized when it made its 1979 decision, these British and French systems cannot substitute for American INF forces stationed in Europe under NATO deterrent strategy.

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[3] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[4] *Ante*, Feb. 1.

British and French forces have no place in a bilateral negotiation about land-based, intermediate-range missiles that were the cause for undertaking these talks in the first place. In past arms control negotiations, the Soviet Union has demanded compensation for British and French systems, and has accepted a rebuff from the United States. As President Reagan said in his recent State of the Union message, the United States insists on equality of comparable weapons as the basis for arms negotiations.

Finally, the Soviets' selective inclusion of British and French systems ignores significant advantages they enjoy in other categories of nuclear weapons threatening Western Europe. As we have said, the Soviets have a monopoly on intermediate-range missiles. They try to justify this by saying that there is an overall "balance" of land-based intermediate-range weapons if all systems, including nuclear-capable aircraft, are counted.

This is egregiously false. Any objective estimate of the overall balance—including the ones prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies here in London—shows a major Soviet advantage. So, if the United States were to accept the Andropov proposal, we would be codifying an arrangement whereby the Soviet Union would have a permanent INF advantage, even including British and French forces.

For all these reasons, the Andropov proposal is not a reasonable one, because it ignores the very rationale for the 1979 NATO decision. U.S. intermediate-range forces are designed to maintain the vital link between NATO's conventional forces and the U.S. strategic deterrent. The purpose of the Soviet proposals is not to reduce, or even to limit, British or French forces, but to eliminate U.S INF from Western Europe and thus decouple Europe from the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

U.S. Proposal

What, then, is a reasonable offer in the field of intermediate-range nuclear weapons? What should be its objectives? The objectives are simple to describe, and in character with all the arms reductions proposals the United States has made.

- Reductions to the lowest possible levels;
- Equal levels of force for the United States and the Soviet Union, which means no "bogus counting"; and
- Verifiability.

President Reagan made a proposal in November 1981, based on these fair-minded straightforward objectives. He proposed that the Soviet Union join with the United States and banish from the entire world this new class of nuclear weapons. [5]

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

The President's offer was dramatic, bold, and straightforward. The only argument I have heard against it is that the Soviet Union doesn't like it and won't accept it. That would account for the issue of threats and nyets we've been hearing.

But the President's offer isn't a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. He's ready to have Ambassador [Paul H. Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation to the INF negotiations (Geneva)] Nitze explore any reasonable Soviet offer made at the negotiating table in Geneva. I was in Geneva myself a few days ago, and I made that message clear to the Soviet delegates personally. That was the message I read to the people of Europe—east and west—from President Reagan when I spoke in Berlin.[6]

Everywhere I went in Europe I was asked if I'm optimistic about the talks I've had. Yes, I am. One message I'll be carrying home to the United States is that despite the differences, what unites us is still far more enduring than whatever divides us.

Paul Valery said that "The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be." I admire the phrasing, but I reject the premise. History has handed us a challenge and an opportunity—a chance to rededicate ourselves to a strategy and values that are still very much alive. Failure? The possibilities do not exist.

Success in this endeavor will have consequences extending even beyond deterrence. It will signal to all the world that an alliance that rises to this challenge will rise to all challenges to the peace it holds so dear. It will fulfill our highest duties: to ourselves, to the future, and to the memory of those four gentlemen under whose rather demanding gazes I have happily found myself today

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U.S. Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Ban, February 10, 1983[1]

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents current United States views on the contents of a chemical weapons convention. It is subject to further modification and refinement.

I. SCOPE OF PROHIBITION

Basic Prohibition

The Convention should require a party: (a) never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons; (b) to eliminate existing stockpiles of chemical weapons; (c) to eliminate facilities for production or filling of chemical weapons; (d) not to conduct activities directly related to use of chemical weapons (for example, not to practice employment of chemical weapons—protective activities would be unaffected); (e) not to use chemical weapons in any circumstances where use is not already prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol [2] (according to the terms of the Protocol, its provisions apply, for example, only in "war" and only between Parties).

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[6] Both *ante*, Jan. 31.

[1] CD/343.

The provisions of the Convention should cover super-toxic lethal, other lethal, other harmful chemicals (such as incapacitating chemicals), and their precursor chemicals, but not riot-control agents or herbicides. Toxins would be included implicitly since they are toxic chemicals.

Non-Transfer/Non-Assistance

The Convention should prohibit:

(a) transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, of any chemical weapons;

(b) transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, other than another party, of any super-toxic lethal chemical or key precursor produced or otherwise acquired for protective purposes. Transfers would be limited to a maximum of 100 grams in any 12-month period. Advance notification of the Depositary (as specified in an annex) of any transfers of such a super-toxic lethal chemical or key precursor should be required.

(c) assisting, encouraging, or inducing, directly or indirectly, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to a party under the Convention.

Terminology

Key terms used in the Convention should be carefully defined to ensure that the Convention's provisions are clear and precise. Important terms that need to be defined, and the United States understanding of them, are given below:

The term "chemical weapons" should be used to mean:

(a) super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals, and their precursor chemicals, regardless of the method of production, except for those intended for permitted purposes as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes; or

(b) munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of chemicals released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; or

(c) any equipment or chemical specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

The term "super-toxic lethal chemical" should be applied to any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m 3 (by inhalation), when measured by an agreed method (this category is intended to include nerve gas and mustard gas, but not such agents as hydrogen cyanide);

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[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

The term "other lethal chemical" should mean any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration or 2,000 mg-min/m 3 (by inhalation) and which is less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m 3 (by inhalation), when measured by an agreed method;

The term "other harmful chemical" should be applied to any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation), when measured by an agreed method;

The term "precursor chemical" should be applied to any chemical which may be used in production of a super-toxic lethal chemical, other lethal chemical, or other harmful chemical;

The term "key precursor" should be applied to any precursor chemical which, based on agreed guidelines, is agreed to be of particular importance;

The term "non-hostile purposes" should cover industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes, or protective purposes;

The term "permitted purposes" should cover non-hostile purposes and military purposes which are not dependent on the toxic properties of chemicals;

The term "protective purposes" should cover purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons;

The term "chemical weapons production or filling facility" should be used for any building or any equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used since (blank) for the production of any chemicals, including key precursors, primarily useful for chemical weapons, or designed, constructed or used since (blank) for filling chemical weapons.

Permitted Activities

Each party should be allowed to retain, produce, acquire, or use any toxic chemical, and its precursor chemicals, for permitted purposes, of types and in quantities consistent with such purposes. The aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors produced, diverted from chemical weapon stocks, or otherwise acquired, or on hand at any one time for protective purposes, should be as low as possible and should not exceed one metric ton for any party.

Any party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes should be required to carry out the production at a single specialized facility, the capacity of which should not exceed an agreed limit.

Each party should be required to make an annual declaration regarding all toxic chemicals which are useful for chemical weapons but are devoted to protective activities.

II. DECLARATION/DESTRUCTION

Shortly after a State becomes a party certain key information regarding its chemical weapons capability should be provided, as outlined below. Other declarations relating to required or permitted activities would be made subsequently. Detailed requirements for the contents of all declarations should be specified in annexes.

Initial Declaration

The Convention should require a declaration from each party, within 30 days after the convention enters into force for it, regarding the following:

(a) whether or not any chemical weapons, or any chemical weapons production or filling facility, are under its jurisdiction or control;

(b) the presence on its territory of stocks of chemical weapons and/or of chemical weapons production or filling facilities, which are under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else, and the locations of such stocks and facilities;

(c) the location of any chemical weapons stocks which are under its jurisdiction or control and the detailed composition of the stocks at each location; (Chemicals should be declared by scientific chemical name, toxicity and weight. The fraction in munitions/devices should be given. Munitions/devices should be declared by type and quantity. "Specifically-designed" equipment should be declared by type and quantity);

(d) its plans for destruction of any stocks under its jurisdiction or control;

(e) the location, nature, and capacity of any chemical weapons production or filling facility which has been under its jurisdiction or control at any time since (blank). (Such facilities should be declared even if they were or are dual-purpose facilities designed or used in part for civilian production, have been destroyed, or are now being used for other purposes. The declaration should also specify the chemical name of any chemical ever produced at the facility, including civilian products, if any);

(f) its plans for closing and eventually destroying any chemical weapons production or filling facilities under its jurisdiction or control;

(g) the location and capacity of the small-scale production facility, if any, for super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes;

(h) the location and nature of any other facility designed, constructed or used, since (blank) for the production of certain commercial chemicals deemed by the Consultative Committee to pose a particular risk (such as key precursors or chemicals closely related to them);

(i) the location and nature of any facility under its jurisdiction or control designed, constructed, or used since (blank) for development of chemical weapons. (This would include test and evaluation sites).

Locations should be specified with sufficient precision to permit unambiguous identification of sites and facilities.

Other Declarations

Each Party should be obligated to provide information (as specified in an annex) regarding the production and use of key precursors and other specific commercial chemicals deemed to pose a particular risk.

Elimination of Stocks

The Convention should require that any party having chemical weapons stocks under its jurisdiction or control must:

(a) permit systematic international on-site inspection of its stocks promptly after declaration, on an agreed basis;

(b) eliminate these chemical weapons by destroying them;

(c) begin the elimination process not later than six months after the Convention enters into force for it and complete the process not later than ten years after that date;

(d) carry out, according to an agreed schedule, the elimination process, employing agreed procedures which permit systematic international on-site verification;

(e) permit systematic international on-site verification of the destruction process on a continuous basis until destruction is completed; (Both inspectors and sensors should be utilized).

(f) notify the Depositary annually regarding implementation of its plans for elimination of chemical weapons stocks;

(g) certify to the Depositary that its stocks have been eliminated, not later than 30 days after the elimination process has been completed.

Provisions for Chemical Weapons Found After the Initial Declaration Has Been Made

Experience has shown that small quantities of chemical weapons may from time to time be found. The provisions of the Convention must take into account that such discoveries may occur after the initial declaration has been made. Care must also be taken to ensure that an opportunity for evasion is not created.

The Convention should require any party which discovers any chemical weapons anywhere under its jurisdiction or control which have not been declared to:

(a) notify the Depositary within 30 days of the discovery of the approximate quantity and type of the chemical weapons found. The notification should also specify how, where, and when the chemical weapons were found, why they were previously unknown, and where they are being stored;

(b) notify the Depositary within 90 days of the discovery of the exact quantity and type of the chemical weapons found, including the scientific chemical name and formula of any toxic chemical found and its quantity. The notification should specify plans for destruction of the chemical weapons.

The chemical weapons found should be subject to:

(a) prompt and systematic international on-site inspection;

(b) internationally-monitored storage;

(c) destruction within one year if found more than nine years after the Convention entered into force for the party;

(d) systematic international on-site inspection of destruction.

Closure and Destruction of Facilities

The Convention should require each party to:

(a) cease immediately all activity, except that required for closure, at any chemical weapons production or filling facility;

(b) close each facility according to agreed procedures which would render the facility inoperative;

(c) permit systematic international on-site inspection of each such facility promptly after declaration, and subsequently at agreed intervals until the facility is destroyed;

(d) permit monitoring of each facility by appropriate types of sensors installed at the facility;

(e) destroy each facility by razing it, employing agreed procedures which permit systematic international on-site verification and according to an agreed schedule;

(f) begin destruction of its chemical weapons production and filling facilities not later than six months after the date on which the Convention entered into force for it and complete it not later than ten years after that date;

(g) permit systematic international on-site verification of the destruction of such facilities, at an agreed level until the facilities are destroyed;

(h) undertake not to construct any new facilities, or modify any existing facilities, for purposes proscribed by the Convention;

(i) notify the Depositary annually regarding implementation of its plan for destruction of facilities;

(j) certify to the Depositary that its facilities have been destroyed, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed.

A chemical weapons production or filling facility could be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. The converted facility would have to be destroyed as soon as it was no longer in use for destruction of stocks and not later than ten years after the date on which the Convention entered into force for the party.

III. VERIFICATION AND ASSURANCE

Consultative Committee

The Convention should provide for establishment of a Consultative Committee. The Committee should hold its first meeting within one month after entry into force of the Convention. Each party should be allowed to designate a representative to the Consultative Committee.

The Consultative Committee should:

(a) Develop and revise, as necessary, detailed provisions for exchange of information, declarations, and technical matters related to implementation of the Convention;

(b) Review new scientific and technical developments which could affect the operation of the Convention;

(c) Provide a forum for timely and responsive discussion of questions regarding compliance;

(d) Conduct (as specified in annexes) systematic on-site inspection of:

(1) declared stockpiles, on an agreed basis;

(2) destruction of declared stocks, on a continuous basis until destruction is completed;

(3) closure and destruction of declared production and filling facilities, at an agreed level until the facilities are destroyed;

(4) permitted small-scale production and facilities for super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes, at an agreed level for as long as a facility is maintained for this purpose;

(5) production for permitted purposes, of specified types of chemicals which are deemed to pose a particular risk, on a random basis and at an agreed level.
Such systematic international on-site inspection would be agreed to in advance in the Convention and thus would be mandatory in nature.

(e) Conduct *ad hoc* on-site inspections for fact-finding purposes;

(f) Participate in *ad hoc* on-site inspection for fact-finding purposes agreed between two or more parties, if requested to do so by one of the parties involved.

All on-site inspections, both systematic and *ad hoc,* should be carried out according to procedures agreed in advance. An annex to the Convention should specify the objectives for inspections, contain guidelines for inspection procedures, and specify the rights and functions of inspectors and of host-State personnel.

The Consultative Committee should not take any decisions as to whether or not a party is in compliance with the provisions of the Convention.

The Consultative Committee should be organized, and should function, as specified in an annex. The full Committee should meet at agreed intervals.

To assist in carrying out the activities of the Consultative Committee, a Committee Secretariat should be established. The over-all composition of the Secretariat should be generally consistent with the composition of the Consultative Committee. The Committee may, for specific tasks, set up other subordinate bodies which may continue their work between meetings of the Committee.

For the purpose of providing confidence in compliance, each party should be obligated:

(a) To co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of its verification responsibilities;

(b) Not to interfere, through deliberate concealment measures or in any other manner, with the conduct of verification activities. This should apply to activities conducted by the designated representatives of the Consultative Committee or by parties, including those using national technical means at their disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

The Consultative Committee should present an annual report on its activities to the States Parties.

Provisions should be included for meeting the expenses of the Committee.

Preparatory Commission

In order to facilitate prompt implementation of the provisions of the Convention after entry into force, an annex to the Convention should provide that a Preparatory Commission would come into existence soon after the Convention is opened for signature. Further views concerning the Preparatory Commission are outlined in Appendix I to this paper.

Consultation and Co-operation; Resolving Compliance Issues

The Convention should contain an undertaking by countries to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may be raised in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

Parties should agree to provide in a timely manner, bilaterally or multilaterally, information to assure confidence in its compliance with the obligations assumed. Such provision of information could be accomplished by, but should not be limited to, inspection of the areas of concern, carried out in accordance with agreed procedures.

Consultation and co-operation might in addition be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures would include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as the Consultative Committee and its subordinate bodies.

The Convention should establish a sequential process for resolving compliance issues, beginning, if possible, with discussions among the parties directly involved. If initial bilateral efforts were not possible or were unsuccessful, the issue could be discussed by a subordinate body of the Consultative Committee, by the Committee itself, and by the appropriate United Nations body. (Further details on this process are given below.)

Any party which has reason to believe that any other party may not be in compliance with the provisions of the treaty, or which has concerns about a related situation that may be considered ambiguous, should be entitled to request clarification of the actual state of affairs bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee. Such a request, which may include a request for an *ad hoc* on-site inspection, should be accompanied by an explanation. (A party should not be expected to present conclusive evidence, but only its reasons for concern. Also, any bilateral action taken under this procedure should not preclude recourse to multilateral action by a party.)

The Depositary should be obligated to convene, as soon as possible and in any case within 10 days, upon request by any party, the fact-finding panel of the Consultative Committee (outlined in Appendix II). The panel should promptly conduct a fact-finding inquiry, including any *ad hoc* on-site inspections considered necessary by at least five members of the panel, and transmit to the Depositary a report on its work, whether interim or final, within six months of the date of the convening of the panel. Reports of the panel should include all views and information presented to the panel during its proceedings. The Depositary should distribute the report to all parties.

Any party whose concerns about compliance have not been resolved by the fact-finding panel within six months should be able to request the Depositary to convene a special meeting of the Consultative Committee to consider a compliance issue. The Depositary should convene such a meeting as soon as possible and in any case within one month of the receipt of the request. Any party should be able to participate in such a meeting, whose functions and rules of procedures should be established in an annex.

Each party receiving a request for an *ad hoc* on-site inspection from the fact-finding panel or the Consultative Committee should have a stringent obligation to permit the inspection. If a party refuses such a request, the Depositary should promptly notify the Security Council.

The complaint provisions should not be interpreted as affecting the rights and duties of parties under international law, particularly as regards bringing to the attention of the Security Council concerns about compliance with the Convention.

Since questions arising about use of chemical weapons would also raise questions about compliance with the Convention's ban on production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the fact-finding procedures should enable reports of chemical weapons use to be investigated. Evidence of use should constitute evidence of violation of the Convention.

Domestic Implementation Measures

Each party should: (a) take any measures necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement the Convention, and in particular to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control, and (b) inform the Consultative Committee of the legislative and administrative measures it had taken to implement the Convention.

Confidence-Building Measures

Further legally binding measures should be developed specifically for the purpose of building confidence in compliance.

Efforts should be made to identify, and place limitations on, any specific protective equipment and activities which are particularly valuable for use of chemical weapons. For confidence-building purposes, information should be provided on activities related to protection against chemical weapons.

Confidence in the declaration of stocks is particularly important for confidence in the effectiveness of the treaty regime as a whole. Additional measures should be developed which will promote, at the earliest possible stage, confidence in the stockpile declaration.

Until the destruction process has been completed, the existence of chemical weapons stocks poses a risk that these chemical weapons may be used in a surprise attack. Confidence-building measures should be devised to provide confirmation that chemical weapons have not been moved from declared storage sites and that any effort to do so would be detected promptly.

IV. OTHER PROVISIONS

Withdrawal

The Convention should contain a withdrawal provision along the lines of those in previous arms control agreements.

Entry into Force

To be effective and durable, a future Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be adhered to by as many States as possible. The United States hopes that all States would deem it to be in their interest to join in the Convention. The United States can support an approach under which the Convention would enter into force on ratification by a suitable number of States.

Additional Provisions

The Convention should also contain a preamble and provisions regarding;

(a) international co-operation in the field of chemistry;
(b) the relationship with other treaties;
(c) amendment;
(d) review conferences;
(e) duration;
(f) signature, ratification and accession;
(g) languages and distribution.

Annexes

The annexes to the Convention should be considered an integral part of the Convention.

APPENDIX I. PREPARATORY COMMISSION

The Commission should include one representative from each signatory. The Preparatory Commission should remain in existence until the Convention comes into force and thereafter until the first meeting of the Consultative Committee. Its actions must be consistent with the principles and objectives of the Convention.

Specific provisions should be made for meeting the expenses of the Preparatory Commission.

The Preparatory Commission should:

(a) elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary, determine its own place of meeting and establish such committees as it deems necessary;

(b) appoint an executive secretary and staff, who should exercise powers and perform such duties as the Commission determines;

(c) make arrangements for the first session of the Consultative Committee, including preparing a provisional agenda, drafting rules of procedure, and choosing the site;

(d) make studies, reports and recommendations for the consideration of the Consultative Committee at its first meeting on procedural matters of concern to the Committee which would require immediate attention, including:

(1) financing of the activities for which the Committee is responsible;

(2) the programmes and budget for the first year of the Committee's activities;

(3) technical problems relevant to advance planning of Committee activities;

(4) staffing of the Secretariat;

(5) the location of the permanent offices of the Committee.

The Preparatory Commission should submit a comprehensive report on its activities to the Consultative Committee at the Committee's first session.

APPENDIX II. FACT-FINDING PANEL

The Convention should contain an annex with provisions along the lines outlined below.

Within 30 days after entry into force of the Convention the Depositary should establish a fact-finding panel. The panel should undertake to conduct a prompt fact-finding inquiry, including any necessary *ad hoc* on-site inspections, to make appropriate findings of fact, and to provide expert views, on any problem referred to it by the Depositary upon request by a party.

The fact-finding panel should be composed of not more than 15 members representing parties:

(a) ten members should be appointed by the Depositary after consultation with parties. In selecting these members due regard should be given to ensuring an appropriate geographic balance. Members should be named for a two-year period, with five members being replaced each year;

(b) in addition, those permanent members of the Security Council who are parties to the Convention should also be represented on the fact-finding panel;

(c) each member could be assisted at meetings by one or more technical or other advisers.

The Depositary or his representative should serve as Chairman of the panel, unless the panel decides otherwise. The work of the fact-finding panel should be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform its functions. At the first meeting of the panel, to be held not later than 60 days after entry into force of the Convention, the Depositary should submit recommendations, based on consultations with parties and signatories, as to the organization of the work of the panel, including any necessary technical resources. The panel should decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible by consensus but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There should be no voting on matters of substance.

Each member should have the right, through the Chairman, to request from parties and from international organizations such information and assistance as the member considers desirable for the accomplishment of the work of the panel.

APPENDIX III. SPECIAL MEETING OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

The Convention should contain an annex with provisions along the lines outlined below. The special meeting of the Consultative Committee provided for in the Convention should undertake to solve any problem which may be raised by the parties requesting the meeting. For this purpose, the assembled parties should be entitled to request and receive any information which a party is in a position to communicate.

The work of the special meeting should be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth above. The assembled parties should decide procedural questions relative to the organization of their work, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There should be no voting on findings of fact.

Any party should be able to participate in the meeting. The meeting should be chaired by the Depositary or his representative.

Each party should have the right, through the chairman, to request from States and from international organizations such information and assistance as the party considers desirable for the accomplishment of the work of the meeting.

A summary of the meeting, incorporating all views and information presented during the meeting, should be prepared. The Depositary should distribute the summary to all parties.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons [Extract], February 10, 1983 [1]

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Mr. Chairman, the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons is perhaps the most important task currently before this Committee. This is an area which is ripe for serious negotiations. Much preliminary work has already been done and the principal issues have been well-defined. It is now time for the Committee to intensify its efforts to resolve these critical differences so that the spectre of chemical warfare may never again threaten mankind.

In his statement to the Committee on 4 February, Vice-President Bush reiterated the commitment of the United States to the objective of the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons and stressed the urgency of its accomplishment. [2] My task in taking the floor today is to present in detail the views of my Government as to how this long-sought objective can finally be reached. I will offer to the Committee a comprehensive document on the content of an effective convention and outline our suggestions on how the Committee can most rapidly move ahead.

If progress is to be made, it is essential that the views of all delegations be clearly stated—and in detail. To this end my delegation outlined, on 12 August last, the points which we believe could serve as the basis for a chemical weapons convention. [3] We further developed these ideas in the contact groups and consultations on technical issues.

Today, the United States is tabling our detailed views on the content of a complete and verifiable chemical weapons convention, which we hope will serve as a framework for discussion. [4] It will be the basis for United States participation in negotiations to resolve key issues which are indispensable to the realization of our common objective.

Our document is an elaboration of the general points which we presented last summer. I would stress, however, that the substance of the document results from a very careful review by our experts of the ideas presented in the Committee by many delegations over a period of years. The results achieved in the contact groups established last summer received particular attention. As you study our document, it will become apparent that suggestions and ideas from many different sources have been adopted. There are also many new ideas.

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[1] CD/PV.193, pp. 33–37.

[2] *Ante.*

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 507–512.

[4] *Supra.*

As delegations will have an opportunity to study the document in some detail, let me just sketch out briefly our approach to the key issues, especially those relating to verification and compliance.

The United States supports a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Any activity to create or maintain a chemical weapons capability would be forbidden. On the other hand, chemical activities with a legitimate purpose would continue unhampered. The convention should also contain several specific provisions relating to the use of chemical weapons to help ensure that our common objective—to remove the menace of the possible use of such weapons—is met. In particular, use in circumstances not covered by the Geneva Protocol should be prohibited; the provisions for dealing with compliance issues should be applicable to all allegations of chemical weapons use.

Existing chemical weapons stocks and production and filling facilities would be promptly declared, and destroyed over a 10-year period. In order to take into account concerns expressed in contact group discussions, we have incorporated specific ideas for dealing with the possible discovery of chemical munitions, for example, on World War I battlefields, after the initial declaration of stocks.

As Vice-President Bush emphasized, the key to an effective convention is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification. We have learned the hard way—through the bitter experience of recent events in Sverdlovsk, south-east Asia and Afghanistan—that effective verification is an absolute necessity for any future agreement.

Many different approaches to the verification of a chemical weapons ban have been discussed in this Committee. We share the view of the majority of delegations, which have emphasized the importance of systematic international on-site inspection. Only an independent, impartial system responsible to all the parties can provide the necessary confidence that the provisions of the convention are being faithfully observed. National technical means alone are not sufficient, as they are available only to a few and are of extremely limited utility for the verification of a chemical weapons ban. Nor can so-called systems of "national verification", which would be tantamount to self-inspection by parties, be taken seriously when one considers the vital import of such a convention.

In our view, the following should be subject to appropriate forms of systematic international on-site inspection on an agreed basis:

Declared chemical weapon stockpiles and the process of their elimination;

Declared chemical weapons production and filling facilities and the process of their elimination;

Declared facilities for permitted production of chemicals which pose a particular risk.

To avoid misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that we do *not* believe it necessary to subject the entire chemical industry of States to inspection, nor do we seek to have inspectors roam throughout the territory of a party. Systematic international on-site inspection is necessary only at a limited and carefully-defined group of facilities, which must be declared.

An effective mechanism for dealing with compliance issues is essential. This is one of the key lessons to be drawn from the compliance problems encountered in recent years with respect to the Geneva Protocol [5] and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. [6] My delegation believes that the mechanism must promote prompt resolution of issues at the lowest possible political level. At the same time it must be flexible, and allow issues to be taken to higher levels, including the Security Council, whenever that may be necessary. We believe that States must undertake a strong commitment to co-operate in resolving compliance issues. This should include a stringent obligation to permit inspections on a challenge basis.

The United States delegation is putting forward this document to help advance the work of the Committee. We believe that the verification approach it described is tough but fair and practical. I want to emphasize that we are not seeking absolute verification. We recognize that some risks will have to be accepted. However, we do insist that these risks be minimized in order to safeguard our security and that of all other countries. We must have a level of verification which meets that objective.

I want also to emphasize that we are continuing to explore possibilities for new and more effective means of verification, for example, possible use of on-site sensors. We have invited others to join us in a co-operative evaluation of such sensors. I wish to reaffirm that invitation. Furthermore, we are prepared to explore seriously any suggestions by others for achieving an effective level of verification. Our views are subject to modification and further refinement. In fact, we encourage constructive comments and contributions from other delegations, particularly with respect to any additional verification arrangements which would reduce the problems of possible undeclared stockpiles and facilities.

We recognize, too, that on reading this lengthy document questions may arise. We welcome your questions and will do our best to respond promptly. We are anxious to explain our approach. In fact, our delegation is tentatively planning to hold, in the near future, an informal session open to all delegations for the express purpose of receiving and responding to your questions and comments.

Vice-President Bush pointed out that a chemical weapons ban is long overdue and urged that efforts toward this long-sought goal be intensified. The United States delegation is ready to engage in intensive negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We have once again augmented our delegation with our best experts. Our interest is in solving problems so that a convention can be achieved as soon as possible, and we sense that most delegations here share that ardent desire.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

But, speaking frankly, the first three weeks of work on a chemical weapons ban this year have been discouraging. It has been quite clear that a small group, led by the Soviet delegation, has thwarted any achievement of concrete results. We call upon the Soviet Union to join with us and other members of the Committee at our 1983 session to find ways to overcome the difficult issues which have prevented progress—especially those pertaining to verification and compliance. As we have repeatedly made clear, we are prepared to consider any and all channels, including bilateral negotiations, that promise to be productive. We must have reason, however, to expect that bilateral negotiations would be productive rather than simply a device to draw a cloak of secrecy around these vital negotiations. Thus far, we have had no reason to be optimistic on this point.

We have repeatedly stated that for such negotiations to be fruitful, the Soviet Union needs to demonstrate, rather than simply profess, that it is genuinely ready to work out and accept effective provisions to verify compliance with a chemical weapons prohibition. And the Soviet Union must also show the United States and the rest of the world that it will abide by existing agreements in this area if meaningful progress is to be made.

It is sobering to realize that the chemical weapons Working Group is entering the fourth year of its existence. Considerable useful work has been accomplished, but the pace is much too slow. The work can and must be accelerated. I would like to outline some suggestions as to how this could be accomplished.

First, let us not waste time and energy on procedural struggles. The chemical weapons Working Group should be re-established and resume its negotiations immediately. It is the responsibility of the western delegations to nominate this year's Chairman. As you know, Ambassador McPhail has agreed to assume the Chair under the rotation system. Consultations on other procedural issues could be conducted simultaneously. Let us not hold up this vital work while we attempt to sort out other problems.

Secondly, let us focus on the tough issues, which are the key to real progress towards a convention. Some may argue that progress could be made by dealing with the "easier" issues, or by drafting treaty texts on matters already agreed on in principle. But this would be a fruitless exercise if the key verification issues cannot be resolved. We will not support a diversion of effort away from the real obstacles to a convention. Before the drafting of actual treaty text can be productive, an acceptable verification and compliance framework must first be negotiated.

Thirdly, the chemical weapons Working Group should be allowed to proceed at its own pace. It should determine its own schedule and not be dependent on the schedules of other groups. It is to be expected in any serious negotiation that during some periods frequent meetings will be needed, while in other periods very informal consultations and work within delegations will be most productive. The Working Group should have the flexibility to adopt whatever schedule will best facilitate its work.

Fourthly, the very useful innovation of contact groups should be retained and refined to permit related issues to be dealt with together. For example, a method needs to be found to deal simultaneously with all questions related to stockpiles—declarations, destruction and verification. These issues are so closely linked that they cannot be resolved in isolation.

Fifthly, more effective ways must be found to make use of technical expertise. Experience has shown that close interaction between technical experts and diplomats is essential. While there will continue to be a need for discussions which are primarily technical, the highest priority should be given to integrating political and technical considerations, perhaps within the framework of the contact groups. As part of the work of these groups, specific periods should be planned, well in advance, for combined political-technical discussion of issues on which technical advice is particularly important.

In closing, I want to stress again what Vice-President Bush said a few days ago in this room. The goal of my Government is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. We urge every member of this Committee to join the United States in intensive negotiations to ensure that the possibility of chemical warfare is eliminated forever.

News Conference Remarks by Vice President Bush: Intermediate-Range Force Negotiations, February 11, 1983 [1]

Q. May I just ask you about the zero-zero option? You say that you brought back to the President the message that our allies would like to see perhaps an interim agreement on the way to a total ban of those weapons. Do I take it from the President's statement today that he is not ruling out the possibility of reaching some interim agreement?

A. We had an opportunity to brief him and, as I said in the press conference yesterday in London, I don't think he'd ruled anything in or out. He's just had a chance to digest the views that we gave him in confidence—received in confidence—from the various leaders. I just don't know what he's going to do yet. It's too early.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 1983, pp. 26–27.

Q. —the statement he gave us and I guess what I want to know is, it would be a misinterpretation then to say that he is insisting on nothing but the zero-zero option?

A. You've heard him say that zero-zero option is our position. You've also heard him say that he would welcome a serious proposal from the Soviet Union. Nitze is over there to negotiate and negotiate seriously, and we hope such a proposal will be forthcoming.

Q. Do you have any indication there will be? Have there been any new signs of serious negotiations?

A. I can't say from the 40 minutes I spent with Mr. Kvitsinskiy [Yuri Kvitsinskiy, head of the Soviet delegation to the INF negotiations] [2] that I got that direct feeling. But it's worth staying in there and trying. One thing I think we dispelled, or hopefully help dispel, on this trip was the feeling that we were not interested in serious negotiation. And I made very clear we were. We also happen to have a very strong moral position banning an entire generation of these intermediate-nuclear force weapons from the face of the Earth. And I say that because the Secretary reminds us that we are dealing globally on some matters, and this is a noble objective. It's an objective that for a while the Europeans seemed to have lost sight of—not our allies incidentally, not the government leaders, because I found the alliance very much together on this point.

Q. Given our position, even if there is some flexibility in it, and given the Soviet position, as we know it, is it really realistic to think of any arms control this year?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Why?

A. Because I think that we're there to seriously negotiate, and I would think that the Soviet Union would want to help lower the level of terror. What people don't realize is the conviction that our President has about arms reduction. He also is firmly committed to both tracks—going forward on the agreed dates with deployment but staying there seriously negotiating. And we think the Soviets know they have a monopoly at this moment. We think that there ought to be some incentive there for them to negotiate because the *status quo* monopoly for one side and nothing for the other is unacceptable to the Europeans and certainly unacceptable to the United States.

Q. It's been said recently that this Administration is losing the propaganda war in Europe to the Russians. What is your assessment? Are we losing that propaganda war?

A. No.

Q. And why did you say some Europeans seem to have lost sight of our goal?

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[2] Brackets in the source text.

A. I think there was some feeling—when zero-option first came out, it captured the imagination of all governments and a lot of the peace movement. Then the Soviet Union, of all people, came forward with kind of a propaganda campaign. I hope that our visit and other things, other statements made by the President in terms of various subjects, but his willingness to be serious about arms reductions, are now back in the forefront. And, so, therefore, I think that there is a much better perception of the U.S. seriousness and willingness after this trip. Maybe that's a little bit of an egotistical assessment, but I believe that the press coverage and the summations that I've seen collected from foreign press coverage would bear that out. That doesn't say we have no problems; there are plenty of problems there.

Q. What would constitute a serious offer by Moscow?

A. I don't know but I think we'd know it when we saw it. Remember what Potter Stuart said about—

Q. Pornography?

A. —pornography, I believe it was? We'll know a serious offer when we see it. And we've got a very able negotiator there. We know an unserious offer when we see that.

Q. Do you think they've been unserious so far?

A. Absolutely, and so does every single ally that I talked to. Not one felt differently on that point.

Q. What about the possibility of an interim agreement along the way before you get to zero-zero?

A. What do you mean, do I—

Q. The allies—the question that the allies said that they might take some steps along the way from—

A. We've noted Margaret Thatcher's statements, we've noted the statements by Mr. Genscher and others, and it's—I've brought back to be kept in confidence the innermost feelings of each of these leaders of the governments and, to some degree, the opposition leaders with whom I've met. And that will all be sorted out now by the Secretary of State and the President as we consider the various recommendations, comments, criticisms, suggestions made by these leaders.

Q. What was the purpose of the open letter that you delivered in Bonn from President Reagan when, in fact, the Soviets had already rejected the so-called zero-zero?

A. When I got to Europe, and before, I think we all agreed that there was some misperception about the President's willingness to meet with the General Secretary. And I reminded the people in Europe that it was, indeed, President Reagan who had suggested that Brezhnev meet him informally at the United Nations. I reminded them—and they needed reminding, I found out—that it was our President who talked a couple of times, at least, about a summit meeting, provided it was well-prepared, the hopes of the world not to be elevated only to be dashed by failure to prepare properly. And this, saying I will drop everything, go anywhere, anytime to sign an agreement, puts in focus the morality and the correctness of the U.S. position on INF.

I realize that some felt that there was nothing particularly new about it, but Chancellor Kohl thought it was a good idea because what he felt is it showed our President—I believe Mr. Vogel had something favorable to say about it. We made it in Germany, so I cite those two. Along the way, a lot of people felt this demonstrated the President's willingness to reach out, albeit the President did define the terms under which he'd have that meeting.

But you can't look at it all alone. You've got to look at the willingness that has been demonstrated. And why the people of Europe felt that the President was unwilling to meet under any circumstances anyway, I don't know. But I think that letter helped lay that to rest and helped put in focus the position that we strongly adhere to.

Interview of Vice President Bush on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation"; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], February 13, 1983 [1]

Q. You have been touring through Europe talking about the question of negotiating zero-option or reduction in the intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Is it your own personal feeling that it can be accomplished, that it will be accomplished, in time to prevent the deployment of the Pershing II missiles next December?

A. We are very serious about arms reductions and about negotiation to achieve arms reduction. I can't make a prediction on exactly when it will happen, but I would say it's a distinct possibility that it will happen, because we found the alliance together; we found them sticking with the two tracks. [2] All I know is that our negotiator, Mr. Nitze, is there saying, "Come on, let's see a good proposal," and, yes, it can happen.

Q. When you talk about a two-track system, I presume you're talking about negotiating while continuing to deploy these new weapons, the Pershing IIs?

A. Yes.

Q. That extends the time a little bit. It's going to take what, 2 years to deploy the Pershing IIs? They won't be fully deployed until sometime in 1985?

A. Yes.

Q. Although this is a serious matter, let me put it in sort of a—if you were a betting man, would you bet that all the Pershing missiles will be deployed, or do you think that there would be some agreement before the process is through?

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 1983, pp. 37–39. The interview was conducted by George Herman, CBS News; Michael Getler, The *Washington Post;* and Robert Pierpoint, CBS News.

[2] For the NATO "dual-track decision," see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 814–816.

A. I wouldn't bet one way or another, but I would say that that negotiating track, the willingness to stay at the table as long as it takes to reduce and hopefully to achieve what we want—morality and elimination of an entire generation of these nuclear weapons—I believe will be successful in negotiation. Can't put a time frame on it, but as I said in Europe, what goes in can come out.

If we are compelled to deploy because the Soviets are not as forthcoming as our allies would like to see them, we will continue to negotiate, but that deployment date is set, and we are not going to vacillate and pull away from it. It is firm and one thing I've found where the allies were together on that.

Q. Now that you've talked with the President about the results of your trip, you've presumably given him some judgments of your own. Can you tell us whether there is likely to be any new American initiative perhaps for some intermediate steps to break the deadlock at the Geneva arms talks, or whether the Russians must take the next step?

A. As you know from your incessant travels around Europe, our position is that they should come forward with a new and reasonable proposal. We think the proposal they made—and our allies totally agree—was unreasonable. But I have reported in confidence to the President, and he will be making a determination whether we should do something different in order to encourage the Soviets to do what we've asked. But we are not going to depart from this moral objective—ridding the world, if you will, banishing forever an entire generation of these weapons.

I have had adequate opportunity to report to him and with the Secretary of State there, and what the President will determine on this, I just don't know.

Q. When you were in Geneva, you met with the Soviet disarmament delegates. Did they give you any reason for believing that they would, in fact, ever accept this so-called zero-zero option?

A. No, they did not. I would be misleading the public if I said, out of those conversations, there was reason to be hopeful. But as you look at the equation, as you look at the capabilities of these Pershings and cruise-launch missiles, those ground-launch cruise missiles, there is every reason to feel that the Soviets would want the kinds of reductions we're talking about, but I did not get that directly from talking to the Soviet negotiators.

Q. When you talk about reductions now, you're not necessarily then going to stick to this zero-zero option, and especially if the Soviets have made it clear to you that they won't accept that? What is the United States going to do? Is it going to be stuck on dead center, or is it going to make a compromise proposal?

A. In the first place, in terms of the proposal of eliminating this entire generation of weapons, as I went across Europe and talked to opposition leaders and talked to government officials, heads of government in every country, I never heard one argument against the zero option, except that the Soviets don't like it. The Soviets won't do it. That is not a good enough reason to depart from an objective that the alliance shares, that the peace movements ought to share if they'd put it into focus—how much better a major reduction than a freeze, for example.

Maybe there is a way, an intermediate way, to get from here to an objective that every thinking person, including the Soviets, should share, and it is that the President is considering right now, bringing home in confidence to him, suggestions from the world leaders.

Q. When do you think the President might decide whether or not this country or the Western alliance ought to do something to encourage the Soviets to go further than they have?

A. I don't know when he'd decide, but I can tell you that whatever was done, if anything, would be done in full consultation with our allies. A good thing out of this trip that I've just finished is that I think the European allies understand that we were operating in the true spirit and letter of the word consultation.

Q. One of the things that the Europeans, as you know, also are very concerned about is the question of whether there will be a summit meeting between President Reagan and the Soviet leader, Yuriy Andropov. Again, since your return, since your discussions abroad and now that you have some feeling from the President about these matters, has that been advanced at all? Is it any more likely now that there at some point is going to be a summit meeting?

A. I wouldn't say that the trip itself accelerated or decelerated the need for a summit, but if I could be permitted just a couple of seconds. It was President Reagan who said to Brezhnev: "I'd like to meet you at the United Nations on a casual basis." It was President Reagan who has said he is prepared to go to well-prepared summits. So, in other words, we don't lift the hopes of a world desiring arms reduction only to have them dashed down because of failure to prepare.

And, as we said in Germany, which got the zero option back on focus, "I'll drop everything. I'll stop anything ongoing, go anywhere, anytime, to sign an agreement to eliminate an entire generation of weapons."

So there are three kinds of guidelines, you might say, and each of them leads to the fact that our President, under certain conditions, would be willing to meet with Mr. Andropov. Some in Europe felt he wouldn't do it at all.

Q. If I may play the devil's advocate for a moment, or the Soviet Union's advocate in this, Mr. Andropov has proposed a rather vague plan that would allow the Soviets to keep a number of missiles equivalent to the missiles—nuclear missiles—now in France and Great Britain. That does sound on the surface like a somewhat reasonable proposal, since Britain and France are America's allies. What is your answer to that?

A. Our answer is that the British and French systems—first, they're sovereign systems, and we've always been talking about U.S.-Soviet balance. Secondly, they're strategic systems, not intermediate nuclear force systems. And, thirdly, what would happen if we did that? We would be decoupling a U.S. guarantee from Europe, pulling ourselves away from our allies by that. These objectives are objectives that the Soviets have understood in the past in other negotiations, and we are not about to count the British and French systems as we reach for this moral end.

Q. But don't they have a certain justification in their view by saying that after all, whether you call them strategic or intermediate-range nuclear missiles, whether they're fired by NATO as a unit, or whether they're fired by the British and the French, Moscow is going to be just as vulnerable, just as many Soviet citizens are going to be dead?

A. Sure. And when you look at them in terms of the total deadly megatonnage of warheads, yes, they should be counted. They're a fraction—just a tiny fraction—of the full total. But somewhere along the line, if one can ever finally resolve the whole question of all of nuclear disarmament, yes, they should be considered, but they ought not to be injected into the intermediate nuclear force discussion when they've never been in there before, ought not to be injected as a way to forestall an objective that the entire world should welcome, getting rid of all of these weapons.

Q. Did the European leaders that you spoke to ask you if President Reagan is going to run again? Is that on their minds? And I ask this because—as a question of whether it's a factor in the Soviet negotiating strategy in arms control, whether they wait and see what Reagan does.

A. No, they didn't ask, but I'll bet you they were all very interested. We tried on this trip to stay out of European elections—elections in France, the elections in Germany. I hope I was successful, and they very tactfully did, indeed, in our consultations stay out of any discussion of election politics, but I think they're keenly interested in that. It didn't come up, though.

Q. I've been sort of fascinated by some of the—you'll pardon my saying so—high-flown rhetoric in this "banish an entire generation of weapons." "Banish from the face of the Earth an entire class of nuclear weapons" and so forth. Does that mean that if a zero-zero option agreement was reached, that any Pershing missiles which had been built in the United States would be dismantled or destroyed?

A. Sure. If that's the kind of agreement we can reach, absolutely, and so would the SS-20s and so would the SS-4s and SS-5s. That leads you to any such agreement being verifiable, but absolutely, that is the President's—and it is high-flown rhetoric, but it's a worthy thought in a world that's troubled by this frightening nuclear threat. We want reduction, not a freeze, we want a reduction, and if the rhetoric is high-flown, fine, because we're dealing with morality here.

Q. I don't see reasonably how you can separate one class of nuclear weapons totally in negotiations from another. If you have tactical, if you have intermediate, if you have strategic, they're really all part of the question of the death of the Earth in a nuclear exchange. Are you satisfied that progress is being made, that the Russians are seriously interested in reducing the threat of nuclear death of Earth?

A. I would think they would be, yes. I don't see how any country, especially one that's lost many soldiers, as they have in various wars, would be disinterested in reducing this threat.

Q. Are they showing it?

A. But they are not showing it, and they are being very iron-willed. Part of the reason they're not showing it is because they think they can win a propaganda battle and keep us from doing that other track—that deployment track—of the NATO decision. They've focused on public opinion; they've highlighted their positions in terms of injecting themselves into the German elections, and I think it's going to backfire on them. But, clearly, if they can have the *status quo*, where they have 1,200 intermediate nuclear force warheads and we have zero as an alliance, they would like that.

Our President and the allies—the heads of allied governments—are determined that that monopoly not continue to exist. And they have a monopoly, and that's not reasonable, and it's not conducive to peace.

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Newspaper Article by the Brazilian Ambassador to the United States (Azeredo da Silveira): Brazil's Nuclear Program, February 13, 1983[1]

The Post published Feb. 3 the article "Brazil Takes Step Toward Developing Nuclear Weapons Potential." First of all, let me emphasize that Brazil has signed and ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty, [2] which prohibits the manufacture or possession of nuclear arms in Latin America. Although Brazil has not waived Article 28 of that treaty, which establishes the conditions for the treaty's entry into force, my country accepts and practices—as an undeniable tenet of good faith—the principle set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties [3] whereby, once it has signed an international act, a state should not practice any acts that might run counter to the act's objective and purpose. Thus, the signing and ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty by Brazil imply Brazil's adherence to the principles it embodies.

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[1] The *Washington Post*, Feb. 13, 1983.

[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[3] *International Legal Materials*, vol. 8, July 1969, p. 679.

I wish to point out, on the other hand, that Brazil is not a signatory of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,[4] which, because of its discriminatory nature, does not prevent vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear weapons states' abstention over the 16 years the treaty has been in force has never represented an incentive for the nuclear-weapons states, particularly the superpowers, to reduce their arsenals.

The agreement concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy Brazil signed with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1975 and the safeguards agreement that both countries signed in 1976 with the International Atomic Energy Agency establish a system of controls that, in fact, exceeds the safeguards requirements contained in the NPT.

Brazil is a charter member of the IAEA and, as such, is committed to abide by its by laws, as well as by its documents pertaining to safeguards incumbent on our country. All nuclear materials, equipment, facilities stemming from the cooperation between Brazil and other countries are entirely covered by IAEA safeguards.

The Brazilian government attaches great importance to its relationship with the United States in the nuclear field. That relationship is regulated by the bilateral agreement for cooperation of Sept. 17, 1972. Brazil has faithfully fulfilled its obligations under the agreement, as well as those provided for in the trilateral safeguards agreement signed by Brazil, the United States and IAEA.

I wish to reiterate that the Brazilian nuclear program and the activities being developed in Brazilian research centers, such as IPEN, are directed toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

I should also inform *The Post* that the Brazilian government issued in Brasilia on Feb. 4 the following communique:

> 1) The American-supplied IPEN reactor is subject to international inspection under the trilateral Brazil-USA-IAEA safeguards agreement.
>
> 2) That which *The Post* article refers to as IPEN's reprocessing facility is actually an analysis laboratory to handle material safety. Its purpose is to train experts on nuclear safety.
>
> 3) The laboratory has not handled any radiated material. Should it do so, it would do it in full compliance with Brazil's international commitments in regard to safeguards.
>
> 4) The Brazilian government has fulfilled and will continue to fulfill its obligations under international cooperation agreements in the area of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including its agreement with the United States and the Brazil-USA-IAEA agreement on safeguards.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

> 5) The Brazilian government reaffirms the exclusively peaceful purposes of its nuclear program, which is geared to the country's technological, economic and social development needs.

I should also add that on that same day the U.S. ambassador in Brasilia, Anthony Motley, summoned the press to announce that:

> 1) It is the opinion of the United States that Brazil is not developing nuclear weapons. Anyone who claims having obtained any information to the contrary from the U.S. intelligence service is absolutely wrong; 2) The U.S. government is convinced that Brazil has strictly abided by all multilateral and bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements of which it is a signatory.

News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: Nomination of Kenneth Adelman and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [Extracts], February 16, 1983 [1]

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Kenneth L. Adelman

Q. Mr. President, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today held off your nomination of Kenneth Adelman as Arms Control Director, and several Senators asked that you withdraw his nomination. Will you?

The President. No, I believe the young man is eminently qualified for this. All of his experience indicates it. He is well educated. He is a very intelligent man—his experience with Jeane Kirkpatrick up at the United Nations and all. And I don't believe that they, in delaying this, have done anything to help us in our efforts to get an arms reductions agreement. I look very much forward to having him doing this, and I have to disagree with those who—

First of all, arms reduction should not be a political problem on the Hill. It's too serious, and we are too concerned with it. And frankly I feel that since I was the one who took the lead in bringing about the first real arms reduction talks that we've ever been able to hold with the Soviet Union—and they are engaged in those talks right now— believe that I had a right to ask for my choice of who I thought could be of help to me in that.

Q. If I may follow up, sir, what do you expect to do in the nex week to turn around that majority that is now against Mr. Adelman And if Mr. Adelman can't win the confidence of the Republican majority in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, how do yo expect him to be an effective spokesman for the United States wit the Soviet Union and our European allies?

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Feb. 21, 1983, pp. 245–247, 250.

The President. I think that what I'll do—you don't give away trade secrets or anything, but I will try to be as persuasive as I can and make them see the light. If that falls short, maybe I'll try to make them feel the heat.

Larry [Laurence Barrett, *Time*]? [2]

Arms Control and Reduction

Q. Further on arms control, sir, since November of '81 your administration has stuck to the so-called zero option in the INF phase, [3] and that tack so far has just led to deadlock. There's been a good deal of debate inside the administration about offering a different position, one that might lead to more bargaining. You've apparently chosen not to do that. Can you tell us why?

The President. No, Larry, the situation is just exactly what George Bush was telling our friends in Europe it was, calling attention back to when I first, before the Press Club, introduced this proposal for zero option, that I said that we would negotiate in good faith any legitimate proposal that might be offered. Well, we still say the same thing. So far no legitimate counterproposal has been offered that would warrant negotiation or study. But we do believe that the zero option is the moral high ground in this situation, that the opportunity in that area to get rid of an entire class of weapons and release both the Soviet Union, the Eastern block, and Western Europe from the threat that is hanging over them warrants doing our best to get that solution.

Q. Sir, if I might follow up. By clinging to that position, if it's leading nowhere, don't you run the risk of the worst of both worlds—no agreement with the Soviets and a backing down by the European allies about deployment of the new cruise missiles and Pershings?

The President. Well, let me just say without getting into the strategy of negotiating, I don't believe we've reached that point yet And I don't think that's a valid threat.

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Q. Mr. President, back on your Arms Control Director nomination, Kenneth Adelman. He was quoted today in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing as having said that, "Arms talks are a sham that we just have to play out to keep the American people and European allies happy." [4] With that kind of statement on the record from him, and with the fact that he doesn't have a lot of practical experience in arms control negotiations, are you not handing the Soviet Union a propaganda advantage in that propaganda war in Europe by presenting this man as our lead man on arms control?

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[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] For the zero option proposal, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

[4] *Nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session* . . . , pp. 145, 154.

The President. No, I don't believe so, and I don't—I know that he is aware of what it is that we're proposing and what we're trying to do. And it isn't—he knows it isn't a sham, that we're as on the level as anyone can be in trying to promote this. And I think he can be helpful in that. And I think that it would be far more destructive to our allies and their peace of mind to see me repudiated by a Senate committee on someone that I want to help in this after the great success that George Bush has had and George Shultz in Asia.

Q. But, Mr. President, in not voting on him today, as I understand the committee action, rather than vote against your choice, they're asking you not to make them do that, but to withdraw him so they won't have to. But if they did have a vote, they would have voted against him. So—

The President. Well, either way I would lose then, wouldn't I? And what's the difference whether I surrender or they beat me by one vote?

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Arms Control and Reduction

Q. Mr. President, back to the missiles in Europe. The message that Vice President Bush seemed to bring back and that we heard from him on television last week [5] was that they do support your zero option proposal, but since it has gotten nowhere that they would very much like the consideration of a so-called interim move toward less progress. Coming out of your spokesman in the past 2 or 3 days seems to be a very hard line against that, and I wonder, don't you think that is making it politically more difficult for the NATO leaders to—

The President. No, what he came back with was support expressed for our zero option. And what he also did—there's no question about, they wanted to know whether, you know, we're going to be willing to talk other issues—and he pointed out to them my original statement, and that has been our position. If somebody wants to present another offer, we'll negotiate in good faith with this.

Q. Well, if I may follow up, since your zero option, Mr. Andropov made a counter-proposal [6] which has been rejected here. Doesn't that leave a lot of NATO leaders feeling like the ball should be in your court if there is going to be some—

The President. Well, no, when you—you know, I said a reasonable proposal. A hundred and sixty-two missiles with three warheads on each one—we are up to the neighborhood of 500 missiles—and yet we would still be zero; we would not have any deterrent force on our side—that does not sound to me like a reasonable proposal. Now, I think the ball is still in their court.

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[5] *Ante*, Feb. 13.

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 917–922.

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Soviet Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests, February 16, 1983 [1]

The objective of averting nuclear war, towards which the efforts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of other peace-loving States are directed, makes it imperative to take *inter alia,* such measures, as would impede the development of ever newer types and systems of nuclear weapons.

One effective measure of this kind would be the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States and in all environments, which would at the same time promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Motivated by these goals, the Soviet Union is submitting to States Members of the United Nations, for their consideration, the following basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

A. SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION

1. Each State Party to this Treaty shall undertake to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear-weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control, in any environment—in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, under water or underground.

2. No party shall cause, encourage or in any way participate in the conduct of any nuclear-weapon test explosions anywhere.

3. A moratorium shall be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under which the parties to this Treaty shall refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of such explosions until an appropriate procedure has been elaborated.

4. Promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty, consideration shall be given to the question of the procedure for the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Such a procedure, to be agreed upon, may take the form of a special agreement or agreements constituting an integral part of this Treaty.

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[1] CD/346.

B. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY

1. General provisions on verification

5. The States parties to this Treaty shall base their activities in verifying compliance with the provisions of this Treaty on a combination of national and international measures.

6. For the purpose of verifying compliance by other States parties with the provisions of this Treaty, any State party shall have the right to use the national technical means of verification which it has at its disposal, in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law.

7. States parties which possess national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place the information which they obtained through those means, and which is important for the purposes of this Treaty, at the disposal of other parties.

8. The States parties to this Treaty undertake not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States parties.

9. International measures of verification shall be carried out through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with its Charter, and through consultations and co-operation between States parties, as well as through the services of the Committee of Experts of States parties to this Treaty.

2. Consultations and co-operation

10. The States parties to this Treaty shall, where necessary, consult each other, make inquiries and provide information in connection with such inquiries with a view to resolving any questions that may arise with regard to compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

11. The States parties shall exchange, bilaterally or through the Committee of Experts, information which they consider necessary to provide assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty.

12. Consultations and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

13. In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of the Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty shall agree in an appropriate way on the prevention of any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with this Treaty by other States parties.

3. International exchange of seismic data

14. For the purposes of better assuring compliance with obligations under this Treaty, each party may participate in an international exchange of seismic data. Such international exchange shall be carried out in accordance with the following guidelines.

4. *Guidelines for the international exchange of seismic data*

15. Each State party to this Treaty shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of seismic data, to contribute data from seismic stations on its territory which it designates for participation in the international exchange, and to receive all the seismic data made available through the international exchange.

16. Each party that decides to participate in the international exchange shall designate an appropriate body through which it will communicate with the international exchange.

17. Seismic data shall be transmitted through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization or through any other agreed communication channels.

18. International seismic data centres shall be established at agreed locations, taking into account the desirability of appropriate geographical distribution. These centres shall receive all seismic data contributed to the international exchange by its participants, process seismic data without interpreting the nature of seismic events, make the processed seismic data available to all participants and maintain records of all seismic data contributed by participants and processed by the centre. Each centre shall be under the jurisdiction of the party on whose territory it is located.

19. The Committee of Experts whose establishment is provided for in this Treaty shall in its work, draw upon the recommendations contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events established by the Committee on Disarmament.[2] Such measures include the elaboration of standards for the technical and operational characteristics of participating seismic stations and international seismic data centres, for the form in which data are transmitted to the centres, and for the form and manner in which the centres make seismic data available to participants and respond to their requests for additional seismic data regarding specific seismic events.

5. *International Committee of Experts of States Parties to the Treaty*

20. A Committee of Experts of States parties to this Treaty shall be established to consider questions relating to the international exchange of seismic data. Any State party shall have the right to appoint a representative to this Committee.

21. The Committee, which will function on the basis of consensus, shall hold its first meeting not later than 90 days after the entry into force of this Treaty and shall meet thereafter as necessary.

22. The Committee shall elaborate, in accordance with the Guidelines, detailed arrangements regulating the establishment and operation of the international exchange, it shall facilitate its implementation and co-operation between States parties to enhance the effectiveness of such exchange.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 636–645.

23. The Committee shall facilitate more extensive international consultations and co-operation, the exchange of information and the provision of assistance in verification in the interests of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

24. Other questions relating to the organization and procedures of the Committee of Experts, its possible subsidiary bodies, their functions, rights, duties and proceedings, its role in promoting international exchange and in on-site inspection, as well as other matters, are to be elaborated.

6. *Fact-finding procedure regarding compliance with the Treaty: on-site inspection*

25. Each State party to this Treaty, if it has doubts regarding an event on the territory of another State which may have been a nuclear explosion, may send that party a request for an on-site inspection. The request should state the reasons why it is being made, including relevant seismic and other physical data that could be associated with a possible nuclear explosion, its time and its location.

26. The party which has received the request, being aware of the importance of providing assurance of compliance with the obligations under this Treaty, shall state whether or not it is prepared to agree to an inspection. If the party which has received the request is not prepared to agree to an inspection on its territory, it shall communicate the reasons for its decision to the requesting State and inform the Committee of Experts of them.

27. If the requesting State party is not satisfied with the explanation received and the information provided on a bilateral basis, it may ask the Committee of Experts for additional information and consultation regarding that request and for assistance in ascertaining the facts in the form of scientific and technical expertise.

28. For the purpose of conducting inspection on the territory of States parties which may give their agreement, procedures shall be elaborated for such inspections and the manner in which they are to be conducted, including the list of rights and functions of the inspecting personnel and the definition of the role of the receiving party during the inspection.

29. This Treaty shall also contain a provision enabling any two or more of the States parties to agree, by mutual consent, in view of special interests or special circumstances, on additional measures which would facilitate verification of compliance with this Treaty.

7. *Procedure for lodging complaints with the Security Council*

30. Any State party which has reason to believe that any other State party has acted or may be acting in violation of the obligations deriving from the provisions of this Treaty shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the Security Council. Such a complaint should include all relevant information, as well as all possible evidence supporting the validity of the complaint.

31. Each State party undertakes to co-operate in the conduct of any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of a complaint received by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States parties of the results of the investigation.

32. Each State party to this Treaty undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State party which requests it, if the Security Council decides that such party has been exposed to danger or is perhaps being exposed to danger as a result of violations by another State party of the obligations assumed under this Treaty.

C. CONCLUDING PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY

33. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 Governments, including the Governments of all States permanent members of the Security Council.

34. However, the States parties may agree that this Treaty should enter into force for an agreed limited period, given the participation of three States permanent members of the Security Council—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

35. Provision should be made for the procedure for the signing and ratification of this Treaty, for the depositary, for accession by States to this Treaty and for amendments.

Statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Freeze Proposals, February 17, 1983 [1]

If I might take just a moment to supplement the points made in my prepared testimony.

We could conclude either a START or INF agreement within a matter of weeks, Mr. Chairman, if we were prepared to accept Soviet terms. It seems to me the issue that this administration or any administration attempting to negotiate arms control agreements always faces is the question of whether fundamental objectives can be achieved, whether those objectives ought to be sacrificed in the interests simply of achieving agreement.

It has been the approach of this administration to insist that our minimum objectives be in trying on any agreement, whether with respect to intermediate nuclear forces or strategic forces, that we not settle despite the pressures to do so for an agreement that would not realize those objectives.

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[1] *Calling for a Mutual and Verifiable Freeze on and Reductions in Nuclear Weapons: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, on H.J. Res. 13,* pp. 12–14.

If we are hasty, if we feel obliged to achieve quick agreement, the only kind of agreement that is going to be available to us is one on Soviet terms, which means, Mr. Chairman, it will be unequal, it will be unbalanced, it is likely to be unverifiable, and it will almost certainly be militarily insignificant.

Because these are the best terms that the Soviets have been prepared to offer thus far, we continue to stand firmly behind proposals of the administration that we believe are equal, that we believe are balanced, that we believe can be made verifiable, and that we believe would lead perhaps for the first time to militarily significant reductions.

Now, there are two or three things that make our job more difficult. And I would like to dwell on those for a moment because, if we are to succeed, we need the help of the Congress, and indeed without strong congressional support I see no prospect of an agreement to any terms except those unacceptable terms I alluded to a moment ago.

Our attempt to eliminate the entire category of intermediate range nuclear missiles from the European continent and indeed worldwide, our attempt can only succeed if the Soviets are persuaded that the alternative to an agreement will be consistent and steady support for the deployment upon which the NATO alliance agreed in December 1979.[2]

From time to time they have had reason to doubt whether the alliance is moving forward toward that deployment. But I am happy to say that at least as far as the support of allied governments is concerned, on every occasion that we have been together with the allies discussing this, they have reaffirmed privately and publicly their support, both for the deployment and for the administration's approach to the negotiations.

Unhappily, in working out a continuing resolution, funding the procurement program for the Department of Defense, Mr. Chairman, funds were deleted for the Pershing II missile, and signals like that are the wrong signals in my judgment. They raise doubts about whether the program is going forward, and to the extent to which the Soviets harbor those doubts we will not succeed in these negotiations.

If I had one point to urge on this committee, it would be that you join us in helping to persuade your colleagues on the Appropriations Committee that a failure to fund the Pershing II, which has now had two successful tests—there were questions raised about the test program—the failure to fund that program will weaken our hand at the bargaining table and make it less likely that we can achieve agreement.

In addition to the failure to fund Pershing II, which I believe will in due course be sorted out, our effort to achieve a START agreement of the kind that the administration hopes to achieve, and that I believe this committee would welcome, has not been aided, indeed it has been weakened, by a lack of support for the MX missile.

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[2] For the "dual-track decision," see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

The Soviets have no reason to come to an agreement unless they conclude that the alternative to an agreement is a worsening of their security situation, or alternatively an improvement in our security situation.

We now find ourselves in a situation where the land-based leg of our strategic triad is vulnerable to an attack. The administration, like previous administrations, has been sending for a solution to the problem of that vulnerability. And if the Soviets come to believe, as well they might, given the lack of support in the Congress thus far for the deployment of the MX, that we will go on in a state of vulnerability, they have that much less incentive to come to an agreement.

So we would urge in the strongest terms that when the commission appointed by the President develops its proposals and brings them to the Congress that they will receive widespread support.

There is a third thing that makes our job more difficult, Mr. Chairman—and I say this with all due respect—and that is the steady stream of congressional resolutions calling for negotiation, negotiating approaches that differ from those of the administration.

I wonder how successful the members of this committee would be in Geneva attempting to negotiate with the Soviets if your colleagues who remained behind introduced a stream of resolutions all urging differing negotiating approaches, and all of them different from the approach that you were arguing for in Geneva, that you had on the table, that you sat there day after day across from the Soviet Union, trying to persuade them this was indeed the position of the Government of the United States.

In a sense it almost doesn't matter what those resolutions propose. The fact that we are there negotiating in Geneva without the full and clear support of the Congress of the United States makes our job infinitely more difficult.

Among the resolutions that fit into this category are resolutions calling for a freeze. The Soviets would be delighted with a freeze. They would be delighted with a freeze because they know, as we know, that our strategic nuclear forces are approaching obsolescence and need to be modernized, replaced, and repaired.

They know, as we know, that we cannot maintain a credible deterrent if the basic elements of that deterrent are broken and need fixing. And, gentlemen, that is the situation we find ourselves in with respect to the land-based leg of our triad, the ICBM's, the submarine-based leg of the triad, something like 90 percent of our missiles on submarines are on boats that are 15 to 20 years old, and nearing the end of their useful operational life, and that is true of the air-based leg of the triad, B-52's, most of them older than the pilots who fly them, and they too need to be repaired and modernized.

What a freeze would require us to do is stop immediately, halt at once all of those programs to fix the vulnerabilities and inadequacies of our strategic deterrent. And I cannot for the life of me conceive how anyone could believe that action of that sort would lead to an arms reduction agreement. It won't.

Namely, I cannot help but observe a week or 10 days ago in St. Louis, the leaders of the freeze movement met, caucused, and decided what their program would be for this year. I wasn't present at that meeting, but I did read a *New York Times* account of what took place there. And I can only lament, as I would imagine members of this committee do, the decision that was taken by the leaders of the freeze movement to insist this year on unilateral action by the United States.

As I understand it, in St. Louis resolutions were passed calling upon the freeze movement to oppose additional funding of strategic weapons programs for the United States while simply calling upon the Soviet Union to show restraint. In short, they would terminate United States programs while counting upon the persuasiveness of their rhetoric to lead the Soviet Union to engage in similar action, which I can assure you the Soviet Union will not do.

So the freeze movement has now become a movement for unilateral disarmament of the kind that I believe to be dangerous and destabilizing. And I hope that as the Congress this year considers what comment it will make on our negotiating position, it will come to the conclusion that we have come to, which is that we are not going to succeed without strength and unity, and resolutions that urge different negotiating approaches will pull the rug out from under the administration and make it awfully difficult for us to achieve agreement.

Statement by the ACDA General Counsel (Graham) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Freeze Proposals, February 17, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee today to testify on Administration arms control policies. As I am sure you are aware, both the INF and START negotiations have resumed in Geneva. This is the fourth round for INF and the third for START.

In INF the U.S. has tabled a treaty based on the President's zero-zero proposal. The Soviets have likewise tabled a treaty calling for reductions in "medium-range" nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles, some of the details of which were made public by Mr. Andropov earlier this year.

The President's May 9, 1982 speech at Eureka College [2] laid out the U.S. approach to START which focuses on reducing the number of ballistic missile warheads on both sides by one-third, to about 5,000, and cutting the total number of ballistic missiles to an equal number, about one-half the current U.S. level. The Soviets have proposed more modest reductions from SALT II levels to about 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles on each side. Since we briefed your subcommittee last week on the status of START and INF, and because Admiral Howe will be addressing this subject, I will devote most of my remarks today to the arms control implications of our modernization programs and their impact on the negotiations now underway in Geneva.

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[1] *Calling for a Mutual and Verifiable Freeze on and Reductions in Nuclear Weapons: Hearings an Markup . . . on H.J. Res. 13*, pp. 22–26.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 266–289.

It is certainly a valid question to ask whether or not it isn't inconsistent to modernize our forces at the same time we are trying to negotiate reductions. A major assumption that underlies much of the freeze movement is that any changes in, or modernization of, nuclear forces will make the nuclear balance less stable and more destructive.

A major goal of our arms control efforts is to enhance crisis stability—to reduce and eliminate the incentive either side would have to strike first. Our modernization programs will go a long way toward ensuring the survivability of our strategic forces. An immediate freeze would have us forgo more survivable land-based missiles, the deployment of less vulnerable submarines, and other measures designed to increase the survivability of our nuclear forces and hence the credibility of our deterrent.

The survivability of our strategic forces is also basic to our ability to accept deep reductions in START. U.S. policy has always been to be able to accept a first strike and retain the forces necessary to inflict unacceptable losses on the Soviet Union. Thus, the survivability of our forces directly relates to the size of the force we require. The more survivable our forces the fewer we need to ensure a credible retaliatory force. Conversely, failure to modernize would make us reluctant to reduce, since lowering the number of today's increasingly vulnerable systems would only increase the overall vulnerability of our forces to Soviet attack. We were able to make a START proposal which called for substantial reductions in ballistic missiles and ICBMs because that proposal was based on the assumption that MX in a survival basing mode would be part of our force structure.

Finally, U.S. modernization efforts are necessary to give the Soviets incentives to negotiate seriously in Geneva. If we stop our modernization programs we would forfeit the most effective leverage we have to get the Soviets to agree to the far-reaching measures we have proposed. Experience has shown that the Soviets will negotiate arms control agreements only when they have a strong incentive to do so. Ambassador Rowny has made clear his belief that our modernization efforts are important to his success in Geneva.

Over the past year, proposals for a nuclear weapons freeze have attracted widespread attention. The notion of a freeze is popular. Opinion polls show upwards of 70 percent of the population favors the general proposition, and eight of the nine states where it was on the ballot last November have registered their support. But it is equally clear that public opinion is based on multiple overlapping and sometimes conflicting fears. A large majority of people, for instance, oppose a freeze if it would give the Soviet Union a nuclear edge over the United States—something we believe an immediate freeze would do. Significant majorities also oppose a freeze in which cheating could not be detected—something we also believe would be true of a freeze that covers all production and research and development.

The answers one gets from the public are often a function of what is asked. But to the extent that the freeze movement is an expression of concern and desire to achieve progress on arms control we welcome it.

—We are all agreed that nuclear war would be an unimaginable catastrophe and that such a war can never be won, and must never be fought.

—We are all agreed that any unrestrained buildup of nuclear forces would be wasteful and dangerous.

—We are all agreed that the world's present nuclear arsenals are too large.

—We are all agreed that arms control offers the best and only real hope of restraining nuclear competition, and reducing the level of nuclear armaments.

The differences which exist are essentially limited to the question of how best to achieve our objectives. While the Administration shares the genuine and deeply felt convictions that have given rise to the freeze movement, we do not believe an immediate freeze would constitute sound defense or effective arms control policy.

The question is whether a freeze would be an appropriate first step toward our goals or a wide detour that could reach a dead end. While the concept of a freeze can be stated quite simply and briefly, the actual task of agreeing to a mutual freeze could be extremely complicated. The Soviets have tabled freeze proposals in both the INF and START negotiations but they have been very vague in form and content. Negotiating a freeze would involve lengthy discussions about what would be covered, how critical terms would be defined and how the prohibitions would be verified—a total freeze on testing and production, for instance, would go well beyond anything we have attempted to verify in previous arms control agreements. Another illustration serves to underscore my point. In March of last year the Soviets announced a temporary unilateral ban on further deployment of SS–20s.[3] Yet we have indisputable evidence that after this declaration they continued to work on several then unfinished SS–20 bases. We and the Soviets clearly had different conceptions of the definition of a moratorium or freeze. Indeed, it could be just as difficult and time-consuming to negotiate a freeze as it would be to negotiate the type of arms reduction agreements we have proposed.

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 118–121.

The U.S. has offered bold new proposals in Geneva. We do not wish to cap deployments at current levels, we want significant reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides. And we want to achieve those reductions in the most direct manner.

Our arms control proposals and defense programs are closely intertwined—as they should be—to enhance our security. The START and INF negotiations can succeed if we show the resolve to take the steps necessary to restore the nuclear balance. The Soviets are not likely to relinquish advantages they have gained when there is no reason to do so. In Europe, the Soviets have sought to shape and use public opinion to block NATO INF modernization without having to dismantle a single Soviet SS–20, and in the U.S. they would likewise hope to exploit public opinion so as to undermine our efforts.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to address any questions you and Members of the Committee might have.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, February 17, 1983 [1]

Distinguished Comrade Chairman, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary today to dwell particularly on a problem which is of an extremely urgent and imperative character.

At the present time there is no task more important than that of saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war and embarking upon the implementation of concrete measures leading to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union for its part is making tireless efforts to achieve this goal.

The complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all States and in all environments would be a major step in the direction of lessening the nuclear threat and curbing the nuclear arms race. This measure, which is long overdue, would be a serious obstacle to the invention of ever newer types and systems of nuclear weapons and the appearance of new nuclear-weapon States.

The Soviet Union is deeply concerned at the fact that although almost 20 years have passed since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests in three environments, [2] which contains an undertaking by the parties to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, up to now not only has there been a failure to agree on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, but what is more, the talks on this problem have been suspended and our negotiating partners continue to refuse to resume them either on a tripartite basis or on a multilateral basis—within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament.

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[1] CD/PV.195, pp. 29–34.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

This concern of ours is shared by the overwhelming majority of States in the world, as has been eloquently manifested in a number of authoritative decisions adopted by the United Nations. Let me recall to the members of the Committee a decision adopted last December at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. I have in mind resolution 37/72 adopted by the votes of 124 States Members of the United Nations.

Although many of the representatives in this room were present also at the adoption of that resolution, it would be useful to recall some of its basic provisions.

The resolution emphasizes that "the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests . . . is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament" and reaffirms the conviction of the General Assembly that the conclusion of "a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority".

I would urge you to note, ladies and gentlemen: the United Nations considers the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests to be a matter of the highest priority, whereas some States, and more precisely one State—the United States—since the accession to power of the new administration, has transferred this problem to the category of its "long-term" or "long-standing" goals. This was reiterated recently in this room by Vice-President Bush of the United States.[3] The reason why the new United States administration has reduced the problem of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban to the level of a task for the distant future was plainly disclosed by *New York Times* observer Tom Wicker, who stated recently in the newspaper that "the Reagan arms build-up, under which an estimated 17,000 new warheads are to be built, would be impossible if a comprehensive test ban were to be agreed upon".

Resolution 37/72 further points out that "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban", and recalls that "since 1972 the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement".

This widely held opinion is shared by many politicians, scientists and experts. In this connection I would like to refer to the views of such well-known American seismologists as Lynn R. Sykes and Jack F. Evernden who wrote in the October 1982 issue of *Scientific American* that "networks of seismic instruments could monitor a total test ban with high reliability even if extreme measures were taken to evade detection". These scientists came to the conclusion that "the problems of negotiating such a treaty (on a comprehensive nuclear test ban) are overwhelmingly political rather than technical and must be recognized as such".

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[3] *Ante*, Feb. 4.

In fact Mrs. Theorin, the head of the Swedish delegation spoke in the same spirit in this Committee on 3 February last when she said: "I believe it is fair to say that to a very large degree the technical problems have been solved as regards the methods for monitoring a test ban, although further progress is still possible. It is now mainly the lack of sufficient political will which is preventing the Committee on Disarmament from elaborating the complete text of a comprehensive test-ban treaty". [4]

The session of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban held last year, during which the questions of verification and compliance were discussed, once again convinced the majority of delegates that the problems of verification are basically resolved and that political will alone is needed to achieve an agreement.

But let me refer once again to resolution 37/72.

The General Assembly considered it necessary to draw attention to the fact "that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in that Treaty, almost twenty years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". [5]

Lastly, resolution 37/72 urges all States members of the Committee on Disarmament (and we would like to draw the particular attention of the members of the Committee to this provision of the resolution) "To assign to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on item 1 of the Committee's agenda (nuclear test ban) a mandate which should provide for the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, to be initiated immediately after the beginning of the session of the Committee to be held in 1983", and "To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty".

This is an absolutely clear and unambiguous instruction given to our Committee by the world community represented by the most authoritative and influential international forum—the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet Union, always faithful to its international undertakings, is ready to spare no efforts in order to promote in the most active way the implementation of this instruction of the United Nations, the entire world community.

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[4] CD/PV.190, p. 19.

[5] The Non-Proliferation Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Desiring to make a constructive contribution to bringing about the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".[6] The Soviet delegation wishes to submit the "Basic provisions" for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, the text thereof having now been issued as an official document of the Committee (CD/346).

The document submitted by us takes into consideration the extent of agreement achieved during the discussion of the problem of the complete cessation of nuclear tests in recent years. It takes into account the observations and wishes expressed by many States, in particular in the Committee on Disarmament, on many aspects of the treaty, including questions relating to verification of compliance with it.

The Soviet delegation expresses its full readiness to comment in detail on the "Basic provisions" and to reply to the questions which other delegations may raise on the text of this document, in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group when it starts its work with an appropriate mandate for elaboration of the treaty, a decision on which will, we hope, be taken by the Committee without delay. We would consider it useful, nevertheless, to draw the attention of the distinguished delegates already now to some very important provisions of our document.

The first of these is the question of the scope of the prohibition. The "Basic provisions" provide that every State party to the treaty will undertake to prohibit, prevent and not to conduct any test explosions of nuclear weapons in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in any environment—in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, under water and underground.

In accordance with the provisions of the 1963 Moscow Treaty, it is proposed that the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests should be of unlimited duration. It is also proposed that it should enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 Governments, including the Governments of all the States permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time we also provide for the possibility that the States parties may agree on the Treaty's entering into force for an agreed limited period and with the participation in it of only three States permanent members of the Security Council—the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Soviet Union consistently upholds the importance of verification as a means of ensuring compliance with international agreement in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The Soviet Union ha authoritatively stated a number of times that we are no less intereste in verification than other States and that we shall not enter into any agreements on disarmament which would not give us due assurance that such agreements are being implemented as scrupulously by other States parties as they always have been, are being and will be implemented by ourselves. At the same time the Soviet Union has never and will not put forward the verification problem as a reason for not achieving agreements on arms limitation. Unfortunately, in discussing certain arms limitation questions our Committee has repeatedly faced in the past and continue to face now a situation where the verification problem is deliberately used as a pretext for thwarting agreements.

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[6] *Ibid., 1982,* pp. 717–721.

The attitude of the Soviet Union towards verification is convincingly shown by the fact that as an act of goodwill it has expressed its readiness to place some of its peaceful nuclear installations—several atomic power plants and some research reactors—under IAEA control. It was declared recently in Vienna that appropriate negotiations between the IAEA secretariat and the Soviet side will start in May–June of this year.

The verification system envisaged in the "Basic provisions", which is based upon many years of consideration of the means, methods and procedures for verification with the participation of competent experts from many States, is in our view an adequate one, fully ensuring compliance with a treaty on a complete nuclear-weapon test ban.

This verification system is based on a combination of national and international measures. I would like to emphasize particularly that while recognizing the importance of the use of the national technical means of verification possessed by States, we realize that at present only a limited number of States have such means. We are convinced that in the future—and the proposed treaty should of course be of unlimited duration—other States, too, will have at their disposal their own national technical means of verification. However, in order to give these States the possibility of having at the initial stage of the implementation of the treaty some access to the information obtained with the help of national technical means, we propose the inclusion in the treaty of a provision stating that "parties which possess national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place the information which they obtained through those means, and which is important for the purposes of this Treaty, at the disposal of other parties".

Another very important and fully international component of the verification is the international exchange of seismic data, which would function on the basis of recommendations prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Group of seismological experts of the Committee on Disarmament. The Soviet delegation considers that the work done by the Group, as reflected in its first two reports,[7] is extremely useful. The global network of seismic stations proposed by the seismological experts for the transmission of the so-called Level 1 data and, if necessary, Level

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[7] *Ibid., 1978*, pp. 103–110; *ibid., 1979*, pp. 476–481.

2 data to international seismic data centres offers an effective means of increasing confidence in compliance by States with their undertakings under the future treaty.

We propose further the establishment of an international committee of experts of the States parties to the treaty which would consider questions relating to the international exchange of seismic data and facilitate more extensive international consultations and co-operation, the exchange of information and assistance in verification in the interests of compliance with the provisions of the treaty.

Moreover, we propose that it should be agreed that if a State party to the treaty has doubts regarding an event on the territory of another State which might have been a nuclear explosion, it may send that party a request for an on-site inspection. The party which has received the request, being aware of the importance of providing assurance of compliance with its obligations under the treaty, will state whether or not it is prepared to agree to an inspection. If the party which has received the request is not prepared to agree to an inspection on its territory, it will communicate the reasons for its decision to the requesting State and inform the committee of experts of them.

In order to increase confidence in compliance with the treaty it is also provided that if the requesting State is not satisfied with the explanation received and the information provided on a bilateral basis, it may ask the committee of experts for additional information and consultation regarding that request and for assistance in ascertaining the facts in the form of scientific and technical expertise.

Naturally, for the purpose of the conduct of inspections on the territory of States parties which give their agreement thereto, procedures will be elaborated for such inspections and the manner in which they are to be conducted, including the list of rights and functions of the inspecting personnel and the definition of the role of the receiving party during the inspection.

In addition to all these provisions concerning verification, the "Basic provisions" provide that any State party which has reason to believe that any other State party has acted or may be acting in violation of the obligations deriving from the provisions of the treaty shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the Security Council. At the same time, each State party undertakes to co-operate in the conduct of any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

These are the basic provisions of the system we propose for th verification of compliance with a treaty on the complete and genera prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. I would like to reiterate that th Soviet delegation will be prepared to display a constructive approac during their discussion in an *ad hoc* working group which has th necessary mandate for practical negotiations on the elaboration of future treaty. Of course, we shall be ready to consider also othe proposals for a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban. We understan that a draft of such a treaty may be submitted shortly by the delegation of Sweden.

The Soviet delegation, like the overwhelming majority of the other delegations represented in the Committee, attaches primary importance to the question of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. A proposal by the socialist countries on this subject was put forward in the working paper submitted by the delegation of German Democratic Republic on 12 March 1982 (CD/259). The wording of the mandate proposed by the Group of 21 on 24 April 1981 in document CD/181 [8] is also acceptable to us.

In the light of the observations made in our statement today, observations based upon United Nations decisions and the opinions of the competent politicians and scientists, the Soviet delegation naturally cannot agree to the maintenance of the limited mandate defined by the Committee for 1982. An absolutely clear task was put before us by the General Assembly—to elaborate and transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session the multilaterally negotiated text of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. We are convinced that all those who cherish the interests of peace, curbing the nuclear arms race and halting test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time will display the necessary persistence and determination in order to organize our work in the current year in such a manner as really to bring closer the achievement of an agreement on the halting of nuclear weapon tests.

As to the Soviet Union it will of course not take part in actions which would be aimed at deceiving the world community. We do not wish to take part in the creation of a false impression that the Committee on Disarmament is dealing with the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban on a priority basis. Let the entire world know whose fault it is that this task is in fact not being implemented and why from a priority task it should become a "long-term" task, according to the wish of a single power. And if we consider that for 20 years it has been impossible to agree on a complete nuclear test ban, although all the parties to the Moscow Treaty, including the United States, recognized the priority of this task, then we may ask the authors of the so-called "long-term" conception how many decades, or maybe centuries, are needed in order finally to achieve an agreement on this question which will satisfy the Pentagon and the United States nuclear laboratories.

In order to create the most favourable conditions for the elaboration of a treaty, the Soviet Union proposed at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly that all the nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions including those for peaceful purposes, starting from a date to be agreed upon between them. Such a moratorium would remain in force up to the conclusion of the treaty. We are pleased that our proposal was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes of the States Members of the United Nations, i.e. by 115 votes (resolution 37/85). Only four States—the

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[8] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 174–176.

United States, the United Kingdom, France and China—voted against this decision, which was in the interests of facilitating the elaboration of a treaty and the early suspension of the qualitative improvement of nuclear charges. This fact, of course, speaks for itself.

At a recent meeting of the Committee figures were given concerning the number of nuclear tests conducted in recent years. We do not intend either to confirm or to deny these figures. We would only say to all the nuclear-weapon States, regardless of the number of nuclear-weapon tests they have conducted—let us immediately halt them. Let us not conduct such tests during the negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty, as is demanded by the world community.

In conclusion, allow me once again to assure the Committee on Disarmament that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries will do everything in their power in order to translate into reality as soon as possible the long-cherished dream of mankind—the halting for all time of nuclear-weapon tests.

Address by President Reagan to the American Legion: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], February 22, 1983 [1]

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Speaking the truth was one of the primary missions accomplished by Vice President Bush in his recent European trip. He cleared the air of misinformation, indeed, of deliberate falsehoods. He reaffirmed America's fundamental commitment to peace. We're not in the business of imperialism, aggression, or conquest. We threaten no one. Soviet leaders know full well there is no political constituency in the United States or anywhere in the West for aggressive military action against them.

Vice President Bush reaffirmed our commitment to serious, mutual, and verifiable arms reductions. Our proposal is a serious one. And it represents real arms reduction, not merely the ratification of existing levels of weaponry on both sides.

The Vice President also conveyed my willingness to meet anytime and anywhere with Mr. Andropov to sign an agreement that would eliminate an entire class of weapons from the face of the Earth. [2] And that offer still stands.

Finally, he conveyed our belief that success in reducing significantly the strategic arsenals of both sides depends on continued Allied unity and a determination to face and speak the truth about the threat confronting us.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 28, 1983, pp. 273–274. The President spoke at the 23d annual Washington conference of the American Legion.

[2] *Ante*, Jan. 31.

I have a deep, personal commitment to achieving an arms reduction agreement at the negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear forces. We and our allies are in full agreement that the proposal that I have made for the complete elimination of the entire class of longer-range, land-based INF missiles remains the best and most moral outcome. We're negotiating in good faith in Geneva, and ours is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. Our negotiations in Geneva are premised upon sound principles, supported by all the Allies after long and careful consultation.

These principles include: The only basis on which a fair agreement can be reached is that of equality of rights and limits between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As a corollary, British and French strategic systems are, by definition, not a part of these bilateral negotiations and, therefore, not to be considered in them. In addition, Soviet proposals which have the effect of shifting the threat from Europe to Asia cannot be considered reasonable. And finally, as in all areas of arms control, it will be essential that an INF agreement be underwritten by effective measures for verification.

Now, we view these negotiations as offering the best hope of assuring peace and stability through the reduction of INF systems. Toward that end, Ambassador Nitze has been instructed to explore in Geneva every proposed solution consistent with the principles to which the Alliance subscribes.

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Statement by the U.S. Representative (Kennedy) to the International Atomic Energy Agency: U.S. Assessment of the Agency, February 22, 1983 [1]

I wish to advise the board of certain decisions recently taken by my government. As you all are aware, last September the United States suspended its participation in the IAEA. Since that time, my government has been engaged in an extensive review and assessment of the IAEA and the future role of the United States in this agency. I would like to use this opportunity to share with you briefly some of the conclusions which we have reached from our intensive study, which is now completed.

Let me begin by recalling for the governors the message President Reagan sent to the delegates on the occasion of the 26th general conference. At that time the President said:

> The United States is determined to work with other countries to assure that this agency can successfully meet the challenges

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 1983, p. 79. The statement was made to the Agency's Board of Governors.

> ahead—from strengthening technical cooperation for sharing the benefits of nuclear energy to finding ways of improving further the technical and institutional safeguards against its misuse. It is our profound hope that others will share this determination—for it would be a tragedy for succeeding generations if we permit this organization to be weakened or undermined by political issues and concerns, which, however strong the emotions they arouse, are extraneous to the central technical purposes for which the agency was founded.[2]

It was with these thoughts in mind that our assessment was conducted. Our assessment underscored two basic points.

First, it is overwhelmingly clear that the IAEA has played and should continue to play a critical role in support of very substantial interests of all of its member states. The IAEA has contributed in a major way to progress in the expanded and safe use of nuclear-generated electric power and through its other development programs such as those in medicine, industry, agriculture, health, and safety. At the same time, we are all beneficiaries of the assurance provided through the application of international safeguards that nuclear material is not being misused for illicit and destructive purposes. Perpetuation of this assurance is essential if progress in peaceful nuclear development is to continue.

We, therefore, need to work together to improve the effectiveness of IAEA technical assistance programs, to improve the agency's safeguard system, and to maintain an effective secretariat. The director general is aware of the concerns we have expressed, and I am confident that we can achieve these needed improvements if we all exert our best efforts to that end.

The second major point emerging from our assessment is that, just as we are all the beneficiaries of the work conducted by the IAEA, we will all pay a considerable price if the viability and effectiveness of the IAEA are threatened. Yet it is clear to us that the growing trend toward controversy and divisiveness over political issues extraneous to the work of the IAEA is such a direct threat. We believe that unless this tendency is promptly checked, it will render the IAEA ineffective and will fatally corrode the enthusiasm with which member states have participated here for the last 25 years.

This is not to say that there will not continue to be legitimate differences among us regarding the allocation of agency resources and the relative emphasis placed on its programs. There are, of course legitimate differences in perspectives and interests among the membe states of the agency. We must not, however, abandon debate of issue germane to the IAEA in favor of debate of controversial politica issues which should be addressed elsewhere. To do that would be t abandon our mutual and important interests in the IAEA.

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[2] IAEA General Conference Record of the 239th Plenary Meeting, Sept. 21, 1982, G (XXVI)/OR.239.

In short, the agency must respect the statute and not, for reasons of political expediency, act in ways that are inconsistent with that statute. The agency's role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy during this critical period depends entirely on the credibility of its technical expertise.

As members of the IAEA's governing body, we bear a singular responsibility for determining the agency's future course. I believe we should make a determined effort to reestablish the tradition of member state cooperation which characterized its first 25 years. I look forward to working actively toward this end with you.

My government and, we are confident, other concerned governments will be watching carefully to see which direction the agency pursues in the months ahead. We hope and trust that the agency can put behind it the unfortunate political wrangling of the recent past and get back to the basic purposes which brought us all together in the first place.

The United States for its part then is prepared to renew its commitment to the IAEA and its important programs. Within the constraint of U.S. law, the United States intends to support fully these programs. At the same time, I must note that our commitment must depend on the degree to which other members are also determined to return this agency to its status as an effective international technical organization. It is our deep desire that all member states will join with us in this sincere effort. Together we can strengthen this unique international organization and see that the agency lives up to the principles contained in its statute.

Statement by the Representative of the German Democratic Republic (Herder) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, February 22, 1983 [1]

Comrade Chairman, in the general statement I made on 8 February[2] here, I declared that it was my delegation's intention to express our views in a more detailed manner on the items of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, in the course of this annual session. My statement today will be devoted to the item on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The German Democratic Republic continues to attach high priority to the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In the recent Prague Declaration my country, together with the other Warsaw Treaty member States, advocated that this Committee accelerate the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

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[1] CD/PV.196, pp. 10–14.

[2] CD/PV.192, pp. 17–23.

In my statement delivered on 8 February my delegation has already expressed some ideas on how this goal can be achieved. Today I would like to elaborate on our basic approach to the work of the Committee on Disarmament in the field of chemical weapons.

In the view of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic as well as many others, it is now high time for the Committee to proceed to actual drafting work with regard to a chemical weapons convention. All prerequisites for such an endeavour exist.

Firstly, we have before us quite a number of comprehensive proposals with regard to a chemical weapons convention. Let me only mention the documents tabled by the socialist countries, Japan, the United Kingdom, the joint documents by the USSR and the United States as well as the Soviet "Basic provisions".

The papers submitted in recent years by the consecutive chairmen of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons have been most helpful for advancing our work. The valuable "Views of the Chairman on a chemical weapons convention" submitted last year by Ambassador Sujka (CD/333) deserve particular praise. The same applies to the interesting papers reflecting the work done in the contact groups set up by Ambassador Sujka (CD/334, Annex). Now also the views of the United States on a chemical weapons ban have been tabled. [3]

Consequently, there is enough material to be processed in drafting the convention.

Secondly, the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons which was agreed upon last year and to which, after all, every delegation gave its consent, provides for the elaboration of a convention. [4] Thus, the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and in particular of its Working Group, can no longer be limited to a mere systematization of views and positions or lengthy discussions on certain questions. Now, the Committee should really start discharging its political negotiating role concerning a chemical weapons convention. It stands to reason that negotiations entail more than just reflections on working papers tabled in this Committee.

Thirdly, the demand to proceed with actual drafting work also takes into account the time factor. Each day spent on discussion may only lead us further away from the aim of a convention. While we are spending our time on discussions, a new generation of chemical weapons—the binary weapons—is being introduced into military arsenals. It is likely to give the whole chemical weapons problem a new dimension. This is also a challenge for the Committee, where the tendency can be felt to involve it ever more in a growing tangle of technical material and ideas, sometimes of no or only marginal importance to an international political and legal instrument.

Fourthly, questions which are still open could be overcome in the course of the drafting of the convention, in a serious and systematic negotiating process. To mention only one methodological example, I would like to refer to the personal experience I gathered during the drafting of the ENMOD Convention [5] which took place in the predecessor of this Committee in 1976. This agreement was then drafted within quite a short period of time, during which intensive efforts were undertaken by delegations and all open questions were solved in the course of the negotiating process.

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[3] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 66–68.

Having stated the case for drafting work one might well ask how this should be done. As far as the negotiating forum is concerned, one possibility could be to use the instrument provided by contact groups in a more systematic way. One could think about setting up such a group for all questions connected with the scope of a future convention. It could also tackle the issues connected with stockpiles and facilities, perhaps even the question of declarations. Another group could deal in a comprehensive way with all verification matters. Thus, we favour an approach which would follow the actual structure of the future convention. We have strong doubts about the usefulness of an approach aiming at a priority discussion of certain activities—stockpile destruction, for instance—and dealing with them in a separate, isolated way. This could perhaps lead to interesting scientific and technical debates, but would obviously lead us away from drafting work on a chemical weapons convention. With regard to the working method, we would prefer the use of brackets. In this way we could proceed on the basis of the structure envisaged for the convention and narrow down differences of opinion concerning questions of detail. This, of course, presupposes a readiness to compromise, to engage in real negotiations.

Sometimes we are told that the main problem of a chemical weapons convention would be that of international verification. We do not overlook the fact that in this field different views still exist. But this is the case with other areas as well, as has been shown by the United States document which I have already mentioned. So, how can one agree to the proposal to negotiate first an acceptable verification and compliance framework before drafting an actual treaty text? This would contravene common practice in international law. Such a position would amount to putting the cart before the horse. It could endlessly postpone actual disarmament, as historical experience shows. Besides, paragraph 31 of the Final Document states clearly that the forms and modalities of verification depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.[6] Moreover, should we now in the field of chemical weapons take the same dangerous approach as we were asked to do last year with regard to a comprehensive test ban? Should it be a rule from now on, first to agree on a verification system which would be acceptable to one delegation, and then, perhaps, start working on the disarmament agreement?

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[5] Printed *ibid., 1977*, pp. 322–326.

[6] *Ibid., 1978*, p. 418.

Experience has shown that it is not a serious approach to expect one side to accept the demands of the other side on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Here again we should bear in mind paragraph 31 of the Final Document which provides that verification measures should be satisfactory to all parties concerned. So, our aim cannot be absolute verification or a verification system which might be perfect and not leave any doubts or risks. It is common knowledge that taking into account the complexity of the modern chemical industry, we have to live with certain risks. What is necessary, however, is a system which creates the necessary confidence and ensures that the relevant agreement is observed by all parties.

In this we share the view, expressed two years ago in the Committee on Disarmament by the Indian delegation: "Let us not pursue verification procedures which may be 'intrusive' but not necessarily effective in ensuring compliance. There is a tendency in the Working Group to assume that on-site inspection or other intrusive methods of verification necessarily ensure compliance. When we are dealing with as complex a field as chemicals, we cannot be so sure. Our debate should not concentrate merely on whether or not to have on-site inspection. Rather we should try to determine what methods of verification are (i) feasible and (ii) optimal in ensuring compliance." (CD/PV.142, p. 31).

On several occasions my delegation has outlined its basic approach to verification. In the Working Group we have expressed our viewpoint about a verification system consisting of a combination of national and international procedures, including different kinds of systematic international on-site inspections and inspections by challenge.

It is the aspect of combination that we miss in the United States document. Virtually nothing is said concerning implementation and monitoring at the national level, that is, on the level of the States parties which, after all, would be responsible for carrying out the obligations of the convention and overseeing national enterprises and other bodies in order to guarantee compliance. This is common practice in international law and has been recognized by many delegations in this Committee. I would only like to refer to working papers CD/203 tabled by the Netherlands,[7] CD/167[8] and CD/313 by Canada, CD/CW/CRP.35 by Australia and CD/326 by the Federal Republic of Germany. Our approach does not imply a "confrontation" of national and international verification. They should be considered two sides of the same medal. It certainly does not mean the establishment of a so-called self-verification. In calling for sound national procedures we start from a purely practical viewpoint, since a well-functioning national implementation and monitoring system is a *sine qua non* for international verification. Where should the consultative committee send the inspectors, if there is no point of contact at the national level which keeps track of national activities concerning the implementation of the convention? Who should keep the records to provide the consultative committee with the required information?

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[7] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 307–310.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 96–103.

In this connection we would like to refer to the experience gathered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The safeguards applied by this Agency are largely based on national systems of accounting and control.

Furthermore, I would like to mention the national experience of my country in the chemical field. The improved Law on the Handling of Poisons adopted five years ago, for example, provides for a full inventory of all poisonous substances, which applies to all branches of the national economy and covers the whole process, beginning with the production and ending with the disposal of poisons. A system of national agencies oversees the implementation of the law. To our knowledge, similar laws exist in other countries as well.

It is the intention of my delegation to express at a later stage of our work more detailed ideas with regard to the co-operation between the national and international bodies of the verification systems.

In our view it is exactly the co-operation aspect which counts, namely, activities based on mutual trust, not an atmosphere of distrust. Moreover, suspicions should be eliminated by verification activities. But how can this be achieved when even the declarations of parties who voluntarily entered the agreement are not trusted and should be verified?

In the course of the Committee's work on a chemical weapons convention we have seen, like many other delegations, that the problems connected with banning chemical weapons are, indeed, quite complicated. One particular reason is that it is sometimes rather difficult to draw a line between what is connected with chemical weapons and what does not belong to it. That is true of chemicals forming the basis for chemical weapons, as well as of facilities producing these chemicals.

Such difficulties arise not only with regard to the scope of a chemical weapons convention but also concerning verification of compliance. These problems are further complicated by differences in the organization of the chemical industry in various countries. The production of binary chemical weapons and their introduction into military arsenals will bring about serious additional problems. This "latest achievement" in chemical weaponry would be more closely connected with the commercial chemical industry than the so-called unitary chemical weapons. This applies both to the chemicals involved and to the facilities concerned.

We share the concern of many delegations about this dangerous development and join their request that the problem should be carefully studied and solved on a priority basis. A situation has to be avoided where attention is concentrated only on the declaration and destruction of facilities for the production of traditional chemical weapons, while the same is not sufficiently guaranteed for the most modern chemical weapons.

In view of this situation, we should look for a solution which would eliminate this imbalance and bring positions on the timing of the declarations for chemical weapons production facilities closer together.

A possible solution could be to elaborate specific measures with regard to production facilities for binary weapons, namely, to declare their location and to destroy them earlier than other facilities. Such a procedure would give all other States parties to the convention confidence that this new kind of chemical weapon does not exist any more. This approach would, in fact, not place those who have binary weapons in an unequal situation. On the contrary, it would improve conditions for elaborating and implementing the convention. Therefore, my delegation proposes that the convention provide for the declaration of the location of production facilities for binary chemical weapons during the first year after its entry into force. They should be destroyed in the course of the first two years.

The Committee has before it a working paper containing the final summary report of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, held in Ho Chi Minh City from 13 to 20 January 1983,[9] which has just been introduced by Ambassador Solá Vila. Scientists of my country participated in this Conference. We highly appreciate its results. There is no doubt that the results of this symposium are directly linked with our efforts to elaborate a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They therefore deserve our special attention. Proceeding from this consideration, we would like to suggest that you, Comrade Chairman, should hold consultations with a view to inviting representatives from Viet Nam to explain in a more detailed way the results of the above-mentioned symposium.

Concluding my remarks, I would like to express the readiness of my delegation to offer in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons additional comments on questions referring to the drafting of the convention.

Question-and-Answer Session With President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations, Defense Facilities, and Soviet ICBM Testing [Extract], February 23, 1983[1]

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Q. Mr. President, Joe Kraft, *Los Angeles Times* Syndicate. In your speech to the American Legion, you set forward four principles that would govern this country's approach to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva. Do those principles in any way conflict with the proposals or ideas advanced by Ambassador Nitze, and if so, how?

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[9] *Ante*, Jan. 20.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 28, 1983, pp. 283–284, 287. The session was with journalists of the Godfrey Sperling group.

The President. No, because from the very beginning, before the Press Club when I made the first proposal about our INF policy and our desire, our goal to try and get zero option, total elimination of that class of weapons and wipe them out of the world, [2] I also said then and have reiterated it many times that we, on the other hand, were going there to negotiate and would negotiate in good faith on any reasonable proposal, any legitimate proposal that might be presented. And we're still willing to do that.

We still believe that the morality of the position we first took, that that goal should be the ultimate goal for all of us, to get rid of the most destabilizing weapons in the world, interballistic [*sic*] missiles—or ballistic missiles, I should say, of an intermediate range, in which in a matter of just 5 to 7 seconds are zeroed in on virtually every target in Europe, but only from one side.

Now, so far, the Soviet Union has seemed to want to continue its monopoly, that they have shown evidences of being willing to reduce to a certain extent their weapons, but in return for that, we would have to remain at zero. I just think this is a threat that we can't tolerate.

Q. My followup. Does that mean, sir, that the Nitze proposals, as far as this government is concerned, are still in play? (A) And, (B), in view of the distinction you've just made between short warning and more lengthy ones, do you make a distinction between the Pershings, that are in our original proposal, and the cruise, which take longer to arrive?

The President. Well, there's a very great difference between the two weapons. One of them takes several hours to get where the other gets in several seconds. [3] But I'm not sure, Joe, that I understand just what proposal you're referring to from Nitze.

Q. Paul Nitze, I believe, went for a walk with the Soviet delegate and aired a fairly—it's now been aired pretty widely—a proposal that I think is not in conflict with the four principles you enunciated. And my question really goes to the issue of whether, from your point of view, the Nitze proposals are still alive.

The President. The only thing that I—no, he referred to us a hint that had been dropped by the man he walked in the woods with, but nothing that he had said back. And that proposal from the other side was an indication that they might look more kindly on cruise missiles than on the Pershings. Well, again, I don't think cruise missiles alone would be a deterrent to the SS–20's.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

[3] This was later corrected to read "minutes." [White House correction.] [Footnote in original.]

Q. Mr. President, Ed Prina of Copley News Service. I have a two-part question in connection with defense.

Senator Tower recently has written to his fellow Senators asking them to nominate bases to be closed in their States and/or contracts to be aborted for defense work in their States. As far as I know, only Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, who doesn't want a nerve gas plant in his State, has responded. My question: Have you had any volunteers from either the Senate or the House in this connection?

And the second part of the question, also on defense: Can you tell us anything about the recent testing of Soviet ICBM's, one of which may have been in violation of SALT II? [4]

The President. Well, in the first place, with regard to the Representatives and the Senators and their areas: No, I haven't had any volunteers. I think that John Tower thought that was probably a very good idea, since some of the loudest squawkers against defense spending seem to squawk just as loudly if you suggested that the reduction of some of that spending in their particular district might take place. And I thought it was a good idea that he proposed and made them look realistically at what they were proposing.

With regard to the SALT II treaty, this was one of the objections, I think, that the Senate had that prevented them, under the previous administration, from ratifying that treaty; that it was so ambiguous and that it could best be described as a legitimizing of a continued arms buildup on both sides. But there have been hints and, yet, so far and up until this last case—and I don't have a full answer on that one yet—it would have been very difficult. You could say, "I'm convinced that these are violations," but it would have been very difficult to find the hard evidence to make it hold up in court. This last one comes the closest to indicating that it is a violation.

But there's no question that, while there was a kind of an informal agreement that, since the treaty had not been ratified but was still in existence there, having been signed, that both sides would agree in good faith that they would observe the things that they had arrived at in that treaty. This one, I think, makes it plain: The Soviet Union has really continued its buildup. As a matter of fact, in the INF thing that we talked about earlier, while they came to the table to talk to us about the reduction of intermediate-range weapons, they continued right on schedule adding to their weapons all the time that these negotiations have been going on. They now have 342.

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[4] The SALT II agreements are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Chemical Weapons, February 24, 1983 [1]

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to discuss the arms control implications of the use of chemical and toxin weapons. Our goal is to see their complete elimination. Our seriousness and dedication was shown most recently during Vice President Bush's trip to Europe. While in Geneva, he addressed the Committee on Disarmament and spoke forcefully and persuasively of the need to rid the world of chemical and toxin weapons. He took the additional constructive step of announcing an important U.S. initiative to achieve that goal. [2]

More than 12 years ago we unilaterally renounced the possession of all biological and toxin weapons. [3] Subsequently, we played a major role in negotiating an international agreement banning these weapons. A large number of countries, including the Soviet Union, joined us in ratifying the treaty. [4] We expected that the threat of this whole class of weapons would disappear. Yet, that turned out to be a false hope. Toxin weapons are being used right now in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Repeated calls to stop violating international agreements go unheeded. Outrages against the dignity of humanity continue. But the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Laos continue to deny their acts which we and others have documented.

We cannot, and will not, remain silent about the death and suffering caused by chemical and toxin weapons since the mid-1970s. Yet, we know it is not sufficient merely to exhort the world to condemn those who supply and use them. Rather, we must constructively find a way to insure that these weapons are effectively abolished.

Evidence of Soviet Use

Toxins and chemical warfare agents have been developed in the Soviet Union and provided to Laos and Vietnam. The Soviets use these agents, themselves, in Afghanistan and have participated in their preparation and use in Southeast Asia. Neither the Vietnamese, Laotians, nor Afghans could have developed or produced these weapons. The Soviet Union can, however, and has extensively trained and equipped its forces for this type of warfare.

An incident which occurred in 1979, in Sverdlovsk, in the Soviet Union raised questions about Soviet compliance with the prohibition on production of biological weapons as well. A sudden major pulmonary anthrax outbreak occurred near a suspected biological weapons facility. The Soviet explanation continues to be inconsistent with available evidence.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 458. The statement was before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment.

[2] *Ante*, Feb. 4.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 590–593; *ibid., 1970*, pp. 5–6.

[4] Printed *ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

Nearly 8 years ago, the world first heard of the use of lethal chemical weapons in Laos. In 1978, similar reports began coming out of Kampuchea, and in 1979 from Afghanistan. We now have accumulated a large body of evidence on the use of these weapons and the plight of their victims. The judgments are well documented, and the facts do not support any other conclusion. The United States has raised this issue publicly in the United Nations, with Congress, and elsewhere. We have issued a series of reports providing extensive evidence of these attacks and the agents used. The most recent report was submitted to the Congress and United Nations by Secretary Shultz on November 29, 1982.[5]

Canada, Thailand, and the United Nations have produced documentation. Other nations have also voiced their concern through their votes in the United Nations and individual and collective statements. Private individuals and organizations are also being heard. Some of these individuals are here today.

It is not as if we were dealing in an area in which civilized standards are vague or international law inadequate. To the contrary: There are two principal international agreements which place restrictions on chemical, biological, and toxin warfare. The first is the 1925 Geneva protocol,[6] one of the oldest treaties on weapons still in force, which prohibits the first use of these types of weapons. The second treaty is the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which bans the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties to this treaty as are Afghanistan, Laos, and Vietnam. Not only are both these treaties being violated in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan but so are universally accepted standards of international law and respect for humanity.

Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations

The continuing use of chemical and toxin weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan has obvious implications for U.S.-Soviet relations. It does not mean that we can no longer work with the Soviet Union to build a more stable and secure world, for as the two superpowers we have a special responsibility. It does mean, however, that the policies of our nation cannot be based on a benign or naive view of the Soviet Union and its intentions. The President has noted the responsibilities we carry and the need for strength and preparedness. With a realistic appraisal of Soviet goals and an appreciation that they are not constrained by some of the values we espouse, we can proceed, with caution and prudence, to help build a world eventually free from chemical, biological, and toxin weapons.

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[5] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 776–786.

[6] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

We have all heard the charges that the continuing Soviet defiance of international norms through the use of chemical and toxin weapons proves that arms control cannot work. Further, if the Soviets would so blatantly violate two important international treaties, what will keep them from violating other arms control agreements as well? We would contend that Soviet actions lead to a different conclusion—real, equitable, and fully verifiable arms control is an absolute necessity. It is not that arms control is pointless; it is that we have to do a better job of it.

Effective arms control is necessary if we are to reduce the number of destructive weapons in the world and reduce the risk of war. As the President has said, arms control is not an end in itself, but a vital means toward insuring peace and international stability.

Effective Procedures for Compliance With Treaties

Yet, if arms control is to work, agreements of this kind must be fully and effectively verified. The Soviet Union will not feel compelled to live by its international agreements if it knows that digression from those agreements will go undetected and unchallenged, and it is not obliged to pay a political cost. To sign agreements which lack tough verification standards would be not only misleading but also a disservice to all who want real arms control. To refuse to sign equitable agreements with strong verification procedures which are in our own interest would be equally misguided.

The Geneva protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention do not contain verification provisions or adequate measures to address questions of compliance. We are seeking, with others, to remedy these shortcomings and to establish Soviet compliance with both agreements. In December, the U.N. General Assembly recommended by an overwhelming vote to call on the states that are parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to hold a special conference as soon as possible to establish effective procedures for compliance with its provisions.[7] In December the U.N. General Assembly also requested the Secretary General to establish procedures to investigate promptly possible violations of the 1925 Geneva protocol.[8] We believe it is important that both resolutions be implemented promptly, and we will continue to participate in follow-on actions.

The United States strongly supported the adoption of both resolutions. The Soviet Union and a number of its allies did not. Soviet cooperation is necessary if we are to achieve the goals embodied in the resolutions which are directed at making these two treaties effective. Opportunities are available to the Soviet Union for such cooperation.

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[7] G.A. res. 37/98C.

[8] G.A. res. 37/98D.

Impartial Verification

We have taken steps to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. On February 10 we tabled, in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, our detailed views on the content of a complete and verifiable chemical weapons convention.[9] In presenting this initiative, we reiterated our commitment to the objective of a chemical weapons ban and stressed its urgency.

We propose that any activity to create or maintain a chemical weapons capability should be forbidden. Existing chemical weapons stocks and production and filling facilities should be promptly declared and destroyed over a specified time period.

Our proposal emphasizes the importance of mandatory on-site inspection. An independent, impartial verification system observed by, and responsive to, all parties is essential if we are to be confident that the provisions of the convention are faithfully observed. National technical means alone are insufficient, as they are available only to a few and have only a limited verification usefulness. Systems of "national verification," or self-inspection, are not the answer.

We have proposed that the following be subject to mandatory on-site inspection:

- Declared chemical weapons stocks and the process of their elimination;
- Declared chemical weapons production and filling facilities and the process of their elimination; and
- Declared facilities for permitted production of chemicals which pose particular risks.

We have also proposed an obligation to permit inspections on a challenge basis when questions of compliance arise. The verification approach we have proposed is tough but fair and practical. Although no one can guarantee absolute verification, we believe that our security and that of all other countries would be safeguarded. We are insisting on a level of verification which meets that objective, and we are prepared to explore seriously any alternative suggestions by other nations to achieve effective verification.

Conclusion

Our views are not fixed but subject to further refinement. The possibility of resuming bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union remains open. Such negotiations occurred earlier but lapsed in deadlock in mid-1980, principally over the issue of verification. We have repeatedly stated that for bilateral negotiations to be fruitful, the Soviet Union would need to demonstrate, rather than simply profess, that it is ready to accept effective provisions to verify compliance with a chemical weapons prohibition. We must also be assured that the Soviet Union is willing to abide by existing agreements.

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[9] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

The focus of negotiations should be on the difficult issues which are impeding progress, especially verification and compliance. Such issues must be resolved if genuine achievements are to take place. Concentrating on the less contentious issues, or even drafting treaty texts, would be a fruitless exercise if an effective verification framework cannot be built.

We hope that our arms control initiatives regarding these weapons will succeed. We do not have any illusions. Agreement will require a major revision of Soviet military strategy which accepts use of these weapons. We must also overcome longstanding Soviet aversion to effective on-site monitoring. Therefore, conclusion of an acceptable agreement cannot be guaranteed.

This Administration remains dedicated to the goal of completely eliminating all chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. Success in this enterprise would enhance not only our security but that of the whole world.

Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (Schneider) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: U.S. Arms Transfer Policy [Extract], March 3, 1983 [1]

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With respect to arms transfers and arms transfer-policy, I would merely reiterate what many officials of this administration have said before: We consider arms transfers to be an instrument of U.S. policy, not an exceptional instrument as our predecessors tried but in fact failed to establish, nor as a largely commercial activity as is the case with a number of some other nations. We will continue to weigh carefully all of the relevant considerations likely to bear upon any specific arms transfer decision in order to determine whether that transfer is, on balance, in the clear U.S. national interest.

These considerations include, of course, the military purpose of the proposed transfer, the ability of the recipient to absorb and operate the equipment, the economic impact of the proposed transfer upon the recipient, the impact upon surrounding states—stabilizing or destabilizing in the region—and so on. As a practical matter, we continue to turn down proposed sales at a rate not significantly lower than our predecessors. This approach, we firmly believe, is sensible and ensures that arms transfers are integrated effectively with other instruments of policy and contribute to our broader strategic objectives.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1983, pp. 77–79. The statement was made before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs.

Arms transfers are inherently neither good nor evil. A given weapons system is not stabilizing or destabilizing as an abstract proposition. Arbitrary restraint and unrestricted transfers are equally unrelated to U.S. national interests. There is no virtue in cutting arms transfers or increasing them, in the aggregate. Transfers can be evaluated fairly only in terms of their impact on specific U.S. interests in specific countries and regions, taking into account military, political, and economic realities at the time.

We have established a rigorous internal review process on arms transfers. All relevant departments and agencies have an opportunity to review major proposed transfers and present their views. This provides me, and other decisionmakers, with assessments of military need, political impact, regional implications, arms control factors, and affordability.

Sometimes there are clear and easy choices, i.e., approval or disapproval is unambiguously in the U.S. interest. In other cases, there are valid pros and cons. We must then decide whether, *on balance*, a proposed transfer is in the U.S. interest. We consult with the Congress, both to factor your advice into the decisionmaking process and to acquaint you with the factors bearing on the case, to sensitize you to the gray areas, and to minimize potential differences if we approve a sale and transmit it to you pursuant to Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. [2]

We also give close scrutiny to transfers of systems that incorporate advanced or sensitive technology. We must be assured that such technology will be adequately protected. This factor adds complexity to our analysis, because we must take into account the potential stability of recipient governments over the lifetime of the equipment being sold. The probability that a country will continue to share common policy objectives with us over the long haul is an important consideration as well.

Arms transfers are not substitutes for other forms of diplomacy. They are not an alternative to a long-term coincidence of national security interests between the United States and another government. They cannot guarantee harmonious bilateral relationships when fundamental interests diverge. The Soviets learned this in Egypt, Somalia, and earlier in Indonesia, or as we have experienced Iran and Ethiopia.

This being said, however, arms transfers should be and are an integral part of our security relationships with friendly countries which seek to deter and defend against neighbors which are, most likely, armed by the Soviets or other East bloc countries. As I stated earlier in my testimony, if we want reliable friends, we must be one ourselves. Countries which cast their lot with the United States must know that they can count on our support to meet their legitimate military needs. Failure to respond prudently and appropriately to these needs would seriously damage our credibility as a leader of the free world, would increase the chances of U.S. forces having to be deployed in a crisis, and would jeopardize defense cooperation with countries which provide access and facilities to the U.S. military. Our ability to supply friendly nations with appropriate arms contributes to a reduction in what would be larger U.S. defense needs to meet our national security objectives.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 405–407.

Government-to-government arms sales have fluctuated in recent years, from $13 billion in FY 1979 and $15.3 billion in FY 1980 to $8.5 billion in FY 1981 and $21.5 billion in FY 1982. They are, of course, subject to inflation like other areas of the economy: thus the levels for the past 3 years, in constant FY 1979 dollars, would more nearly approximate $13.6 billion, $6.6 billion, and $16.3 billion, respectively.

FMS Agreements

(billions)

	1979	1980	1981	1982
Current	$13	15.3	8.5	21.5
Constant FY 1979	$13	13.6	6.6	16.3

Commercial military exports in recent years have approximated $2 billion or less per year. This figure might rise somewhat since the Congress removed the commercial arms sales ceiling several years ago.

The surge in arms sales in 1982 largely reflects the impact of several large transactions. During recent years, for example, the United States has approved or has under consideration the following major cases:

•Trident for the United Kingdom—about $4 billion;
•F-18s for Spain—about $3 billion;
•F-18s for Australia—about $2.6 billion; and
•F-16s for Israel—about $2.7 billion.

The four sales exceed $12 billion, or more than half the FY 1982 level of $21.5 billion. Adding the $8 billion Saudi airborne warning and control system (AWACS) package would, with just the five largest transfers of the past 2 or 3 years, virtually match the entire FY 1982 total. Shifting such large sales from one year to another can dramatically change annual totals, with absolutely no policy implications.

In fact, the high FY 1982 level following the low FY 1981 level is largely an artifact of just such a shift of the Saudi AWACS package from FY 1981 into FY 1982 as a result of the extended congressional debate. Averaging those two fiscal years yields annual levels of some $15 billion—about the same as FY 1980.

For the record, I would like to provide you with some additional detail on the major arms transfers recipients in FY 1982.

FY 1982 Major Transfers Recipients

(millions)

Saudi Arabia	$ 5,170	Weapons-Related
	$ 1,844	Construction
Subtotal	$ 7,014	
Australia	$ 2,653.5	(Mostly F-18s)
Egypt	$ 1,943.2	(Mostly F-16s)
Pakistan	$ 1,422.9	(F-16s and Army Equipment)
South Korea	$ 1,046.4	(Mostly F-16s)
Total	$14,080.0	

These five countries, therefore, accounted for fully two-thirds of total FY 1982 sales; adding the next largest eight recipients brings the total to nearly $17 billion, or about 80% of the total for FY 1982:

Venezuela	$615.3
Israel	$544.3
Turkey	$411.0
Netherlands	$324.2
Tunisia	$320.3
Taiwan	$297.1
Japan	$256.1
West Germany	$ 79.9
Total	$2,848.2

I would note that very few of these have been the subject of significant controversy.

With respect to FY 1983, it is difficult at this point to make a confident projection; however, we will provide an estimate, in the classified arms sales proposal, as required by law. At this point, we have concluded some $5.7 billion in arms transfer agreements for the current fiscal year. Of this amount, about 60% is accounted for by just five sales—to Saudi Arabia, Japan, and NATO plus two NATO-member countries:

Major FY 1983 Arms Transfer Agreements

(March 1, 1983)

$2.365 billion—Saudi (Naval Program)
$1.178 billion—U.K. (Trident Program)
$ .275 billion—Japan (Helicopters)
$ .232 billion—NATO (Missiles)
$ .218 billion—Netherlands (F-16s)

In conclusion, I would like to remind you of the relationship between arms sales and U.S. assistance programs. In general terms, our military financing has covered roughly 20% or 25% of annual approved arms sales agreements in recent years. The remainder has been paid for in cash. Of the financed portion, between two-thirds and three-fourths has been at the cost-of-money to the U.S Treasury—in recent years as high as 14%. The remaining fraction has been paid for by grant U.S. financing, largely to Israel and Egypt.

Letter From President Reagan to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (O'Neill): Nuclear Cooperation With the European Atomic Energy Agency, March 7, 1983 [1]

The United States has been engaged in nuclear cooperation with the European Community for many years. This cooperation was initiated under agreements concluded over two decades ago between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) which extend until December 31, 1995. [2] Since the inception of this cooperation, the Community has adhered to all its obligations under those agreements.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 [3] amended the Atomic Energy Act to establish new nuclear export criteria, including a requirement that the United States have a right to consent to the reprocessing of fuel exported from the United States. Our present agreements for cooperation with EURATOM do not contain such a right. To avoid disrupting cooperation with EURATOM, a proviso was included in the law to enable continued cooperation until March 10, 1980, and provide for negotiations concerning our cooperation agreements.

The law also provides that nuclear cooperation with EURATOM can be extended on an annual basis after March 10, 1980, upon determination by the President that failure to cooperate would seriously prejudice the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security and after notification to the Congress. President Carter made such a determination three years ago and signed Executive Order 12193, permitting continued nuclear cooperation with EURATOM until March 10, 1981. [4] I made such determinations in 1981 and 1982 and signed Executive Orders 12295 and 12351, permitting continued nuclear cooperation through March 10, 1983. [5]

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 14, 1983, pp. 356–357. An identical letter was sent to the President of the Senate (Bush).

[2] 9 UST 1116, 10 UST 75, 11 UST 2589; TIAS 4091, 4173, 4650.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

[4] *Ibid., 1980*, pp. 29–30, 39.

[5] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 69–70; *ibid., 1982*, pp. 105–107.

The United States has engaged in four rounds of talks with EURATOM regarding the renegotiation of the US–EURATOM agreements for cooperation. These were conducted in November 1978, September 1979, April 1980 and January 1982. We also consulted with EURATOM on a number of issues related to these agreements last summer. We expect to continue the talks in 1983.

I believe that it is essential that cooperation between the United States and the Community continue and likewise that we work closely with our Allies to counter the threat of nuclear explosives proliferation. A disruption of nuclear cooperation would also cause serious problems in our overall relationships. Accordingly, I have determined that failure to continue peaceful nuclear cooperation with EURATOM would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States non-proliferation objectives and would jeopardize the common defense and security of the United States. I intend to sign an Executive Order to extend the waiver of the application of the relevant export criterion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act for an additional twelve months from March 10, 1983.

Address by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to the Non-Aligned Summit Conference [Extracts], March 7, 1983 [1]

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Development, independence, disarmament and peace are closely related. Can there be peace alongside nuclear weapons? Without peace, my father said, all our dreams of development turn to ashes. It has been pointed out that global military expenditure is 20 times the total official development assistance. Each day, each hour, the size and lethality of nuclear weapons increase. A nuclear aircraft carrier costs $4 billion, which is more than the GNP of 53 countries. The hood of the cobra is spread. Humankind watches in frozen fear, hoping against hope that it will not strike. Never before has our earth faced so much death and danger. The destructive power contained in a nuclear stockpile can kill human life, indeed all lives, many times over and might well prevent its reappearance for ages to come. Terrifying is the vividness of such description by scientists. Yet, some statesmen and strategists act as though there is not much difference between these and earlier artillery pieces.

The arms race continues because of the pursuit of power and desire for one-upmanship, and also because many industries and interests flourish on it. More recently, the notion has been propagated that tactical nuclear weapons are usable in limited wars. Powerful states propagate the untenable doctrine of deterrence. New areas are being brought into the scope of strategic grouping, military blocs and alliances. New bases and facilities are being established. That is why our responses must be surer, swifter and sharper. The desire for peace is universal, even within countries which themselves produce nuclear weapons and in those where they are deployed. The Nonaligned Movement is history's biggest peace movement. It welcomes the spontaneous upsurges of people, but government persists in propounding, practicing and pursuing the same, selfsame strategic interest, fears of influence, balances of power and tutelary relations, reminiscent of the earlier theory of divine right.

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[1] Delhi Domestic Service in English, Mar. 7, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Mar. 8, 1983, vol. VIII, pp. AA4–AA6.

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A third issue on which we stand as one, is on opposing the intensive militarization of the Indian Ocean and the nuclearization of the Diego Garcia base. We should redouble our efforts to ensure that the UN conference on the Indian Ocean is convened as earlier decided. The littoral states, the Nonaligned Movement and the United Nations have declared time and again that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace.

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Our plan for a better life, for peace of our people, depends on world peace and the reversal of the arms race. Only general and complete disarmament can provide credible security. Negotiations confined to a close circle of nuclear weapons powers have made little progress. We are nonaligned states, who want nuclear energy used only for peace. But, we too have a right to live and to be heard. In the name of humanity and on behalf of us all, I call upon nuclear weapons powers to give up the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances, to suspend all nuclear weapons tests [applause] [2] and the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and resume disarmament negotiations with determination to reach agreement.

The eyes of the world are upon us. People in India and in all our countries have high expectations from our deliberations. Let us decide to demand more purposeful steps to carry forward the democratization of international system and to usher in a new international economic order, to call for an international conference on money and finance for development which will devise the methods to mobilize finance for investments in the critical areas of food, energy and industrial development and to reassert our commitment to collective self-reliance. Above all, let us proclaim anew our belief that independence, development, disarmament and peace are indivisible and reaffirm our unceasing faith in the five principles which are the foundation of nonalignment, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

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[2] Brackets in source text.

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Address by President Reagan: Nuclear Freeze and Administration Military Policy [Extracts], March 8, 1983 [1]

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And this brings me to my final point today. During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that's their name for religion—or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930's. We see it too often today.

This doesn't mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 14, 1983, pp. 368, 369. The President spoke at the annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals.

I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.

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So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I've always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration's efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and one day, with God's help, their total elimination.

While America's military strength is important, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith.

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READEX FICHE pages tightly bound

British Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons, March 8, 1983 [1]

Introduction

1. It has become increasingly clear that the key to agreement on a chemical weapons convention is the elaboration of a sound verification regime which will generate confidence that States Parties are complying with provisions of the convention. The Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament has discussed this question in depth and a great deal of work has been done on the technical procedures which could be used for such verification. These discussions have shown that it would not be practicable to devise verification procedures which would provide an absolute assurance that the convention is not being violated. On the other hand, a chemical weapons convention must provide for sufficient verification to deter the would-be violator and to provide a degree of assurance against violation by one party which is accepted as adequate by others.

2. Five main complementary types of verification for a chemical weapons convention have been suggested:

(i) verification of destruction of stocks of chemical weapons;

(ii) verification of the destruction of facilities for their production and filling;

(iii) monitoring of production of super-toxic chemical agents for permitted purposes;

(iv) verification of non-production of chemical weapons;

(v) special inspections under the fact-finding procedures, including those conducted in relation to possible violations of all types.

This paper addresses itself to the problem of verification of non-production by regular inspection, i.e. category (iv) above. It would aim to provide confidence through non-discriminatory routine inspections that those chemical warfare agents posing the greatest threat are not being produced in violation of the convention. It would thus lessen the need for special inspections of type (v) above. This paper aims to show that the regime required for this purpose need not be anything like as onerous to the chemical industry as has sometimes been suggested.

3. Attention will be concentrated on a limited list of substances which pose particular problems for the verification of a chemical weapons convention. They comprise a list of named compounds or types of compound which are key precursors of super-toxic chemical agents. Valuable work on the identification of key precursors which might be included in this list has been done in the latest series of Chairman's consultations with experts on technical matters (17 January–4 February 1983). The illustrative list at annex is designed to show

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[1] CD/353. The annex is not printed here.

types of compound which might be included in a special category for the purpose of verification of non-production under a chemical weapons convention. This list is not definitive and is open to discussion. It comprises chemicals which are vital for the production of particularly potent, lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. Fortunately many of these substances are manufactured in extremely small quantities, if at all. Most of them are probably not produced at all in many countries. The table at annex shows, as far as these are known, civil purposes for which these substances are used and the number of factories known to be producing them in Britain. In order to demonstrate that the inspection of commercial facilities would not be too burdensome, it would be useful to know how many facilities worldwide produce the substances listed at annex. It would be helpful if members of this Committee would furnish corresponding data about their civil chemical industries.

Verification Regime for Key Precursors for Super-Toxic Chemicals

4. To be sure that the substances in the list of key precursors are not being used for the production of chemical weapons, it would be necessary, in the view of the British delegation, to subject the declared facilities which produce these substances to inspection as well as retaining procedures for verifying undeclared facilities. A possible verification regime for a limited number of civil chemical facilities is set out below. In the view of the British delegation, the appropriate verification regime for declared facilities would comprise the following components:

(a) declarations of facilities producing the chemicals listed at annex, and of facilities designed, constructed or used for such purposes in the past;

(b) periodic random selection of a number of all such declared facilities for on-site inspections;

(c) on-site inspection by a team of inspectors under the aegis of the Consultative Committee.

Declarations

5. A requirement should be included in the Declarations section of the Convention for all States Parties to declare any facilities on their territories which produce the substances listed at annex. Those countries failing to make such a declaration or those who submitted a nil return would of course still be subject to special inspections (category (v)). The first such declaration should be made within thirty days of the entry into force of the convention for the State Party concerned, and declarations should be made annually thereafter. The declaration should state the locations of the facilities, which substances are produced at a given facility and the current civil use to which the substances are put. Such information would be submitted to the appropriate body of the Consultative Committee.

Random Inspection

6. The facilities notified to the Consultative Committee in the way described in paragraph 5 above would become subject to random on-site inspection. These facilities would be subjected by the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee to a random selection procedure at intervals determined approximately by the agreed number of inspections. In deciding on the frequency of inspections to be carried out, the Consultative Committee would take into account the number of facilities declared, statistical sampling requirements and chemical engineering data on how much time would be needed to carry out prohibited activities. It is important that the process of selection should be carried out on a random basis, and that each selection should be made from the complete list of facilities, in order to maximize the deterrent effect of such a system. Thus the fact that an inspection had just been carried out at a particular facility would not exclude another check on that particular facility in the near future if the lot fell on it again. This would discourage States from beginning illegal activities at a facility immediately after an inspection had been carried out on the assumption that that facility was temporarily safe from inspection. The precise timing of the selection of the sites to be inspected would be left to the inspection teams, thus increasing the deterrent effect of the regime.

Inspection Procedures

7. Once a site had been selected for inspection, the inspection should be carried out as soon as possible, since modifications to a facility could be made very quickly to cover up any suspicious circumstances. A period of one week is suggested. Any delay should be satisfactorily explained and a pattern of bureaucratic delays, e.g. refusal to grant entry visas etc., in allowing a team of inspectors to visit a facility would be taken as a *prima facie* indication that a breach of the convention had occurred.

8. Inspections carried out in the way described above would be part of an over-all system of routine inspections to ensure implementation of the convention. The organization of inspections and the system of appointment of inspectors would therefore depend on the detailed provisions agreed. In general terms, however, an international inspectorate is envisaged which would involve the appointment of a panel of independent technical inspectors. The inspectors would need to be assisted by a permanent technical secretariat established at an appropriate place. Both the inspectorate and the fixed secretariat would be responsible to the Consultative Committee. The experience of the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency might be of value in the establishment of such machinery.

9. The procedures which the inspectors would be permitted to use would need to be set out in general terms in the convention itself or in an annex to it. Within the limits thus laid down, however, it would be desirable for the inspectorate to have scope for the technical develop-

ment of their own procedures and some latitude for their application under the different conditions prevailing at different facilities. In carrying out their duties the inspectorate would act under the authority of the Consultative Committee, which could from time to time issue guidelines within the authority given to them by the convention.

10. The objectives of on-site inspections would be to ensure:

(i) that the quantities of a particular substance being produced at the facility under inspection are compatible with the declared use;

(ii) that any stockpiling is carried out in a manner and quantity compatible with the declared civil use;

(iii) that the production facilities have not been modified in such a way that any could be used to produce chemical warfare agents.

11. Bearing in mind the purpose of on-site inspection as described above, it is proposed that procedures should be discussed by the Working Group (in particular during consultations with technical experts) under the following headings:

(a) examination of production for the facility concerned;

(b) visual observation at the site, both inside and outside the production facility, to detect unnecessary stockpiling facilities, munition filling facilities, over-specialized safety equipment etc.;

(c) engineering inspections to ensure that the production line is compatible with the production of the declared substance.

Dual Purpose Chemicals

12. The previous sections have been concerned with precursors for supertoxic chemicals. Most of these precursors are not usually produced in large quantities in civil industries and are typically produced at a small number of sites. There are other chemicals, however, which do have a large civilian use and which are also important in chemical warfare. Amongst these chemicals are those which are toxic, such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, chlorine, etc., which could pose a serious threat to personnel without protection. There are also non-toxic chemicals, such as ethylene and ethylene oxide, which could be precursors for mustard.

13. Some of the suggestions made previously for the control of precursors could be applied to these bulk chemicals. However, perhaps all that is practically possible is that there would be a requirement for a declaration of all facilities producing these chemicals above a prearranged quantity together with their civil uses. This is an area where the collection of statistics on a national basis may play an important role. More and more countries are imposing rigorous health and safety regulations on such chemicals and in many countries there are already requirements that industrial companies provide information to their governments on their use. Additionally, for safety reasons, there is an increasing tendency not to store chemicals such as Hydrogen Cyanide but to make and use them immediately. Declaration of facilities producing or storing these chemicals should present no problem.

Effect of On-Site Inspections on Civil Chemical Industry

14. As has often been pointed out in the Committee on Disarmament, it will be important in the establishment of any verification regime for a CW convention to ensure that the civil chemical industry is affected as little as possible. Consultations will therefore be necessary by individual States with their national chemical industries to ensure that the convention does not place an unnecessary burden on them. The inspections proposed in this paper would affect few facilities and are designed to cause as little disruption as possible to the chemical industry. The British Government has been consulting representatives of the British civil chemical industry about the inspection procedures above and its preliminary conclusion is that satisfactory arrangements could be made if a convention were agreed.

Conclusion

15. The above verification regime for non-production of chemical weapons, together with routine inspection of activities such as the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities, should help to create confidence in the implementation of the convention without imposing undue strain on industry, and thus serve to decrease the need for special inspections. The number of routine inspections would be kept to the minimum and the inspection procedures both simple and confidential; they would not involve intrusion into research activities or into the details of production while still deterring violations of the convention. The British Government will continue its consultations with the British chemical industry on this subject. We hope that other States will also carry out such consultations in the near future. Such action would build confidence by showing the determination to make the necessary effort to reach agreement on a convention.

Statement by ACDA Acting Director George Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, March 9, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before this Committee to seek your support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 2-year authorization request of $21,385,000 for fiscal year 1984 and $21,675,000 for fiscal year 1985. In support of this, I will review some of the Agency's recent activities and anticipated future initiatives. Mr. William J. Montgomery, ACDA's Director of Administration, and Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., ACDA's Director of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs, are with me today and they will join me in responding to questions you may wish to raise.

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[1] *Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorizations: Hearing . . . on S. 608, a Bill to Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as Amended, in Order to Extend Authorization for Appropriations*, pp. 4–8. For the final legislation, see *post*, Dec. 2.

As you know, I have been serving since January 14, 1983 as the Acting Director of ACDA, pending the confirmation of a new Director. As the Acting Director, I have reviewed the Agency's request to ensure that there will be sufficient resources available to permit ACDA to carry out its responsibilities.

I believe that the authorization request for ACDA, which includes the funding for the Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors Program, is adequate for the Agency to carry out its mission and to conduct the various arms control negotiations which are in progress on the schedules as we now know them. The authorization for the 2 years represents lean budgets without padding which should not be reduced below requested levels. I will discuss this in more detail later in my testimony and in our responses to questions the Committee may wish to pose.

Let me now highlight some of ACDA's programs and activities.

SUMMARY OF RECENT ACTIVITIES

Organization

ACDA's primary responsibilities continue to be centered on advising and assisting the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, the Congress, and other appropriate Government officials on arms control issues. During the past year the Agency has been reorganized and now includes four principal Bureaus which carry out the mission and line activities of the Agency. These include the Bureaus of Multilateral Affairs, Nuclear and Weapons Control, Strategic Programs, and Verification and Intelligence. These groups are supported by the Offices of Administration, General Counsel and Congressional Relations and Public Affairs which function as service units to provide support to the line Bureaus and ACDA's various negotiating delegations. These delegations presently include the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks (INF), and the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). ACDA has primary responsibility for providing financial, personnel and administrative resources for all these negotiations. The Agency has a secondary responsibility for administrative support for the United States delegation to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations. These delegations receive the bulk of their resources from the Department of State.

Arms control negotiations

Following the Administration's thorough review of U.S. defense and arms control policies, we now have a very full agenda for arms control. I will now review the involvement of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in this broad spectrum of arms control activities, initiatives and negotiations.

During the last year, ACDA has participated extensively in the final phase of the Administration's review of strategic arms control policy in preparation for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). In support of these negotiations ACDA has had responsibility, with other interested agencies, for generating and analyzing specific proposals, and for evaluating the verifiability of such proposals and their implications for U.S. national security.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks began in Geneva, Switzerland, on June 29, 1982, and two rounds of talks have been completed; the third round began in February 1983. The U.S. START delegation is under the direction of Ambassador Edward L. Rowny. Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), which began in Geneva on November 30, 1981, held three rounds in 1982. The fourth round began in late January 1983. The U.S. INF delegation is under the direction of Ambassador Paul H. Nitze. During negotiations, the Agency has a primary role in coordinating interagency efforts in support of both INF and START. ACDA has also had a leading role in the development of the President's proposals for Confidence-Building Measures and their incorporation into START and INF negotiations.

For the remainder of fiscal year 1983, ACDA expects to continue to work with other agencies to prepare for and support START and INF negotiations, and is engaged on a continuing basis in coordinating with other agencies the preparation and analysis of U.S. positions on these matters.

ACDA has primary responsibility for supporting the permanent U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which meets at least twice a year to deal with implementation of, and compliance with, existing strategic arms agreements and the Accidents Measures Agreement of 1971. [2] During the fall of 1982, a review of the ABM Treaty as required by Article XIV of that treaty was conducted in a third 1982 session of the SCC. The Agency expects that there will be at least two sessions of the SCC in fiscal years 1984 and 1985.

ACDA is also responsible for the United States participation in a variety of multilateral disarmament bodies. These include the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva; the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, which deals exclusively with disarmament and related issues; the United Nations Disarmament Commission; and the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna, between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In addition to providing much of the staffing for our delegations to these bodies, ACDA prepares guidance and supports their efforts from the Washington end.

The Committee on Disarmament meets each year for a total of approximately 6 months, with sessions from February through April and again in the summer from June through August. The U.N. General Assembly's First Committee meets each fall for approximately 2 months, usually mid-October to mid-December. As for the U.N. Disarmament Commission, it normally meets once each year for 3 weeks, usually in May or June. All of these are, of course, standing bodies, in which United States participation will continue for the foreseeable future.

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[2] The SALT agreements are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff., and *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff. The accidents measures agreement is printed *ibid., 1971,* pp. 634–635.

Our participation in these bodies requires the development of policy on a variety of arms control issues. ACDA plays a leading role in this interagency process. In the Committee on Disarmament, for example, among the issues under consideration or negotiation are such things as a nuclear test ban, a convention to ban chemical weapons, a convention to ban radiological weapons, and possible further arms control measures affecting outer space. The United Nations General Assembly each fall addresses a wide range of disarmament issues, on which ACDA takes the lead in developing United States positions for use in the Assembly's debate and in negotiations on the development of Assembly resolutions. Last fall the First Committee passed almost 60 resolutions, dealing with such matters as nuclear freezes, nuclear weapons free zones, the no-first-use or non-use of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, chemical weapons use, the reporting of and limitations on military spending, outer space arms control, and a host of other matters.

ACDA also continues to play an important part in the development of policy for the control of nuclear testing. The President has decided to seek Soviet agreement to strengthen verification procedures on the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties.[3] The Administration's long-term goal is to conclude a comprehensive test ban within the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions.

The MBFR negotiations seem likely to continue throughout fiscal year 1984. Last summer a new draft treaty providing for NATO and Warsaw Pact force reductions was tabled by the Western side. This draft was developed primarily by ACDA. In addition, the Soviet Union has just recently unveiled a new proposal of its own regarding force reductions, so it seems likely that these negotiations will have much material to address in the months ahead.

Finally, I should note ACDA's involvement in the Madrid Review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As you know, agreement has not yet been reached on a concluding document for that meeting, which is continuing at this time.[4] If agreement is reached at Madrid, one of the principal results of this meeting could be the convening of a Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It is possible that a preparatory meeting and initial sessions of such a conference could be held this year, and continue into fiscal year 1984.

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[3] Printed *ibid., 1974,* pp. 225–229, and *ibid., 1976,* pp. 328–332.

[4] A concluding document was drawn up Sept. 9, 1983. For an extract, see *post,* Sept. 9.

ACDA will play an important role in the United States participation in such a conference.

Non-proliferation

Nuclear non-proliferation policy remains one of ACDA's focal points for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. Preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is vital not only to our national security interests, but to the goals of global peace and security. The challenges of preventing further proliferation will continue to grow in the coming year, and the demands on ACDA's role as both a lead agency and a key coordinating agency in this field will also increase. ACDA will continue to play an important role in the development and analysis of regional approaches to non-proliferation, in the enhancement of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, in devising strategies to enhance bilateral security measures to decrease motivations for proliferation, and in initiating new strategies for consultations with other supplier states.

Cooperation between nuclear supplier and recipient states will be of increasing importance. As the lead agency for the 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[5] Review Conference, ACDA will be intensifying efforts to consult and reach agreement with other nations about international safeguards, physical security and security measures, and long-term issues such as fuel storage and waste management. The NPT Review Conference will be a major challenge in international diplomacy and its outcome will have major repercussions on the goals and objectives of non-proliferation. Extensive consultations with other states and major preparation for at least one FY Preparatory Committee meeting is central to our non-proliferation efforts at this point.

In addition, ACDA will continue to have a major responsibility in the nuclear export field, including not only evaluation of our national policies, but also multinational consultations. Cooperation among current and emergency supplier states will also be a focus of ACDA's activities in the non-proliferation field.

It is also clear that ACDA will play an important role in efforts to increase the effectiveness of the international safeguards regime.

ACDA will continue to devote significant efforts to the areas already mentioned and, in addition, to the more technical areas of non-proliferation policy such as safeguards and physical security for plutonium in all stages of the fuel cycle, and to safeguard other advanced technologies. We will continue to promote full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco[6] in Latin America and to encourage universal adherence to the NPT and will devote a great deal of time and energy to exploring ways to bring about full adherence to these important treaties.

We expect that the need to control the spread of nuclear weapons will continue in the coming years, and we are committed to ACDA's full and active participation in the full range of activities which surround this critical issue.

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[5] The treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[6] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

Arms and technology transfer

ACDA is involved on a day-to-day basis with the Departments of State and Defense and other concerned agencies to ensure that the arms control implications of proposed exports of conventional weapons and militarily-useful technology are given full consideration.

Pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act [7] and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, we advise the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, the President on the extent to which proposed transfers of conventional arms will contribute to an arms race, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements. When so requested, ACDA, in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, prepares for the Congress evaluations of the arms control implications of particular proposed sales. We also prepare statements of arms control considerations involved in each country program for inclusion in the annual Executive Branch request to the Congress for U.S. security assistance.

ACDA also participates with other agencies in controlling exports of technology with both military and commercial applications ("dual-use" technology). We give particular attention to those cases involving the possible transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Union and its allies, and those with a potentially adverse effect on arms control verification. In our review of "North-South" technology transfer cases, we are particularly concerned with minimizing the risk of adverse effects on regional stability of unauthorized third-country transfers.

As a result of greatly intensified Soviet efforts to acquire Western technology and the rapid advances in militarily-useful technology, we will be required to consider increasingly complex technology transfer policy issues in the future. We will be devoting more and more attention to the arms control issues raised by peaceful cooperation and trade in space technology, in order to limit the proliferation of strategic missile programs.

Defense programs and analysis

The Agency's Defense Program and Analysis Division is responsible for evaluating the national security implications of arms control proposals and for conducting analyses of defense policies, programs, and technologies as they relate to arms control. As required by law, the Division prepares the annual submission of arms control impact statements (ACIS) to the Congress. In addition, the Division prepared the *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (WMEAT) publication and provides analytic support to other ACDA arms control activities. The

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[7] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 386–430.

Division also provides the Agency point of contact for operational activities related to Antarctica Inspections.

January 31, 1983 marked the eighth annual submission of ACIS by the Executive Branch to the Congress. In 1975 Congress enacted Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act which requires submission of arms control impact statements to Congress with requests for authorization or appropriation for certain defense, technology, and nuclear programs.[8] Each impact statement analyzes the possible implications of these programs for arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations. Detailed information about the programs under consideration, including an analysis of weapon capabilities, stated military requirements, and funding, are contained in each impact statement. However, the principal portion of each ACIS is devoted to a comprehensive arms control analysis. This year's submission (FY 1984) included 10 ACIS covering 85 Department of Defense and Department of Energy programs.

Allocations of authorized funds

Our present thinking on general allocations of authorized funds for the 2 years is reflected on pages 2, 3, 12 and 13 of the presentation booklet we have submitted to the Committee.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would like to repeat that we feel that this authorization request is well conceived and lean. We can, with this amount of financial support, accomplish our mission. However, I urge that the Committee support this request in its full amount. If the work of the Agency and its delegations overseas expand significantly beyond those which are presently planned, it will be necessary for us to seek supplemental funding. My colleagues and I will now be happy to answer any questions which you may have.

Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Nuclear Freeze, March 9, 1983[1]

I particularly welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee on the subject of a possible freeze on the U.S. nuclear arsenal. I welcome it for several reasons:

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[8] *Ibid., 1975*, pp. 708–709.

[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 470. The statement was made before the Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems.

- Because this is an issue of such fundamental importance to the security of the United States;
- Because of its impact on our allies; and
- Ultimately, because of its importance to the maintenance of peace.

The prevention of nuclear war is the highest priority of this Administration. It must be the highest priority of any administration in the nuclear age. All of us know what nuclear war would mean for our country and the world. As the President himself has repeatedly said, in such a war there can be no winners.

No one has a monopoly on the desire to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. We recognize that nuclear freeze proposals issue from a profound concern about the danger of nuclear war; we fully share that concern. We also know that these proposals are supported by many who are deeply committed to rapid and significant progress in arms control. We, too, share that commitment.

The debate here is not over ends; it is about means. It is not a debate between those with good and those with malevolent intentions. The issue is how to translate the good intentions of those who desire effective arms control into actions which will achieve that end.

I believe the proposals for a freeze on the U.S. nuclear arsenal—however well intentioned they are and however attractive they may seem—would not achieve their stated purpose. On the contrary, I am convinced that they would diminish our national security and ultimately increase, not reduce, the danger of war.

- A freeze would encourage, rather than discourage, threatening Soviet behavior.
- It would hinder, rather than help, our efforts to achieve effective arms control.
- And it would weaken, rather than strengthen, the Atlantic alliance which is the cornerstone of our own security.

Implications for Our Relations With the Soviet Union

The effective management of our relations with the Soviet Union is essential to the preservation of peace and stability in the world. Toward that end, our policy toward the Soviet Union must be based on consistency, resolve, and national and allied unity. We cannot successfully manage this vital relationship—we cannot moderate Soviet international conduct—on the basis of gestures which would only be interpreted as signs of weakness and division.

Unilateral U.S. restraint during the 1970s, which was tantamount to a freeze on our part, did not produce Soviet restraint. On the contrary, the Soviet Union implemented expansionist policies in far regions of the world and carried out the most intensive conventional and nuclear military buildup in peacetime history.

The changes in the military balance—or as the Soviets would say, the correlation of forces—which resulted from our respective policies during the 1970s mean that even a mutual freeze under present circumstances would only legitimize the existing Soviet nuclear advantage with uncertain and potentially dangerous political and military consequences.

The Soviet Union has itself frequently advanced proposals for freezing forces, so as to conserve the military advantages it has acquired and avoid having to undertake significant reductions in arms control negotiations.

A freeze would undermine the relative capability of our nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and, as a result, the credibility of our strategy of deterrence, which has successfully preserved the peace for over three decades. Moreover, as you know, it would not be verifiable.

The Soviet leadership's assessment of our resolve is every bit as important to the effectiveness of deterrence as is the Soviet calculation of our military capability. But even a nonbinding freeze resolution would raise the most fundamental questions about our will to deter aggression and, if necessary, repel it with force.

Implications for Arms Control

Many proponents of a freeze maintain that it could be an effective first step toward arms control. In fact, I fear that it would have just the opposite effect. As you know, we are engaged in a variety of arms control endeavors.

In START [strategic arms limitation talks],[2] we are seeking deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, whose existence inspires such justified concern, and we are focusing our efforts on the most destabilizing systems, namely land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces], we have proposed the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons—an unprecedented offer in the history of nuclear arms control. The President has at the same time made clear that this is not a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, head of the INF negotiations] has been authorized to explore any possible solutions which would take four fundamental principles into account.

- Any agreement must provide for equal levels between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- As a corollary, no agreement should include the independent national deterrents of France and Great Britain.
- An agreement should not have the effect of transferring the threat from Europe to Asia.
- And any agreement must provide for effective verification.

These are not only eminently fair and reasonable conditions. They are absolutely vital to serious and effective arms control. It remains for the Soviet Union to decide whether it will negotiate on the basis of them.

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[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

We are also seeking significant reductions of military manpower in Europe in the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] negotiations, as well as a total verifiable ban on chemical weapons, which we are pursuing in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

In all of these negotiations we are pursuing the same goal: arms control agreements which will enhance peace and stability not by just placing a ceiling on the arms race but by actually producing verifiable, militarily significant reductions in armaments.

The principal obstacle to progress in all these arms control endeavors so far has been Soviet reluctance to agree to significant reductions and/or to a verification regime which would guarantee compliance.

Whether the Soviet Union will change its position in this regard is difficult to predict. But it is certain that it will not if it has no incentive to do so. A freeze would, in effect, reward the Soviet Union for its arms buildup.

The Soviets have agreed to real arms control only when it has been in their interest to do so. You will recall the major debate over the ABM [antiballistic missile] system. Only when the Congress—by one vote—authorized the government to proceed with the ABM did the Soviet Union have the incentive to enter into negotiations on and eventually agree to the ABM Treaty.

Prior to NATO's 1979 dual-track INF decision, [3] the Soviet Union was unwilling to consider control on the SS-20 missiles. It was only after that decision was taken and after the Soviets were finally convinced, on the basis of U.S. and allied preparations, that we were fully committed to implementing the 1979 decision did they agree to negotiations.

We must ask ourselves whether the Soviet Union would be in Geneva today negotiating over these systems if we had not moved ahead with preparations for counterdeployments of U.S. longer range INF missiles. Similarly, the prospect of U.S. strategic modernization continues to be a vital element in ensuring serious START negotiations.

With your permission I would like briefly to read to you the views of Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny [Edward L. Rowny, special representative for arms control and disarmament negotiations] on the freeze question:

- Ambassador Nitze reports that,

> . . . the passage [of a freeze resolution] would seriously undermine our ability to negotiate an equitable agreement. . . . Continuation of NATO preparations for deployment of U.S. longer-range INF missiles in Europe and the prospect of that deployment are the strongest incentives the Soviets have to negotiate seriously. . . . Were the development and deployment of U.S. longer-range INF missiles to be deferred, we would have virtually no

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

> bargaining leverage with the Soviets. They would have every reason to draw out the negotiations indefinitely without results.

- Ambassador Rowny, for his part, advises that

> negotiations on reducing strategic arms would be made immensely more difficult, if not impossible, by passage of a freeze resolution. . . . The Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate. . . .

We should not delude ourselves. A mutual freeze would be every bit as difficult to negotiate as arms reductions themselves—indeed, such a complete ban on production, development, and deployment of new systems could prove even more complicated than our current complex and difficult arms talks.

Moreover, a freeze would be a step backward. In START both sides have accepted the concept of reductions; in INF the Soviets have moved away from rigid insistence on the maintenance of current SS-20 force levels. Why should we throw away the opportunity to achieve real reductions in the talks which are now under way in exchange for the uncertain and potentially dangerous alternative of a freeze?

Implications for Relations With Our Allies

The U.S. strategic deterrent is fundamental to the effectiveness—even the survival—of NATO.

- Militarily, our nuclear forces are the capstone of NATO's deterrent and the linchpin of our strategy of flexible response. They are the ultimate link between the European security and our own, as the only forces which ultimately can deter the Soviets from using, or threatening to use, their own nuclear potential or massive conventional forces.
- Politically and psychologically, our strategic deterrent and the presence of U.S. troops in Europe symbolize our commitment to the defense of Europe and our conviction that the security of Western Europe and our own security are, indeed, indivisible.

A freeze would undermine our capacity to defend Europe, and it would inspire doubts among European leaders and publics about our resolve to do so. As such, it would have the most deleterious effect on the underpinnings of the alliance.

It is significant that no major allied government, all of which support arms control in principle but are deeply concerned about Soviet nuclear modernization and the current nuclear balance, has spoken out in favor of a freeze. Indeed, they have all repeatedly rejected Europe-wide freeze proposals offered by the Soviet Union. By destroying the deployment track of the NATO two-track decision, a freeze would cut the ground out from under these European leaders who have steadfastly held to implementation of that decision.

In short, a freeze resolution would call into question the will and ability of the United States to exercise its leadership in a manner which protects the interests of all.

Conclusion

To sum up, I believe that the consequences of a freeze resolution would be the opposite of those its proponents hope to achieve.

- It would encourage irresponsible, rather than restrained, Soviet conduct.
- It would threaten stability by preventing reestablishment of the strategic balance, rather than strengthening that balance.
- It would cripple, rather than advance, our arms control initiatives.
- It would weaken, not strengthen, the Atlantic alliance upon which our own security so heavily depends.
- It would heighten the risk of war, rather than strengthen the peace.

I ask you to bear these concerns in mind in the course of your deliberations. We share with you the same objectives of preventing war and securing the peace and the same commitment to effective arms control as an essential means to that end. We believe that the President's program—the most comprehensive arms control program ever set out by any American administration—is the best way of fully achieving this objective.

Political Declaration of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries [Extracts], March 12, 1983 [1]

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III. DISARMAMENT, SURVIVAL AND CO-EXISTENCE IN THE AGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

28. The Heads of State or Government consider that the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war. Disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is no longer a moral issue; it is an issue of human survival. Yet the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation. The Heads of State or Government therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States. Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike and

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[1] A/38/132–S/15675, pp. 14–16, 23–25, 45, 51. The conference was held in New Delhi.

ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. They rejected all theories and concepts pertaining to the possession of nuclear weapons and their use under any circumstances.

29. The qualitative development of conventional weapons adds a new dimension to the arms race, especially among States possessing the largest military arsenals. New generations of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons with increased lethality and greater accuracy are being deployed and there is increasing danger of the extension of the arms race into outer space. All these developments have greatly aggravated the dangers to the survival of human civilization.

30. The Heads of State or Government reiterated their conviction that international peace and security can only be ensured through general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, under effective international control. In order to prevent effectively the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should adopt urgent measures for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the Heads of State or Government, in the name of humanity, demanded an immediate prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States. They further called for a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons and the speedy finalization of a comprehensive treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons. They also reiterated that the nuclear-weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The Heads of State or Government recommended that negotiations should proceed without delay for the conclusion of an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to insure all non-nuclear-weapon States, without any discrimination, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

31. The Heads of State or Government affirmed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure. The establishment of such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

32. The Heads of State or Government expressed grave concern that certain nuclear-weapon States have deployed or intend to deploy nuclear weapons in various regions of the world.

33. The Conference emphasized that while nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, efforts should be made to conclude without further delay a treaty banning chemical weapons. Conventional disarmament must also be pursued within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament. The Heads of State or Government declared once again that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

34. The Heads of State or Government expressed their deep disappointment at the failure of the second special session of the United

Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to achieve meaningful results. Efforts to adopt a comprehensive programme on disarmament and other measures for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, failed due to the inflexible positions adopted by some of the major powers. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed that the principles and priorities contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament [2] retained all their validity and that the objectives and measures contained therein still represent a goal to be achieved, for which the non-aligned countries would continue to work untiringly. In this context, they welcomed and fully supported the World Disarmament Campaign launched during the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They also called for the early elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament so as to ensure its adoption at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

35. In order to avoid a further deterioration of the situation, the Heads of State or Government called for urgent consideration by the world community of the proposals advanced by the non-aligned countries.

36. The Heads of State or Government underlined the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. They called upon the Committee on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, to fulfil its mandate and adopt concrete measures of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament.

37. The Heads of State or Government urged the major nuclear-weapon States to pursue their negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament with greater vigour. Bearing in mind the vital interest that all States have in disarmament, they urged these States to keep the United Nations informed of the progress achieved in the above-mentioned negotiations.

38. Reviewing the international situation, the Heads of State or Government expressed grave concern over the continuing existence and further aggravation of focal points of aggression and hotbeds of tension in different regions of the world.

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VIII. THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

74. Ever since the Lusaka Summit Conference first called upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, non-aligned States have consistently extended their unanimous support to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 411–439.

2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971,[3] which sought to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States of the region and to bring about the elimination from the Indian Ocean and its natural extensions of foreign bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities and the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and to free the region from any manifestation of rivalries and competition for influence among the great powers, which have led to an increase in their military presence and threatened the peace and stability of the area.

75. The Conference reaffirmed the determination of the non-aligned States to continue their endeavour towards the attainment of the objectives embodied in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and as considered at the Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States of July 1979 as well as at the subsequent meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean. It reiterated its conviction that the presence in the Indian Ocean area of any manifestation of great power military presence, foreign bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction conceived in the context of great power rivalries, constitute a flagrant violation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace.

76. It viewed with disquiet and concern the continuous escalation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean area, including the expansion of the existing bases, the search for new base facilities and the establishment of the new military command structures of the great powers against the express wishes of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and other non-aligned countries. These activities endangered the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development of the States in the area.

77. It noted with concern that the quest for spheres of influence undermined the objective of establishing universal collective security without military alliances and the security interests of the non-aligned countries. It also noted and condemned the development of strategic concepts conceding to the South African racist regime a regional role which it was using as a pretext to maintain the *apartheid* system by force, to occupy the international territory of Namibia illegally and to destabilize neighbouring independent States.

78. The non-aligned countries are determined to work for the success of the Conference on the Indian Ocean to be held in Sri Lanka in 1984. They urged the United Nations *Ad Hoc* Committee to complete its preparations for the Conference strictly in accordance with its mandate. They welcome and support the efforts of the non-aligned members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to finalize preparations for the said Conference despite unwarranted delays resulting from the attitude of some great powers, which has thus far prevented the completion of the preparations for holding the Conference. They also urged all great powers and other major maritime users to participate in the Confer-

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[3] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 901–903.

ence in a constructive spirit and in the meanwhile to start a process of reducing their military presence in the Indian Ocean area.

79. The Conference called for the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which should result in the reduction and the eventual elimination of the military presence of the powers concerned and thereby contribute to the implementation of resolution 2832 (XXVI) on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

80. The Conference reiterated its satisfaction over the initiative taken by the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar in suggesting the convening of a summit conference on the Indian Ocean to be held at Tananarive. The Conference requested the non-aligned countries of the region to hold consultations on the elaboration of an international convention on the Indian Ocean as proposed by Madagascar.

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XXII. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

166. The Heads of State or Government reiterated that full and unrestricted access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, under non-discriminatory conditions, is an inalienable right of every State. They stressed the need to respect the options and decisions of each State in this sphere, without jeopardizing or affecting related policies and programmes regarding the nuclear fuel cycle, or international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

167. The Heads of State or Government deplored the pressures and threats directed against the developing countries to prevent them from accomplishing their programmes for developing nuclear energy. In this connection, it was reiterated that non-proliferation should not be made a pretext for preventing States from exercising their full rights to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes geared to economic and social development, in accordance with their priorities, interests and needs.

168. Likewise, they supported the convening of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, after adequate preparation, with a view to adopting universally acceptable principles of international cooperation in this field on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis.

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187. Non-alignment rejects the obsession with supremacy and the accompanying suspicion and fear as a basis for international relations. The arms race, especially in its nuclear aspect, is a direct result of great power confrontation. This in turn leads to new attempts at strengthening strategic groupings, military blocs and alliances, attempts to secure

and build up military bases and facilities and other interlocking arrangements conceived in the context of great power conflict in various regions of the world which only aggravate insecurity in the international environment. The peoples all over the world, on the other hand, seek harmony and peace and peaceful co-operation, and above all, to lift the spectre of a nuclear holocaust, which has hung over humanity far too long. The greatest peril facing mankind today is that to its very survival. The great powers, therefore, must give up the search for power, dominance and supremacy and pursue the policy of peaceful co-existence. They must resume the process of negotiations in earnestness and sincerity for the settlement of their mutual problems. The Heads of State or Government affirm that agreement between the great powers must not be at the expense of members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

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Message From the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries [Extract], March 14, 1983 [1]

Our world is increasingly turbulent and insecure. International economic relations continue to be characterized by inequality, domination and exploitation. The gravity of the situation is evident in the intensification of the arms race, in the resistance of the strong to the initiatives for change in favour of the weak, in great power involvement in regional conflicts and in the threat of a worldwide nuclear catastrophe.

Peace and peaceful co-existence, independence, disarmament and development are the central issues of our time but peace must be based on justice and equality because the intolerable inequality and exploitation established by colonialism and imperialism remain the most important causes of tension, conflict and violence in the world.

We, the heads of state or government of non-aligned countries, appeal to the great powers to halt the arms race which is consuming at an ever-increasing rate, the scarce material resources of our planet, destroying the ecological balance and wasting much of our finest scientific talent in sterile and destructive pursuits. These should be used to revitalise and restructure the world economy. The resources released by measures of disarmament should be diverted to promote the development of developing countries.

The non-aligned countries, speaking for the majority of the world community, want an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens not only the well-being of humanity in our times but of future generations as well. The nuclear weapon powers must heed this voice of the people of the world. From all indications, 1983 may be a crucial year for nuclear disarmament. We urge the nuclear weapon powers to adopt urgent and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. They should agree on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances and stop further production and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is also essential that they observe existing arms limitation agreements seeking to negotiate broader and more effective programmes leading to general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, under international supervision.

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[1] Delhi *National Herald* in English, Mar. 14, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, vol. V, Mar. 29, 1984, p. AA1.

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Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons [Extract], March 17, 1983 [1]

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Following Vice-President Bush's initiative in the Committee, [2] I had the pleasure of introducing on 10 February the United States' detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban (document CD/343). [3] I am pleased to note that since that time others have also made contributions to the Committee's efforts to achieve an effective ban on chemical weapons. The working paper, document CD/350, on the technical aspects of a convention on chemical weapons, introduced by Spain on 28 February, is a useful and thoughtful effort, and my delegation is carefully studying it. The working paper, document CD/353, submitted last week by the delegation of the United Kingdom, on verification of non-production of chemical weapons, [4] is also an important contribution and adds a great deal to our knowledge and understanding of the critical aspect of effective verification of a chemical weapons convention.

My delegation is also gratified that many delegations—indeed, virtually all who have spoken at this session—attach great importance to this body's efforts to negotiate a chemical weapons ban. This is a priority task which we all share. However, as I said on Tuesday last, we are greatly concerned that the chemical weapons Working Group and, indeed, other working groups, have not been allowed to begin their important work. We are hopeful that delegations will see their way clear to allow work to begin without further unnecessary procedural delays.

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[1] CD/PV.204, pp. 7–10.
[2] *Ante*, Feb. 4.
[3] *Ante*, Feb. 10.
[4] *Ante*, Mar. 8.

Since the introduction of our paper, many delegations have accepted our invitation to detailed briefings and open discussions regarding our views. These exchanges have been valuable to us and, we hope, to the others who have participated in them. We look forward to the continuation of this frank and free exchange of views and ideas in further group sessions and, of course, within the Working Group when it resumes its work. We believe that only through a complete understanding of the details and underlying principles inherent in our respective positions on the issues can true progress be achieved.

In this regard my delegation has noted statements by many delegations which reflect both an understanding and an acceptance of the need for effective international verification of a chemical weapons ban. The United States believes that timely agreement on the elements of a verification regime is necessary in order to realize progress on elements of the over-all convention. Vice-President Bush said during his appearance before this Committee on 4 February: "The key to an effective convention—one that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare forever—is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification". He further pointed out what we all know—the key outstanding issues impeding agreement on a chemical weapons ban are those pertaining to verification and compliance.

In an effort to facilitate the work of the Committee on the verification and compliance issues, I would like to focus today on some of those key issues and, specifically, to elaborate our views on several points made recently by other delegations.

Two delegations, those of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, in their respective statements on 22 February [5] and 10 March, [6] made several points and offered proposals relative to the potential for evasion of obligations under a chemical weapons ban. These proposals were set in the context of what was characterized as the principle of undiminished security of any party. It was proposed that the location of one type of chemical weapons production facility, those involved in the production of binary weapons, be declared during the first year after the Convention enters into force, and that during the first two years of the Convention only this type of facility be eliminated. Although their statements were silent on verification provisions regarding the declaration and elimination of binary production facilities, judging from their expressed concerns, we must conclude that they would consider systematic international on-site inspection to be essential.

Based on other standing proposals made by the Soviet Union and its allies, we note that the location of other types of chemical weapons facilities, however, would not have to be similarly declared nor their status relative to closure ascertained until some time later, but within 10 years after the Convention enters into force. The effect of their proposal, therefore, would be to require early declaration and destruction of some facilities while others would remain unaffected for a much longer period of time. This outcome is not consistent with the principle of undiminished security.

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[5] *Ante.*

[6] CD/PV.202, pp. 23–28.

The United States shares the belief that the Convention should not result in undiminished security or unequal obligations for any party. Indeed, the principle of undiminished security is one of the pillars of any effective arms control agreement. This approach is reflected in our "detailed views" paper. We have proposed in our paper that the location, nature, and capacity of all chemical weapons production and filling facilities be declared within 30 days after the Convention enters into force. This includes dual-purpose facilities designed or used in part for civilian production. As well as other facilities designed, constructed or used for the production of certain commercial chemicals deemed by the Consultative Committee to pose a particular risk. These chemicals would include *all* key precursor chemicals potentially useful for *all* types of chemical weapons, including binary weapons.

We have also stated our view that *all* activity, except that required for closure at all chemical weapons production and filling facilities, be immediately ceased upon the entry into force of the Convention; that *all* such facilities be closed according to agreed procedures which render the facilities inoperative; that *all* parties permit systematic international on-site inspection of each such facility promptly after declaration and, subsequently, at agreed intervals until the facility is destroyed; that parties permit the monitoring of *all* facilities by agreed appropriate types of sensors installed at the facility, and that *all* such facilities be destroyed by razing them, employing agreed procedures which permit systematic international on-site verification, and according to an agreed schedule.

It is obvious that our own views take fully into account the concerns expressed and, if adopted, would preclude any possibility of evasion such as was envisaged by the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. Indeed, our views are designed to prevent any continuation of production of *all* types of chemical weapons at production and filling facilities by *all* parties to the Convention regardless of the technical nature, design or fabrication of such facilities or the type of chemical munition produced.

Concerns have also been raised regarding the possibility of evasion of the Convention through covert production of dangerous chemicals for the ultimate creation of chemical weapons at commercial or nonmilitary facilities. We share these concerns, which have been expressed by many others as well. The group of chemical weapons technical experts and the Working Group have spent a great deal of time on this particular issue, and we believe a solution is at hand that does not present unreasonable demands on commercial chemical industries or otherwise put in jeopardy the production of those legitimate chemicals or synthetic substances on which so much of our basic existence depends.

The proposal of the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the banning of all production of all methyl-phosphorus bond compounds, regardless of any future, potential peaceful benefit to mankind, seems to my delegation to be unnecessary and, more importantly, would provide only a partial solution to the problem. There are many other chemicals which have similar potential importance not only for supertoxic compounds useful for chemical weapons purposes but also for incapacitants as well. To ban only one of them and not place controls on the others would in reality lessen the degree of protection which all parties require against possible covert chemical weapons production at commercial facilities. The United Kingdom working paper, document CD/353, presented just last week, contains elements of a better approach, which closes this loophole, and seems to offer a sound approach for dealing with this aspect of the verification problem. The United Kingdom paper suggests that all commercial facilities producing any of a listed group of chemicals having potential for chemical weapons purposes would have to be declared and made subject to an agreed mandatory international inspection regime to ensure that they are not being used for the production of chemical weapons. The components of such a verification regime could easily be designed so as not to be unnecessarily intrusive but still provide the necessary degree of assurance to all parties that such chemicals are not being diverted for the fabrication of any type of prohibited chemical weapon.

Another point which I will address today relates to the concern expressed with regard to the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons under the Convention. It has been rightly pointed out that if one party purposely delays the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks until the latter part of the period allowed for destruction, while another party commences the destruction of its stocks immediately after the Convention enters into force, a unilateral military advantage can be legally gained under the Convention. It has also been pointed out in this respect that parties may have different chemical weapons capabilities—components as well as total stocks—in being at the time the Convention enters into force. This is a legitimate concern. We welcome Soviet acceptance of our suggestion that procedures must be worked out during negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament with regard to the timing and rates of destruction of chemical weapons stocks on an agreed basis. Specifically, we believe that an arrangement for effective and verifiable reductions of chemical weapons stocks to equal levels between parties, or groups of parties, in the early phase of the destruction period is necessary to ensure the mutual security of all parties. We look forward to further discussion on this and other aspects of this most important issue.

In conclusion, let me say that my delegation considers the flexibility indicated by the Soviet Union delegation on the inclusion of a ban on the use of chemicals prohibited by the Convention as a constructive development. We welcome the Soviet statement that appropriate, effective verification procedures regarding alleged use should be provided. We are carefully assessing the legal implications of a new ban on use. It is essential to ensure, however, that the 1925 Geneva Protocol remains fully effective. In this context, the development by United Nations experts of more effective procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons use, in response to General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, is particularly important as a complement to the Committee's work on a chemical weapons ban and to provide a mechanism for dealing with this problem until that agreement comes into effect.

Address by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam): NATO, Western Security, and Arms Reductions, March 21, 1983 [1]

For Americans, a visit to Norway is an opportunity to learn more about our own culture. Much of what we Americans take pride in, we owe to our Nordic heritage. The traits of personal independence, self-reliance, endurance, and perseverance which built the American West were forged here on the fjords and the farmlands of Norway.

Those men and women from Norway who crossed the sea to build a new nation in America brought with them their skills, their labor, and their worldly goods. They also brought with them a set of values—respect for family, for church, and for themselves as free men and women. These values provided the moral foundation upon which our nation was built.

On a more personal note, I am particularly delighted to return to the region of my own ancestors.

I find in Norway today that the attitudes and concerns about the course of world events are much the same as those in my own country. There is concern about continued threats to international peace. There is anxiety about the growth in armaments. There is uncertainty about the future.

I am not surprised that these concerns are keenly felt in Norway. People who have experienced the horror of war know the benefits of peace. People who have experienced the oppression of occupation know the value of freedom. Western Europe was mankind's greatest battleground for two millenia. Nations subjugated nations. Peoples enslaved peoples.

This must never happen again, especially in the nuclear age. No nation must ever be allowed to assume that it has anything to gain from a nuclear war. As President Reagan has said, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." [2]

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, July 1983, pp. 81–83. The address was before the Executive Club, Oslo, Norway.

That truth will be the touchstone of my remarks this evening. Those remarks will address various concerns about the alliance, Western security, and arms reductions. I shall describe the foundations of our alliance for peace with freedom. I shall then describe the policies of that alliance. Those policies are based upon two imperatives: the need to maintain a stable military balance and the need to maintain a dialogue on arms reductions. Those imperatives are clearly manifested in the 1979 NATO "dual track" decision [3] which has resulted in the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations in Geneva. I shall conclude my remarks with an assessment of the prospects for agreement in those important negotiations.

An Alliance for Peace With Freedom

Modern weapons pose an unprecedented threat to security. Yet Western Europe has enjoyed peace with freedom for the past 38 years. One must go far back in the history of this continent to find as long a period in which there was not a single war, however small, fought upon its territory.

Outside Western Europe over 100 international conflicts have erupted since 1945. Obviously, the peace we have known for 38 years is no accident. It is not the result of a change in the nature of man. It is not the result of a change in the behavior of nations. The peace of Western Europe results from an act of will and a conscious set of policies.

The act of will is the commitment contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. That article asserts that all members of the Western alliance will regard an attack upon any one member as an attack upon us all.

This undertaking was freely entered into by 12 independent nations in 1949 and four more since then. It is more than a formal gesture. It is the foundation upon which peace in Europe has been built for more than a generation. It recognizes that the fate of Western peoples, of Western values, of Western civilization depends on the ability and will of Western governments to work together. Every nation in the alliance plays a vital role in our collective security. The United States applauds the important contribution Norway has made and continues to make to the alliance.

The act of will embodied in Article 5 has been translated into a conscious set of policies. Those policies have kept the peace in Western Europe for well over three decades. They are based upon two imperatives: military balance and arms control.

First, we must maintain a stable military balance to remove any incentive for aggression.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 218–219.

[3] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

Second, we must maintain active negotiations between East and West to reduce the level of arms.

The policies of the alliance are based squarely on these twin imperatives of military balance and arms control. These imperatives found their most recent expression in December 1979. At that time the NATO countries unanimously decided to seek limits on Soviet long-range intermediate nuclear forces in Europe and to deploy counterbalancing forces if negotiations fail to remove the Soviet threat.

Challenges to Mutual Security

After nearly four decades of success, it would seem that few in the West would contest that peace with freedom should be our common goal, that collective security should be our vehicle, and that a stable military balance and arms control should be the twin imperatives of our policy. Yet today even these fundamental notions are subject to debate within the member nations.

Some serious and thoughtful individuals question whether it is moral or prudent for the West to maintain such a military balance with the East. Others would argue that it is unnecessary to expend energy and resources to maintain a military balance. Still others have been persuaded by a generation of peace that the Soviet Union has no current aggressive intentions against Europe, and would not develop such intentions, even if it were permitted to acquire a preponderance of military power. The view that Soviet restraint toward Western Europe is inherent, rather than enforced, has even survived the Soviet use of military might in East Germany in 1953; in Hungary in 1956; in Czechoslovakia in 1968; in Afghanistan in 1979; and in the continued political, economic, and military coercion of Poland.

In our alliance, unity and resolve are not imposed by force of arms but are maintained through free choice. The current debate over alliance policies is a sign of the vitality that only a free partnership of sovereign states can possess. We have always achieved broad accord on the challenges facing the alliance not despite this debate but because of it.

A clear majority of the Western public now agrees on the threat we face. They recognize that West European peace and freedom cannot endure if left undefended against a dominating Soviet neighbor. They look to the alliance to take concrete steps to maintain the military balance needed to prevent war in Europe. They also look to the alliance to take concrete steps to reduce the risk of war in the first place. It is for this reason that our efforts to maintain a military balance have been paralleled by the maintenance of a dialogue with the Soviet Union. The most important dialogue of all is that which seeks to control and reduce the armaments of war.

Arms Control Agenda

The United States and its allies have pursued and continue to pursue every promising avenue toward arms control. Arms control has always been a major element of Western security policy. There have been some notable successes in this endeavor: the Atmospheric Test Ban of 1963, [4] the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, [5] and the SALT I accords of 1972. [6]

The 1970s were, however, a particularly disappointing decade for arms control—disappointing because it initially seemed so promising. Many negotiations were begun. Some were successfully concluded. Yet after a decade of negotiation, there seemed to be more arms in the world, not less.

This disappointment did not diminish our resolve. The United States has been the historic leader among nations in seeking genuine arms control measures. Today, with the support and cooperation of our allies, we continue our serious efforts to negotiate effective and verifiable arms control measures.

•We are working to obtain agreement on a European-wide conference on disarmament as part of a balanced outcome, including progress in human rights in the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

•Sixteen months ago we began negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Geneva. This was an entirely new area for arms control for the United States and for the alliance.

•Seven months later we began the strategic arms reduction talks (START), also in Geneva.

•Last summer, we and our allies put forward a comprehensive new proposal for reducing conventional forces in the mutual and balanced force reductions talks in Vienna.

•Most recently, the United States has urged accelerating negotiations on a comprehensive ban of chemical weapons. The United States has tabled its detailed views on the possible contents of such an accord in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament. [7]

In short, the Western approach to arms control has moved along several different fronts. Yet one cannot ignore the fact that recent events have focused attention upon the U.S.-Soviet INF talks in Geneva. I should like, therefore, to take a moment to examine the status of those important negotiations.

The INF Talks

The U.S. position in the INF talks is based on the initiative which President Reagan announced in November of 1981 and which has been fully endorsed by our allies. In support of the 1979 NATO decision, the President offered to cancel deployment later this year of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate its INF missiles—the SS-4, SS-5, and

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[4] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.
[5] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.
[6] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197 ff.
[7] *Ante,* Feb. 10.

SS-20. This proposal was based upon the belief that the complete elimination of the entire class of longer range land-based INF missiles remains the best and most moral outcome to the negotiations.

The President has made it clear, however, that ours "is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal." He has instructed Paul Nitze, our ambassador to the INF talks, "to explore in Geneva every proposed solution" that is consistent with the principles supported by our European allies.

These principles state that a fair agreement must be based on equal levels of U.S. and Soviet forces. British and French national strategic systems are, by definition, not a part of these negotiations. Soviet proposals which would merely shift the Soviet threat from Europe to Asia cannot be considered reasonable. Finally, a fair agreement must contain effective verification measures, and not undermine our ability to defend NATO with conventional forces.

The Soviet Union recognizes the universal appeal of President Reagan's proposal to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. It cannot afford to reject this arms reduction proposal in principle, lest it lose the battle it is waging to sway Western public opinion. Yet the Soviet leadership has not brought itself to accept arms reductions in practice. Instead, the Soviets have sought a device which would permit them to advocate reductions without having to accept them. They have found such a device in their insistence on compensation for British and French nuclear forces.

What the Soviets are arguing is that they must be allowed to retain a number of SS-20s in Europe equal to the number of British and French strategic forces. This argument is based upon a claim that a nuclear balance currently exists in Europe. The facts belie this claim. And the Soviets know the facts.

•The Soviets know that the British and French forces are different in type and function from the American and Soviet systems under negotiation.

•The Soviets know that almost all the British and French forces are sea-based, submarine-launched strategic missiles, not land-based INF missiles like the Soviet SS-20.

•The Soviets know that the British and French forces are strategic weapons of last resort, designed to defend Britain and France not to prevent attacks on other NATO countries.

•The Soviets know that the United States has rejected similar demands for compensation for British and French systems in the SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] [8] and SALT II negotiations.

•The Soviets know that their demand for a nuclear force as large as that of all countries combined is tantamount to a demand for military superiority over any one nation and thus for global hegemony.

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[8] Brackets in the source text.

•The Soviets know that only American weapons, not British or French, can directly tie the defense of Europe to the U.S. intercontinental force.

For all these reasons, the Soviets know full well that NATO cannot accept the Soviet demand for including British and French nuclear systems in the INF talks.

The truth is that the current Soviet position in Geneva is not put forward as a basis for serious negotiations but as a means to block progress on arms control. The Soviet position merely gives the appearance of arms control while resisting the reality. That it is intended as a barrier to progress is underscored by the fact that the Soviets have refused to resolve, or even seriously address, important issues in the talks until their demand regarding British and French systems is met.

In erecting such a barrier to progress, Moscow puts off the day when it must consider serious limitations upon its own forces. In turn, Moscow hopes to buy more time to threaten European governments, to sway Western public opinion, and to secure limits on U.S. systems without accepting any corresponding limits on its own.

Prospects for Agreement

In stating that the Soviets are not now negotiating seriously in the INF talks, I do not mean to suggest that they will never do so. On the contrary, we have often before seen them raise similar obstacles, only to drop them once the decision to move toward agreement has been made in Moscow.

I have already noted how the Soviet Union raised and then dropped its demand for compensation for British and French systems twice before, once in SALT I in the early 1970s and again in SALT II in the latter part of the decade.

In 1972, they moved quickly to conclude a treaty on antiballistic missiles (ABM), but only after the U.S. Congress had voted funds to build our American ABM systems.

In 1980, the Soviets reversed their refusal to negotiate about intermediate-range nuclear forces, but only after NATO had made it clear that it would field such a force of its own if an arms control agreement could not be obtained.

Today, as on those occasions in the past, the alliance must demonstrate to the Soviet leaders that they cannot achieve the limits they would like to see on U.S. forces unless they are prepared to accept comparable limits upon their own. Once the Soviets drop the illusion and accept the reality of arms control, they will find the United States and its allies ready to respond.

We will pursue with imagination and vigor the INF negotiations and all the other arms control efforts in which we are engaged. We will negotiate in close cooperation with other allied governments. The United States believes that consultations are essential to securing the most effective participation in the arms control process. Tomorrow I will have such consultations with the Government of Norway.

A vital objective of our government, your government, and those of all allied nations is to secure arms control agreements which will help assure that our children can enjoy the peace with freedom we have experienced for the past 38 years. Arms control alone cannot provide these conditions. To rely only upon arms control for our security would be to rely upon the good will of an adversary who may want peace on his own terms, but who is certainly hostile to freedom.

But as long as Western nations demonstrate the collective will to provide for their security through their own efforts, arms control can enhance stability, lower the risk of war, and reduce the burden of armaments.

The Real Peace Movement

In considering how to proceed in the years ahead, Western leaders would do well to recall that 45 years ago the governments of the free world engaged in wishful thinking and ignored the need for a balance of forces. Their peoples subsequently paid a terrible price. Once truly learned, however, the lesson was not forgotten. In the aftermath of war, the Western nations created by an act of will an effective instrument for mutual security, the NATO alliance.

The twin imperatives of military balance and arms control have guided alliance security policy for the past generation and have preserved peace and freedom for that generation. Those imperatives are manifested in the NATO decision of December 1979 to seek limits on Soviet INF missiles and to deploy U.S. missiles if negotiations fail to remove the Soviet threat.

It was only after the alliance took this decision, unanimously and with a common commitment, that the Soviet Union reluctantly agreed to enter arms control talks to limit intermediate-range nuclear missiles. More recently, alliance solidarity has forced the Soviets to begin talking about what seem to be reductions on its side. Yet, still the Soviets insist that they must have a monopoly on these systems. Still the Soviets demand compensation for British and French nuclear forces. Still the Soviets attempt to block Western deployments by dividing the alliance and challenging our resolve.

As a result, the INF issue has become a test of the alliance's ability to carry out a decision made by all its members and a test of Western ability to sustain the policies which have provided us peace with freedom for over three decades.

After 34 years of success, NATO should be considered the real peace movement, the proven peace movement, the only peace movement which guarantees peace and freedom, too. We must adhere to both elements of our approach to East-West relations. We must maintain a balance of arms to avoid war. And we must pursue effective, verifiable arms reductions to reduce the risk of war. In so doing, we will make NATO as successful a peace movement in the next generation as it has been in ours.

Working Paper Submitted by a Group of Socialist States to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War, March 21, 1983[1]

1. In view of the growing threat to peace and increasing war preparations there is no task more important and more urgent [than] the prevention of nuclear war. This is the most important global problem of our time, common to all peoples, irrespective of differences in their social order, way of life or ideology. Mankind is confronted with a choice: to halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face the danger of annihilation.

2. The First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament emphasized in its Final Document,[2] adopted by consensus, that the immediate goal of the efforts of all States in the disarmament field is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war, and it is underlined that among genuine measures of disarmament effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. The conclusion was drawn that measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.

The Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, in its Concluding Document,[3] expressed its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day. All United Nations Member States were urged to consider as soon as possible relevant proposals designed to secure the avoidance of war, in particular nuclear war, thus ensuring that the survival of mankind is not endangered.

In addition, the United Nations General Assembly in a number of resolutions recently adopted has emphasized the importance and urgency of concrete steps for the prevention of nuclear war.

3. Under present conditions, when the international situation gives rise to justified concerns of the peoples over their future, the task of preventing nuclear war is becoming even more pressing. The increased danger of war is not only caused by growing nuclear-weapon arsenals, but also by the introduction of ever new nuclear-weapon systems with increased warhead accuracy. Another source of profound concern is the emphasis laid recently by the United States on the creation of a nuclear first-strike potential based on qualitatively new nuclear-weapon systems which are destabilizing and greatly increase the risk of a nuclear war breaking out. The development of weapons based on the latest scientific achievements and discoveries, including systems

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[1] CD/355.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411–439.

[3] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 421–430.

and facilities for the conduct of military operations in and from outer space, is equally disturbing.

The introduction of new arms programmes creates an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust, which in view of the speed and destructive power of modern weapon systems represents a particular danger for the maintenance of peace. The situation would be further complicated, if new medium-range missiles were to be deployed in Western European countries, in the immediate neighbourhood of socialist countries. Such deployment could only be considered by the socialist countries as a measure aimed at increasing the surprise factor of an attack. Besides, it has to be considered, under present conditions, that even a coincidence, a mistake or technical imperfections, connected with nuclear weapons, would have catastrophic consequences for mankind.

4. The introduction of new military programmes is inseparably linked with an escalation of strategic concepts and doctrines, such as the doctrines of "a first disabling nuclear strike", "limited nuclear war", "protracted nuclear conflict" and others. All these aggressive doctrines, which are a threat to peace, are based on the assumption that it is possible to win victory in a nuclear war by being the first to use nuclear weapons.

The socialist States consider it necessary to emphasize resolutely that any calculations on winning a nuclear war after unleashing it are senseless. Once nuclear war breaks out, there can be no victors. Such a war would inevitably lead to the annihilation of whole peoples, colossal destruction and disastrous consequences for civilization and all life on Earth.

5. Proceeding from these considerations the Warsaw Treaty member States, in their Prague Declaration of 5 January 1983, emphasized that "it is essential to act without delay, while there is still a possibility of curbing the arms race and moving towards disarmament. At the same time they assume that all States, if they are concerned for the fate of their peoples and of mankind as a whole, must objectively be interested in avoiding war".[4]

6. The delegations of the socialist countries are firmly convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is, indeed, the organ called upon to undertake the necessary efforts in order to achieve agreement on practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly. They call for the inclusion of the question of prevention of nuclear war in the agenda of the Committee as well as for the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group with a view to conducting negotiations for the elaboration of concrete steps in this field.

7. The *ad hoc* working group could, in the view of the delegations of the socialist countries, start with defining the complex of measures for the prevention of nuclear war. They believe that it would be necessary, in the first instance, to elaborate such practical measures which

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[4] *Ante.*

have already found broad international support and for the implementation of which the political will of the corresponding States would be required above all. Among such priority measures for the prevention of nuclear war the following should be mentioned in the first place:

—the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons. The socialist States expect that, after the unilateral pledge given by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, all other nuclear powers which have not done so yet will take a similar step. This would, in practice, amount to prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, a significant step for the prevention of nuclear war would be done;

—a freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as on the production of fissionable material for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons, as a first step to the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of their nuclear arsenals;

—the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions for the time until a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is concluded.

8. An important step for the prevention of nuclear war could be the conclusion of a World Treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. At the recent Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty it was proposed to the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty to conclude a Treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations. The conclusion of such a treaty will certainly improve the present international situation.

9. The delegations of the socialist States support the proposal on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

10. The delegations of the socialist States are, of course, prepared to discuss other multilateral steps aimed at the prevention of nuclear war, such as preventing an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, avoiding the possibility of surprise attacks, etc. Measures of a bilateral nature should, obviously, be considered in corresponding negotiations between interested States.

The delegations of the socialist States express their readiness to proceed without delay to negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament with the aim of achieving agreement on concrete measures for the real prevention of nuclear war.

Address by President Reagan: Defense Against Strategic Nuclear Weapons [Extract], March 23, 1983 [1]

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Now, thus far tonight I've shared with you my thoughts on the problems of national security we must face together. My predecessors in the Oval Office have appeared before you on other occasions to describe the threat posed by Soviet power and have proposed steps to address that threat. But since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps have been increasingly directed toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation. This approach to stability through offensive threat has worked. We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war for more than three decades.

In recent months, however, my advisers, including, in particular, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored the necessity to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security. Over the course of these discussions, I've become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. Feeling this way, I believe we must thoroughly examine every opportunity for reducing tensions and for introducing greater stability into the strategic calculus on both sides.

One of the most important contributions we can make is, of course, to lower the level of all arms and particularly nuclear arms. We are engaged right now in several negotiations with the Soviet Union to bring about a mutual reduction of weapons.

I will report to you a week from tomorrow my thoughts on that score. But let me just say, I am totally committed to this course. If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major arms reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat. And that's a sad commentary on the human condition. Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability?

I think we are. Indeed, we must. After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 472, pp. 7-8.

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

I know this is a formidable, technical task; one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response.

But isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is. In the meantime, we will continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that can be ensured only by modernizing our strategic forces.

At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities. America does possess—now—the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, non-nuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.

As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter attacks against them. Their vital interests and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor our commitments. I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy; and no one wants that. But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM [antiballistic missile] Treaty [2] and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose—one all people share—is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201. Brackets in the source text.

My fellow Americans, tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it. As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support.

Final Communique of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, March 23, 1983 [1]

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) held its Spring Ministerial meeting at Vilamoura, Portugal on 22nd and 23rd March, 1983. Spain attended as an observer. Ministers discussed a wide range of security matters, including the trends in the balance of nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the preparations for NATO's Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) missile deployments, and the state of arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear forces and on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The main purpose of the Alliance is to prevent war, safeguard democracy and build the foundations of lasting peace. As was made clear by Heads of State and Government in their Programme for Peace in Freedom laid out following their meeting in Bonn on 10th June last year, [2] deterrence and defence, together with arms control and disarmament are integral to the achievement of this purpose. NATO is determined to preserve its security by possessing a spectrum of capabilities adequate to deter aggression and intimidation. For its deterrence strategy to remain credible, NATO has to maintain adequate forces in each area of the interlocking triad of forces: strategic nuclear forces, intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces, and conventional forces, with intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces in NATO Europe providing a crucial link between the defense of NATO Europe and the United States strategic nuclear deterrent. At the same time, the Alliance seeks a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level to strengthen peace and international security, and to this end has initiated a comprehensive series of proposals for militarily significant, equitable and verifiable agreements on the control and reduction of armaments.

Ministers noted with concern that, in spite of statements to the contrary, the Soviet Union continues to build up its nuclear forces. They are improving their capabilities over the entire spectrum from short-range to strategic weapons. Ministers, in discussing Soviet strategic nuclear forces, noted that amongst other developments the Soviet

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 1 (Apr. 1983), pp. 32–33.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug. 1982), pp. 25–26.

Union, while having already deployed modern, accurate SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, had recently flight-tested two new intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the field of Longer-Range INF (LRINF), the Soviet Union now has 351 launchers for the mobile and accurate SS-20 missile deployed and operational, comprising 1,053 warheads. Combining these with the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles still operational, the Soviet Union has about 1,300 longer-range land-based INF missile warheads on operational launchers. This is more than twice as many warheads as the Soviet Union had in this category before the deployment of the SS-20 missiles had begun. The deployment of the SS-20 was a key factor leading to NATO's double-track decision in December 1979. In addition, Ministers noted that the Soviets are replacing older shorter-range missiles with a formidable array of new more accurate systems, namely the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 which if deployed forward could reach deep into Western Europe. They agreed that such a concerted build-up—in spite of a decade of restraint by NATO—was far more than was necessary for purely defensive purposes.

Ministers discussed trends in the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States. They supported the determination of the United States and the United Kingdom to ensure the deterrent capabilities of their strategic nuclear forces which are of fundamental importance to the Alliance's strategy. Strategic nuclear forces remain the ultimate guarantee of NATO's security. Ministers underlined that the stability and security of all countries concerned would be greatly enhanced by an equitable and verifiable agreement as proposed by the United States at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) that calls for substantial reductions in strategic nuclear systems and strategic ballistic missile warheads.

Ministers also discussed the proposals tabled in Geneva concerning Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). They welcomed the United States proposals aimed at further enhancing international safeguards in this area.

Ministers emphasized their determination to move ahead with the double-track approach of modernization and arms control. For arms control negotiations to be successful, the Soviets must be convinced that NATO is determined to deploy its missiles as planned. In this connection Ministers noted with satisfaction that the ongoing development, flight-testing and initial production of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in the United States were proceeding well. They agreed that, while vigorously pursuing the arms control negotiation track in Geneva, the Alliance must at the same time continue preparations, which are currently on schedule, for the planned deployment of modernized LRINF. Ministers fully supported the United States efforts to achieve the total elimination of all longer-range land-based INF missiles (the zero-zero solution) and reiterated that in the absence of such an agreement the deployment of NATO's LRINF missiles would begin according to schedule at the end of 1983.

Ministers welcomed the fact that the United States would continue to maintain an active and flexible negotiating position. They stressed that the Alliance commitment to negotiations would, if necessary, continue even after initial deployment.

Ministers reviewed the state of the INF negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. They reaffirmed that the United States proposal, developed in close consultation with the Alliance, to eliminate the entire category of United States and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles remains the best and most equitable outcome. At the same time they welcomed the continuing close consultations within the Alliance and fully supported the United States' determination to explore in Geneva every proposed solution for an INF arms control agreement that meets the basic criteria of balanced and effective arms control: that is, significant reductions based on equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union, no inclusion of or compensation for third-country systems, global limitations, no weakening of the United States contribution to NATO's conventional deterrence and defence, and effective verifiability.

Ministers noted that the Soviet Union has yet to make proposals which recognize the legitimate security interests of the West, as reflected in the above criteria. Contrary to recent claims by Soviet leaders, the Soviet proposals have not substantially changed since the beginning of the negotiations. In fact, their most recent proposal would leave the Soviet Union with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the negotiations began, deny NATO the right to modernize its means of deterring this threat, allow them to have an unlimited number of mobile SS-20s east of the Urals which would still pose a threat to NATO Europe and almost totally eliminate from the European continent United States aircraft which are indispensable to NATO's conventional defences. The result would be to preserve the Soviet monopoly in the field of land-based LRINF missiles, to erode seriously the linkage between the United States' strategic deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe and to further the Soviet long-term aim of dividing the Alliance.

Ministers noted that the Soviet proposal to reduce the number of their "medium-range" missiles in Europe to the number of the strategic systems of the United Kingdom and France was unacceptable. In particular this proposal would result in the virtual elimination of the presence of United States intermediate-range nuclear forces from the European continent and thus constitute a fundamental change in the security situation of the Alliance. Only adequate United States forces in Europe, both conventional and nuclear, can provide the necessary linkage between the defence of NATO Europe and the United States strategic deterrent, which remains the ultimate guarantee of NATO security. The United Kingdom and French nuclear forces are independent strategic deterrents and hence cannot be compared with the Soviet or United States longer-range land-based missiles under consideration in the INF negotiations.

Ministers noted progress in the comprehensive work of the High Level Group which, as a matter of priority and against the background of INF arms control negotiations, is thoroughly examining the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments which would be required by longer-range INF deployments as well as the possible implications of these deployments for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. Ministers stated that in present circumstances both short- and intermediate-range nuclear forces continue to play their necessary role in maintaining an unbroken spectrum of deterrence. Further, they reaffirmed that the overall size of NATO's nuclear forces should be at the lowest level consistent with the Alliance's agreed deterrent strategy and that no more nuclear weapons than are needed should be retained in NATO's inventory. Ministers also pointed to the completed withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe and the commitment, undertaken as part of the 1979 decision to modernize longer-range INF missiles, that the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles would not result in an increase in the number of warheads in Europe over that reduced level.

Ministers accepted with pleasure an invitation from the Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, the Canadian Minister of Defence, to hold their next meeting in Canada in Autumn 1983.

Greece has expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes.

Letter From the Counselor of the Indian Embassy in Washington (Singh) to the *Washington Post:* Indian Nuclear Policy, March 24, 1983 [1]

Milton R. Benjamin's article "India Storing Arms-Grade Plutonium" [front page, Feb. 20] [2] is misleading. India's nuclear program is a peaceful one, and Indian leaders have made solemn declarations to that effect publicly and consistently.

There is nothing secret or surreptitious or even sudden about the work being undertaken at the Tarapur Reprocessing Plant. Annual Reports of the Department of Atomic Energy, which are public documents, have been regularly indicating the work being undertaken there. For instance, the Annual Report for 1980–81 stated that "the power reactor fuel reprocessing plant at Tarapur completed the second campaign of trial runs and has started the third campaign with metallic fuel." The Annual Report for 1981–82 specified that "as a part of the preparations for starting reprocessing of power-reactor fuel, a few spent fuel shipments were made from the Rajasthan Atomic Power

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[1] The *Washington Post*, Mar. 24, 1983.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

Stations (RAPS), to Tarapur." Since November last year, a beginning has been made in reprocessing spent fuel from RAPS at Tarapur with a view to establishing our technical ability to undertake such work and to confirm its commercial feasibility. This reprocessing is being done under appropriate IAEA safeguards.

The logical sequence of events was incorrectly given a dramatic and misleading construction in the article in question. Our attempt is to ensure that our fuel goes hand in hand with our understanding of the science and technology of nuclear power generation. The production of plutonium is neither an end in itself nor is it intended for any military purposes.

Indeed, the eventual use of this plutonium in a fast breeder reactor would be to avail of this self-generating technology for power production. It is public knowledge that India is planning to have a generating capacity of 10,000 megawatts of electricity from its nuclear power plants by the turn of this century.

Another statement made in the article—that India was legally barred from reprocessing the fuel from the Tarapur Atomic Power Station until 1993—is not correct.

In the context of our nuclear program, which is for peaceful purposes only, it is totally wrong to suggest that India has begun to stockpile separated plutonium to build atomic bombs. We have no nuclear weapons, and we have no desire or intention to make nuclear weapons.

Agenda Adopted by the Committee on Disarmament for 1983, March 24, 1983 [1]

The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account *inter alia* the relevant provisions of the Documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
II. Chemical weapons;
III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
IV. Conventional weapons;
V. Reduction of military budgets;
VI. Reduction of armed forces;
VII. Disarmament and development;
VIII. Disarmament and international security;

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[1] CD/356. The agenda was adopted at the 206th plenary meeting.

IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;

X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1983 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be considered by it:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Announcement by President Reagan: Issuance of National Security Decision Directive on Defense Against Strategic Nuclear Weapons, March 25, 1983 [1]

Today the President issued a National Security Decision Directive addressing his intent to direct the development of an intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program aimed at an ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles as announced in his speech of March 23, 1983. [2]

The document directs the following:

It is my policy to take every opportunity to reduce world tensions and enhance stability. Our efforts to achieve significant reductions in strategic offensive forces and to eliminate LRINF land-based missiles are one approach to that aim. However, it is my long-range goal to go beyond this. I would like to decrease our reliance on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons and to increase the contribution of defensive systems to our security and that of our allies. To begin to move us toward that goal, I have concluded that we should explore the possibility of using defensive capabilities to counter the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 28, 1983, pp. 462–463.

[2] *Ante*.

I direct the development of an intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program aimed at an ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles. These actions will be carried out in a manner consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty [3] and recognizing the need for close consultations with our allies.

In order to provide the necessary basis for this effort, I further direct a study be completed on a priority basis to assess the roles that ballistic missile defense could play in future security strategy of the United States and our allies. Among other items, the study will provide guidance necessary to develop research and development funding commitments for the FY 85 Departmental budgets and the accompanying Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP).

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is assigned the responsibility to formulate detailed instructions for implementing this NSDD including organization, assignment of responsibilities, and completion dates.

News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: Defense Against Strategic Nuclear Weapons [Extract], March 25, 1983 [1]

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Q. Mr. President, why did you make that proposal now, in the light of the arms race that is going on with the Soviet Union, so to speak, and the negotiations over in Geneva, at a time when the budget is being beaten up in Congress because of the higher defense spending that you want? Why would you put that proposal out now?

The President. I put it out now, because what better time? I've been having this idea, and it's been kicking around in my mind for some time here recently. And constantly I have thought about the fact that the nuclear missile seems to be one of the only major weapon systems in history that has never produced or brought about a defense against itself. And I brought this up one day in a meeting which the Chiefs of Staff were present and others, and we talked about it and discussed it and then discussed it some more. And since we don't know how long it will take or if—or ever, that we have to start—the quicker we start, the better.

But it is inconceivable to me that we can go on thinking down the future, not only for ourselves and our lifetime but for other generations, that the great nations of the world will sit here, like people facing themselves across a table, each with a cocked gun, and no one knowing whether someone might tighten their finger on the trigger.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Mar. 28, 1983, pp. 452–453.

There is one way, and the way we're pursuing, which is to see if we can get mutual agreement to reduce these weapons and, hopefully, to eliminate them, as we're trying in INF. There is another way, and that is if we could, the same scientists who gave us this kind of destructive power, if they could turn their talent to the job of, perhaps, coming up with something that would render these weapons obsolete. And I don't know how long it's going to take, but we're going to start, because I'm going to be signing an executive directive very shortly, when I get out of here.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International]? [2]

Q. Mr. President, the Soviets don't see it your way at all in terms—they say that you are, in fact, accelerating the arms race, that we are violating the ABM treaty, [3] and that it's almost that you've thrown down the gauntlet.

The President. Well, maybe they're looking at us in a kind of a mirror image. They're having us think like they think.

First of all, it doesn't violate the ABM treaty. We've just extended that for 5 years. The ABM treaty has to do with deployment. There is nothing in it that prohibits research, which is what we're calling for. I'm quite sure that whatever time it would take and whatever President would be in the White House when, maybe 20 years down the road, somebody does come up with an answer, I think that that would then bring to the fore the problem of, all right, why not now dispose of all these weapons since we've proven that they can be rendered obsolete?

Q. But we have had the—the mutual deterrent has kept the peace, the mutual destruction approach, for 40 years. And are you moving away from that, the fear of mutual destruction?

The President. Yes, but that's it—it's, as I say, it's like those two fellows with the loaded guns, cocked and ready. Yes, we have. I think that—but remember that, for a great part of that period, we proved, I think pretty definitely, that we are not expansionists, that we're not aggressive, because we had, to begin with, a monopoly. And then, for a number of those 30 years, we had such a superiority, as witness the Cuban missile crisis.

When they blinked I think it's safe to say it was because our superiority at that time was about eight to one. And, if you'll recall, the Russian involved in those, are very high up in the Politburo, involved in that particular incident said within the hearing of his counterparts on our side that they would never again be caught in that position. And they started their dramatic military buildup.

So, you can't say that we have sat here even and with the great amount of weapons that both sides have today for those 30 years. For a long time, and as I say again, we proved—you have to ask yourself how many nations in the world could have had the monopoly that we had and not have taken advantage of it, and we didn't.

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[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

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Working Paper Submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War, March 28, 1983 [1]

Introductory remarks

The present Working Paper intends to provide a frame of reference for the treatment of "Prevention of Nuclear War, including all related matters" under agenda item 2. The paper seeks to embed the vital objective of preventing nuclear war in the more comprehensive objective of preventing all armed conflict. During the discussions that have led to the formulation of the agenda item, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has made clear that it considers this context as anchored in reality and indissoluble. Indeed, if one looks to the possible causes of war it becomes evident that the separation of various forms of armed conflict, as they may ultimately evolve, becomes a somewhat artificial exercise.

The subsequent description of the environment in which a policy of war prevention must be pursued comprises those areas in which States can make a meaningful contribution to the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war. The discussion in depth of these various aspects can, in the view of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, promote the development of a comprehensive set of tools for the prevention of war. In an initial stage of the discussions it is designed to facilitate the identification of possible practical and appropriate, negotiable measures for the prevention of war, including nuclear war.

I. *Prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations*

The Committee on Disarmament should start from the basis that the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter and the command to all members contained therein to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State (in full respect of the provisions of Article 51 concerning the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs) remain the inalterable foundation of any policy aimed at the prevention of war. In this context, the Committee should also affirm the necessity for existing threats or uses of force to be rescinded. It should further establish that exceptions from the prohibition of threat or use of force, or of war, for ideological motives—in deviation from the accepted definition of aggression—are incompatible with Article 2 of the Charter and with the objective of war prevention.

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[1] CD/357.

II. *Significance of renunciation of force*

The Committee should take note of those unilateral declarations, bilateral treaties and multilateral arrangements (Final Act of Helsinki, [2] Declaration of Ayacucho [3]) which contain solemn commitments to renounce force, in reaffirmation of the prohibition of the threat or use of force of the United Nations Charter, and should be aware of the significance of these acts, be they legally binding under international law or merely politically binding, for the heightened effectiveness of Article 2 of the Charter.

III. *Obligation to conduct a policy of restraint*

The Committee should establish the necessity for all states to maintain a policy of restraint and to act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations so as to avoid military confrontations and exclude the outbreak of armed conflicts. This obligation would also include restraint in the establishment and expansion of armed forces and military armament, and in the field of arms transfer. This policy of restraint would also comprise the declared commitment by states not to exploit unstable political situations to their own advantage.

IV. *Special responsibilities of Nuclear Weapon States*

The Committee should discuss the primary responsibility of nuclear weapon states, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. Nuclear weapon states should maintain, as a priority objective, their policies to remove the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, and thereby, also of the use of nuclear weapons.

V. *Domestic measures of a legal and political nature*

The Committee should affirm that prescription, under constitutional law or law in general which would transform the prohibition of the threat or use of force of the United Nations Charter into domestic law and declare unconstitutional and penalize the initiation of a war of aggression, may make an exemplary contribution to the prevention of war. In addition, the Committee should discuss the possibility for States to enshrine effectively in their legal system an active policy for the promotion of peace, and to provide for sanctions against acts of incitation to war and measures preparatory to war. The Committee should affirm that any form of education designed to foment hatred against other peoples, races and societal systems, as well as the militarization of society in general, and mandatory military education by the State of children and adolescents in particular, heighten the danger of war, including the danger of nuclear war. The Committee should further underline the contribution which the free formation of public opinion in the field of security policy issues, a broad participation of the population in major security policy decisions and the transparency of the corresponding decision processes can make to the prevention of war.

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[2] The arms control portions are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the entire act, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 819–822.

VI. *Co-operative measures under international law*

The Committee should explore the contribution to the prevention of war which could result from the strict observance of the rules of international law, the compliance with treaties, the conclusion of additional co-operative treaties, and the compliance with general norms and codes of conduct under international law which promote and enhance relations among States. This should include an assessment of the advantages, in terms of prevention of war, of the co-operation of the largest possible number of States in international organizations, including regional organizations.

VII. *Peaceful settlement of disputes*

Taking into account relevant discussions in the United Nations General Assembly on this subject, the Committee should examine the contribution of peace-making mechanisms under international law for the direct settlement of disputes and conflicts, and should be aware of possibilities for the more effective use of already existing institutions for dispute settlement like, e.g., the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal in The Hague, the European Court of Justice and the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. In this context, the possibilities for the establishment of a Permanent Arbitration Tribunal for juridical disputes, and of a Permanent Commission of enquiry, mediation and settlement for non-juridical disputes might be noted.

VIII. *Regional security arrangements*

The Committee should assess the possibilities, the effectiveness and the political significance of additional regional security arrangements which would exercise a stabilizing effect in their respective region and thereby contribute to the maintenance of peace and security. This would also include regional systems of collective security in conformity with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter; geographically limited disarmament and arms limitation measures; the establishment of regional zones free of particular kinds of weapons, and zones of peace in keeping with the requirements spelt out in paragraph 60 et seq. of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament.[4]

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[4] *Ibid., 1978*, p. 422.

IX. *Commitments to renounce the use or first use of specific types of weapons*

The Committee should take note of existing commitments by which States have renounced the use of weapons in general, or of specific types of weapons, except in cases where they—or their Allies—are themselves victims of armed attack (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter); it should assess the effective contribution which such commitments could make to the prevention of war.

X. *Security guarantees*

The Committee should assess the war-preventing effect of positive security guarantees—such as, e.g., defence alliances make for the benefit of their members—and should take note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States concerning security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; it should stress the need to harmonize these latter assurances with a view to concluding effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

XI. *Strengthening of the peace-making and peace-keeping capability of the United Nations*

The Committee should contribute to the present discussions on possibilities to strengthen the United Nations machinery and, especially, the system of collective security under the United Nations Charter.

XII. *Policy of non-proliferation*

In the context of the prevention of nuclear war, the Committee should emphasize, the significance of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and discuss the possibilities for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

XIII. *Measures for the prevention of accidental war*

The Committee should examine the existing safeguards against th outbreak of war—especially of nuclear war—as a consequence of technical accidents or miscalculation, and should explore possibilities o how these safeguards could be strengthened and made applicable to larger number of States.

XIV. *Measures for the protection of civilian nuclear facilities*

XV. *Confidence-building measures*

On a priority basis, the Committee should discuss the possibilitie for an extended application of confidence-building measures whic serve the prevention of war, taking into account that measures fro among the following areas would be particularly suitable: Prepare ness on the part of States, especially on the part of nuclear-weapo States, to practise more openness and transparency, including in th field of military budgets and force planning; increase in the exchan of information on military strategies, especially as regards the functi of nuclear weapons within such strategies; possibilities for the limit tion of military options of all States concerned in order to ensure that existing capabilities cannot be used for aggressive purposes; the largest possible facilitation of international measures for the verification of compliance with agreements in the field of disarmament and arms limitation; steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, such as advanced notification of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches within as well as beyond national boundaries, advance notification of strategic exercises; an expanded exchange of strategic force data.

XVI. *Significance of military balance, stability and undiminished security of all States*

The Committee should strongly underline to what extent the preservation of peace depends on the establishment and maintenance of military balance and strategic stability on the global, regional and subregional levels, and on the undiminished security of all States; the Committee should state the consequences and obligations resulting therefrom for all States. Given the particular significance of a stable military balance between East and West, the complex interrelationship of nuclear and conventional forces of the two Alliances and their bearing upon balance should be taken into account.

The Committee should also underline the positive contribution which the Non-Aligned movement makes to international security and stability.

XVII. *Significance of disarmament negotiations*

As the centre-piece of its discussions, the Committee should underline the significance of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations on a global or regional basis, and should stress the contribution which a rapid conclusion of the current negotiations in the nuclear field could make, if they result in deep reductions of the nuclear potentials of the parties to the negotiations, as well as the positive effect of the speedy initiation of new, more far-reaching negotiations which the nuclear powers would undertake in accordance with the obligation of all Parties under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [5] to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

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[5] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

Program of Work Adopted by the Committee on Disarmament for Its Spring Session, March 29, 1983 [1]

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1983 session:

1 February–31 March	Statements in the plenary. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda. Chemical weapons. Nuclear test ban. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
4–8 April	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
11–15 April	New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
18–22 April	Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
25–29 April	Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

Informal meetings of the Committee will be held to continue consideration of the question of the review of its membership, as well as proposals submitted by members for its improved and effective functioning. Section II of General Assembly Resolution 37/99 K regarding the designation of the Committee will also be considered at informal meetings.

Meetings of *ad hoc* working groups will be convened after consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairmen of the *ad hoc* working groups according to the circumstances and needs of the groups.

The *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events met from 7 to 18 February.

In adopting its agenda and programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

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[1] CD/356/Add.1. The program was adopted at the 207th plenary meeting.

Decision of the Committee on Disarmament on the Re-Establishment of *Ad Hoc* Working Groups for the 1983 Session, March 29, 1983[2]

The Committee decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1983 session the *Ad Hoc* Working Groups on a Nuclear Test Ban, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons, and to appoint Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador McPhail of Canada as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

It is understood that the *ad hoc* working groups may start their work on the basis of their former mandates. The mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee which will consider this question with appropriate urgency.

The *ad hoc* working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work before the conclusion of its 1983 session.

Statement by Netherlands Foreign Minister van den Broek to the Committee on Disarmament [Extract], March 29, 1983[1]

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The world arms build-up in all its aspects, nuclear, chemical and conventional, constitutes a threat to our very existence and is therefore one of the most pressing problems facing us. We all share the conviction that the risk of war and in particular the inconceivable horror of a nuclear conflict must be reduced to a minimum and that our best efforts should be directed towards controlling and reversing the present trend towards ever more numerous and more lethal arsenals.

The close linkage of the various components of the arms build-up and the awareness that an armed conflict of one kind may easily lead to another at a higher level of destruction, obliges us to treat the whole complex of security, arms limitation and disarmament as a whole. However great may be our natural preoccupation with the growth of nuclear arsenals, we should not allow ourselves, to my feeling, to ignore the menace of quantitative and qualitative developments in the field of conventional armaments.

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[2] CD/358.

[1] CD/PV.207, pp. 7–14.

This being our varied and complex task, how do we go about it? By their nature, all arms fulfil the dual role of a means of self-defence—and in the worst case, a means of aggression—and of a deterrent, but it was only the advent of nuclear weapons, with their inherent threat of total mutual destruction, that led to the full realization of their dual nature.

They pose an awesome threat. At the same time, and for the very reason of their terrifying character and the awareness that in a nuclear war there are no winners but only losers, their existence has contributed to the prevention of a major outbreak since 1945.

To be credible, deterrence requires the preservation of a stable balance, both in the nuclear and in the conventional field, but I hasten to add a second and equally essential condition for the preservation of peace, and that is a balance at the lowest possible level of armaments and of such a nature as to promote stability. To achieve this is the function of arms control, arms limitation and disarmament.

The requirement of stability at the lowest possible level makes it essential to consider arms limitation and disarmament as a comprehensive process. Steady work and systematic negotiations can diminish the role of nuclear weapons. Establishing a conventional balance will reduce dependence on nuclear weapons. Thus, nuclear and conventional arms control and limitation go hand in hand, and the different negotiations in this field, aimed at restraining qualitative as well as quantitative developments, should be seen in that perspective.

The START negotiations are, of course, a key element in the process of arms control and limitation. The Netherlands notes with satisfaction that both sides have expressed the wish for substantial reductions in strategic weapons, both launchers and warheads. We support the United States approach of focusing on the most destabilizing elements, that is, those weapons systems that put at risk the retaliatory capabilities of the other side.

START is a complex matter, but that certainly also holds true for the problem of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, in particular those Soviet land-based missiles that can reach western Europe in a matter of minutes and are specifically targeted on that area. Without an answer from the Atlantic alliance to these triple-headed mobile missiles, the misconception might grow in the minds of some Soviet military planners that in an armed conflict in Europe, Soviet territory would be sacrosanct, and such a misconception could in certain circumstances engender the outbreak of a devastating conflict. Neither side could afford to take such a risk.

In the face of this increased and massive Soviet threat to Europe, the Atlantic alliance had no other choice than to decide on countermeasures, but at the same time made a sincere offer to negotiate. As we know, negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are now under way and we fervently hope that they will lead to the complete elimination of a whole category of nuclear weapons.

Though these various negotiations primarily affect East-West relations, they are also of great importance to the world at large because of their influence on the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation policies have been reasonably effective since the 1960s, but this effectiveness runs the risk of being undermined by quantitative and qualitative developments in nuclear armament. It follows that non-proliferation, vital to all of us, requires the control and limitation of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers.

Nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament can only be achieved if the States concerned are convinced that their security remains assured. This enhances the significance of other negotiations concerning Europe. In Vienna, East and West are discussing troop reductions in central Europe. How seriously the Western countries take these negotiations was borne out by their introduction a few months ago of a new proposal for a comprehensive treaty. A clear answer to that proposal is still being awaited. In this context, a reminder is in place that equality in central Europe does not yet mean a conventional military balance in Europe as a whole, and that the geographical advantages are unevenly divided between the two sides.

Yet another forum is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is to be hoped that balanced and substantial progress in all fields covered by the Final Act of Helsinki [2] will make it possible to include in the concluding document of the Madrid meeting the mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe as an integral part of the CSCE process. This is so important because it could bring about confidence- and security-building measures that could have a positive over-all effect on the arms control and limitation process.

Concrete results of arms control and limitation negotiations could lead to a conventional balance, which we consider a prerequisite to the positive consideration of a declaration on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

I now come to the Committee on Disarmament. In the foregoing I stressed the comprehensive nature of the process of arms limitation and disarmament. In doing so, I referred in particular to negotiations of a bilateral and regional character, aimed at providing the northern hemisphere with a greater degree of stability and security.

The *global* dimension of the arms limitation and disarmament process is of no less importance. The advance in science and technology makes it less and less possible to think in regional terms only when addressing the vital issues of peace and security. As a result, the international community has an important role to play in the efforts to bring about arms limitation and disarmament measures of a world-wide character, essential to a peaceful future for our world and indeed to the preservation of mankind.

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[2] The arms control portions are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975,* pp. 304–308. The entire act is printed in *Department of State Bulletin,* Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

Seen in this perspective, the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament, has a crucial role to play. One cannot sufficiently underline the great responsibility of this forum and its individual members in helping to bring about a better and safer world. The Committee has important issues on its agenda which it should address as constructively and efficiently as possible.

And these issues should not be seen in isolation—none of them. A comprehensive test ban and negative security assurances are directly related to halting and reversing the nuclear arms race; they may also have a beneficial effect on the existing non-proliferation regime to which we attach so much importance. Chemical weapons, though perhaps best capable of being dealt with separately, are nonetheless part of the over-all military equation. The importance of arms control with respect to outer space is particularly relevant to the concept of stability.

Before I go into these issues somewhat further, allow me to dwell for a moment on the tools and the methods of this Committee in dealing with these and other tasks it has been entrusted with.

Overcoming the inherent complexities of the problems the Committee on Disarmament is dealing with, and bridging the differences of opinion on subjects of a technical nature like verification, scope, etc., can only be achieved through painstaking negotiations. To those there is no alternative, but at least the Committee should be adequately equipped to deal with its task more efficiently. This spring session has shown only too clearly that there is considerable room for improvement in the field of methods and procedures.

In the past, the Netherlands has made concrete proposals for improvements in the working methods of this Committee. Recently, other delegations have voiced their ideas on this problem. It would seem to me that the various suggestions or proposals that have been made are worth considering, and that the Committee would be well advised to reserve some of its efforts for a serious discussion of its methods and procedures to avoid future loss of the precious commodity that is time.

Allow me now to make a few observations in some greater detail on the individual issues I mentioned earlier, starting with that of a comprehensive test ban.

Traditionally, my country has steadfastly favoured the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. The Netherlands continues to do so in the conviction that a comprehensive test ban would be an important contribution to the efforts to bring the qualitative arms race to a halt.

The question of a comprehensive test ban has been on the international agenda for a long time. This may be a source of disappointment, but no alibi for a slackening of the efforts to arrive at concrete results as a matter of priority. Though admittedly difficult, this target is not out of reach.

Although a lot of work remains to be done in the field of verification, this complex problem can in principle be solved. Last year, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban did valuable work on the question of verification of compliance with a test ban. It will have to continue its work on details of complaint procedures, the functioning of the consultative committee and on the conditions and means of on-site inspections.

The *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events will have to indicate how an international seismic verification system, making use of the available advanced technology, could function. The former trilateral negotiating parties could perhaps contribute to this end by providing information on means to detect low-yield explosions.

I cannot agree with those who maintain that there is no sense in negotiating the details of a comprehensive test ban without a clear prospect that an early agreement is within reach. Such a notion is, in my opinion, self-defeating. The Committee can and should perform as much preparatory work as can be done now. Only then will the rapid conclusion of a comprehensive test ban be possible as soon as the political conditions are favourable.

You will have noticed that in dealing with this issue I have consistently spoken of a *comprehensive* test ban. The use of the word *comprehensive* in this context indicates my country's conviction that a future test ban should include peaceful nuclear explosions. In a technical sense, a nuclear device for peaceful purposes cannot be distinguished from a nuclear weapon, nor for that matter can a nuclear test for peaceful purposes be distinguished from one which serves military goals.

I can understand the genuine opinion of a number of countries which claim that peaceful applications of nuclear explosives must be allowed, if only for reasons of principle. However, the different interests and considerations here at stake should be weighed against each other. Would the possible, but small and largely theoretical economic advantages of peaceful nuclear explosions outweigh their negative effect on the system of verification of a comprehensive test ban and on non-proliferation?

On several occasions, my country has put forward ideas concerning negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. We continue to believe that such guarantees can increase confidence and strenghten the non-proliferation regime.

For a variety of political, legal and practical reasons the conclusion of a convention on this issue seems to be difficult. Our delegation has been consulting with nuclear-weapon States to find out whether it would be possible to harmonize their unilateral assurances in order to incorporate them in a common formula, to be embodied in a Security Council resolution.

Aware of the fact that, in the final analysis, the nuclear-weapon powers have to come to terms amongst themselves, we, for our part, reiterate our willingness to contribute to the best of our ability to a possible resolution of the Security Council on this important matter.

So far I have dealt with issues actually on the agenda of the Committee. May I now ask your attention for a proposed measure that has not yet acquired that same status. Throughout the last four years, the General Assembly has asked the Committee to take up the matter of the cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes at an appropriate stage of its work. We believe that the time has come for informal explorations by the Committee of the so-called "cut-off" proposal.

Contrary to some others, this particular freeze concept can be adequately verified by the indiscriminate application of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since four of the five nuclear-weapon States—and why should the fifth not follow?—have now accepted some kind of safeguards, a cut-off agreement seems easier to achieve.

In this context, I may recall the announcements made in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the United States and the Soviet Union on 20 April 1964, later joined by the United Kingdom, that these countries would take unilateral steps to restrict the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. [3] The footmarks of these steps seem to have been obliterated. Perhaps the distinguished representatives of the countries involved could shed some light on the fate of these unilateral measures.

On the subject of yet another category of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, I should like to say the following:

I reiterate that the Netherlands armed forces do not possess chemical weapons, that the Netherlands Government does not consider introducing those weapons into its armed forces and that it also rejects the stockpiling of chemical weapons on Netherlands territory.

Awareness has grown that the question of chemical weapons is not merely an East-West problem. These weapons can effectively be used *against* technologically less developed countries, which virtually lack any protection against such a threat. Though little proliferation in this field has taken place thus far, they can be also used *by* countries from the third world. A treaty must be concluded, before developments get out of hand.

One of the main obstacles to a chemical weapons treaty is the question of verification. I fully realize that. In the past year the Committee has started to tackle that problem seriously. This momentum should not be allowed to peter out.

I therefore welcome the recent important contribution by the United States. On verification we think along the same lines; individual elements, in particular regarding routine inspections, are of course in need of further refinement.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 165–168.

It is encouraging to note that the Soviet Union has somewhat modified its position regarding on-site inspections. Essential gaps, however, continue to exist and differences remain on the conditions for challenge-inspections. In our view, systematic international inspections are necessary both with respect to the destruction of stockpiles and to the closing and dismantling of chemical weapons plants. The full use of modern technical equipment can help to decrease the degree of intrusiveness of such inspections. Some random inspections to deter clandestine production in the civilian industry of the most dangerous chemicals can likewise not be dispensed with. In many respects, such inspections are preferable to a system of challenge inspections alone: it will often be difficult to acquire enough information to justify a request for a challenge inspection. In addition, the procedures regarding a challenge inspection could easily lead to mistrust and reciprocal reproaches of a dubious nature.

Verification is not an end in itself but a tool to strengthen confidence in the implementation of and compliance with a treaty, and to deter violations. Many ideas have been put forward to promote this verification. Perfect verification is neither possible nor wholly indispensable. And so a trade-off between scope, verification and protection against chemical attack could create the necessary confidence.

As for the question whether a chemical weapons treaty should include a provision against "use", we have always believed that any use would indicate a violation of the treaty and would therefore trigger an investigation. We have no objection at all, however, in accepting a specific ban on use in the convention itself. This seems to be the view of the majority of States in the Committee on Disarmament. Naturally, we must see to it that such a ban will not in any way detract from the obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925.[4] Much to the contrary, the treaty should build on the Protocol and strengthen it.

We will study with interest the proposal made by the Soviet Union for a complete ban on all chemicals related to nerve agents with a particular structure.

I mentioned earlier the need for stability to maintain international peace and security and to prevent war. The notion of stability is particularly relevant to outer space.

Last year, the Committee on Disarmament held a first round of discussions on this subject. Since time is running out on us, the Committee should now probe more deeply into this complex problem and try to reach some conclusions.

At present, many artificial satellites fulfil military functions, wholly or partially. On the whole, these satellites have a stabilizing effect. Observation-, early-warning- and communications-satellites strengthen confidence that arms-control measures are being complied with, that no surprise attacks can be mounted and that communications can be maintained even in periods of tension and conflict.

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[4] *Ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.

This conclusion seems to me of the utmost importance. It means that for the foreseeable future complete demilitarization of outer space is not at all a good idea. It would, of course, not be very realistic either.

The development of anti-satellite weapons is quite another matter. Systems capable of destroying stabilizing satellites are by their very nature destabilizing. Both major space powers are developing such weapons, and the Soviet Union has even tested quite a number of them. In our opinion, this development should be halted. We know quite well that we are talking about a complex matter. Many different types of potential systems are involved, applying various techniques, operating either from the earth or from space. We realize that even under a complete and verifiable ban on anti-satellite weapons, some residual capacity in this field will remain since certain weapons and space-systems could also be used for anti-satellite warfare without being specially designed for that purpose. None of these complexities should discourage us.

After careful study of the major aspects of this issue we believe that two general measures should be taken which are mutually reinforcing and are meant to take away the threat of anti-satellite warfare. The first would be an investigation into the possibility of reaching an agreement to declare satellites inviolable. Parties should undertake not to damage, destroy or remove satellites and not to interfere with their functioning.

The second, meant to reinforce the declaration on inviolability, would consist of an agreement to prohibit the testing, stationing and use of specific anti-satellite weapons. We realize that both the definition of anti-satellite weapons as well as the development of adequate verification measures will be difficult, though not insoluble. For example, we regard a speedy ban on testing to be important, since that would be about the best way of verifying that anti-satellite weapons would not be deployed.

We eagerly look forward to intensive discussions on these matters in this body. The Netherlands Government also believes that discussion and subsequent negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament would greatly benefit by a speedy resumption by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of their bilateral negotiations on anti-satellite weapons. A ban on this type of warfare would be a first and urgent step, but not the whole story. We also have to reflect on other forms of actual and potential military use of outer space, which requires further examination and consideration from the point of view of arms control.

Recently, ideas have been expressed which could, in the long run, have a bearing on this subject. We shall have to study this complicated subject-matter most carefully.

More than ever before in history, questions of arms limitation and disarmament preoccupy people all over the world. In this age of science and technology no less than the survival of the human species is at stake. It is no exaggeration to say that the moment may not be far off when mankind will reach a critical branching of the road, one way leading to a finite human existence on this planet, the other leading to a safer and better world.

Much vision, intelligence, a sense of compromise, and—why not say it—a daring and creative diplomacy will be needed to avoid our ever having to make that ultimate choice. May I express the hope that your Committee will live up to its great responsibility and contribute to the goal which I, for one, would define in few words: increased security through disarmament.

Statement by President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, March 30, 1983 [1]

Last week, when I addressed the American people on this administration's defense program, I expressed our determination to reduce our reliance on the terrible power of nuclear weapons to assure the peace. [2] And today I want to say a few words about this critical aspect of our security policy—our efforts to drastically reduce the arsenals which burden the lives of our own citizens, of our friends and allies, and, yes, of our adversaries as well.

As you know, over the last year and a half, this administration has undertaken a comprehensive and far-reaching arms control program designed to achieve deep reductions in nuclear arms, to rid the world of chemical weapons, and to cut the size of conventional forces in Europe. I'll be saying more about these initiatives in a speech tomorrow, but this morning let me focus on one of these negotiations.

I have just met with the Ambassadors of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. We invited them here because the citizens of their countries share with Americans a profound hope for success in the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The forces being discussed in the INF negotiations directly affect the security of our allies. As I told you last week, the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of powerful, new SS-20 missiles, armed with multiple warheads and capable of striking the cities and defense installations of our allies in Europe, and of our friends and allies in Asia as well. The Soviets have built up these forces even though there's been no comparable threat from NATO. They've deployed them without letup; there now are more than 350 SS-20 missiles, with more than a thousand nuclear warheads. NATO will begin deploying a specific deterrent to this threat late this year, unless, as we hope, an agreement to eliminate such weapons would make this deployment unnecessary.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Apr. 4, 1983, pp. 478–480.

[2] *Ante*, Mar. 23.

The United States, with the full support of our allies, has been negotiating in Geneva for more than a year to persuade the Soviet Union that it is a far better course for both of us to agree to eliminate totally this entire category of weapons. Such an agreement would be fair and far-reaching. It would enhance the security of the Soviet Union as well as the security of NATO. And it would fulfill the aspiration of people throughout Europe and Asia for an end to the threat posed by these missiles.

So far, the Soviet Union has resisted this proposal and has failed to come up with a serious alternative. They insist on preserving their present monopoly on these weapons. Under their latest proposal, the Soviets would retain almost 500 warheads on their SS-20 missiles in Europe alone and hundreds more in the Far East, while we would continue to have zero. Their proposal would actually leave them with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the talks began in 1981. In addition, the Soviets have launched a propaganda campaign aimed apparently at dividing America from our allies and our allies from each other.

From the opening of these negotiations nearly 18 months ago, I have repeatedly urged the Soviets to respond to our zero-zero proposal with a proposal of their own. I've also repeated our willingness to consider any serious alternative proposal. Their failure to make such a proposal is a source of deep disappointment to all of us who've wished that these weapons might be eliminated, or at least significantly reduced. But I do not intend to let this shadow that has been cast over the Geneva negotiations further darken our search for peace.

When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many. If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope that they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides.

To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis.

Ambassador Nitze has explained that the United States views this proposal as a serious initial step toward the total elimination of this class of weapons. And he has conveyed my hope that the Soviet Union will join us in this view. Our proposal for the entire elimination of these systems remains on the table.

We've suggested that the negotiations resume several weeks earlier than originally planned. The Soviets have agreed to that, and talks will resume on May 17th. I hope this initiative will lead to an early agreement. We remain ready to explore any serious Soviet suggestions that meet the fundamental concerns which we have expressed.

I invited the NATO Ambassadors here today not only to review these developments but to express my appreciation for the firm support which the allies have given to our negotiating effort in Geneva. And I can assure them of my personal commitment to the closest possible consultations with them on the INF.

This consultative process has already proven one of the most intensive and productive in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance. It's made the initiative announced today an Alliance initiative in the best sense of that term. And over the past months, we and our allies have consulted intensively on the INF negotiations.

I have been in frequent and close contact with other heads of government. Vice President Bush had a very productive discussion with allied leaders on INF during his trip to Europe. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger have exchanged views with their counterparts from allied governments. And the NATO Special Consultative Group has met regularly to review the negotiations and consider criteria which should form the basis for the Alliance position in INF.

The very thoughtful views expressed by the allies in these consultations have been of significant help in shaping this new initiative. This process is a model for how an alliance of free and democratic nations can and must work together on critical issues. It is the source of our unity and gives us a strength that no one can hope to match. And it gives me great confidence in the eventual success of our efforts in Geneva to create a safer—safer world for all the Earth's people.

Letter From the Soviet Union to U.N. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar: Geneva Protocol, March 30, 1983 [1]

The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, concerning the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, [2] would like to draw his attention to the following.

The Soviet Union has made vigorous efforts over a protracted period for the complete elimination of any chemical danger from the life of human society. To that end, together with other socialist States, it initiated back in 1969 a proposal on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical (together with bacteriological) weapons, [3] and is making consistent efforts to attain that objective.

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[1] A/38/131, Mar. 31, 1983, Annex.

[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 455–457.

As a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for more than 50 years, and having scrupulously observed its provisions, it advocates action to ensure effectiveness of the prohibition of the use of poisonous substances for military purposes.

Taking into account the view of a number of States, the Soviet side considered that it would be advisable to include in the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons being drafted in the Committee on Disarmament a provision banning the use of such weapons and providing for appropriate verification procedures and the use of machinery to monitor the convention, including verification *in situ* on a voluntary basis. We consider that the drafting and conclusion of the above-mentioned convention at the earliest possible date would be the most effective and complete guarantee of the non-use of chemical weapons. It would therefore appear to be essential to focus all efforts on speeding up the drafting of that convention and to avoid any actions that might hamper that process.

From that standpoint, we cannot but welcome the appeals in General Assembly resolution 37/98 D concerning the need to expand the number of parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to expedite the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament concerning a conven tion on the prohibition of chemical weapons. However, that resolution also contains provisions with which the Soviet Union cannot in an way agree.

In providing for the establishment of procedures for verifying ob servance of one of the international agreements in force in the field c curbing the arms race—the 1925 Geneva protocol—the resolution *ip* *facto* entails an increase in the scope of obligations assumed by State parties to the Protocol. Such a decision would be quite illegal, since would be taken not as a result of agreement among the parties to th instrument, but by means of the adoption of a United Nations resol tion with the additional participation of those States which have n yet acceded to that Protocol.

A dangerous precedent would thereby be created by the impositi through the United Nations of a revision of international agreemer in force in the disarmament field with no account being taken of t views of all the parties thereto, and, what is more, in defiance of t opinion of a significant number of parties. Suffice it to say that, of t 99 parties to the Geneva Protocol which are Members of the Unit Nations, a little over half the number of States voted for that reso tion. The remaining States parties to the Protocol did not support

Such a practice of amending agreements is in blatant contradict to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,[4] particula its article 39, which permits the amendment of treaties only by agr ment between the parties.

To undertake an illegal review of the Geneva Protocol may ca harm not only to the Protocol itself but to the entire system international agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

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[4] *International Legal Materials*, vol. 8, July 1969, p. 679.

Serious objections arise also in connection with the attempt made in the resolution to impose on the United Nations Secretary-General the functions of monitoring the implementation of agreements in the disarmament field, functions which are not assigned to him under the United Nations Charter.

The Soviet side expresses the hope that the Secretary-General will consider its position with regard to that resolution. It is self-evident that the Soviet Union will not only not take part in its implementation but will also point out to other States the serious negative consequences that would arise from the observance of the provisions of that resolution.

The Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of its highest consideration.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Shultz: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, March 31, 1983 [1]

I thought I would make a few opening comments and then we can just have the questions we wish. I have been trying to think to myself what is this really all about. And obviously it is about reductions in nuclear arms, particularly a particular class of armaments in Europe that are highly destabilizing and, therefore, especially dangerous. And clearly we have been in the position—the President has—of wanting to see that whole class of weapons eliminated globally. We continue to think that is the best solution.

We recognize that this is a negotiation and the Soviet Union has rejected that, and so the President has made another proposal. The new proposal you will have so I won't repeat it other than to say that it is a further effort to negotiate something that still aspires, although it isn't a condition, to get to elimination of these weapons but is willing to take, as an interim step, some finite number somewhere between zero and 572 warheads on both sides, according to specified criteria that has been set out.

So partly this is about that. But I think that in the full perspective of things, we tend to mislead ourselves if we concentrate overly on the weapons aspect of this problem. And it is a fact that we have had an extensive rich consultative process with our allies on the original 1979 dual-track decision, in the first place, then on the elimination option, in the second place, and now on the President's most recent proposal.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1983, pp. 17–19. The remarks were made at the White House.

And we have had really sort of an alliance view throughout. It is very unified and strong and determined. So I think that raises a question of how it is possible to get so many countries that are geographically spread around and which have varying interests on many things to be so unified on something of this kind. And I think you have to come back to the values that these countries share in a determination to be able to defend those values against a very clear threat to them.

It is really that that underlies the unity that we have and the fact that we are undertaking both to confront the Soviet Union with the strength implied by the first-track and the dual-track decision, [2] but at the same time hold out to everyone the prospect of a reduction or, in our basic prospect, elimination of these very destabilizing weapons.

The perspective that I want to lend is the strength of the alliance and the reason for that, namely our jointly held values, as really the underlying source of strength. And I don't say that in any way to neglect the importance of the particulars of the arms reduction negotiation and the weapons systems and all that.

Q. From Moscow recently, we have heard from Andropov and we have had some journalists reporting on the temper of the talk over there. And the general feeling seems to be that the Russians have had it up to here, if you will, with dealing with the Reagan Administration. Is that, do you find that is their reading?

A. There have been some very sharp statements made, and I think it is fair to characterize the U.S.-Soviet relationship as not a particularly good one right now. It is tense. At the same time, I think it is important to point out that we have discussions going on with the Soviet Union in two fora in Geneva that include both the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] [3] and the START [strategic arms reduction talks] talks also kind of adjoining each one of those talks about confidence-building measures.

There is a continuing discussion in Vienna and MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] talks. We are engaged with them across a range of Helsinki Final Act [4] and disarmament issues in Madrid. And we have quite a number of other settings in which there are from time-to-time meetings, for example, meetings that I have with Ambassador Dobrynin. So there is a dialogue.

And it is our feeling that the important element here is to see and to probe and to find out whether there are some areas of importance where substantive agreements can be made. That is, tone reflects substance, not the other way around. And there are a great many substantive matters where we are in deep disagreement with the Soviet Union, and that is the essence of it.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[3] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[4] The arms control portions are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. The entire act is in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

We need to work at the substance. And if it turns out that the substance can be improved, then I think the tone of the relationship will improve.

Q. There are some very sharp differences in statements which the President made over a period of some weeks—very, very harsh denunciations of the Soviet Union—and what everyone seems to feel is a very constructive proposal at this time. Why is there such a great variance between the President's rhetoric on some of these occasions when he speaks so sharply and so strongly of the Soviet Union, the focus of all evil, and then made movement toward this kind of substantive thing? Because the first statements almost indicate that it wouldn't matter what negotiation we had, we wouldn't trust them to carry it out. And it would be almost impossible to negotiate. Is there a plan here? Is it by accident? Why are these enormous differences in tone?

A. I think that if we didn't feel that there was a reasonable possibility of arriving at significant agreements in these discussions, we wouldn't be having them. The fact that they are going on, at least from our standpoint, shows that we think there is a chance that things can improve and that the improvement can be genuine in the sense that it can be built on substance.

The range of issues that one can discuss is quite broad. And, of course, on many of them, particularly when you are talking about something like arms control, I think that it is not so much a matter of trust as it is verifiability, that you are going to aspire to an agreement that is inherently capable of being carried out because you can know on both sides, they as ourselves, that it actually is being carried out. The key here is the subject of verifiability.

Q. Do you get any indication from the Soviets at all of a shift in their position on verifiability? Are they moving toward a more acceptable position as far as we are concerned? Is there any shift in that whole area?

A. Our negotiations are ongoing in various areas, and I think that the notion that an agreement ought to be verifiable is an accepted notion. The question of what it takes to satisfy yourself on that is where all of the argument comes. For example, the President feels that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [5] is capable of considerable improvements in the area of verifiability, and the Soviets have told us that they do not agree with that. The Soviets have a difference of opinion there. It is not over whether verifiability is a proper concept; it is over the implementation of the concept.

Q. Given that you have said that the tone for that meeting reflects substantive disagreements between us and the Soviet Union, wherein lies the possibility for an improvement or a chance of an agreement on improvement of the relationship? Why do you think there might be such a thing, and do you think there is any prospect of a summit meeting before the end of the first term in this Administration?

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

A. I think you have to review all of the issues and then appraise them one by one and see what the prospects might be piece by piece, so if you say "any agreement," that can cover a broad range. The focus of attention right now is on the major arms reduction negotiations and particularly today the INF negotiations. But there are a lot of other things.

The President has said, and as far as I can read it Mr. Andropov has also said, that in principle they are prepared to have a summit meeting but only on the basis of the prospect that something really significant could be achieved in the meeting. So the idea of a simple get-acquainted meeting doesn't seem to be in the cards.

Q. You have expressed the wonder—the pleasurable wonder—that at the—

A. No, I didn't express any wonderment. I insist that it is remarkable and that it is important and then I tried not to have wonderment but rather to give you an answer, namely our shared values.

Q. Isn't it true though that President Reagan would have stayed on his original zero-zero option had it not been for pressure from our allies in Europe?

A. The President has said—and this has been an alliance proposition all along as I understand it, I am relatively new to it, but the 1979 decision—the original proposal—has been an alliance proposition all along and it has been discussed continuously about what position we should take and what our negotiating strategy should be, and so on. And there have been lots of discussions within the U.S. Government, as well as within the European governments and among us. I think it was a shared view that the timing is right now to make this change in our position. So I don't think it is a question of pressure this way or that way. It is a question of a continuous process of consultation, and I think there emerged a very broad consensus in our government and in the governments abroad that this was the time to make a change, as the President has done.

Q. You didn't find a reluctance in the Pentagon to make this change?

A. No. We had lots of discussions of this practically ever since I got here—I was reminded this morning—9 months ago. Somebody implied that it ought to be time for me to produce something. [Laughter]

Q. Isn't there perhaps a considerable danger that offering the interim proposal at this point, shortly after the hurdle of the West German elections, will suggest or be interpreted as meaning that the Administration was not terribly intent on zero-zero option to begin with, that once the political hurdle had been cleared we throw out a more specific bargaining position and that this might tend to undercut the substance of zero-zero?

A. I don't think there is really a legitimate question about what the President feels and, for that matter, what our allies feel is the best outcome. It is the elimination of these weapons. We think so, we continue to think so, and I think that that position has a kind of broad appeal to mankind in a sense. It is supported by the Japanese. The Chinese think that is the right proposal and so on. There is a worldwide acceptance of that. I think there is also a recognition of the reality that we are trying to bring about arms reduction and that, in the process of conducting this negotiation, we need to try out other options, and so we have.

I think it is worth pointing out that the way the President has constructed this proposal, he did not substitute some number for zero. He rather said, in effect, that there are a variety of numbers that are conceivable, and we are saying to the Soviet Union that we are willing to seek an interim number. And if they would accept this concept, maybe there are some other numbers that they think are better than other numbers. Obviously, you cannot just pick any number for a whole bunch of reasons. But I think it is an effort to put this forward in a manner that maximizes the potential for negotiation and for some reality of the prospect of getting some place as much as—we cannot do it, of course. It takes two sides to make an agreement.

Q. Does this put the onus on the Soviet Union now to come up with a number—an acceptable number—and in terms of the public relations battle of this, is the ball now to be perceived in the Soviet court?

A. I think that the ball has always been in the Soviet court because we have tabled a complete and very good proposal in what has been called the zero option. I guess you could say that they have made a response but the response is so far out of the ballpark that I don't think anyone really took it that seriously. But at any rate, certainly this is another effort to put forward something as they have said very clearly that they do not accept the idea that they will have none of these weapons.

So this is another way of trying to get at it consistent with the principles that have been implicit in the President's position and the alliance position all along and has been enunciated most recently in his American Legion speech[6] and again by Paul Nitze [Head of the U.S. delegation to the INF negotiations] in Geneva.

Q. You are saying to the Soviets in effect, what number will you take? Is that the way that you read it?

A. It leaves it open to the negotiators to say, well, you think this number, we might think that number, but if we can get the thing into that ballpark then it seems to me that that is a big advance. I don't know whether the Soviets will respond that way, but at any rate, I think that our position is a good one. It has a good ultimate objective, and it is a negotiating position, and it has strong alliance support.

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[6] *Ante*, Feb. 22.

Q. We are truly trying to maximize the prospects of coming up with an agreement. Will there be some way to take account of the fact that the British and the French are modernizing their strategic nuclear forces in a significant way and either in this negotiation or in START might we accommodate that fact somehow? Because it doesn't seem to me from the Soviet perspective of *a priori* crazy to insist that these forces be factored in this tabulation of forces.

A. I will just focus on the negotiations we are talking about. You used a good word, "strategic," and these are intermediate-range missiles that we are talking about. We are talking about land-based missiles, and we are talking about the United States and the Soviet Union. I don't think that it is reasonable to consider—we should not consider a proposition broadly that equality consists of adding up the armed forces of every country in the world and then saying that the Soviet Union has to have the same as everybody else combined.

I think this problem that we have has to be put in terms of the United States and the Soviet Union and equality and capacity to deter on our part based on that notion. As you know, the overwhelming number of U.K. and French systems are submarine-based so that they are not land-based systems—I believe only a very small number of the French systems are land-based. Strategic land-based—those are national systems. They are not NATO systems. I don't think that they should be counted, let alone taken into account in this negotiation.

Q. I wondered if the United States would feel that the number of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles that the Soviet Union has, if they eliminated those would this be a realistic approach to the thing? Because the Soviets have never given an indication in their history of eliminating a new weapons system.

A. You must be kidding.

Q. No, I am not.

A. You must be kidding.

Q. The Soviet Union has never eliminated an operating weapons system. They have only gotten rid of the old obsolete systems, and they haven't given any indication in these negotiations, I am sure, that they wish to dismantle any of the SS-20s.

A. We cannot appraise proposals according to what the Soviet Union would like. We have to appraise proposals according to what would be sensible and reasonable from the standpoint of our allies and which one would think would be reasonable for them. If they feel, as it has been said so often, that they are threatened, then why isn't it reasonable to say let's just eliminate all of these weapons and then they don't threaten anybody.

Q. I wasn't talking about what was reasonable—

A. I think that there are all sorts of responses to these things, but to think that we could accept—the number of SS-20 warheads now deployed, I think, well exceeds 1,000 and not have anything to confront that and to be used as a component of our deterrence would be absolutely ridiculous.

News Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (de Vos) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, March 31, 1983 [1]

The objective of the Vienna negotiations—as contained in the agreed mandate—is to contribute to stability and security in Europe. On July 8, 1982, the West tabled a draft treaty which does that. It provides for one comprehensive agreement with contractual commitments from the outset by all participants and for staged reductions leading to parity at the agreed ceilings. In its treaty the West also met a fundamental Eastern requirement—that all direct participants take legally-binding reduction and limitation obligations.

In the past round, we have explained our treaty in detail. We have pointed to areas both of agreement and disagreement between the sides. We have noted that an agreement must be based on a common understanding of the facts—that is, agreed data—while providing for effective verification of compliance with both reductions and limitations. Let me emphasize that the provisions in the Western draft apply equally to both sides so that, contrary to frequent allegations by the East, no unilateral advantage is possible.

Unfortunately, Eastern reaction to the Western draft proposal has been negative, with no spirit of reciprocity to the Western compromise advance on linkage. For example, there has been no comprehensive move on the part of the East on the crucial issue of verification and confidence building. For verification measures to be genuinely effective, they must include, in addition to non-interference with national technical means, regular information exchanges, permanently manned exit/entry points, and jointly undertaken direct observations.

As to the recent Eastern proposals, they are still imprecise. Western participants submitted several weeks ago a series of questions to the East concerning their proposals. Eastern answers so far have not sufficiently clarified matters.

However, as we have pointed out before, the new Eastern proposals differ in important ways from the Western approach embodied in the July 8, 1982 proposal. For example, while agreeing in principle to manpower parity in central Europe, the East refuses to cooperate with the West in establishing a factual foundation for determining on a mutual basis the substantial reductions required by both sides to achieve genuine parity, and, as I said, the East also so far has not been willing to agree to the specific measures needed to verify effectively the reductions and limitation obligation contained in an agreement.

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[1] ACDA files.

Such a situation cannot provide assurance that manpower reductions needed to achieve genuine parity in central Europe will indeed take effect or that residual ceilings will subsequently be respected.

Moreover, we question whether withdrawals outside a formal agreement and with no binding provisions to verify that force levels are not subsequently increased would guarantee real or lasting reductions. A case in point is our experience with the 1979–80 Soviet unilateral 20,000-man withdrawal, where a continuing reorganization and expansion of Soviet units in central Europe, as we have noted, has already largely offset the announced reduction. We wonder how the East would propose to settle a dispute if a similar disagreement on the net effect of force changes should arise after implementation of the withdrawals they propose on the basis of mutual example.

We have called on our Eastern colleagues to give a constructive reply to our proposals and to clarify their own proposals in a way which takes into account fundamental Western requirements, in particular on the issue of verification. So that together in the next round we can intensify efforts to resolve our differences and seize the opportunity we have to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe.

News Conference Statement by the Czechoslovakian Representative (Keblusek) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, March 31, 1983 [1]

The course of the 29th round of the Vienna negotiations, concluded just now, was significantly influenced by the major foreign policy initiatives set forth in the Political Declaration of the Prague session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states. [2] These initiatives are designed to prevent the threat of war, to improve international climate, to halt the arms race in both nuclear and conventional weapons, to achieve disarmament and to enhance and develop peaceful relations between states with different social and political systems.

The Prague session paid special attention also to the Vienna negotiations. The provisions of the Prague Political Declaration concerning the Vienna negotiations were developed and specified in the new set of proposals of the socialist countries tabled in Vienna on February 17, this year.

The new approach of the socialist states to the Vienna negotiations provides for:

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[1] ACDA files.

[2] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

—contractual reductions of armed forces of Warsaw Treaty and NATO states in Central Europe together with their equipment to reach equal collective levels (of 900,000 men including 700,000 ground force personnel respectively) in one single stage regardless of the discrepant estimates of the sides of their military manpower strength;

—a reduction of USSR and USA armed forces (by 20,000 and 13,000 servicemen with their equipment respectively) on the basis of mutual example and outside contractual framework;

—a subsequent freeze of the levels of armed forces and armaments of all direct participants in the negotiations on the basis of mutual political obligations of the sides.

The new proposals not only open the way, most direct and reasonable in the developed conditions, toward achieving generally acceptable understandings in Vienna but also clear this way of the obstacles and difficulties that have emerged. Above all, this regards the data question. The fruitlessness and—most importantly—the hopelessness of the data discussion have been demonstrated by the very course and practice of our negotiations. Indeed, how can such discussion lead to any positive results when all official data facts on military manpower strength of the socialist countries are only contested or rejected by the Western side. Under such circumstances, the data issue cannot be resolved—it can only be avoided without prejudice to both Western and Eastern interests. And this is what the socialist countries propose.

The new proposals of the socialist countries are based on compromise. They take the Western position into account in many aspects as well as the developed degree of understanding between the sides on a number of questions. They rest on elements of commonality of the approaches of the sides to such problems as the initialness of Soviet-US reductions, the need for a freeze collectivity of reductions and of the freeze, definition of the final outcome of reductions in the form of equal collective levels of military manpower of the sides expressed in agreed numerical terms, the need for adequate associated measures. The socialist states have met the Western position also in such important questions as are the determination of the reduction quotas by each participant as well as the form of the respective reductions.

We believe that it is one of the main benefits of our proposals that they offer real opportunities for reaching a radical movement and an understanding in the negotiations already in this year. This period of time is becoming especially significant now in connection with the particular features of the present political climate in Europe. Hence, if someone really wishes this situation to be recovered and normalized he can no longer tolerate the fruitlessness of the Vienna negotiations.

It is well-known that the excessive concentration of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe brings about tensions and mistrust among states. Nobody can deny the irrefutable truth that to step up military preparations and to enhance confidence among states are two incompatible things—certain antipodes which undermine and even simply exclude each other. If, for example, the United States, while it cannot reckon with the plain fact of the negotiations and ignores our proposals for a freeze of the level of armed forces over the negotiations, increases the numerical strength of its military contingents in Europe—including the envisaged area of reductions—from year to year—can we possibly avoid suspicion and the natural question: what is the purpose of all this? If, for example, announcements are made in the United States about far-reaching measures for building qualitatively new systems of conventional weapons, as is the case today, can it help enhance our confidence toward the United States and their current course? Certainly not!

If the build-up of armed forces and armaments is not stopped and if effective and tangible steps toward reducing the armed forces together with their equipment are not taken no verification measures will be able to facilitate the solution of the substance of the confidence problem. The implementation of the proposals of the socialist countries would lead to a lowering of the level of confrontation, to reducing the danger of war, to a gradual increase and strengthening of trust between the sides in the negotiations.

It is for the above stated reasons that we call on our Western partners to take a forthcoming political approach to our proposals so that the real chance for a decisive breakthrough is not missed. We hope that the Western participants will take advantage of the recess to work out a constructive answer to our proposals. It would make possible a practical elaboration of future understandings from the very outset of the next round.

North Atlantic Council Press Statement: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, March 31, 1983 [1]

At the conclusion of the latest briefing by the Deputy United States INF Negotiator, Ambassador Maynard Glitman, and the subsequent exchange of views, the North Atlantic Council issues the following statement:

1. The Council warmly welcomed and strongly supported the new proposal of the President of the United States for an intermediate agreement at the US/Soviet INF negotiations in Geneva.

2. This latest initiative is the result of intensive and continuing consultations among Allies participating in the Special Consultative Group. It is fully consistent with the criteria developed by NATO in the December 1979 double-track decision.[2] Specifically, the United States is prepared to agree to an equal level of warheads substantially below the number planned for deployment as part of that decision provided the Soviet Union would reduce its warheads on land-based

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 1 (Apr. 1983), p. 32.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

LRINF missiles on launchers to the same level. Allies reaffirmed that the complete elimination of the entire category of longer-range, land-based INF missiles remains the optimal solution, and expressed the hope that this outcome can be achieved.

3. Meanwhile, the United States has moved to open the way for significant progress in Geneva and it is now incumbent upon the Soviet Union to consider this offer with the utmost seriousness and respond constructively to it when the negotiations resume. Allies reaffirmed that in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement, deployments will proceed in accordance with the original schedule as foreseen in the 1979 decision.

Congressional Research Service Digest of Fiscal Year 1984 Arms Control Impact Statements, April 1983 [1]

The arms control impact statements [ACIS] [2] for fiscal year 1984 consist of 10 indepth documents and two compilations of abbreviated ACIS. Each indepth ACIS is organized into six sections: (1) Introduction; (2) program description; (3) stated military requirements; (4) funding; (5) analysis; and (6) summary and overall arms control assessment. The digests that follow were prepared from the unclassified versions provided to the Congress by the administration on January 31, 1983. These digests represent restatements of the language of each ACIS and do not reflect the views of the Congressional Research Service or the Congress. Information beyond the scope of these digests is available in the unclassified ACIS published in this volume. The most complete information, of course, is available in the classified ACIS.—

ICBM PROGRAMS

Maintaining and improving the capabilities of the U.S. land-based ICBM force includes, for the Minuteman squadrons, improving survivability, replacing the current reentry vehicle for greater yield and accuracy, improving the command, control, and communications systems, and completing production of the W78 warhead. For the MX program, the missile booster, guidance and control systems, postboost vehicle, and reentry system are being developed, tested, and integrated into a missile system. The advanced strategic missile systems program develops ballistic missile systems, subsystem, reentry and penetration aid for existing and future ICBM's, IRBM's, and SLBM's. All of these improvements contribute to the extreme flexibility of the U.S. land-based missile force which will enable it to continue to make a major contribution to the deterrent posture of the United States. The following arms control implications have been taken into consideration.

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[1] *Fiscal Year 1984 Arms Control Impact Statements* . . . pp. XI–XXV. The Digest was prepared by Dagnija A. Sterste-Perkins, Analyst in International Relations, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

—Production and deployment of MX will result in a more secure and stable strategic deterrent force and create incentives for the Soviets to enter into meaningful arms reduction negotiations, because a wide range of Soviet military targets will have been placed at risk.

—Development of MX and Minuteman improvements are consistent with the provisions of SALT I,[3] which permitted modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic missile systems, precluded construction of new fixed land-based ICBM launchers, but did not limit development of new missiles for fixed or mobile launchers.

—The provisions of SALT II[4] are not violated by U.S. programs. Deployment of MX would not prevent us from meeting the launcher limits since less capable systems could be retired. In addition, MX will be the only new ICBM type (limited to one by SALT II) flight-tested and deployed by the United States in the foreseeable future.

—Neither SALT I nor SALT II provides a definition of a fixed ICBM launcher, though both prohibit parties from starting "construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers." Deployment of MX in canisters would not entail construction of new fixed launchers in the strict SALT sense, because all essential launch equipment would be included in the canister (not as an integral part of the silo as in current fixed ICBM's) and the canister with the missile would be transportable; such a basing mode thus would be a new concept for land-based ICBM deployment and would not undercut either SALT Agreement.

—A viable ABM defense of U.S. ICBM's could improve ICBM survivability and is under study as an element of a long-term option for maintaining the survivability of MX.

—The President's May 9, 1982 START proposal[5] attempts to reduce the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and securing a stable nuclear balance, the main threat to which has been the Soviet buildup of strategic ballistic missiles forces. MX is fully compatible with the U.S. START proposal, and lends itself to flexible force sizing. The number of missiles eventually deployed is uncertain, depending on the size and character of projected threats and strategic force targeting requirements.

—Overall, the effect of U.S. ICBM programs on stability is positive. The impact of MX on "arms race stability"—a condition of predictability and restraint which lessens the incentives for reactive force buildups—will be largely determined by Soviet interpretation of MX's effect on vulnerability of both sides' land-based strategic forces. MX will increase Soviet ICBM vulnerability and a secure MX deployment mode will enhance U.S. ICBM survivability. The Soviets might conclude that reduction of their ICBM's would be suitable if they perceive MX to be vulnerable even by a reduced ICBM force, or if MX is perceived as so invulnerable that additional targeting would not be warranted (assuming, in both cases, that Soviet vulnerability was also reduced by mobility, deceptive basing, or ballistic missile defense [BMD]). The U.S.S.R. could reject reductions as being too constraining if MX is perceived as vulnerable enough to warrant countermeasures but still so invulnerable as to require large Soviet prompt hard-target-kill forces—especially in the near term, if the U.S.S.R. did not anticipate rapid development of a counter to the threat posed by MX to their existing fixed-based ICBM's.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

[4] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[5] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 286–289.

—MX will primarily threaten Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM's, those missiles mainly responsible for the imbalance in prompt hard-target-kill capability. Thus, MX deployment should provide incentive for Soviet efforts to lessen the vulnerability of their land-based ICBM's.

—Implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program together with agreement to the U.S. START proposals could significantly enhance stability and deterrence by lessening the Soviet incentive to use or threaten to use military force, to the extent that the U.S.S.R. recognizes that any nuclear attack would not destroy the U.S. forces and C^3 necessary for us to respond against both remaining Soviet nuclear capabilities, and against the Soviet conventional forces essential to achieve any lasting military, political, and economic gain from a preemptive nuclear attack.

—Reducing the number of prospective targets through survivable MX basing will remove one of the primary Soviet incentives for maintaining a preemptive threat.

—Failure to deploy MX would have political repercussions, also, and could lead to perceptions of Soviet advantage with the following implications: greater Soviet freedom of action in the employment of conventional forces; greater Soviet latitude in using nuclear strength for political coercion; development of new perceptions of relative United States and Soviet strength among third countries; and an adverse effect on Allied willingness to deploy GLCM and Pershing II in Europe.

—MX could affect regional stability by demonstrating to U.S. allies that the United States is committed to pursuing strategic equivalency with the Soviet Union; the Allies' perceptions of U.S. determination to prevent strategic force asymmetries from providing advantages to the U.S.S.R. would be strengthened.

—U.S. deployment of systems significantly improving missile accuracy or pursuit of technology programs providing even greater accuracies could stimulate continued competition with the Soviet

Union. However, Soviet ICBM accuracy has significantly progressed recently and the Soviets have tended to stress development in areas driven by their military requirements rather than in reaction to U.S. program developments.

—Deployment of a mobile ICBM, particularly a Soviet mobile ICBM, could raise verification problems, since the different intelligence-gathering environments in the two countries would make it more difficult for the United States to monitor compliance. Increased capabilities of each side's strategic forces place increased burdens on monitoring capabilities, although such obstacles can be reduced by negotiated agreement and cooperative measures if both sides desire to do so.

SSBN/SLBM PROGRAMS

The Trident submarine, missile, and warhead programs provide a new class of fleet ballistic missile submarines and associated SLBM's to augment and eventually replace the present Poseidon submarines. (All 10 Polaris submarines have been withdrawn from the strategic force.) They have the peacetime mission of deterrence of nuclear war, and the wartime missions of strategic and theater nuclear strikes, as well as deterrence of further escalation. The ultimate size of the Trident submarine force has not been determined and will depend on many factors, including (*a*) assessments of the size and capability of Soviet strategic and antisubmarine warfare [ASW] forces; and (*b*) possible ceilings on strategic forces negotiated in strategic arms reductions negotiations.

—SSBN/SLBM systems, while at sea, are highly survivable elements of U.S. strategic forces and thus provide an important and credible element to our nuclear deterrent. Modernization of the U.S. sea-based strategic forces is consistent with the U.S. policy of restoring the strategic balance, enhancing stability through survivability, and creating incentives for the Soviets to enter into meaningful negotiations for arms limitation treaties.

—Under the terms of the expired SALT I agreement, the United States has dismantled three older Polaris submarines to compensate for launchers on new Delta and Typhoon SSBN's in dismantled launchers on older ballistic missile submarines to compensate for launchers on new Delta and Typhoon SSBN's in order to meet these restrictions.

—Unlike the SALT I Interim Agreement, there were no separate limits on numbers of ballistic missile submarines under SALT II. The United States is below the 2,400 aggregate ceiling on launchers and the other subceilings. The transfer of weapons systems numerically limited by SALT II was not precluded by the agreement; the United States plans to sell to the United Kingdom sufficient MIRV'd missiles to maintain a force of four to five new

British built submarines that would replace the existing British Polaris sea-based strategic missile force in the early 1990's.

—With respect to the NPT,[6] unilateral U.S. nuclear modernization restraint would not eliminate criticism from nonnuclear weapon states for lack of arms control progress, especially as some of this criticism is a product of extraneous political factors. Such unilateral restraint would weaken the credibility of the U.S. deterrent for those countries that rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

—The Trident SSBN/SLBM programs could be constrained by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty;[7] Soviet observance of the 150KT limit is in question, as is U.S. ability to verify Soviet observance.

—The Trident programs will assure that the United States continues to maintain a credible, survivable sea-based strategic retaliatory force, even taking into account foreseeable developments in Soviet ASW capabilities. The more capable Trident II missiles will help, in the 1990's, to compensate for the declining number of submarines as older Poseidon submarines are retired. The greater range of Trident missiles produces a far greater ocean operating area for the U.S. strategic submarines. This, combined with greater speed and quietness, will make Trident even more survivable against Soviet ASW forces. No impending Soviet ASW development appears likely to pose a significant threat to Trident.

—Increased confidence of U.S. allies in the readiness and ability of the United States to react to the modernization of Soviet strategic systems will prevent the U.S.S.R. from obtaining a perceived or real strategic advantage.

—In the future, U.S. SSBN's could come to assume increasing importance in guaranteeing the secure U.S. retaliatory capability necessary to deter nuclear attack on the United States or its allies; hence, these programs are essential to U.S. security and to strategic stability.

—Deployment of Trident II and other systems with hard-target-kill capabilities could add incentives for the Soviets to reduce their ICBM vulnerability; for example, by deploying more of their capability at sea, or on mobile ICBM's, thereby enhancing strategic and crisis stability. Soviet reaction would depend on factors such as the speed of the U.S. deployment, the cost of such changes to them, and the degree to which they perceived their silo-based ICBM's to be threatened.

—These programs should cause no verification problems. Although SSBN's and SLBM launchers are concealed for a part of their life, they periodically emerge and provide opportunities to confirm existing operating numbers. This can be accomplished by Soviet NTM.

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[6] *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461–465.

[7] *Ibid.*, 1974, pp. 225–229.

AIRBORNE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS

Modernization of the airborne component of U.S. strategic forces will maintain the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. Transforming the B-52 force from a pure penetration to a cruise missile launch mission will maintain its combat effectiveness against projected enemy threats of the 1980's. The ALCM will present Soviet air defenses with a more diversified threat, thereby preventing the Soviets from concentrating their resources on any one system. The B-1B bomber, with its high penetration speed, low-altitude terrain clearing flight, reduced radar cross-section and advanced electronic countermeasures will provide a flexible, large-payload delivery aircraft capable of penetrating Soviet defenses well into the 1990's. An advanced technology bomber, planned for deployment in the early 1990's, will be capable of penetrating all existing and projected Soviet air defenses until well past the turn of the century.

—The United States intends to rely on a mixed force of penetrating bombers and standoff bombers with cruise missiles to maintain the effectiveness of the air-breathing forces against future Soviet air defenses, which are not limited by current arms control agreements. Modernization of the bomber element of the strategic Triad will establish a deterrent that is more secure and stable than exists today and could provide the incentives necessary for the Soviets to respond seriously to proposals for equitable and verifiable reductions in arms.

—According to the second agreed statement to article IV.14 of SALT II, no bomber of the B-52 or B-1 types and no bomber of the TU-95 or Myasischev types would be equipped for more than 20 cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km.

—The May 9, 1982, U.S. START proposal does not include specific limits on bombers and cruise missiles but the United States has indicated that such limits could be included in the second phase.

—Since bombers and ALCM's take at least several hours after take-off to deliver their weapons on target, such forces clearly are not a first-strike threat against the Soviet Union. Their considerable retaliatory capability enhances deterrence, while their slowness of delivery makes them inappropriate for use in any attack against time-urgent targets in the Soviet Union. Therefore, they contribute to crisis stability.

—The U.S. lead over the Soviet Union in ALCM technology is 5 or more years. If they believed it necessary, the Soviets could respond to U.S. ALCM deployment by (1) increasing efforts to deploy a defense against ALCM's and their associated launch platforms; (2) accelerating their own ALCM program; (3) upgrading their overall existing strategic offensive systems.

—Cruise missiles raise difficult verification problems, especially over the longer term. Each side would have to overcome difficult problems in order to be able to determine the particular fuel exhaustion range, payload, and launch platform of a given cruise missile. To the degree that such elements are or become the subject of constraints under arms control agreements, verification would become more complicated and more detailed and stringent cooperative measures will be required in order to assure adequate verification. The open U.S. society, in contrast to that of the Soviet Union, affords the Soviets considerable advantages in monitoring ALCM development, production, and deployment.

SPACE DEFENSE

The purpose of the U.S. space defense program is to insure the capability of the United States to defend its assets in space and to deny the Soviets the uninhibited use of space. Programs to accomplish this comprise four main functional areas: (1) antisatellite [ASAT] systems; (2) space systems survivability; (3) space surveillance systems; and (4) command and control. The U.S. ability to utilize its military power continues to be increasingly dependent on the effective and reliable operation of various satellite systems; the Soviet Union is also expected to be increasingly dependent on satellites. The Soviet Union possesses an operational ASAT system, while the United States currently does not.

The Air Force ASAT system will provide a capability to negate low-altitude Soviet military satellites that directly support Soviet combat forces, and will give the United States a capability to deny unilateral Soviet control of space. Posing such a threat to Soviet satellites could help deter Soviet use of ASAT systems against U.S. satellites in some situations, such as limited war, in which such Soviet activity might be a real risk.

—As part of the national space policy announced by the President on July 4, 1982,[8] U.S. study of space arms control options will continue. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapon systems, should those measures be compatible with U.S. national security. Current space defense programs are consistent with these goals.

—The Soviets enjoy the advantage of an ASAT system which has been tested and operational for a period of time. In the absence of a comparable U.S. system or some form of negotiated mutual limits, the Soviet ASAT program provides them with a unilateral military advantage which could be detrimental to the United States, even with improved survivability for U.S. satellites.

—The U.S. space defense program is consistent with international obligations under the terms of the Outer Space Treaty,[9] the

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[8] *Ibid., 1982,* p. 418.

[9] *Ibid., 1967,* pp. 38–43.

Limited Test Ban Treaty, the ABM Treaty,[10] the Direct Communications Link Improvement Agreement,[11] the U.N. Charter, and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space.[12]

—The U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint communique issued in Vienna in June 1979, after a year of bilateral ASAT talks, stated that the sides "agreed to continue actively searching for a mutually acceptable agreement in the continuing negotiations on ASAT systems,"[13] but since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, no further talks have been held.

—The definition of what comprises an ASAT system could have a bearing on several U.S. space programs, to the extent that constraints on ASAT's might be inferred to apply to other elements of the U.S. space program.

—A Soviet advantage in ASAT capability could contribute to strategic and regional instability. ASAT weapons could pose a considerable threat to critical satellites on both sides, creating a situation in which neither side could rely with confidence on unprotected space systems to provide reconnaissance of foreign forces, navigational data, or other necessary forms of support.

—Soviet ASAT programs are driven by their national security requirements; but, depending on their perceptions of U.S. ASAT developments, they might see it in their interests to seek some type of ASAT limitations.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The U.S. ballistic missile defense research and development program, conducted within the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty, is aimed at building the technological base to provide a wide range of options for possible strategic defense applications including the definition and demonstration of the defended options for MX basing included in the President's strategic modernization program. The program aims to reduce the cost and the system development lead time, as well as improving the effectiveness of systems applicable to ICBM defense. It thus allows the United States to keep abreast of advances in BMD technology while providing a hedge against possible Soviet ABM breakout. The current U.S. effort in this area is largely motivated by the threat posed by growing Soviet ICBM countersilo capabilities and the U.S.S.R.'s own continuing BMD development activities.

—By hedging against Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty, the U.S. program serves to discourage such breakout and contributes to the continued viability of the treaty. It also provides a base of expertise for evaluating the costs and benefits of further system deployment options created by new or improved BMD technology should the United States conclude that deployment would be in its interest.

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[10] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[11] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 635–639.

[12] 28 UST 695; TIAS 8480.

[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, p. 229.

—Absent the U.S. BMD program, the prospects for Soviet advantage in BMD technology, or perceptions of Soviet advantage, could be increased with attendant negative implications for global and regional stability.

—The fiscal year 1984 BMD program has no perceptible effect on such issues as the nuclear threshold, crisis stability, escalation, collateral damage, and aftermath effects, or the risk of accidental war, and hence is not destabilizing on any of these grounds.

—The ability to deploy an effective BMD system could convince a potential attacker that any offensive buildup designed to produce a disarming first-strike capability against ICBM's would be pointless. Also, BMD deployments could stimulate the development and deployment of advanced penetration aids and maneuvering reentry vehicles for United States and Soviet forces, as well as increases in force levels.

—Expertise accumulated through our own BMD program could assist the United States in its efforts to assess Soviet BMD activities, thereby having a positive effect on verification.

SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

The Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile [SLCM] is being developed with a conventional and nuclear capability for land-attack and a conventional capability for ship-attack, to satisfy U.S. requirements worldwide. The missile is capable of being deployed aboard a variety of surface ships and submarines in several launch configurations. As part of the strategic modernization program, nuclear land-attack SLCM would provide a survivable, credible, and effective military option on a worldwide basis to strike selected naval and other fixed targets ashore and to contribute to a strategic reserve in support of national policy. Upgrading the Navy's current nuclear land-attack force will provide (*a*) a means of bringing nuclear forces to bear in areas of the world where they are not forward deployed ashore; (*b*) a mobile nuclear reserve to augment land-based systems; and (*c*) a contribution to a postexchange reserve force.

—The SLCM program is consistent with the U.S. policy of restoring the strategic balance, enhancing stability through increased survivability, and creating incentives for the Soviets to enter meaningful negotiations for arms reduction treaties.

—The SALT II protocol, which would have expired December 31, 1981, would have prohibited deployment of cruise missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 km, on ground- and sea-based launchers. But development and testing of such cruise missiles was permitted if they were not equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads. Thus, SLCM was not impeded by the protocol, since it will not have multiple independently targetable warheads.

—With regard to the INF talks, it is the U.S. position that sea-based systems should not be included in an INF agreement.

—SLCM's impact on stability is partly a function of cruise missile characteristics. SLCM will provide an improved capability to bring nuclear forces to bear in areas where they are not forward deployed ashore, and provide a hedge against Soviet preemption of land-based systems. Thus, their deployment could strengthen regional and global stability. In addition, SLCM's range, flight time, and survivability affect stability and deterrence.

—The variety and number of potential launch platforms also affect SLCM's impact on stability. From the U.S. perspective, the large number of available launch platforms complicates the Soviet targeting problem and should increase system survivability and hence deterrence.

—The cruise missile represents a potent nuclear system which is highly mobile and difficult to detect. From the Soviet perspective, the problem is compounded by the fact that Tomahawk cruise missiles will be deployed on many different platforms, thereby making it difficult to negate U.S. retaliatory capabilities. Thus, the Soviets could become more willing to engage in substantive arms control negotiations which could limit such systems.

—SLCM, while conveying to the Soviet Union that its territory is a sanctuary, also threatens important reserves, supplies, and other supports for Warsaw Pact forces, thus complementing other nonstrategic nuclear systems. The range of options resulting from conventional, nonstrategic, and strategic nuclear forces provides some possibility of controlling escalation and stopping conflict at the lowest level possible should deterrence fail. SLCM's increased survivability might allow the West to put relatively less dependence on aircraft for the delivery of nuclear weapons, thereby releasing some aircraft for conventional roles.

—Verification could be complicated by such characteristics of cruise missiles as range, payload, and missile types and missions.

—The effect of U.S. modernization programs on current prospective arms control negotiations has already been demonstrated in the INF talks. It was not until faced with the prospect of Pershing II and GLCM deployments that the Soviet Union displayed a willingness to engage in substantive arms control negotiations.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

There have been no significant programmatic changes in either the Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missile [GLCM] programs since the submission of the fiscal year 1983 ACIS. Discussion of these programs is included because of the high degree of interest in "longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces" [LRINF] here and in Europe.

—LRINF are important to deterrence because they constitute a link between conventional capabilities and U.S. strategic forces. These two systems complement short-range nuclear systems. The range of options resulting from conventional, nonstrategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces provides a means to control escalation and stop conflict at the lowest level possible should deterrence fail. Additionally, the flexibility of these nuclear forces strengthens stability.

—Since it is U.S. and NATO policy that modernization of NATO's nuclear systems should not take precedence over modernization of conventional forces, there will be no increased dependence on nuclear weapons resulting from such deployments—as explicitly recognized in the December 1979 modernization decision.[14]

—Warsaw Pact forces have over the years developed massive nuclear and conventional systems, far more than the level and capability required for defense. Deployment of the SS-20 is particularly unsettling. Failure to counter this threat, either by Pershing II and GLCM deployment or the achievement of an acceptable arms control agreement, would be highly destabilizing.

—The United States and its allies remain committed to both tracks of the 1979 decision on force modernization and negotiation. Thus, while Pershing I and GLCM programs continue apace, in order to provide the Soviets the incentive to negotiate seriously, the President has proposed an agreement that would trade the elimination of Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 systems in return for cancellation of Pershing II and GLCM deployments.

—The Soviets are worried about the prospects of Pershing II and GLCM deployment. The U.S.S.R. might react with additional weapon programs and further diplomatic activity of its own in Western Europe directed at turning allied governments against modernization.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Dual-capable artillery and short-range missiles comprise the lower end of the spectrum of U.S. nuclear weapons, and are an important component of NATO's military forces and the U.S. nuclear deterrent posture. By posing the credible option of their effective use on the battlefield, they enhance deterrence. They also enhance conventional force effectiveness by denying an aggressor the option of massing forces to overwhelm our defenses without risking the creation of lucrative nuclear targets. These new warheads improve various performance characteristics of nuclear artillery projectiles and the Lance missile. The addition of an enhanced radiation [ER] capability makes possible a reduction in blast and thermal yields, compared with predecessor weapons, thus reducing the potential for collateral damage to civilians, friendly military forces, and facilities.

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[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 814–816.

—On August 6, 1981, the President announced that ER weapons would be produced and stockpiled solely on U.S. territory. Any decision to deploy ER warheads would be taken only after close consultation with any country on whose territory they would be based, and then only with the explicit approval of the President.[15]

—Soviet short-range nuclear forces, like their longer range counterparts, are undergoing rapid modernization; for example, development of the new SS-21 missile to replace the older Frog rockets and introduction of new self-propelled 203-mm. and 240-mm. nuclear artillery systems. The new U.S. short-range nuclear systems have not been developed in response to these specific developments, but rather in concern over across-the-board improvements in Warsaw Pact military capabilities.

—Modernization of these warheads through improvements in range, accuracy, control, and security features represent evolutionary changes in existing weapons; the improvements are unlikely to affect significantly existing perceptions of these weapons or their relationship to U.S. arms control efforts. The effective implementation of the NATO doctrine of flexible response in a manner consistent with announced strategy contributes to stability in Europe—an arms control objective.

—The existence of ER weapons may be perceived by adversaries to increase the credibility of the NATO deterrent; thus their availability would increase deterrence of war overall, but at the same time could increase Soviet concern regarding the use of nuclear weapons if they have decided to go to war. This is the dilemma of nuclear deterrence, which must contain some threat of use to be credible.

—The U.S. understanding, placed on record at the time of signing the additional protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention (adopted in 1977 by the Law of War Conference) is that the rules established by the protocol were not intended to have any effect on, and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The protocols are currently under interagency review to determine whether or not they should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.[16]

—The Soviet Union has sought propaganda advantages by proposing U.S.-U.S.S.R. mutual renunciation of development and production of ER weapons. Such an agreement would provide asymmetrical advantages to the Soviet Union, since the principal value of ER weapons lies in their potential use to defend against an armed offensive, a problem facing NATO but not the Warsaw Pact.

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[15] For news conference remarks by President Reagan on this subject, see *ibid., 1981*, pp. 339–341.

[16] For the pertinent portion of additional protocol I and the U.S. understanding, see *ibid., 1977*, pp. 359–360.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Proposed fiscal year 1984 chemical warfare [CW] programs will continue initiatives in active RDT&E for both deterrent retaliatory and defensive CW needs; procurement of an improved protective CW capability; initiation of the modernization of the U.S. deterrent retaliatory capability; development of the capabilities to dispose of the deteriorating chemical agent stockpile; and maintenance of currently stockpiled chemical munitions. The programs support the objective of maintaining adequate defensive and deterrent retaliatory capabilities, as well as increasing the safety and usability of the systems involved.

—U.S. ratification of the Geneva protocol [17] and the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] [18] underscores the U.S. commitment to the objective of the complete, effective, and verifiable prohibition of all chemical weapons. The administration has confirmed continued U.S. support for such prohibition of CW production, development, and stockpiling, recognizing that for the foreseeable future such a prohibition would be unverifiable by NTM alone and that other measures, including onsite inspections, would be required.

—The U.S. emphasis from 1977 to 1980 was on CW arms control and on maintaining our CW deterrent retaliatory forces without force improvement. Against the background of a continuing CW threat and a lack of sufficient progress in arms control, the administration and the Congress initiated alternative policies. Fiscal year 1976 legislation required Presidential certification before binary weapons could be produced. On February 8, 1982, the President certified to the Congress that production of binary weapons was "essential to the national interest." [19] A Defense Department Report to Congress on the United States Chemical Warfare Deterrence Program, submitted in March 1982, concluded that in view of the overall United States-Soviet military balance, we cannot rely on other components of our military capabilities—in particular nuclear weapons—to deter CW and that we have been unable to eliminate the threat through negotiations or unilateral U.S. restraint. Hence, U.S. defensive and retaliatory capabilities must be improved.

—Soviet military doctrine provides for the use of CW; Soviet forces are the best prepared and equipped in the world to operate in a CW environment. The Soviets have devoted more resources than the United States to nuclear/biological/chemical [NBC] defense and protection. It is expected that the Soviets will continue to improve their NBC capabilities for the foreseeable future.

—Since 1976, the Soviets have used or provided for use toxin and other CW agents in Southeast Asia and in Afghanistan. Although these conflicts present situations different from what could be expected in a war in Europe, available evidence shows that CW remains an intrinsic part of Soviet military strategy.

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[17] *Ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.

[18] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 133–138.

[19] See the Department of State fact sheet of this date, printed *ibid., 1982,* pp. 33–36.

—The effect of Soviet CW use in Europe would be doubly severe if NATO forces alone were subject to such attack without the enemy being equally impeded by chemical attack. The need to deter the use of CW in any conflict is critical.

—The administration views a chemical retaliation capability as the most credible and effective specific deterrent presently obtainable against Soviet CW use. Defense/protective measures alone cannot constitute a credible deterrent. The threat of CW retaliation would be more credible and less escalatory than a threat to use nuclear weapons.

—The objective for the retaliatory element of the U.S. CW program is to maintain the safest, smallest chemical munitions stockpile that provides the ability to deny a significant military advantage to any initiator of CW. The United States does not plan to match the Soviets in agent/munition quantities of any type, and will continue to exercise restraint. It will make only those improvements necessary to insure that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent retaliatory capability.

—CW modernization actions do not represent a decision to place greater reliance upon CW, but reflect overall U.S. national security policy to deter war. They enable the United States to gain crucial negotiating leverage in the area of CW arms control.

—The importance of achieving effective verification measures in any CW agreement is underscored by Soviet use of toxins and other agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, and the Soviet unwillingness to discuss U.S. concerns about Soviet compliance with the BWC and the Geneva protocol.

—Fully implementing a CW ban would take at least 10 years for the disposition of declared facilities and destruction of declared stocks, and would require onsite verification under independent, international auspices.

—Since the suspension of U.S.-U.S.S.R. CW talks in 1980, the U.S. Ambassador informed the Committee on Disarmament [CD] in March 1982 that the possibility of resuming bilateral negotiations remains open, pending a demonstration by the Soviet Union of genuine readiness to negotiate effective verification and compliance arrangements. The United States has played an active role in the CD working group on CW, and continues to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet position, particularly on verification. The Soviets are perceived to be holding an unreasonable and unforthcoming position.

—The U.S. CW program should contribute to stability. Continued reliance on the existing stockpile, however, could encourage instability.

—The Soviet Union can verify easily that the United States is actually conducting the CW program which we openly claim.

DIRECTED ENERGY PROGRAMS

Fiscal year 1984 directed energy [DE] programs attempt to explore the technologies and develop the potential of DE weapons which, if actually developed, would have potential mission advantages over many existing types of weapons against missiles, aircraft, and spacecraft targets, due to the extremely high delivery speed of the damaging energy to the targets. While high energy lasers [HEL] and particle beams [PB] differ in state of development and in technology required to realize them, they have potential for weapons systems of similar operational characteristics and they could have similar implications for the future of the ABM Treaty, possible ASAT negotiations, and space defense issues generally.

—DE research allows the United States to stay abreast of technologies having military potential and to gain insight into what the U.S.S.R. may be discovering through its own research, thus providing confidence that the United States can maintain an adequate balance of forces.

—Current DE research programs are not constrained by existing arms control agreements. The BMD potential of future DE weapons could eventually create a conflict with the obligations assumed by the United States under the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty prohibits development, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems, or components for such systems. Although the treaty allows the development and testing of fixed, land-based ABM systems and components based on other physical principles (such as HEL and PB), including such fixed, land-based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, the treaty prohibits their deployment unless the parties consult and amend the treaty.

—With regard to DE systems in an ASAT role, only the actual use of systems to interfere with NTM used to verify compliance with strategic arms control agreements is prohibited under the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, and the SALT II Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty, the Direct Communications Link Improvement Agreement, and the International Telecommunication Convention [20] all impose certain restraints on ASAT activities, if they result in prohibited interference.

—Because of the lack of significant near-term development of U.S. or foreign PB weapons for any military missions, it is unlikely that PB weapons questions would affect current and prospective negotiations in the near term.

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[20] 28 UST 2495; TIAS 8572.

—It is not possible at this time to make a reasonable assessment of the net impact of the HEL program on future global or regional stability.

—Given a DE weapon-related arms control agreement, the United States would insist on adequate verification measures. NTM alone may not be adequate and some form of cooperative measures may be required to contribute to mutual confidence.

ABBREVIATED ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT

As in the fiscal year 1983 ACIS, the fiscal year 1984 submission contains two sets of abbreviated ACIS: one for Department of Defense [DOD] programs and one for Department of Energy programs.

The abbreviated DOD ACIS contains two sections. Section I, listing programs for which ACIS were previously submitted, includes antiship missile systems, large area ocean surveillance systems, strategic warning and attack assessment, advanced isotope separation and centrifuge enrichment, NAVSTAR global positioning system, fleet air defense, medium-range air-to-surface missile, ASW standoff weapon, and inertial confinement fusion. While these programs have continuing arms control implications, there have been no significant changes in funding, program direction, policy, or international developments that would revise the administration's analysis forwarded in early 1982. The need for updated ACIS will be reevaluated as these programs evolve.

—Section II includes other programs which meet congressional criteria for ACIS but for which indepth ACIS were not prepared. For each program, a brief description is given along with its program element number and R-1 or P-1 report page and line number, as applicable. Activities within these programs are primarily associated with one or more of the following:

—Programs in too early an exploratory research and development stage to determine with precision their possible arms control implications.

—Programs providing continuing normal support for existing missions or deployed operational systems and organizations.

—Production and procurement of a developed weapon system; nonnuclear munitions, cartridges, projectiles, rockets, et cetera, and associated equipment; spares and repair parts; associated electronic, communications, training, and support equipment; support, storage, industrial, and test facilities construction and operation; utility and specialized vehicles, ships, tanks, and aircraft; miscellaneous production charges, first destination charges and outfitting costs. In themselves, none of the activities in this category is judged to have a significant impact on arms control policy or negotiations.

—Modification or modernization of an already procured system which does not significantly alter the characteristics of the system from an arms control standpoint.

—Programs which were analyzed as indepth statements in previous years and found to have little, if any, additional arms control impact.

—Programs involving miscellaneous research, development, testing, and evaluation of programs not otherwise categorized, which are judged to have marginal, if any, impact on arms control policy or negotiations.

The abbreviated ACIS for the Department of Energy programs list those activities related predominantly to normal maintenance and reliability assessment of the nuclear stockpile. Because they do not provide for additional warheads/bombs or for significant changes in characteristics or deployments, none of them is judged to have a significant impact on arms control policy or negotiations. The ACIS lists 21 different nuclear warheads and gravity bombs, with a brief statement about the weapons systems for which they were developed.

Statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko: Soviet Disarmament Policy in General and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extracts], April 2, 1983 [1]

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What can be said of our foreign policy? Our foreign policy, the Soviet Union's foreign policy, is defined by the congresses of our party, the ruling party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and decisions of the party Central Committee. It is expressed in many of our actions, including the major actions that we would think are familiar to everyone.

It is reflected in our statesmen's speeches on concrete issues of policy, on concrete proposals—above all in the speeches by Yuriy Valdimirovich Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I think you remember these speeches, most of which were made recently. This is a peaceful policy, a policy of friendship among peoples. It is a policy of noninterference in other states' internal affairs. It is a policy aimed at relaxing tension in the world and eliminating the tension from the international situation. It is aimed at reversing the mindless arms race and, above all, arriving at ways to reduce and limit armaments, which is a good formula, and, subsequently, ways to eliminate armaments. For some reason, in the West the Soviet proposal concerning universal and full disarmament is not currently spoken or written about.

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[1] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, Apr. 2, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Apr. 4, 1983, vol. III, pp. AA2–AA9. The statement was the initial part of a news conference. It was followed by a question and answer session.

I should emphasize this in front of everyone here: After the end of the World War II the Soviet Union proposed two things that will go down in history in letters of gold—and it can be said that this has already happened. The first thing concerned the conclusion of an international convention banning the application and use of nuclear weapons in perpetuity.[2] Second, the Soviet Union proposed full and universal disarmament.

It emerged that other states intended to drag out deciding the question of disarmament, on various pretexts—how to precisely define ratios, how to approach reductions in weapons of one type or another, and how to combine all this. Under the pretext of complexity they began to frustrate the solution of this task. The Soviet Union proposed: Let us cut short the disputes. Let us work toward full and universal disarmament. Then our partners began to ask how can we implement full and universal disarmament without being convinced that it is being implemented in practice? In other words, they raised the question of control, [here and throughout paragraph TASS renders "control" as "verification"][3] thinking that here the Soviet Union could be leaned on and made to feel uncomfortable. The Soviet Union then proposed full and universal control. Full and universal disarmament must be combined with full and universal control. This proposal of ours remains in force today. I repeat: In the West it is not customary to write about this. A pity! Yet the reason it is not written about is more or less understandable: It is difficult to underline the importance of full and universal disarmament and control while at the same time pursuing a policy of preparing for war, implementing the arms race, escalating military budgets and so on.

I should like to stress these two things at the very beginning. Further, I should like to tell those present that recently the Soviet Union proposed steps that nobody has the right to ignore without acknowledging their own feebleness, if you like, and unconditional, open—I repeat: open—adherence to militarist policy.

What are these steps? First, the Soviet Union has unilaterally pledged that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.[4] It did not wait for other powers' agreement to this. This step is resolute and bold. I think that everyone present will probably agree with this. The other powers are not even making the slightest move in this direction and yet the Soviet Union pledges not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Yes, it is a bold, peace-loving step. In the West they are not very keen on covering this problem. That is a pity.

Second, at the session of the Consultative Political Committee the Soviet Union and its friends and allies in the Warsaw Treaty adopted a decision to propose a treaty to the NATO countries on the conclusion of an agreement between the two groups—NATO and the Warsaw Treaty—not to use nuclear weapons or conventional weapons. That is, not to use force in relations between states.[5]

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* vol. I, pp. 17–24.

[3] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 349–352.

Why should such a proposal be made in this form? Because in the West there has been very much demagoguery regarding the fact that the Soviet Union might attack one state or another or a group of states—that it could carry out aggression, and not necessarily with nuclear weapons. It could do this using conventional weapons. I repeat: Of course, this was demagoguery. But uninformed people, people who are not experienced in foreign policy issues, could be misled by this. The Warsaw Treaty countries' proposals knock out the argument—knock our opponents' [protivniki] argument completely out of hand.

Even today we are ready to sit with the NATO countries at the negotiating table, discuss this issue and, even better, sign the relevant document. The treaty would be an agreement to make mutual obligations not to use force against each other. How they react—I think those here have a general idea of how the countries of the North Atlantic alliance, the NATO countries, react to this proposal of ours.

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I would like to dwell on questions of nuclear weapons in Europe in connection with the talks being held between the USSR and the United States and on how we perceive the near future and how we assess the current situation with regard to this. One would first and foremost like to emphasize the incorrectness of assertions being made in Washington that, in general, serious talks are underway in Geneva; that there are no major problems and that the thing is to put pressure on the Soviet Union, to harden the position, and then things will start rolling. They even go further and say: The more pressure we put on the USSR, the greater the chance of reaching an accord. This is reflected in concrete proposals which are being proposed during the course of these talks. These statements contain a great deal of untruths, false assertions, cheating and juggling with the facts, in as much as what we are dealing with is factual data, and it is necessary to dwell on this question.

Above all, it is essential to dwell upon an assertion which has been formulated with the greatest precision in the recent statements by the American President, the assertion alleging that his proposals regarding medium-range missiles are the way toward an agreement and the way toward peace.

No. This is an incorrect assertion. This is not the way to peace and not the way to agreement. The gap between agreement and these proposals will become even wider.

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[5] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

Does everyone all know that the President is leaving aside entire components of huge scale and significance? He leaves them aside and does not touch on them. This refers to aviation, aircraft which are nuclear weapons carriers. They are missing in the President's statements and reasoning. Neither political nor military figures have the right to exclude this component from the talks and from the agreement.

What difference does it make to people whether they die from a nuclear charge delivered by a missile or a nuclear charge delivered by an airplane? Is it not well known that what was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was dropped from an airplane? But now more terrible weapons exist which can be delivered by aircraft. How can this entire component be excluded?

The delegations in Geneva tried to discuss this question. They approached it. However, nothing emerged from this discussion. Why Because the American representatives have instructions not to reach agreement on this question. For example, I will cite this example: You see, they say there are medium-range aircraft which can deliver both nuclear weapons and completely peaceful objects. They can have both a military purpose and a peaceful purpose. Therefore, they cannot b included in the number of nuclear weapons carriers. But it is the sam if somebody said that the most powerful, terrible—let us say ground based—ballistic missile can be described in this way; true, it ca deliver a nuclear charge but it can also be used for meteorologica aims. And therefore, it is better not to include it in the number those which deliver nuclear charges.

Therefore, it is absurd—yes, completely absurd—but indeed, th official representatives expressing the opinion of the United Stat Government declare such a position.

Further, in the West they hardly ever write about this, and they d not write about it at all in the United States of America. The Unit States possesses aircraft carriers, and sea-borne aircraft. There a many aircraft carriers, or groups of aircraft carriers, in the Unit States. According to the figures, which are widely known, there are least six of them. They have taken a liking to Europe, being station either in the waters of Europe, in the Mediterranean sea, or around They could cross any line dividing the European waters from the no European ones in minutes, in seconds if you like. This is a huge for each carrier containing at least about 40 aircraft carrying nucl weapons, nothing other than nuclear weapons.

So surely we, the Soviet Union, are not to shut our eyes to this, a not count them. It is absurd. The intentions of a government th suggests that we close our eyes and not see this, are not serio Therefore, any proposal which excludes the whole, one could s terrible, component of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, such as av tion, is not a serious proposal. And one cannot look for an agreem on this basis.

The second, important element of the picture—and one needs to know this, otherwise one would get muddled because so many words are said, so many statements made, that without knowing the specifics, one has to know at least a minimum. Without knowing this minimum, one might get muddled; without wishing to, of course. Britain and France have weapons, missiles, nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union proposes to include them in the talks. One cannot close one's eyes to them, reckoning them as if they did not exist, and only agreeing on American weapons. For these missiles themselves are part of the overall forces of the North Atlantic alliance. How many declarations have been made of this? Hundreds, thousands, if you will, of declarations of the most solemn nature, including one recently during the talks in Geneva, have been made. It was declared in Geneva that, yes, the nuclear forces of Britain and France are an integral part of the nuclear forces of the United States, of the nuclear forces of NATO as a whole. It is being proposed that we seek agreement leaving aside these nuclear forces. Not a serious proposal.

Imagine that a terrible tragedy has occurred: A British missile, say, is flying with nuclear warheads. What then, do you do? Perhaps hang a label on it saying I am British? But if it is to drop its charge people are still going to get killed as from any other missile. A French one is flying. It may also be flying with a label saying: I am French—you do not count me. Absurd, it will kill people just the same as any other one. Therefore, these missiles—both the English ones and the French ones need to be taken into account in the overall number. This is the only approach that is justified in the political respect, in the military-strategic respect, in the scientific respect, in the technical respect, and, however you will, the only correct approach. It would seem that this is as clear as could be. But, even up to now the position has not been changing and has not changed judging by the latest statements of the American President.

Further—this is also clearly reflected in the statements referred to—the demand is made: Well, if we are talking about any reduction of missiles in Europe, bear in mind that it is not enough to reduce and abolish those missiles in Europe. It is necessary to abolish the corresponding class of missiles in Asia as well. Why Asia all of a sudden? Asia was previously absent. They must be abolished in Asia, too! It is necessary to say that this too, by itself—and this alone makes accord impossible.

On what grounds is Asia brought in? We concede, as Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov said in introducing the relevant proposal—which is well known—we concede that we might transfer—I repeat, if an agreement were reached—some of our missiles from Europe, from the European zone to Asia. That is our affair and our right. And we are willing to put them in an area from which they will not reach central Europe. And we have said this in the course of the talks. The American Administration know this. I repeat: We will transfer them to an area from which they will not reach the central European countries.

We are told: No, that is not enough. All the arguments of the American Administration, and of the President personally, are to the effect that these missiles must also be abolished. Take that demand alone, and it already excludes the possibility of agreement.

These missiles pose no threat to the countries of Europe. But why are they needed? The Soviet Union needs them in order to make itself secure. After all, it is well known by what ring of military bases the Soviet Union is encircled by the United States.

Japan and the waters surrounding Japan are stuffed full of nuclear weapons and the corresponding launchers [nositeli]. The island of Okinawa is an enormous nuclear weapons base. South Korea is an enormous base, or more precisely a complex of nuclear weapons bases. The Indian Ocean, especially the Diego Garcia base, is stuffed full of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The Persian Gulf and adjacent waters are stuffed full of nuclear weapons.

And what is more—take note, I ask you to pay attention—that it is a matter of medium-range weapons. All these weapons are capable of reaching Soviet territory. Moreover—and if anyone is unaware of this, then what I am about to say will probably be of special interest—moreover, they cover all of Siberia, all of the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Even the northernmost part, the island [as heard] of Taymyr, is also covered.

What is more, we are only talking about medium-range weapons. We do not mean strategic weapons in this context, which exist and are deployed in the same areas I have been mentioning. Strategic weapons are controlled by another agreement, by a provisional agreement, but so far, in effect, the parties have reached agreement on extending the period of operation of this agreement.[6] Consequently, we are only talking about medium-range weapons. These weapons cover the entire Asian territory of the Soviet Union. So the question arises: Can it be that the Soviet Union does not have the right, for purposes of defense—for purposes of defense—to have something to oppose these weapons? It does have the right.

They do not pay attention to all of this, do not mention it publicly and do not tell the truth to the people. If the truth were told and explained to the people on each one of these questions, we are sure that there would be a change in opinion and it would probably not be to the advantage of the government and the [TASS here supplies "U.S."] administration which ignore these aspects and facts. They simply do not speak—they simply do not speak about this. They do not speak of it in the press; they do not speak of it on the radio; they do not speak of it on television. They pass over it in silence.

And if you take the United States, they hear only one thing from morning to night: The Soviet Union is a threat—the Soviet Union is threat—it is not moving toward agreement; it submits a proposal which is not in accordance with the United States' line.

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[6] The SALT I Interim Agreement on strategic offensive weapons, printed in *Documen on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 202–204.

However, factual material, even factual material for a person to reflect on, is not provided. This may sound sharp, but it is impossible to keep from saying that in general the population is being presented with deceitful propaganda. This idea which is being formed in people who, through no fault of their own, are poorly informed, is distorted, totally distorted.

As for the assertion that the more pressure put on the Soviet Union, the greater the chances of agreement is concerned, this is also completely lacking in substance. It is possible to explain it to a certain extent by lack of knowledge of the Soviet Union—lack of knowledge of our character, if you like—but the proposal is not serious and is not designed to create the possibility of agreement. This is what we think, that it is not designed to promote agreement.

Therefore, without knowing how they will regard this in Washington, we call for a more objective approach to this matter, for a more objective renunciation of unilateralism, taking into account all factors, taking in to account the legitimate interests and security of the Soviet Union; and we call for a line to be taken toward agreement, toward rapprochement [sblizheniye] with the Soviet Union. The line the United States is currently taking at the talks is not a line toward rapprochement, but a line moving away from agreement, a line of complicating the situation, a line toward spiraling the arms race even further, in order to further worsen relations with the Soviet Union, in order to achieve an even greater increase in military budgets, in order to even further fetter those forces which stand for finding a common language with the Soviet Union and for resolving the problems of disarmament.

Incidentally, from time to time Washington, and first and foremost the representatives of the administration, talk about the United States' move for a freeze of nuclear weapons allegedly being almost inspired by the Soviet Union. Or they say it might be inspired or it might be led by the Soviet Union. One way or the other we must point out the absurdity of such an assumption, the absurdity of such statements, in the most categorical manner. This movement is a spontaneous American movement. The Soviet Union has nothing to do with the fact that this movement is based on a desire to promote the finding of a common language with the Soviet Union, or that it desires to fetter the forces preparing for war—militaristic forces. We can only express solidarity with this movement, because we are of a like mind regarding the prevention of war and the need for agreement, for a search for agreements and understandings [dogovorennosti] on these issues.

One cannot charge either the movement or us that there is some kind of unified center for which responsibility is to be borne by the Soviet Union or the leaders of that movement. We shall hope that those reproaches will not live long and that they will be dispelled; and that the people who understand—intensely, one may say—what corresponds to the interests of the American people and what does not, that they will even more effectively and with an even louder voice show and make themselves felt in the political life of the United States.

So, in conclusion, in view of the latest pronouncements, chiefly the President's, we can say that the so-called interim solution—which is what the President called his idea—is unacceptable. It is unacceptable for the following reasons: First, it does not take the British and French medium-range nuclear weapons, including 162 missiles, into account; second, it does not take many hundreds of American nuclear weapon carrying aircraft based in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers into account; and third, Soviet medium-range missiles in the Soviet [as heard] part of the USSR would be dismantled [likvidatsiya] even though they have no relation to Europe. [Here TASS reads: ". . .] Thirdly, the Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR would also be subject to liquidation although they do not have relation to Europe . . ." (rewording for clarity)]

As a whole, if NATO now has a 1 and ½ superiority in medium-range nuclear warheads [boyezaryady] in Europe, then in the event of the implementation of the President's interim option, NATO would have almost 2 and ½ times as many such warheads as the Soviet Union has.

That, in a concentrated form, is our attitude on the American Administration's so-called intermediate proposal. Moreover, we do not doubt the fact that Washington did not count on a different reaction from us. We have reasons for this.

Before ending my statement I would like to draw the attention of those present to two circumstances, without which the picture would probably be incomplete—from the viewpoint of the people who provide the news today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow understanding the situation as a whole, at any rate. This would be useful for people.

Once and for all everyone should remember that not one of our weapons, that is our missile armaments, in Europe will reach U.S. territory. This task, of course, is not being set. That is a different matter. The missiles cannot reach and are not capable of reaching the United States. In the case of the American weapons that are to be deployed in Europe, each missile can reach the Soviet Union's territory. That is a factor of geography. In whose favor does this factor operate? It operates in favor of the United States and to the detriment of the Soviet Union.

We are not asking for compensation for this and we are not raising this question. But in order to scrupulously and precisely work out of the balance we could raise the question of compensation.

Further, a missile is a missile and a missile flies. Well, now, the flight time for an American missile from Western Europe to Soviet territory is roughly six to seven times shorter than the flight time of a missile from the territory of the Soviet Union to the United States in the event of a terrible tragedy befalling mankind.

The Soviet Union also has to scrupulously and precisely approach and construct an appropriate equation for observing the principle of equality. It also has the right and would have the right to set the question of compensation. But we are not setting this question and we are withdrawing this factor, as it were, into parentheses. Why? In the interests of making the path to agreement easier—in these interests. Furthermore, we consider that if agreement were reached, it would then be evident that steps had been taken toward further, more radical reductions and perhaps—who knows?—to the complete eradication of missiles weapons. To the complete eradication of missile weaponry.

I also ask you to bear this circumstance in mind: Here we are displaying extreme flexibility—even magnanimity, if you like—in the interests of agreement, bearing in mind, as I have already said, that the aim that has to be sought, that the world has to seek, is the complete eradication of nuclear weapons and the application of nuclear energy for purely peaceful aims and purely for the good of humanity. Our policy in these questions, questions of both medium-range weapons and strategic weapons outside the confines of Europe, is to preserve the equality—the principle of equality—come what may. This has come about over a period of many years.

You could say that life itself has brought the principle of equality into being. It is not the result of any mere bureaucratic labors. Life itself. We are for preservation. U.S. policy is directed toward breaking, demolishing, that principle. We will do all to observe that principle, whether an agreement is achieved or not.

If the principle is violated as a result of action by the U.S. Government and NATO, then the Soviet Union would most certainly—and no one can waver and no one can have any doubts—take steps to guard its legitimate interests and see that the principle continues to operate.

That we will do. That we will do. We have the material and intellectual capability—of that there can be no doubt. We think that, in fact, even those who bear the guilt for the present situation know that, too.

Interview With President Reagan: Defense Against Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Treaties With the Soviet Union [Extracts], April 4, 1983 [1]

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Q. Mr. President, on that general subject of defense, won't your plan to develop anti-missile weapons in outer space set off a new round in the arms race? Won't it just be a destabilizing force?

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Apr. 4, 1983, pp. 471–474. The interview was conducted by six journalists.

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The President. I think to the contrary. And I tried to make it as plain as I could in that address. I've been amazed at some of the fevered rhetoric in editorials that I have been reading. And I think some of them are quite irresponsible.

But no, I made it plain that we are going to continue, and I am determined to continue doing everything I can to persuade them that legitimate arms reduction is the only path to follow. To look down to an endless future with both of us sitting here with these horrible missiles aimed at each other and the only thing preventing a holocaust is just so long as no one pulls the trigger—this is unthinkable.

In my opinion, if a defensive weapon could be found and developed that would reduce the utility of these or maybe even make them obsolete, then whenever that time came, a President of the United States would be able to say, "Now, we have both the deterrent, the missiles—as we've had in the past—but now this other thing that has altered this." And he could follow any one of a number of courses. He could offer to give that same defensive weapon to them to prove to them that there was no longer any need for keeping these missiles. Or with that defense, he could then say to them, "I am willing to do away with all my missiles. You do away with all of yours."

Q. But what would you expect the Soviets to do in this period while we are developing this weapon? They're not just going to sit idly by and let the United States make itself invulnerable to their missiles.

The President. On the other hand, I think that there's every indication that they've been embarked on this same kind of research themselves.

Q. Mr. President, you said that some of the editorials that you had read criticizing your new defensive initiative had been irresponsible. What did you mean by that? How, "irresponsible"?

The President. I've just been reading a collection of them over there. There have been charges that this was a smoke screen on my part to avoid a discussion of the arms buildup. Some of them have charged that in my speech the other night on television, [2] that I did not give any facts, that I obscured the truth. Well, I think those charts were pretty factual and based on actual count and actual figures.

Other statements—that I was proposing something that never was and never could be a defensive weapon. And I had to remember that Vannevar Bush, one of our truly great scientists was asked by President Eisenhower with regard to the feasibility of creating a missile in which the delivery of an atomic weapon could be by missile. And this great scientist, after his own study, said to the President that the image of a missile that could be launched from a silo, pre-targeted on a target on another continent, just was an impossibility and could never happen.

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[2] *Ante,* Mar. 23.

Well today, the thing we're talking about are thousands of those on both sides of the ocean, targeted on each other. And so for someone to say that what I was talking about was a fairytale—they even used that term—that it could never take place, I think is irresponsible.

Q. Mr. President, can I ask you just one question about that program that you announced last week? The cost of it—everybody seems to be sort of moving around it. Nobody's really getting into what it's going to cost. If we spend a billion dollars, we don't know what it's going to cost in the out-years.

One, do you know what it's going to cost in the next few years or what kind of money has been put aside for it? And two, because of the trouble you've been having on the Hill with the defense budget as it is being too high, why should the Congress go along with approving a program like this that's going to cost a lot more money, presumably? Do you have a cost figure on it?

The President. No, because first of all, this is not a crash program. There, I think you would have to have—well, a crash program was the development of the atom bomb in wartime. I have said I don't know how long this would take. I don't know in what direction that research would go. To all of those who also editorialized that this was truly "outer space" and so forth, I don't know. I'm not a scientist.

Q. But to start it, sir, you're going to have to put some money with it. What kind of money are you going to put with it?

The President. Yes. Well, we already have about a billion dollars that is in the budget for research in the defense budget now, and some of that would be diverted to this research. Now, you would have to see what direction this took and what was needed to further that research. But I don't think that it would be the tremendous immediate cost that a crash program would be.

Q. You mentioned just a minute ago, Mr. President, that some future President might have the option of providing this defensive weapon to the Soviets if he so chose. What about some sort of an interim arrangement now? Do you think there's any merit to the idea of some sort of a joint venture where the United States might be willing to share the research data on this system with the Soviets to reduce any chance of escalating tensions in this area?

The President. I have to tell you, I haven't given that any thought. That's something to think about and look at. And incidentally, Gary, as for our defense budget being too high, I think your paper editorialized that it isn't.

Q. Well, that may be, sir, but the Congress has to vote on it. And I'm still curious on what you think the congressional reaction will be to a program like this that some have said, including the Speaker and others, that it's "pie in the sky." Why should we vote for funding for a program like this? They're going to be called on to do it, and you can propose it, but they may dispose of it as fast as you do that.

The President. Well, I would assume that it would take the same place in the budget. It would be part of the—in every defense budget there is a sum, as I've said before, there's already in this one about a billion dollars in various research, and it's just a case, then, of the direction of the research and where you direct it to go.

Q. Would you like to see it doubled or tripled or, I mean, do you think—

The President. I don't see any need for that, no.

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Q. Mr. President, if I could jump back to our original subject of our relations to the Soviets for the minute—something that you said a couple of times, that we have three different sets of negotiations going with them. I've been told that in one of these sets of negotiations the United States has proposed modifications of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [3] and the Peaceful Nuclear Exchange [*sic*] Treaty [4] to make verification, in particular, and other procedures of carrying those treaties out more effective, and that their response was very disappointing to us. Can you confirm that, and what do you—

The President. Yes, and this was not one of the three I was thinking of. I was thinking of START, the INF, and then our negotiation on conventional weapons. But yes, we had proposed some improvements to the testing treaty and so forth, and they rejected our proposals.

Q. What's your reaction to that?

The President. Well, I think that the treaty we're talking about is the Test Ban Treaty.

Q. Yes.

The President. It isn't all that important, because the treaty as it is now—and this is what we want to strengthen—is so restricted as to verification that we have reason to believe that there have been numerous violations. And yet, because of the lack of verification capacity, we could not make such a charge and sustain it. We just were wanting to improve it so that maybe both sides could be sure.

Q. Are you considering letting that treaty lapse since it's not—

The President. No.

Q. Since that treaty has not done what it's supposed to be doing because of verification problems, are you considering letting the treaty lapse?

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[3] The President was referring to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

[4] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

The President. No. As a matter of fact, I think that we've extended it.

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Statement by the U.S. Representative (Busby) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban [Extract], April 5, 1983 [1]

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My delegation has asked for the floor today to briefly outline our position regarding the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. In particular, we would like to give our views as to how that Working Group might proceed in order to fulfil the mandate upon which we all agreed last year. [2] I do not intend to make a long rhetorical statement as to the adequacy or sufficiency of the mandate. That question was debated at length last year and it is for each delegation to decide for itself whether it is willing to begin work under the existing mandate.

Rather, I would like to explain fully the position of my delegation regarding the mandate and what it requires; offer our views as to the relationship of the verification and compliance issues to other aspects of any future treaty banning nuclear explosions; discuss briefly the verification and compliance issues themselves; and finally make some suggestions as to how the Working Group might proceed.

First, let me speak about the mandate. It calls on the Working Group to "discuss and define . . . issues relating to verification and compliance". This is clear and unambiguous language. It does not call for the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Rather, it requires the Working Group to bring issues relating to verification and compliance into sharper focus.

What do we mean by "issues relating to verification and compliance"? Last year concerns were expressed by some delegations that our proposal was too restrictive to allow substantive work to be done. But from the outset my delegation has viewed this language rather broadly. Clearly, any information relevant to the verification and compliance problem is within the mandate and is pertinent to our work. Although we would not like to see the Working Group diverted from its main task, in so far as any delegation holds a national position on a particular issue which affects its own view of verification and compliance, then it should bring these views forward and discuss that relationship. We will have no objection. I hope one thing is clear in the minds of all delegations. When the United States proposed last spring a mandate on verification and compliance, it was out of a genuine desire to have the Committee on Disarmament undertake discussions on these issues. And while it is true, as we have often stated, that we are not prepared to negotiate a CTBT now, we did not then, nor do we now, have any ulterior motives of avoiding reference to or discussion of other aspects of a test ban. So in all respects the mandate is broad enough for a full examination of the problem.

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[1] CD/PV.208, pp. 7–9.

[2] CD/291, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 636–645.

Perhaps I could share with you our *own* view of the relationship of verification and compliance to other aspects of any future treaty. We clearly see a relationship between verification and compliance questions and the scope of, the objectives of and participation in any comprehensive test ban. But does that mean that we must first decide on the scope of a future treaty before we can engage in meaningful work regarding verification and compliance? We do not believe that to be the case. The very term comprehensive test ban is self-defining when considered in a multilateral context. A CTBT is an agreement not to carry out any nuclear explosions, and therefore the problem is to verify the absence of nuclear explosions on a world-wide basis. By taking this broadest possible view of scope, the Working Group can begin discussing the problems surrounding the creation of a verification system in which any and all States parties can participate and in which all States parties will share both benefits and obligations. It has always been a United States objective that any future CTBT should be designed so as to attract universal adherence, and we need a verification and compliance system which will be effective on a world-wide basis.

Viewed in this context, it is clear what direction our discussions in the Working Group should take. The Group should undertake a serious examination of issues relating to the multilateral verification of compliance with a total ban on nuclear explosions on a world-wide basis. We envision a system that all States parties will be able to participate in, both in terms of the right to share in the system as well as the obligation to make it work. By its very nature, such a system will accomplish two purposes: first, it will verify the cessation of testing by all who have tested nuclear explosives, and, secondly, it will verify the absence of commencement of testing by those who have not done so. That is what we have in mind.

Let me now be a bit more specific as to what the Working Group might do during this session of the Committee on Disarmament. There are two broad categories of issues. First, the degree of verifiability and how it might be raised to a level that each State party might consider to be acceptable; and, secondly, mechanisms for ensuring compliance. In the area of seismic means of verification, we would suggest a focus on four general topics:

International monitoring networks and how to fill gaps in existing systems;

The problem of identifying—as opposed to detecting—the origin of seismic signals;

Further needs regarding the detection of nuclear explosive signals in areas of high seismic activity; and,

Seismic data exchange and analysis mechanisms.

In the second category of issues, compliance, the purpose of any compliance mechanism is to ensure confidence in a legal regime by establishing a workable means to resolve disputes and eliminate misunderstandings.

Some elements of compliance which we believe should be examined are:

Obligations to ensure compliance with data-exchange provisions;

– The role of fact-finding bodies or commissions;

The handling of allegations of violations; and,

The possible role of experts groups as advisers.

An additional issue which the Committee should address relates to the role of on-site inspection. This is an issue which cuts across both verification and compliance. Obviously, particular attention will have to be paid to the role of on-site inspection in any future CTBT.

My delegation has never argued that the mandate, to which we all agreed last spring, was sufficient to allow negotiation of a CTBT. In fact, we have repeatedly stated that this was not our purpose in proposing the creation of this Working Group. We have even gone further and stated that any future decision of the United States Government to negotiate a CTBT would have to take account of a broad range of factors relating to our national security and that no delegation should consider our willingness to participate in a Working Group here as indicating an intent to begin immediately the negotiation of a CTBT. It remains a long-term goal.

Given the nature of our debates last spring and the negotiations which led to the creation, by consensus, of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test-Ban, surely no one is under any illusion regarding our position. For this reason, we find the position of some delegations which argue that the mandate has been fulfilled as simply a politically expedient way of attempting to return this Committee to the stalemated situation of 1981 and 1982. This may suit their political purposes. But, if those delegations did not intend to do serious work under the mandate, why did they agree to it? We urge those delegations to sit down with us and begin what my delegation believes will be useful, productive work.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban [Extract], April 5, 1983 [1]

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In view of the Committee's decision on 29 March that we should, at this meeting, consider the question of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc*

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[1] CD/PV.209, pp. 15–18.

Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban,[2] I should like today to express the views of the Soviet delegation on this matter.

The question of a nuclear test ban has the highest priority among all the items on the Committee's agenda. This question has been under discussion for nearly 30 years in various international forums—in the United Nations, at the tripartite negotiations, at meetings of experts and in the Committee on Disarmament. Consequently, all aspects of it have been very carefully studied. Furthermore, they have been studied, not academically but in a strictly practical manner, with a view to dealing with them within the framework of an appropriate treaty. The tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom came very close to the completion of work on such a treaty; however, as you know, these negotiations were broken off in 1980 by the United States, which has refused to resume them. The prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be a practical measure towards the limitation of the nuclear arms race, which has assumed unprecedented proportions at the present time and brought the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. This is why the Soviet Union, like the overwhelming majority of the other members of the Committee on Disarmament, attaches particular importance to the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet Union has always advocated and continues to advocate the fullest possible use of the opportunities offered by the Committee on Disarmament for the successful conduct of multilateral negotiations with a view to the halting of nuclear tests in all environments and by all those who are carrying them out. It was for this reason that the delegation of the Soviet Union last year supported the proposal for the establishment in the Committee of an *ad hoc* working group on this matter, and gave its agreement to a compromise formula for the mandate of such a group. In so agreeing, we acted on the belief that the discussion of questions of verification ought not to be used in order to put off the elaboration of an agreement as a whole, as has unfortunately happened in the past, and that such discussion can be useful only if it is not artificially isolated from the specific content of the arms limitation measure in question but is considered in very close connection with that measure.

Last year, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group held an exchange of views on basic aspects of verification. The delegations of many States interested in the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests made a useful contribution to the Group's work. At the same time, it has regrettably to be said that the United States delegation and the delegations of some of its close allies tried to drag the Working Group into organizational and procedural debates, and to drown the solution of the question of verification in a sea of abstract arguments about the importance of the technical aspects of control. Last year, when we agreed to the compromise formula for the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, it was on the understanding that that mandate was of a provisional character and would be revised the following year. This understanding was shared by many other delegations, as is clear from the fact that the following provision was specifically included in the relevant decision of the Committee:

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[2] CD/PV.207, p. 26.

> The *ad hoc* working group . . . will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard. [3]

On the basis of this provision, efforts have been made in the Committee from the very beginning of this session to work out a new mandate. However, they have been blocked, primarily by the United States delegation. In order not to hold up the work of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies, we agreed that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should resume its work on the basis of the old mandate. At the same time, in the decision it adopted on 29 March, the Committee particularly emphasized that the mandate of that Group might thereafter be revised.

We believe that this should be done immediately, as a matter of urgency, as indeed is stated in the decision of the Committee to which I have referred. We consider that the wording for the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban which was put forward today on behalf of the delegations of the socialist countries, including that of the Soviet Union, by Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia, [4] conforms most closely to the recommendation of the General Assembly. [5] We appeal to other delegations to support that proposal.

The Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should begin its work in the next few days. It is the Soviet delegation's intention to take an active part in that work, with the aim of the speediest possible drafting, and I repeat, drafting, of an appropriate treaty, including, of course, provisions on verification. All the necessary prerequisites exist for the Working Group to proceed to practical negotiations on a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

We put before the Committee for its consideration not long ago a document containing the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" [6] which in our view offers a practical basis for multilateral negotiations on this matter, a basis, moreover, which takes into account the views of a large number of States and the elements agreed on in the course of the tripartite negotiations. Many delegations have already, at the present session, spoken in favour of practical negotiations on the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the broadening of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. We note with satisfaction that delegations interested in the speedy conclusion of a test-ban treaty have made and will evidently continue to make constructive proposals in this connection.

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[3] CD/291, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* p. 636.

[4] CD/PV.209, p. 13.

[5] G.A. res. 37/72.

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 717–721.

We have also taken note of the statement by the Swedish delegation of its intention to submit the text of a draft treaty on this question in the near future and we shall await this document with interest.[7]

Thus, there are more than enough concrete proposals in the Committee, both of a general and of a specific character, for the conduct of business-like negotiations with a view to the speedy completion of the drafting of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the submission of the draft text of such a treaty to the United Nations General Assembly at its next session, as indeed is called for by General Assembly resolution 37/72. We are eagerly awaiting the start of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group under the experienced guidance of Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, so that all questions connected with the drafting of the treaty, including, of course, questions of verification, can be considered in their entirety in the Working Group.

Before I conclude my statement, I should like to make one or two comments on the remarks of the United States delegation.[8] We shall, of course, have an opportunity to give our views in substance on the topics he proposed for consideration by the Working Group. For the moment I should like to pick out two thoughts, two themes from the United States statement. The first concerns the nature of the activity of the Committee and its working groups.

The United States representative in his admittedly short statement nevertheless frequently stressed the word "discussions". The holding of discussions in the Committee can indeed sometimes be useful, but as we have had occasion to point out once again only recently at a plenary meeting, this international body has a specific characteristic distinguishing it from all other international bodies in which discussions are held. This Committee is not a debating club. It is a negotiating body. This applies particularly to the working groups, which were set up not merely to conduct negotiations but to conduct negotiations leading to the drafting and conclusion of appropriate international agreements. Does this mean that we are opposed to discussions? No, of course not. Sometimes, I repeat, discussions are necessary. This applies to problems that have not been discussed before, to problems that are new and that have not been studied. But what is there to discuss, gentlemen, on the subject of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests? For 30 years various bodies, consisting of 157 States, of three States and even of two States, have discussed and studied the matter and, more than that, have even put on paper the greater part of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. And the United States delegation itself, at the tripartite negotiations, had a hand in this formulation of a treaty. But suddenly we are told that all this must be scrapped—none of it happened—forget about it, gentlemen, this problem has appeared only today and it is a long-term one. We could discuss it for another 30 years or even another 300 years. This is why we believe that the substance of our differences lies precisely in this word. Although we are not opposed to discussions in general, we object to discussions on this issue. There have been enough of them; it is now time to go on to the formulation, the drafting of a text.

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[7] CD/PV.190, p. 20.

[8] *Supra.*

My second comment concerns the very broad and important problem of the national interests of States. The distinguished representative of the United States referred repeatedly to the national interests of his country. He said, for example, the following:

> We have even gone further and stated that any future decision of the United States Government to negotiate a CTBT would have to take account of a broad range of factors related to our national security and that no delegation should consider our willingness to participate in a Working Group as indicating an intent to begin immediately the negotiation of a CTBT.

Of course, every State has its national interests, and naturally, every delegation representing its State takes great care to safeguard the national security interests of that country. But surely the whole question, distinguished representative of the United States, resides in the fact that the national security interests of the United States in this matter are at variance with the interests of all other States. That is the problem. No one can tell the United States delegation, or any other delegation, how to protect the national security interests of its country. That is a matter of the sovereign right of each State and the duty of each delegation. But the problem arises that there is a divergence between the interests of the United States and the interests, I can say without any risk, of all other members of the international community. To substantiate this I would recall that even on the draft resolution submitted by the group of western countries—I repeat, the western countries—at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the question of a nuclear test ban, there were 111 votes in favour and one vote against, and that was the vote of the United States of America. And again, on the draft resolution on a nuclear test ban submitted by the group of non-aligned States, which was supported by 124 votes, the United States once more voted against. That is the essence of the problem, and we would therefore ask the United States delegation to take due account of this absolutely unique, unprecedented and, to say the least, extremely regrettable situation in which one State places its national security interests above the national security interests of the whole of the rest of the world. This is the crux of the matter with respect to the mandate of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

The Committee has an important decision to take. In the last analysis, what we are concerned with is not mere words but whether the Committee is simply going to continue holding abstract discussions—and for how many more years—or whether it is going at last to do what the world community expects of it and draft a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Letter to President Reagan From the Chairman of His Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft): Commission Report, April 6, 1983 [1]

On January 3 of this year you asked us to review the strategic modernization program of the United States. In particular, you asked us to examine the future of our ICBM forces and to recommend basing alternatives.

In the ensuing three months we have held 28 full meetings and numerous smaller conferences, and have talked to over 200 technical experts as we have reviewed U.S. strategic policy and forces. We have also consulted closely with members of Congress, as you requested.

There are no simple solutions to the questions that must be answered in basing our forces, achieving equitable arms control agreements, and improving strategic stability. Our lengthy review and extended deliberations, however, have led us unanimously to conclusions and recommendations which we hope will provide the basis for a broad national consensus on these difficult issues. The Commission's Senior Counselors set forth below also support the recommendations of this report. Our recommendations and the reasoning behind them are set forth in the attached report.

We appreciate the opportunity to be of service. We hope our efforts will prove helpful in the Nation's pursuit of peace and security.

The Commission

Nicholas F. Brady
William Clements
John M. Deutch
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Richard Helms
John H. Lyons
William J. Perry
Thomas C. Reed
Levering Smith
R. James Woolsey

Senior Counselors to the Commission

Harold Brown
Lloyd N. Cutler
Henry A. Kissinger
Melvin R. Laird
John McCone
Donald H. Rumsfeld
James R. Schlesinger

Marvin C. Atkins
Executive Secretary

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[1] ACDA files.

Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, April 6, 1983 [1]

I. DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL

The responsibility given to this Commission is to review the purpose, character, size, and composition of the strategic forces of the United States. The members of the Commission fully understand not only the purposes for which this nation maintains its deterrent, but also the devastating nature of nuclear warfare, should deterrence fail. The Commission believes that effective arms control is an essential element in diminishing the risk of nuclear war—while preserving our liberties and those of like-minded nations. At the same time the Commission is persuaded that as we consider the threat of mass destruction we must consider simultaneously the threat of aggressive totalitarianism. Both are central to the political dilemmas of our age. For the United States and its allies the essential dual task of statecraft is, and must be, to avoid the first and contain the second.

It is only by addressing these two issues together that we can begin to understand how to preserve both liberty and peace. Although the United States and the Soviet Union hold fundamentally incompatible views of history, of the nature of society, and of the individual's place in it, the existence of nuclear weapons imbues that rivalry with peril unprecedented in human history. The temptation is sometimes great to simplify—or oversimplify—the difficult problems that result, either by blinking at the devastating nature of modern full-scale war or by refusing to acknowledge the emptiness of life under modern totalitarianism. But it is naive, false, and dangerous to assume that either of these, today, can be ignored and the other dealt with in isolation. We cannot cope with the efforts of the Soviet Union to extend its power without giving thought to the way nuclear weapons have sharply raised the stakes and changed the nature of warfare. Nor can we struggle against nuclear war or the arms race in some abstract sense without keeping before us the Soviet Union's drive to expand its power, which is what makes those struggles so difficult.

We should face both problems directly.

Our words, policies, and actions should all make clear the American conviction that nuclear war, involving few or many nuclear weapons, would be a tragedy of unparalleled scope for humanity. It is wrong to pretend or suggest otherwise. Neither the American people, our allies, nor the Soviets should doubt our abhorrence of nuclear war in any form.

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[1] ACDA files.

By the same token, however, our task as a nation cannot be understood from a position of moral neutrality toward the differences between liberty and totalitarianism. These differences proceed from conflicting views regarding the rights of individuals and the nature of society. Only if Americans believe that it is worth a sustained effort over the years to preserve liberty in the face of challenge by a system that is the antithesis of liberal values can our task be seen as a just and worthy one in spite of its dangers.

We do have many strengths in such an effort. Over the long run, the strengths lent by liberty itself are our greatest ones—our abilities to adapt peacefully to political change, to improve social justice, to innovate with technology, to produce what our people need to live and prosper. What we have most to fear is that confusion and internal divisions—sometimes byproducts of the vigorous play of our free politics—will lead us to lose purpose, hope, and resolve.

We have good reason to maintain all three. Neither time nor history is on the side of large, centralized, autocratic systems that seek to achieve and maintain control over all aspects of the lives of many diverse peoples. We should, with calm persistence, limit the expansion of today's version of this sort of totalitarian state, the Soviet Union. We should persuade its leaders that they cannot successfully divert attention from internal problems by resorting to international blackmail, expansion, and militarism—rationalized by alleged threats posed by us or our allies. We should also be ready to encourage the Soviets to begin to settle differences between us, through equitable arms control agreements and other measures. But moral neutrality and indifference or acquiescence in the face of Soviet efforts to expand their military and political power do not hasten such settlements—they delay them, make them less likely, and ultimately increase the risk of war.

Deterrence is central to the calm persistence we must demonstrate in order to reduce these risks. American strategic forces exist to deter attack on the United States or its allies—and the coercion that would be possible if the public or decisionmakers believed that the Soviets might be able to launch a successful attack. Such a policy of deterrence, like the security policy of the West itself, is essentially defensive in nature. The strategic forces that are necessary in order to support such a policy by their very existence help to convince the Soviet Union's leaders: that the West has the military strength and political will to resist aggression; and that, if they should ever choose to attack, they should have no doubt that we can and would respond until we have so damaged the power of the Soviet state that they will unmistakably be far worse off than if they had never begun.

There can be no doubt that the very scope of the possible tragedy of modern nuclear war, and the increased destruction made possible even by modern non-nuclear technology, have changed the nature of war itself. This is not only because massive conventional war with modern weapons could be horrendously destructive—some fifty million people died in "conventional" World War II before the advent of nuclear weapons—but also because *conventional* war between the world's major power blocs is the most likely way for *nuclear* war to develop. The problem of deterring the threat of nuclear war, in short, cannot be isolated from the overall power balance between East and West. Simply put, it is war that must concern us, not nuclear war alone. Thus we must maintain a balance between our nuclear and conventional forces and we must demonstrate to the Soviets our cohesion and our will. And we must understand that weakness in any one of these areas puts a dangerous burden on the others as well as on overall deterrence.

Deterrence is not, and cannot be, bluff. In order for deterrence to be effective we must not merely have weapons, we must be perceived to be able, and prepared, if necessary, to use them effectively against the key elements of Soviet power. Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple quantification. Still less is it a mirror image of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of beliefs in the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression, even in a crisis—not to determine what would deter us.

Our military forces must be able to deter war even if the Soviets are unwilling to participate with us in equitable and reasonable arms control agreements. But various types of agreements can, when the Soviets prove willing, accomplish critical objectives. Arms control can: reduce the risk of war; help limit the spread of nuclear weapons; remove or reduce the risk of misunderstanding of particular events or accidents; seal off wasteful, dangerous, or unhelpful lines of technical development before either side gets too committed to them; help channel modernization into stabilizing rather than destabilizing paths; reduce misunderstanding about the purpose of weapons developments and thus reduce the need to over-insure against worst-case projections; and help make arsenals less destructive and costly. To achieve part or all of these positive and useful goals, we must keep in mind the importance of compliance and adequate verification—difficult problems in light of the nature of the Soviet state—and the consequent importance of patience in order to reach fair and reasonable agreements.

This is a vital and challenging agenda. In some of these areas of arms control our interests coincide closely with those of the Soviets. In others, their efforts to undermine the effectiveness of our deterrent and to use negotiations to split us from our allies will make negotiations difficult.

But whether the Soviets prove willing or not, stability should be the primary objective both of the modernization of our strategic forces and of our arms control proposals. Our arms control proposals and our strategic arms programs should thus be integrated and be mutually reinforcing. They should work together to permit us, and encourage the Soviets, to move in directions that reduce or eliminate the advantage of aggression and also reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. As we try to enhance stability in this sense, the Commission believes that other objectives should be subordinated to the overall goal of permitting the United States to move—over time—toward more stable strategic deployments, and giving the Soviets the strong incentive to do the same. Consequently it believes, for the reasons set forth below, that it is important to move toward reducing the value and importance of individual strategic targets.

II. Soviet Objectives and Programs

Effective deterrence and effective arms control have both been made significantly more difficult by Soviet conduct and Soviet weapons programs in recent years. The overall military balance, including the nuclear balance, provides the backdrop for Soviet decisions about the manner in which they will try to advance their interests. This is central to our understanding of how to deter war, how to frustrate Soviet efforts at blackmail, and how to deal with the Soviets' day-to-day conduct of international affairs. The Soviets have shown by word and deed that they regard military power, including nuclear weapons, as a useful tool in the projection of their national influence. In the Soviet strategic view, nuclear weapons are closely related to, and are integrated with, their other military and political instruments as a means of advancing their interests. The Soviets have concentrated enormous effort on the development and modernization of nuclear weapons, obviously seeking to achieve what they regard as important advantages in certain areas of nuclear weaponry.

Historically the Soviets have not been noted for taking large risks. But one need not take the view that their leaders are eager to launch a nuclear war in order to understand the political advantages that a massive nuclear weapons buildup can hold for a nation seeking to expand its power and influence, or to comprehend the dangers that such a motivation and such a buildup hold for the rest of the world.

Although there is legitimate debate about the exact scope of Soviet military spending in recent years, it is nonetheless clear that the Soviet leaders have embarked upon a determined, steady increase in nuclear (and conventional) weapons programs over the last two decades—a buildup well in excess of any military requirement for defense.

For example, as a result of this determined investment the Soviet ICBM force has grown to nearly 1,400 launchers carrying over 5,000 warheads, with a throw-weight about four times that of the U.S. ICBM force. The U.S. ICBM force has 1,047 launchers and about 2,150 warheads. More than half of the Soviet ICBMs—the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 missiles—have been deployed since the last U.S. ICBM was deployed. These new Soviet ICBMs are equipped with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Over 600 of these recently-deployed missiles, the SS-18s and SS-19s, have payloads as large or larger than the MX and have excellent accuracy. Many Soviet launchers can be reloaded. The Soviets are now pushing forward with tests of two even newer ICBMs.

While Soviet operational missile performance in wartime may be somewhat less accurate than performance on the test range, the Soviets nevertheless now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047 U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM force. The U.S. ICBM force now deployed cannot inflict similar damage, even using the entire force. Only the 550 MIRVed Minuteman III missiles in the U.S. ICBM force have relatively good accuracy, but the combination of accuracy and yield of their 3 warheads is inadequate to put at serious risk more than a small share of the many hardened targets in the Soviet Union. Most Soviet hardened targets—of which ICBM silos are only a portion—could withstand attacks by our other strategic missiles.

The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force currently consists of 62 modern submarines; these are armed with 950 missiles, with a total of almost 2,000 nuclear warheads. The U.S. has fewer such submarines (34) and missiles (568), but more warheads (about 5,000), in its submarine force. Our submarines, moreover, are quieter than those of the Soviets. Recent Soviet ballistic missile submarine building programs have been vigorous: four times that of the U.S. rate. While the U.S. has a substantial present advantage in the overall capability of its ballistic missile submarine force, this gap is narrowing. The U.S. also has a present advantage in anti-submarine warfare and submarine quietness, but the Soviets appear to be giving high priority to these areas.

Soviet heavy strategic bombers (not including the Backfire) now number about 150, around half equipped with air-to-surface missiles. This force is considerably less capable than the total active U.S. bomber force, which numbers about 270 B52 G and H bombers and about 60 FB-111 bombers. The U.S. bomber force has just begun to be equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Both U.S. and Soviet bombers have carried short-range missiles for many years. A new Soviet intercontinental bomber (the Blackjack) is now being flight-tested. It is similar in appearance to, but larger than, the U.S. B-1B now in production. The Blackjack will probably begin to enter service during the mid-to-late 1980s.

Soviet strategic defenses are extensive, consisting of a dense nationwide air defense network and a limited ballistic missile defense at Moscow. Both are undergoing modernization. Their vigorous research and development programs on ballistic missile defense provide a potential, however, for a rapid expansion of Soviet ABM defenses, should they choose to withdraw from or violate the ABM treaty. Such a potential is enhanced by the continued deployment of modern and capable Soviet air defense missile systems. At least one new Soviet defensive system is designed to have capability against short-range ballistic missiles; it could perhaps be upgraded for use against the reentry vehicles of some submarine-launched missiles and even ICBMs. Proliferation of such Soviet air defense missile systems thus creates a need for us to have enough throw-weight to carry sufficient numbers of warheads, and penetration aids such as decoys, in order to be assured of maintaining a deterrent. The U.S. has dismantled its ABM system and has minimal continental air defenses.

These Soviet programs do not, in and of themselves, indicate plans to initiate nuclear attacks. But they do confirm the value that Soviet leaders place on military programs across the board, both to provide an essential backdrop for their political purposes and—should circumstances dictate—to give them the capability to fight effectively. They also understand that the success of their efforts depends upon the outside world's perception. If comparative military trends were to point toward their becoming superior to the West in each of a number of military areas, they might consider themselves able to raise the risks in a crisis in a manner that could not be matched.

In a world in which the balance of strategic nuclear forces could be isolated and kept distinctly set apart from all other calculations about relations between nations and the credibility of conventional military power, a nuclear imbalance would have little importance unless it were so massive as to tempt an aggressor to launch nuclear war. But the world in which we must live with the Soviets is, sadly, one in which their own assessments of these trends, and hence their calculations of overall advantage, influence heavily the vigor with which they exercise their power.

III. Preventing Soviet Exploitation of Their Military Programs

In our effort to make a strategy of deterrence and arms control effective in preventing the Soviets from political or military use of their strategic forces, we must keep several points in mind.

The Soviets must continue to believe what has been NATO's doctrine for three decades: that if we or our allies should be attacked—by massive conventional means or otherwise—the United States has the will and the means to defend with the full range of American power. This by no means excludes the need to make improvements in our conventional forces in order to have increased confidence in our ability to defend effectively at the conventional level in many more situations, and thus to raise the nuclear threshold. Certainly mutual arms control agreements to reduce both sides' reliance on nuclear weapons should be pursued. But effective deterrence requires that early in any Soviet consideration of attack, or threat of attack, with conventional forces or chemical or biological weapons, Soviet leaders must understand that they risk an American nuclear response.

Similarly, effective deterrence requires that the Soviets be convinced that they could not credibly threaten us or our allies with a limited use of nuclear weapons against military targets, in one country or many. Such a course of action by them would be even more likely to result in full-scale nuclear war than would a massive conventional attack. But we cannot discount the possibility that the Soviets would implicitly or explicitly threaten such a step in some future crisis if they believed that we were unprepared or unwilling to respond. Indeed lack of preparation or resolve on our part would make such blackmail distinctly more probable.

In order to deter such Soviet threats we must be able to put at risk those types of Soviet targets—including hardened ones such as military command bunkers and facilities, missile silos, nuclear weapons and other storage, and the rest—which the Soviet leaders have given every indication by their actions they value most, and which constitute their tools of control and power. We cannot afford the delusion that Soviet leaders—human though they are and cautious though we hope they will be—are going to be deterred by exactly the same concerns that would dissuade us. Effective deterrence of the Soviet leaders requires them to be convinced in their own minds that there could be no case in which they could benefit by initiating war.

Effective deterrence of any Soviet temptation to threaten or launch a massive conventional or a limited nuclear war thus requires us to have a comparable ability to destroy Soviet military targets, hardened and otherwise. If there were ever a case to be made that the Soviets would unilaterally stop their strategic deployments at a level short of the ability seriously to threaten our forces, that argument vanished with the deployment of their SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. A one-sided strategic condition in which the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the whole range of strategic targets in the United States, but we could not effectively destroy a similar range of targets in the Soviet Union, would be extremely unstable over the long run. Such a situation could tempt the Soviets, in a crisis, to feel they could successfully threaten or even undertake conventional or limited nuclear aggression in the hope that the United States would lack a fully effective response. A one-sided condition of this sort would clearly not serve the cause of peace.

In order, then, to pursue successfully a policy of deterrence and verifiable, stabilizing arms control we must have a strong and militarily effective nuclear deterrent. Consequently our strategic forces must be modernized, as necessary, to enhance to an adequate degree their overall survivability and to enable them to engage effectively the targets that Soviet leaders most value.

Also, as described below, we should seek to use arms control agreements to reduce instabilities and to channel both sides' strategic modernization toward stabilizing developments, deployments, and reductions. Regardless of what we are able to accomplish with arms control agreements, however, two aspects of deterrence are crucial. The problems of maintaining an effective deterrent and of reaching stabilizing and verifiable arms control agreements cannot be addressed coherently without keeping in mind the nature of Soviet expansionism. Second, the deterrent effect of our strategic forces is not something separate and apart from the ability of those forces to be used against the tools by which the Soviet leaders maintain their power. Deterrence, on the contrary, requires military effectiveness.

IV. U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES AND TRENDS

A. STRATEGIC FORCES AS A WHOLE

The development of the components of our strategic forces—the multiplicity of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers—was in part the result of an historical evolution. This triad of forces, however, serves several important purposes.

First, the existence of several strategic forces requires the Soviets to solve a number of different problems in their efforts to plan how they might try to overcome them. Our objective, after all, is to make their planning of any such attack as difficult as we can. If it were possible for the Soviets to concentrate their research and development efforts on putting only one or two components of U.S. strategic forces at risk—e.g., by an intensive effort at anti-submarine warfare to attempt to threaten our ballistic missile submarines—both their incentive to do so and their potential gains would be sharply increased. Thus the existence of several components of our strategic forces permits each to function as a hedge against possible Soviet successes in endangering any of the others. For example, at earlier times uncertainties about the vulnerability of our bomber force were alleviated by our confidence in the survivability of our ICBMs. And although the survivability of our ICBMs is today a matter of concern (especially when that problem is viewed in isolation) it would be far more serious if we did not have a force of ballistic missile submarines at sea and a bomber force. By the same token, over the long run it would be unwise to rely so heavily on submarines as our only ballistic missile force that a Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare could not be offset by other strategic systems.

Second, the different components of our strategic forces would force the Soviets, if they were to contemplate an all-out attack, to make choices which would lead them to reduce significantly their effectiveness against one component in order to attack another. For example, if Soviet war planners should decide to attack our bomber and submarine bases and our ICBM silos with simultaneous detonations—by delaying missile launches from close-in submarines so that such missiles would *arrive* at our bomber bases at the same time the Soviet ICBM warheads (with their longer time of flight) would arrive at our ICBM silos—then a very high proportion of our alert bombers would have escaped before their bases were struck. This is because we would have been able to, and would have, ordered our bombers to take off from their bases within moments after the launch of the first Soviet ICBMs. If the Soviets, on the other hand, chose rather to *launch* their

ICBM and SLBM attacks at the same moment (hoping to destroy a higher proportion of our bombers with SLBMs having a short time of flight), there would be a period of over a quarter of an hour after nuclear detonations had occurred on U.S. bomber bases but before our ICBMs had been struck. In such a case the Soviets should have no confidence that we would refrain from launching our ICBMs during that interval after we had been hit. It is important to appreciate that this would not be a "launch-on-warning," or even a "launch under attack," but rather a launch *after* attack—after massive nuclear detonations had already occurred on U.S. soil.

Thus our bombers and ICBMs are more survivable together against Soviet attack than either would be alone. This illustrates that the different components of our strategic forces should be assessed collectively and not in isolation. It also suggests that whereas it is highly desirable that a component of the strategic forces be survivable when it is viewed separately, it makes a major contribution to deterrence even if its survivability depends in substantial measure on the existence of one of the other components of the force.

The third purpose served by having multiple components in our strategic forces is that each component has unique properties not present in the others. Nuclear submarines have the advantage of being able to stay submerged and hidden for months at a time, and thus the missiles they carry may reasonably be held in reserve rather than being used early in the event of attack. Bombers may be launched from their bases on warning without irretrievably committing them to an attack; also, their weapons, though they arrive in hours, not minutes, have excellent accuracy against a range of possible targets. ICBMs have advantages in command and control, in the ability to be retargeted readily, and in accuracy. This means that ICBMs are especially effective in deterring Soviet threats of massive conventional or limited nuclear attacks, because they could most credibly respond promptly and controllably against specific military targets and thereby promptly disrupt an attack on us or our allies.

B. Technological Trends for Strategic Forces

1. Accuracy

The accuracy of strategic weapons in the foreseeable future will continue to increase. There are lower limits, perhaps a few hundred feet, to the accuracy of strategic weapons that do not rely on some kind of terminal guidance. For weapons using terminal guidance, accuracy should be even better. Accuracy is most advanced today in the ICBM forces, but in the 1990s SLBMs should have sufficient accuracy seriously to threaten hardened targets. Nevertheless, ICBM accuracy should remain somewhat better than that for submarine-launched missiles.

These accuracy developments and the ability of an attacker to use more than one warhead to attack each fixed target on the other side increasingly put at risk targets of high value such as fixed launchers for MIRVed ICBMs. Although such fixed targets may retain some survivability for a number of years—because of problems of operational accuracies, planning uncertainties (as discussed at Section V.E. below), and the previously described need to co-ordinate ICBM and SLBM attacks—their survivability will nevertheless continue to decline over time. Thus reasonable survivability of fixed targets, such as ICBM silos, may not outlast this century, even when one considers them together with the rest of our strategic forces. In time, even non-nuclear weapons with excellent accuracy may be able to attack effectively some fixed targets previously thought to be vulnerable only to nuclear weapons.

2. *Superhardening*

New concepts and developments in hardening are quite promising. They could lead to the capability to harden such targets as ICBM silos far in excess of what was thought possible only a short time ago. Eventually the survival of even the hardest such targets would be doubtful in light of the accuracy improvements described above. Nonetheless increased hardness would raise the weapons requirements and the risk of attack for some years. Hardening will also be able to postpone vulnerability to, and therefore the probability of, attack by submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

3. *Mobility*

New techniques in guidance, miniaturization of electronic components, hardening against nuclear effects, and solid fuels will continue to make mobile strategic systems more feasible. Strategically useful hardening of land-based mobile launchers appears more feasible than in the past.

4. *Anti-submarine Warfare*

The problem of conducting open-ocean search for submarines is likely to continue to be sufficiently difficult that ballistic missile submarine forces will have a high degree of survivability for a long time. Nevertheless, the prospect of concentrating all of the submarine-launched missiles at sea in a few very large submarines raises some concern. Communication links with submarines, while likely to improve, will still offer problems not present for land-based systems.

5. *Ballistic Missile Defense*

Substantial progress has been made in the last decade in the development of both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric ABM defenses. However, applications of current technology offer no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century. An easier task is to provide ABM defense for fixed hardened targets, such as ICBM silos. However even this will be a difficult feat if an attacker can use a large number of warheads against each defended target. The effectiveness of such a defense could be enhanced by some types of bunching and close spacing of the defended targets, in order to reduce the number of ABM systems required. It could also be enhanced by having multiple shelters for each missile and preferentially defending only the shelter containing the missile while facing an attacker with the need to attack all shelters.

Improvements in Soviet air defense systems—to give them some capability against some submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads, and even against some warheads fired by ICBMs—are likely to continue as such air defenses are made capable of dealing with modern aircraft, cruise missiles, and shorter-range ballistic missiles. The 1972 ABM treaty, however, has provisions prohibiting the testing of air defense systems as ABMs.[2]

V. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

Although there is room for improvement and adjustments in the several strategic programs discussed below, the Commission noted that these programs are—in the main—proceeding reasonably well. Therefore this report concentrates on the current issues presented by the ICBM force (Section E below) and its relation to arms control (Section VI). The current and recommended programs, taken as a package, should give us high confidence in maintaining an effective deterrent in the years to come.

A. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

Our first defense priority should be to ensure that there is continuing, constitutionally legitimate, and full control of our strategic forces under conditions of stress or actual attack. No attacker should be able to have any reasonable confidence that he could destroy the link between the President and our strategic forces.

The Commission urges that this program continue to have the highest priority and urges the investigation of ways in which the planned improvements could be augmented by low-cost back-up systems.

B. SEA-BASED MISSILE PROGRAMS

1. Deployment

The Commission supports the continuation of the Trident submarine construction program. It also supports the continued development and the deployment of the Trident II (D-5) missile as rapidly as its objectives of range, accuracy, and reliability can be attained. The Trident submarine's significantly reduced noise level and the D–5 missile's greater full-payload range will add importantly to the already high degree of survivability of the ballistic missile submarine force. Given the increased importance of that force, both programs are essential. The D–5 missile's greater accuracy will also enable it to be used to put some portion of Soviet hard targets at risk, a task for which the current Trident I (C–4) missile is not sufficiently accurate. The Commission also stresses the importance of the command, control, and communication improvements of particular relevance to the submarine force—namely the ELF communication system, the ECX aircraft, and the MILSTAR satellite.

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[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

The Commission does not recommend the development and deployment of a system for the launch of ballistic missiles from surface ships. Such a system appears to have no net advantage over submarine basing and would have vulnerabilities that submarines do not possess.

For the reasons stated in section IV.A., above, the Commission recommends strongly against adopting a strategic force posture relying solely on submarines and bombers to the exclusion of ICBM modernization; it recognizes, however, the increasing importance of the ballistic missile submarine force.

2. *Research*

The Commission notes that—although it believes that the ballistic missile submarine force will have a high degree of survivability for a long time—a submarine force ultimately consisting solely of a relatively few large submarines at sea, each carrying on the order of 200 warheads, presents a small number of valuable targets to the Soviets. Vigorous pursuit of the longstanding program to avoid technological surprise by the Soviets in anti-submarine warfare is thus of vital importance.

Consistent with the long-term program recommended for the ICBM force, below, to reduce the value of individual targets, the Commission recommends that research begin now on smaller ballistic-missile carrying submarines, each carrying fewer missiles than the Trident, as a potential follow-on to the Trident submarine force. The objective of such research should be to design a submarine and missile system that would, as much as possible, reduce the value of each platform and also present radically different problems to a Soviet attacker than does the Trident submarine force. This work should proceed in such a way that a decision to construct and deploy such a submarine force could be rapidly implemented should Soviet progress in anti-submarine warfare so dictate.

C. BOMBER AND AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMS

Our bomber and air-launched cruise missile force is of vital importance to the maintenance of an effective deterrent. As long as its ability to survive and penetrate Soviet defenses can be maintained, it provides unique advantages of its own as a strategic system. It also provides mutual support to the survivability of the ICBM force, as discussed in Section IV.A., above. Furthermore the Commission bases its other recommendations on the assumption that a strong bomber and cruise missile program is continued. The Commission is unanimous in these views although it recognizes that there are legitimate differences about the best and least expensive way to provide for the necessary modernization of the bomber and cruise missile force. Since these modernization decisions, although not wholly independent of other strategic force decisions, may reasonably be considered within their own framework, the Commission—having concentrated its efforts on the ballistic missile forces and related issues—has no changes to recommend in these bomber and cruise missile programs.

D. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Vigorous research and development on ABM technologies—including, in particular, ways to sharpen the effectiveness of treaty-limited ABM systems with new types of nuclear systems and also ways to use non-nuclear systems—are imperative to avoid technological surprise from the Soviets. Such a vigorous program on our part also decreases any Soviet incentive—based on an attempt to achieve unilateral advantage—to abrogate the ABM treaty. At this time, however, the Commission believes that no ABM technologies appear to combine practicality, survivability, low cost, and technical effectiveness sufficiently to justify proceeding beyond the stage of technology development.

Of particular importance, however, is the ability to counter any improvement in Soviet ABM capability by being able to maintain the effectiveness of our offensive systems. The possibility of either a sudden breakthrough in ABM technology, a rapid Soviet breakout from the ABM treaty by a quick further deployment of their current ABM systems, or the deployment of air defense systems also having some capability against strategic ballistic missiles all point to the need for us to be able to penetrate some level of ABM defense. This dictates continued attention to having sufficient throw-weight for adequate numbers of warheads and of decoys and other penetration aids.

E. ICBM PROGRAMS

The problem that led to the establishment of this Commission is the same one that has been at the heart of much of the controversy concerning strategic forces and arms control for over a decade—the future of our ICBM force. As described above (Section IV.A.) our ICBM force has three main strategic purposes: (1) serving as a hedge against possible vulnerabilities in our submarine force; (2) introducing complexity and uncertainty into any plan of Soviet attack, because of the different types of attacks that would have to be launched against our ICBMs and our bombers; and (3) helping to deter Soviet threats of massive conventional or limited nuclear attacks by the ability to respond promptly and controllably against hardened military targets.

ICBM modernization is also particularly important now in order to encourage the Soviets to reach stabilizing arms control agreements and to redress perceived U.S. disadvantages in strategic capability.

The Commission believes that, because of changing technology, arms control negotiations, and our own domestic political process, this issue—the future of our ICBM force—has come to be miscast in recent years.

To many the problem has become: "How can a force consisting of relatively large, accurate land-based ICBMs be deployed quickly and be made survivable, even when it is viewed in isolation from the rest of our strategic forces, in the face of increasingly accurate threatened attacks by large numbers of warheads—and how can this be done under arms control agreements that limit or reduce launcher numbers?" It is this complex problem that many, inside and outside the government, have sought to solve for a variety of reasons. These reasons fall into five main groups.

First, in order to serve one of the necessary purposes of a strategic force—namely to hedge against possible failure by the others, such as would be caused by a Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare—many have felt that any new ICBM deployment should be almost totally survivable even when viewed in isolation from our bomber force and the rest of our strategic forces. The threat now posed by accurate Soviet ICBMs to the Minuteman force, viewed in isolation, has also led many to argue that this particular survivability problem has to be solved quickly.

Second, the overall perception of strategic imbalance caused by the Soviets' ability to destroy hardened land-based targets—with more than 600 newly-deployed SS–18 and SS–19 ICBMs—while the U.S. is clearly not able to do so with its existing ballistic missile force, has been reasonably regarded as destabilizing and as a weakness in the overall fabric of deterrence. In particular, since the ICBM force helps to deter massive conventional or limited nuclear attack against us or our allies, this has led many to believe that the serious imbalance between U.S. and Soviet capabilities should be rectified quickly in the overall interest of the alliance.

Third, arms control agreements—in part to be verifiable without resort to the sorts of co-operative measures such as on-site inspection typically opposed by the Soviets—have concentrated to a significant degree on limiting or reducing strategic missile launchers rather than warheads. This is in some measure because launchers are more easily counted by satellite reconnaissance than are other ICBM characteristics and because launcher numbers provide relatively unambiguous terms for a treaty. Launcher or missile limits have the indirect effect, however, of encouraging both sides to build large ICBMs with many warheads.

Fourth, if one sets aside survivability, basing, and other cost considerations and looks solely at the cost of the missiles themselves, it is cheaper to deploy a given number of warheads in a few relatively large missiles than to deploy the same number of warheads on a larger number of smaller missiles. Fewer expensive guidance systems need to be purchased, for example.

Fifth, for almost two decades our Minuteman ICBM force had virtually all of the positive characteristics desirable for any strategic system. It was survivable, even when an attack on it was viewed in isolation, because Soviet accuracies were not good enough to threaten silos. Command and control was comparatively easy. ICBMs were more accurate than submarine-based missiles and could reach their targets faster than bombers. And, when compared to either submarine-based missiles or bombers, silo-based ICBMs, once purchased, had strikingly low annual operating costs. This history has led many to continue to seek to replicate those two decades of Minuteman history, and in so doing to try not only to meet these objectives, but to do so with a single way of basing a single type of ICBM that would have all of these desirable characteristics.

These five sets of considerations, different ones of them of greater importance to different decision-makers at different times, have led us as a nation in recent years to try to re-create all of the desirable characteristics that Minuteman possessed during the sixties and much of the seventies. We have tried to do so by deploying a few relatively large missiles as quickly as possible, in a single basing mode, on land, under arms control agreements limiting or reducing launcher numbers, in the face of a threat of attack by increasingly accurate and numerous warheads—and to do so in a manner that seeks to preserve ICBM survivability for the long term, even when the ICBM force is viewed in isolation. But by trying to solve all ICBM tasks with a single weapon and a single basing mode in the face of the trends in technology, we have made the problem of modernizing the ICBM force so complex as to be virtually insoluble.

In arriving at its recommendations regarding ICBM programs, the Commission was mindful of the following criteria. For the near term, it would concentrate on possible deployments and basing modes that appeared to have straightforward and achievable technical and military value. For the long term, compatibility of ICBM programs with the need for flexibility and innovation in responding to possible Soviet actions would be of great importance. Economic cost would be considered carefully. The Commission would not insist on seeking a single solution to all the problems—near-term and long-term—with which the ICBM force must cope. Finally, and of great importance, our ICBM programs should support pursuit of a stable regime of arms control agreements.

The Commission has concluded that the preferred approach for modernizing our ICBM force seems to have three components: initiating engineering design of a single-warhead small ICBM, to reduce target value and permit flexibility in basing for better long-term survivability; seeking arms control agreements designed to enhance strategic stability; and deploying MX missiles in existing silos now to satisfy the immediate needs of our ICBM force and to aid that transition.

A more stable structure of ICBM deployments would exist if both sides moved toward more survivable methods of basing than is possible when there is primary dependence on large launchers and missiles. Thus from the point of view of enhancing such stability, the Commission believes that there is considerable merit in moving toward an ICBM force structure in which potential targets are of comparatively low value—missiles containing only one warhead. A single-warhead ICBM, suitably based, inherently denies an attacker the opportunity to destroy more than one warhead with one attacking warhead. The need to have basing flexibility, and particularly the need to keep open the option for different types of mobile basing, also suggests a missile of small size. If force survivability can be additionally increased by arms control agreements which lead both sides toward more survivable modes of basing than is possible with large launchers and missiles, the increase in stability would be further enhanced.

In the meantime, however, deployment of MX is essential in order to remove the Soviet advantage in ICBM capability and to help deter the threat of conventional or limited nuclear attacks on the alliance. Such deployment is also necessary to encourage the Soviets to move toward the more stable regime of deployments and arms control outlined above.

The Commission stresses that these two aspects of ICBM modernization and this approach toward arms control are integrally related. They point toward the same objective—permitting the U.S. and encouraging the Soviets to move toward more stable ICBM deployments over time in a way that is consistent with arms control agreements having the objective of reducing the risk of war. The Commission is unanimous that no one part of the proposed program can accomplish this alone.

1. *ICBM Long-term Survivability: Toward the Small, Single-Warhead ICBM*

The Commission believes that a single-warhead missile weighing about fifteen tons (rather than the nearly 100 tons of MX) may offer greater flexibility in the long-run effort to obtain an ICBM force that is highly survivable, even when viewed in isolation, and that can consequently serve as a hedge against potential threats to the submarine force.

The Commission thus recommends beginning engineering design of such an ICBM, leading to the initiation of full-scale development in 1987 and an initial operating capability in the early 1990s. The design of such a missile, hardened against nuclear effects, can be achieved with current technology. It should have sufficient accuracy and yield to put Soviet hardened military targets at risk. During that period an approach toward arms control, consistent with such deployments, should also seek to encourage the Soviets to move toward a more stable ICBM force structure at levels which would obviate the need to deploy very large numbers of such missiles. The development effort for such a missile need not and should not be burdened with the uncertainties accompanying a crash program; thus its timing can be such that competitive development is feasible.

Decisions about such a small missile and its basing will be influenced by several potential developments: the evolution of Soviet strategic programs, the path of arms control negotiations and agreements, general trends in technology, the cost of the program, operational considerations, and the results of our own research on specific basing modes. Although the small missile program should be pursued vigorously, the way these uncertainties are resolved will inevitably influence the size and nature of the program. We should keep in mind, however, that having several different modes of deployment may serve our objective of stability. The objective for the United States should be to have an overall program that will so confound, complicate, and frustrate the efforts of Soviet strategic war planners that, even in moments of stress, they could not believe that they could attack our ICBM forces effectively.

Different ICBM deployment modes by the U.S. would require different types of planned Soviet attacks. Deployment in hardened silos would require the Soviets to plan to use warheads that are large, accurate, or both. Moreover, for those silos or shelters holding a missile with only one warhead, each would present a far less attractive target than would be the case for a silo containing a large missile with many MIRVs. Mobile deployments of U.S. missiles would require the Soviets to try to barrage large areas using a number of warheads for each of our warheads at risk, to develop very sophisticated intelligence systems, or both. In this context, deployment of a small single-warhead ICBM in hardened mobile launchers is of particular interest because it could permit deployment in peacetime in limited areas such as military reservations. Land-mobile deployments without hard launchers could be threatened by a relatively small attack—in the absence of an appropriate arms control agreement—unless our own missiles were distributed widely across the country in peacetime. The key advantages of a small single-warhead missile are that it would reduce the value of each strategic target and that it is also compatible with either fixed or mobile deployments, or with combinations of the two.

As discussed below (Section VI), deployment of such small missiles would be compatible with arms control agreements reducing the number of warheads, in which case only a small number of such missiles would probably need to be deployed. If the Soviets proved unwilling to reach such agreements, however, the U.S. could deploy whatever number of small missiles were required—in whatever mix of basing modes—to maintain an adequate overall deterrent.

2. Immediate ICBM Modernization: Limited Deployment of the MX Missile

a. The MX in Minuteman Silos

There are important needs on several grounds for ICBM modernization that cannot be met by the small, single-warhead ICBM.

First, arms control negotiations—in particular the Soviets' willingness to enter agreements that will enhance stability—are heavily influenced by ongoing programs. The ABM Treaty of 1972, for example, came about only because the United States maintained an ongoing ABM program and indeed made a decision to make a limited deployment. It is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM program that could lead to deployment in this decade. Such a termination would effectively communicate to the Soviets that we were unable to neutralize their advantage in multiple-warhead ICBMs. Abandoning the MX at this time in search of a substitute would jeopardize, not enhance, the likelihood of reaching a stabilizing and equitable agreement. It would also undermine the incentives to the Soviets to change the nature of their own ICBM force and thus the environment most conducive to the deployment of a small missile.

Second, effective deterrence is in no small measure a question of the Soviets' perception of our national will and cohesion. Cancelling the MX, when it is ready for flight testing, when over $5 billion have already been spent on it, and when its importance has been stressed by the last four Presidents, does not communicate to the Soviets that we have the will essential to effective deterrence. Quite the opposite.

Third, the serious imbalance between the Soviets' massive ability to destroy hardened land-based military targets with their ballistic missile force and our lack of such a capability must be redressed promptly. Our ability to assure our allies that we have the capability and will to stand with them, with whatever forces are necessary, if the alliance is threatened by massive conventional, chemical or biological, or limited nuclear attack is in question as long as this imbalance exists. Even before the Soviet leaders, in a grave crisis, considered using the first tank regiment or the first SS-20 missile against NATO, they must be required to face what war would mean to them. In order to augment what we would hope would be an inherent sense of conservatism and caution on their part, we must have a credible capability for controlled, prompt, limited attack on hard targets ourselves. This capability casts a shadow over the calculus of Soviet risk-taking at any level of confrontation with the West. Consequently, in the interest of the alliance as a whole, we cannot safely permit a situation to continue wherein the Soviets have the capability promptly to destroy a range of hardened military targets and we do not.

Fourth, our current ICBM force is aging significantly. The Titan II force is being retired for this reason and extensive Minuteman rehabilitation programs are planned to keep those missiles operational.

The existence of a production program for an ICBM of approximately 100 tons [3] is important for two additional reasons. As Soviet

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[3] MX weighs 195,000 pounds. Thus it is a "light ICBM" under the terminology of SALT II, approximately the same size as the 330 newly-deployed Soviet SS-19 ICBMs.

ABM modernization and modern surface-to-air missile development and deployment proceed—even within the limitations of the ABM treaty—it is important to be able to match any possible Soviet breakout from that treaty with strategic forces that have the throw-weight to carry sufficient numbers of decoys and other penetration aids; these may be necessary in order to penetrate the Soviet defenses which such a breakout could provide before other compensating steps could be taken. Having in production a missile that could effectively counter such a Soviet step should help deter them from taking it. Moreover, in view of our coming sole reliance on space shuttle orbiters, it would be prudent to have in production a booster, such as MX, that is of sufficient size to place in orbit at least some of our most strategically important satellites.

These objectives can all be accomplished, at reasonable cost, by deploying MX missiles in current Minuteman silos.

In the judgment of the Commission, the vulnerability of such silos in the near term, viewed in isolation, is not a sufficiently dominant part of the overall problem of ICBM modernization to warrant other immediate steps being taken such as closely-spacing new silos or ABM defense of those silos. This is because of the mutual survivability shared by the ICBM force and the bomber force in view of the different types of attacks that would need to be launched at each, as explained above (Section IV.A.). In any circumstances other than that of a particular kind of massive surprise attack [4] on the U.S. by the Soviet Union, Soviet planners would have to account for the possibility that MX missiles in Minuteman silos would be available for use, and thus they would help deter such attacks. To deter such surprise attacks we can reasonably rely both on our other strategic forces and on the range of operational uncertainties that the Soviets would have to consider in planning such aggression—as long as we have underway a program for long-term ICBM survivability such as that for the small, single warhead ICBM to hedge against long-term vulnerability for the rest of our forces.

None of the short-term needs for ICBM force modernization set forth above would be met by deploying any missile other than the MX.

The Commission examined the concept of a common missile to serve the function of both the Trident II (D–5) missile, now under development for the Trident submarine, and of MX. At this point such a common missile would essentially be a modified Trident II. But deployment of that missile as an ICBM would not only lag several years behind the MX, its payload at the full ICBM range would be

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The MX is well under half the dimensions of the much larger 308 newly-deployed SS-18s; the latter are designated as "modern heavy ICBMs" under SALT II. [Footnote in original.]

[4] An attack in which thousands of warheads were targeted at our ICBM fields but there were no early detonations on our bomber bases from attacks by Soviet submarines. [Footnote in original.]

reduced. Since a larger number of Trident II missiles would need to be deployed in order to have the same number of warheads as the MX force, there would be no cost savings.

The Commission also assessed the possibility of improving the guidance on the Minuteman ICBM to the level of accuracy being developed for the MX. Such a step, however, would take some two to three years longer than production of the MX and would not redress the perceived imbalance between U.S. and Soviet capabilities. The wisdom of placing new guidance systems on the front ends of aging 1960s-era missiles is highly questionable. Moreover, shifting to such a program at this point would not provide the increased throw-weight needed to hedge either against Soviet ABM improvements or against the need to launch satellites in an emergency. Most importantly, a Minuteman modification program would not provide the incentive to the Soviets to negotiate that would be provided by production of the MX.

A program of deploying on the order of 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos would, on the other hand, accomplish the objectives set forth in this section and it would do so without threatening stability. The throw-weight and megatonnage carried by the 100 MX missiles is about the same as that of the 54 large Titan missiles now being retired plus that of the 100 Minuteman III missiles that the MXs would replace. Such a deployment would thus represent a replacement and modernization of part of our ICBM force. It would provide a means of controlled limited attack on hardened targets but not a sufficient number of warheads to be able to attack all hardened Soviet ICBMs, much less all of the many command posts and other hardened military targets in the Soviet Union. Thus it would not match the overall capability of the recent Soviet deployment of over 600 modern ICBMs of MX size or larger. But a large deployment of several hundred MX missiles should be unnecessary for the limited but very important purposes set forth above. Should the Soviets refuse to engage in stabilizing arms control and engage instead in major new deployments, reconsideration of this and other conclusions would be necessary.

b. Other Possible MX Basing Modes

The Commission assessed several basing modes for the MX missile as a way of solving the problem of long-term ICBM survivability.

Deploying the MX missile in Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS) meets the need of long-term survivability reasonably well. It would have a similar advantage to the deployment of small, single-warhead missiles in silos or shelters—namely it would force an attacker to plan to deal with a multiplicity of targets. It would not, however, have the advantages of the missile's being able to move, in the event of an attack, outside its basing complex—a capability that is potentially available in some types of small missile deployments. The basing complex required for MPS necessarily affects a land area sufficiently large that local political opposition to it has been significant. There is also a possibility that, over the long run, even if the SALT II Agreement [5] were ratified, a Soviet abrogation or refusal to renew the limits on ICBM launchers or on the number of warheads per missile contained therein could create difficulties for MPS basing. It could lead to the need either to add shelters (and not clearly at a lower cost than the Soviets' cost of adding warheads) or the need to defend the MPS basing complex with an ABM deployment in excess of that permitted under the ABM treaty.

Another alternative MX deployment that has some attractiveness for long-run survivability is closely-spaced basing (CSB). Such a deployment—e.g. 100 missiles in 100 new closely-spaced silos—would sharply reduce the land area required by the MPS system and could cause significant difficulties for some types of planned Soviet attacks by forcing the attacker to take account of the circumstances under which one of his attacking warheads would destroy others ("fratricide"). This basing scheme would require newly-developed techniques for hardening silos in order to avoid the possibility that one attacking warhead could destroy more than one silo. It would also, by its close spacing, make several potential types of ABM defense of the ICBM deployment more feasible. Some of these ABM defenses, countering some potential types of Soviet attacks, could be deployed within the numerical limits of the 1972 ABM treaty, but other more generally effective ones could not. The effectiveness of a CSB deployment in preserving the survivability of the ICBM force over the long run would depend significantly upon advances in hardening silos; the effectiveness of this is yet to be demonstrated and the cost is as yet uncertain. It also would depend upon fratricide effects that are not fully understood.

These uncertainties would not be eliminated by adding multiple hardened shelters for each missile to a CSB deployment to permit deceptive basing—a combination of MPS and CSB. Beginning a hardened shelter deployment immediately would be a concurrent program, involving a commitment to construction before new hardening techniques are fully understood or developed. In addition, although a greater number of shelters could improve survivability, constructing a number of very hard shelters would be expensive. Each shelter would be considerably more costly than the shelters in the original MPS system. Since more shelters would be needed than in the original CSB proposal, the total program would also be more costly than CSB basing.

Other basing modes for a large missile involve longer delays than those for MPS or CSB deployment (or a hybrid of the two). Thus, the improvement in survivability that might be offered by, for example, basing MX in continuous patrol aircraft or in deep underground deployments—given the time it would now require to design and develop these basing modes—would not permit deployment in this decade.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

Moreover, the large size of the MX missile could complicate these and other longer-term deployments.

c. Research and Development Work on ICBM Basing

The Commission recognizes that a series of phased decisions involving both the Executive branch and the Congress will be necessary in order to determine the future shape of our ICBM force. Not all decisions can or should be made in 1983. The Commission believes, however, that it is important to pursue the following research and development programs now in order to allow the U.S. government to make intelligent future decisions about ICBM basing.

The Commission believes that the work done to date (much of it in connection with designing CSB) is impressive on the technology for dramatic improvements in hardening ICBM silos or shelters. It thus recommends that vigorous research should proceed on new techniques for hardening silos and shelters generally. A specific program to resolve the uncertainties regarding hardness should be undertaken under the leadership of the Defense Nuclear Agency, and with the cooperation of the Air Force and of those Department of Energy laboratories with expertise in the relevant technology. In the event that such hardening proves sufficiently effective and affordable it may later prove useful for some or all of the silos containing MX to be hardened appropriately. In any case, such hardening techniques could prove useful for small missile deployments in the 1990s. Research on the circumstances in which there could be mutual destruction of one attacking warhead by another (fratricide) should be continued.

Vigorous investigation should proceed on different types of land-based vehicles and launchers, including hardened vehicles, for mobile deployment of small ICBMs. Depending on the hardening level achievable for such mobile launchers, it may be possible, for example, to obtain adequate survivability by deploying small ICBMs on military facilities in vehicles alone or in vehicles in simple shelters, with the added advantages of wider mobility if there is warning of an attack. This would avoid the need to disperse the missiles beyond such areas in normal peacetime conditions. For the longer run, other types of mobile basing should also be explored.

The above ICBM programs should contribute to stability and point toward—and be compatible with—a responsible set of arms control principles that can be sustained over the years during negotiations and new agreements.

F. SUMMARY OF MODERNIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Strategic Forces other than ICBMs

a. As first priority, vigorous programs should continue to improve the ability of the President to command, control, and communicate with the strategic forces under conditions of severe stress or actual attack.

b. The Trident submarine construction program and the Trident II (D-5) ballistic missile development program should continue with high priority; the work recommended on small submarines to avoid technological surprise in anti-submarine warfare should begin now.

c. No changes are recommended in the bomber and air-launched cruise missile programs.

d. Vigorous research and technology development on ABM should be pursued. The development of decoys and other penetration aids for our ballistic missiles is also recommended.

2. *ICBM Programs*

a. Engineering design should be initiated, now, of a single-warhead ICBM weighing about fifteen tons; this program should lead to the initiation of full-scale development in 1987 and an initial operating capability in the early 1990s. Deploying such a missile in more than one mode would serve stability. Hardened silos or shelters and hardened mobile launchers should be investigated now.

b. One hundred MX missiles should be deployed promptly in existing Minuteman silos as a replacement for those 100 Minutemen and the Titan II ICBMs now being decommissioned and as a modernization of the force.

c. A specific program to resolve the uncertainties regarding silo or shelter hardness should be undertaken, leading to later decisions about hardening MX in silos and deploying a small single-warhead ICBM in hardened silos or shelters. Vigorous investigation should proceed on different types of land-based vehicles and launchers, including particularly hardened vehicles.

d. Costs

The long-term costs of major programs are necessarily subject to uncertainty. Moreover, the standard of comparison is not clear in this case because, in order to compare costs, one should assess programs of equal effectiveness. Effectiveness of various types of ICBM deployments, especially with regard to long-term survivability, is precisely the issue which is most in controversy. For comparative purposes, the Commission has considered only evolutionary expansions of CSB basing of MX under which there would be some effort, in light of possible Soviet reactions, to preserve long-term ICBM force survivability.

The Commission compared the costs of the program that it recommends to the current program and to other possible strategic programs over the years of the Department of Defense's Five Year Defense Program (FY 1984–88).

The comparison, displayed in the following table, shows that the recommended program is about $1 billion per year less than the CSB program for each of the next four years, and that the total net savings during the five-year period is about $3 billion.

There will be significant costs incurred by the Commission's recommended program beyond these five years, but the exact amount would depend heavily on: the type of basing modes chosen for the small, single-warhead ICBM; the number of U.S. ICBMs deployed; whether the silos in which MX missiles are deployed are hardened, and to what degree; the evolution of the Soviet threat; and the terms of any arms control agreement at that time. For those programs which the Commission considered as reasonable alternatives, such as the further evolution of ABM defenses or multiple shelters for CSB of MX, there would similarly be significant additional costs beyond the five-year period; the magnitude of these would be affected by similar uncertainties.

Costs in Billions of Fiscal Year 1982 Dollars [6]

Alternatives:	**1984**	**1985**	**1986**	**1987**	**1988**	**Total 5-Year**
100 MX in CSB (current program)	5.6	6.0	4.9	4.1	2.3	22.9
100 MX in CSB/MPS (300 shelters)	5.6	6.0	4.9	4.1	2.3	[7] 22.9
100 MX in CSB/MPS with treaty-limited ABM defense, for initial operating capability in 1993	5.9	6.5	5.7	5.6	4.2	[7] 27.9
Commission recommendations:						
100 MX in Minuteman Silos	3.9	4.1	3.0	2.2	1.4	14.6
Development of small, single-warhead ICBM and basing R&D, for initial operating capability in 1993	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.0	2.8	[7] 5.3
Total	**4.4**	**4.6**	**3.5**	**3.2**	**4.2**	**19.9**

VI. ARMS CONTROL

It is a legitimate, ambitious, and realistic objective of arms control agreements to channel the modernization of strategic forces, over the long term, in more stable directions than would be the case without such agreements. Such stability supports deterrence by making aggression less likely and by reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. The strategic modernization program recommended herein and the arms control considerations contained in this report are consistent with an important aspect of such stability. In light of the developments in technology set forth in Section IV.B. above, they seek to enhance survivability by moving both sides, in the long term, toward strategic deployments in which individual targets are of lower value. The recommended strategic program thus proposes an evolution for the U.S. ICBM force in which a given number of ballistic missile warheads would, over time, be spread over a larger number of launchers than would otherwise be the case.

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[6] Constant FY 1982 dollars are used in this comparison, since these were the units used in December 1982 to present CSB costs to the Congress. Using either constant dollars of a later fiscal year or "then-year" dollars would show higher numbers for all alternatives. Figures were provided by the Department of Defense. FY 1983 costs are not included. [Footnote in original.]

[7] All involve significant costs beyond the five-year period. [Footnote in original.]

This evolution is important for long-term strategic stability, but it is not without its costs. Spreading a given number of ICBM warheads, whatever the number, over greater numbers of ICBM launchers would normally mean added operating costs, for example. But in the judgment of the Commission, permitting our forces to evolve in this direction and encouraging the Soviets to do likewise is worth such costs. Moreover, if such programs can lead to mutually agreed lower levels of warhead deployments in time, then ultimately the net cost may be less.

Such an evolution marks a sound principle to guide our own long-term strategic force modernization and arms control proposals, but it is neither necessary nor wise to move precipitously in that direction. In part this is because time is required to develop such new systems properly, in part it is because continued efforts on our current strategic programs are needed to encourage the Soviets to move in a stabilizing direction. Absent such encouragement there is no realistic hope that the Soviets will join such an evolution and forego the current advantages they have in the ability to attack hard targets and to barrage large areas with their preponderance in throw-weight.

Over the long run, stability would be fostered by a dual approach toward arms control and ICBM deployments which moves toward encouraging small, single-warhead ICBMs. This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments.

Arms control agreements of this sort—simple and flexible enough to permit stabilizing development and modernization programs, while imposing quantitative limits and reductions—can make an important contribution to the stability of the strategic balance. An agreement that permitted modernization of forces and also provided an incentive to reduce while modernizing, in ways that would enhance stability, would be highly desirable. It would have the considerable benefit of capping both sides' strategic forces at levels that would be considerably lower than they would otherwise reach over time. It would also recognize, realistically, that each side will naturally desire to configure its own strategic forces. Simple aggregate limits of this sort are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization whose ultimate consequences cannot be confidently anticipated.

Encouraging stability by giving incentives to move toward less vulnerable deployments is more important than reducing quickly the absolute number of warheads deployed. Reductions in warhead numbers, while desirable for long-term reasons of limiting the cost of strategic systems, should not be undertaken at the expense of influencing the characteristics of strategic deployments. For example, warhead reductions, while desirable, should not be proposed or undertaken at a rate that leads us to limit the number of launching platforms to such low levels that their survivability is made more questionable.

For a variety of historical, technical, and verification reasons, both the SALT II unratified treaty and the current START proposal contain proposals to limit or reduce the number of ICBM launchers or missiles. Unfortunately this has helped produce the tendency to identify arms control with launcher or missile limits, and to lead some to identify successful arms control with low or reduced launcher or missile limits. This has, in turn, led to an incentive to build launchers and missiles as large as possible and to put as many warheads as possible into each missile. Such an incentive has been augmented by the cost savings involved in putting a given number of warheads on a few large missiles rather than on a number of smaller ones. Although reasonable efforts have been made to constrain warheads through arms control (e.g. by the payload fractionation limits in the negotiated SALT II treaty), these types of limits have still not produced an incentive mutually to move away from large land-based missiles. They will not do so as long as launcher or missile limitations are seen, in and of themselves, as primary arms control objectives.

We will have for some time strategic forces in which the number of launchers on one side are outnumbered many times over by the number of warheads on the other. Under such circumstances, it is not stabilizing to use arms control to require mutual reductions in the number of launching platforms (e.g. submarines or ICBM launchers) or missiles. Such a requirement further increases the ratio of warheads to targets. It does not promote deterrence and reduce the risk of war for the Soviets to have many more times the number of accurate warheads capable of destroying hard targets than the U.S. has ICBM launchers.

In time we should try to promote an evolution toward forces in which—with an equal number of warheads—each side is encouraged to see to the survivability of its own forces in a way that does not threaten the other. But if the Soviet Union chooses to retain a large force of large missiles, each with many warheads, the U.S. must be free to match this by the sort of deployment it chooses. Any arms control agreement equating SS–18s and small single-warhead ICBMs because each is one missile or because each is on one launcher would be destabilizing in the extreme.

The approach toward arms control suggested by the Commission, moreover, is compatible with the basic objectives and direction of several other current arms control proposals.

For example, the negotiated SALT II treaty indirectly limited warheads by its limits on launchers and on the fractionation of payloads. It also barred deployments of new large ICBMs or the construction of additional fixed launchers. And it pointed toward further reductions in a follow-on SALT III agreement. These broad purposes of SALT II are wholly compatible with the arms control approach suggested here.

However, it should be noted that, as a method of restricting ICBM modernization, the negotiated SALT II Treaty, which would have expired in 1985, would have prohibited testing of more than one new ICBM. The two-part ICBM modernization program suggested by the Commission would not violate that negotiated agreement because testing of a small, single-warhead ICBM could not begin before this expiration date. Of more long-term importance, however, the approach toward arms control and force modernization suggested here is fundamentally compatible with the sort of stability that SALT II sought to achieve. SALT II specifically contemplated the negotiation of extension agreements with improved terms, and there is no reason to doubt that future extension agreements would have allowed the testing and deployment of a second new ICBM missile with the stabilizing potential of a small, single-warhead ICBM. Moreover, the Soviets have tested two new ICBMs since October 1982.

The current Administration's START proposal is centered on warhead limitations and reductions, with some attention to throw-weight limitations. These are consistent with the Commission's recommended program. It also contains a proposed limit on launchers that the Commission believes should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs.

Some current arms control proposals in Congress concentrate on warhead limitations in which reductions are forced in warhead numbers as a price of modernization; others seek explicitly to encourage movement toward small, single-warhead ICBMs on both sides. These general directions are also consistent with the approach suggested in this report.

The Commission urges the continuation of vigorous pursuit of arms control; it is beyond the scope of this report, however, for the Commission to recommend specific arms control proposals, the size of numerical limits, or the pace and scope of reductions. Of course any arms control proposal must be carefully designed with a view to compliance and verification—often particularly difficult questions in agreements with the Soviets. Some proposals may require innovation in verification techniques.

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Finally, the Commission is particularly mindful of the importance of achieving a greater degree of national consensus with respect to our strategic deployments and arms control. For the last decade, each successive Administration has made proposals for arms control of strategic offensive systems that have become embroiled in political controversy between the Executive branch and Congress and between political parties. None has produced a ratified treaty covering such systems or a politically sustainable strategic modernization program for the U.S. ICBM force. Such a performance, as a nation, has produced neither agreement among ourselves, restraint by the Soviets, nor lasting mutual limitations on strategic offensive weapons.

The Commission realizes that its recommendations will probably not fully satisfy any one of the many contending groups and individuals, inside and outside government, that have staked out claims to particular approaches to strategic modernization or arms control—much less all of them. In the interest of producing a national consensus on these two large issues, however, the Commission has developed an approach that is different in kind from what has gone before.

The Commission believes that all of the difficult issues discussed in this report—including the devastating nature of modern war and the totalitarian and expansive character of the Soviet system—must be considered fairly in trying to reach a national consensus about a broad approach to strategic force modernization and arms control that can set a general direction for a number of years. Clearly there will be, and should be, many different views about specific elements in that approach. But the Commission unanimously believes that such a new consensus—requiring a spirit of compromise by all of us—is essential if we are to move toward greater stability and toward reducing the risk of war. If we can begin to see ourselves, in dealing with these issues, not as political partisans or as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set of problems, but rather as citizens of a great nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in the long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, a common perspective may finally be found.

Speech by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [Extract], April 6, 1983 [1]

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We Soviet people are proud that the GDR is now a reliable forward outpost of socialism and peace—an outpost on the border between the opposing social systems.

That border has never been quiet. But the situation in Europe is causing particular concern at this time, now that the aggressiveness of reactionary imperialist circles has sharply increased. The United States and NATO are cranking up the arms race without restraint, striving to achieve military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. At the same time they are doing everything they can to mark the aggressive essence of their militarist course with false talk about the "Soviet military threat" and the supposed one-sided expansion of Soviet armaments in the past 20 years. All this is a monstrous invention. The Soviet Union has indeed strengthened its defense capability. But, as Comrade Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stressed, "The USSR has been forced to do this in order to eliminate the American military superiority for which Washington now so yearns. The military-strategic parity which has been achieved has deprived the United States of the opportunity to blackmail us with the nuclear threat. That parity is a reliable guarantee of peace, and we will do everything to preserve it."

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[1] Moscow *Krasnaya Zvezda* in Russian, Apr. 7, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Apr. 8, 1983, vol. III, pp. F4–F6.

A particular threat to the cause of peace is embodied in the U.S. and NATO plan to deploy hundreds more American medium-range nuclear missiles in West Europe. According to the Pentagon's calculations, this will supposedly increase U.S. survivability in the event of conflict. In fact the United States is placing its NATO allies under [the threat of] [2] a retaliatory nuclear strike and making them hostages to its nuclear strategy. For the majority of the West European countries where the American nuclear weapons are to be deployed, that retaliatory strike could be the last.

The governments of the Western states should keep that constantly in mind.

Nor will the United States escape with impunity in that event. If Washington is calculating that we will retaliate to the use of Pershings and cruise missiles only against targets in West Europe, it is profoundly deluded. Retribution will inevitably follow against the United States itself too.

Will the deployment of the new type of American nuclear weapons contribute to peace in Europe, as the Washington administration is trying to suggest? Our answer is unequivocal—no. The appearance of these weapons will lead not to a reduction but to a further expansion of nuclear potentials. An arms race is not our aim, and we have stated that repeatedly. But the Soviet Union is forced to take the necessary steps to keep out of the imperialists' hands advantages which would enable them to dictate terms beneficial to themselves.

The U.S. President's "new" proposal on the so-called "interim option" also serves the purposes of upsetting the existing approximate parity in nuclear arms. It is being presented as a great U.S. concession at the talks. In fact it contains nothing new. It is a modification of the previous American approach aimed at deploying the American medium-range nuclear missiles in West Europe at any price.

The main point of this proposal comes down to reducing the USSR's existing approximately 1,000 medium-range nuclear facilities by a certain number while increasing NATO's 1,000 facilities of a similar type by the same number.

What is more, as under the "zero option," the corresponding British and French arms as well as the U.S. forward-based nuclear facilities are still left out of account in the overall balance between NATO and USSR forces. In addition, the U.S. President's proposals provide that Soviet medium-range missiles must be reduced across our country's entire territory.

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[2] Brackets in the source text.

It is clear from this that the aim of the "interim option" is the same—to achieve unilateral disarmament by the Soviet Union.

The question of nuclear weapons in Europe must be resolved only on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security, with which the USSR readiness to have in Europe not a single missile or a single aircraft more than the NATO side has in full accordance.

The agreement proposed by the Soviet Union on giving up all types of nuclear weapons intended for destroying targets in Europe—both medium-range and tactical—would serve this end to an even greater degree. This would be the "absolute zero" for both sides which would accord with all the peoples' innermost aspirations.

The U.S. President recently announced the start of the development of a wide-scale, highly efficient ABM defense. [3] But these measures would in reality be not defensive but offensive, aimed at securing for the United States a first nuclear strike potential. They are intended to deprive the Soviet Union of the capability to deliver a retaliatory strike, to disarm the USSR in the face of the American nuclear threat.

We stress once again in all responsibility that the Soviet Union will never forego its security or the security of its allies.

Loyal to Lenin's policy of peace, the Soviet Union, the GDR and the other socialist community countries will do everything to turn aside the threat of war and to defend and consolidate peace.

The path to the resolution of this most burning problem of modern times is pointed out in the peace program for the eighties adopted at the 26th CPSU Congress. [4] It received the unanimous support and approval of all the fraternal parties and states.

The socialist community countries' clear and precise proposals for curbing the arms race and averting the threat of war are contained in the Warsaw Pact States' Prague Political Declaration. [5] Important proposals have been introduced by our countries at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe. They are simple and understandable to all, but the West has so far remained deaf to them.

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[3] *Ante*, Mar. 23.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 64–69.

[5] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

Statement by the Federal Republic of Germany on Depositing Its Instrument of Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, April 7, 1983 [1]

The Federal Republic of Germany today deposited in Washington and London its instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, [2] thus becoming a Contracting Party to this universal disarmament agreement. As early as 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany gave an undertaking in the Brussels Treaty not to manufacture these weapons, nor chemical and nuclear weapons. [3]

As the first disarmament agreement abolishing an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, the Bacteriological Weapons Convention is, in the opinion of the Federal Republic of Germany, of great importance both in legal terms and from the point of view of security.

The elimination of these weapons by the Bacteriological Weapons Convention represents an improvement on the international law in existence since the Geneva Protocol of 1925, [4] which merely prohibits the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons in war. Now that the mere possession of bacteriological weapons is forbidden, a new and particularly horrifying type of warfare has been definitely outlawed and the security of all Contracting States greatly enhanced.

The Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany would like to state on this occasion:

1. Despite the great importance attaching to the Convention, it still has a major shortcoming: It does not contain any provisions for verifying compliance with its essential obligations, as would be in keeping with its importance to security. The Federal Government considers the right enshrined in Article VI to lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations in the event of an alleged breach of the Convention to be an inadequate arrangement. This viewpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany is shared by numerous other Contracting Parties to the Convention. The German Bundestag also referred to this problem in the resolution it unanimously adopted on 3 December 1981.

The Federal Republic of Germany would welcome a readiness on the part of the Contracting Parties to draw up rules providing for the establishment of an independent international committee of experts able to carry out impartial investigations when doubts exist as to whether the Convention is being complied with.

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[1] CD/372.

[2] The convention is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.

[3] *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955, Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 979–984.

[4] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

The Federal Republic of Germany therefore expresses the hope that the Contracting Parties to the Convention will support the initiative adopted in General Assembly resolution 37/98 C by a large majority of the members of the United Nations on 13 December 1982 and hold a special conference on this subject as soon as possible.

2. The efforts undertaken with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Bacteriological Weapons Convention aimed at protecting mankind against the dangers of bacteriological or chemical warfare must be continued in a resolute manner with a view to prohibiting as soon as possible the possession and manufacture of chemical weapons, too, by means of a universal and dependably verifiable agreement and to eliminating existing stocks and production facilities. The Federal Republic of Germany therefore appeals to all Member States of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to expedite the negotiations on an agreement prohibiting chemical weapons and, in particular, to adopt a constructive attitude in the central question of verifying compliance with such an agreement. The Federal Republic of Germany, which accepted international inspections when it renounced the manufacture of chemical weapons in 1954, knows from experience that legally binding on-site inspections are necessary. Any State can reasonably be expected to consent to such inspections since they can be carried out without impairing the legitimate interest in maintaining business and production secrets. The Federal Republic of Germany has repeatedly submitted practicable proposals on this subject and is confident that agreement can be reached on the basis of those proposals.

Communique of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, April 7, 1983 [1]

A regular meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, took place in Prague on April 6–7, 1983.

The meeting was attended by Petur Mladenov, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Frigyes Puja, minister of foreign affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic, Oskar Fischer, minister of foreign affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Stefan Olszowski, minister of foreign affairs of the Polish People's Republic, Stefan Andrei, minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Andrey Gromyko, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Bohuslav Chnoupek, minister of foreign affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Apr. 7, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report,* April. 8, 1983, vol. III, pp. BB1–BB4.

Participants in the meeting exchanged opinion and information on the development of the situation in Europe, in the broader context of the overall world situation, during the period since the Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries.

They examined questions related to the implementation of the proposals and initiatives put forward by the Political Consultative Committee with a view to averting nuclear war, carrying on and augmenting the process of detente, resolving disarmament problems, strengthening security and developing cooperation in the European Continent and in the world at large.

1. It was pointed out during the exchange of views that the developments are confirming in full that the evaluations of the international situation given in the Prague Political Declaration [2] are well-founded and imparting still greater urgency to the proposals formulated in it. These proposals have been appreciated in the world as a realistic alternative to nuclear catastrophe and a call for extensive international cooperation for the sake of preserving life on earth.

The participants in the meeting stressed the importance of the conclusion, drawn by the Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, that the prevention of war depended first and foremost on the cooperation, cohesion and purposefulness of the forces of peace, which today are stronger than the forces of war. They noted that these activities were becoming ever more energetic. An important contribution in this field was made by the 7th Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi. [3]

It was stressed at the same time that the international situation remained complex and tense. There is a further escalation of imperialist policy, first and foremost the policy of American imperialism, the policy of strength and confrontation, of encroachment of the national independence and sovereignty of states, of the consolidation and re-carving of "spheres of influence", of the extension of old conflicts and incitement of new ones. The continued build-up of armaments is fraught with serious consequences and particular danger is posed by the new round of the nuclear arms race. The economic crisis, gripping many states, is growing worse. The gap between the economic development levels of countries is widening and obstacles to bridging it are becoming larger.

The states represented at the meeting drew attention to the adverse effects of the resurgence of revanchist tendencies in West Germany on the political climate, detente and cooperation in Europe. It was stressed that unconditional respect for the territorial and political realities of today's Europe is a fundamental factor of peace and security in the continent as a whole.

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[2] *Ante,* Jan. 5.

[3] *Ante,* Mar. 12.

The states represented at the meeting believe, in the light of the emerging situation, that it is the duty of all countries to contribute in every way towards stemming the present dangerous course of developments and directing them towards detente and mutually beneficial cooperation, finding solutions to urgent problems of limiting and reducing armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, and achieving a peaceful settlement of conflict situations. In this context the participants in the meeting stressed the primacy of the continuation and extension of state-to-state political dialogue at all levels on the more urgent European and other international problems. They examined, under instructions from the Political Consultative Committee, further steps aimed at advancing the proposals and initiatives contained in the Prague Political Declaration and practical measures related to the talks with the member countries of the North Atlantic alliance and other states on basic problems of strengthening peace and promoting disarmament and security in Europe and all over the world.

2. Special attention was attached at the meeting to measures to prevent the escalation of the nuclear arms race in the European Continent, which is fraught with dangerous consequences for the situation in Europe and which enhances the threat of war. This problem is becoming all the more urgent and acute since there is still no progress at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe while preparations are unfolding for the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe already at the end of this year.

The Warsaw Treaty member countries for their part reiterated the striving for the complete ridding of Europe from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical, and their readiness to contribute towards the achievement of this solution. They firmly declare themselves in favour of a radical reduction in medium-range nuclear systems in Europe on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security as a major step in this direction.

They make a reminder in this context of their proposals formulated in the Prague Political Declaration, particularly of the Soviet proposals of December 21, 1982, [4] and expect an answer in a constructive spirit so that positive agreements should be reached at the Geneva talks. The problem of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe should be resolved in a way precluding the deployment of new American medium-range missiles and ensuring the maintenance of military-strategic parity at increasingly lower levels.

3. The ministers examined questions of the further steps to implement the major joint initiative put forward in the Prague Political Declaration, the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 917–922.

states participating in the Warsaw Treaty and the member states of the North Atlantic alliance that would be open for signature to all the other countries.

They noted that this proposal, as the contacts and consultations their countries had had with other states had shown, had attracted great attention in many countries of the world, both at the level of governments and in the public and political circles.

The participants in the meeting took note of the intention of the member countries of the North Atlantic alliance, to whom the proposed treaty is addressed first and foremost, to study that proposal. They expressed the hope that these countries would take a constructive attitude to concluding such a treaty.

For their part the states represented at the meeting confirm their readiness to contribute in every way to the examination of their proposal and to develop exchanges of views on its different aspects with all the interested countries. This concerns, in particular, such questions as the substance and scope of possible commitments under the treaty, their correlation with the commitments under the U.N. Charter, the Helsinki Final Act,[5] and other bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, and also cooperation in ensuring compliance with the commitments under the treaty.

For this purpose the participants in the meeting believe it useful and desirable to continue bilateral contacts with the member states of the North Atlantic alliance and other countries, also bearing in mind the possibility of examining appropriate questions on a multilateral basis at the level and in the forms acceptable to all.

4. The participants also exchanged views on the ways and means of implementing the proposal, formulated in the Prague Political Declaration, to begin as early as possible direct talks between the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the NATO member countries on the non-increase of military spending and its eventual reduction in per cent or in absolute terms. The participants in the meeting spoke in favour of achieving such an agreement.

The conviction was confirmed that the solution of this question would effectively facilitate the ending of the arms race and transition to disarmament while the thus freed means could be used for needs of social and economic development, including of developing countries.

The participants in the meeting stressed that in conditions of the growing international tension it is especially important for their call to be received positively by the NATO member countries and for the talks on the non-increase and reduction of military spending to commence without any further delay.

5. In connection with the talks in Vienna the participants in the meeting confirmed the position of their states as regards the need of implementing effective measures to reduce armed forces and arma-

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[5] For the arms control portions, see *ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–308. The entire act may be found in the *Department of State Bulletin,* Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

ments in central Europe, and also their readiness, in accordance with the task set in the Prague Political Declaration, for the speediest attainment of agreement on this score.

They recalled the proposals of their countries directed at the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments in that area, including the February 17, 1983 proposal of socialist states—direct participants in the talks based on the new approach under which the absence of agreement on the present numerical strength of the troops of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in central Europe would not impede the attainment of agreement on such a reduction.

The hope was expressed at the meeting that these efforts will pave the road to a real lessening of military tension in the continent and that with the active cooperation of all participants in the talks it will be possible to achieve success at them in the nearest future.

6. The participants in the meeting noted that the initiative set forth in the Prague Political Declaration concerning the freeing of Europe from chemical weapons has aroused interest and response in many European countries. Their states hold as before that the banning and destruction of chemical weapons on a world scale, talks on which are being conducted at the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, would be a radical solution of the problem of preventing chemical war. At the same time it would be useful to take parallel steps leading to the same aim within the limits of the European Continent.

The states represented at the meeting are ready to enter business contacts with other interested states to jointly study practical questions connected with the task of freeing Europe from chemical weapons, in particular such as the volume and consecutiveness of the relevant measures, the content of commitments and verification of compliance with them.

7. The participants in the meeting hold that the creation in various parts of the European Continent, including in the north of Europe and in the Balkans, of nuclear-free zones would be an effective factor of freeing it from the nuclear threat. Going in this direction also is the proposal to create a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons in that part of Europe where the concentration of armed forces and armaments is particularly great. The participants in the meeting noted the growing interest of the European peoples in the proposals related to the creation of nuclear-freeze zones and declared in favour of conducting appropriate talks between the interested sides.

8. During the discussion of the state of affairs at the Madrid follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the ministers specially pointed out the need to concentrate all efforts at the present responsible phase of the Madrid meeting on finalising as soon as possible the coordination of a substantive and balanced final document. Concerning the concrete contents of such a document it was emphasized that the states represented at the committee's meeting will continue to proceed from their constructive position as it is set out in the Prague Political Declaration.

The participants in the committee's meeting expressed an opinion that possibilities now exist for successfully completing the work to coordinate a final document of the Madrid meeting, including the question of convening a conference on confidence-building measures and on security and disarmament in Europe. In this connection they exchanged considerations concerning the renewed draft final document tabled by the neutral and non-aligned states on March 15, 1983.

They confirmed the position of their countries in favour of holding in Bucharest the next follow-up meeting of the European conference. In case of successful completion of the work to coordinate a final document of the Madrid follow-up meeting, the states represented at the committee's meeting would be ready to positively consider a proposal by some participants in the meeting on adopting it at foreign ministers' level.

A firm conviction was expressed that in Europe all necessary prerequisites remain for the states and peoples of the continent to live under the conditions of peace, security and cooperation. This depends, first of all, on the efforts of the European states themselves.

The committee's meeting passed in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and common striving of the states represented at it for further enhancing their efforts in the struggle for peace and relaxation of tension in Europe and the whole world. For their part, they as usual are ready to consider in a constructive spirit other states proposals directed toward these objectives.

A regular meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states is to be held in Sofia in October 1983.

Report to the Congress by Secretary of Defense Weinberger: Direct Communications Links and Other Measures To Enhance Stability, April 12, 1983 [1]

I am pleased to submit, in accordance with Public Law 97–252, the Department of Defense evaluation of possible initiatives for improving the containment and control of nuclear weapons, particularly during crises.

I share with the Congress the conviction that we must make every effort to ensure against nuclear war ever occurring between the United States and the Soviet Union. I am equally persuaded that we can and should improve existing mechanisms to control crises which might lead to the use of nuclear weapons as a result of accident, miscalculation, or misinterpretation. Of course we should be aware that measures toward these ends, no matter how attractive at first glance, in certain cases, could entail unacceptable risks to our security and that of our allies. The Department of Defense has therefore carefully assessed the potential advantages and disadvantages of each possible new initiative intended to lower the danger of an accident or miscalculation which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

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[1] *Congressional Record*, Apr. 12, 1983, pp. S4362–S4366.

That evaluation has led me to propose to the President several important measures:

The addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the Hotline.

The creation of a Joint Military Communications Link between the U.S. and USSR.

The establishment by the U.S. and Soviet governments of high rate data links with their embassies in the capital of the other.

Agreement among the world's nations to consult in the event of a nuclear incident involving a terrorist group.

Each of those measures would increase our ability to resolve crisis situations and to prevent the escalation of military incidents. Taken together, they would mark significant progress toward eliminating the danger that accident or misinterpretation could lead to nuclear war.

We also have proposed for further study several possible new technical and procedural measures which might enhance our ability to verify treaty compliance and thereby further our goal of effective, significant arms control. These measures, which are outlined in the study, will be further analyzed by the Administration in the context of the development of verification measures for specific arms control treaties.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose

Section 1123(a) of Public Law 97-252, dated 8 September 1982 (Department of Defense Authorization Act 1983), directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a full and complete study and evaluation of possible initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during crises. It also specifies that the report should address:

Establishment of a multi-national military crisis control center for monitoring and containing the use or potential use of nuclear weapons by third parties or terrorist groups.

Development of a forum through which the United States and the Soviet Union could exchange information pertaining to nuclear weapons that could potentially be used by third parties or terrorist groups.

Development of other measures for building confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to further crisis stability and arms control, including:

An improved United States-Soviet Union communications hotline for crisis control;

Improved procedures for verification of any arms control agreements;

Measures to reduce the vulnerability of command, control, and communications (C^3) systems of both nations; and

Measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

This report responds to that tasking. In addition, it describes ongoing U.S. initiatives already undertaken by President Reagan to reduce the risk of accidental or unintended nuclear war.

B. Agreements in force designed to reduce the risk of war

There is a long history of U.S. and Soviet efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war between them. In fact, from the very beginning of the nuclear era, experts and government leaders expressed concern that nuclear war between the two nations could erupt unintentionally, by accident or miscalculation.

As a result, various arrangements for U.S.-Soviet cooperation and consultation have been proposed and negotiated, designed to reduce the risk of misinterpretation and accidental conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on several such measures.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link (Hotline Agreement), signed in 1963, [2] established a direct communications link, or Hotline, between Washington and Moscow.

The Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Accident Measures Agreement), signed in 1971, [3] requires each side: to maintain and improve organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; to notify the other side in advance of planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party; and to notify the other immediately in the event of an accidential, unauthorized, or unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war; and in the event of any unexplained nuclear incident to act in such a way as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other party.

The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the US–USSR Direct Communications Link, signed in 1971, [4] provided for the upgrading of the Hotline by the installation of two satellite communications circuits.

The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (Incidents at Sea Agreement), signed in 1972, [5] enjoins the two sides: to observe strictly the letter and the spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; to refrain from provocative acts at sea that could increase the risk of war; and to provide advance notice to mariners of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963,* pp. 236–238.

[3] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 634–635.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 635–639.

[5] 23 UST 1168; TIAS 7379; 852 UNTS 151. For the protocol to this agreement, signed in 1973, see 24 UST 1063; TIAS 7624.

The Agreement Between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, signed in 1973,[6] requires that the two sides refrain from acts that could exacerbate relations between them, lead to military confrontations and/or lead to nuclear war between them or between one of them and another country.

It also recognizes that each party must refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, its allies, or other countries and to consult with the other in the event of heightened risk of nuclear war.

C. Current initiatives

On 18 November 1981, President Reagan delivered the first in a series of major speeches outlining his program for preserving peace. He stated that one of the main elements of his program is to engage the Soviet Union " . . . in a dialogue about mutual restraint and arms limitations, hoping to reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments and to lower the barriers that divide East from West." He also took that occasion to present the general framework of his major arms control initiatives and to express his commitment to reducing the risk of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation.[7]

President Reagan returned to this theme in his Berlin speech of 11 June 1982,[8] and at the United Nations on 17 June 1982.[9] He announced that we would approach the Soviet Union with proposals for reciprocal measures in such areas as advance notification of major strategic exercises, advance notification of missile launches within as well as beyond national boundaries, and an expanded exchange of strategic forces data.

On 22 November 1982, President Reagan announced to the American people that he had proposed several Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in a letter to the Soviet leadership.[10] He also instructed our START and INF negotiators in Geneva to discuss those proposals with their Soviet counterparts. The President's proposals reflect his belief that we must take every step possible to ensure that nuclear war cannot break out as a result of an accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding.

The measures not only include, but go beyond, the suggestions he made in Berlin and at the U.N. Thus the President proposed advance notification not only of ICBM launches but also of all launches of U.S.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973,* pp. 283–285.
[7] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 570–578.
[8] *Ibid., 1982,* pp. 337–338.
[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 381–387.
[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 810–820.

and Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles and of intermediate-range, land-based ballistic missiles of the type being negotiated in the INF talks. Additionally, he proposed an expanded exchange of data on intermediate-range nuclear forces as well as strategic forces and extended his proposal for advance notice of major strategic exercises to cover all major military exercises which might cause concern. Further, to illustrate the value of this measure, the U.S. voluntarily notified the Soviet Union in advance of its plans to begin the major military exercise named "Global Shield".

D. The "third party" danger

Most of the U.S. efforts in this area have concentrated on the interaction of Soviet and U.S. forces and systems, and possible risks of nuclear war through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding from this interaction. However, we have also paid attention to the risks that might arise from the use of nuclear weapons by a third country or subnational group.

Six nations are known to have detonated nuclear explosive devices, and a number of additional countries currently have, or could achieve, the technological and industrial capacity to develop and produce nuclear weapons. A decision to "go nuclear" could occur quickly, once a nation with the necessary technology came to regard nuclear weapons as a desirable means to respond to perceived threats, to acquire international prestige, to salvage national honor, or to compensate for loss of confidence in outside security assurances or nuclear guarantees. Compounding the problem is the possibility that a terrorist group might acquire a nuclear weapon by fabricating a crude device or by stealing one from an existing stockpile.

E. Approach of this study

The United States and the USSR have a common interest in averting unintended or accidental nuclear war between them, and in preventing use of nuclear weapons by third nations or by terrorists that could trigger such a war. However, we must recognize that many fundamental differences between the United States and the Soviet Union complicate any effort to further that common interest through jointly agreed measures. The United States seeks to establish a stable balance of military forces and a world order based, not on the use of force, but on respect for the territorial integrity of nations. It perceives arms control measures, including CBMs, as means to help achieve these ends. While the Soviet Union professes to seek the same objectives, it encourages and takes advantage of political and military instabilities throughout the world, and is likely to exploit any ambiguities in a negotiated agreement.

The political and military interests of the United States and the Soviet Union conflict with respect to many specific nations and situations. The USSR also has a deep interest in weakening the bonds between the United States and its many friends and allies throughout the world.

Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union differ in fundamental geographic and societal characteristics. The United States is preeminently an open society, whose government must freely share vital information about national security with the public—and thereby automatically with foreign governments. The leaders of the closed Soviet society, in contrast, maintain a heavy veil of security over their political and military activities. In addition, the Soviet Union is a large land power, contiguous to many of its allies and client states, and a short distance from many of our allies. The United States, on the other hand, is geographically distant from most of its friends and must, therefore, devote special effort to ensuring access to them.

All of those differences mean that the United States must approach prudently any effort to devise joint U.S.-Soviet measures to reduce the risk of war or to contain and control the threat of use of nuclear weapons by third countries or terrorists. In this regard, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that most of the CBMs which the USSR has proposed in the past have sought to create or to solidify Soviet geopolitical or strategic advantages. Some Soviet CBM proposals have tried to restrict our ability to come to the aid of our allies or to defend other U.S. interests. Others have aimed at ensuring Soviet conventional and/or nuclear superiority. Such proposals are, of course, unacceptable, whether they are presented on their own or as the price for Soviet agreement to measures we advocate.

We must also carefully examine any suggestions for U.S. CBM proposals to ensure that they would not inadvertently offer the Soviet Union some important unilateral benefit at our expense. We also must be alert to the possibility that any agreement could unduly restrict our ability to come to the aid of our allies, or directly harm their interests in another way. Indeed, our efforts must not only protect the interests of our allies, but must also take into account our relations with all those nations which conduct themselves in accordance with the UN Charter and other international agreements.

Finally, we must avert the possibility that the USSR could use CBMs for deception or unilateral intelligence purposes. The closed nature of Soviet society permits the Soviet government to use disinformation and deception as foreign policy tools in a way that is not acceptable—let alone feasible—for any democratic government. The fundamental purpose of CBMs could be undermined if the Soviet Union was permitted to turn them into propaganda or deception opportunities. Exceptional care must be taken to ensure that the very procedures agreed upon to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war would not themselves become the means for the deception which would allow a premeditated surprise attack. Moreover, the United States needs to weigh carefully the possibility that measures designed to increase understanding and reduce the risk of misinterpretation could provide the Soviets with valuable, unique insights into U.S.

military programs and intelligence operations, without necessarily providing the United States with comparable information or advantages.

Despite these potential drawbacks, the United States must still pursue every possible avenue to reduce the risk that war could break out between it and the Soviet Union because of accident, miscalculation, or misinterpretation. We must also try to cooperate with the USSR to limit the threat that a third party might use nuclear weapons. In so doing, however, we must be realistic about possible outcomes, approach initiatives with care, and insist that, for any new efforts undertaken, the potential benefits outweigh the risks.

II. CURRENT PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR

The confidence-building measures which the President proposed to the Soviets last November would significantly add to the range and importance of existing means to improve communication, and thus to lessen the likelihood of misinterpretation, between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the President stated in Berlin in June 1982, "Taken together, these steps would represent a qualitative improvement in the nuclear environment."

A. Notification of ballistic missile launches

The President proposed to the Soviet leadership that the United States and the Soviet Union should announce in advance all launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) and intermediate-range, land-based ballistic missiles of the type the U.S. and USSR are currently negotiating in Geneva. Because ballistic missiles combine high-yield warheads, accuracy, and short flight times, both sides consider them to be the most destabilizing and dangerous elements in the nuclear arsenal. Consequently, these steps to reduce the uncertainty associated with the launching of these missiles would significantly lower the risk of accidental nuclear war.

1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Launches

A number of previous U.S.-USSR agreements have provided for advance notification of some ICBM launches:

The 1971 "Accident Measures" Agreement requires each side to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launches which will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other party. Both sides have understood the Agreement to apply to land- rather than submarine-based ballistic missiles. A protocol to the Agreement requires immediate notification of an "unsuccessful" or malfunctioning launch of an unarmed missile when the trajectory of the missile extends beyond national territory in a direction that could be misinterpreted by the other side.

The 1973 Incidents at Sea agreement requires both sides to issue Notices to Airmen and Marines (NOTAM's) for missile launches which will impact in international waters. The NOTAM's mention only the projected impact areas of the launch vehicle and associated debris. They do not specify launch point or area, the type of vehicle, or the purpose of the launch. Moreover, relatively few Soviet launches are covered by the agreement, whereas virtually all U.S. ICBM and SLBM launches are directed to the open ocean.

The SALT II Treaty [11] would have obligated each party to notify the other well in advance of any multiple ICBM launches or of single ICBM launches which would extend beyond its national territory. Unlike the NOTAMs required under the Incidents at Seas Agreement, the SALT notifications we sought would have included detailed information (e.g., launch locations, test range) and would have been provided directly to the other side. The U.S. began providing notifications in July 1979, consistent with its desire that the two countries act in accord with appropriate provisions of the SALT II Treaty even though it was not ratified. The Soviets also have provided notifications, albeit not as detailed as the U.S. notifications.

None of the previous agreements provides total coverage of all ICBM launches. In particular, they do not cover single launches which impact within the territory of the launching nation. Because any launch can create some uncertainty and ambiguity, the U.S. has proposed in the START negotiations that the sides provide notice of all ICBM launches, whether they occur singly or in multiples, whether their flights remain within national boundaries or extend beyond them. This proposal would carry the additional benefits of equalizing the current obligations on each side for advance notification and of discouraging the use of missile launches for geopolitical purposes such as a "show-of-force."

2. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Launches

The United States and the USSR do not now notify each other directly or specifically of SLBM launches. They only issue standard NOTAMs which announce air space and ocean "closure areas" if they expect an SLBM to impact in international waters. They do not, however, specify the reason for the closures. The President has, therefore, proposed that the two sides provide specific advance notification of all SLBM launches, including any which impact within national territory. This, combined with the ICBM notification proposal, would mean that for the first time, advance notice would be required for all launches of strategic ballistic missiles in the arsenals of either side.

3. LRINF Ballistic Missile Launches

Finally, the United States has proposed that both sides provide advance notification of all launches of land-based longer-range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) ballistic missiles. These include the Soviet Union's SS–20, SS–4, and SS–5 missiles, and the US PERSHING II. We continue to seek the elimination of all land-based American and Soviet LRINF missiles. While we are negotiating that ban, however, we believe that notification of all LRINF ballistic missile launches would have some net benefits.

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[11] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

Soviet LRINF missiles are already deployed in large numbers. Our PERSHING II system is in an advanced stage of development. Unless prior notification is given, launches of any of those missiles could lead to misperceptions concerning military or political intent.

B. Advance notification of major military exercises

Each year the United States and the USSR conduct military exercises intended to provide training, to assess operational readiness, or to develop, perfect or refine plans, procedures, or operations related to nuclear forces. Such exercises, involving a nation's major nuclear forces, could be misinterpreted and evoke an unintended response from the other side. The President has proposed that each side provide advance notice of major military exercises involving nuclear forces which are of such a scope as to raise the concerns of the other side.

The United States currently provides advance notice of many field exercises via embassy notifications and news releases. For example, last year we gave advance notice of Global Shield, our largest and most significant exercise for strategic nuclear forces. The USSR provides no advance notification, except in conformance with the voluntary procedures of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which call for advance notice of exercises involving 25,000 or more troops.[12]

C. Expanded data exchanges

The third main element of the President's proposal calls for a broad-ranging exchange of basic data about each side's nuclear forces. The U.S. START and INF delegations are now pursuing such an agreement in Geneva.

The data exchange we envisage would go far beyond that contained in the SALT accords. SALT II provided for reciprocal information only on the numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The President has proposed a much wider and more detailed exchange of data on both strategic and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which would provide essential information on the make-up of each side's forces.

The exchange of detailed information about each side's forces might help verification and could facilitate future arms control negotiations. It would also enhance the understanding which each side has of the capabilities and limitations of the other. Such exchanges would be essential for the implementation of any START or INF Agreement.

III. POSSIBLE NEW MEASURES TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION

One of the most effective ways to further the effort already begun by President Reagan to ensure against unintended nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would be to improve the ability of the two to communicate about crises and military incidents. In examining possible new initiatives for reducing the threat of nuclear weapons use, the Department of Defense has therefore focused on ways of increasing the speed, reliability, accuracy, and completeness of direct communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, we have studied whether improved communications with other countries could lower the risk of war.

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[12] *Ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–308.

A. Hotline improvements

A priority measure to enhance communications is to improve the Direct Communications Link (DCL, or "Hotline") between the U.S. and Soviet heads of government. The Hotline is, and should remain, for use only in severe emergencies. It would degrade the system, and reduce its impact in major crises, if it were used in cases that could be handled effectively through routine or lower-level bilateral channels.

In keeping with the Hotline mission, the precise number of times that the two heads of state have used it has not been disclosed. It is known that it has been used sparingly during its twenty-year existence, but it has proved invaluable in major crises. U.S. Presidents have cited its use during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War to prevent possible Soviet misunderstanding of U.S. fleet movements in the Mediterranean and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

The United States and the Soviet Union have significantly upgraded the DCL once since its creation. The system originally consisted of two terminal points with teletype equipment, one full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit (routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow), and for back-up, one full-time duplex radio-telegraph circuit (routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow). In 1971, the two governments agreed to establish two satellite communication circuits for the DCL, with a system of multiple terminals in each country. When those became operational in 1978, the DCL achieved almost 100 percent technical reliability. The original radio circuit was terminated, while the wire telegraph circuit remains as a back-up.

1. Facsimile Transmission Capability

The Department of Defense has now proposed for consideration by the President the addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the system. This improvement would increase the DCL's ability for conveying information by enabling the two sides to transmit more, and more complex, data more quickly and reliably. The time saved—even though limited by the slowness of the translation process—could be used to send more messages or for increased deliberation and consultation on each side. In addition, a facsimile transmission capability would minimize or entirely eliminate the need for keyboarding and therefore the possibility of operator error.

More important, facsimile equipment would endow the Hotline with a capability which it does not now possess: the ability to exchange graphic information. The precise, detailed, and often easily interpreted information offered by maps, charts, and drawings could be essential in resolving an ongoing military crisis. Because graphic information requires little or no translation, the total time saved through this improvement could actually be much greater than that implied simply by the increase in the transmission rate. Translation is the slowest step in the direct communication process. A highly proficient Russian language specialist can produce a full translation at the rate of only 1,000 words per hour, and do a cursory review at the rate of 6,000 words per hour.

2. *Voice and Video Capability*

The Department of Defense has also considered the possibility of adding a secure voice or video capability to the DCL. We have concluded, however, that this step would carry many more disadvantages than advantages. The United States and the Soviet Union explicitly decided not to include voice capability when they negotiated the original Hotline agreement and its subsequent improvement. On both occasions, they concluded that printed communication would be more private, more precise, and more reliable. The studies leading to this report reinforce that conclusion.

Because voice communication is more difficult than written material to translate, it is far more subject to misunderstanding. In addition, a direct conversation could encourage instant response, thereby denying the head of state the necessary opportunity to consult with advisors and prepare a thoughtful and measured response. For both reasons, emergency voice communications between the two leaders could reduce, rather than heighten, their ability to resolve a crisis. The same considerations apply, in heightened fashion, to the installation of video conferencing capability.

B. *Possible new communications mechanisms*

1. *Bilateral Joint Military Communications Link*

One measure which we are now considering would create a Joint Military Communications Link (JMCL), paralleling the DCL, between the United States and the Soviet Union. A JMCL would provide a direct facsimile transmission capability between the two national crisis control centers (in the United States, the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon). It would supplement, but not supplant, existing diplomatic channels.

Placing a JMCL in the national military command centers would enable us to build on and strengthen the existing rapid communications system, and reduce requirements for additional personnel, training, etc. Also, it would allow rapid exchange of highly technical information that could be essential to understanding and therefore resolving a nuclear or other military crisis. No existing communication channel between the United States and the USSR has a similar capability.

A JMCL could be used to implement agreements on the sharing of military information that is time urgent. It could, for example, be the mechanism for the consultation on terrorist nuclear activity that we discuss later in this report. It could also be the designated vehicle for the ballistic missile launch and military exercise notifications proposed by the President.

A JMCL could also have a crisis control function. It could be used in the event of any military incident that required urgent communication between the United States and the USSR, but did not warrant direct contact between the two heads of government.

A JMCL could also be used for cooperation—rather than avoidance of confrontation—between the two countries in certain urgent situations. For example, if a military craft of the one side were lost or disabled, a JMCL would facilitate assistance by the other. Similarly, it could ensure proper handling of any space objects with nuclear components which threatened to impact on land.

We believe that exercises of a JMCL and its regular use for implementing information-sharing agreements would go far toward ensuring that the system would work well in any crisis.

The information-sharing function of a JMCL would provide both sides with a series of opportunities—in time-sensitive, but not emergency, situations—to increase their familiarity with the system and to identify any procedural changes which would heighten its usefulness in a military crisis.

Joint U.S.-Soviet exercises of a JCML could also offer an important vehicle for refining and building each side's confidence in the system.

2. Multilateral Military Communications Link

While the bilateral JMCL concept could enhance communication and reduce the risk of war arising from miscalculation or misinterpretation, we believe that a multilateral MCL would not be desirable. It would be extremely difficult to determine which states to include in a multilateral network. The addition of too many states would threaten to make a MCL so unwieldly that it would never function effectively.

3. Embassy-Capital High Rate Data Communication Link

Another promising method of improving crisis communications between the United States and the Soviet Union could be for each to establish high rate data links between its head of government and its embassy in the other's capital. We believe that such a system could provide an important supplement to the DCL and to a JMCL.

Each government would install and control its own system, using its own technology. Nevertheless, introduction of the system would require consent pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities.[13] A bilateral agreement would also be essential to ensure that each government agreed to allow the other to bring in the necessary equipment freely and without interference.

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[13] *International Legal Materials*, vol. 8, July 1969, p. 679.

4. *Crisis Control Center*

We have also carefully considered the suggestions for a U.S.-Soviet or multinational crisis control center, but have concluded that it would not be desirable to establish such an institution at this time. Over time, our experience with operating a JMCL might allow us to pursue the idea of a crisis control center, by indicating ways in which we could reduce the risks involved in it to an acceptable level. We doubt, however, that a multilateral crisis control center located in a neutral country will ever be feasible. We expect that the use of a JMCL would be more likely to point the way to a bilateral mechanism linking separate crisis control bodies located in Washington and Moscow.

A crisis control center located in a neutral country would be far removed from the national capitals where crisis decisions would have to be made. This separation would present several serious drawbacks. It is most likely that a center would be completely by-passed in national crisis decisionmaking. If not, a center would create a cumbersome extra layer in the national and international decision processes, retarding action just when speed was most imperative. Moreover, flexibility in deciding when to communicate, which would be an important feature of a JMCL, would be difficult to achieve in an institutionalized U.S.-Soviet crisis control center. The institution would provide a clear and legitimate channel for automatic consideration of any crisis—including those in which Soviet participation would serve to heighten, rather than reduce, tensions.

A multilateral crisis control center would suffer from even more problems. The more members in a center, the less likely that they would all share a common interest in preventing the outbreak or escalation of conflict. Even if that were not the case, the decisionmaking process in a multinational center would easily become bogged down, and inhibit timely, concerted actions to avert a serious crisis. Indeed, there would be a general risk that the facility would evolve from a confidential tool for crisis management into a forum for waging propaganda warfare over sensitive crises.

Finally, the expansion of the number of recipients of shared information would increase the danger that a member government might use the facility to spread disinformation or misuse gathered information. With unrestricted membership, it would be impossible by definition to exchange intelligence data. Any shared information would immediately be in the public domain.

5. *Information Sharing Facility*

A U.S.-Soviet institution for sharing information on nuclear activities by third countries or terrorists would present many of the problems associated with a crisis control center and add new ones. Since such a body would concentrate on information exchange, the risks would increase that the Soviets could transform it into a new source of sensitive intelligence data or attempt to exploit it for disinformation purposes. Those risks would be compounded if an effort was made to endow the institution with a general data bank or if it was made a multilateral rather than bilateral forum.

Although an information-sharing institution therefore does not seem feasible, we are considering a multilateral agreement providing for consultations during particular nuclear crises.

Nations party to the agreement would, when they deemed appropriate, consult with each other on nuclear explosions or acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. By limiting the consultation to an aspect of the nuclear proliferation problem that is of particular concern to virtually all states, the agreement would minimize the risk that a nation would use it for disinformation purposes.

IV. ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO REDUCE AMBIGUITY AND MISINTERPRETATION

In addition to the enhanced communication mechanisms discussed in the previous section, the Department of Defense has considered a number of other measures which might reduce ambiguity surrounding military incidents, and thus lessen the possibility of misinterpretation. These fall into three general categories: improved arms control verification procedures; improved warning of nuclear attack; and reduced vulnerability of command, control, and communication systems.

A. Enhanced verification procedures for nuclear arms control agreements

Effective verification is essential to effective arms control. The first requirement for effective verification is possession of satisfactory monitoring capability. Towards this end, the United States maintains an extensive intelligence capability for monitoring treaty-limited activities and invests heavily in new technologies which may improve our ability to monitor activity related to treaty compliance.

Effective verification depends on satisfying a series of non-technical conditions as well. Our verification efforts cannot rely solely on intelligence community monitoring of the other side to evade detection, and our own ability to counter cheating. We must assess the incentive of the other side to cheat. We must also assess the political and military significance of potential violations, recognizing that charges of treaty violation are not easily made nor easily accepted, especially when evidence based upon the most sensitive intelligence sources and methods is involved. Enforcement of compliance under these circumstances is even more difficult.

The verification provisions of US-USSR arms control treaties vary widely. Some agreements, such as the Biological Weapons Convention,[14] do not include express verifications measures, but instead simply provide for consultations about compliance. Other agreements, like the SALT I Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty,[15] explicitly refer to national technical means of verification (NTM), and provide supplements to NTM through counting rules and collateral measures such as dismantlement and destruction procedures. The SALT II verification provisions appeared to go further by including telemetry encryption under measures that could be defined as deliberate concealment measures. In fact, however, some SALT II provisions were ambiguous and provided an inadequate basis for judging compliance.

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[14] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 133–138.

[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 197 ff.

The information needed by the West for effective verification of arms control agreements generally requires disclosure of what the Soviet Union considers to be state secrets—even though it may involve information normally made public in the West. Consequently, except for such collateral measures as dismantlement and destruction procedures, the Soviet Union typically prefers caveated or ambiguous wording which makes it difficult to challenge its compliance with verification rules.

The Soviet Union's callous disregard of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention by producing deadly toxins and of the 1925 Geneva Protocol [16] by using and encouraging the use of deadly toxins against combatants and innocent civilians in Southeast Asia provides the most compelling explanation of why, in the future, the U.S. must insist that arms control agreements with the USSR contain effective verification provisions.

We have examined several technical and procedural measures which could enhance verification capabilities and thereby contribute to mutual confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union. These include the use of combined consultative commissions, international verification bodies, data exchanges and other measures beyond National Technical Means of verification. All, however, require further analysis in the context of specific treaty requirements.

B. Measures to lengthen warning time of potential attack

Many of the initiatives discussed earlier in this report—the President's proposals for ballistic missile launch notifications, the Joint Military Communications Link, the high rate data link between each side's capital and its embassy in the other country, the agreement to consult during crises involving terrorist nuclear activity—would heighten U.S. and Soviet awareness of—and thereby ability to divert—any near-term danger of a nuclear accident or attack. We have also examined more technical measures which might enhance U.S. and Soviet warning capabilities, whether the threat comes from the other party, from a third country, or from a terrorist or subnational group. After careful study, however, we have concluded that none of the possible bilateral U.S.-Soviet measures available for increasing warning time would have enough utility to warrant its continued consideration.

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[16] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

C. Measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications (C^3) on both sides

Finally, we have examined possible bilateral U.S.-Soviet and unilateral approaches to reduce the vulnerability of our command, control and communications (C^3) systems—the systems necessary to communicate with and direct strategic forces.

The strategic C^3 system is vital to insure that strategic forces can respond to attack, and is therefore an essential element of deterrence. The system also guarantees that the ultimate control over nuclear weapons resides at the highest national decision-making level. The C^3 system provides the essential intermediary between our nuclear attack warning system and the decision-makers who would determine a response to a nuclear attack. Thus, it must be capable of performing its functions both during and after attacks.

Shortly after President Reagan took office in 1981, he directed that a thorough review be conducted of the strategic C^3 system and its ability to function under and survive attack. When the President announced his Strategic Modernization Program, he gave the highest priority to correcting strategic deficiencies. Major initiatives for achieving these C^3 corrections are now under way. President Reagan's decision was made in response to ten years of neglect of U.S. C^3 capability and survivability, as well as a sustained Soviet C^3 improvement program. That Soviet effort has not only strengthened the Soviet strategic C^3 system but also increased its ability to target and destroy U.S. strategic forces and associated C^3.

The modernizations program for strategic C^3 calls for balanced improvements in essential capabilities, including upgrading of the survivability and endurance of the alert warning and attack assessment sensors, increasing mobility and endurance of command decision-making functions, extensively improving communications, and assuring means for recovery and reconstitution of U.S. strategic forces following a major nuclear attack.

Statement by President Reagan: Report of the Secretary of Defense on Direct Communications Links and Other Measures To Enhance Stability, April 12, 1983 [1]

I am pleased to note the completion of the report of the Secretary of Defense on Direct Communication Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability. [2] I believe that the proposals in this report, which was prepared in accordance with Public Law 97–252, are fully consistent with our goal of reducing the risk of nuclear war.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Apr. 18, 1983, pp. 533–534.

[2] *Supra.*

The Department of Defense report recommends a number of new measures. Of special note are those measures proposed to improve communications and build confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union. They include: addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the Direct Communications Link (Hotline), which would permit the transmission of full pages of text and maps and graphs; the establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link, which would be a high-speed facsimile link between the U.S. National Military Command Center and its Soviet counterpart; and the upgrading of existing diplomatic communications channels with higher speed data transmission capability. Also included is a proposal for an agreement, open to all states, which would call on the signatories to consult with each other in the event of a nuclear incident involving a terrorist group.

The Department of Defense recommendations complement the arms reductions proposals which the U.S. already has made to the Soviet Union in both Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces.

The initiatives also complement the confidence-building measures the United States already has proposed to the Soviet Union in the START and INF negotiations. Those measures would reduce the danger that nuclear war could ever arise from accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. They include proposals that the two sides notify each other in advance of all launches of intercontinental, submarine-launched, and land-based, longer-range intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Additionally, they would require each party to provide advance notice of major military exercises involving nuclear forces and to exchange information of unprecedented breadth and detail about their strategic and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Over the next few weeks, I will be giving the recommendations in the Defense Department report my full consideration.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons [Extract], April 12, 1983 [1]

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I take the floor today to speak on the subject of chemical weapons.

My delegation is gratified by the positive interest shown in our document (CD/343) containing detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban. [2] We have had fruitful and constructive informal exchanges with many delegations and have welcomed the questions of our colleagues. We have tried to respond promptly and clearly to such questions in whatever forum they were asked.

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[1] CD/PV.211, pp. 12–14.

[2] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

At the plenary meeting on 29 March we were pleased to have several thoughtful and serious questions put to my delegation by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas.[3] Such interest in our paper is deeply appreciated and deserves an equally serious response, which I am pleased to provide today.

The United States holds the view that riot-control agents and herbicides should not be covered by this convention. Let me say at the outset that, although we hold this view, our objective is not to retain an option for waging chemical warfare with such chemicals. We ruled this out years ago. This fact is certainly well known. Most importantly, we do not see that including these chemicals in a ban on development, production, stockpiling and transfer would promote the ultimate objective of preventing their use in combat. In contrast to the military nerve gases, for example, herbicides are not developed, produced, or stockpiled for chemical weapons purposes but can easily be obtained through commercial channels. In fact, military forces may well have substantial quantities of herbicides readily available for vegetation control at bases, a perfectly legitimate purpose. Commercial spraying equipment, such as spray aircraft, can be quickly requisitioned. Quite probably, a State could be in full compliance with a provision banning the development, production and stockpiling of herbicides for chemical weapons purposes and yet be able to use herbicides for prohibited purposes within a few days.

A similar situation exists for riot-control agents. In many countries, military and paramilitary forces are equipped with substantial amounts of such agents for the purposes of maintaining internal order. We do not see how a provision against the development, production, and stockpiling of riot-control agents for military purposes could be effective in preventing their use for prohibited purposes when the substances are already available in significant quantities for permitted purposes.

Ambassador Vidas also dealt with the permitted transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes. It is well known that many countries use small quantities of such chemicals for research purposes to develop protection against chemical attack. In many cases the State obtains the necessary chemicals from an ally, rather than producing the chemical itself. It seems desirable to permit such arrangements to continue once a treaty comes into force. A ban on small-scale transfers could have the clearly undesirable effect of encouraging many States to set up production facilities in order to have super-toxic chemicals for protective research purposes. Of course, transfers should be permitted only under appropriate controls, which necessarily can apply only to parties. Thus, we can agree that even small-scale transfers to non-parties should be banned.

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[3] CD/PV.207, pp. 15–19.

The proposed limit of 100 grams is a nominal one for purposes of discussion. We would welcome comments as to whether it is reasonable or not.

We have also been asked to clarify our understanding of the term "permitted purposes" as used in our document. This is a very broad term which covers industrial, agricultural, research, medical and other peaceful purposes, law enforcement purposes and protective purposes, as well as military purposes—such as the use of chemicals as rocket fuels—which are not related to chemical weapons. The one-ton limit would apply specifically to super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes, a legitimate activity which is closely related to chemical weapons. Again, one ton is an approximate figure for discussion purposes. We believe the one-ton limit is low enough to preclude waging chemical warfare on any militarily significant scale. In assessing whether it is reasonable, it should be kept in mind that one ton is a ceiling, not a quota. States should be required to justify whatever amount they used, even small quantities. Also, the one-ton figure is an aggregate for all super-toxic lethal chemicals used for protective purposes.

The Yugoslav delegation also asked if in our view the proposed preparatory commission would continue working without interruption until the treaty entered into force, whether this occurred quickly or only after some time. Our hope is that the preparatory commission would be able to complete promptly the tasks assigned to it by the convention. But certainly it should work as long as necessary. As a legal matter, it would exist until the consultative committee was established, shortly after the entry into force of the convention.

A question was raised regarding the relationship between the fact-finding panel and the consultative committee. Our suggestion is that the fact-finding panel should be a subordinate body to the consultative committee, established for the specific purpose of looking into compliance questions. The intent is that the depository would be involved only as the chairman of the consultative committee. In this regard, we would note that we simply assumed that, as in the case of the ENMOD Convention, the depositary should be the chairman of the consultative committee.

With regard to our views on any confidence-building measures beyond those mentioned in our paper, the subject has certainly not been exhaustively treated. Constructive suggestions have already been made by the delegation of Sweden and many others. We have an open mind on the question and would welcome further ideas from our colleagues.

It has been noted that national technical means are not mentioned in the United States paper. To our way of thinking, it was not necessary to include such a reference. Of course, States will continue to acquire information using whatever national technical means are available to them. But such means are not accessible to many States and, in any case, are hopelessly inadequate for verification of a ban such as is envisaged in this convention. The principal means for verification must be international in nature to ensure effectiveness and political acceptability and to inspire confidence.

Finally, Ambassador Vidas raised the question whether the provisions for international co-operation would include the field of toxicology. My delegation feels this would be entirely appropriate. Knowledge of the toxic effects of chemicals is becoming increasingly important.

I hope I have been successful in clarifying our position in response to the questions put by our Yugoslav colleagues and others. We hope that by doing so we have facilitated negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We look forward to similar clarifications from other delegations. Only if delegations clearly explain their views on the key issues shall we be able to move fruitfully ahead.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, April 12, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation today intends to refer once again to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Like other delegations we, of course, very much regret that at least two months of work have been lost and that the good start made in its work at the beginning of this year by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the guidance of Ambassador Sujka of Poland was not appropriately followed up.

As to the Soviet delegation, it has not wasted its time during this enforced break. The USSR delegation has submitted a number of new proposals on key issues of the future convention at plenary meetings of the Committee. In addition to that, in March we conducted intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations on various aspects of the complicated chemical disarmament problem. The main conclusion we have reached from these consultations is that progress in the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is entirely possible. A large number of questions was put to us, to which we tried to give exhaustive answers. We, for our part, put questions to our colleagues which were of interest to us. In addition, all those taking part in those consultations made interesting comments and observations, which will, we believe, help towards mutual understanding.

In this connection we would like to express our gratitude to the delegations which took part in the consultations. This, of course, includes the delegation of the Netherlands, with which also we held consultations, and we should like, through you, Mr. Chairman, to convey our gratitude to the head of the Netherlands delegation.

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[1] CD/PV.211, pp. 15–20.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work a few days ago. First of all, the Soviet delegation wishes to congratulate Ambassador McPhail of Canada on his appointment as Chairman of this Group, and wishes him success. We should also like to make a few general comments on the Group's work.

We endorse a great deal of what Ambassador McPhail said in his interesting statement at the meeting of the Working Group on 6 April and in general the optimistic and business-like tone of his statement. We could go even further in expressing optimism. We continue to believe that the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons could be successfully completed this year.

What is our view of the general content and character of the future negotiations in the Working Group? It would of course be possible to choose the easy path and concentrate all the attention of the Working Group on questions on which there is a coincidence or similarity of positions. In fact, there is a large number of such questions, including many key, basic issues affecting the future convention. If we were to put agreed wordings on these issues on paper, we could blow the trumpets announcing to the world our great success and keeping quiet about those serious differences which continue to exist. Such an approach would rather delude world public opinion and would hardly contribute to the speedy conclusion of the negotiations.

But we could also go to the other extreme. We could concentrate all attention on the problems on which there are differences between us, including secondary ones, amplify and exaggerate them, gamble on them and thus lead all our work to a deadlock. Perhaps some are pursuing these goals, but certainly not the Soviet Union delegation. We are resolutely opposed to such an approach and will not follow this line.

We should go along the tested road of international negotiations. On the one hand, we should agree upon, formulate and draft those provisions, and first and foremost the key provisions relating to the general scope of the convention, the necessary definitions, verification and other subjects, on which there is a coincidence or similarity of positions. On the other hand, in close connection with this work, we should continue intensive negotiations in order to find the solutions to the problems on which there are still differences. We believe that the recording of similar positions on the key problems should keep ahead of the phase of finding solutions to unsolved questions. I will explain this idea. For example, what is the need to conduct negotiations on specific methods of conducting international on-site verifications of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, on the basis of quotas or the drawing of lots or on any other basis, if there is no recorded agreement, even of a preliminary nature, on the mandatory conduct of systematic international on-site verifications of the destruction of stockpiles and on the method to be used? To be brief, we wish to construct the building starting from its foundation and not from the roof.

Now I would like to touch upon the comments on our proposals and the observations made by various delegations both at plenary and at other meetings. We shall also reply to the questions addressed to the Soviet delegation.

Our agreement with the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States to include in the future convention a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in general met with a positive response in the Committee. Some delegations at the same time stressed the need to be cautious so as not to prejudice the 1925 Geneva Protocol. [2] We fully share this view and believe, like the delegations of Indonesia, Sweden and of many other countries, that the task is not merely to avoid unfavourable consequences for the Geneva Protocol, and in particular not to allow a limitation of the general scope of the prohibition in it, which covers also bacteriological weapons, but to make the regime of non-use of chemical weapons established by it even stronger, more reliable and more universal.

The Soviet delegation wishes the future convention to provide a regime of the non-use of chemical weapons that is unique and strictly mandatory for all States and based on the idea that there can be no justification for the use of chemical weapons either in war, in military conflicts or as a first or retaliatory strike, with the use of the completely prohibited supertoxic chemicals or the so-called "other lethal chemicals" which are and will always be produced in huge quantities for peaceful purposes.

Together with an agreement on the use, within the framework of the convention, of the verification machinery for the verification of compliance with the provision on the non-use of chemical weapons also, this would lead to a substantial strengthening of the non-use regime, and we believe that it should be our main goal.

The delegations of the United States and France have spoken here in favour of a "provisional" solution of the problem of verification of non-use based on resolution 37/98 D of the United Nations General Assembly. We believe that the earliest possible conclusion of the convention would be the most effective and complete guarantee of the non-use of chemical weapons. Proceeding from this premise, it is necessary to make every effort in order to speed up the elaboration of the convention, avoiding actions which might complicate the negotiations. By proposing the verification of compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the resolution enlarges the obligations of the States parties through a vote in the United Nations, with the participation also of States which were not signatories of the Protocol. We have already noted that slightly more than half of the States parties to the Geneva Protocol voted in favour of the resolution. Thus, a dangerous precedent could be created of the revision of an international agreement without taking into account and contrary to the opinions of a significant number of the parties to it. Such a practice would be in flagrant contradiction with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of international treaties, [3] and in particular with article 39 thereof, which allows the amendment of a treaty only on the basis of an agreement between the parties.

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[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

That is why the Soviet Union will not take part in the implementation of the above mentioned resolution and we have stated so recently to the United Nations Secretary-General. We appeal to every delegation to think about the negative consequences that would result from an attempt to impose the solution of disarmament problems through a majority of votes.

I shall now pass on to another question. A number of the Committee's members put questions on the Soviet proposal for a renunciation, by the States parties to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, of the production of methyl-phosphorus bond compounds. We were asked whether such a decision is really necessary, whether it might not be harmful to progress in the sphere of the peaceful chemical industry in the distant future, and what is the point of such an action if there are other chemicals which are also used for chemical weapons production.

Unfortunately I cannot, in the present statement, reply in detail to these and similar questions. That will be done in the Working Group. For the moment I will make some general observations on our approach.

A number of delegations in the Committee believe that even after the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons enters into force, every State will in effect be entitled, if it so wishes, to produce supertoxic lethal chemicals and any other chemicals, including those capable of being the key precursors for chemical weapons, as well as particularly dangerous organophosphorus compounds with the methyl-phosphorus bond, provided that States intend to use them all, not for arms production but for peaceful purposes. We have been told that such facilities will be declared and be subject to verification—to verification by the drawing of lots, what is more.

In this event, apparently, the sword of Damocles would be hanging over any declared facility in the form of the possibility of its becoming unexpectedly subject to verification. But this requires as a minimum that all such facilities be really declared, both those producing and those capable of producing such chemicals. If we follow this way proposed by some delegations, then the lists of the declared facilities will contain hundreds or even thousands of facilities of various kinds, both large and small, and the element of chance in the carrying out of verification by the drawing of lots will be so great that the potential violator of the convention is hardly likely to be disturbed by such a method. I do not even have to say that such a system, whereby the special lists would contain almost all chemical enterprises, might cause them to be discredited in the eyes of the consumers of their products. Thus the proposed approach is very complicated, vulnerable and, what is more, ineffective.

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[3] *International Legal Materials*, vol. 8, July 1969, p. 679.

As far as our approach is concerned, it narrows down the range of the industrial facilities capable of producing any supertoxic lethal chemicals, as well as those chemicals—"key precursors" (with the methyl-phosphorus bond) which are the most dangerous from the point of view of their use for chemical weapons production, practically to a single special facility in any State party. Regardless whether 30 kg or 300 kg of such chemicals are needed, they should be produced at the special facility subject to systematic international on-site verifications by quota, and nowhere else. The detection of the production of these chemicals by other enterprises on the basis of verification by challenge would prove the violation of the convention.

Now I come to the questions of distinguished Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia addressed to us on 29 March.[4]

The delegation of Yugoslavia was interested in whether according to the Soviet position, facilities for filling chemical weapons should be eliminated or dismantled and enterprises producing the chemical weapons should be closed immediately after the convention enters into force. Naturally, our reply to both questions is positive.

One thing should be explained however. The verification procedure proposed by the USSR for the closing and elimination or dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities, as well as the timing for their declaration considerably differ from the approach contained, for example, in the "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban"[5] and in the statement by the United States delegation in the Committee on 17 March,[6] upon which we shall dwell in greater detail in the Working Group.

The delegation of Yugoslavia requested us to explain our position on specialized facilities for the permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals.

The Soviet Union believes that the upper limit of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes, i.e. for industry, agriculture, research, medicine and any other peaceful purposes, for the purpose of protection from chemical weapons as well as for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons, should be one metric ton for any State party. This means that the total quantity of such chemicals produced at the special facility, transferred from stockpiles or acquired in some other way every year or at the disposal of the State party at any moment should not go beyond this limit. It may be less, be only a part of this amount, but it should not be superior to it at any time. Taking into account all these features of our position, the one-ton limit does not seem to us to be too high.

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[4] CD/PV.207, pp. 15–19.

[5] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

[6] *Ante*.

Finally, the delegation of Yugoslavia was interested in how the Soviet Union understands the verification of a justified request on a voluntary basis. We confirm that we see this form of verification as universal and one which could be used especially for the verification of the non-production of chemicals for chemical weapons at commercial enterprises. As to the verification of the destruction of stockpiles, we believe that its main form will be systematic international on-site verifications on the basis of an agreed quota at a transformed or special destruction facility.

The decision of the State in the case of a request for verification by challenge will depend, to a large extent, on the nature of the request, the specific circumstances which provoked it, and so on. The request should be prompted by the real interests of compliance with the convention by all States, and not by any other reasons; it should be justified. It is only natural that a completely unjustified request submitted on the basis of considerations which are far removed from the convention's purposes will be met accordingly. Let us be realistic and ask ourselves—can we demand from a State to which a request is addressed that it should accept verification automatically? That would mean that verification could cover any enterprise which has nothing to do with the production of chemicals for the purposes of chemical warfare but which, let us say, is directly connected with military production, for example, the production of missile fuel, explosives, various types of armaments, military equipment, etc., since at present chemistry is used everywhere. Those who state that they are ready automatically to permit an international on-site verification in response to any request, even if unjustified, are demagogues. We have no doubt about it.

It is sometimes said that the Soviet Union, in proposing the prohibition of the production of methyl-phosphorus bond compounds at commercial enterprises, wishes to exclude the entire commercial industry from the scope of verification under the convention. Of course, this is a flagrant distortion of our position. We in no way eliminate the problem of the verification of the so-called key precursors. We are in favour of the elaboration of criteria and definitions for such precursors and the setting up of appropriate lists on the basis of these. We believe that the States parties to the convention should annually submit information on the precursors included in these lists that they have produced, acquired, retained or used for permitted purposes. We in no way eliminate, either, the question of the verification of chemicals which are particularly dangerous from the point of view of their possible diversion for purposes connected with the use of chemical weapons. We propose a similar approach to them. In both cases the system of on-site verification on the basis of a justified request could be applied.

Distinguished delegates, the Soviet delegation would now like to make some general comments on the prospects for the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Committee is on the eve of the decisive stage of the negotiations aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Of course, a lot will depend on the proper organization of the negotiations, on the time allocated for them, on the activity of all delegations and on other questions. But in the final analysis, success will be determined not by these factors but by the readiness of every delegation to search for mutually acceptable solutions and compromises, to display flexibility. It will also depend on whether attempts will continue to be made artificially to heat up the atmosphere at the negotiations and to turn them into an arena for various political speculations, or whether a business-like situation will prevail.

In this context I should like to draw your attention to the following. Since 7 July 1980, when the USSR and the United States submitted to the Committee their "Joint report" (document CD/112), [7] the Soviet Union has repeatedly improved its approaches to certain aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, come out with various initiatives, meeting half-way the other participants in the negotiations, including the Western countries, in order to achieve an early agreement. It is enough to recall that the Soviet Union, while believing that for the purposes of verification, national forms of verification, national technical means and international on-site verification on the basis of a justified request are adequate, nevertheless agreed that the verification of the destruction of stocks and of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes should be conducted on the basis of mandatory international on-site verifications. Quite recently, we agreed with the position of the non-aligned countries on the inclusion of a provision on the non-use of chemical weapons in the convention.

And what has happened during this time to the United States approach to the key questions of the prohibition of chemical weapons? Using as a cover the allegations invented by them in respect of the USSR and other socialist countries, the United States has moved away from some of its earlier positions, has toughened them, in particular on questions of verification, etc. Such a movement does not inspire great optimism, but on the contrary leads to the sad conclusion that what we are dealing with is no more than another political game. We cannot leave out of our reckonings the fact that chemical weapons have an important role to play in the Pentagon's plans for the next decade. Various American statesmen have said a great deal about this in recent times.

We also pay attention to the fact that sometimes proposals are put forward in the Committee which are known to be unacceptable to us and which in some cases have a quite unrealistic and demagogic character. Sometimes differences appear as if from nowhere, based simply, it seems, on a lack of desire to take into account the opinion of the other side. This happened recently when the tasks of contact group C were defined within the framework of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, when, in spite of the objections of the entire group of socialist countries, it was considered possible again to put forward an unacceptable range of such tasks at the Group's meeting on 11 April. There are also in the Committee those who are in favour of a method of negotiating with the Soviet Union which offers no prospects at all—the method of putting pressure on it. They believe that the greater the pressure on the Soviet Union, the greater are the chances for an agreement. This is a profound delusion. It was very convincingly stated by the USSR Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, at his press conference on 2 April.

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 285–289.

We call upon all delegations and in the first instance the United States delegation to embark upon honest, constructive negotiations taking into account the mutual interests of the sides. Only such negotiations can lead to success. The Soviet delegation, at any rate, will resolutely follow such an approach to the negotiations.

British Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Definition of Radiological Weapons and the Scope of a Radiological Weapons Treaty, April 13, 1983 [1]

1. The *ad hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons of the Committee on Disarmament has been negotiating a treaty banning radiological weapons on the lines envisaged by the authors of a joint US/USSR draft which was submitted to the Committee in 1980 [*1979*]. [2]

2. A central problem has been the definition of such weapons. Since radiological weapons do not exist, there can be no precise technical description of such weapons, but common sense and analogy with chemical or other weapons suggest that what was envisaged by the authors of the joint draft is some sort of weapon (or perhaps, more properly, munition) which would on delivery, by explosion or other means, disperse or disseminate radio-active material in the environment. The primary danger from such a weapon would come from exposure to the dispersed radio-active material. In order to make the definition of such weapons more comprehensive, however, it is necessary to include sprays, aerosols, or other methods of dispersing radio-active material in large quantity within the scope of the treaty.

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[1] CD/374.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 357–361.

3. Nuclear weapons would be excluded from the scope of the treaty but so far the working group has failed to find language satisfactory to all delegations which would express this fact. The United Kingdom delegation has carefully considered various "positive" definitions which have been put forward, and has indeed suggested one of its own, but has concluded that it would be preferable to seek a "negative" definition which would specifically exclude nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Such a definition has a greater possibility of being unambiguous and unmistakable in intent. The United Kingdom delegation does not accept that a definition which specifically excluded nuclear weapons in this way would make any statement about the legitimacy or otherwise of that class of weapons. If a problem existed in this regard for certain delegations, it could readily be overcome by a clear statement of interpretation at the time of signature of the treaty or, indeed, might well be held to be implied if the views of any particular State in this regard had been clearly expressed on other occasions and had thus become part of the negotiating history of the treaty.

4. Consideration of the danger that might occur in war-time from the dispersal of radio-active material into the environment has led some delegations to suggest that prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be included in the scope of the treaty. Nuclear facilities already exist in many areas of the world and attacks on them in war-time could possibly lead to the dispersal of large amounts of radio-activity into the environment, causing radiological damage to the population of surrounding areas. The United Kingdom delegation recognizes this problem, but sees difficulties in accepting that radiological weapons (in the sense that we have described them above) and attacks on nuclear facilities can be prohibited by the same legal instrument. Since attacks on nuclear electricity generating stations which might cause the release of "dangerous forces" are already prohibited by the Additional Protocols [3] to the Geneva Conventions, legal confusion could follow from an attempt to cover substantially the same subject in another convention.

5. The United Kingdom delegation sees distinct dissimilarities between the two problems. In the case of radiological weapons, as originally envisaged, the radio-active contents may be presumed to be delivered from the attacking State against a target in the State being attacked. The attack will employ weapons, or means of dispersal, which have been specifically designed for the purpose of the efficient dissemination of the radio-active material. The radio-active material and the means of dispersal together will constitute a recognizable weapon system, which has no purpose other than the military one which it is the object of the Convention to proscribe. In the case of an attack on a nuclear facility, the radio-active material is not delivered from the attacking State but already exists in the State subject to

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[3] *International Legal Materials*, Nov. 16, 1977, No. 6, pp. 1391 ff., 1442 ff.

attack. Furthermore, the immediate vehicle of the attack would be weapons which fell outside the scope of the treaty. Conventional weapons would not in themselves contain any significant radio-active material, and the radiological damage caused by the dispersal of the contents of the nuclear facility would almost certainly be secondary to the purpose of the main attack. An attack by conventional weapons on a nuclear facility would appear to be more analogous to attacks on other facilities, for example dams, which could also cause mass destruction and which, like nuclear electricity generating stations, are already treated in the Additional Protocols. Because of these fundamental differences between the two situations, the United Kingdom delegation sees serious conceptual difficulties in bringing together the two ideas. The fact that either radiological weapons or attacks on nuclear facilities would both cause damage by means of radiation resulting from the decay of radio-active material is, in the view of the United Kingdom delegation, too narrow a reason for attempting to prohibit them within a single legal instrument.

6. Discussions within the Committee on Disarmament have shown that differences of view also exist between those delegations which are in favour of the question of attacks on nuclear facilities being included within the scope of a radiological weapons treaty. In particular there are differences over whether military facilities should be excluded from the treaty and whether there should be a lower limit on the size of facility which should be included in any prohibition. To extend a prohibition to include all nuclear facilities of whatever size would take us away from the concept of mass destruction in the sense commonly understood, and would in the view of the United Kingdom delegation render any treaty on these lines impractical. The United Kingdom delegation has no objection to further exploratory discussions in the Committee on Disarmament to try to resolve some of these problems with respect to a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, while retaining an open mind whether, on the assumption that existing differences can be resolved and that there can be some agreement on the principles on which a treaty can be based, negotiations should be completed within the Committee on Disarmament or in some other body.

French Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, April 14, 1983 [1]

The Committee on Disarmament has affirmed its competence in the matter of the prevention of an arms race in outer space by making this subject a specific item on its agenda since 1982.

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[1] CD/375.

This competence is, moreover, recognized in various resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (36/99, 37/83, 36/97 C and 37/99 D). Lastly, the consensus reached at the United Nations "UNISPACE" conference resolved the problem of competence that might have arisen as between the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

The settlement of this problem reflected a recognition of the growing and complex part which outer space is bound to play in matters connected with international security. It can be deduced from this fact that questions relating to an arms race in outer space are no longer today of concern only to the two principal space powers, even though, by reason of their actual or potential military capabilities, they clearly have a special and direct responsibility in this connection.

The problems posed by the prevention of an arms race in outer space derive particularly from the following facts:

The inadequacy of existing legal instruments with respect to foreseeable developments in technology;

The ambiguity surrounding the idea of the immunity of space objects;

The constraints resulting from the long-standing and now irreversible overlapping of civilian and military uses of outer space.

I. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The technological developments likely in the next 10 or 20 years are to a fairly large extent foreseeable, for space programmes proceed as much in response to their own internal logic, which is determined by the size of the technical and financial investments put into them, as to political promptings.

For more than a quarter of a century now, outer space has provided support for military observation and communications systems.

In the near future, even if it is not certain that it will be possible to develop new, operationally effective systems of laser or directed energy weapons at an acceptable cost, it is probable that the concept of the orbital platform, either manned or automatic, capable of use for both civilian and military purposes, will become a reality. Both the orbital rendezvous techniques which the USSR has been practising for some years and the capacities of the United States space shuttle point in this direction.

Thus the essential problem up to now has been, as it still is, that of the immunity of the space segment of a land-based weapon system to possible pre-emptive attacks by the adversary. Certainly, this space segment is confined to a specific function (for example, communications, data transmission, analysis of the environment in which troop-movements are taking place, the locating of positions). But it is functionally indissociable from a land-based communications network and control system. Furthermore, it has no meaning except as part of a complex military organization.

The moment outer space can itself become the scene of specific military activities, and whether these are directed against other space objects (enemy satellites) or against activities conducted from the surface of the earth (the launching of ballistic missiles, for example), the problem of the arms race in outer space changes dimensions.

What we need to consider is the role we intend to reserve for outer space among the various roles which it is possible to assign to it:

(1) That of a demilitarized "sanctuary", like those that it has been possible to establish for the Antarctic and the moon;

(2) That of a "support area" for land-based civilian and military activities, to be used in accordance with its specific characteristics and advantages;

(3) That of a specific new "battlefield" in which space-based systems endeavour to destroy or paralyse each other, very probably as a prelude to—the more optimistic would say as a substitute for—confrontations on earth.

The first concept, that of absolute sanctuarization or demilitarization, is something that is no longer possible. It is therefore unrealistic to try to revert to such a situation.

The second concept, that of outer space as a support area for mixed civilian and military activities, represents the present situation and ought therefore to be taken as the basis for our work.

The third concept, that of outer space serving as the base for specific confrontations, remains a possibility. It is for us to decide if it is desirable.

Some may offer the following arguments:

That it is in any case preferable to transfer to outer space a rivalry that could lead to incalculable damage on the surface of the earth;

That it offers a possibility for reducing dependence on nuclear ballistic missiles;

That the competition between defensive systems (anti-ballistic missile systems on orbital platforms) in outer space would in any event be preferable to the present situation in which the balance between offensive weapons has constantly to be re-established as one side or the other becomes vulnerable.

These apparently convincing arguments do not take account of the facts. On the one hand, even if the new space technologies become operational, it is unlikely that they will be sufficiently reliable to justify reducing dependence on land-based systems; thus a space-based anti-missile system would in all probability constitute only a first line of defence.

On the other hand, it is doubtful whether, in such a competition for the military domination of outer space, one of the Superpowers would tolerate the superiority of the other for any length of time. That being so, the very vulnerability of the systems stationed in outer space would offer a considerable inducement to a preventive attack.

It is not enough, therefore, to say that weapons systems deployed in outer space would not threaten the earth and that in any case these prospects are too remote and uncertain to merit consideration now.

The efforts of the international community as regards the problems of an arms race in outer space ought to be aimed at two things:

Not to allow outer space to become a base for military actions;

To protect space vehicles and in particular to ensure the immunity of satellites.

In fact the first objective, which concerns the technologies of the future, can be attained only if the second, which concerns innumerable vehicles at present in orbit, is ensured.

Hence the importance of ensuring the immunity of satellites.

II. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

It has to be admitted that the existing legal instruments in the matter are inadequate and do not meet the needs of the present situation.

The following instruments may be mentioned in this connection:

The 1963 Treaty on the Partial suspension of nuclear tests, in the atmosphere and "beyond its limits, including outer space";[2]

The bilateral Soviet-American Treaty of 1972 on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, which bars the deployment of ABM systems in outer space (article V, para. 1) and enunciates the principle of non-interference with national technical means of verification (article 12);[3]

The SALT I Agreement (article V), which also provides for non-interference with "national technical means of verification";[4] these include satellites, according to the formal declaration of President Carter of 1 October 1978,[5] a declaration for which there is no counterpart on the Soviet Union side;

The 1967 Treaty on the principles governing the use of outer space.[6]

The other international agreements and conventions relating to outer space, which concern the helping of astronauts (1968),[7] possible damage caused by space objects (1973),[8] the activities of States on the moon (1979)[9] and the registration of objects launched into outer space (1976),[10] are of only marginal interest as regards the subject under consideration.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197-201.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 201 ff.

[5] *Ibid., 1978*, p. 586.

[6] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38-43.

[7] 19 UST 7570; TIAS 6599; 672 UNTS 119.

[8] 24 UST 2389; TIAS 7762.

[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 737-745.

[10] 28 UST 695; TIAS 8480.

It may be noted that:

(1) First of all, the 1967 Treaty on outer space deals very inadequately with the problems posed by the arms race in outer space. The only limitation placed on military activity in outer space is the prohibition, in the first paragraph of article IV of the Treaty, of the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

The Treaty thus, on the contrary, authorizes other military uses of outer space. Moreover this is clear both from the statements made at the time by the Soviet representative (A/AC.105/C.2/SR.66, p. 6) and from the positions adopted by the United States (*Hearings on the Outer Space Treaty*, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 90th Congress, 1st session 1976, p. 76).[11]

Furthermore, from the point of view of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Treaty has a very limited value in so far as the use of nuclear weapons in orbit is of doubtful military effectiveness. In fact, in trying by that means to cripple or destroy the enemy's satellites, a country would be likely to damage its own satellites.

(2) In the second place, the lack of any recognized immunity for satellites is likely to detract from the positive role of some of them in the matter of international verification, a role nevertheless attributed to them as "national means of verification".

III. THE IMMUNITY OF SPACE VEHICLES

The 1967 Treaty on outer space states in its article I that outer space should be used in accordance with international law. Article III further specifies that such use should be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and in the interest of international peace and security.

Thus the question of the immunity of military observation satellites is closely linked with the recognition of the international legitimacy of the role they play.

The declaration of President Carter of 1 October 1978 establishes a link between military observation satellites and national means of verification, the legitimate use of which is recognized by the international instruments in force.

The position of the Soviet Union is more ambiguous and requires clarification on the following three points:

Does the international protection afforded "national technical means of verification" specifically include satellites? This would seem to be obvious, but it would be useful if it could be unequivocally recognized.

Is such immunity subject to any limitative interpretations concerning the scope of acceptable verifications, or is any observation capability considered legitimate?

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[11] These hearings were in 1967, not 1976.

Is the non-interference clause appearing in the bilateral Soviet-American instruments valid for third countries or international organizations?

These questions would not arise if the draft treaty put forward by the Soviet Union (document A/36/192, 11 August 1981)[12] did not appear to leave the door open to every sort of possibility. The juxtaposition of article 1 of the draft treaty, which prohibits the stationing in outer space of weapons, without specifying what that term means, and article 3 of the draft which, on the other hand, legitimizes the destruction of satellites that might appear to any one of the signatories to have a purpose contrary to article 1, to which I have just referred, justifies the most serious concern.

Not only would article 3 have the effect of authorizing States to take the law into their own hands in outer space on the basis of their suspicions, thus creating mistrust and insecurity for all, but it would in addition legitimize the deployment of anti-satellite systems.

The terms of article 2 likewise give rise to many doubts: the moment a satellite or space platform is considered, in the unilateral and subjective interpretation of one of the parties, as not being used in strict conformity "with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding", is it to be concluded that it would be legitimate to interfere with its functioning?

It is worthwhile asking this question in view of the existence of a Soviet Union proposal submitted on 10 August 1972 with respect to television satellites. That proposal stated that a State was entitled to use against programmes it deemed "illegal" "the means at its disposal, not only on its territory but also *in outer space* or situated outside its national jurisdiction".

IV. POSSIBLE MEASURES

The difficulties encountered the moment an attempt is made to distinguish between satellites for military purposes and satellites for civilian purposes, or to use such ill-defined notions as that of a "weapon", should lead us to contemplate specific measures rather than a general prohibition on the placing of weapons in orbit. Such measures might include the following:

(1) The immunity of satellites. Bilateral agreements have given these a certain degree of protection. This immunity should be made more specific and should be broadened and extended beyond the scope of bilateral arrangements concerning non-interference with "national means of verification" to apply to all existing satellites, if they are equipped only with passive means of defence.

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[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 334–336.

(2) Measures taking into account the entire weapon system in each case and not merely its space component. It should be recognized that when that component is integrated into a weapon system of which it is merely the part in orbit, it is the whole of the system that should, if necessary, form the subject of measures of limitation, as in fact was done in the bilateral treaty on anti-ballistic missile systems. The central problem is still that of the arms race, including its increased use of outer space, and not that of the "militarization of outer space".

(3) The adoption of measures designed to strengthen confidence in the immunity of systems whose stabilizing value derives principally from the fact of their availability in times of crisis. For example, notification of the characteristics of space objects and the adoption of "co-operative" measures in order to remove any suspicions that might be aroused by certain manoeuvres on the part of a space vehicle.

(4) Recognition of the usefulness of a human presence in outer space because of the capacity for initiative and judgement thereby introduced into the conduct of a space mission. In that connection, the specific mention of reusable manned space vehicles, which means the United States space shuttle, in article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty casts an unwarranted suspicion on that type of craft.

(5) Lastly, the giving of higher priority to the consideration of ways of promoting international co-operation with a view to using earth observation systems for the verification of compliance with arms limitation agreements and for purposes of crisis control. The proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency is worth recalling in this connection (see report of the Secretary General entitled "Study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency"—document A/AC.206/14; [13] resolution 37/78 K).

Article by the Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy (Petrosyants): Limitation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, April 18, 1983 [1]

[Text] [2] In July 1974, during the Soviet-U.S. Moscow summit meeting, the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests was signed, establishing a ban on the testing of such weapons having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. [3] The Soviet side was prepared to go even further. The USSR has consistently advocated and is advocating the conclusion of an agreement banning all tests of nuclear weapons, seeing it as a most important measure to limit the qualitative improvement of such weapons and, consequently, to curb and, in the final count, to halt the nuclear arms race. But, given the circumstances wherein talks on the complete cessation of nuclear tests were making no headway at all because of the negative U.S. position, the Soviet Union, in its striving to lead the entire problem out of deadlock, agreed, to begin with, to conclude a treaty limiting the yield of underground nuclear explosions, to conclude what is usually called in the West a "threshold" treaty. Such an agreement was useful insofar as its purpose was to put an end to the testing of the most powerful and most destructive nuclear devices.

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[13] *The Technical, Legal and Financial Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency* (U.N. Sales No. 83.1X.3).

[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, Apr. 18, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Apr. 19, 1983, vol. III, pp. AA1–AA4.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

In May 1976 the USSR and the United States concluded yet another "threshold" treaty—on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes—which established a limit on the yield of nuclear explosions used to accomplish various national economic tasks.[4]

In signing these treaties the Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that, in line with the establishment of the 150-kiloton threshold for nuclear explosions which was in itself of considerable significance, the agreements reached laid the foundations for resolving the basic problem: the total and universal banning of nuclear weapon tests. The 1974 treaty registered the sides' commitment "to continue negotiations with a view to achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests."

And how did matters develop further?

Insofar as the United States was in no hurry to ratify the treaty, in the spring of 1976 the sides reached an understanding that they would adhere to the agreed 150-kiloton threshold in carrying out nuclear weapon tests. Although 9 and 7 years respectively have already elapsed since the two treaties were signed, neither of them has yet come into force because the United States has simply not gone on to ratify them.

It must be said that through all these years the debate and arguments over the ratification issue have not ceased in the United States. It is, nevertheless, indicative that each time the question of the treaties' ratification seems to be approaching its goal, various grounds and pretexts were found in Washington to slow matters down. Thus in 1977 during the Carter administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended the ratification of the two treaties, but the U.S. Administration decided to withhold their ratification on the artificial pretext that this might hinder the completion of the tripartite Soviet-U.S.-British talks on the total banning of nuclear weapon tests, which were under way at that time.

Later on, however, after the Reagan administration came to power, the tripartite talks were broken off by the United States. This happened at a time when significant progress had been achieved at the talks.

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[4] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332

For several years I happened to head the USSR delegation at these talks and I have full grounds for declaring that agreement had been practically reached by that time on all the basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Nevertheless, in July 1982 Washington announced that the U.S. Administration refuses altogether to reach a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which has now been transferred to a "long-term" goal. At the same time statements emerged about its intention to raise the question of revising the 1974 and 1976 treaties.[5]

The real state of affairs behind this decision by the U.S. Administration was openly disclosed by the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* which noted in its March 1983 issue: "Presently the Pentagon is planning to develop and produce during the next 6 years about 17,000 new units of nuclear munitions. This is precisely why in 1982 President Reagan issued a directive to increase the number of nuclear tests and end further U.S. participation in the tripartite test ban talks with Britain and the Soviet Union." The same magazine noted that since President Reagan came to power the funds allocated for use of the Nevada testing ground have doubled and will reach $354 million in 1983. Commentary, as they say, is superfluous.

The U.S. programs for the accumulation of nuclear weapons cannot, obviously, but generate growing concern among the world's public, and also in the U.S. Congress. Under the existing conditions Washington is forced to maneuver in order to cover up its true goals, its line of reexamining and undermining existing agreements in the arms limitation field.

It is in this light that we must examine the U.S. side's proposal, announced by President Reagan at his 29 March White House press conference to hold talks regarding the revision of the monitoring provisions [*polozheniya o kontrole*] contained in the 1974 and 1976 treaties,[6] supposedly in order to "improve" these provisions. Furthermore, the U.S. President said that the above proposal has been motivated by the fact that the United States supposedly had "grounds to believe that there have been numerous violations" of the agreement not to exceed the 150-kiloton threshold. The President, however, admitted at once that "in view of the absence of verification capabilities [*vozmozhnosti proverki*] we could not raise such an accusation and support it with concrete facts."

And indeed, the United States has not had and does not have the slightest ground to doubt that the Soviet Union is keeping its word and does not undertake any actions at all incompatible with the 1974 treaty's stipulations. The Soviet state always has and always does strictly fulfill its international commitments.

Even in the United States itself authoritative experts are convinced that the Soviet Union has not exceeded the agreed threshold. The well-known seismologist L. Sykes (member of the U.S. delegation to the talks on drafting the "threshold" treaty), together with another seismologist, (J. Evernden), wrote in the October 1982 issue of *Scientific American:* "In recent years there have been reports that the Soviet Union has, possibly, repeatedly breached the 1974 treaty by testing devices with a yield exceeding the 150-kiloton threshold. Such assumed breaches have recently been cited as proof that the 'threshold' treaty, which has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate, is impossible to verify and that new talks are necessary. On the basis of our analysis we have concluded," the article's authors continue, "that these reports are erroneous, that they are based on an error in one of the calibration curves linking magnitude with explosion yield. When the correct calibration curve is used it becomes obvious that the Russian weapon tests have never exceeded 150 kilotons, although some tests have been close to that magnitude."

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[5] *Ibid., 1982,* pp. 475–478.

[6] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Apr. 4, 1983, pp. 473–474.

And here is the opinion of yet another eminent expert in the nuclear field: M. (Mey), deputy director of the Livermore Laboratory, (which, as is well known, deals with the development of new types of U.S. nuclear weapons). According to the March issue of *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* (Mey) recently declared that there are documents "allowing the conclusion that there is no proof of breaches by the Soviet Union of the 'threshold' treaty banning nuclear tests." This is the true state of affairs.

The U.S. Administration, in proposing to review the 1974 and 1976 treaties, alleges that the monitoring procedures envisaged by these treaties are "inadequate." This is why it is necessary to bring total clarity to the issue of the procedures for monitoring observance of the treaties limiting underground nuclear weapon tests and underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Soviet Union considers that effective monitoring is an important element of agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. Such monitoring is indeed envisaged by the 1974 and 1976 treaties. It is based on the use of national technical means. But the matter does not end there. There are supplementary provisions for monitoring procedures, elaborated in detail, which comprise a coordinated system of measures which, as and when it comes in force, would reliably ensure the confidence of the sides in the observance of mutual agreements.

These procedures include the exchange of information on the geological and geophysical characteristics of the sides' test grounds (density, seismic wave velocity, water saturation, porosity and depth of water tables). It is furthermore envisaged exchanging information on the yield, date, time, depth and coordinates of nuclear weapon tests for calibration purposes for each geophysically distinct test area where underground nuclear weapon tests have been and are to be conducted, as well as other data concerning test areas. The purpose of these exchanges is to enhance the effectiveness and accuracy of the work of the national technical means which record the seismic oscillations in the Earth's crust caused by underground explosions.

If the monitoring system elaborated during the drafting of the "threshold" treaty with the participation of highly qualified experts from both sides were brought fully into operation then the accuracy of evaluating the yield of explosions which have taken place would be much higher. How is it possible to accept as convincing the claims that this system is "inadequate" when it has not even been tested in practice? If the United States were to ratify the treaties and bring them into force, thus bringing into operation the effective monitoring measures envisaged by them, the questions or doubts now being raised by the U.S. side would simply not emerge.

For a long time now the Soviet Union has been proposing to the United States that the treaties be ratified and enacted, thus eliminating any "uncertainties" at all regarding observance of the explosion yield threshold which have sometimes emerged on one side or the other. The very posing of the question of "improving" the monitoring provisions contained in the Soviet-U.S. treaties is artificial.

The Soviet Union's position on the above-mentioned treaties is clear and unambiguous; it has been stated repeatedly and officially. This position is that it is first of all necessary to bring them into force and to realize the opportunities contained in them which are aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of monitoring. It is well known that the treaties also contain provisions for reviewing their operation insofar as is necessary. If during the implementation of treaties to their full extent the sides raise questions relating to monitoring, they can resort to the consultation procedure provided for by the treaties.

Regarding the question of observing the existing understanding that the threshold not be exceeded, the Soviet Union has declared on many occasions that it does not intend to undertake any actions whatsoever incompatible with the 1974 treaty's provisions, provided that the United States, for its part, acts analogously.

The Soviet Union, as A.A. Gromyko declared at the last UN General Assembly session, is prepared at any time—on the basis of reciprocity—to ratify the Soviet-U.S. treaties on the limitation of nuclear weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. [7] The Soviet side advocates the resumption in the very near future of the tripartite talks to conclude the drafting of a total nuclear weapon test ban treaty. This is why today it is imperative that we begin to move toward the limitation and subsequent cessation of the nuclear arms race.

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 721–731.

Remarks by President Reagan: Report of the Commission on Strategic Forces, April 19, 1983 [1]

Later today, I'll send a report to the Congress [2] which endorses the recommendations of the bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces, [3] urges prompt congressional action and support. This distinguished panel's recommendations are important for two reasons: The actions they propose will preserve stable deterrence and thus protect the peace, and they will add solid incentives and credibility to our efforts to negotiate arms reductions that can pave the way to a more secure and peaceful future.

On the 23d of March, I spoke to the American people about our program for strengthening this nation's security and that of our allies and announced a long-term research effort to reduce, someday, the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles. [4] A week later in Los Angeles, I expanded our efforts to limit and reduce this danger through reliable, verifiable, and stabilizing arms control agreements. [5] Both of these paths lead to a common goal: preventing conflict, reducing the risk of war, and safeguarding the peace.

Every American President has accepted this crucial objective as his most basic responsibility. But preserving the peace requires more than wishful thinking and vague good intentions. Concrete, positive action is required to free the world from the specter of nuclear conflict. And that's why we will continue to work relentlessly to achieve nuclear stability at the lowest possible levels.

Our words, policies, and actions all make clear to the world our country's deeply held conviction that nuclear war on any scale would be a tragedy of unparalleled scope. Time and again, America has exercised unilateral restraint, good will, and a sincere commitment to effective arms control. Unfortunately, these actions alone have not yet made us truly safer, and they haven't reduced the danger of nuclear war. Over the past year, for example, the Soviets have deployed over 1,200 intercontinental ballistic missile warheads, more than the entire Peacekeeper program.

The history of American involvement in arms control shows us what works and what doesn't work. The fact is that in the past our one-sided restraint and good will failed to promote similar restraint and good will from the Soviet Union. They also failed to produce meaningful arms control. But history also teaches us that when the United States has shown the resolve to remain strong, stabilizing arms control can be achieved.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Apr. 25, 1983, pp. 563–565.

[2] The letter transmitting the report is *infra*.

[3] *Ante*, Apr. 6.

[4] *Ante*.

[5] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Apr. 4, 1983, pp. 484–489.

In the late sixties, we made a major effort to negotiate an antiballistic missile treaty with the Soviet Union. After the Soviet leadership demonstrated a clear lack of interest, the Congress agreed to fund an antiballistic missile building program. And the result was predictable. Once the Soviets knew we were going ahead, they came to the negotiating table, and we negotiated a treaty. It was formally adopted and remains in force today.

Obviously, the best way to nuclear stability and a lasting peace is through negotiations. And this is the course that we've set. And if we demonstrate our resolve, it can lead to success.

It was against this background that I established a bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces last January and directed it to review the strategic program for United States forces with particular emphasis on intercontinental ballistic missile systems and their basing. A distinguished bipartisan panel of Americans who served on the Commission, and those who served as senior counselors, have performed a great service to their country, and we all owe them a debt of gratitude.

Brent Scowcroft, the Commission's Chairman, other Commission members, Harold Brown, and the senior consultants are here today. I want to express my appreciation to you all for a tough job extraordinarily well done.

In the finest spirit of bipartisanship, the Commission unanimously arrived at clear, important recommendations on some of the most difficult issues of our time. During the past 3 months, the Commission held dozens of formal meetings and numerous small conferences. They talked to over 200 technical experts and consulted closely with the Congress. The Commission members sought a common objective: to achieve a greater degree of national consensus concerning our approach to strategic force modernization and arms control.

As the Constitution's [*Commission's*] [6] report concludes, "If we can begin to see ourselves in dealing with these issues, not as political partisans or as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set of problems, but rather as citizens of a great nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in the long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, a common perspective may finally be found." Well, these words guided the work of the Commission. It is my fervent hope that they will guide all of us as we work toward the solution of what has been a difficult and lengthy issue.

The Commission has completed its work and last week submitted its report to me. It was immediately released, as you know, to the public. After reviewing the report, I met with the National Security Council. They endorse the Commission's recommendations, as do all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And so do I.

First, the Commission urges us to continue the strategic modernization program which I announced in October of 1981. [7] It reaffirms that the need remains for improvements in the command, control, and communications of our strategic forces, and continuation of our bomber, submarine, and cruise missile programs.

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[6] Brackets in source text.

[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 461–464.

Second, the Commission urges modernization of our ICBM forces. We should immediately proceed to develop and produce the Peacekeeper missile and deploy 100 in existing Minuteman silos near Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. At the same time, the Commission recommends that we begin engineering the design for a small, single-warhead missile. If strategic and technical considerations warrant, this missile could be ready for deployment in the early 1990's. Incidentally, this modernization program will save about $1½ billion in 1984 and even more than that in each of the next 2 years.

Third, the Commission recommends major research efforts in strategic defense and a thorough research program of hardening, making our land-based missile systems more secure. This modernization effort is the final component of our comprehensive, strategic program. It will mean a safer, more secure America. And it will provide clear evidence to the Soviet Union that it is in their best interest to negotiate with us in good faith and with seriousness of purpose. That adds up to an important incentive for both arms control and deterrence, for peace and security now and far into the future.

Finally, the Commission underscores the need for ambitious arms control negotiations, negotiations that would lead to agreements that are balanced, promote stability in time of crisis, and result in meaningful, verifiable reductions. These are precisely the objectives of our arms control proposals now on the table in Geneva. These are—well, I want to reemphasize that we're in Geneva seeking equitable, reliable agreements that would bring real reductions.

So, the task before us is to demonstrate our resolve, our national will, and our good faith. That's absolutely essential both for maintaining an effective deterrent and for achieving successful arms reductions. Make no mistake, unless we modernize our land-based missile systems, the Soviet Union will have no real reason to negotiate meaningful reductions. If we fail to act, we cannot reasonably expect an acceptable outcome in our arms control negotiations, and we will also weaken the deterrent posture that has preserved the peace for more than a generation.

Therefore, I urge the Congress to join me now in supporting this bipartisan program to pursue arms control agreements that promote stability, to meet the needs of our ICBM force today, and to move to a more stable ICBM structure in the future.

To follow up on the Commission's recommendations, I have asked Brent Scowcroft in his capacity as Chairman to keep me closely advised as this issue moves toward resolution, particularly as it relates to arms control.

For more than a decade, each of four administrations made proposals for arms control and modernization. Unfortunately, each became embroiled in political controversy. The members of the Commission, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I have all had to take fresh looks at our previous positions. But despite the wide range of views these groups have held in the past, we now have a program that has our unanimous support.

Support by the Congress and the American people for this consensus will unite us in our common search for ways to strengthen our national security, reduce the risk of war, and ultimately reduce the level of nuclear weapons. We can no longer afford to delay. The time to act is now.

Thank you all very much for being here, and again I thank the Commission for their fine work.

Letter From President Reagan to the Speaker of the House (O'Neill), the President of the Senate (Bush), and Congressional Committee Chairmen: Report of the Commission on Strategic Forces, April 19, 1983 [1]

On January 3, 1983, I established a bipartisan Commission to respond to the issues raised by the Congress regarding the Peacekeeper missile, possible alternatives to the Peacekeeper, and possible alternative ICBM basing modes. The report, which the Commission submitted to me, was delivered to you last week. [2] Attached is a classified report prepared by the Department of Defense submitted pursuant to the provisions of subsection (7) of Title V of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1983, enacted as part of P.L. 97–377. The attached document addresses the issues set out in subsection (7).

I am pleased to report to you that the distinguished group of Americans who served on the Commission have unanimously agreed on a package of actions, which I strongly support, and on which Secretary Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Shultz and the National Security Council have joined with me in supporting. They are as follows:

(1) Improve as a first priority the command, control, and communications for our strategic forces; continue with high priority the Trident submarine and D–5 missile programs; and continue the bomber and air-launched cruise missile efforts as planned.

(2) Proceed with the immediate production of the Peacekeeper missile, and deployment of 100 such missiles in existing Minuteman silos in the Francis E. Warren AFB area, which I propose as the alternative basing plan required by P.L. 97–

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Apr. 25, 1983, pp. 565–566. The Committee Chairmen to whom the letter was sent were John Tower, Senate Armed Services; Mark O. Hatfield, Senate Appropriations; Melvin Price, House Armed Services; and James L. Whitten, House Appropriations.

[2] Printed *ante*, Apr. 6.

377. Specifically, the first 50 missiles will replace the Minuteman missiles in the 400th Strategic Missile Squadron (SMS). In turn, the second 50 will replace the Minuteman missiles in the 319th SMS. I have chosen Francis E. Warren AFB because the existing silos at that location offer the best operational considerations.

(3) Commence engineering design of a small, single warhead ICBM. If strategic and technical considerations warrant, such a missile could be ready for full-scale development in 1987 and potential deployment in the early 1990's.

(4) Expand research into, and undertake the most rigorous examination of, all forms of defense against ballistic missiles. This includes work on penetration aids.

(5) Undertake a specific program to resolve uncertainties regarding silo and shelter hardness, a study of fratricide effects, and investigation of different types of land-based vehicles and launchers, particularly hardened vehicles.

Finally, I reconfirm that I am fully committed to continue to pursue ambitious and objective arms reduction negotiations with a goal of agreements that are balanced, promote stability in time of crisis, constitute meaningful force reductions, and are verifiable. As you know, our proposals to secure reductions of all types of weapons are before the Soviets in many forums.

I urge the Congress to join me now in this bipartisan effort to settle on a modernization plan for our strategic forces. For more than a decade, each of four administrations has made proposals for arms control and modernization that have become embroiled in political controversy.

Balancing a number of factors, the members of the Commission, the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I have all had to take fresh looks at our previous positions. Despite the range of views these groups have held in the past, we are presenting to you a unanimous view on this vital issue. Your support for the consensus can unite us in taking a major step forward in our common search for ways to ensure national security.

Statement by Secretary of State Shultz Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services: U.S. Strategic Forces, April 20, 1983 [1]

I am pleased to be here along with [Defense] [2] Secretary Weinberger to explain the importance of the President's proposals for modernizing our strategic forces. First of all, I want to say that we all owe a great debt to Brent Scowcroft and his colleagues on the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. They have given us a thorough, thoughtful, and invaluable analysis. They brought to their task expertise and experience. They also brought with them the conviction that a matter so fundamental as our strategic forces—the backbone of our military strength—must be addressed in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation. There is a lesson here for all of us.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 480.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

The question of how to modernize our strategic forces has been hotly debated for years now. The time has come to resolve it. As the commission has shown us, it can only be accomplished if Americans of both parties work together with the attitude that we are partners in a common enterprise. I know President Reagan is eager to work with the Congress in that spirit.

I defer to Secretary Weinberger on the military considerations that underlie the President's program. I want to address myself to two key points.

First, modernization of our strategic forces, and particularly of our ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] forces, is of critical importance to our foreign policy.

Second, the President's program is not only consistent with but, indeed, advances the important national objective of strategic arms control and reduction.

Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance

The central goal of our national security policy is deterrence of war, and maintenance of the strategic balance is a necessary condition for that deterrence. But the strategic balance also shapes, to an important degree, the global environment in which the United States pursues its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, decisions on major strategic weapons systems can have profound political as well as military consequences.

As Secretary of State I am acutely conscious of the strength or weakness of American power, because it has a direct impact on our ability to achieve our goals. As a crucial determinant of relative strength, the strategic balance is a key indicator of relative influence.

Perceptions of the strategic balance are bound to influence the judgments of not only our adversaries but also our allies and friends around the world who rely on us. As leader of the democratic nations, we have an inescapable responsibility to maintain this pillar of the military balance which only we can maintain. Our determination to do so is an important signal of our resolve. Our performance of this responsibility is absolutely essential to sustaining the confidence of allies and friends and to maintaining the cohesion of our alliances.

For the first two decades of the postwar period, our allies in the Atlantic community, Japan, and elsewhere could count on our unquestioned strategic superiority. The longstanding Soviet superiority in conventional forces on the Eurasian landmass was offset by superior American strategic power as the guarantee of our allies' security.

The massive growth of the Soviet strategic arsenal and our unilateral self-restraint in the 1960s and 1970s have altered this situation. We no longer possess the strategic advantage we once had, and, indeed, we face significant weaknesses in several areas of strategic weaponry. This shift in the strategic balance makes it more important for us and our allies to address the problem of conventional and regional imbalances, while doing whatever is necessary to restore strategic stability.

The Soviet Union has also expanded its conventional forces and its global reach at a rapid rate in tandem with its nuclear buildup. Our vulnerability in many regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf is apparent, as is the impressive growth of the Soviets' ability to project power worldwide. This development is even more sobering given the increasing proclivity of the Soviets since the mid-1970s to use their forces and those of their proxies in Angola, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, as well as to threaten their neighbor (in Poland) and to try to subvert our neighbors (in Central America).

My concern is that the growth of Soviet strategic power can, therefore, have an important effect on the Soviets' willingness to run risks in a regional conflict or crisis. Correspondingly, it makes our response more difficult. In the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and in the Middle East alert in 1973, American strategic power was an important element in denying the Soviet Union any credible option to escalate beyond the local level. In the Cuban case we possessed an overwhelming strategic as well as local superiority; in the case of the 1973 alert we still had some advantage. I do not want to see the day come when, in a replay of the Cuban crisis or Middle East alert, the numbers—and the results—are reversed.

The Peacekeeper ICBM has a direct relevance to this problem of Soviet risk taking. If the Soviets can strike effectively at our land-based ICBMs while our land-based deterrent does not have comparable capability, the Soviets might believe that they have a significant advantage in a crucial dimension of the strategic balance; they could seek to gain political leverage by a threat of nuclear blackmail. Without arguing the question of whether the Soviets are prepared to launch a nuclear first strike, such a crucial imbalance in strategic capabilities could well make them bolder in a regional conflict or in a major crisis.

For these reasons, I believe that our foreign policy—and our ability to defend our interests and our most cherished values—will be critically strengthened if the Congress gives strong backing to the program the President announced yesterday. Modernization of our strategic deterrent—and of our land-based ICBM force in particular—is essential to the goal he stated, that of "preventing conflict, reducing the risks of war, and safeguarding the peace." That is why the Peacekeeper program is so important.

- It will demonstrate our commitment to maintaining the strategic balance and to maintaining the credibility of our land-based strategic forces.
- It will enhance our capacity to deter nuclear war and significant conventional attack or the threat of either.
- It will strengthen our commitment to the security of the United States and its allies and friends.
- It will also increase Moscow's incentive to negotiate seriously in START [strategic arms reduction talks] and other arms reduction talks. Let me say more on that subject.

Arms Reductions and the Strategic Balance

I know that the Congress, and all Americans, share our hopes that arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union will bring about a significant reduction of nuclear arsenals and a significant easing of the dangers of nuclear war. Strategic arms control has been a subject of major controversy and concern for well over a decade. If we have learned anything from those debates and negotiations, we should have learned this fundamental truth: The process of strategic arms control depends absolutely on the demonstrated ability of the United States to maintain the strategic balance. This, in turn, depends—as it always has—on maintaining a modern, capable triad of strategic forces. The Peacekeeper ICBM is a critical component of that modernized triad.

The Peacekeeper represents the response which every administration since that of President Nixon has believed necessary to offset, at least partially, the formidable Soviet ICBM arsenal. In this profoundly simple sense, a new missile like the Peacekeeper is not only consistent with strategic arms control but is an essential element of the process. From the standpoint of the SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks] Treaty, [3] that treaty was premised on the existence of the Peacekeeper or MX (as it was then called). From the standpoint of the negotiations in which we are engaged today—not only to limit strategic arms but to reduce them—it is even more important to maintain the balance. I know from personal experience that the Soviets are tough bargainers, as we are and must be as well. They make no compromises for free; nor should we. Only if they see the United States determined to modernize our strategic forces will they have an incentive to negotiate a verifiable agreement, establishing equal, lower levels. Only if they see no possibility of achieving superiority will they accede to real arms reductions based on equality.

The Peacekeeper is also fully consistent with all the specific provisions of existing SALT agreements. [4] Deploying 100 of the new missiles in existing Minuteman silos, as the President proposes, would involve no construction of new fixed launchers, no increase in silo volume, and no increase in MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] ICBM launchers. Moreover, the limited number is obviously far too few to be destabilizing.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[4] *Ibid.* and *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

Questions have been asked, I know, about the new small ICBM, as proposed by the Scowcroft commission and by the President. Some have wondered how this is consistent with either SALT II or a possible START agreement. The SALT II Treaty would have permitted deployment of no more than one new ICBM on each side; on our side, the new missile would be the Peacekeeper. But that treaty, even if it had been ratified, would have expired at the end of 1985. The President's proposal calls for the start of engineering development of a possible new small ICBM; no deployment could be possible until after 1990—long after the SALT II time period had expired. And long before that time, we would hope that a START agreement will have established a new regime for maintaining a stable strategic balance.

Beyond this, the new small missile, if it proves feasible, would have broader, positive implications for arms control. It would enhance stability, which has always been a central objective of arms control since the process began. As Secretary Weinberger has explained, it may move the evolution of strategic systems in a stabilizing direction over the long term. Our START proposals can be flexible enough to accommodate this small missile.

There is no guarantee that a restructuring of U.S. and Soviet forces will take place in the near future, but time may well give both sides the incentive to move in this direction. The U.S.-Soviet strategic competition will continue into the long-term future. We can make a historic decision now that can shape the strategic relationship in a positive way for decades to come.

Conclusion

To sum up, as Secretary of State I can only share with the Secretary of Defense the conviction that modernization of our strategic forces is a matter of the highest priority. A credible, flexible strategic force is not only vital to the balance of power but is the essential foundation of our role as leader and defender of the free nations. The fundamental goal of nuclear deterrence depends on it; our goal of deterring non-nuclear war or nuclear blackmail also depends on it.

The Peacekeeper missile is indispensable to our near-term goals of restoring the strategic balance, deterring challenges, and providing an incentive to the Soviets for serious negotiations on arms reductions. Research and possible development of a small ICBM may enhance strategic stability into the next century. As the Scowcroft commission stressed, neither of the two systems can ensure security alone; they are complementary.

Strength and peace are also complementary. Both must be pursued with determination. And with that determination, both can be achieved.

Chinese Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Prohibition Regime of the Future Convention Banning Chemical Weapons, April 21, 1983 [1]

I

The idea of including a prohibition of the use in the scope of a future convention on chemical weapons has now been accepted by a number of delegations. However, a new question is raised by some other delegations concerning the relationship between the two prohibition regimes respectively contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol [2] and the future convention should the prohibition of use be included in the scope of the future convention. It is obvious that a proper solution of the problem will contribute to an early agreement on the scope of prohibition in negotiations.

II

The Chinese delegation believes that the two regimes should be in line with each other. Should there be any difference between the two, problems would arise which would be similar to those we have already encountered during negotiations when such a prohibition of use was not supposedly to be included in the scope of the convention.

For instance, it would be necessary to differentiate areas which come under the prohibition regime of Protocol and which would come under the regime of the future convention. The next step would be to seek a remedy to the deficiency of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the verification of compliance. As is shown by experience, these issues alone are too complicated to allow of an easy solution, let alone certain man-made difficulties which are likely to be encountered.

If, however, the two regimes could be brought in line with each other, all the difficulties mentioned above would be rid of, because any failure of compliance with one of the regimes would simultaneously be a failure with the other. And this failure of compliance could be dealt with according to the verification provisions or other relevant provisions possibly contained in the future convention.

III

There exists such a basis for bringing these two regimes in line with each other. That is, to prohibit the direct or indirect use of the toxic physiological effects of chemical substances for fighting purposes. It is not only the obligation provided for in the 1925 Geneva Protocol (the field of biological warfare is not referred to here, this being outside the range of our present discussion) but is also in full accord with the "general purpose criteria" of the future convention. At the same time it can suitably resolve the differences of opinion on herbicides and irritants, that is, their use for fighting purposes should be prohibited while allowing their use for the purposes of peace and law-enforcement. And obviously, activities which are in conformity with these two purposes such as development and production, etc. are also legal.

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[1] CD/378.

[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

IV

The best way of bringing the two prohibition regimes in line with each other is to use the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in the definition of chemical weapons to be included in the future convention, and to also include a definition of "chemical warfare agents" itself.

The concept of "chemical warfare agents" centers on the most fundamental characteristics of chemical weapons and also reflects the content of the "general purpose criteria". As such it can aptly serve as the basis for unifying the two prohibition regimes.

It can be said that it is precisely the term "chemical warfare agents" which sums up most precisely and appropriately the fundamental characteristics of the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol (here no reference is made to biological warfare either), and which embodies the kernel prohibition by the future convention, whether it refers to super-toxic, lethal, other harmful substances or any other types of chemicals so long as they are used for fighting purposes.

V

In document CD/CW/CRP 62, definitions of "chemical weapons" and "chemical warfare agents" are given as follows:

> The chemical weapons . . . refer to those weapons the casualty capabilities of which are based on the toxicity of chemical substances. They include:
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> (a) chemical warfare agents and their precursors which produce a direct toxic effect on the target.
>
> (b) munitions or devices specially designed for filling with chemical warfare agents or their precursors and dispersing them in a combat state;
>
> (c) equipment specially designed for the purpose of the direct use of such munitions or devices.
>
> Chemical warfare agents are all toxic chemical substances whose types and quantities accord with hostile and military purposes and whose toxic effects are used to interfere directly with the normal functions of men, animals and plants in such a way as to lead them to death, temporary incapacitation or permanent injury. In accordance with the toxicity criteria, chemical warfare agents can be divided into the following three categories: . . .

Many other delegations have also advanced their definitions of "chemical weapons" and "chemical warfare agents" which, in spite of different wordings, are all very much characteristic and audio-visual.

As such it can aptly serve as the basis for unifying the prohibition regime of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and that of the future convention.

So here is the conclusion: the prohibition regime of the future convention and that of the 1925 Geneva Protocol should and can be unified, and the appropriate medium to substantiate such unification is "chemical warfare agent".

Remarks by President Reagan at the Swearing In of Kenneth L. Adelman as ACDA Director, April 22, 1983 [1]

The President. Well, Ken, it's wonderful to see a smile on your face—[laughter] [2]—after so many trying weeks and to be able to congratulate you on this happy occasion. And I want you to know we're proud of you.

I know that your family is even more proud. And you're a man of vision, courage, and honor, and, I might say now by this time, patience and endurance. [Laughter]

Of course, your work is just beginning. This position you're assuming is unique within the governments of the world. No other country has an arms control agency with such prominence as ours. In a sense, this is highly symbolic, for ACDA and its mission embody America's highest aspirations.

Our country's record on arms control in the postwar era is a proud record. It began with the Baruch plan, [3] and it's being carried on today in our far-reaching negotiating proposals and our other efforts to reduce the risks and arsenals of war.

Our goal is peace with justice. We search for a means to resolve differences without resort to war, without resort to violence, and with assurance of compliance with the agreements made.

I know that you'll be an important voice, a true advocate, and a source of energy for our efforts to achieve these great goals through the equitable and effectively verifiable agreements that we're seeking.

And I see, Ken, that you've brought a few friends and colleagues—[laughter]—with you in addition to your lovely family up here. You now join a larger family whose entire professional commitment is to be an important resource for me and for you in the search for genuine peace.

While the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is small compared to other Federal agencies, its importance far exceeds its size. Since its founding in 1961, ACDA has played a key role in some of this country's most important policy decisions. During your tenure, ACDA will often be front and center in that process. One thing your

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Apr. 25, 1983, p. 579.

[2] These and following brackets in the source text.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* vol. I, pp. 7–16.

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confirmation process clearly did was to highlight this Agency's critical role.

Last week, following your confirmation by the Senate, I said that I foresaw a reinvigorated Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under your leadership. I want to assure the dedicated personnel of ACDA that they and you have my full confidence. They should know that I will look to you and to them for counsel in these important days ahead. And I know that I can depend on all of you for strong support.

And I might say in view of so much of what was said in these arduous weeks that have gone by, honest, I want arms reduction. [Laughter]

Welcome aboard, and our warmest congratulations.

Remarks by Kenneth L. Adelman at His Swearing In as ACDA Director, April 22, 1983 [1]

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary, ACDA staff, family and friends, someone just the other day reminded me, Mr. President, that it's been a quarter of a year since you nominated me as Director of ACDA, and I was kind of startled. But it just goes to show how time flies when you're having fun, you know? [Laughter] [2] But these past 3 months have shown me, more than ever before, that nothing worthwhile ever comes easily. Surely, it's safe to say this in terms of the confirmation process.

The extensive, unflinching support you gave me, Mr. President, and which was given to me by Secretary Shultz, Judge Clark, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and the White House staff, ACDA, and the State Department, and the family and friends gathered here, meant more to me than any gift I have ever been given before. I'm deeply grateful and know that it has been worthwhile.

It has been worthwhile because of the unquestionable importance of the directorship of ACDA and the fine caliber of the Agency staff. It has been worthwhile because of the unquestionable importance of arms control to you, Mr. President, to us at ACDA, and to the American people. It has been worthwhile because of the critical importance of arms control to our elected officials in the Congress.

Much of the time since my confirmation vote last week has been spent on individual meetings with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other interested Senators in discussing the depth of our mutual commitment to a strong arms control program. I've gathered a good amount of advice which I will share with you later, Mr. President. This was anticipated, since I spent considerable time with those Senators voicing reservations over the last 3 months.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Apr. 25, 1983, pp. 579–580.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

The spirit of bipartisanship and of close consultations has been superb. I look forward to working with the Congress in precisely this spirit.

Similarly for arms control agreements themselves, nothing worthwhile ever comes easily. To accomplish your goals for arms control, including deep and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons, bringing about enhanced stability, this takes time, energy, tenacity, and imagination. Your administration has surely chosen the difficult, the bold road on arms control, a road which can lead to agreements which make the world a safer place for all of us, a world with fewer nuclear weapons on both sides, a world wherein freedom can blossom and diversity is widely treasured.

These are the traditional goals of America. These are the goals which inspire all of us in our lives as Americans. These are the goals which I pledge to you to pursue to my fullest as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Interview of Soviet General Secretary Andropov by *Der Spiegel* Magazine: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations and Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union, April 24, 1983 [1]

Question: There is clearly no progress at the Geneva talks on medium-range weapons in Europe. The American proposal, which contains the "zero option" and since then recently the "interim variant", appears to be incompatible with the Soviet proposal to reduce the number of its missiles to the number of West European medium-range missiles. What, in your view, is the essence of the differences, and do you consider a compromise possible?

Answer: We understand the concern that the questions of limiting medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, that are being discussed at the talks in Geneva, are not finding their solution. These talks, if one is to speak frankly, are deadlocked.

For the sake of what were these talks started? The Soviet side proposed the talks and began them with resolve to press for the reduction of the medium-range nuclear weapons of the USSR and NATO countries existing in that area, for a radical mutual reduction of the level of nuclear confrontation. The purpose of the United States at the Geneva talks, as it has transpired, is to add at all cost new powerful armaments to the already existing vast nuclear arsenal of NATO. And it is only Soviet missiles that it wants to reduce.

As you see, two opposite lines, I would say two fundamentally different approaches, face each other in Geneva. It was even before

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Apr. 24, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Apr. 25, 1983, vol. III, AA1–AA10.

Geneva that we encountered this line of the Americans. The United States, as is known, derailed the SALT–2 treaty [2] and withdrew from a whole number of talks which were picking up pace or approaching their successful conclusion. I can remind you that the United States has suspended and is avoiding to this day the resumption of talks on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, on anti-satellite systems, on the limitation of deliveries and sale of conventional armaments, on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean. I will add to this the treaties with the Soviet Union on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes that have not been ratified by the United States to this day. All this speaks for itself. And as for the Geneva talks, it is known that the present U.S. Administration has entered them with great reluctance.

For us the attainment of agreement between contracting sides means to reach accord on questions to mutual satisfaction. But the American Administration is behaving as though the age-long history of international relations, the practice of agreements and treaties does not exist. The recent alteration by Washington of its proposal that was falsely called "zero option" and was unacceptable to the USSR from the outset does not change anything. The United States Administration remains on its old one-sided positions and is not showing the slightest desire to take into account the lawful interests of the other side, to reach an honest mutually acceptable agreement. Every single time when setting forth its proposals the United States strives, and this is the most important thing for it, first and foremost to inflict damage to the security of the Soviet Union, to tilt in its favour the existing balance of forces.

This is the main reason for the failures of the talks in Geneva. In reply to our clear-cut and fair proposals the Reagan administration comes up first with the "zero option" and then with the "interim-zero" variant. Both the first and the second are unrealistic and do nothing to facilitate the successful reaching of agreement. Why? Because the intent is to disarm us and to arm NATO even more. We will not accept this.

Lately in the United States and in some other NATO countries one hears talk about the "intransigence" of the Soviet side. But in what, as a matter of fact, must we concede? It is demanded of us that we conclude an agreement only on missiles—on the existing Soviet medium-range missiles and on the American ones that it is planned to bring to Europe. The Americans simply refuse to reach agreement on the other components of the nuclear medium-range weapons. They declare that they refuse to hold talks on this and that is all.

They want us to pretend that we do not notice the more than 400 warheads on the British and French sea- and land-based missiles which are aimed at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

Americans, and after them also the representatives of other NATO countries, describe the British and French missiles as a force of "deterrence". I am prepared to allow that that is so. But then the question arises: Why, then, while recognising the right of France and Britain to deterrence, [do] [3] they deny us the right to have our own deterrent force—exactly in the same amount as in the possession of the French and the British?

It is also said that the nuclear arms of France and Britain should not be counted because they purportedly have some "independent status". But have these countries ceased being members of the North Atlantic Alliance? And do they conceal that their nuclear weapons are directed against the Soviet Union? And is it not symptomatic that the French Government not only is not dissociating itself from the plans of deploying American nuclear missiles in Western Europe but, on the contrary, is zealously supporting them? What "independent status" can there be in this case! On the one hand, the known NATO decision is presented as a sort of mandate to the United States from all members of this alliance and, on the other hand, when NATO's armaments are beginning to be counted it turns out that the British and French missiles have nothing to do with them, it turns out that they are "independent". There is no logic here.

Try to look at the situation from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, its lawful interests: On what grounds, by what right are we to be left disarmed in face of these British and French nuclear missiles aimed at our country?

It is clear that we cannot agree and never will agree to this. The Soviet people has the same right to security as the peoples of America, Britain, France and other countries.

We are also asked to ignore the fact that were we to accept the proposals of the Americans they would retain intact in the zone of Europe their aviation at airfields and aircraft carriers, that is the forward-based systems for the delivery of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union. And we are speaking here of as many as hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of nuclear warheads.

The violation of generally accepted norms of conducting talks and the refusal to work for the attainment of a mutually acceptable accord expresses itself also in the attempts of the United States Administration to disarm us unilaterally not only in the west, in Europe, but also in the east, in Asia. Washington would like to dictate its terms to us—not to deploy our medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union.

This of course, totally transcends the framework of the Geneva talks. The Americans are keeping silent that they have concentrated numerous nuclear weapons against us in Asia, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in the Far East. By the way, time and again there are reports in the American and British press about the intention of the United States to station its medium-range missiles in Alaska. Were that to happen, it would not have gone unnoticed from our side. I am mentioning this now as a confirmation of the conclusion that the American side is demanding from the Soviet Union something which it itself evidently has no intention of observing.

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[3] Brackets in the source text.

So the question is who has more reason to show concern about his security?

It is the more justifiable to pose the question in this manner because the Soviet Union, as is known, has undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear arms whereas the NATO nuclear countries are flatly refusing to this day to assume such an obligation.

Question: The West and the East accuse each other of striving for military superiority. The Americans even contend that the Soviet representatives at the Geneva talks strive to perpetuate the USSR's superiority in medium-range missiles in the European Continent. How should an approximate balance look like?

Answer: We know of such contentions. American military and political leaders are trying particularly hard in this. I must say, however, that some other politicians in the West are not trailing far behind them. There is not a grain of truth in such contentions. One must stand on the ground of facts. In recent times alone the Soviet Union, wishing to move the talks off dead centre, presented for consideration by the American side and other NATO countries a whole number of proposals of a clearly constructive nature.

Suffice it to recall our proposals at the already mentioned Geneva talks on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. At present each side in Europe has about a thousand medium-range carrier vehicles of nuclear weapons. Plus several thousand tactical nuclear warheads each. Were our most far-reaching proposal accepted, incidentally in the West they bashfully prefer to hush it up, there would have remained no types of nuclear weapons at all in the European Continent, weapons intended to hit targets in Europe, both medium-range and tactical ones. Will Europe, European security win or lose from the implementation of this proposal? The answer is clear and unequivocal.

The same applies to another proposal we have made. Were it implemented, there would have been a radical reduction: Each side would have had the number of its medium-range weapons cut by two thirds. In other words we would have covered two-thirds of the road to fully freeing Europe from these weapons.

Then, had the West accepted the variant proposed by us last December the USSR and the NATO countries would have retained 162 missiles each, that is exactly as many as Britain and France now have on the side of NATO. Each would have retained also 138 medium-range planes. I would like to stress that even these figures are not an absolute. They could be reduced on a mutual basis if NATO would want to.

All these proposals of the Soviet Union remain in force. They fully ensure genuine equality and a real balance of forces.

Where is here any striving of the USSR for military superiority?

The complexity and danger of the present situation is that the arms race imposed by the West is outstripping talks. To avoid this, to create favourable conditions for holding talks common sense tell us that it is necessary to freeze the nuclear arsenals of the sides. It would be most reasonable to do this while other solutions are found. We proposed to freeze the medium-range weapons just as strategic arms. In our opinion this would be only the first step. An objection is raised to this: Why freeze when what we must talk about is reduction? True, this sounds nice but the trouble is that while this is being declared armaments are being built up at the same time. So what we have is no freeze and no reduction.

The contrast is just as sharp when comparing the approaches of the USSR and the USA to other problems of limiting and reducing arms.

I have already mentioned our commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If the United States and other NATO members possessing nuclear weapons made an analogous statement people throughout the world would heave a sigh of relief. Why not do this? But our initiative encounters a wall of silence.

Here is another example. What can justify the failure of the West to react to this day to the honest proposal made by the Soviet Union together with the other socialist countries with the best of intentions to conclude between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO a treaty on the non-use of military force and on the maintenance of relations of peace? It is hard to find a sensible explanation of this.

Or let us take a look at how one side and the other behave at the talks on strategic arms. Let us compare the two positions. We propose substantial, by more than a quarter, reductions of the total number of strategic carrier vehicles without any whatsoever exclusions. The number of nuclear warheads on them would also be reduced to equal levels. But on what is the United States insisting? It only talks about reductions while in reality is working for a substantial, really "radical" build up of its strategic arms. It is planned to additionally deploy more than 12,000 long-range cruise missiles alone. I will refer to the latest news from Washington: Yet another plan has been placed on the President's desk—to deploy in the coming years an additional considerable number of intercontinental ballistic missiles of a new type.

This is an unbridled arms race. There is no other term for this.

Neither is it a secret that the United States is stockpiling and planning the use also of such a terrible weapon of mass annihilation as chemical weapons. These weapons are already being brought to Europe and new, even more baleful types of these weapons are being intensively developed in the United States. We are proposing to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and to destroy them altogether. It would seem that there is nothing and cannot be anything contentious here. But there are people both in the United States and in Western Europe who praise the "usefulness" of such weapons.

I cannot but say a few words about the problem of verification of arms reduction. It is said that the Soviet Union is supposedly against verification and for this reason it is difficult to reach agreement with it. Using a German expression, this is an "old hat", a threadbare thesis. For us verification is important no less, if not more, than for others. We approach questions of verification concretely and not in terms of general declarations. This approach of ours has found its embodiment in the agreements on the limitation of strategic arms.

Our policy in questions of verification is a far-reaching one—right up to and including the establishment of general and complete verification when matters reach general and complete disarmament. We are against the turning of the problem of verification into a stumbling block at talks.

Such is the true picture. I have cited only some facts. The list could be continued but from what has already been said it is evident what positions in questions of disarmament are held by the Soviet Union and what positions are held by the United States.

Now judge for yourself who strives for military superiority and who strives for parity, for lessening the level of military confrontation.

Question: During the period to 1987 President Reagan of the United States intends to boost spending on armaments to the gigantic sum of 1600 billion dollars. He plans the creation of the MX intercontinental missile, the Pershing-2 missile, cruise missiles and even an anti-ballistic missile system deployed in space that is to make the United States invulnerable. What do you intend to range against that?

Answer: It has become a vogue with members of the Reagan administration when they are exposed of having militaristic, aggressive ambitions to strike the pose of feeling hurt. Such a pose perhaps might impress some people who are not well versed in politics. And that appears to be its intent. But in such cases it is best to turn to facts. And facts show that the United States has embarked on the road of unleashing an unprecedented arms race along all directions and is spiraling international tension to the limit.

I concretely refer to Washington's announced plans of developing a large-scale and highly effective anti-ballistic missile defence. The adventurism and danger of this entire idea is that the emphasis in it is made on impunity, on delivering the first nuclear strike thinking that they can protect themselves from the reply strike. From here it is not far from the temptation to reach out for the firing button. This is the main danger of the new American military concept. It is capable only of bringing the world closer to the nuclear precipice. It comes out that while they are speaking of defence in reality they are planting a mine under the entire process of limiting strategic arms.

Authoritative scientists of the world are saying that this is exactly the case. We are offering the United States Government: Let Soviet and American scientists, specialists in this field meet and discuss the possible consequences of creating a large-scale anti-ballistic missile defence system. Let science say its weighty word.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the development of cosmic means of waging war is a component part of the American military preparations. They want to go into outer space with arms and from there to threaten mankind. This should not be allowed to happen. Outer space must remain peaceful. We proposed to conclude an international treaty on the non-deployment of any types of weapons in space. We are convinced that it is necessary to advance even further: to reach agreement on prohibiting altogether the use of force both in outer space and from outer space in respect of the earth.

Not to start the arms race where it did not exist, and stop it where it is now taking place. This is the essence of our position, and this is what we guide ourselves by at talks.

The Soviet Union will further consistently search for and strive to find a common tongue with the American side. Our earlier made proposals remain in force. Should the American Administration come up with proposals on some problem, proposals directed at its solution in the spirit of equal security, we will definitely study them in a positive spirit.

Question: The Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl is planning to visit Moscow soon. What is your opinion of the prospects of relations between the USSR and the FRG and do you see possibilities for cooperation if the Kohl government implements the so-called NATO rearmament?

Answer: Peaceful, businesslike cooperation between the USSR and the Federal Republic is a substantial factor of stability in Europe and in international life as a whole. I think it is in the interests both of the FRG and the Soviet Union to preserve this. A basis for this exists, a good basis. This is the Moscow treaty and a whole number of other agreements concluded by our countries in the 1970's. [4] This is the jointly accumulated experience of practical cooperation in various fields.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit, on which agreement in principle has been reached, is expected in the Soviet Union. We hope that during the visit we will succeed in consolidating the positive elements that exist in relations between our countries and outline prospects for the future.

At the same time, when evaluating the prospects of our relations we cannot, naturally, abstract ourselves from the plans of deploying new American nuclear missiles in the FRG.

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[4] For the treaty in this group that included the United States, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of Sept. 3, 1971, see 24 UST 283; TIAS 7551.

Judge for yourself what a damage would be inflicted to these relations if the territory of the FRG were turned into a bridgehead for delivering a nuclear strike at the USSR and its allies. Should this happen this would mean most grave consequences for the FRG itself.

But I repeat, the Soviet Union is an emphatic opponent of such a turn of events. We propose a different way out of the present situation that would strengthen the security both of the FRG and the Soviet Union and would allow both our countries to successfully cooperate in the interests of consolidating European and world peace.

Rudolf Augstein. I am very happy at the opportunity to meet and talk with the highest leader of the Soviet Union. We have already formulated some questions and got answers to them in written form. I must say that before our meeting I have already studied the text of your answers. I do not know if you will now hand it over to me officially or it can be considered that it has already been handed over to us.

Yuriy Andropov. I am prepared to give you this text. I think that is the most reasonable and convenient way. Does it suit you?

Rudolf Augstein. Yes of course. Thank you. But since no text can be exhaustive, I would like to ask your permission to put here several additional questions to you.

Yuriy Andropov. Please.

Rudolf Augstein. One can often hear contentions in the West that during a certain period, when the United States was not arming itself at the rate it is doing and is planning to do now, the Soviet Union had actively built up its armaments. As a result, according to these contentions, in the course of the 1970's the Soviet armaments increased while the American ones had even decreased.

Yuriy Andropov. These contentions are not new. They are especially actively being disseminated by the Americans but they are being helped also by their NATO allies. I did not prepare specially for the answer to this question, but it is easy to prove that the contentions quoted by you are at variance with reality. If one is to start from the beginning allow me to remind you that it was not the Soviet Union that invented atomic weapons and was the first to include them in its arsenal. After all, there was a lengthy period when we had no such weapons altogether while the Americans had them and tried to blackmail us and the whole world for that matter. We had to catch up with them. Several years passed and the Soviet Union, too, got its atomic weapons. We were forced to do that. That is how it all happened.

Rudolf Augstein. But did not the top Soviet leadership themselves admit in 1977 that there was rough parity in armaments between the two sides?

Yuriy Andropov. Precisely so. But I have not yet finished answering your question. If we trace subsequent developments through a number of stages, they were as follows: The United States began intensively to improve its nuclear weaponry. They went over from single to cluster warheads. Then we had to do so too. Then the Americans adopted multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. We had to do the same in response. Then the United States began to install MIRV missiles in its submarines, which we did not have at the time. So we had to respond in kind here as well.

There is an approximate balance of forces, we continue to believe so today too, there is rough parity.

So, things have always stood in such a way that we have only followed the Americans in the arms buildup, not vice versa. Moreover, catching up with the United States, we have always suggested that this race be ended, that the levels of armaments of both sides be frozen and subsequently reduced. Regrettably, we have received no consent of the American side to this proposal.

Discussing the situation at present, we, of course, can consider it in different ways, using different methods and approaches. The United States, for instance, believed that its nuclear weapons would be more invulnerable if it installed them in submarines. And it did so. This is understandable because the United States is a sea power. We are a land power and most of our nuclear weapons were deployed on land. Now the Americans suggest reductions in land-based nuclear weapons, leaving sea-based missiles aside. We, naturally, take exception to this approach. We for our part take account of all the types of nuclear weapons available to both sides and suggest even reductions in them on both sides, reductions to the point of their eventual complete elimination.

As for detailed data on the balance of forces between the two sides, our Defence Minister Dmitriy Ustinov recently made a public statement on this subject and supplied detailed facts and figures. You can easily have a look at those figures and see the truth of what I have been telling you here.

Rudolf Augstein. Many West Europeans think that they are particularly threatened by Soviet SS-20 missiles, which are a new and quite effective type of weapon.

Yuriy Andropov. As a matter of fact, this subject has been covered in the text of my answers to the questions received from you. But I can say the following in addition. I understand that the peoples of Europe feel concerned and even worried. We stand for removing causes for this worry.

We have suggested different options. We have proposed the removal from Europe of all the nuclear weapons altogether, both medium-range and tactical ones. The United States has not even responded to this proposal of ours. It has continued stubbornly to press its so-called "zero option", which does not even deserve being dwelt upon here. We have demonstrated its true worth on many occasions. So you and I do not differ in the sense of concern with the existing situation. But the United States would like to deploy its nuclear missiles in the territory of Western Europe, to make you, the West Germans, and the Belgians, and the Dutch its hostages. We are against this. We have proposed different ways out of the situation, making it possible either to remove the mutual threat altogether or considerably to lessen existing tension.

Rudolf Augstein. The Soviet Union has stated that if the Geneva talks do not lead to positive results and if the American missiles are nevertheless deployed in Europe, the USSR will deploy its missiles at roughly the same distance from U.S. territory. I would like to ask you, Mr. General Secretary, if you are really going to do so, and if you are, in what parts of the world could your missiles be deployed?

Yuriy Andropov. I will not tell you this even as a secret—for obvious reasons. But turning to the crux of the matter, I want to confirm: We will find ways to counter the Americans actions both with regard to U.S. territory directly and with regard to Europe. Nuclear arms talks are not a game of poker, in which if you lose heavily you can hope to make your loss good afterwards. These talks involve literally life and death questions for the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries. We cannot take lightly the prospect of more than 500 nuclear missiles being deployed close to our borders in addition to those French and British missiles which are already targeted at us. Our measures in response will be perfectly justified from any point of view, including the point of view of the highest moral standards.

Rudolf Augstein. You have mentioned here the French missiles, and this has prompted me to recall another issue. The Soviet had very good relations with France, and it so happened that it was a government of Socialists, in which the Communists participate, that demanded that about 50 Soviet diplomats and other officials leave France. How do you assess this development?

Yuriy Andropov. What can I say on this score? First and foremost, I would not like to see the blame for this crude provocative move against Soviet people be laid with the French Socialists and, still less so, with the Communists. We are well aware of the fact that behind this action there are forces which do not want to see good relations of France with the Soviet Union. And it is possible that these forces exist not only in France itself but also beyond it. It is hardly likely that this action meets France's national interests. This is an act of arbitrariness. It has no legal foundations whatsoever. Any assertions that Soviet people allegedly engaged in impermissible activities—are inventions.

I would also like to note this fact. Among the Soviet people who were told to leave France, there are officials who have not worked in France for the last half-year and are staying in the Soviet Union, while others had not even worked in France for more than two weeks. Is this not absurd?

We are told only one thing: that the Soviet officials engaged in collecting information. But, as far as I understand it, the functions of the diplomatic and other services of any country, of any embassy, include collection of information about the host country, and transmission of it to their government. Is this impermissible activity? It has been laid down in international diplomatic conventions.

This action of the French authorities cannot be qualified otherwise than as deliberately aimed at worsening Soviet-French relations.

Some of the press organs in France assert that the absence of response measures on our part with regard to the French officials in Moscow is alleged to constitute an indirect admission by the Soviet Union of its "guilt." This is nonsense. If someone interprets our actions in this manner, he shows his lack of understanding of the Soviet foreign policy. To adopt reply measures with regard to the French working in the USSR would be the easiest thing to do. In exercising restraint, we are guided by the broad interests of the Soviet-French relations which we hold dear and which evolved over a long period of time, by the interests of preserving detente in Europe.

This does not mean, however, that we shall tolerate, wherever it may be, arbitrariness vis-a-vis Soviet diplomats and other officials working in our missions abroad.

Rudolf Augstein. Yes, one can say that, in this case, you acted following the Bible's recommendation that if they hit you on one cheek, you turn the other.

Yuriy Andropov. Not quite. We bear little likeness to biblical characters. We were guided by sober political discretion, and the desire to prevent a deterioration of Soviet-French relations, and we took a broader view of things than that of this narrow local conflict.

Rudolf Augstein. Since we have already referred to biblical themes, I would like to say this. President Regan, addressing a religious gathering, declared the Soviet Union to be the "centre of evil". In your answer to that statement, you provided your assessment of it. But I would like to ask this: Are reasonable and successful negotiations possible at all in such an atmosphere?

Yuriy Andropov.We are realists enough not to pay attention to rhetorics. If Reagan, besides his charges, adopted at least one of our concrete proposals on questions of arms reductions, or put forward himself at least one reasonable, suitable proposal, we would forgive him his—how shall I put it mildly—groundless statement. The French are probably right when they say that each one uses the language which is his own.

Rudolf Augstein. It rarely happens that all evil and all the blame lie with one side only, even if it seems to the East with respect to the West, or to the West with respect to the East. In this connection, I must ask this: Namely, are they in the Soviet Union aware of the extent to which the question of Afghanistan spoils the international atmosphere—and are there any plans for doing away with such a situation?

Yuriy Andropov. In answering the first part of your question I shall say: Yes, they are aware of it. Our plans for a political settlement of the Afghan problem are not secret. We have repeatedly stated them publicly. Leonid Ilich Brezhnev spoke about that. We consider that as soon as outside interference in the affairs of Afghanistan has been terminated and non-resumption of such interference guaranteed, we shall withdraw our troops. Our troops are staying in that country at the request of the lawful Afghan Government—that government which was then in power—and they continue staying there at the request of the lawful government headed by Babrak Karmal. We are not after anything for ourselves there. We responded to the request for assistance from a friendly neighbouring country. It is, however, far from being a matter of indifference to us what is happening directly on our southern border. Washington even goes as far as arrogating for itself the right to judge what government must be there in Nicaragua, since this, allegedly, affects the U.S. vital interests.

But Nicaragua is over a thousand kilometres away from the USA, and we have a rather long common border with Afghanistan. And so, in assisting friends, we at the same time think of ensuring the interests of our security.

Political negotiations are now under way on settling the problems connected with Afghanistan. True, these negotiations are going on with difficulty, with the Pakistanis, one may say, being held by their sleeve by their overseas friends. We still think, however, that these negotiations, which are being pursued with the assistance of the representative of the U.N. secretary general, have some prospects before them.

Rudolf Augstein. I would like once again to come back to the question of medium-range missiles. In the eventuality that the Americans do deploy them in the FRG, will you continue the talks with the USA on nuclear arms in Europe?

Yuriy Andropov. It has been stressed on the Soviet side more than once that such a course of events would mean an abrupt change for the worse of the situation not only in Europe but on a global plane as well. It is in connection with this, that we would have to adopt the necessary decisions.

Rudolf Augstein. There is yet another issue which is a matter of concern for many in the FRG. It is known that the foreign indebtedness of some of the socialist countries has now assumed extremely dangerous proportions. What way out is possible here in order to avoid a deepening of the crisis? The fact is that we in Europe all depend on one another.

Yuriy Andropov. Since we are speaking about sovereign states, I can only say that looking for ways out of the problems that arise is a sovereign matter for each particular country. If we are speaking about what the FRG could do for its part, then I can only offer this piece of advice: Carry on trade and develop economic relations, and do not engage in "sanctions".

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament, April 26, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, as we come to the close of our spring session, permit me a brief survey of the state of the Committee from the perspective of the United States delegation.

This session began on a high note with the visits to the Committee by many distinguished government officials, including the Vice-President of the United States, the Minister for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, and the Foreign Minister and Deputy Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. These important visitors were followed later by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, the Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, and the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria joined this distinguished host of visitors and also addressed the Committee. Aside from the prestige of their respective high offices, each brought to the Committee their expressions of respect and encouragement for the Committee. For our part, Vice-President Bush brought a major new initiative on chemical weapons to the Committee. [2] However, despite the auspicious beginning and the attention devoted to our work, the Committee wasted almost two months of precious time—virtually two-thirds of its spring session—on futile debate. Consideration of agenda items and procedural arrangements were linked to important substantive measures awaiting its consideration. This was a deplorable situation which prevented any real progress for this half of our 1983 session. Our performance this spring can only serve the interest of our critics and depreciate their opinion of our role as a negotiating body. Let us learn a lesson from these mistakes, lest we, as Santayana cogently warned, "are damned to repeat them".

We have, however, taken some small steps in this session. Our agenda finally settled, we re-established our working groups, elected their chairmen, and finally began to settle down to the substantive work of the Committee.

The achievement of a ban on chemical weapons, a priority item for the Committee—and certainly of my delegation—got off to a promising start. The Working Group, under the capable leadership of Ambassador McPhail of Canada, moved quickly to organize itself and set about the important task of resolving differences. Continuing the extremely useful method of work begun under Ambassador Sujka last year, contact groups were established to focus on key issues. The Working Group is considering the wealth of material developed on this subject—and, in particular, the "basic provisions" tabled by the Soviet Union last summer (CD/294) [3] and the United States "detailed views" tabled this year on 10 February (CD/343). [4] The Chairman, aided by his consultations and the energetic work of his contact group leaders, has placed us in a good position to make significant progress in the coming summer session. Let us all dedicate ourselves to this vital task.

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[1] CD/PV.215, pp. 30–31.

[2] *Ante*, Feb. 3 and 10.

Similarly, the radiological weapons Working Group, under the skilled chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, has been organized into two sections—one to continue work on the traditional convention under negotiation in the Committee, and one to deal with the collateral question of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. This approach will hopefully move the Committee toward creative solutions to the problems which face it. Again, the prospect of progress is at hand, so let us grasp it firmly.

The working groups on negative security assurances and a comprehensive programme of disarmament, continuing under the experienced chairmanships of Ambassadors Ahmad of Pakistan and Garcia Robles of Mexico, respectively, have tended to rely more on informal consultations in pursuing these goals but seem to be now in an operational mode. The same can be said for the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban under the chairmanship of our departing colleague, Ambassador Herder. I would be misleading you, Mr. Chairman, however, if I expressed any satisfaction regarding the work of this particular Group. Today, it still has not reached agreement on a programme of work and, thus, has not yet begun consideration of the important issues under its mandate. My delegation hopes that the Working Group will settle this procedural problem once and for all at its next meeting so that this important Group can begin useful work at our summer session.

We have also had useful and informative discussions on the subjects of the prevention of nuclear war and outer space. Informal meetings on these subjects have reflected the keen interest of some delegations in the immediate creation of working groups with full negotiating mandates and a more cautious approach to these subjects by other delegations. The Committee has through this process made some progress in reconciling these opposing approaches. My delegation has tried to keep an open mind on these questions, but has not, as yet, heard compelling arguments that we have definitively established the existence of a dangerous void in international law which demands the urgent attention of the Committee or a precise focus on concrete issues on which negotiations can take place. It seems to my delegation that there is a perception by some delegations that the creation of a working group somehow in and of itself solves these complex and often obscure problems. If we were to accept this approach, we would have a proliferation of working groups—well beyond the resources of most delegations in the Committee to cover adequately. We believe it would be better to concentrate on the completion of the work before us, while at the same time exploring the substantive issues relating to these complex subjects on which we can develop a common approach. As the sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, we must always be vigilant to those areas where disarmament negotiations are necessary and appropriate.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 373–381.

[4] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

I began my statement on a somewhat pessimistic note. Our performance has not been something of which we could be proud. But let me end on a note of optimism. We are now facing a six-week recess. I believe that there is at this time a common view as to our tasks during the summer session. Unlike last year, when we faced a shortened session, we will have a full 11 weeks of concentrated effort to move forward on the issues confronting us. The procedural questions are, hopefully, behind us, and I detect in the Committee a strong desire to approach the coming session in a workmanlike fashion and get down to serious business. I pledge my delegation to this effort.

As this will be the final intervention of my delegation in plenary for this spring session, I should like, through you, Sir, to extend the congratulations and best wishes of my delegation to Ambassador Gerhardt Herder on his new posting as the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic to the United States. He leaves the Committee after over eight years of distinguished service here, and he will be well remembered for his efforts. We are happy that he is going to Washington and know that he will be an effective member of Washington's diplomatic corps. We wish him the very best.

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to a Group of American Scientists and Public Personalities: Ban on Weapons in Space, April 27, 1983 [1]

Your appeal for banning space-based weapons is permeated with grave concern about the peaceful future of space. I fully share this concern. To prevent the militarisation of space is one of the priority tasks facing mankind, and much depends here, on earth, on whether it will be achieved.

As scientists and specialists, you are well aware of the extremely dangerous consequences of saturating space with deadly weapons. The statesmen, politicians and scientists really ought already today to do everything possible to prevent the use of the achievements of the human intellect, the accelerating progress of science and technology to the detriment of the people.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Apr. 27, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Apr. 27, 1983, vol. III, pp. AA1–AA2.

I should like to emphasize that it is precisely the Soviet Union—the country which blazed the trail to outer space 25 years ago—which is the initiator and a party to all the current international agreements aimed at securing that outer space be used only for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind.

With a view to radically solving this task, the Soviet Union, as you know, I believe, suggested concluding a treaty banning the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. We submitted a draft such treaty to the United Nations Organisation as far back as in August 1981. [2] The implementation of this Soviet proposal, in support of which an overwhelming majority of U.N. member states voted, would mean that a reliable barrier is put to attempts to turning outer space into a source of mortal danger to people.

Regrettably, work to draft such a treaty at the Disarmament Committee has not yet actually begun owing to the position of the U.S.A. and a number of other NATO states. Moreover, recent developments have demonstrated that the use of space-based military technology is assigned an ever greater role in U.S. strategic plans, including those announced by the top U.S. leadership.

Now a crucial moment is really coming: Either the interested states will sit down at the negotiating table without delay to begin drawing up a treaty prohibiting the placement in space of weapons of any kind, or the arms race will go over also into space.

I can assure you that the Soviet Union will continue to exert maximum effort to prevent the ominous plans of transferring the arms race into space from being converted into reality.

I would like to hope that the scientists and public personalities of the whole world will also make a contribution of their own to making certain that space will forever remain free of any weapons at all, that it will not become an area of military clashes, and that there will be no threat coming from space to those living on earth.

I wish you success in efforts to protect peaceful space, the efforts which are fully supported in the Soviet Union.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 334–336.

Letter From the U.S. Permanent Representative (Kirkpatrick) to U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuéllar: Provisional Arrangements To Deal With Alleged Violations of International Law Regarding Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, April 27, 1983 [1]

The United States has noted with interest the views of the Soviet Union on General Assembly resolution 37/98D, setting forth provisional arrangements to deal with alleged violations of international law regarding chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. [2]

The United States shares the view of the Soviet Union that actions should not be taken which are contrary to the goal of concluding a complete chemical weapons ban. Specifically, we believe that states must not engage in actions which violate international law and agreements, but abide strictly by the obligations they have accepted. To do otherwise, in our view, does more than complicate the process of concluding an effective, comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. It undermines and makes a mockery of the very goal we are trying to achieve. This is why the United States voted in favor of General Assembly resolution 37/98D.

In its letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, the Soviet Union stated that while it welcomed certain aspects of General Assembly resolution 37/98D, it objected to ". . . the establishment of procedures for verifying observance of . . . the 1925 Geneva Protocol." [3] The Soviet Union also expressed the view that it is "quite illegal" for the United Nations to take such a decision via a resolution adopted with the participation of states which have not adhered to the Protocol.

The prohibition contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol has become part of customary international law and is thus binding on all states. As such, questions concerning compliance with the prohibition and methods for investigating activities that may constitute violations of the prohibition are, in fact, quite properly addressed by the states members of the United Nations, "pending eventual formal arrangements," as provided for in resolution 37/98D. As such, General Assembly resolution 37/98D does not create, as the Soviet Union asserts, any "dangerous precedent." Indeed, it establishes the quite constructive practice of having states work together and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to make possible "prompt and impartial investigation of possible violations" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol in order to further strict adherence to international law pending the completion of negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament.

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[1] A/38/184.

[2] See the Soviet letter of Mar. 30, *ante*.

[3] The protocol is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

The United States also disagrees with the Soviet Union that General Assembly resolution 37/98D "increases the scope of obligations" states have incurred under international law and the Geneva Protocol. The obligation remains unchanged—states may not use chemical, biological or toxin weapons against others, unless these weapons have first been used against them in an armed conflict.

The United States believes that General Assembly resolution 37/98D constitutes an important, though interim, step forward—a step which we hope will succeed in bringing about an end to the illegal use of chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.

Further, it is the hope of the United States that the work of the United Nations group of consultant experts established pursuant to resolution 37/98D will contribute to the important work underway today in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. We share the view of the majority of United Nations member states that it is with the conclusion of a complete, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons that we should be able to eliminate the use of such weapons once and for all time.

Statement by the French Representative (de la Gorce) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], April 28, 1983 [1]

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While the vicissitudes we encountered at the beginning of this session delayed the re-starting of the working groups, we must nevertheless recognize that the weeks devoted principally to the discussion of procedural problems and the agenda were not altogether lost, even as regards certain questions of substance, and I would refer in particular to the question of chemical disarmament. During the first two months of the session, some very important contributions were made on this issue; we heard statements of great interest at plenary meetings of the Committee; even before the opening of the session, the Working Group had spent three weeks continuing its efforts under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, and in fact it could be said that it was that subject—one we consider extremely important—which marked the opening of the session. The situation has now returned to normal, with the resumption of work in conditions we consider favourable. The responsibility for this, I should like to say, is due in large part to the new Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador McPhail. We particularly appreciate his determination to concentrate the work of the Group on trying to reach agreement on the points of substance on which there are still divergences of views. Ambassador McPhail has again used the method of contact groups which proved so fruitful under the chairmanship of his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, while reducing the number of those groups to three.

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[1] CD/PV. 216, pp. 31–35.

I should like to say a few words about the subjects so far dealt with by these groups: the declaration and destruction of stocks of chemical weapons; the procedure for on-site inspections by challenge, and the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

As regards the verification of the destruction of stocks, the position of the French delegation is well known; we believe that such verification should in the first instance guarantee that the nature and the quantity of the products destroyed in fact correspond to what has been declared; then, that there is no possibility for the diversion or substitution of products during the process of destruction, and lastly, that the destruction is carried out in a manner that is irreversible or very difficult to reverse and that the final products are unusable as chemical weapons.

We believe that in order to guarantee all these things, international verification should be carried out continuously throughout the period of the operations of destruction. In the present state of technology, this means that international inspectors must have access at all times to every part of the destruction facility. The development of automatic verification systems will perhaps one day make it possible to reduce these constraints, but it will still be necessary for any equipment installed to be reliable and guaranteed against any manipulation.

In the contact group concerned with the procedure for on-site inspections by challenge, the discussion has centred mainly on the way a State forming the subject of a request for an inspection by challenge should react to it. According to the consensus which appears to have emerged in the contact group, a State forming the subject of such a request could not refuse to accede to it arbitrarily and without explanations. We believe that it is necessary to go much further. Once the destruction of stocks and facilities is complete, confidence between the parties can be assured only by a guarantee that none of them will subsequently resume the manufacture of chemical weapons. This requires, on the one hand, that the industrial establishments manufacturing products capable of being diverted for use in chemical weapons—for example, products containing the methyl-phosphorus bond—should be subject to systematic international verification of a strictness dependent on the potential danger of the products in question. In that connection, verification by the drawing of lots appears to offer an appropriate method. On the other hand, it is essential that any suspicion of a possible violation of the convention should be investigated promptly after the addressing of a "challenge" to the State suspected, by means of an on-site inspection conducted by an international team. This kind of inspection is so important that acceptance of it ought to be the rule—it would, moreover, be to the benefit of the innocent State and would embarrass any dishonest accuser—and refusal ought to be the exception. What the contact group ought to consider, therefore, is not the conditions that should be met by a request for inspection by challenge, but in what very limited cases a State so challenged could refuse such an inspection, and what justification it would then be required to provide.

The third contact group has been dealing with the question of the possible inclusion in the convention of a clause prohibiting use, and the question of verification of compliance with that clause. As we explained on 8 March last,[2] we are not convinced of the need for such a provision. We consider that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is already ensured in as complete a manner as possible by the Geneva Protocol of 1925,[3] both as regards the products to which that prohibition would apply—"asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices"—and as regards the circumstances in which use is prohibited. The expression "use in war" ought not to be interpreted as having a restrictive meaning: in 1925 the idea of armed conflicts other than formally declared wars had not made its appearance in international law, and it is clear from the terms of the Protocol itself that its authors had no intention whatever of restricting its application to formally declared wars.

However, if a consensus emerges in favour of a repetition of the prohibition of use in the future convention, it would be essential, and I think we are all agreed on this, to avoid anything which would prejudice the authority of the Geneva Protocol. As the French delegation has already stressed, the preamble to the convention ought to contain a paragraph reaffirming the validity of the Protocol. Such a text ought also to state that the Protocol forms part of international law and that the prohibitions it contains apply to all. The future convention ought also to stipulate that none of its provisions can be interpreted as derogating from the obligations flowing from the Protocol.

If more is felt to be needed, the States parties to the convention which are parties to the Geneva Protocol could recall the commitments they had assumed under the latter, and those States which were not parties to the Protocol could declare their acceptance of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons embodied in the Protocol. Such a solution, which is very near to that suggested by Mr. Ackerman, the co-ordinator of the contact group responsible for this question, would have the advantage of avoiding both duplication with the Geneva Protocol and the risk of instituting regimes for the prohibition of use that were different for States parties to the protocol and States not parties to the Protocol.

As to verification of compliance with the prohibition of use, as was proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union and other delegations, this should form the subject of appropriate provisions in the part of the convention devoted to verification. These provisions should take account of the specific conditions—state of war or armed conflict—in which a violation of the prohibition of use might be committed. They ought to be based essentially on on-site inspection by challenge and to provide in particular for speedy and unhampered access by inspectors to the locations of alleged violations. The French Government attaches particular importance to this matter of the verification of violations of the Geneva Protocol and more generally to the rule of international law it embodies. It was for this reason that at the United Nations General Assembly session of last year the French delegation, along with others worked to secure the adoption of a procedure for that purpose. We have already replied here to the objections raised that the resolution adopted violates the law of treaties. We shall, if necessary, revert to this matter. But we should like to repeat that an action designed to ensure respect for a provision of international law cannot be presented as being contrary to international law. In adopting resolution 37/98 D of 13 December 1982, the General Assembly in no way exceeded its competence. It merely provided for the adoption of provisional procedures designed to uphold the authority of the 1925 Protocol, an authority which would be weakened if such procedures could not be applied when there was an allegation of a violation of the Protocol. The well-known and indisputable rule of international law concerning the useful effect of treaties—*Potius valeat quam pereat* (the treaty should prevail rather than perish)—fully confirms this.

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[2] CD/PV.201, pp. 15–18.

[3] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

In the event of any lacuna in an international undertaking, it is implicitly within the competence of the body best equipped, both by its composition and by the range of its general functions, to act on behalf of the international community of States as a whole, to provide for the creation of a mechanism to ensure that that international instrument is in fact respected and that possible violations thereof shall be brought to the notice of international public opinion when such an instrument forms an integral part of general international law, and in the present instance the body of rules of international law applicable in the case of armed conflicts.

I should like, lastly, to refer to a question with respect to which the French delegation has already had to restate its position here in response to declarations made by the Soviet delegation, and that is the question of the counting in of the forces of third countries in the process of the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. In this connection, I refer in particular to the statement made on 24 March by our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan.[4] The French position on this question has repeatedly been stated on various occasions and in various places, including Moscow, by France's most authoritative representatives; it is well-known and, I would add, generally understood and approved of. I should like to recall the reasons why we consider that the inclusion of the forces of third countries in those negotiations, and in particular our forces, is unacceptable in principle and based on ill-founded arguments.

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[4] CD/PV.206, pp. 13–19.

The Soviet demand is not merely unacceptable to the French Government; it runs directly counter to the essential principles of disarmament negotiations to which all the States represented here must subscribe. First, the principle of the non-inclusion of the forces of third countries in bilateral negotiations. This is obvious: you cannot talk about the weapons of others in negotiations at which the country concerned is not represented, and no independent State can allow its means of defence to be thus disposed of in negotiations between other countries. Secondly, the Soviet Union's claim to a kind of super-parity, which amounts in fact to superiority: the Soviet Union thus claims the right to possess as many weapons as all those it apparently considers its potential adversaries put together. In the name of "equal security", it considers that those countries should agree to allow it permanent superiority, that is to say, that they should accept for themselves an unequal status, for the Soviet Union wants to be allowed not only equality with the other Superpower but in addition the equivalent of all the other existing nuclear forces. That is a new version of the old idea of condominium. It claims a right we cannot allow, that of determining the composition and the relationship of forces between two coalitions while ignoring the independence of their members.

As a result of our objections, we are now told that it is a question of taking our forces into account not directly but indirectly. We are told that it is simply a matter of counting on the side of the United States the forces of its allies, the figures for the British and French forces being simply added to those of the American forces in Europe. We consider that this presentation of the matter is entirely without foundation. In the first place, the independence of our forces is total and will remain so, any decision as to their use resting solely with the President of the French Republic. In the second place, the French forces are not in a position to act as a link between the central American systems and the defence of Europe; they were not designed for that purpose. Not only have we never claimed that our forces could be considered as playing such a role, but in addition neither the United States nor our other partners in the Atlantic alliance consider them as such. Furthermore, it is the very independence of the French forces, in so far as that independence introduces a new, autonomous factor in the strategic situation, which gives them their own value as a deterrent. The Soviet Union itself in effect recognized this when it signed the agreement of 22 June 1973 with the United States on the prevention of nuclear war, [5] for that agreement provides for consultation in the event of a nuclear conflict between "one of the parties and another nuclear-weapon power", which must therefore be presumed to be acting independently. In the third place, it cannot really be claimed that the refusal to include the forces of third countries in the bilateral negotiations amounts to depriving the USSR of the right itself to possess the possibility, in its turn, of "deterring" the French and British forces. It was recently stated in Moscow that the important thing in the eyes of the Soviet Union was not so much the point of departure of a missile coming from the West as its point of impact. From the French point of view, in the event of an attack against France, it is not the model or type of Soviet missile that is important but the fact that it is capable of reaching France. Intercontinental missiles like the SS.18 and SS.11 can equally well be used below their maximum range. Similarly, missiles with a range less than that of the SS.20 can, depending on where they are stationed, equally well reach France. We reject as false the idea of a Euro-strategic balance dissociated from the over-all balance. The 132 strategic delivery vehicles France possesses—80 SLBMs on five submarines, 18 ground-to-ground missiles on the plateau d'Albion and 34 Mirage IV aircraft—are not to be compared with "x" number of SS.20 missiles but with all the Soviet weapons capable of reaching France. A quick calculation shows that the 98 missiles and 34 aircraft, giving a total of 132 nuclear warheads, should be compared with the more than 10,000 Soviet nuclear warheads which can reach France. These figures speak for themselves, so much so that certain persons in the Soviet Union have made a comparison between what the French forces might amount to at the end of the century as the result of a modernization the facts about which have been published by the French authorities and have been debated in the French Parliament, and the 1983 situation of the Soviet forces, about which it would hardly be true to say that they have been the subject of an equivalent effort of information and transparency. These figures show, first of all, that France adheres strictly to the idea of sufficiency and that it has decided to modernize its nuclear forces only because of the imperative need, in view of the increase in the threat, to maintain the credibility of deterrence on the part of the weak with respect to the strong, and in the second place that the claim of the Soviet Union, which is not new but has never been accepted, that it has a right to this super-parity, that is to say, superiority to the United States through counting in the forces of third countries, is an obstacle to the reaching of an agreement on balanced and verifiable force reductions ensuring security at a lower level of forces, a goal which my country naturally pursues.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 283–285.

In conclusion, I should like to express my hopes for the success of the second part of our session, the summer part, and I think that in this connection we have established a very useful basis for the continuation of our work. I should also like to offer all my thanks to Ambassador Jaipal, Mr. Berasategui, the secretariat staff, the interpreters, the translators and all those who, whether visible or invisible, have given us assistance.

Report by the Comptroller General (Bowsher) to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Chemical Warfare [Extract], April 29, 1983 [1]

DIGEST

Controversial issues have been raised by the present Administration's plan to spend between $6 billion and $7 billion in 1983–87 to modernize the U.S. defensive and retaliatory chemical warfare capabilities. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs asked GAO to assess and synthesize the nature, extent, and quality of the documented information that relates to these questions: (1) How can chemical warfare be deterred? (2) How do U.S. and Soviet chemical warfare capabilities compare? (3) How can the United States modernize its chemical warfare system? (4) How will modernization affect the prospects for disarmament? The current debate on whether the United States should increase its chemical warfare capability necessarily involves these questions.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report is an "information synthesis." GAO examined the facts and analyses that support the various positions that have been taken on chemical warfare issues, assessed the confidence that can be placed in that information, and identified the gaps and inadequacies that it presents. GAO reviewed and assessed classified (up to and including secret) and unclassified literature, focusing on empirical and analytical studies, including Department of Defense (DOD) technical documents. GAO used various techniques and experts' assistance to ensure the inclusion of all the major information sources in its review. GAO also interviewed experts representing a wide range of positions in the chemical warfare modernization debate. The end product of these efforts provides a synthesis of what is currently known about the chemical warfare issues under study. The report identifies the information that GAO finds adequately substantiated and the gaps and inadequacies that remain in that information.

Summary of GAO's Findings

GAO finds that most arguments about chemical warfare are based on belief rather than on empirical evidence. Much of the information presented as fact is unsupported by citations. Few simulations and test-and-evaluation studies have been performed. Several GAO reports have been issued in the past that identify deficiencies in U.S. chemical warfare defensive and retaliatory readiness.

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[1] *Chemical Warfare: Many Unanswered Questions* (GAO/IPE–83–6), pp. i–viii.

In the present review, GAO identified a multitude of unanswered questions about chemical warfare, some having been partly, but inadequately, addressed and some having, apparently, not even been raised. GAO finds that the U.S. chemical weapon system is generally not seen as a credible deterrent and that little is known about its functioning or its usefulness. Yet the U.S. Department of Defense is requesting a large amount of money to modernize it. GAO is particularly concerned about DOD's modernization program because so many questions have not been satisfactorily answered, even though the United States has continued to maintain chemical weapons.

How Can Chemical Warfare Be Deterred?

The general concept of deterrence is that potential adversaries can be dissuaded from hostile actions if they perceive a nation as being both able and willing to retaliate against aggression with a means that can inflict unacceptable damage. Chemical warfare analysts differ, however, on what means are most likely to inflict (and to be perceived as likely to inflict) unacceptable damage. Two views are most often expressed—(1) that the threat of tactical nuclear response is a credible deterrent to chemical warfare and (2) that the ability to retaliate with chemical weapons is necessary in deterring chemical warfare.

The literature reveals three overlapping ways of achieving chemical warfare deterrence:

—arms control: an acceptable treaty banning chemical warfare would reduce the need for chemical weapons and the risk of a chemical attack;

—weapons: a major conventional, nuclear, or chemical warfighting ability would achieve chemical deterrence;

—defense: an adequate defensive position against a chemical attack would reduce the likelihood of such attack and the need for a large chemical retaliatory capability.

All three require some defensive capability, and policies emphasizing weapons and defense call for some retaliatory capability.

The literature shows that U.S. policy reflects either an emphasis on weapons or an emphasis on defense with a limited retaliatory capability. It also shows that the United States has consistently stated a policy of retaliating in kind—that is, responding with chemical weapons to a chemical attack. The existence of the U.S. chemical weapons arsenal and current proposals to upgrade its defensive and retaliatory capabilities confirm and expand—but do not change—this policy.

How Do U.S. and Soviet Capabilities Compare?

The U.S. chemical warfare deterrence policy requires both chemical retaliatory and defensive, or protective, capabilities. The literature agrees in general that the United States lacks a credible chemical warfare deterrent. Inadequacies in the U.S. ability to retaliate and defend are well documented.

In contrast, the literature generally reflects the perception that the Soviet Union is highly capable of waging chemical war. Classified and unclassified documents supply only limited information to support the various assertions that are made about the specific levels of Soviet offensive capability. However, available facts do support assertions that the Soviets have built a strong ability to defend against nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.

The findings and gaps in the literature on how the United States and the Soviet Union compare on five elements of capability—doctrine, stockpile, delivery systems, defense equipment, and implementation—can be summarized in the following way.

1. Even though the United States does not have a chemical warfare *doctrine* implementing its policy, DOD is preparing to modernize the U.S. chemical weapons arsenal. There is evidence that the Soviet Union has developed defensive doctrine for integrated conventional, nuclear, and chemical warfare; less is known about Soviet offensive doctrine.

2. The precise size and condition of the U.S. chemical *stockpile* are not known, but it is known that the stockpile provides only a limited long-range air-strike capability and no long-range surface-to-surface capability at all. Little is known about the size and mixture of the Soviet stockpile of chemical munitions.

3. The United States appears to have no plan for developing a long-range surface-to-surface chemical weapons *delivery system*. The Soviet system for delivering chemical warfare agents seems well developed, but little is known about its specific capabilities.

4. In developing *defensive equipment*, the United States has put into the field relatively good suits for individual protection but needs to improve decontamination, remote-area detection, and collective protection in vehicles and stationary shelters; remote sensors and alarms are an especially critical deficiency. The Soviets have made extensive chemical warfare defensive preparations in all areas—decontamination, detection, and individual and collective protection.

5. Regarding *implementation*, the United States has not pursued initiatives with its NATO allies that would allow forward deployment of chemical weapons, and logistics plans for timely deployment in Europe are not in evidence. Little is known about Soviet chemical weapons deployment.

How Can the United States Modernize Its Chemical Warfare System?

There are alternative ways to modernize U.S. chemical warfare deterrence capability. DOD should have adequate information on them, a strong rationale based on reliable data for selecting one alternative rather than another, and comprehensive and integrated plans for improving the five elements of capability. DOD's modernization plans do not present convincing evidence that these requirements have been adequately met.

The production of binary weapons is the centerpiece of the U.S. modernization program. DOD's plans for 1983–87 would augment the existing stockpile of unitary weapons with new binary weapons. A binary weapon keeps nonlethal chemicals separately in two canisters until the time of using the weapon, when the canisters are brought together in an artillery shell or a bomb and the nonlethal chemicals are mixed, producing a lethal agent.

DOD's program is based on the assumption that existing unitary chemical weapons are insufficient in number and condition. Opponents of DOD's binary program do not accept this assumption. They assert that the existing stockpile of unitary chemical weapons would provide an adequate retaliatory capability if it were refurbished and maintained. GAO finds that present knowledge is not adequate either to refute or to support the assumptions, claims, and counterclaims in this debate.

GAO finds that assertions about the specific technical and operational advantages of binary weapons, compared with unitary weapons, are not supported by empirical evidence and must be recognized as possibly inaccurate. The lack of field-test data on binary weapons leaves a substantial gap in what is known about them, and many have challenged the credibility of the simulation data. There is some consensus that the design of binary weapons makes them safer than unitary weapons for handling, storing, and transporting in peacetime, but these peacetime advantages may have some related wartime costs (such as mixing time and more complex logistics) that are not often discussed. Various alternatives to the production of binary weapons are described in the literature, but few studies have attempted to determine their relative merits or what would happen if they were used in a chemical war.

How Will Modernization Affect the Prospects for Disarmament?

GAO finds two major positions on how the U.S. chemical warfare modernization program might affect prospects for disarmament. One view is that modernizing by producing binary weapons would result in a negotiations breakthrough; the other view is that it would have the opposite effect and result in a total breakdown of negotiations and an arms race. Data and analyses supporting these positions are few. A major stumbling block in current disarmament negotiations is on-site verification of chemical warfare-related activity. The literature suggests that binary production might complicate verification procedures.

Concluding Observations

Conjecture plays a major role in the formulation of theories about chemical warfare deterrence and in the analysis of Soviet threats and possible U.S. responses. There is little empirical data on the functioning and usefulness of chemical weapons. GAO finds seven areas of primary information need.

1. Soviet offensive capability: More reliable information is needed on Soviet offensive capability. The evidence is strong that the Soviets have been building nuclear, biological, and chemical defensive capabilities, but this does not necessarily imply, as is sometimes assumed, that the United States should strengthen its chemical retaliatory capabilities.

2. Combination of chemical and nonchemical munitions: The literature reveals no analysis of what proportions of chemical to nonchemical munitions would be needed to remove the potential advantage of an enemy's using chemical weapons and to degrade an enemy's performance in chemical war. It is argued reasonably in the literature, however, that some ability to retaliate with chemical weapons is required.

3. Achieving military objectives: The literature does not conclude that chemicals are tactically more advantageous than other weapons in achieving military objectives, other than for achieving degradation of an enemy's performance. There appears to be no comparative information on the ability of chemical and other weapons, alone or in combination, to cause casualties in attacks on specific battlefield targets. Further, a simulation study sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) indicates that under certain conditions . . . achieve the military objective. Involvement of . . . to achieve the objective, regardless of other combat factors. This question about a chemical . . . and the associated costs, requires further analyses.

4. Delivery systems: Comparative analyses of the effectiveness of the various chemical weapons delivery systems have not been made. The literature is confined to concern about reliance on limited long-range air-to-ground capability.

5. Protecting civilians: There are no analyses of how to protect the civilian population in a combat area, even though a simulation sponsored by the JCS indicates that a relatively . . . in a chemical war. No policies for protecting civilians have been stated.

6. Planning: The literature indicates that a major reason that chemicals have been used in only limited ways in past wars is that chemical warfare has never been assimilated into armed forces procedures, preparing everyone on the battlefield to know what to do, how to do it, when to do it, and what will happen if it is done.

7. Producing binary weapons: Given the implications for national security and for dollar expense in DOD's proposal to modernize the U.S. chemical warfare capability by producing binary weapons, the literature contains surprisingly little analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of these weapons compared with the unitary weapons they would replace. What is known about the ability of other countries to produce binary nerve agents and munitions should be brought up to date in a way that addresses the issue of verification in the negotiation of a weapons ban.

Agency Comments and GAO's Response

DOD reviewed a draft of this report and provided oral and written comments. DOD was highly critical of the report, arguing that (1) a literature review is not an appropriate method for dealing with such a complex topic, (2) not all available documentation was included in the review, and (3) knowledgeable and responsible DOD officials were not interviewed. GAO's methodology goes far beyond a literature review and GAO has revised the report to elaborate on its "information synthesis" approach. GAO remains confident that all major completed studies were included in the review and that appropriate, responsible individuals were interviewed. DOD provided no titles of studies omitted from GAO's review. Discussion of DOD's comments and GAO's response is presented in chapter 6 of the published report. DOD's written comments and GAO's letter response are included as appendix IV.

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Speech by Soviet General Secretary Andropov: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], May 3, 1983 [1]

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Comrades, today, on the eve of the 165th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx, we communists, declare with pride: History has evolved according to Marx, Engels and Lenin. Marxism-Leninism, constantly enriched by the practice of communist and workers parties, international experience of building socialism and struggling for it, continues to remain the sole correct and reliable guide to action.

Our ideological opponents reacted in their own way to the Marx year. U.S. President Reagan even called for a crusade against communism, prophesying its ruin. Washington does not limit itself to mere words. Plans to gain military superiority over the USSR and other countries of socialism are openly prepared there.

The United States resorts to unceremonious interference in the affairs of other nations, imposing on them the American way of life, and is trying, in fact, to gain world domination. This is the true root of evil perpetrated in the world, the evil which threatens the very existence of people.

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[1] Moscow *Krasnaya Zvezda* in Russian, May 4, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, May 4, 1983, vol. III, pp. F6–F8. The speech was made in the Kremlin at a dinner in honor of a delegation from the German Democratic Republic headed by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of the Council of State.

We proceed from the premise that the historical competition of the two social systems, the struggle of ideas is quite a natural phenomenon stemming from the very fact of the existence of socialism and capitalism. But we are emphatically against this historical confrontation being directed at curtailing peaceful cooperation and even more so against switching to the plane of nuclear war.

In conditions when the whole of mankind is threatened by nuclear catastrophe it is the duty of all who deal with the adoption of political decisions to put concern for the preservation of peace above everything else. Is it not time for the American leaders to display more political restraint, responsibility and common sense?

This relates first of all to the most pressing need of the day—to prevent a new cycle of the nuclear-missile race, to avert war.

The countries of socialism approach these questions with the highest sense of responsibility. Our proposals have been outlined in a number of joint documents, including in the Prague Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty member states. [2] They provide both for the removal of the material means of waging war and for the creation of political barriers to unleashing war. They cover both nuclear and conventional armaments. They take into account the lawful interests of the security both of the European peoples and of the peoples of the whole world. To this day the NATO countries are avoiding giving an answer to the new peace initiatives of the socialist states.

We have stated more than once our readiness to consider any other initiatives based on the principle of the equality and equal security of the sides. No attempt to violate this principle has any chance of success. We will not allow ourselves to be deceived.

The moment now is very important: It is enough to pull a string to send the ball rolling. Precisely this role can be played by the deployment of American Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe. A chain reaction is inevitable if, contrary to all arguments of reason, the matter takes this turn. The USSR, the GDR, other Warsaw Treaty member-states will be compelled to adopt response measures.

I would not like to think that such a prospect suits the American leadership. But how then must one assess its statements and actions? For it is clearly realized in Washington that neither the "zero" nor the "interim" options, designed to secure the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union and to give the United States a military advantage in Europe, can serve as a basis for a just settlement acceptable to both sides.

Likewise, the position of the governments of some other NATO countries cannot but cause perplexity. It is known, for instance, that the FRG statesmen have repeatedly expressed agreement that war should never again be unleashed from German soil. How can this be squared with support for the plans to deploy American missiles on

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[2] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

West German soil? For these are first-strike weapons. Besides, the decision to fire the missiles would be made by those who are across the ocean.

The Soviet Union has stated readiness not to have in Europe a single missile and a single plane more than possessed today by NATO countries. We are told that in this event the Soviet Union would have more missile nuclear warheads.

Well, we are prepared to reach an agreement on the equality of nuclear potentials in Europe both as regards delivery vehicles and warheads, taking into consideration, of course, the corresponding armaments of Britain and France.

In other words, we want the USSR to have no more missiles and warheads mounted on them than on the NATO side in each mutually agreed period. In the event of a reduction of the number of warheads on British and French missiles, the number of warheads on our medium-range missiles would be reduced by the same amount. The same approach would be applied also to the aviation systems of this class deployed in Europe. Thereby an approximate equality would be maintained between the USSR and NATO both as regards medium-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, that is, missiles and aircraft, and by the number of warheads carried by them. Furthermore, this equality would be on a much lower level than at present.

I particularly want to stress that the fulfillment of this new proposal would bring about a situation where we would have far fewer medium-range missiles and warheads in the European part of the Soviet Union than before 1976 when we did not have SS–20 missiles.

Those who will again say "no" to this proposal too will assume grave responsibility before the peoples of Europe and the whole world because every week, every day lost for the attainment of agreement increases the nuclear danger.

All the peoples and governments must realize the extent of this danger and do everything to protect peace, to turn the development of events back in the direction of detente.

From our side we are doing everything within our power for this. And here, and I want to emphasize this, we have a full unity of views and intentions with the German comrades.

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Statement by ACDA Director Adelman Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, May 3, 1983 [1]

Before I read my statement, let me just say that at the staff meeting at ACDA this morning I said that as somebody who has served in our Government, who has had the privilege of serving our Government for 9 or 10 years now, I am not used to being in that situation.

When I started, one of my early jobs was in the OEO, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and from there into AID, the foreign aid program, where I talked to Congressman Hyde and others about foreign aid. Then at the Pentagon, and at the United Nations, and in every case previously the call from the Congress was always for less and less, and "Why do you need so much money" for OEO, AID, the Pentagon, and the United Nations. I can tell you that it is an unusual position to be in, but not uncomfortable to be sure.

Mr. Chairman, it is a great privilege to appear before you for the first of what I hope to be many appearances before this committee and the subcommittee in particular. I hope we can build the kind of close working relationship with steady consultation back and forth that I believe we, at ACDA, are in the process of building in the Senate.

COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL

As you mentioned, the Senate has recently confirmed me, on April 14, and I was sworn in on April 22. As you might have noticed, my nomination did not exactly slip by without anyone paying attention. But the attention given arms control in general, and ACDA in particular, during the Senate confirmation process matches the administration's own firm commitment to a strong arms control program and to the institution that can spearhead that activity.

Congressman Mica, as the chairman's statement made very clear that I, too, see my responsibilities to invigorate ACDA to the fullest extent possible. I believe that strong arms control agreements, which are equitable, verifiable, and militarily significant really depend in large measure on the vigor and the ability of ACDA.

I come before this committee, as I came before the Senate, fully aware of the central importance of these issues for our Nation, for the world. I come before you also with pride in America's record in this realm. Perhaps no people in modern history have held higher hopes for effective arms control measures, and no nation in modern history has presented more farsighted plans for meaningful control of nuclear weapons. The Reagan administration carries on in this fine American tradition, and I am personally exceedingly proud to be part of this vital mission.

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[1] *Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1984–85: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs . . . on H.R. 2192,* pp. 92–96.

ACDA'S IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES

Mr. Chairman, my own priorities as the Director of ACDA in the coming several months are twofold basically. First, to reinvigorate and reinforce ACDA as a spearhead in this mission. I believe that the President's statements in recent weeks have been very clear on this point, and later on in this hearing, we may go into that in detail.

Certainly ACDA is one of the most critical and has become over the last 3 months one of the most prominent Government agencies in Washington even though it is one of the smallest.

My own goals for the organization are quite simply to staff it up and settle it down from the personnel turmoil that has been through or, more accurately, that it has endured over the past months in particular, and even a longer period of time in general: To staff it up so that all the top positions are filled with individuals eminently qualified.

Congressman Mica, as you mentioned, the testimony to the subcommittee before about the vacancies, and the administrative problems at ACDA, I read all those statements just last week in preparation for looking at the administrative side of ACDA. As you have said, there is a good deal to be done in that regard.

The second priority is, of course, to review, organize, and manage the arms control negotiations now underway in Geneva. We will go into that in depth later on.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

In both of these endeavors, I plan to work closely with the Congress, to receive our elected representatives' ideas on arms control, to explain the administration's plans, approaches, and attitudes to these representatives on these issues.

I have done that in the Senate since the vote on my confirmation on April 14. That afternoon, I called all the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke to most of them on the phone, trying to set up times for the following week to get together with them individually to say, "Now that the confirmation process is behind us, let's talk about arms control and looking to the future." Those discussions are very valuable to me to get an idea of the feelings on arms control and the administration's proposals. I hope to do a similar activity of sharing information with members of this committee.

AUTHORIZATION REQUESTS

Mr. Chairman, I seek your support and the support of this committee for the Agency's 2-year authorization request for fiscal years 1984–85. We have a legislative presentation booklet before the committee that describes our budget in detail.

During the hearing, I will add my own perspective and call on Bill Montgomery, in charge of our Office of Administration, and Tom Graham, Director of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs, to help me out.

The authorization requests for ACDA of $21.3 million for fiscal year 1984 and $21.6 million for fiscal year 1985 were formulated and submitted before I came onboard. My general impression of them is that they seem adequate to carry out the missions of the Agency, but they are very lean budgets, ones without reserves whatsoever, and should really not be reduced below the requested levels by the committee or by any committee in the Congress. Also the authorization request is adequate only given the current level of negotiating activity. Should there be an increase in negotiating activities, we may have to come back with a supplemental request.

The highlight of ACDA's role is well familiar to you—the START, the INF, the SCC, the MBFR, and the CD. Like I said, we can go into all of that, and hopefully we will.

PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS AND FUNDING

Let me address some of the concerns that the chairman in his statement has raised about ACDA reductions in personnel and financial resources, so that we have it right up front.

With respect to the funding, the chart on page 7 of my testimony is very useful. Prior year ACDA reductions have been no more than those experienced on the average by other Government agencies, and certainly less than some Government agencies. Government-wide budget guidance for fiscal year 1982 was to reduce the size of the nondefense budget by 12 percent, that was the overall figure for the Government. ACDA's fiscal year 1982 funding was kept at about the fiscal year 1981 actual budget authority of $17 million. For fiscal year 1983, our decrease was about 7.9 percent. As you can see, the fiscal year 1984 ACDA appropriation request for continuing ACDA program is $16.4, for an increase of about 6 percent.

For personnel, we have on page 8 the numbers on personnel, which show the authorized positions and fulltime equivalents.

Let me point out that the present level, which is 154 with 24 authorized FTE—full time equivalent—is similar to the level in 1963 when ACDA helped spearhead the effort on the Hot Line Agreement [2] and the Limited Test Ban Treaty [3] were concluded, and about the level in 1974 when the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [4] was signed. Real accomplishments on arms control measures can, indeed, be realized with a small, but top caliber staff. ACDA has done it in the past, and I believe that it can do it at the present time as well.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 236–238.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 291–293.

[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.

The agencies of Government were given guidelines to cut their staff to help realize the President's economic goals, and the Agency absorbed a 16-percent decrease in personnel from January 1981 to the beginning of fiscal year 1983, but this was not unusual compared to cuts in other Government agencies as I point out on page 9. Our dot for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is right at the 16 percent level. You can see that it is a little higher than some and a little lower than others. It is not out of whack with all Government agencies around.

RELOCATION OF ACDA LIBRARY

Questions have also arisen on the relocation of the ACDA library. We were faced with a doubling of the Rosslyn rent, and we decided to move the ACDA library to an area that was more convenient and less expensive. We were unable to find space for the entire collection within the Department of State building, therefore, parts of the library which were unique to ACDA were moved into the State Department building, and the other parts are in good facilities in George Washington University, which is a 6½ minute walk from ACDA offices.

I can say that with precision because that is what I did yesterday, I walked over there to see what the library was like, and how it was housed, and to get a feel for that situation.

Mr. Mica. If I may say, 6 minutes doesn't seem like much, but they tell us we only have an 8-minute warning when something is fired in Russia and we have to respond here. [Laughter.] [5]

Mr. Adelman. Having been in academia most of my life, I have never seen students rushing to libraries with quite the speed of that. I have seen students rushing from libraries with lightning launcher speeds, but not to libraries. [Laughter.]

OFFICE OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS

Mr. Adelman. Last, questions have been raised about the Office of Operations Analysis, which was also housed in our Rosslyn offices. The rent there also went up, and we decided to effect cost savings and move some of the computer facilities into the ACDA offices where they are now. For other facilities we have to use, we have a service agreement with the U.S. Railway Association.

We are looking at that computer situation right now to get back to the situation that we were in before. We have secure computers now that are in use, and they are being used in the Agency.

ACDA'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Let me just wind up and open it up for questions by saying that when you look at all that ACDA does in the negotiations of START, INF, the Committee on Disarmament, the SCC, the arms transfers and nonproliferation activities, the impact statements, we are a very busy Agency. It has a great deal to do, a great deal of critically vital work to perform with an authorization request which I believe is well conceived but very lean. We can with the amount of financial support accomplish our mission.

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[5] These and following brackets are in the source text.

I urge the committee to support this request in its full amount. If the work of the Agency and its delegations overseas expand significantly beyond those which are presently planned, it may be necessary for us to seek supplemental funding.

Now my colleagues and I will be happy to answer questions from you, and to start this, like I said, as hopefully as I said, as the first of many, many times that we have together.

News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter, Nuclear Arms Reduction, and Nuclear Arms Freeze [Extract], May 4, 1983 [1]

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Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter

Q. Mr. President, the Roman Catholic Bishops, as you know, voted overwhelmingly yesterday in favor of a resolution calling for a halt in the nuclear arms race. Is that going to complicate your administration's efforts in trying to head off the nuclear freeze movement?

The President. No, I don't really think so, particularly if those of you who are going to be commenting on this will wait, as we have to, until we have a chance to see the 45,000-word letter. I think that too much attention was being paid to the one word, "curb" or "halt," when you think there's 45,000 words in toto.

We haven't received it yet. I have had some information in advance about it which indicates that it really is a legitimate effort to do exactly what we're doing, and that is to try to find ways toward world peace. And if so, then we're both doing the same thing.

Q. But isn't it true that if a number of leading Catholic bishops, archbishops, cardinals, such as we've seen during this debate, go around the country, either to their parishes or in other forums, and say, as they are saying, that "we think use of nuclear weapons is wrong"—and some of them are saying, in fact, "we see no way that nuclear weapons should ever be used"—isn't that going to have an influence on the debate?

The President. Well, is it really? Is there anyone that really favors using those weapons or that wants to see them? Our own proposals in START and INF are aimed at starting to reduce those weapons. And my own hope is that maybe once we start, that we can completely eliminate them.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 4, 1983, pp. 643–645.

What we're talking about is a weapon that is so contrary to what used to be, before Hitler invented total war—what used to be the policy of all nations by way of the Geneva rules and regulations concerning warfare. And that is that you did not make civilians targets of war. We used to have very specific rules about that in the rules of warfare. And then came total war in World War II, and yes, all of the nations finally were doing it with the conventional weapons, bombing and so forth.

But this now—can anyone—granted that your weapons are targeted on weapons, but this kind of weapon can't help but have an effect on the population as a whole. So, they're not saying anything we don't say, that, God forbid, those weapons should ever be used.

Q. Could you clarify it, Mr. President?

The President. What?

Q. Are you saying that based on what you've seen so far, there's nothing inconsistent in the bishops' letter with your administration's policies?

The President. Well, as I say, I have not seen it yet, and 45,000 words are a lot to digest. But what I'm saying is that I think their purpose is the same as ours. They're looking for a way toward peace and promoting world peace, and that's what we're also looking for. And I think that to just deal in the specifics, and so far all of the accounts of this and all of the reporting has dealt on that one word, as if the difference between "curb" and "halt"—we've had some indications that, in reality, there are many things in there that we'll have no quarrel with at all.

Nuclear Arms Reduction

Q. Mr. President, Soviet leader Andropov yesterday made a new offer in the medium-range missile talks.[2] Do you see anything positive in what he called for yesterday?

The President. Well, yes, the very fact that they have moved toward discussing warheads instead of missiles. We feel that way and have felt that way for some time—that this is what we should be negotiating. And we're going to give this serious consideration, as we do any proposal that they make, and I will be talking to Dr. Nitze before he returns to the INF talks about this. And I can't go beyond that now in giving any indication—

Q. Well, if I might just follow up. What about the fact that he continues to want to include the British and the French missiles, the fact that he's not talking about Soviet missiles in Asia?

The President. Well, this is, as I say, this is going to take careful consideration to see where it figures in with what we're trying to accomplish in those meetings. And I can't go beyond it, because then you get into the very area of talking about negotiations, and you can't do that in advance.

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[2] *Ante,* May 3.

Q. Mr. President, I was wondering, the administration has initially seemed to characterize what Andropov said as less than sweeping in terms of the changes that he's offered. But I was wondering whether you felt, based on what you've seen, read, and heard, whether this seemed to you like a sincere effort on his part to break the impasse or whether it was just another chapter in the propaganda back and forth.

The President. Well, this'll be determined, I think, when the negotiators get back there and are actually at the meetings. But as I say, the encouraging thing was that he made a proposal. And it was a proposal that aimed at something that has been a consideration of ours, and that is that we should be negotiating warheads and not just missiles. Now, you won't know until you really sit across the table from them whether this was just propaganda or a proposal.

Q. Are you saying that you think this improves chances for an agreement this year?

The President. I can't put a time limit on it. Remember, it took 7 years to get the SALT agreement. [3] I can only say that the very fact that they're at the table and returning to the table is encouraging to me, when you look back at the history all the way to the end of World War II in attempting to get negotiations of this kind with them. But we're encouraged by the fact that they are there at the table and willing to discuss and have actually made a proposal of their own.

Nuclear Arms Freeze

Q. Going back to Carl's question a second, some of your aides have expressed the opinion that the nuclear freeze movement may be on the wane. Do you share that view?

The President. Be on the wane?

Q. Yes.

The President. No. But I could express a hope that—I haven't given much consideration to whether it is or is not. I hope it is, because I think it's counterproductive.

Actually, we're all talking a freeze, but we're talking something that is practical—that, if you once get down to a verifiable balance—they are talking, and have been talking, of a freeze even though there is a great imbalance, which we think would increase the possibility of war if one side has too much of an advantage over the other.

And so, what we have said is, reduce first, and then freeze. And we've always thought the fallacy in the freeze movement was they wanted to freeze first, and then see if you could reduce. But there wouldn't be any incentive for the Soviets with the margin of superiority they have to, once they had a freeze, to then go for reductions.

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[3] The SALT II agreement, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

So, if, as you say, the movement is on a wane, maybe they've begun—maybe many of them who, I'm sure, are quite sincere have seen the fallacy of that position.

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Statement by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations: Strategic Modernization, May 4, 1983 [1]

Maintaining an effective and stable nuclear deterrent presents the President and the Congress with difficult and complex choices. As the chairman of the President's bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces, Gen. Scowcroft has said: "There are no simple solutions to the questions that must be answered in basing our forces, achieving equitable arms control agreements and improving strategic stability." [2]

As this committee knows, the specific issue of a new American ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] [3] has been debated hotly for almost a decade. It is time that we made a decision. And, in my view, that decision should be to proceed with production and deployment of the Peacekeeper missile.

There has been consensus on the need for a new ICBM for many years now. Each of the past four Presidents has supported the development of a new ICBM, and the Congress has been supportive as well. It is the choice of a basing mode for that new ICBM that has complicated the production and deployment decision.

The President's bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces has completed its review of the overall U.S. strategic posture. [4] The commission studied a number of alternative basing modes for a new ICBM, consulted with Congress, and presented unanimous conclusions concerning U.S. strategic forces and arms control. The commission conclusions have now been accepted by the President, and the President's recommendations are before the Congress. These recommendations provide the basis for developing a broad national consensus. [5]

Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance

The most important goals of our defense and foreign policy are to prevent war and to maintain a just peace. The foundation of peace in the nuclear age has been America's strategy of deterrence. Since we first acquired nuclear weapons, the United States has sought to prevent war by discouraging aggression against the United States and its allies. By presenting any potential aggressor with the prospect of certain retaliation, peace has been maintained for nearly 40 years. The history of the 20th century makes it sadly clear that peaceful intentions and good motives alone will not stop aggressors. Adequate military strength does do so, and the strategy of deterrence has been successful in protecting the security of America and Western Europe since the end of World War II.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 1983, pp. 17–18. The testimony was before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

[2] *Ante*, Apr. 6.

[3] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[4] For the commission's report, see *ante*, Apr. 6.

[5] The President's letter to the Congress is printed *ante*, Apr. 19.

The strategic balance, however, has dimensions beyond deterrence. That balance shapes the global context in which American foreign policy operates. As Deputy Secretary of State, I am acutely aware that America's military strength is vital to the conduct of foreign policy. Our perceived strengths and weaknesses directly affect our ability to achieve our goals. Therefore, the decisions we make or fail to make on weapons programs are bound to influence the judgments not only of our adversaries but also of our allies and friends around the world.

The growth of Soviet military power relative to the United States over the past 10 years has had a direct effect on Soviet willingness to challenge America's interests around the world. Moscow is using its power directly in Syria, Poland, and Afghanistan and indirectly through its proxies in Angola and closer to home in Central America. These are the tangible manifestations of growing Soviet power. Our concern is that unless we maintain a strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the problem of Soviet adventurism will persist and may get even worse.

If for example, the Soviets are able to strike effectively at our land-based ICBMs while we do not have comparable capability, Moscow might believe it could gain political leverage by a threat of nuclear blackmail. Without arguing the question of whether the Soviets are prepared to launch a nuclear first-strike, one can recognize that such a crucial imbalance in strategic capabilities could well make them bolder in a regional conflict or in a major crisis. That situation cannot be in the interest of either this nation or of world peace.

Our visible commitment to maintaining the strategic balance is also essential to sustain the confidence of our friends and cohesion of our alliances. While we have debated among ourselves and tabled serious arms control initiatives at the negotiating table, the Soviets have deployed—repeatedly. Over the past decade the Soviets have deployed three new ICBMs. They have tested two more in the last 6 months and have, at least, two additional new types of ICBMs in development.

What would our allies and other nations conclude about American strength, resolve, and reliability if we were to fail to deploy a new ICBM in the face of these Soviet developments? Our foreign policy and our ability to defend our interests and our most cherished values will be decisively strengthened if the Congress gives strong backing to the program the President announced last month. Modernization of our deterrent, and of our land-based ICBM force in particular, is essential to the goals of preventing conflict, reducing the risk of war, and demonstrating our resolve to adversaries and allies alike. At the same time, it will also increase Moscow's incentive to negotiate seriously in START [strategic arms reduction talks] and other arms reduction talks.

Arms Reduction and the Strategic Balance

It is important to note that the Scowcroft commission did not consider the ICBM problem, or even our overall strategic posture, in isolation from other issues. They also considered the relationship between strategic programs and arms control. The commission made clear that there was a necessary complementary between strategic programs and arms control. Both arms control and modernization programs can affect the strategic balance. Vigorous pursuit of both is the best course to pursue. To quote the Scowcroft commission report: "Our arms control proposals and our strategic arms programs should thus be integrated and be mutually reinforcing. They should work together to permit us, and encourage the Soviets, to move in directions that reduce or eliminate the advantage of aggression and also reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation."

President Reagan adopted this dual approach early in his Administration. When he announced his modernization program, he also announced that the United States would negotiate with the Soviet Union to achieve mutual and deep nuclear arms reductions.[6] We are now negotiating seriously with the Soviets in Geneva on both intermediate-range and strategic nuclear weapons.

If we have learned anything from our experience in arms control negotiations over the last two decades, we should have learned this fundamental truth: The process of arms control depends on the demonstrated ability of the United States to maintain an effective strategic force. This, in turn, depends, as it always has, on maintaining a modern, capable triad of strategic forces. The Peacekeeper ICBM is a critical component of that modernized triad.

As a lawyer, I know that negotiations begin only when both parties believe they have something to gain by talking or something to lose by failing to talk. Without the incentive of gain or loss provided by our modernization program, the Soviets would see no advantage in negotiating seriously to reduce their own nuclear force.

The Peacekeeper represents the response that each of the past four administrations has considered necessary to offset, at least partially, the formidable Soviet ICBM arsenal. The question now before us is whether we shall abandon this decade-long modernization program.

As the Scowcroft commission report reasoned: "It is illusory to believe that we would obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM program that could lead to deployment in this decade. . . . Abandoning the MX at this time in search of a substitute would jeopardize, not enhance, the likelihood of reaching a stabilizing and equitable agreement."

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 461–464.

The commission's recommendations included more than support for deploying the Peacekeeper missile. The commission also recommended, and the President agreed, that the full modernization program begun in 1981 be continued. It also recommended development of a new small single-warhead missile and continuation of research on survivability improvements for our ICBMs, including active defense and silo hardening.

Questions have been raised about whether the proposed modernization program is consistent with our arms control objectives and our obligations under past arms control agreements. Let me assure you that the proposed program is fully consistent with those objectives and obligations. The Peacekeeper is consistent with all specific provisions of existing SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] agreements. Deploying 100 of the new missiles in existing Minuteman silos, as the President proposed, would involve no construction of new fixed launchers, no increase in silo volume, and no increase in MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] ICBM launchers. Moreover, the 100 new Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos are, obviously, far too small a force to be destabilizing.

Some have wondered, however, how the development of a small ICBM in addition to the Peacekeeper would be consistent with either SALT II or a possible START agreement. The SALT II Treaty [7] would have permitted deployment of no more than one new ICBM on each side. On our side, the new missile would be the Peacekeeper. But that treaty, even if it had been ratified, would have expired at the end of 1985. The President's proposal calls for the start of engineering development of a new small ICBM, but no deployment would be possible until after 1990—long after the SALT II time period had expired. And long before that time, we would hope that a START agreement will have established a new regime for maintaining a stable strategic balance.

Beyond this, the new small missile, if it proves feasible, would have broader, positive implications for arms control. It would enhance stability, because it would be more survivable, and stability has always been a central objective of arms control since the process began. As [Defense] Secretary Weinberger has explained, it may move the evolution of strategic systems in a stabilizing direction over the long term. The basic concepts underlying our START proposals are flexible enough to accommodate this small missile.

The U.S.-Soviet strategic competition will continue into the long-term future. And there is no guarantee that a restructuring of U.S. and Soviet forces in the direction of single warheads will take place in the near future. But we believe both sides have real incentives to move in this direction. In the meantime, we need now to take the hard decisions necessary to ensure a safe strategic relationship for the years immediately ahead.

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[7] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

Conclusion

I share with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense the conviction that modernization of our strategic forces is a matter of the highest priority. A credible, flexible strategic force is not only vital to the balance of power but is the essential foundation of our role as leader and defender of free nations. The fundamental goal of nuclear deterrence depends on a credible force. Our goal of deterring non-nuclear war or nuclear blackmail also depends on it.

The Peacekeeper missile is indispensable to our near-term goals of restoring the strategic balance, achieving deterrence, and providing an incentive to the Soviets for serious negotiations on arms reductions. Development of a small ICBM may well enhance strategic stability in the longer term. But as the Scowcroft commission stressed, neither of the two systems can ensure security alone; they are complementary. Strength and peace are also complementary. Both must be pursued with determination. And with that determination, both can be achieved.

Statement by President Reagan: Nuclear Arms Freeze Resolution, May 5, 1983 [1]

Nearly 2 months ago, the House of Representatives began a serious debate about alternative approaches to arms control. This debate, one of the longest in the history of the House, not only elevated understanding of the issues, but made it clear that the issues themselves are enormously complex. There are no easy answers to arms control.

During this debate, it became apparent to more and more Members of the House that an immediate freeze, while superficially appealing, is fundamentally flawed. For more than 30 years, we have maintained world peace because the United States maintained effective forces of deterrence; we must not jeopardize our ability to keep the peace. Nor can we lock the United States into a position of inferiority. And we must not take any steps that would disrupt the highly sensitive arms reduction negotiations underway in Geneva.

I am pleased that a great number in Congress came to recognize the threats posed by a simple "freeze now" approach and passed amendments that sought to improve the final resolution passed by the House. The Levitas amendment was especially welcome, because it recognizes the importance of arms reduction in achieving genuine arms control.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 9, 1983, p. 652.

The balance of the resolution that was passed last night is ambiguous and, indeed, so internally inconsistent that interpretation is difficult. For example, the resolution calls for a freeze while also expressing the need for maintaining equivalence and a stable international balance. As stated many times before, this administration agrees that the maintenance of an arms balance is essential. But an immediate freeze would prevent us from having it. In sum, the resolution finally adopted by the House, while greatly improved, is not an answer to arms control that I can responsibly support.

Should this debate now move on to the Senate, I am confident that the doubts and opposition to a simple freeze now will continue to grow. In the meantime, this administration will continue to press forward vigorously at the negotiating table for arms reductions that I believe remain the best, true hope for peace and stability.

Statement by the Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 11, 1983 [1]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure for us to appear before you and the members of the committee to explain the Commission's work, why we did what we did, and what our recommendations are. You do have the Commission report [2] and also a statement, so I will make my opening remarks very brief and summary in nature.

The Chairman. Your full statement will be incorporated in the record.

General Scowcroft. Mr. Chairman, as we looked over the troubled history of the MX missile, we became mindful of a number of points which we felt had to be dealt with. The first was the political point, in the sense that every proposal for arms control and modernization of our strategic forces over about the past decade has become embroiled in increasingly partisan debate, increasingly divisive debate.

We have also been searching in our modernization program for the ICBM leg of the Triad in a sense to recreate the conditions at the time of Minuteman III when it was in a sense the ideal weapon, with the survivability, accuracy, command and control, and the very low operating costs that were attendant upon its deployment. Times have changed and an attempt to recreate that with a single system deployed in a single way perhaps is not achievable.

We also felt that perhaps we were at the end of an era, the end of an era in the kinds of trends in ICBM development, in arms control, and perhaps in our relations with the Soviet Union.

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[1] *President's Commission on Strategic Forces: Hearing . . . on the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Implications of the Scowcroft Commission Report*, pp. 2–4.

[2] *Ante*, Apr. 6.

And reviewing all that, we felt that a substantially new departure was needed, and we developed a package of proposals designed really to accomplish two things: First, to integrate our strategic weapons programs, especially our ICBM programs, with arms control; and then to move both in the direction of enhanced stability.

The three-part program is designed as follows: First, the deployment of something like 100 MX missiles, both as modernization and to accomplish a number of other goals, among which I will mention three:

First of all, to demonstrate U.S. national will and cohesion. Four Presidents have now stated that the MX is important, if not vital, to our national security. To now back away from that as a country and to reject requests for that system it seemed to the Commission would reflect an absence of that critical element of deterrence, and that is national will and determination.

Second, whatever your conclusions about the overall state of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union in ICBM forces, there is an asymmetry in the sense that the Soviets, with their large throw-weight numbers and accuracy, can pose a risk to our forces and other high-value hardened targets of a nature to which we cannot begin to respond. We feel that that is a fundamental element of instability and needs to be rectified.

Third, and very importantly, we believe that the deployment of the MX is essential in order to induce the Soviets toward negotiations which would permit us and encourage them to move in the direction of stability.

That brings me to the second part of our program for ICBM modernization. That is to move toward the development and the deployment of a small single-warhead missile. A single-warhead missile in order to reduce the value of the target, and thus the incentive, the military incentive to attack in a crisis.

We have perversely, as a result of one of the effects of arms control, both sides have been developing bigger weapons, bigger missiles with more warheads, providing an attractive target in the event of a conflict. We believe that reducing the ratio of warheads to launchers, hopefully with the ultimate goal of unity, will provide to the extent possible a degree of stability in our strategic forces.

We believe this missile should be small in order to open up the maximum number of options for its basing, almost certainly to include some element of mobility, which will provide survivability over the longer term for our ICBM forces.

The third element of our package is the development of arms control proposals which will enhance stability and provide the proper environment for this modification of strategic forces which we propose. For that, an initial step, an essential initial step, is to modify our strategic proposals to begin to count by warheads and not by launchers.

It would not be prudent for us to modernize by going to a single warhead missile if the Soviets at the same time continued deploying SS-18 follow-ons, for example, at a 10-to-1 warhead ratio. It makes that development of stability impossible.

Having made those changes, we feel that then prudent, even sharp, reductions would be possible and would, in fact, enhance stability and provide a proper environment for the small missile, rather than, as is possible today with deep reductions, actually increase instability.

We believe that—back to the MX, MX deployment in Minuteman silos is an adequate response to the needs of the moment. We have not, as many have suggested, reversed or closed the window of vulnerability. Whatever one thinks about the vulnerability of those silos, they are likely to become more vulnerable in the future.

We have proposed a rigorous R&D program in silo hardening and we of course recommend taking advantage of any reasonable developments in that field. But we feel that survivability at the moment is not so critical an element of the overall problem as to require further immediate steps, for several reasons:

First of all, the fundamental requirement for survivability in the ICBM forces is as a hedge against a Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare which would put our submarine forces at risk. We do not see that at the moment, nor at any time over the coming years. We cannot anticipate when, if ever, it will take place. But we think that we prudently have some period of time before we have to face that problem.

In addition, whatever comfort the Soviets can take from the test accuracy of their individual weapons, we think there is a substantial amount of caution that they have to view as they look not at test accuracies, but at operational accuracies and the complex problem of mounting an attack, which cannot be practiced, which has to be perfect the first time. And we think that would induce a considerable amount of caution, operational caution in their mind.

And lastly, we feel that for now and perhaps for a decade in the future we have what I would call a synergistic survivability between the bomber and the ICBM forces, in that at the present time the Soviets have to use different forces to attack those two forces and therefore they cannot do so simultaneously.

This is in brief the package we proposed, Mr. Chairman. We believe its elements are integrally related and that no one standing by itself is satisfactory. We do not claim this is a perfect solution. We believe it is a workable solution which enhances our national security and offers the promise of bringing us together on a consensus which is reasonable, which is workable, and would allow us to put the divisiveness of the past behind us and move forward as a Nation confidently into the uncertainties of the future.

U.K. Note to the General Secretary of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America: Allegations About the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Falklands Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands [Extract], May 11, 1983 [1]

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I have just read with interest your report which you kindly sent to me as document No. CG/234 of 15 April of the 8th Ordinary Period of Sessions of OPANAL which will take place in Kingston from 16–19 May. [2] I have also read the Notes from the Argentine Embassy of 21 April and 29 April circulated as documents Nos. S/Inf. 254 of 22 April and S/Inf. 256 of 3 May.

The Argentine Embassy Note of 21 April refers to the "introduction of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom into the Falklands Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich." The Note goes on to claim that the allegations about the presence of nuclear weapons in the British task force have never been adequately answered by the British Government.

The Government of the United Kingdom has scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [3] and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which *de jure* or *de facto* it is internationally responsible and lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in that Treaty.

Further the Government has scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which the Treaty is in force.

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Letter From President Reagan to Leaders of the Congress: Strategic Modernization Program and Nuclear Arms Reduction, May 12, 1983 [4]

Thank you for your recent letter on our strategic modernization program and its relationship to our arms control proposals. Your letter represents the bi-partisan spirit which I believe will help achieve our common goals of ensuring effective deterrent forces and equitable and verifiable arms reductions.

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[1] A/38/496, p. 41. The note was sent by Ambassador Tickell, U.K. Ambassador to Jamaica.

[2] For the OPANAL resolution on this question, see *post*, May 19.

[3] The treaty and its protocols are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[4] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 16, 1983, pp. 704–705. This is the text of identical letters addressed to Senators Percy (R., Ill.), Nunn (D., Ga.), and Cohen (R., Maine). Similar letters, dated May 11, were sent to Congressmen Foley (D., Wash.) and Dicks (D., Wash.). The letters to Congressmen Foley and Dicks did not contain the seven paragraphs before the last two paragraphs but did contain a fuller sentence at the

The fundamental U.S. goal in negotiations concerning arms reduction, and especially in our approach to the START negotiations, is to seek agreements that would enhance security and stability by reducing overall force levels while permitting modernization of U.S. forces necessary for a credible deterrent. As you know, the Scowcroft Commission noted that elements of our START proposal are consistent with and supportive of the Commission's findings. I agree wholeheartedly with the essential theme of the Scowcroft Commission's approach to arms control: the attainment of stability at the lowest possible level of forces.[5]

The Scowcroft Commission's recommendations on modernization and arms control are integrally related. Our action with respect to these recommendations must be equally comprehensive. That is why I am now reviewing our START proposal in order to develop such modifications as are necessary to reflect the Commission's approach, which I share. To cite just one example, the Commission report recommended that the proposed limit on deployed ballistic missiles currently contained in the U.S. START position be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs. There are a number of alternative approaches available to integrate this and the other Commission recommendations into our approach to arms reductions. As modifications are made to our START proposal, I will continue to seek stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

The planned deployment of the Peacekeeper missile as proposed by my Administration is compatible with the long-term objective of the Scowcroft Commission Report. The Peacekeeper missile, deployed in a mix with small single-warhead ICBMs, would permit us to maintain the effectiveness of our deterrent and enhance stability.

At the same time, let me emphasize that we do not seek a first strike capability. To this end, we will constrain the number of Peacekeeper missiles to the minimum number needed to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent and no more. Our task, of course, would be much easier if the Soviets would agree to work with us to reduce the ratio of accurate warheads to missile silos. Clearly, consistent with our national security requirements, the overall level of Peacekeeper deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reductions agreements.

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end of the fourth paragraph. That sentence reads: "The Peacekeeper missile, deployed in a mix with small single-warhead ICBMs, would permit us to maintain the effectiveness of our deterrent and enhance stability *while serving as a hedge against Soviet temptation to exploit their present advantage.*" The italicized portion appears in the letter to the Congressmen but not in the letter to the Senators. *Ibid.*, pp. 701–702; *Washington Post*, May 12, 1983, p. A–8.

[5] The Scowcroft Commission report is printed *ante*, Apr. 6.

In addition, I fully recognize the central role that the small, single-warhead ICBM plays in the overall modernization program recommended by the Scowcroft Commission Report. We will promptly undertake a major effort to bring the proposal of a small, single-warhead ICBM to fruition on a high priority basis.

In considering the implementation of the essential ICBM modernization program, the Scowcroft Commission also recognized that a series of decisions involving both the Executive Branch and the Congress would be necessary in the months ahead in order to determine the future shape of our ICBM force. Further, it noted that not all of these decisions can or should be made in 1983. The deliberate approach to decision making proposed by a number of members of Congress is fully in keeping with the intent of the Scowcroft Commission Report. I fully recognize that a lasting consensus on such an important issue must be built up carefully and I intend to take the time necessary to forge that lasting consensus.

I urge all concerned, however, to keep in mind that if we draw out critical elements of the decision-making process unnecessarily, we encourage the Soviets to delay in negotiations while continuing apace in their own weapons modernization programs.

To avoid this, I am seeking a clear show of support from Congress to signal U.S. resolve. A case in point is the clear necessity of approving funds promptly to procure Peacekeeper missiles. Working together, this should be achievable while simultaneously meeting our mutual desire to deal with deployment issues, whenever possible, in a careful, deliberate manner.

You have suggested that certain additional initiatives could be helpful in moving us toward our goals of security and stability at reduced levels of forces. One of the most prominent of these initiatives is the idea of a "guaranteed build-down."

The principle of a mutual build-down, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek.

It would, if properly applied, reinforce our intent to cap the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads on both sides and to cause each side to reduce those levels steadily and substantially over time.

It could be implemented flexibly and with reasonable latitude for each side to balance the forces it deploys and reduces. Variable ratios as appropriate, would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems.

It could be implemented in conjunction with an agreed floor which, when reached, would trigger the suspension of the build-down rule, subject to renegotiation.

As you have acknowledged, any build-down concept must recognize the importance of strategic modernization and the necessity of maintaining a balance during the reduction process to deal with asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet forces. It would, of course, require agreement on effective verification measures, including counting rules for all systems.

My Administration is currently examining the structure of a build-down proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces. I will work with you and your colleagues to develop such a proposal.

Finally, I want to stress the extraordinary contribution made by the Scowcroft Commission. It provided an opportunity for nonpartisan analysis of an exceptionally difficult issue as a prelude to obtaining necessary bipartisan support for critically needed modernization of our strategic forces. While not prescribing the details or the timing, the Commission report suggested certain directions that the continued evolution of our complementary strategy for arms reduction could take. Over the short term, follow-on arrangements involving members of the Commission, as well as close coordination with the Congress, will be extremely helpful both technically and politically in thinking through this evolution. However, we are giving careful consideration to determining which follow-on arrangements best meet our common objectives.

In this regard, I do see merit in a panel with bi-partisan composition and with staggered terms of membership to provide advice and continuity in this area. I will work with the Congress, building upon the experience of the Scowcroft Commission, to strengthen and supplement our consultative and advisory processes to assure a lasting, national, bi-partisan consensus concerning arms control initiatives—a consensus which will deserve to be sustained from one Administration to the next.

Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle) to the *Washington Post*: SS–20 Moratorium, May 12, 1983 [1]

Raymond L. Garthoff's article ["That SS20 Moratorium: Who Is Telling the Truth?" op-ed, April 26] [2] misrepresented both the Soviet definition of the so-called moratorium on SS20 deployments within range of Western Europe and U.S. government statements about Soviet observance of that moratorium.

First, Mr. Garthoff defined the moratorium more narrowly than the Soviets did themselves. He claimed that it covers only new SS20 base construction and not the completion of any begun before Leonid Brezhnev first announced the moratorium in March 1982. [3] On May 18, 1982, however, Mr. Brezhnev specified that the moratorium applied to SS20s within range of Central Europe (not just to those located in the European U.S.S.R.) and that it involved "termination of preparation for the deployment of missiles . . . including an end to the construction of launching positions for such missiles." [4] In other words, according to Mr. Brezhnev's definition, the Soviet Union would violate its moratorium not only if it started building new SS20 bases within range of Western Europe but also if it completed any bases then under construction.

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[1] The *Washington Post*, May 12, 1983, p. A–22.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 118–121.

The Soviets have violated the moratorium on both counts. As Mr. Garthoff accurately wrote, six SS20 bases have been completed and have become operational since the Brezhnev announcement. Those six bases have a total of 54 missile launchers with 162 warheads (not counting reload missile warheads). Thus, contrary to Mr. Garthoff's view, the Soviet Union over the past 12 months has actually deployed an average of *more* than one SS20 missile a week.

Four of the new bases are in the European U.S.S.R. The other two are farther east, but because of the SS20's range, the missiles there can still reach NATO Europe—without even taking advantage of the missile's mobility.

In addition, the Soviets have violated even Mr. Garthoff's own narrow definition of their moratorium. He alleged that those missile bases that are still under construction are all in eastern Siberia and will not affect the European military balance. In fact, the U.S.S.R. is building new SS20 bases in Central Asia that are within striking distance of NATO Europe.

None of the countries within the broad arc of the SS20's target coverage—from Asia through the Middle East to Western Europe and North Africa—poses a nuclear threat to the Soviet Union. And yet the U.S.S.R. has already deployed 351 of those missiles with more than 1,000 warheads and continues to build more.

NATO is determined to offset this threat to its common security. Our hope is that the Soviet Union will accept an arms control agreement that eliminates, or substantially reduces, Soviet land-based longer-range INF missiles and limits U.S. planned deployments to a level no greater than that of the Soviets.

Barring such an arms control agreement, however, NATO is determined to proceed with its planned full deployment of 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershings IIs. We must redress the current imbalance in long-range INF missiles—through arms control if possible but through NATO deployments if necessary—to maintain a credible deterrent, to persuade the U.S.S.R. beyond any doubt that it would pay too high a price if it ever risked using its missiles against our allies.

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 308–311.

Remarks by President Reagan: MX Missile Deployment, May 16, 1983 [1]

Thank you for coming today. I realize it's very rough to break away from the office on short notice, but the reason I've asked you to come is an important one—kind of an arm-twisting session.

For more than a decade, the modernization of America's land-based, strategic missile force has been analyzed, debated, and pondered by the Congress, four administrations, countless congressional committees and subcommittees, and nearly every columnist who's ever put pen to paper. During all this time not one new United States missile has been deployed. In fact, the opposite has occurred. We've begun retiring our Titan ICBM's because of their old age—don't think what I'm thinking. [Laughter] [2]

ICBM, of course, stands for intercontinental ballistic missiles. And by comparison, last year alone the Soviet Union deployed more than 1,200 ICBM warheads, which is more than is projected for our entire MX Peacekeeper program. So, we've had a price—or paid a price for our past unilateral restraint and indecision. And the growing imbalance in strategic forces has weakened the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Our self-imposed restraint has left the Soviet Union with far less incentive to negotiate arms reductions.

The debate, analysis, and posturing are just about over. Within the next 2 weeks the Congress will decide the issue. They'll determine whether or not our deterrence, the key to peace in the nuclear age, will be strengthened. They'll also decide whether arms reduction negotiations now underway will have a chance to bring about a safer and more secure future.

When the Congress votes on the Peacekeeper program and later on the small missile funds, it'll not be just another vote. Leaders in Western Europe, in the Kremlin, leaders everywhere will be watching, because they know the decision will have a profound impact for generations to come. It's hardly possible to exaggerate the stakes that are involved.

The full Senate is scheduled to debate later this week on MX, and the House next week. The specific legislative proposal is to approve flight testing of the Peacekeeper missile and the work necessary for basing it in the existing Minuteman silos. Implicit in the vote is the okay for production of the missiles. And this is the essential first step for deployment of a hundred Peacekeeper missiles, beginning in 1986, and for the development of a new, small single-warhead ICBM which would be mobile.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 23, 1983, pp. 723–735. The remarks were made at a White House briefing for chief executive officers of trade associations and corporations.

[2] Brackets in source text.

Congressional approval will be a clear signal of national resolve, the critical message so necessary if we're to assure deterrence and real arms reductions.

When I endorsed the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, [3] I did so in large measure because of its thoughtful integration of three indispensable elements—modernization, deterrence, and arms control. There's a direct relationship between modernization programs like the Peacekeeper and the twin objectives of deterrence and arms control. Tear the elements apart and you have less security. Keep them together and the future of peace and freedom are strengthened.

Now, this isn't a partisan issue. The Scowcroft commission demonstrated that it's possible to undertake a complex, emotional issue of extraordinary consequence and achieve bipartisan consensus. Leading Republicans and Democrats across the country and senior officials from past administrations joined our call to build and deploy the Peacekeeper and to build the small, single-warhead missile, but not so we can fight a war. They want to build those missiles so America can secure deep arms reductions and preserve the peace. So do I, and so do we all.

Now the question is whether the Congress can also reach a consensus, a consensus that will unite us in our common search for ways to strengthen our national security, reduce the risk of war, and, ultimately, reduce the level of nuclear weapons. The security and well-being of our nation desperately require a lasting, national, bipartisan consensus. We must sustain it from one administration to the next on arms control initiatives, defense policy, and fundamental issues on foreign policy. A vote for the Peacekeeper program can lay the foundation for this consensus.

During the past several weeks, I've met with many Members of the Congress. I've provided written replies to the specific concerns expressed by individual Senators and Congressmen. And now we're approaching the critical moment. In my discussions with the Congress, I've asked all Democrats and Republicans to act responsibly and to act together to endorse the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

Last week, two key congressional committees voted to support these recommendations. And now I'm asking you for your active support.

I want to again thank you for taking time from your busy schedules. Your presence proves you understand the stakes involved. But understanding isn't good enough. To ensure that the final decision is a reflection of a national consensus, you must express your views and make your voices heard. I hope that you'll do just that and do it soon.

The legislative clock is about to run out on this particular issue. So, again, I thank you for being here, and again, let me say—because I'm so frustrated hearing the amateur psychoanalysis of some individuals that I don't really want arms reduction. Well, then, why did I say it over and over again in the campaign? Why did I appoint two commissions that are in Geneva—one negotiating on the strategic missiles and the other on the intermediate-range missiles in Europe? I do want arms control.

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[3] The commission's report is printed *ante*, Apr. 6. The President's endorsement may be found *ante*, Apr. 19.

I can't believe that this world can go on beyond our generation and on down to succeeding generations with this kind of weapon on both sides poised at each other without someday some fool or some maniac or some accident triggering the kind of war that is the end of the line for all of us. And I just think of what a sigh of relief would go up from everyone on this Earth if someday—and this is what I have—my hope, way in the back of my head—is that if we start down the road to reduction, maybe one day in doing that, somebody will say, "Why not all the way? Let's get rid of all these things." And that's why any of those fellows up on the Hill, lean on them. Do anything you can to persuade them that we must have this.

I know it sounds silly that—to build a missile in order to get rid of missiles—but we're very dangerously close to not having the deterrent that we need to keep the other fellow from using his or at least using them for blackmail. So, we have to modernize to the point that there is a deterrent, that he knows that the damage to himself would be too great to risk pushing the button. And then with that taken care of, we start down to an equal and verifiable limit on both sides.

And I'm going to quit talking because I know there are others that are going to be speaking to you, and I've got to get back to the Oval Office. But thank you all, again, very much for being here.

Report by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 [Extracts], May 16, 1983 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 2906) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to extend the authorization for appropriations, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

PURPOSE

The principal purpose of H.R. 2906 is to authorize appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. The sum authorized for fiscal year 1984 is $20,888,000, and fiscal year 1985 is $21,932,000, plus such additional amounts for each fiscal year as necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, foreign currency exchange rates, and other nondiscretionary costs. The sum authorized for fiscal year 1985, $21,932,000, is the same amount authorized for fiscal year 1984 plus a 5-percent inflationary increase.

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[1] H. Rept. 98–180; 98th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1–8. For the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see *post*, May 23; for the report of the Committee of Conference, see *post*, Nov. 17; and for the final authorization, see *post*, Dec. 2.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On March 18, 1983, the draft bill submitted by the executive branch on February 17, 1983, authorizing appropriations under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was introduced by request by Chairman Clement J. Zablocki, for himself, and Mr. Broomfield. The bill, H.R. 2192, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 23, 1983.

On March 24, 1983, the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs began its oversight hearings on the authorization of appropriations for ACDA for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. The subcommittee's hearings assessed the Agency's current ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of U.S. arms control policy. The subcommittee received testimony from Frank Conahan, Director, International Division, the General Accounting Office (GAO), which is in the process of conducting the first comprehensive audit of ACDA at the request of the subcommittee.[2]

On April 11, 1983, the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs heard testimony from Hon. Paul Warnke, former Director of ACDA and former chief negotiator, strategic arms limitation talks; Mr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., president, Arms Control Association, and former Assistant Director for Science and Technology, ACDA; Mr. Philip Farley, Senior Research Associate, arms control and disarmament project, Stanford University, and former Deputy Director, ACDA; and Mr. William H. Kincade, executive director, Arms Control Association.

On May 3, 1983, Hon. Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the Agency, testified in support of the request of the executive branch of $21,385,000 and $21,675,000 for fiscal years 1984 and 1985, respectively (both requests include approximately $5 million for the proposed transfer of the Department of Energy's reduced enrichment in research and test reactors (RERTR) program to ACDA).[3]

Immediately following the hearing, the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs held a markup of H.R. 2192 and by unanimous voice vote adopted amendments to the bill: (1) to adopt an authorization level of $20,888,000 for fiscal year 1984; (2) to adopt an authorization level of $21,932,000 for fiscal year 1985; and (3) to make the Director of ACDA a permanent member of the National Security Council.

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[2] Documents regarding this audit are *post* (Sept. 9, 12, 13, 30).

[3] *Ante*, May 3.

On May 3, 1983, the subcommittee agreed by unanimous vote to introduce a clean bill, incorporating these amendments, for consideration by the full committee. On May 4, 1983, Chairman Zablocki, on behalf of himself, Mr. Fascell, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Studds, Mr. Mica, Mr. Broomfield, and Mr. Hyde introduced H.R. 2906.

On May 9, 1983, the committee met in open session, a quorum being present, and by unanimous voice vote ordered H.R. 2906 favorably reported without amendment.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1 of H.R. 2906 authorizes the appropriation of $20,888,000 for fiscal year 1984, and $21,932,000 for fiscal year 1985, to carry out the purposes of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act for fiscal year 1984 plus such additional amounts for each fiscal year as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates. The authorization for fiscal year 1985 represents the fiscal year 1984 authorization plus a 5-percent inflationary increase.

In assessing the executive branch request of $21,385,000 for fiscal year 1984 and $21,675,000 for fiscal year 1985, the committee noted that minus the nearly $5 million RERTR program, these requests are approximately $2 million below the authorized fiscal year 1982 and 1983 levels.

In authorizing a fiscal year 1984 level of $20,888,000 but disapproving the transfer of the RERTR program, and adopting an authorization level of $21,932,000 for fiscal year 1985, it is the committee's intent that such authorizations should be used to restore ACDA's independent computer capability; to increase ACDA's personnel level to 175, as intended by the committee in its 1981 report; and to support external research in verification, chemical weapons arms control, antisatellite arms control talks (ASAT), and nuclear nonproliferation.

Section 2 of H.R. 2906 strengthens the status of ACDA by designating the Director as a permanent member of the National Security Council. The committee views this action as a reaffirmation of the fundamental principle that arms control is a basic and integral component of U.S. national security. This action is complementary to the intent of the original legislation establishing ACDA as a unique and autonomous agency and designating its Director as the principal adviser on arms control matters to the President and the Secretary of State. Designating the Director of ACDA as a permanent member of the NSC should enhance the President's stated desire for the Director of ACDA to be "front and center" in the foreign policy decisionmaking process.

The committee recognizes that many of the issues treated by the NSC involve, directly or indirectly, arms control and disarmament implications. Therefore, the committee believes that this enhancement of the Director's relation to the NSC will help to insure fuller consideration of the arms control aspects of all issues considered by the NSC. Presently, the Director attends NSC meetings only by invitation.

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This provision of H.R. 2906 is within the shared jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services. The correspondence of the two committees on this issue follows:

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C., May 9, 1983.

Hon. Melvin Price,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Today the Committee on Foreign Affairs ordered favorably reported H.R. 2906, to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to extend the authorization for appropriations. Section 2 of the bill amends section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act by designating the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as a permanent member of the National Security Council.

Although membership on the National Security Council falls within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services, I respectfully request that you forgo sequential referral of H.R. 2906, without prejudice to your jurisdiction, in order that this important authorization legislation may be considered expeditiously on the House Floor. If you agree to the consideration of this measure on the House Floor as reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, we would, of course, include all correspondence in the Committee report.

With very kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Clement J. Zablocki, *Chairman.*

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C., May 11, 1983.

Hon. Clement J. Zablocki,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your May 9 letter concerning Section 2 of H.R. 2906 which would designate the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as a permanent member of the National Security Council.

Since this matter falls within our committee's jurisdiction, I appreciate your calling it to our attention. I have discussed with appropriate members of the committee your request that we forego sequential referral of H.R. 2906. It is our belief that your proposal to include this correspondence in the committee report would be acceptable if, during House consideration of H.R. 2906, we are provided an opportunity for a colloquy to discuss the interest of our committee in this matter. I trust that this proposal is agreeable to you and your committee.

Sincerely,

MELVIN PRICE, *Chairman.*

STATUS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ACDA

The committee's oversight hearings on ACDA, coupled with the preliminary findings of the ongoing audit by GAO of ACDA, revealed the following deficiencies:

Approximately 30 percent of ACDA's top management positions are either vacant or filled on an acting basis;

ACDA's staffing level has fallen to a new record low of 154 which does not provide ACDA with sufficient personnel to support negotiations in Geneva and Vienna, does not provide backstopping support in Washington, and does not enable ACDA to participate actively in the interagency working groups;

ACDA, in contrast to the 1960's and 1970's, now chairs no interagency arms control policymaking groups;

ACDA has lost the bulk of its independent computer capability; and

ACDA's external research budget has fallen from a high of $6 million a year to the low level of $1 million proposed by the executive branch.

It is the committee's view that chemical weapons verification research activities are essential to the achievement of a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. The committee strongly supports the provision of adequate funds for the conduct of external research on chemical weapons verification by the Multilateral Affairs Bureau.

This legislation attempts to rectify these deficiencies by providing the ACDA with a very modest increase in both operational funds and personnel. In this time of increasingly complex arms control challenges, the committee strongly believes that ACDA should be provided more, not fewer, analytical resources, personnel, and support services. It is the committee's hope that this legislation will enable ACDA to play the vital role Congress originally intended—to be the principal agency responsible for the formulation and management of U.S. arms control policies.

COMMITTEE COMMENT ON FISCAL YEAR 1984–85 AUTHORIZATION

In disapproving the transfer of the RERTR program from the Department of Energy to ACDA, the committee does so without prejudice to the program. The committee supports the continued funding of the RERTR program and notes that the program strongly complements our nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Furthermore, should the Congress, after fiscal year 1985, concur in the dismantling of the Department of Energy, this committee will look favorably upon shifting the authorization for the RERTR program to the ACDA budget. In the interim, the committee strongly believes that the program should continue to be authorized and appropriated through its traditional committees of the House of Representatives; that is, the Committee on Science and Technology and the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, of the Committee on Appropriations, and should not be transferred to ACDA in fiscal years 1984 and 1985.

There was complete concurrence in the testimony, received by the subcommittee, from the witnesses, the GAO, that at a time when arms control issues are growing in number and complexity, ACDA needs more, not fewer analytical capabilities and support services at its disposal.

The committee regards the dismantling of the Office of Operations Analysis as a significant loss in ACDA's ability to carry out independent arms control analyses with its own computer and models.

In this regard, the committee strongly believes that the Office of Operations Analysis should be reconstituted. The committee expects that the $20,888,000 authorization will enable ACDA to restore this office to its fullest capacity. Further, the authorization will enable the restoration of the ACDA's independent computer capability which both the GAO and the committee found to be inadequate.

ACDA's Chairmanship of Interagency Groups

ACDA was established as the primary agency responsible for arms control in the U.S. Government. Section 2 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act states that ACDA has statutory responsibility for the formulation and coordination of arms control policy and the preparation and management of arms control negotiations.

In order for ACDA to fulfill these responsibilities and to comply fully with the intent of Congress, the committee believes that it is essential for ACDA to chair the appropriate interagency and working groups on arms control policy. The present situation where ACDA chairs none of the interagency groups and only a few of the working groups is unacceptable and verges on violation of ACDA statutory responsibilities.

In the original legislation establishing ACDA in 1961 [4] and throughout the legislative history since then, Congress has consistently underscored the need for ACDA to be the lead Agency in the field of arms control. The legislative history reflects congressional intent that ACDA should chair interagency and working groups concerned with arms control policies and international arms control negotiations.

The committee fully expects this situation to be rectified and that ACDA will soon once again chair the appropriate interagency and working groups and thus fulfill its statutory responsibility as intended by the Congress.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 482–495.

BACKGROUND

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created by the Congress in 1961 to coordinate U.S. arms control policy, to negotiate arms control agreements with other governments, to conduct and coordinate U.S. Government-sponsored research related to problems of arms control and disarmament, and to coordinate and disseminate public information on conventional arms control and disarmament matters. Subsequent changes in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act required that ACDA participate in U.S. Government decisions on arms transfers and on the export of nuclear materials and related technology. As required by Public Law 95-141, ACDA plays a major role in the preparation of statements submitted to Congress which analyze the arms control implications of defense, nuclear weapons, and nonweapon technology programs which have an impact on arms control policy and negotiations.

ARMS CONTROL [AND] DISARMAMENT AGENCY OPERATIONS

In establishing ACDA in 1961, Congress sought to create a separate authority to coordinate U.S. arms control policy as well as to integrate arms control into U.S. national security policy. The major responsibilities of ACDA follow:

(1) *International negotiations.*—ACDA must prepare for and manage U.S. participation in international negotiations.

During 1982, ACDA participated in both the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva, Switzerland.

ACDA has a primary role in coordinating interagency efforts in support of both START and INF, and is engaged on a continuous basis in preparing and analyzing specific arms control and verification proposals for these talks.

ACDA also has primary responsibility for supporting the U.S. component of the permanent U.S./U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which meets at least twice a year to deal with implementation of and compliance with the ABM Treaty;[5] SALT Interim Agreement of 1972,[6] and the Measures Agreement of 1971.[7] The SCC also considers any questions involving activities which could undercut the signed but unratified SALT II Treaty.[8] During the fall of 1982, the second 5-year review of the ABM Treaty was successfully conducted by the SCC.

The Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are expected to continue through 1984. A new Western draft treaty proposal, developed in

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[5] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 202–204.
[7] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 634–635.
[8] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

ACDA and presented in Vienna during the last half of 1982, will continue to be elaborated in 1983.

ACDA is responsible for guidance, backstopping, and staffing of U.S. delegations to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva; the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, which deals exclusively with disarmament and related issues; the U.N. Disarmament Commission (UNDC); and the NATO Disarmament Experts. U.S. representatives in these forums are actively discussing a variety of arms control issues, including chemical weapons, weapons in outer space, and other arms control measures.

The Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was unexpectedly extended through the last half of 1982 and will continue throughout the first half of 1983. If agreement is reached at Madrid, the preparatory meeting and initial sessions of a Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe could be held during the latter part of 1983, continuing through 1984.

The Agency continues to play an important part in the development and implementation of U.S. policy on the Environmental Modification Treaty,[9] the Biological Weapons Convention,[10] and the signed but unratified Threshold Test Ban[11] and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties.[12]

(2) Nuclear proliferation.—During fiscal years 1984 and 1985, ACDA will confront nonproliferation challenges in South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa at least as great as in previous years.

ACDA will have primary responsibility within the executive branch for preparations for the upcoming Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1985.[13] In addition, ACDA will continue working to strengthen the technical capability and credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program while, at the same time, minimizing the introduction of the kinds of extraneous political issues which led to the temporary U.S. withdrawal from IAEA activities in the fall of 1982.

ACDA will play a leading role in diplomatic efforts to promote full entry into force of the Latin American Treaty of Tlateloco,[14] and will continue to seek adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty by nonmember countries.

ACDA will expand its activities in improving safeguards and physical security for plutonium, in safeguarding advanced technologies, and in addressing nuclear technology transfers and safeguards problems in third countries. Cooperation among nuclear supplier countries will continue to occupy an important place in ACDA's nonproliferation efforts.

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[9] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 322–326.

[10] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

[11] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.

[12] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

[13] The treaty is printed *ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[14] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

(3) Conventional arms and technology transfers.—ACDA, as required by statute, is an active participant in the U.S. Government's arms transfer decisionmaking process.

ACDA advises executive branch decisionmakers on the extent to which proposed U.S. arms transfers will contribute to an arms race, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements. ACDA provides advice on the arms control implications of about 1,200 military equipment and commercial export license applications per year and, when requested by Congress, prepares evaluations of the arms control implications of particular proposed sales.

It is the committee's expectation that the Agency will remain an active participant in the arms transfer management group and its subgroups which deal with U.S. arms transfer policy issues and security assistance programs.

ACDA is also an active participant in the implementation of controls on U.S. exports of technology with both military and commercial applications, and is involved in policy formulation and review of East-West and North-South technology transfer cases. The current emphasis on halting the transfer of strategic technologies to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will increase ACDA's technology transfer activities in the years ahead.

(4) Space policy and issues.—ACDA participates in a variety of interagency groups involved in studying outer space arms control policy. It is the committee's view that the issues raised by space weaponry deserve more attention by ACDA and that the United States must move quickly to head off the growing militarization of space.

(5) Arms control impact statements (ACIS).—In response to legislative directive, ACDA has primary responsibility for coordinating and developing, on an annual basis, analyses of the potential impact of conventional, chemical, and nuclear programs on arms control policy and negotiations. The committee believes these statements enhance both executive branch and congressional decisionmaking on defense issues and programs, and looks forward to future submissions of this valuable document.

(6) Public information.—ACDA is responsible for disseminating and coordinating public information on arms control issues. ACDA fulfills this responsibility through speaking engagements, conferences, and the release of publications such as "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers," "Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements," and "Documents on Disarmament."

(7) Administrative and other support.—The balance of ACDA's funds are used for administrative support liaison with other government agencies, and external research in support of the ACDA's activities. The committee believes that ACDA should pursue additional external re-

search projects on verification and outer space and chemical weapons arms control issues.

Statement by Secretary of Defense Weinberger Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces [Extract], May 17, 1983 [1]

* * * * * * *

The President's proposal, I think, is well known to you.[2] It was recommended as an entirety by the Scowcroft Commission.[3] It is fully endorsed by me and by the Joint Chiefs. It consists of three key elements which will restore the overall strategic balance, but also solve the twin problems of ICBM retaliatory effectiveness and survivability. The plan calls for limited deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles in Minuteman silos which would reestablish the hard target capability necessary to maintain deterrence.

But the Peacekeeper deployment by itself will not provide the degree of survivability we ultimately require. So, for the near term, we must rely on the interaction of the other triad legs to provide some degree of ICBM survivability. For the longer term, the modernization plan will achieve survivability through continued research and development of silo hardening and development of a new, small single-warhead missile; and continued research and development on mobility for that small missile.

The plan also calls for continued research and development on ballistic missile defense, fratricide and deep underground basing.

[Chart 3 follows:][4]

PROPOSAL STRENGTHENS STRATEGIC STABILITY

Peacekeeper: Eliminates Soviet prompt hard target monopoly;

Small missile: Reduces attack value;

R&D on basing: Long-term survivability;

Arms control: Mutual reductions; focus on destabilizing weapons.

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL

As the next chart shows the President's proposal will strengthen both deterrence and strategic stability. The Peacekeeper missile will eliminate the Soviet monopoly of prompt hard target capabilities, and deployment of a single warhead missile will distribute the total number of warheads contained in our forces over a larger number of smaller missiles, thereby reducing the target value of the other two and of individual ICBM's, reducing the attack incentive of a potential aggressor.

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[1] *Review of Arms Control Implications of the Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, Hearings*, pp. 5–8.

[2] See the President's letter to congressional leaders, printed *ante*, Apr. 19.

[3] The Commission's report is printed *ante*, Apr. 6.

[4] These and following brackets are in the source text.

The continued research and development on several basing modes offers a potential for frustrating Soviet attack planning, thereby increasing survivability of our land-based forces.

Finally, by enhancing the prospects for mutual arms reduction, especially of the most destabilizing weapons, we will be moving toward a more stable world with fewer nuclear weapons.

[Chart 4 follows.]

PROPOSAL ENHANCES ARMS CONTROL

Peacekeeper: Major incentive for Soviets to negotiate;

Small missile: Designed with arms control in mind;

Arms control proposals: Developing modifications to reflect commission's approach.

PROPOSAL'S EFFECT ON ARMS REDUCTIONS

As the next chart shows, the President's proposal will have an effect on arms reduction efforts in two ways. First, it provides the Soviets with the incentives that they need to agree to the sort of deep balanced mutual and verifiable arms reduction proposals that the President has made. Second, by channeling ICBM forces in a more stable direction, it holds out the hope in the long term for a new approach for arms reduction. Whether the President's START proposal is successful will in large measure, depend on whether Soviet leaders believe that we are determined to maintain an effective deterrent capability in the face of their massive strategic buildup. If they believe that our current round of debates will not produce future deployments—but only future debates—they would have no incentive to negotiate reductions. Rather, they would simply continue with their policy of seeking unilateral strategic advantage through continued deployment of ever more powerful weapons in ever greater numbers.

We have learned the hard way that the Soviet Union is not impressed by self-restraint, but by determination. For the first time they have proved willing now to sit down at the negotiating table to discuss deep arms reductions. We must give them the incentive, Mr. Chairman, to stay there and reach fair, equitable, and verifiable agreements.

The ICBM modernization proposal will affect our arms reduction efforts in a second way. As you know, this Administration has sought to address the most stabilizing and threatening aspects of the nuclear buildup by focusing on the number of ballistic missile warheads and missile throw-weight. In this connection, I was pleased to note that the Scowcroft Commission endorsed and encouraged President Reagan's approach. By definitely planning a small single-warhead missile, especially if the Soviets follow suit, we will be channeling ICBM forces into a new direction which will not only be more stable but more conducive to reaching arms reduction agreements.

EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION

In the past, the arms control positions have always lagged behind weapons development programs. For example, once we and the Soviets began to fractionate our missiles, or MIRV them, we then set out to place limits on them. We realized after the fact that this was difficult to do because of verification questions and because our previous arms control approach had focused on the number of launchers—not numbers of warheads.

By combining warhead and throw-weight limits with small missile development, we provide an opportunity to make a fresh start so that arms control and deployments are mutually supportive. As you noted, there is considerable interest in the integration of the arms limitations concepts presented by the President's Commission into our START proposal. As I previously testified, this President is deeply committed to real, effective, and verifiable arms reduction.

At this time, we are engaged in an intensive and high-level effort to review and develop such motivations as are necessary to the START proposal to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's approach. The President's letters last week to Members of both Houses of Congress reaffirms his strong commitment to arms reductions and are evidence of this ongoing work to implement the Commission's recommendations on arms reduction.

No one should mistake this. Those letters are a solemn public commitment by the President to press ahead with renewed effort in seeking to achieve genuine, mutual, equal, and verifiable arms reduction.

Just to conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the report issued by the President's Commission reflects the dedication and patriotism with which this bipartisan group of distinguished Americans responded to the task given them.

Let me end by quoting from the end of their report where they said:

> If we can begin to see ourselves, in dealing with these issues, not as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set of problems, but rather as citizens of a great nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in the long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, a common perspective may finally be found.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Malone) to the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, May 17, 1983[5]

With respect to comments made by a few delegations this afternoon, I would like to restate a long-standing United States view—supported both in negotiating history of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and State practice. That is that the United States believes that the Treaty and its Protocols do not affect the right to exercise freedom of navigation of the high seas, to undertake innocent passage through territorial waters, nor affect the sovereign right of the territorial States to grant or deny transit rights.[6]

The United States does not believe that the actions of British naval forces in the South Atlantic were in any way inconsistent with its obligations under Protocols I and II. The Secretary-General's report in paragraph 16 states that the issue before this General Conference is in fact political rather than legal. It is important that this Conference not permit the lingering bitterness of the South Atlantic conflict to result in questioning the legal basis of the Treaty régime that has been established through the years with regard to freedom to navigate on the high seas and to transit rights.

Statement by ACDA Director Adelman Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Outer Space [Extract], May 18, 1983[1]

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The fact that the administration has found it difficult to move toward space arms control proposals thus far is testimony more to the complexity of the issues themselves than to the lack of commitment for a wide and deep arms control agenda.

I think, just looking over the horizon, that this administration's arms control agenda is quite extensive, and I feel it in ACDA. As you know and we do not need to review right now, there is a great deal of international law on outer space now—the Outer Space Treaty,[2] the Charter of the United Nations, Limited Test Ban,[3] the ABM Treaty,[4] and the Environmental Modification Convention.[5]

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[5] A/38/496, p. 23. For text of the treaty and its protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[6] For earlier statements of this position, see *ibid., 1968*, p. 205; *ibid., 1970*, p. 409; and *ibid., 1981*, p. 560.

[1] *Controlling Space Weapons: Hearings on S. Res. 43, a Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate That the President of the United States Invite the Soviet Union to Negotiate a Verifiable Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons as a First Step Toward Prohibiting All Space-Based and Space-Directed Weapons, and on S.J. Res. 28, a Joint Resolution Calling for Immediate Negotiations for a Ban on Weapons of Any Kind in Space*, pp. 78–81.

I mention these and put them in the testimony to make the point that it is not a case of starting out at zero with some kind of negotiations and agreements on weaponry in outer space. There is already on the books considerable, although I think everybody here would admit insufficient, agreements on this question. But at least we are starting off with a base of some accomplishment through arms control over the years.

I would like to clear up something that Senator Pressler mentioned during my confirmation hearing, and that is the U.S. position in the CD on these issues, because there is some confusion on that score. It was one of the rare points of confusion during the confirmation.

The possibility of further arms control measures affecting outer space has been an active topic of discussion in the United Nations in discussions I have participated in, and in sessions of the Committee on Disarmament for the past 2 years.

In 1981, the United States supported Resolution 36/97C at the U.N. General Assembly, which requested the CD to consider the question of negotiating further outer space arms control measures.[6] This resolution was introduced in the United Nations and strongly supported by a number of our allies. We were a cosponsor.

Also during the 1981 General Assembly, the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty that would ban the stationing of any weapons in outer space.[7] That is the treaty, Mr. Chairman, that you wrote a letter in the New York Times about, very carefully analyzing the deficiencies thereof.

There was a U.N. resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union and its allies calling for CD negotiations on such a treaty, which also passed the General Assembly.[8] The Soviet draft treaty did not define what the term "weapon" is and did not seriously address the complex questions of verification.

The United States did not support the Soviet bloc resolution, a point that you made, Senator Pressler, during the confirmation hearings. You were asking me why that switch—because we do not believe that we should embark on negotiations before several technical problems are resolved. We do believe that the area of space arms control merits detailed discussion in the CD and that these discussions could help solve some of the problems and open the way to future negotiations.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.

[3] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

[5] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 322–326.

[6] See U.S. statement *ibid., 1981*, p. 625.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 334–336.

[8] Adopted by the G.A. as res. 36/99.

In the 1982 spring and summer sessions of the CD, the U.S. participated in further discussions on issues associated with outer space arms control. In the fall of 1982, the U.N. General Assembly passed a U.S.-supported resolution, again introduced by several of our allies, that requested the CD to continue its consideration of the question of negotiating further outer space arms control measures.[9]

The General Assembly also passed a resolution sponsored by some nonaligned countries, and supported by the Soviet bloc, calling for immediate outer space negotiations in the CD.[10] Discussions continued during the spring part of the 1983 CD session, and the U.S. delegation continued to play an active role in those discussions. We anticipate doing so again during the upcoming sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, but I have noted that many issues and uncertainties require further resolution before embarking on any negotiations, and I am sure we are going to discuss that in detail later on.

The prime procedural issue at the CD is how best to approach a serious examination of the highly complex legal and technical aspects of the current situation regarding arms control arrangements for outer space. These include utilization of outer space for a number of activities, which you mentioned, Senator Pressler—navigation, communication, and weather forecasting, as well as activities such as command and control of military forces, early warning of ballistic missile attack, general reconnaissance and stabilizing activities, although of a clearly military nature.

More in our concern is the vital role of satellites in monitoring compliance with arms control agreements, both current and prospective, that need to be reflected.

In light of this complicated situation, we believe that the establishment of a full-fledged subsidiary body or working group within the CD to discuss the issues was premature at that time and that the discussion was best pursued within the framework of the informal discussions of the committee, the CD, as a whole.

Interest in establishing a working group has been intense, however, and has included strong support for setting up a body on the part of our allies. The United States has indicated to the committee that we do not object in principle to a working group and have suggested that when the CD resumes its 1983 session next month consultations begin on both substantive issues involved in the establishment of a working group and on the mandate for that working group. We want to insure that, if established, it could usefully undertake a full discussion of the relevant issues.

The President's decision on defensive technologies[11]—I need not quote what the President said; they are consistent with our principles under the ABM Treaty. He called for close consultation with our allies. It is a comprehensive, intensive effort to define the long-term research and development program to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.

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[9] Adopted as G.A. res. 37/99D.

[10] Adopted as G.A. res. 37/83.

[11] *Ante*, Mar. 23.

This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority or political advantage. This was the President's March 23 speech. Our only purpose, one all people share, is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

The President's initiative represents the first step on a very long journey, which he was very frank in admitting, that of eliminating the threat posed by offensive strategic missiles. I want to assure you that this step does not conflict with existing agreements [12] or the START or INF negotiations in progress.

As the effort goes forward to determine the technical feasibility of eliminating the threat posed by ballistic missiles, we will be better able to examine its arms control implications in general and its potential for contributing, together with arms control efforts, to the creation of a more stable strategic balance.

Some of the considerations associated with the possibilities for additional arms control for outer space which require us to move with special caution in this area, the President's criteria last July are equality, verifiability, and compatibility with U.S. national interests. I do not think any of us would disagree with any of the three of those essential criteria.

The verification problem which is central to all arms control is particularly difficult here because there is a potential risk that would be inherent in even a small number of undetected antisatellite weapons. The seriousness of these risks flows from the fact that there are a relatively small number of satellites that are most important to our security and our arms control efforts.

Difficult space arms control verification problems must be resolved before serious negotiations are undertaken. That may be a point of contention with the committee, but we can get into that later.

One example of such a problem is that of verifying effectively that the Soviets would have given up their own operational ASAT system under an ASAT agreement. The Soviet ASAT is a relatively small system which is fitted to a space booster. We do not know how many ASAT systems the Soviets have manufactured. It would be difficult to preclude the possibility of a covert supply of ASAT systems for use in a crisis.

A second example is the difficult problem of determining whether a satellite contains proscribed material. As to Soviet ASAT capabilities, as the chairman stated, they have had an operational capability since the early 1970's. It is the only nation on earth with an operational ASAT capability. It is an asymmetrical relationship and it becomes a serious obstacle to achieving an equitable space arms control agreement. Even were we to solve the problems of verification and showing that the Soviets eliminate their interceptor system under an ASAT agreement, we could not eliminate the decade of Soviet ASAT experience.

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[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff., and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

In the nonspecialized weapons, space arms control is complicated by the fact that a variety of weapons could potentially be used for attacks on satellites, including some weapons such as certain Soviet ABM interceptor missiles that are permitted under other arms control agreements.

On defense policy, there is a growing threat posed by the present and prospective Soviet satellites that are not themselves weapons but can be used in time of war to direct Soviet military forces against United States and allied forces. Space weapon agreements that limit the Soviet threat to U.S. satellites will likely limit U.S. ability to negate such threatening Soviet satellites. I am not saying that is an overriding concern, but it is a concern.

Thus, there is a dilemma as to whether arms control agreements that would restrict our ability to deal with such satellites are in our national security interest. We must balance the desire to limit threats to U.S. satellites against the desire to be able to take actions against Soviet satellites that could cost American lives in a situation short of all-out war.

The technology, as you have said, Senator Pressler, and as Senator Tsongas has made a point, throughout the last year or two I have been aware of it, that the rapidly evolving technology in this area and on so many other areas—the Atari kind of technology advancement—space technology is likewise evolving at a rapid rate and developments in this field have implications both for military use and for space arms control.

The President's initiative on defensive technologies is a potential example of such a change. We cannot at this time clearly judge the implications of those advances and future ones.

Other negotiations. The outer space environment is very important to Western security. Arms control for outer space cannot be isolated from our other arms control initiatives. As talked about a few minutes ago, we have had a series of proposals to the Soviet Union and their outcome will affect, in part because they relate to monitoring and verification, on how we do in this area.

Let me say, because I know how committed this committee is to ACDA as an institution, that ACDA has taken and will continue to take a leading role in attempting to resolve the problems of space arms control, as I have outlined. We have an active program of research on space arms control matters, the results of which I am reviewing right now.

Our research program has projects in progress that address many of the technical obstacles I have discussed, including the verification problems, space weapon technology questions, and evaluation of potential space arms control initiatives. One of these is with Harvard University.

I have taken two additional steps in this area since being confirmed, motivated in part by the importance members of this committee placed on space arms control during the confirmation hearings.

First, I have asked my staff to take a fresh look at the scope of present international space law, in particular to assess the adequacy of the coverage of current agreements regarding arms control and any differing interpretations among nations as to the meaning of their provisions. Such a review of the present situation seems to me an important preliminary to moving forward in this area, to find out where the gaps are in the existing international space law.

Second, I have asked them to look into possible arrangements that could limit the threat to U.S. satellites and to spell out for me both their potential problems and their potential benefits. I can assure you I will be looking at both sides of this equation very carefully.

In summation, Mr. Chairman, I see significant problems for space arms control, but I share the view that we need to carefully consider all possible practical steps in space arms control that would meet the key criteria of equality, verifiability and compatibility with our national security.

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Statement by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Outer Space [Extract], May 18, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, in fact I was going to propose that I be very brief in my opening testimony to give you time for your questions.

I obviously welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the national security implications of outer space and the President's recent initiative on ballistic missile defense. The technological evolutions and the possible uses of outer space have opened up new opportunities as well as new threats to our national security.

Both U.S. Armed Forces and Soviet Armed Forces use space systems to a great degree. They are used increasingly for command, control, and communications. Our launch detection satellites and strategic warning systems contribute to our nuclear deterrence, and space systems enable us to monitor compliance with arms control agreements.

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[1] *Controlling Space Weapons: Hearings on S. Res. 43, a Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate That the President of the United States Invite the Soviet Union to Negotiate a Verifiable Ban on Anti-Satellite Weapons as a First Step Toward Prohibiting All Space Based and Space Directed Weapons, and on S.J. Res. 28, a Joint Resolution Calling for Immediate Negotiations for a Ban on Weapons of Any Kind in Space,* pp. 100–101.

Needless to say, our U.S. military use of space is consistent with international law. Our military space programs are not simply a reaction to Soviet space activities but are the result of our continuing evaluation of the best means for achieving our national security objectives.

In the past 10 years, the U.S.S.R. has been launching more than 75 spacecraft per year, a rate 4 to 5 times that of the United States. Over the past few years, the rate has been close to 100 annually. The annual payload, weight, placed into orbit by the Soviets is even more impressive—600,000 pounds, 10 times that of the United States.

This level of effort reflects the importance the Soviet military attaches to their space programs. It may also reflect some technological weaknesses in the longevity and flexibility of their spacecraft, to be sure. Soviet military space programs range all the way from manned missions to meteorological, communications, navigational satellites, and so forth.

I shall skip essentially most of the summary of the description of the Soviet spacecraft program, since it will be in my opening statement submitted for the record, Mr. Chairman.

The Soviet commitment to their manned space program is also growing. The development of a large manned space station by about 1990 seems a possibility to maintain a military presence in space, and this may be one of the goals of the heavy life launcher systems that we now see in development.

The Soviets may also use the heavy lift space boosters to orbit even larger space stations and space modules before the end of the century. Such stations could weigh more than 100 tons and would be able to support a large crew for extensive periods without replenishment.

The Soviets, as you discussed during Mr. Adelman's testimony,[2] have an operational Soviet antisatellite system which has a capability to destroy U.S. systems that are in near-Earth orbit. They conduct yearly tests to practice satellite interception and to refine their antisatellite capability. We think that one of the purposes of the Soviet Union's space program is to develop a space-based laser that could be used for antisatellite attacks.

Let me just add a few words to conclude and give you time for your questions on our own activities and then on the President's program for strategic defenses.

Given the antisatellite capability that the Soviets have been developing and testing for some time, we have to pay a great deal o attention to survivability and endurance of our satellites, and that i technologically a very difficult problem. The treaties, of course, tha govern our current activities, as I mentioned before, our activities ar fully consistent with these treaties and the treaties to restrict an prohibit certain operations in outer space.

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[2] *Supra.*

In conclusion, a few words about the President's initiative on strategic defense.[3] The President decided that we embark on a program to counter the Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. As you know, he directed a comprehensive, intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program toward the goal of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear missiles. This development could be, indeed should be, complemented by arms control measures.

Now, in accordance with the President's decision, the Defense Department, in cooperation with the other agencies, has initiated a two-pronged effort—one, to explore and prioritize the technological possibilities, and the other to develop and define the policy and strategy options.

We are not envisaging a single system to intercept or defend against all missile attacks. Our research is designed to explore a defense network, a series of systems not necessarily based on the same technology and same physical principles, systems which, taken together, will provide an effective defense against nuclear ballistic missiles for us and for our allies.

We recognize, of course, that this is a long-term effort. Because it is a long-term effort, we need to be clear, as the President explained, that we must continue for the interim to rely on the deterrent threat of retaliation to preserve the peace, and we must and will continue to pursue the agreed reductions in nuclear arms that are balanced and verifiable.

Since the search for defensive technologies has the goal to reduce the threat of ballistic missiles, it is fully consistent, indeed it dovetails, the arms reduction effort that we are pursuing today in the START negotiations. It supports those efforts by offering the prospect that the effectiveness and role of ballistic missiles may be reduced sharply in the future.

The President's initiative, of course, is also fully consistent with existing arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty,[4] which permits research.

Mr. Chairman, the essence of the President's decision on strategic defense, in my view, is that it opens up alternative avenues to preserve the peace in the nuclear age. President Reagan's successors in the next decade or in the first decade of the next century should not have their options limited by the strategic notions that were fashionable in the 1970's.

Our strategic planning has been restricted far too much by the idea that defensive systems are bad and that we can and must indefinitely remain locked into confrontation of all-powerful offensive missile forces. We owe it to the next generation, I believe, to make a determined search for better alternatives.

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[3] *Ante*, Mar. 23.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

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Resolution 170 (VIII) of the General Conference of th Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons i Latin America: Report on the Introduction of Nuclea Weapons by the United Kingdom Into the Zone an Areas of the Malvinas, South Georgia, and Sout Sandwich Islands, May 19, 1983 [1]

The General Conference,

Considering that the Governments of the States signatories to th
Treaty of Tlatelolco [2] have expressed categorically their determinatio
that nuclear energy be used in Latin America exclusively for peacef
purposes, and, to that end, reaffirm their sovereign decision to esta
lish a military nuclear-free Zone to keep its territories free, for ev
from nuclear weapons,

Considering that the Argentine Republic has alleged in different inte
national fora the presence of nuclear weapons in the British na
forces which operated in the area defined by paragraph 2 of Article
of the Treaty as a result of the conflict in the Malvinas/Falkla
South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, stressing in the light
this event, the significance of the fact that the States which poss
nuclear weapons carry out operations in which nuclear energy h
been used for non-peaceful purposes,

Considering that spokesmen of the United Kingdom Government h
declared on several occasions that it would not be in the interests
national security to depart from the established practice observed
successive Governments, neither to confirm nor deny the presence
absence of nuclear weapons in a particular place at any particular ti

Considering that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North
Ireland has made the declaration which appears in document S/Inf
dated May 11, 1983, [3]

Mindful that the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon
Latin America (OPANAL) must ensure compliance with the obl
tions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

Reaffirming the need for the existence of a balance of responsibil
and obligations for the States which possess nuclear weapons
those which do not,

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[1] A/38/496, pp. 6–7.

[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[3] *Ante*, May 11.

Resolves:

1. *To take note with concern* of the allegations formulated by the Argentine Government regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons, on the part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in areas included in the geographical Zone defined by paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

2. *To take note* of the statement by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the fourth paragraph of the preamble of this Resolution refers and which in its relevant paragraphs expresses: "The Government of the United Kingdom has scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which *de jure* or *de facto* it is internationally responsible and lie within the limits of the geographical Zone established in that Treaty. Further the Government has scrupulously observed its obligations under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which the Treaty is in force.";

3. *To take note* of the important statements and declarations made by the delegations of the Argentine and United Kingdom in this General Conference.

4. *To express its concern* over the fact that nuclear propelled submarines have been used in warlike actions in areas falling within the geographical Zone defined by paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty;

5. *To urge* all States for which the Treaty and its Additional Protocols are not in force, to take the necessary action in accordance with Article 28, to finalize the process of military denuclearization of the Zone of application as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty;

6. *Reaffirm* the commitment of all States bound by the Treaty and its Additional Protocols, to refrain from engaging in all activities which may endanger the military nuclear-free statute of Latin America, and to entrust to the Council of the Agency to oversee its strict compliance;

7. *To transmit* to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth Session and to the Committee on Disarmament the text of this Resolution, together with all the statements on the subject made at this Conference.

Radio Address by President Reagan for Armed Forces Day, May 21, 1983[1]

Each year we set aside a special day to pay special tribute to our men and women in uniform. Today is Armed Forces Day and, on behalf of a grateful nation, I would like to offer them our thanks and appreciation.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* May 30, 1983, pp. 761-762.

Their job is unusually difficult not only because it involves hardship and danger, or because it requires long periods away from families and loved ones, or even because it may demand the giving of one's life in defense of our nation. The difficulty of the military profession grows out of all of these, plus the fact that our service men and women are always faced with several of the most fundamental questions we ask as individuals and as a nation—the questions of war and peace and the use of force in the world.

Americans have asked these questions again and again for more than 200 years. They're still debating them today. Perhaps the reason these questions persist is because there are no easy answers. The answers lie in seeming paradoxes, underlying truths that may appear contradictory on the surface.

The most fundamental paradox is that if we're never to use force, we must be prepared to use it and to use it successfully. We Americans don't want war and we don't start fights. We don't maintain a strong military force to conquer or coerce others. The purpose of our military is simple and straightforward: We want to prevent war by deterring others from the aggression that causes war. If our efforts are successful, we will have peace and never be forced into battle. There will never be a need to fire a single shot. That's the paradox of deterrence.

The men and women in our Armed Forces also live with a second paradox. They spend their entire time in service training to fight and preparing for a war which we and they pray will never come. As individuals, these men and women want peace as much as we do as a nation. In fact, they want it even more, because they understand that war is not the romantic heroism we read about in novels or see in the movies, but the stark truth of suffering and sacrifice and the slain promise of youth.

Our service men and women know firsthand the horrors of war and the blessings of peace, but they also know that just wanting peace is not enough to guarantee that peace will be sustained. As George Washington said, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual ways of preserving peace."

Today, Americans are again asking important questions about war and peace. Many have been debating two very important questions: How could we prevent nuclear war, and how could we reduce American and Soviet nuclear arsenals?

The answers to these questions are not found in simple slogans, but again, in paradoxes. To prevent nuclear war, we must have the capability to deter nuclear war. This means we must keep our strategic forces strong enough to balance those of the Soviet Union.

It must be absolutely clear to the Soviets that they would have no conceivable advantage in threatening or starting a nuclear war. In seeking to reduce American and Soviet nuclear arsenals, we must convince the Soviet Union that it is in our mutual interest to agree to significant, mutual arms reductions. And to do that, we cannot allow the current nuclear imbalance to continue. We must show the Soviets that we're determined to spend what it takes to deter war. Once they understand that, we have a real chance of successfully reaching arms reduction agreements.

Last month I sent to the Congress a proposal to modernize our intercontinental ballistic missile force.[2] By building the MX Peacekeeper and small, single warhead missiles, we will not only preserve our ability to protect the peace, we will also demonstrate that any Soviet quest for nuclear superiority will not work, that it is in everyone's interest to end the arms race and to agree to mutual arms reductions.

There's a direct relationship between modernization programs, like the MX Peacekeeper, and the twin objectives of deterrence and arms control.The MX and other modernization measures will help us to achieve our fundamental goal, and that is to strengthen the peace by seeking arms reduction agreements that make for more security and stability by reducing overall force levels while permitting the modernization of our forces needed for a credible deterrent.

I know that the paradox of peace through a credible military posture may be difficult for some people to accept. Some even argue that if we really wanted to reduce nuclear weapons we should simply stop building them ourselves. That argument makes about as much sense as saying that the way to prevent fires is to close down the fire department. It ignores one of the most basic lessons of history, a lesson that was learned by bitter experience and passed down to us by previous generations.

Tyrants are tempted by weakness, and peace and freedom can only be preserved by strength. So, let us resolve today, as we honor the brave men and women who serve in our Armed Forces, to give them the support they need to protect our cherished liberties and preserve the peace for ourselves and our children.

Till next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you.

Report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 [Extract], May 23, 1983[1]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the bill (S. 608) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

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[2] See the letter of Apr. 19, *ante.*

[1] S. Rept. 98–144, 98th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1–5. For the report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, see *ante*, May 16; for the report of the Committee of Conference, see *post*, Nov. 17; and for the final authorization, see *post*, Dec. 2.

Primary Purposes

The principal purpose of S.608 is to authorize appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA][2] for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. The sum authorized for fiscal year 1984 is $20,888,000 and the sum of $21,932,000 for fiscal year 1985. In each case the sum authorized includes such additional amounts, for each such fiscal year, as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.

The bill also establishes a new section 28 in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, as amended, to establish a program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control and disarmament in order to obtain the services of scholars from the faculties of recognized institutions of higher learning. The bill specifies that in each fiscal year not less than $200,000 shall be available for the program for visiting scholars. The bill also creates a new section 51 in the act to authorize the Director to create up to eight additional permanent personnel positions at both junior and more senior levels for specialists in Soviet foreign and military policies, arms control, or strategic affairs, who also demonstrate fluency in Russian.

Committee Action

Senator Percy introduced, by request, on February 28, 1983, S. 608 to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. A hearing was held on the authorization bill on March 9, 1983. The principal witness for the Agency was the Acting Director, James L. George.[3]

The administration requested authorizations for fiscal year 1984 of $21,385,000 and for fiscal year 1985 of $21,675,000, and such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates. Previous Agency authorizations were $18,268,000 for fiscal year 1982 and $19,893,852 for fiscal year 1983.

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[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] For the statement by Acting Director George, see *ante*, Mar. 9.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY FUNDING

[In thousands of dollars]

Fiscal year 1983 authorization	Fiscal year 1983 appropriation	Administration fiscal year 1984 request	Administration fiscal year 1985 request	Committee fiscal year 1984 bill	Committee fiscal year 1985 bill
18,994	15,142	21,385	21,675	20,888	21,932

The committee marked up the ACDA authorization on April 28, 1983. The committee noted that the requested authorization included $4,980,000 in fiscal year 1984 and $4,932,000 in fiscal year 1985 for the transfer from the Department of Energy to ACDA management of the reduced enrichment in research and test reactor program [RERTR], aimed at developing a low-enriched fuel as a substitute for highly enriched uranium in small reactors—thus reducing the proliferation risks posed by the use of weapons-grade uranium. The administration originally proposed the transfer of the RERTR program from the Department of Energy to ACDA in connection with the fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983 authorization and appropriations. The proposal was originally made because of the administration's expressed desire to abolish the Department of Energy. That proposal never came to fruition. The committee decided in connection with the fiscal year 1983 and fiscal year 1984 authorization that, while it supported the RERTR program in concept, it did not believe that ACDA was prepared to manage a program of such magnitude, and it did not approve the transfer. The committee continues to believe that the program should remain in the Department of Energy. Accordingly, it does not authorize either the transfer of the program or spending by the Agency in support of the RERTR program. Until the administration is willing to provide ACDA with the necessary personnel and resources, we do not believe it is appropriate to burden the Agency with such costly programs as the RERTR effort.

Excluding the funds requested for RERTR, the authorizations and appropriations for ACDA would be as follows:

REQUESTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year—				
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Requests	[1] 18,000 [2] 17,000	16,768	15,142	[3] 16,405	[3] 16,743

Continued

REQUESTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year—				
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Appropriations	18,500	16,768	15,142	(4)	(4)
Authorizations	20,645	18,268	19,894	20,888	21,932

[1] Carter administration.
[2] As requested.
[3] Reagan administration.
[4] Committee recommendation.

The committee has supported authorizations and appropriations for ACDA sufficient to insure that it would have adequate funding to support various arms control efforts, including major arms control negotiations. Currently the Agency is providing major funding for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START], the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces [IRNF] talks and the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC] created under SALT I. In addition, the Agency is incurring costs in connection with mutual and balanced force reductions [MBFR] and efforts in the Committee on Disarmament [CD] in Geneva. Accordingly, the committee concluded that it would be appropriate to provide modest increases in authorized funding over the $19,893,852 for fiscal year 1983, and voted to authorize $20,888,000 for fiscal year 1984 and $21,932,000 for fiscal year 1985.

The committee approved an amendment offered by Senator Pell providing that the Director shall establish at ACDA a program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control and disarmament. The purpose is to afford specialists in various disciplines relevant to the Agency's activities, such as, but not limited to, the physical sciences, a valuable opportunity for firsthand experience in participation in ACDA's activities and to gain for the Agency the perspective and expertise such scholars can offer. Appointments will be for 1-year terms, with a 1-year extension permitted. To insure continuity and a nonpartisan character, fellows will be chosen by a board chaired by the present Director and including all former directors. The committee agreed to authorize the appropriation of not less than $200,000 each year in fiscal years 1984 and 1985 to provide initial funding for the program.

The committee also approved an amendment offered by Senator Pressler authorizing the Director to create up to eight additional permanent personnel positions at appropriate grade levels for specialists in Soviet foreign and military policies, arms control, or strategic affairs, who also demonstrate fluency in Russian. The purpose of the amendment is to encourage the Agency to employ a sufficient number of people with appropriate substantive background, as well as skills in the Russian language, to assist at negotiations, in the backstopping of negotiations and other arms control activities.

At the conclusion of the markup, S. 608, as amended, was ordered reported unanimously, by voice vote, with a quorum present.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

The committee considered the ACDA authorization at a very difficult point for the Agency. A new Director had just been confirmed, but the Deputy Director position still remained vacant after more than 2 years of this administration, and the Agency had in place only two of its four authorized Assistant Directors. The Agency's spending continued to be sharply curtailed and total permanent personnel had declined by one-fourth in the past several years. The committee has monitored the Agency's activities carefully over the years, and many members were concerned that ACDA's functioning might have become so severely hampered that its ability to provide effective support for negotiations and to take the leading role in pursuit of arms control might be severely hurt. The committee noted that among other things, budget strictures had caused the Agency to close the library and turn over its books to George Washington University and to shut down its independent computer operation.

In connection with the authorization for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 the committee had urged the Agency to maintain its personnel levels, given the increased demands placed on the Agency by numerous negotiations. As Senator Percy pointed out, "Despite this recommendation, ACDA reduced its staff by 11 to 154. This cut represents a continuation of an unwelcome trend, and the committee is concerned with the Agency's decision to ignore our recommendations."

The chairman further noted that it may be necessary to abandon the committee's practice of authorizing a single sum for ACDA with limited earmarking of funds to move to an approach of thorough earmarking to insure that the Agency carries out recommendations and requirements passed by the Congress. The committee would like to give the Agency maximum flexibility, given the Agency's relatively modest budget, but it cannot tolerate continued action by ACDA which ignores the suggestions and instructions by Congress. The committee further noted that the Agency has never fully implemented Senator Glenn's amendment approved by the Congress in 1978 providing that the Agency shall accompany each authorization request "with a detailed budget for each bureau and functional category within each bureau which budget shall set forth and justify obligations and outlays for the fiscal year preceding and next following such year." [4] The committee wishes to serve notice to the Agency that it will expect strict adherence to the Glenn amendment in future years, as well as careful attention to the advice and instructions by the committee and the Congress.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 489.

Earlier this year, a majority of the members of the committee voted to report unfavorably the nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman to be the Director of ACDA. The Senate, however, voted to confirm Mr. Adelman. Now that that decision has been made, the committee intends to give Mr. Adelman its full support in all efforts to develop sound arms control policies, to achieve bilateral and multilateral agreements in arms control, and to bolster the Agency. As Senator Pell told the committee, "I think now that Mr. Adelman is confirmed we ought to give him all means we can to put the ACDA house in order."

Accordingly, the committee decided unanimously to provide a modest increase for financial support authorized for ACDA. It is expected that continuation of current negotiations will strain ACDA's financial resources and the committee intends, through this authorization, to insure that ACDA has sufficient funds to continue, or even expand these efforts, and to take advantage of opportunities for arms control initiatives.

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Remarks by President Reagan: Direct Communications Links Between the United States and the Soviet Union, May 24, 1983 [1]

When I became President, I made a solemn pledge that my administration would build a more stable and secure peace, one that would last not just for years but for generations.

The force modernization programs that we're preparing, the deep strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms reductions we're seeking, and the confidence-building measures we've proposed in START, INF negotiations, at the U.N., and elsewhere are all designed to achieve this goal.

Over the years, the United States has taken extraordinary steps unilaterally and bilaterally to reduce the possibility that an accident, miscalculation, misunderstanding, or misinterpretation would somehow ignite armed conflict.

For over a year now, this administration, in close consultation with the Congress, has been studying the feasibility of a broad range of further measures to reduce that possibility. On April 12th, this year, '83, the Department of Defense delivered a report to the Congress which proposed four new confidence-building measures to strengthen communications and cooperation, thereby reducing the chances even further that war, especially nuclear war, could come about by accident or miscalculation. [2]

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 30, 1983, pp. 768–769.

[2] *Ante*, Apr. 12.

It gives me special pleasure today to announce my endorsement of significant additional confidence-building measures. These confidence-building measures have the potential for reducing the possibility of unintended war and the outgrowth of close bipartisan consultation—or they are the outgrowth, I should say, of close bipartisan consultation with the Congress. Three of them are designed to strengthen and broaden communications between the United States and the Soviet Union. They include the upgrading of the hotline between myself and General Secretary Andropov by adding a facsimile transmission capability.

Secondly, we propose to create a direct military communications link that could be used for the rapid exchange of technical military information, thereby preventing misunderstanding in a crisis.

And, third, we propose improving the existing diplomatic crisis-control related functions of both the United States and the Soviet Union by upgrading the communications links between Washington and Moscow and each nation's embassy in the other's capital.

Any one of these measures would significantly strengthen our existing crisis communication network. Together, they add new dimensions to our communications efforts, allowing us to contact each other rapidly at political, military, and diplomatic levels, improving our capability to contain crisis situations.

I encourage the Soviet Union to carefully examine these proposals. Extending the range of rapid direct communications between the United States and the Soviet Union would make an important contribution to stability. It's in our best national interest and in the best interest of all mankind.

The fourth recommendation we propose is an international agreement, open to all the world's governments, providing for consultation in the event a nuclear incident is precipitated by an individual or group. Establishing procedures among all interested nations in the event of such an incident would complement the steps that we already have taken in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty [3] and the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. [4]

I endorse the proposal, not because I foresee an increasing risk of nuclear incidents—I do not—but because I believe that it is prudent to have in place the means to facilitate international communications should the unthinkable happen.

These four proposals are not the end of a process; rather, they add momentum to the process that's already underway in the administration, in the Congress, and within the international community.

In the coming days, I intend to consult closely with those Members of the Congress who've shown a great personal interest, such as these gentlemen here today, and especially Senators Nunn, Jackson, Warner, and Tower. Additionally, we intend to consult closely with the international community concerning these measures. These are reasonable proposals, and we will work diligently to reach early agreement on them with the Soviet Union.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[4] *Ibid., 1980*, pp. 129–138.

Interview of President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], May 26, 1983 [1]

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Mr. Pleitgen. Regarding the INF talks, in Germany there's a growing concern that the United States is not negotiating seriously enough. Among the critics is our former Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. What can you tell the Germans in this regard? And why can't you accept the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy outline limiting the West to 75 cruise missiles and reducing the Soviet SS-20's, also, to 75? In our country, a lot of people think we could have lived with this.

The President. I don't think they quite understand what the situation would be. Incidentally, we have been in full consultation with the leaders of all of your countries on the INF negotiations and will do nothing without consulting first with them. This has been one of the great steps forward that I think we've made in these last 2 years. And I've had the gratitude expressed by your leaders for the fact that we are in this close contact on all these major issues.

I don't know that the walk in the woods would have been acceptable even to the Soviet Union with its proposal. But let me point out something. The SS-20 has three warheads each, so it would be three times 75. It also, once the button is pushed, arrives at the target in about 5 to 7 minutes. The cruise missile is an in-flight vehicle that would be in the air, you might say, in a matter of hours and is, therefore, subject to the same kind of conventional defensive weaponry—anti-aircraft type weaponry, picked up on radar and aimed by radar and so forth—that an airplane would be.

It wasn't very much of a deterrent. And what we're seeking is not a counterweapon that we want to use against the Soviet Union. We're seeking a deterrent. The closest thing is the Pershing II missile, which the allied countries asked for. You know, this isn't something we volunteered. And they asked for it as the Soviets continued to build these intermediate-range weapons aimed at the Western European target.

And let me point out again that the Soviet Union, during all these negotiations—when the late Mr. Brezhnev said that they had achieved parity with us, now, we had nothing, and when I say we, I mean NATO forces on the Western front, to match their weapons—but they continued to build. And they have added several hundred more warheads during the time, the brief time of these negotiations. Today they've got over 1,300 of those warheads targeted on Europe.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* May 30, 1983, pp. 780–782. The President was interviewed by six foreign television journalists.

I believe that deploying on schedule, when the time comes later this fall, this winter, that the schedule calls for in the deploying of our weapons, will be the thing that will bring the Soviets legitimately into negotiations. Right now they seem, with their propaganda, to have pinned their hopes on preventing our deployment. But any proposal they make is one in which they still have a monopoly, and they view us as having nothing on our side.

I think once they see that we and our allies are determined to go forward with the deployment of these weapons, then I think they might meet us in legitimate negotiation. They will probably—this will be for a reduction in the numbers of those weapons, such as we have proposed in what we call an interim solution. I would hope that as we advance on that, that they would see the value of total elimination, zero on both sides, which is what we originally proposed, and leave Europe free of those weapons which could almost instantly target the other countries.

Mr. Pleitgen. I agree. But if the INF talks fail, what kind of a—what gain of security have we then, when we have got 572 American new missiles but are targeted by 1,500 Soviet SS-20 warheads? Could it be a combination of both talks, INF and START, a way out of this deadlock?

The President. Oh, this is what we hope very much. But in the meantime, what we and the allies must maintain is a deterrent. I don't think that any one of us ever contemplates a first strike or making war, and we don't want the other side to have a first strike or make war. Therefore, what we must maintain is not necessarily superiority, but enough force in which the result of a first strike would result in unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union and its allies.

This is the deterrent. And so far, the deterrent has worked now for almost 40 years that there has been peace in Europe. And this is what we're seeking. I think it would be destabilizing if we ourselves sought what they might look at as giving us the potential for a first strike, and there's no point in us doing that. All we need is enough that they have to weigh the consequences to themselves, regardless of what damage they would do to us.

Mr. Suchet. Mr. President, a major issue in the British general election is the basing of American cruise missiles in Britain. Mrs. Thatcher has said in Parliament that she has received an explanation from you as to who will be in control of firing these missiles, but you, as yet, have said nothing publicly. Would you tell the British people now who is ultimately in control of firing these missiles, you or Mrs. Thatcher?

The President. Well, let me say that we will—I don't think either one of us will do anything independent of the other. This constitutes a sort of veto power, doesn't it? But we have an understanding about this and would never act unilaterally with any of our allies on this.

Mr. Suchet. I think the British people are very concerned about the basing of these missiles in their own country. Perhaps they deserve to be all the more so, since you seem reluctant to say that the power to fire them does not rest with you.

The President. Well, they can rest assured. But my reluctance to say anything is based on the fact that we get dangerously into the area of telling others not friendly to us what our policies might be. And I don't think we should do that.

Mr. Schlesinger. Mr. President, some of the opposition to your defense policies, whether it be the stationing of Pershing II's in Europe or the testing of cruise missiles in Canada, stems not so much from what you're doing as much as what you're saying. There is a perception out there among many people when they hear you talking about the immorality of the Soviet system, about the Russians lying, that you're bent more on a crusade than pure defense, that you're too warlike.

The other day, Prime Minister Trudeau, in defending the testing of cruise missiles in Canada against considerable opposition, said that you and some of the people around you have, as he put it, given some justification for fears that you cannot be trusted to look for peace.

Now, how do you react to such charges? And, incidentally, did Pierre Trudeau ever talk about these fears to you personally?

The President. No, and—well, he talked about that particular interview and suggested to me that it did not correctly represent his views. Sometimes words can be taken out of context. I have called him to thank him for the open letter to all the Canadian people that he delivered to all the press of Canada in which there it is, with nothing out of context, and you can see how he feels.

I know that there's been an effort to express doubt as to whether I really mean it about arms reductions. Let me assure all of your audiences right now, I campaigned over and over again saying that I would stay in negotiations as long as it took to arrive at a real, legitimate reduction of these nuclear strategic weapons; that I believe this is the only future for the world. I not only believe that, but I would like to think that if we can get the Soviet Union to start with us down that road of reductions, they then might see the common sense in going all the way.

I cannot conceive of the world going on endlessly, future generations, with these horrible weapons poised and aimed at each other. The risk is too great. And their total elimination should be the goal of all of us. And I will persist in this and try for this with every means at my disposal. And I believe in it with all my heart.

So, I can't at the same time ignore, nor should the civilized world ignore the conduct of a country that today is bombing helpless women and children, is using chemical warfare, places like Kampuchea and

Afghanistan. I don't think that we can remain silent, as too many of us in the world did when Hitler was coming to power, in the face of this kind of conduct. I don't know whether your television networks carried the program that we saw one day of Soviet soldiers being interviewed in Afghanistan, soldiers that have deserted and gone over to the Afghan side. And in every instance, when they were asked why they deserted, they said, "Because we were ordered to kill women and children."

And if I speak frankly about those things, it's because I believe that we in the Western World, in the free world, must make it clear that, yes, we want peace and, yes, we're willing to sit down and work out agreements with the Soviet Union, but we want them to know that we're not going to forsake our principles that are based on a love of humanity in order to achieve this.

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Statement by the Department of State: Soviet Statement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, May 28, 1983 [1]

We regret that the Soviet Government has again resorted to unwarranted threats of retaliation in the event that we and our NATO allies modernize our forces in the face of the massive Soviet nuclear buildup.

On INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] [2] the Soviet statement reiterates familiar positions designed to maintain the Soviet monopoly of long-range INF missiles.

As for suggesting the Soviet Union might lift its alleged "moratorium" on SS-20 deployments, we would note that SS-20 deployments continued uninterrupted last year. If the Soviet Union wishes to prevent NATO's deployment, the opportunity exists in the U.S. proposal to eliminate the entire class of U.S. and Soviet land-based long-range INF missiles.

The Soviets in their latest statement [3] repeat their familiar demand for as many long-range INF warheads and missiles as are in the independent arsenals of Britain and France. The British and French systems are nationally based strategic deterrents designed to defend France and Britain, not to deter attacks on the other countries of NATO. The Soviet demands for nuclear forces as large as all countries combined is tantamount to a demand for effective military superiority and thus global hegemony.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, July 1983, pp. 75–76.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] *Ante*, May 3.

The Soviet statement also rejects global limits on long-range INF despite the fact that many SS-20s stationed in Asia can reach parts of Europe, and all could be rapidly redeployed against Europe. Moreover, we cannot accept an agreement which would transfer the SS-20 threat to our friends and allies in Asia.

On START we welcome the Soviet statement that it seeks deep reductions. However, we reject the Soviet assertion that the U.S. proposal is one-sided. The United States has proposed substantial reductions to equal levels in the important measures of strategic capability.

Statement by the Leaders of the Williamsburg Economic Summit, May 29, 1983 [1]

1. As leaders of our seven countries, it is our first duty to defend the freedom and justice on which our democracies are based. To this end, we shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat, and to ensure the peace. Our arms will never be used except in response to aggression.

2. We wish to achieve lower levels of arms through serious arms control negotiations. With this statement, we reaffirm our dedication to the search for peace and meaningful arms reductions. We are ready to work with the Soviet Union to this purpose and call upon the Soviet Union to work with us.

3. Effective arms control agreements must be based on the principle of equality and must be verifiable. Proposals have been put forward from the Western side to achieve positive results in various international negotiations: on strategic weapons (START), on intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF), on chemical weapons, on reduction of forces in Central Europe (MBFR), and a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE).

4. We believe that we must continue to pursue these negotiations with impetus and urgency. In the area of INF, in particular, we call upon the Soviet Union to contribute constructively to the success of the negotiations. Attempts to divide the West by proposing inclusion of the deterrent forces of third countries, such as those of France and the United Kingdom, will fail. Consideration of these systems has n place in the INF negotiations.

5. Our nations express the strong wish that a balanced INF agree ment be reached shortly. Should this occur, the negotiations wi determine the level of deployment. It is well known that should th

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* June 6, 1983, p. 805. The summit w attended by President Reagan, President François Mitterrand of France, Prime Minist Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Elliott Trudeau of Cana Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, Prime Minister Yash Nakasone of Japan, and Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani of Italy; Gaston Tho President of the European Commission, was also present.

not occur, the countries concerned will proceed with the planned deployment of the U.S. systems in Europe at the end of 1983.

6. Our nations are united in efforts for arms reductions and will continue to carry out thorough and intensive consultations. The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis. Attempts to avoid serious negotiation by seeking to influence public opinion in our countries will fail.

7. We commit ourselves to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war. We have a vision of a world in which the shadow of war has been lifted from all mankind, and we are determined to pursue that vision.

Fourteenth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, December 1, 1982–May 31, 1983: Confidence-Building Measures [Extract], May 31, 1983 [1]

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The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the Act's "Documents on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament" [2] to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBM's include invitation of observers to maneuvers, military exchange visits, prior notification of major military movements, and prior notification of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

The United States and its NATO Allies have scrupulously notified all major maneuvers of more than 25,000 troops. Warsaw Pact notifications frequently fail, through the sparseness of information offered, to live up to the spirit of the CSCE notification. The minimalist notification by Bulgaria of its "Shield '82" exercise is a case in point. The failure of Bulgaria to name either the specific area of the exercise or the countries which would be participating was particularly egregious, and in sharp contrast with the details regularly provided in U.S. and Allied notifications. In addition, Soviet failure to notify the "Soyuz 81" exercise raised questions about Eastern compliance with the letter as well as the spirit of the Final Act, as that maneuver may have involved more than 25,000 men.

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[1] Dept. of State Special Report No. 109, p. 14.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. The entire Final Act is printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

As regards smaller scale maneuvers, a number of NATO and Neutral/Non-Aligned signatories have made voluntary notifications. Of the Warsaw Pact states, only Hungary has made such notifications.

Since the signing of the Final Act, both NATO and Neutral/Non-Aligned signatories have regularly extended invitations to Eastern and other observers, and given them the opportunity to carry out their duties. NATO members have invited observers to 17 of their 22 major maneuvers. In contrast, the Eastern states have invited observers to only 7 of their 16 major maneuvers. In addition, Eastern states are frequently unwilling to permit those observers who are invited, in fact, to observe the exercise adequately.

CBM Compliance in Reporting Period

The United States and its NATO Allies did not hold maneuvers of more than 25,000 troops in the reporting period. Norway notified the exercise "Cold Winter 83" involving about 10,000 troops.

Unlike last year, when it notified "Druzba 82," the Warsaw Pact did not issue notification of its exercise "Druzba 83," which took place in Czechoslovakia from February 14 to 19, 1983, and involved Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Soviet troops. Given the tight security which surrounded the exercise, it is not possible to tell whether fewer than 25,000 troops took part.

In contrast, Hungary informed the Budapest attache corps (which included representatives of the CSCE states), of "Danube 83" shortly before that field training exercise involving Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Soviet troops began January 13. The information came less than the 21 days in advance envisaged in the Final Act and was not formally described as being made under Helsinki's discretionary notification provisions. It was considered unusual, however, for the detail it provided on the nature, area, and objectives of the maneuver, as well as for the indication of the number of individuals and weaponry involved. The Hungarian notification advised that the exercise would involve "a little more than 20,000 people, with a specific caveat that this was less than the number which would have required prior notification under the Final Act."

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Speech by Soviet General Secretary Andropov [Extract]: Northern European Nuclear-Free Zone, June 7, 1983 [1]

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The Finland of today is an active participant in international life and we in the USSR value this role that it plays: its initiatives directed at strengthening peace, security, and cooperation of the peoples of Europe. Suffice it to recall in this connection Finland's proposal concerning the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe and the efforts of Finland's diplomacy at the Madrid meeting of 35 states. The Soviet Union is not just sympathetic to the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe, but is prepared to facilitate its creation. We would not only assume the commitment to respect the status of such a zone but also would be ready to study the question of similar measures, and substantial ones at that, concerning our own territory adjoining the zone and which would enhance the consolidation of its nuclear-free status. The Soviet Union also could discuss with the interested sides the question of giving nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea.

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[1] Moscow *Krasnaya Zvezda* in Russian, June 7, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, June 7, 1983, vol III, pp. G6–G7.

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Remarks by President Reagan: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, June 8, 1983 [1]

The strategic arms talks, or START, as we have named it, officially resumed today in Geneva, and I would like to speak for a moment about my hopes for these important negotiations and about changes which I've decided to make in our START proposal. Such changes reflect concerns and recommendations of the Scowcroft commission, [2] the Congress, and others. They offer the prospect of new progress toward a START agreement.

Before discussing these specifics, I would like to comment on what I see as very positive developments taking place both here and abroad.

I'm happy to say that today there's a growing sense that we're making progress. I just met in Williamsburg, as you perhaps have heard, with the leaders of the major industrialized nations, and I was struck there not only by the facts and figures pointing toward economic recovery but also by a spirit of optimism and cooperation which was remarkable. This same spirit is visible in our discussion on security issues.

In NATO, as in other alliances, there's a new feeling of partnership. The Atlantic Alliance is alive and well, and its close consultations are a source of strength and participation for each of its members. At least as important, and very gratifying to me, is the new spirit of bipartisanship on national security issues which is increasingly evident in both Houses of Congress.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 13, 1983, pp. 841–843.

[2] *Ante*, Apr. 6.

When I established the Scowcroft commission,[3] I could not then foresee the impact that this outstanding panel would have. Clearly, the Commission's work, which went beyond MX to address critical issues of deterrence and arms control, has become a major stimulus to the rethinking of national policy. The Commission's report challenged some favorite assumptions and called for changes in our strategic planning. At the same time, it expressed support for my administration's most heartfelt objectives in arms control—deep reductions, modernization for stability's sake, and the elimination of the first-strike threat.

I have pledged to Congress my full support for the Scowcroft commission recommendations and my intention to incorporate them in our START proposal. So that we can continue to benefit from the wisdom of its counsel, I intend to ask the Commission to continue to serve. Its bipartisan membership will thus be able to provide timely advice to me, both with respect to the adoption of its proposals into our defense program, and our arms control policies.

In recent weeks, I and officials of my administration have had an extensive series of private meetings with many Members of Congress. We've reviewed implications for the START negotiations of the Scowcroft commission recommendations and also of the mutual guaranteed build-down advocated by a number of distinguished Members of the Congress. The review of our START position was capped by four recent meetings, three yesterday and one today.

Yesterday morning at a meeting of the National Security Council, my senior advisers and I reviewed major implications and options. We also considered a range of congressional viewpoints. Yesterday afternoon I met with groups of Senators and Congressmen whose interest and expertise in arms control I value highly. I discussed with them the major issues before us. And this morning, I met with the leadership of both Houses of the Congress. And throughout the START negotiations, the administration has consulted with our allies.

Three full rounds of negotiations of START are now behind us. It's my judgment that these rounds have been useful and have permitted us to cover necessary ground. However, due largely to Soviet intransigence, we have not yet made meaningful progress on the central issues. I remain firmly committed to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real, substantive progress toward an agreement involving significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals and in the national security interests of both sides.

Above all, our goal is to maintain a stable nuclear balance in order to reduce the risk of war. Our efforts in the START negotiations must be guided by that objective.

The report of the Scowcroft commission offers us a new opportunity for progress. It has provided a consistent and coherent framework to guide our thinking about the fundamental elements of our national security policy—deterrence, defense, and arms control. But more than that, it has provided the basis for renewed, bipartisan support for that policy.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 913.

To capitalize on this critical opportunity and on the basis of the widest possible range of advice, I have directed new steps toward progress in achieving real arms reductions at the START negotiations. The purpose of this guidance, provided to Ambassador Ed Rowny, our Chief START Negotiator, is to adjust the U.S. START position to bring it into line with the Scowcroft commission's recommendations and to provide additional flexibility to our negotiators in pursuing our basic goals.

Although we have put forth a comprehensive proposal on limiting strategic ballistic missiles and bombers, our primary aim in the START negotiations has been, and continues to be, to reduce the threat posed by the most destabilizing systems, namely ballistic missiles. To achieve that aim, measures that constrain the number and destructive capability and potential of ballistic missile warheads are essential. Our proposed limit of 5,000 total ballistic missile warheads—a reduction by one-third of the current level—remains the central element of the U.S. START position.

The U.S. START position tabled in previous negotiating rounds includes another constraint. It would have limited each side to no more than 850 deployed ballistic missiles. This measure was never viewed as being as useful or important a constraint as the limit on total ballistic missile warheads. The Scowcroft commission report specifically suggested that it should be reassessed, since it could constrain the evolution we seek towards small, single-warhead ICBM's. Acting upon the Commission's recommendation, I have now directed our negotiators to adjust our position on deployed ballistic missiles by relaxing our current proposal for an 850 deployed ballistic missile limit.

At the same time, the United States remains firm on the point that the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missiles must be addressed in START. Our current position includes a network of constraints designed to lead toward a more stable strategic balance at reduced force levels while addressing the destructive potential of missiles.

The Soviets and others have complained that these constraints are designed to dictate Soviet force structure according to U.S. standards. This is not the case. We believe, as does the Scowcroft commission, that ability—or stability—can be increased by limitations on the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missiles. As a consequence, we will continue to propose such constraints which indirectly get to the throw-weight problem, while making clear to the Soviets our readiness to deal directly with the corresponding destructive capability, if they prefer.

There may be more than one way to achieve our objective of greater stability at reduced levels of arms. So, I've instructed Ambassador

Rowny to make clear to the Soviet delegation our commitment to our fundamental objectives, but I have also given him the flexibility to explore all appropriate avenues for meeting our goals. I sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will respond with corresponding flexibility.

Finally, high priority work is continuing on how the mutual and guaranteed build-down concept proposed by several United States Senators can be applied in our quest for significant and stabilizing strategic arms reductions.

These actions reflect a bipartisan consensus on arms control and new flexibility in the negotiations—steps to be viewed by the Soviets and all others who have a stake in world peace. To the leaders of the Soviet Union, I urge that this new opportunity not be lost. To America's friends and allies around the world, I say that your steadfast support for the goals of both deterrence and arms control is essential in the future. To Congress and to the American people, I say let us continue to work together in a bipartisan spirit so that these days will be spoken of in the future as the time when America turned a corner. Let us put our differences behind us. Let us demonstrate measured flexibility in our approach, while remaining strong in our determination to reach our objectives of arms reduction, stability, and security. Let us be leaders in the cause of peace.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Shultz: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations and Strategic Superiority [Extract], June 8, 1983 [1]

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Q. Back to Europe: Britain and France don't want to be included in the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] [2] talks. What is the position of the Administration?

A. Our feeling—and the feeling of Britain, France, and all our allies—is that these are national forces, and they don't have a role in the Geneva talks, so they are not there. That was stated once more in the Williamsburg security and peace statement. [3]

Q. You talked about waiting to see if the Soviets will be conciliatory. Do you think there is any chance of movement before a high-level meeting—you and Gromyko or Andropov and the President?

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 1983, pp. 40–41. The news conference was held in Paris.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] *Ante*, May 29.

A. On certain things, it depends on the subject. Certainly, it's reasonable to expect that the capable negotiators that both sides have in these various negotiations will be able to make progress if the national governments involved want to see that happen. The U.S. Government and, I think, those of our allies, wants to see it happen. So there is no reason why competent negotiators can't get somewhere. I hope that a strong and significant conclusion can be brought out of the CSCE [Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe] meetings in Madrid from the standpoint of the Western side. We have unity and purpose there, and we have outstanding representation in the various delegations. And from the U.S. standpoint, Max Kampelman is doing a terrific job. So there is no reason why you couldn't have an outcome there.

Q. The President is supposed to announce new START proposals today. Could you give us a preview? Can you envisage START and INF being grouped into one negotiation?

A. I think they are separate. What we have said is that we are prepared to keep negotiating and working for the ultimate goal of the elimination of all of these weapons and for as low a level as possible of equal and verifiable deployments. If the elimination goal is not reached right away, and in the event of the start of deployment, at least from our standpoint, we are prepared to continue the negotiations, and I don't see there is any implication there of merging the negotiations. We probably would just keep it the way it's going now.

Q. Do you see an evolution in the relationship between the alliance and Japan on the basis of the Williamsburg declaration?

A. I don't think that anybody is trying to work toward a formal alliance. There is a relationship between major industrial democracies, and there is a common concern, born out of security interests on the one hand and economic linkages on the other. That was well illustrated by both statements that came out of Williamsburg. The way in which that is working now is perfectly satisfactory. There is a lot of interaction between ourselves and the Japanese—diplomatic work—and of course, direct relationship on security concerns and between Japan and Europe as well.

Q. The paragraph in the statement on security re "indivisibility." What was that addressing?

A. It was a broad statement of conception, and, at the same time, was an affirmation of the position that has been taken by ourselves as a spokesman for everyone in the INF negotiations that among the principles that have been put forward there, by Ambassador Nitze, [Paul H. Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation to the INF talks] and the President, stated as guiding principles, one is a global approach.

Q. An apparent contradiction: If there is no INF agreement and deployment goes ahead, you accept inequality. But in the negotiations, you seek equality.

A. What has happened since the decision was taken to proceed with a double-track decision, is that the Soviet Union has continued a relentless and extensive deployment process. From our standpoint, the thing for us to do is to proceed with planned deployments if the negotiations don't indicate some other outcome, and then we'll have to appraise the situation as we go along. But, of course, what we want to see happen is that as the Soviet Union deepens its appreciation of the resolve and the cohesion and the unity of the alliance, it will decide that it's better to have a negotiated outcome, either before or after deployment starts. So the principle of equality obtained, we don't have it now; that's the reason deployments are so needed, the Soviet Union has a monopoly of these weapons and seeks to maintain it, and we don't accept that.

Q. Are we willing to accept inequality at higher levels?

A. We don't appreciate inequality at any level, and we want to see levels kept down. So we think the right way to approach things right now is to proceed with the deployments that are planned unless negotiations yield a result for some other pattern of deployment. We believe that the best pattern and the best level of equality is at zero; we continue to believe that, and we'll continue working for it. It leaves you right where you were when you started the question. [Laughter]

Q. There seems to be a widespread feeling in Europe that it isn't fair for the United States to seek equal levels with the Soviet Union when the Soviets have to face French, British, and Chinese weapons as well. Is the United States prepared to take this into account?

A. It is a commentary on people's mentality that there emerges into thinking that the Soviet Union has to be more heavily armed than all the rest of the world combined. That's not an acceptable way to think about it, and from our standpoint, we take the position and we'll maintain the position that in this strategic area we have to think about the Soviet systems and the systems of the United States and seek a balanced outcome—an equal outcome to the relationship between those forces.

Q. What happens if the allies don't show cohesion?

A. They are showing cohesion and have demonstrated that time and again. It is interesting, as you review the history of the alliance, that periodically it rises to a crescendo, but it is always there—a sense of a lack of cohesion and so on—and yet here we are, what is it, 35 years later. The statements and the actions and the ability to adapt to the evolution of circumstances remain strong. It seems to me the basic reason must be that the values that unite us are preeminent, and, in the end, are the things which tie us together and will continue to do so.

Q. With [French] President Mitterrand having signed the Williamsburg agreement and with the NATO meeting being held in Paris, do you see a change in the French attitude toward the alliance from that of the previous government?

A. I see the French Government as being very strong minded, independent, conscious of its sovereignty and, fundamentally, very supportive of the security concerns of the alliance. That has been evident to me in every meeting that I have held with President Mitterrand. It was evident in Williamsburg, and it is evident in the behavior of what the French are doing. I'll just leave it at that.

Q. Is the United States talking to the British and French to get bargaining chips in the INF talks?

A. No. These are independent forces, and we've gone through that argument again and again.

Q. Is there any merit to this, in asking them in some way to join with the United States?

A. No. They are not part of it. They are not to be counted in these negotiations. They are not part of it, they don't want to be part of it, and that's where the situation rests.

Q. Does the Soviet Union possess strategic superiority in the world?

A. No. The question that was raised was different. It was: Should the Soviet—if I can rephrase the question—you were saying: Isn't it legitimate that the Soviet Union should be superior to any given country and think of itself as equal to all the rest of the world combined. I say: No. That's not a legitimate point of view at all. We don't accept that at all.

Q. Is it your impression that they have superiority? Would you trade U.S. armaments for theirs?

A. When you ask that kind of question, you have to put it in its broadest context. Armaments are one thing, and what stands behind the armaments has to go with it. I wouldn't trade our situation for theirs, even remotely, because a free system will yield the best results as we go along. Also, ultimately, in terms of human values and in terms of our determination and ability to defend ourselves.

You have to think of this as one big pot, in a way, and I don't have any doubt whatsoever of the superiority of Western values and abilities. Now insofar as particular elements of armaments are concerned, there is no doubt that, in some very important areas, there is a clear margin of Soviet superiority. One that has been focused on in the NATO dual-track decision[4] is the Soviet monopoly of these highly destructive intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and if you . . . and there are various ways of establishing or counting elements of that picture, but there are important overall elements, throw-weight, perhaps, being the one that is most prominent, where there is a huge Soviet advantage. That isn't true across the board; I fully recognize that. But there are some very important elements of Soviet superiority

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[4] For the NATO decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

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which we seek to remedy. But, take overall, our system, their system, our military forces, their military forces and the impact of free people—I don't have any doubts about which side I want to be on.

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Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) Before the NATO Special Consultative Group: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, June 9, 1983 [1]

The Special Consultative Group met today (9 June) to consider developments regarding the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva. It was the fifth meeting of the SCG this year.

The SCG welcomed the U.S. tabling of a draft treaty which embodies the American proposal for an interim INF agreement that would establish equal levels of warheads on U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF (LRINF) missiles on a global basis. This proposal, developed in extensive consultations in the SCG, provides a flexible basis for negotiations leading to an agreement that would reduce LRINF missile systems to the lowest possible level. At the same time, the SCG reaffirmed that total elimination of this class of nuclear weapons remains the best and most equitable outcome, and noted that the American proposal for such a result remains on the table in Geneva.

The Soviet Union unfortunately continues to resist achievement of an equitable agreement which recognizes the legitimate security concerns of both parties and their Allies. Among other things, the Soviet Union continues to insist that it be compensated in the INF negotiations for the independent national forces of the United Kingdom and France. This position remains unacceptable and cannot serve as the basis for an agreement; Soviet adherence to it blocks the way to progress in the negotiations. Within the negotiations, the Soviet delegation has refused to give fair consideration to U.S. proposals, has evaded providing an adequate explanation of its own position, and has refused to participate constructively in the serious work of the negotiations. The SCG calls on the Soviet Union to begin exploring the possibilities for progress in the negotiations.

Allied representatives also expressed regret at the May 28 statement in which the Soviets, who already possess a destabilizing monopoly in LRINF missiles, threaten to increase still further their nuclear arsenal. [2] The Soviet statement aims at raising tensions and belies Soviet professions of interest in an arms control solution to the INF question. Such threats can neither prevent the Allies from taking the steps necessary to maintain an adequate deterrent, nor intimidate the Allies into acceding to an agreement on Soviet terms. The Allies reaffirm that the measured NATO modernization program foreseen in the 1979 decision will proceed on schedule absent concrete negotiating results which obviate deployments. [3]

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 2 (July 1983), p. 22. Mr. Burt was chairman of the group.

[2] Cf. the Dept. of State comments on the Soviet statement, *ante*, May 28.

At the same time, the SCG believes the opportunity for progress in the negotiations remains, and calls on the Soviet Union to cooperate urgently with the United States in order to reach an equitable, militarily significant and verifiable agreement at the earliest possible moment.

The SCG will meet again in early July.

North Atlantic Council Communique [Extract], June 10, 1983 [1]

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Paris on 9th and 10th June, 1983. Ministers reaffirmed that their supreme objective is the maintenance of peace in freedom. A stable military balance is essential to this objective.

The countries of the Alliance are determined to ensure through negotiations that this balance will be established at the lowest possible level. They are equally determined to assure their security and their independence. They will defend the liberty and the justice on which their democracies are founded.

They have put forward a broad set of arms control and disarmament initiatives on:

—strategic arms reductions (START)
—intermediate range nuclear forces (INF)
—Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
—a Conference on Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)
—a total ban on chemical weapons.

They call upon the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its deeds an equal resolution to achieve concrete results in these negotiations.

As regards intermediate range nuclear forces, the Ministers affirmed the importance of the double-track decision taken on 12th December, 1979, by the countries concerned. [2] They hope that, in the near future, a verifiable agreement providing for United States and Soviet equality can be reached in Geneva. If concrete results through negotiations cannot be reached, deployments as planned will begin as already decided in December 1979. [3]

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[3] For the 1979 decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 2 (July 1983), pp. 27–30.

[2] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[3] Greece reserves its position on this paragraph. [Footnote in original text.]

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1. Recognising that the cohesion and strength of the Alliance is of paramount importance for the preservation of peace and improved international relations, Ministers agreed as follows:

The Programme for Peace in Freedom adopted in the Bonn Summit Declaration of 10th June, 1982, emphasises the Alliance's resolve to deter aggression by means of a strong defence and to develop, through co-operation and dialogue, a constructive East-West relationship aimed at genuine détente.[4] This balanced policy will continue to serve peace and uphold the independence and democratic values of the free peoples of the Alliance.

The Alliance remains a fundamental forum for close and regular consultation on matters of common concern and permits member states to adjust their aims and interests through free exchanges of views.

The maintenance of adequate defences by the Allied countries threatens no one. In Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty[5] the members of the Alliance reaffirmed the undertaking to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This solemn obligation was restated in the Helsinki Final Act signed by thirty-five countries and will always be fully honoured by the members of the Alliance.[6] Each and every sovereign member of the Alliance is a guarantor that none of their weapons will be used except in response to attack.

2. The Allies view with concern the sustained increase in Soviet military strength in Europe and capability for military action worldwide, which far exceed defence needs. The Soviet Union maintains its build-up of conventional arms, chemical weapons, naval forces, nuclear forces, and in particular the deployment of SS-20 intermediate range nuclear missiles. Faced with this threatening situation, the Allies are resolved to ensure that conditions never exist which could tempt the Soviet Union to exploit its military power against any of the Allies. They are determined to meet the legitimate security requirements for the entire North Atlantic Treaty area. A sufficient level of both conventional and nuclear forces remains necessary for the credibility of deterrence. The security and sovereignty of the European members of the Alliance remain guaranteed by their own defences, by the presence of North American forces on European territory and by the United States strategic nuclear commitment to Europe. The United States and Canada likewise depend for their own security upon the contribution of the European partners to the defence of the Alliance.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 336–337.

[5] 63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964; 4 Bevans 828; 34 UNTS 243.

[6] The arms control portion of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323 ff.

3. The Allies have reviewed the trends of Soviet policies which bear upon Western interests. They are resolved to maintain a firm, realistic and constructive attitude and agree that it is important to maintain a dialogue, not least in periods of tension.

The Allies stress that respect for the obligation not to use force is mandatory and applicable between all states without exception. The reaffirmation of this obligation, contained in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, cannot substitute for deeds. The Allies therefore call on the Soviet Union for a complete end to the use of force in Afghanistan and the threat of use of force, as in the case of Poland. The exercise of restraint and responsibility by the Soviet Union is essential for the constructive relations which the Allies wish to establish with it. Such relations with the Soviet Union are possible on the full range of East-West issues.

The Allies look to the Soviet Union to contribute to the achievement of tangible results in the negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures, since this would enhance the credibility of the principle of non-use of force. They would welcome any serious proposals to improve confidence and co-operation between East and West.

4. The Allies deplore the continuing violation by the Polish authorities of the commitments undertaken by Poland in the Helsinki Final Act. They look to those authorities to honour the wish of the Polish people for national reconciliation, the release of political prisoners and the establishment of civil rights, including the right of the workers to have trade unions of their own choice. This would enable Poland to overcome its crisis. More normal trade and economic co-operation with Poland, for which the Allies wish, could be effective if progress were made towards national reconciliation without which there can be no genuine economic and social recovery. The Allies urge the Soviet Union to cease its pressure on Poland so as not to impede the efforts of the Polish people for national renewal and reform.

5. The Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan also pose a major obstacle to the normal development of international relations. Intensified Soviet aggression there continues to meet with the determined resistance of the Afghan people. The mounting toll of civilian casualties and destruction emphasises the urgency of a political solution based on the verifiable application of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly which called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces, the restoration of Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty and non-aligned status, the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, and the voluntary return of refugees.[7]

6. Defence and arms control are integral parts of the security policy of the Alliance. In pursuit of this policy the Allies have submitted a comprehensive series of proposals designed to lead to equitable, verifi-

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[7] G.A. res. 35/37 of Nov. 20, 1980 and res. 36/34 of Nov. 18, 1981.

able and militarily significant agreements for major reductions to a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible levels.

7. In this spirit, the Allies concerned underline the continued importance of the decision of 12th December, 1979, which combined the modernization of United States longer range INF (LRINF) with a parallel offer of negotiations and the unilateral withdrawal from Europe of a thousand United States nuclear warheads which was completed in 1980. Since that decision was taken, the Soviet Union had relentlessly continued its deployment of modern SS-20 missiles, greatly expanding its monopoly in this class of weapons which has created an entirely new threat for Europe. Ignoring the concerns of countries threatened by these systems, the Soviet Union is, at the same time, resisting achievement of an equitable negotiated solution. The Soviet approach would undermine the vital link between the defence of Europe and the American strategic deterrent. Present Soviet proposals would include third country national deterrent forces which have no place in the negotiations and leave the Soviets with more SS-20 missiles than when the negotiations began, deny the right to modernise the deterrent to this threat, leave unrestrained large Soviet SS-20 forces in the Eastern USSR which threaten Europe as well as Asia, and remove from Europe aircraft of the United States which are essential to conventional defence.

The Allies concerned reaffirm that in the absence of concrete negotiating results which obviate deployments will begin at the end of 1983, in accordance with the schedule established in the decision of 1979. At the same time these Allies remain fully committed to reaching a successful outcome in the INF negotiations, which they continue to monitor and evaluate closely. They will support continued negotiations even after initial deployments. These Allies will examine NATO's LRINF requirements when concrete results are achieved in the negotiations, and will make appropriate adjustments in the levels of deployments already decided in 1979. They fully support the efforts of the United States, in close consultation with them, to achieve progress at Geneva. These Allies strongly prefer the elimination of all United States and Soviet LRINF missiles, as proposed by the United States. They welcome and support as a further effort to achieve progress toward that end the United States proposal for an interim agreement which would result in equal global ceilings on warheads on United States and Soviet land-based LRINF missile systems at the lowest possible level. This proposal which establishes a flexible framework for negotiations was developed through close consultation among the Allies concerned. They call on the Soviet Union to contribute constructively to a successful outcome of the negotiations which addresses the legitimate security concerns of both sides and welcome current United States efforts to that end. They strongly hope a balanced agreement will be rapidly reached. [8]

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[8] Greece reserves its position on paragraph 7. [Footnote in original text.]

8. Allies expressed their full support for the effort of the United States to negotiate reductions in United States and Soviet strategic arms, and to secure an agreement which will enhance strategic stability. They welcomed new steps being taken by the United States to promote progress in the START negotiations, and called upon the Soviet Union to respond in a similarly positive spirit.

9. The Allies participating in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks attach great importance to achieving progress. They consider that the comprehensive approach embodied in their draft Treaty text of July 1982 provides the basis of an accord which would lead to parity at the agreed collective ceilings for combined ground and air force manpower in Central Europe through substantial staged reductions. This major initiative met what had been represented by the East as a fundamental requirement. It also proposed a well defined and practical programme for implementing an agreement with the East. Western participants hope that the East will respond in a more constructive way and recognise that, in order to contribute to stability and security in Europe, an MBFR agreement must provide for reductions and limitations based on agreed data and for effective Associated Measures on verification and confidence-building.

10. In the Committee on Disarmament the Allies seek disarmament measures which are balanced, realistic and verifiable, and which would maintain or enhance global security. In particular, they are working for an agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on the destruction of all existing stocks as well as the means of production. The Allies call upon the Soviet Union to co-operate in developing effective inspection and verification measures leading to agreements for the elimination of this entire category of weapons.

The Allies remain gravely concerned about strong evidence of continued use of chemical weapons in South East Asia and Afghanistan in violation of international law and of Soviet involvement in the use of such weapons.[9] They welcome procedures being developed by the United Nations to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

11. The Allies are continuing their efforts at the Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting to arrive at a substantial and balanced concluding document, including a precise negotiating mandate for the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. They consider that, as a result of the latest proposal by the neutral and non-aligned states, an agreement is now within reach which could permit a successful and early conclusion.

The Allies have already stated their willingness to accept the draft concluding document submitted by the neutral and non-aligned states, subject to limited and reasonable amendments favourably received by other participants and designed to enhance the balance of the agreement. The Allies therefore urge the Soviet Union to change its attitude and negotiate a solution of the few remaining issues. This would demonstrate that the Soviet Union shares the interest shown by other participating countries in a successful outcome to the Madrid meeting which will consolidate the CSCE process. The Allies are convinced that a substantial and balanced concluding document, together with renewed efforts to give full effect to the Final Act through concrete action, would be of particular importance for developing a more constructive East-West relationship.

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[9] Greece recalls its position as it has been expressed during the previous Ministerial Session. [Footnote in original text.]

The Allies emphasise the importance, in the present circumstances, not only of a reaffirmation of the 1975 Helsinki commitments as a whole, but also of an expression of the determination of the thirty-five signatory states to carry them out. They reaffirm, too, the importance they attach to the convening of a Conference which, as an integral part of the CSCE process, would have as its purpose the adoption of verifiable, militarily significant and binding provisions applicable to the whole of Europe. The Allies also remain committed to further progress in the important humanitarian aspects of East-West relations.

12. The Allies support confidence-building measures designed to promote greater openness about armed forces and military activities, overcome misapprehension and distrust and thus facilitate disarmament negotiations. The Allies recall that in 1982 the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures and invited all states to consider the introduction of such measures in their region. The Allies have taken a number of concrete initiatives in that direction. Proposals put forward by the Soviet Union, in contrast, are often declaratory. The United States Government, in an effort to help develop a stable peace, has tabled a series of confidence-building measures in the START and INF negotiations and has suggested new proposals in the nuclear field and in mutual communications between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Allies will, in the context of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, put forward concrete proposals for a new generation of confidence and security building measures in Europe. The Allies will continue their efforts to build confidence through improved verification procedures, the provision of clear and comparable data on defence spending and other steps likely to remove misconceptions. They urge the Soviet Union to join them in this endeavour.

Executive Order 12424: Extension of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, June 10, 1983 [1]

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), it is hereby ordered that Executive Order No. 12400, as amended, establishing the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, [2] is hereby further amended as follows:

Section 1. Section 2(a) of the Order is amended to provide as follows:

"(a) The Commission shall review on a periodic basis the progress made in implementing the recommendations contained in the Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, dated April 11, 1983, [3] with particular reference to the deployment of the Peacekeeper Missile; development and deployment of a small, single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile system; and developments in strategic arms control. In its review, the Commission shall consider carefully the views of the Congress on these issues. The Commission shall provide appropriate advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

Sec. 2. Section 2(b) of the Order, as amended, is further amended to provide as follows:

"(b) The Commission shall report to the President, from time to time as he may request and, in any event, no later than December 15, 1983.".

Sec. 3. Section 4(b) of the Order, as amended, is further amended to provide as follows:

"(b) The Commission shall terminate on January 3, 1984, unless sooner extended.".

Statement by President Reagan: Extension of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, June 10, 1983 [4]

First, I want to take this occasion to again thank Members of both parties in the Congress for their support of the Scowcroft commission's recommendations on modernization, deterrence, and arms control. Their support for these crucial, interdependent recommendations gives us a genuine chance to achieve balanced, verifiable arms reductions—the goal we all seek. I am determined to achieve effective deterrence and significant strategic arms reductions, and I am confident that they can be achieved. But if we are to secure our common objectives, the consensus we now have must be maintained.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* June 13, 1983, p. 858.

[2] See *ante,* Jan. 3.

[3] Submitted to the President on Apr. 6, *ante.*

[4] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* June 13, 1983, pp. 858–859.

I look forward to working with the Congress in the days ahead to maintain and strengthen this bipartisan consensus. In this regard, I will submit an annual status report to the Congress. To assist me in this effort, I am pleased to announce that I have asked the members of the Scowcroft commission to continue to serve until January 3, 1984.[5] The Commission will review, on a periodic basis, the progress made in implementing the recommendations contained in its report of April 1983, with particular reference to the deployment of the Peacekeeper missile, development and deployment of a small, single warhead intercontinental ballistic missile system, and developments in strategic arms reductions. The Commission will consider carefully the views of the Congress during the review. The value to the country of this bipartisan framework, both with the Congress and through the Scowcroft commission, is evident to all. It must be and shall be sustained through and beyond the work of the Commission. I pledge this to the Congress and ask their reciprocal good faith.

In addition to consulting closely with the Members of Congress, I have directed Chairman Scowcroft to seek out views and assistance from a wide variety of leading authorities in the strategic and arms control field. As before, the Chairman has authority to appoint Senior Counselors as he deems appropriate.

As we continue to move forward in this vital bipartisan effort, let us all keep in mind our fundamental goal—to conclude agreements that will enhance security and stability by reducing overall strategic force levels, while permitting modernization of forces necessary for effective deterrence.

Note: *On the same day, the Office of the Press Secretary issued a list of individuals who have agreed to continue to serve on the Commission. They are: Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to serve as Chairman; Nicholas Brady, former Senator from New Jersey; William Clements, former Governor of Texas and Deputy Secretary of Defense; Dr. John Deutch, dean of science at MIT and former Director of Research at the Department of Energy; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence; John Lyons, vice president of the AFL-CIO and chairman of the defense subcommittee of its executive council; William J. Perry, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; Vice Adm. Levering Smith, former Director of Special Projects for the Navy; James Woolsey, former Under Secretary of the Navy. Dr. Cyrus P. Knowles, Director of Offensive and Space Systems in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, will serve as Executive Secretary of the Commission.*

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[5] *Supra*. The Commission's report was submitted to the President on Apr. 6, *ante*.

Program of Work Adopted by the Committee on Disarmament for Its Summer Session, June 14, 1983 [1]

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1983 session:

14–17 June	Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the programme of work for the second part of the 1983 session.
20–24 June	Nuclear test ban.
27 June–1 July	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
4–8 July	Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
11–15 July	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
18–22 July	Chemical weapons.
25–29 July	New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
1–5 August	Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
8–12 August	Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
15–19 August	Reports of *ad hoc* working groups; organizational questions.
22–26 August	Consideration and adoption of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
29–31 August (if necessary)	

Informal meetings of the Committee will be held to continue consideration of the question of the review of its membership, as well as proposals submitted by members for its improved and effective functioning. Section II of General Assembly resolution 37/99 K regarding the designation of the Committee will also be considered at informal meetings.

Meetings of *ad hoc* working groups will be convened after consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairman of the *ad hoc* working groups according to the circumstances and needs of the groups.

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[1] CD/382. The program was adopted at the 217th plenary meeting.

As decided by the Committee at its 211th Plenary Meeting, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 11 to 22 July.

In adopting its programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

Swedish Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Treaty Banning Any Nuclear Weapon Test in Any Environment, June 14, 1983 [1]

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures towards nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting, permitting or in any other way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion anywhere.

3. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional process to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Treaty anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

Article II

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes not to carry out any nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes and accordingly to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting, permitting or in any other way participating in the carrying out of any such explosion until international arrangements for conducting them are worked out which would be consistent with this Treaty and the obligations of each Party under other relevant international treaties.

2. The Parties undertake to keep under consideration the question of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis, including the aspect of precluding mili-

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[1] CD/381*.

tary benefits. Such arrangements may take the form of a special agreement or agreements constituting an integral part of this Treaty.

Article III

This Treaty does not affect obligations which have been assumed by Parties under other international agreements, including the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. [2]

Article IV

1. Each Party to this Treaty will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law to verify compliance with the Treaty and undertakes not to interfere with such means of verification.

2. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in an effective international exchange of seismological data in order to facilitate the monitoring of this Treaty.

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in order to achieve an effective international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity and other measures for facilitating the monitoring of this Treaty.

The arrangements for these international co-operative measures, which are laid down in Protocol I annexed to this Treaty, shall be operative at the time of the entry into force of this Treaty.

3. The Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in good faith for the clarification of all events pertaining to the subject matter of this Treaty. In accordance with this provision, each Party to the Treaty is entitled:

(a) to request and receive information from any other Party;

(b) to request an on-site inspection in the territory of any other Party for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a specified event was a nuclear explosion. The requesting Party shall state the reasons for its request, including available evidence. Recognizing the importance of ensuring confidence among Parties that treaty obligations are being fulfilled, the Party which receives the request shall state whether or not it is prepared to agree to an inspection. If the Party which receives the request does not agree to an inspection in its territory, it shall state the reason for its refusal. Procedures for such inspections and the manner of their conduct, including the rights and functions of the inspecting personnel, are laid down in Protocol II annexed to this Treaty.

4. In order to avoid unfounded accusations or misinterpretations of large non-nuclear explosions the Party conducting such an explosion may invite an inspection at the site of the explosion. The rules and procedures for such inspections are laid down in Protocol II.

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[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

5. For the purpose set forth in this article a Consultative Committee shall be established to oversee the implementation of the Treaty and of the international verification arrangements. A Technical Expert Group and a permanent Secretariat shall be established to assist the Consultative Committee. The functions and rules of procedure of the Consultative Committee, the Technical Expert Group and the Secretariat are set out in Protocol III annexed to this Treaty.

Article V

The Protocols annexed to this Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty.

Article VI

Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Such proposals shall be submitted to the Depositary, who shall, in consultation with States Parties, take appropriate action. Amendments shall enter into force for each Party accepting them upon their acceptance by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article VII

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article VIII

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of ratification by twenty Governments, including the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each

instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments thereto, any notice of withdrawal, as well as of the receipt of other notices. He shall also inform the Security Council of the United Nations of any notice of withdrawal.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty, if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article X

If this Treaty has not been adhered to by all Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council five years after its entry into force, each Party shall by giving notice to the Depositary have the right to withdraw from the Treaty with immediate effect.

Article XI

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall send certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty.

Done at ________________ on ________________

PROTOCOL I

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE VERIFICATION OF A TREATY BANNING ANY NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST EXPLOSION IN ANY ENVIRONMENT

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in an effective international exchange of seismological and other data. The purpose of these international measures is to assist the Parties in the verification of the Treaty by providing additional technical information for their national assessment. These international co-operative measures include designated seismological stations in participating countries and in other territories, efficient systems for the exchange of seismological data, and especially established International Data Centres.

2. Each Party to this Treaty shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of seismological data by contributing data from designated seismological stations and by receiving all the seismological data made available through the international exchange. To ensure that seismological stations having the necessary geographical coverage will be incorporated in the exchange, the States given in table 1 have agreed to provide data from the stations specified in the same table.

Each Party participating in the international data exchange shall provide geographical co-ordinates, geological site description and a description of the instrumentation of each designated station. Any changes in these data shall be immediately reported. Data on designated stations are collected, compiled and regularly reported by the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee.

3. Each Party participating in the international data exchange shall for this purpose designate an appropriate National Body through which it will communicate.

This body shall handle the exchange of seismological data and contacts with International Data Centres, the Consultative Committee and its Secretariat on matters related to the operation of the data exchange.

4. The seismological stations designated for participation in the international exchange shall have the basic equipment as specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Stations. These stations shall be operated, calibrated and maintained as specified in the same manual. Information on the operation and the calibration of the stations shall regularly be sent to the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee.

5. Seismological data from each designated station shall routinely and regularly be reported through the appropriate National Body. The seismological data to be reported, the reporting format and time schedule are specified in the Operational Manual for Data Exchange. The seismological stations shall, through the appropriate National Body, co-operate with the International Data Centres to clarify any technical question in connection with reported data.

In addition to routinely submitted data each Party participating in the international data exchange shall provide any additional seismological data from its designated stations requested through International Data Centres by any Party to the Treaty. The procedures for making such requests and the format and time schedule for responding are laid down in the Operational Manual for Data Exchange.

6. Seismological data shall be transmitted through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization, WMO/GTS, or through other agreed communication channels. The detailed procedures for exchanging data are laid down in the Operational Manual on Data Exchange.

7. International Data Centres shall be established at the following locations:

Each Centre shall be under the jurisdiction of the State in whose territory it is located, and the cost of establishing and operating it shall be borne by that State. Easy and free access for representatives from all Parties to the Treaty and for Officers of the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee shall be guaranteed to all facilities of all International Data Centres.

Each International Data Centre shall receive all seismological data contributed to the international exchange by its participants, process these seismological data without interpreting the nature of seismological events, make the processed seismological data available to all participants and maintain all seismological data contributed by participants as well as the results of the processing at the Centres. The procedures to be used at International Data Centres to receive and compile reported data, to conduct necessary computation, to interact with other International Data Centres in the analysis and to transmit the results of the computations to participating States are laid down in the Operational Manual for International Data Centres.

International Data Centres shall also co-ordinate requests for additional seismological data from one Party to another and redistribute data obtained as a result of such requests.

8. In addition to the exchange of seismological data specified in paragraphs 2–7 of this Protocol, a similar exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity shall be established. This exchange shall include equipment for collecting atmospheric radioactivity operated by each contributing State, an exchange of collected data and International Data Centres where data are processed, compiled and redistributed as described in paragraph 7 of this Protocol. The additional rules and procedures needed to establish and operate this exchange, are laid down in an Operational Manual for the Exchange of Atmospheric Radioactivity.

9. International Co-operative Measures described in this Protocol and in the Operational Manuals annexed to it, shall be established and be operative at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

10. The Consultative Committee and its Secretariat have the task of overseeing the over-all operation of the international data exchange as is set forth in Protocol III.

The Committee, its Technical Expert Group and Secretariat have the responsibility to maintain the efficiency of the exchange by improving and amending the equipment and the operational procedures. The Parties to the Treaty undertake to implement such changes of the data exchange which may be agreed upon.

11. With a view to improving the verification of this Treaty, negotiations on additional international measures such as the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity, hydro-acoustic signals in the oceans and infrasound and micro-barographic signals in the atmosphere, shall be undertaken by the Parties to the Treaty. Such additional measures shall as closely as possible be integrated in the co-operative measures

specified in this Protocol and an agreement on such additional measures shall be annexed to this Protocol.

PROTOCOL II

PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION

1. The Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in good faith for the clarification of all events pertaining to the subject-matter of this Treaty. If any Party sees the need to further clarify any event observed in the territory of another Party to the Treaty it shall seek such clarification through bilateral consultations. These consultations may include the exchange of additional technical information and other measures, such as on-site inspections, which the two Parties concerned may agree upon.

If the event cannot be satisfactorily clarified through such bilateral consultations, the Party seeking further clarification can request an international on-site inspection. Requests for such international on-site inspection shall be made through the Consultative Committee. The requesting Party shall state the reasons for its request, including appropriate technical and other evidence.

The requesting Party shall further specify the area to be inspected. This area must be continuous and not exceed 1,000 km^2 or a length of 50 km in any direction.

2. If a Party receiving a request agrees to an international on-site inspection of the requested area, or part thereof, the practical arrangements for the inspection shall be worked out by the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee in co-operation with the Party to be inspected. Such arrangements shall be worked out within one month after a Party has agreed to an inspection. The inspection shall be conducted by experts chosen by the Chairman of the Consultative Committee among experts made available for this purpose by the Parties to the Treaty. The experts shall be selected taking into account available expertise and the desire to obtain equitable geographical and political representation. The International Inspection Team shall be headed by an officer from the Secretariat and contain . . . additional experts. The International Inspection Team shall further comprise necessary technicians, interpreters and secretaries provided by the Secretariat.

The total number of such support personnel shall not exceed . . . .

At all times while the inspecting personnel are in the territory of the Party to be inspected, their persons, property, personal baggage, archives and documents as well as their temporary official and living quarters shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as provided in Articles 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 34 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations [3] to the persons, property, personal baggage, archives and documents of diplomatic agents as well as to the premises of diplomatic missions and private residences of diplomatic agents.

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[3] *International Legal Materials*, vol. 8, July 1969, p. 679.

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities it shall be the duty of the inspecting personnel to respect the laws and regulations of the State in whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, in so far as they do not impede in any way whatsoever the proper exercising of the rights and functions provided for by the Treaty and this Protocol.

3. The purpose of an international on-site inspection is purely fact-finding and the International Inspection Team shall not make any assessment as to the nature of the inspected event. The Inspection Team shall present a factual report of the observations made during the inspection. This report shall as far as possible present the consensus view of the participating experts. In case consensus cannot be achieved, the report shall reflect the views of all the participating experts.

The report shall be made available to all Parties to the Treaty through the Consultative Committee.

4. (This paragraph should contain a specification of the techniques to be used and the procedures to be followed when conducting on-site inspections. As these issues have not been properly discussed, there is at present no basis for preparing an appropriate text. To facilitate further discussions some more or less intrusive techniques are presented that might be considered in connection with on-site inspections. More technical data must be collected and compiled on the various inspection techniques and their potential usefulness. Rules and procedures have to be worked out for the conduct of these inspections, for the selection and the acceptance or refusal of more intrusive techniques and for the transportation of people and material.

The following inspection techniques might be useful to consider:

—visual inspection from the air and on the ground including rules and procedures for taking photographs;

—measurement of radioactive radiation in the atmosphere above the area, at ground level and in waters;

—temporary seismological measurements in the area to record possible aftershocks and also events at larger distances to improve the possibilities to interpret the recordings of the event that lead to the inspection;

—seismological reflection measurements, in limited areas, to provide data for detection of possible subsurface activities;

—measurement of temperature anomalies;

—drilling and measurements in boreholes to obtain subsurface data at selected points.)

5. If the Party which receives the request does not agree to the inspection of the requested area or part of it, it shall provide the reasons for its decision.

6. As stated in Article IV, paragraph 4, of this Treaty, a Party conducting a large non-nuclear explosion may invite an inspection at the site of the explosion. An Inspection Team, established as in paragraph 2 of this Protocol and headed by an officer of the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee, containing . . . experts, shall be established. The privileges and immunities of members of this Inspection Team shall be the same as specified in paragraph 2 of this Protocol. The Inspection Team shall be present before the explosion takes place and stay until the explosion has been conducted. Only visual observations shall be made. The Inspection Team shall provide a factual report of the observations during the inspection. This report shall be distributed to all Parties to the Treaty.

PROTOCOL III

THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, ITS FUNCTIONS AND RULES OF PROCEDURES

1. A Consultative Committee shall be established to oversee the over-all functioning of the Treaty and its verification arrangements. The Consultative Committee shall also serve as a forum to discuss and resolve disputes concerning the Treaty and its verification arrangements which might occur between Parties to the Treaty. The Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies, the Technical Expert Group and the Secretariat shall be established when the Treaty enters into force.

In performing its duties the Consultative Committee shall:

—oversee the implementation of the Treaty;

—prepare review conferences in accordance with Article VII of this Treaty;

—review the verification arrangements of the Treaty on the basis of material provided by the Technical Expert Group and the Secretariat;

—decide on changes in the equipment and technical procedures used to verify compliance with the Treaty;

—be a forum in which any Party can make inquiries and receive information as a result of such inquiries;

—be a forum in which any Party can request an international on-site inspection and the factual results of such inspections are presented;

—guide and oversee the work of the Technical Expert Group and the Secretariat;

—decide on the annual budget of the Secretariat and elect the Director and the Deputy Director of the Secretariat.

2. Each Party to the Treaty shall have the right to be a member of the Consultative Committee.

3. The Depositary of the Treaty or his representative shall act as Chairman of the Consultative Committee.

4. The Committee shall meet annually and, in addition, upon the request of any Party when an extraordinary meeting is considered

necessary to oversee the implementation of the Treaty or to settle disputes between Parties to the Treaty concerning its compliance.

The Consultative Committee shall work on the basis of consensus on the following matters;

—review and analysis of the over-all operation of the Treaty and its verification arrangements;

—decisions on changes in the equipment and technical procedures used to verify compliance with the Treaty.

The Consultative Committee shall take decisions by a majority of the members present and voting on the following issues:

—decisions on the annual budget of the Secretariat;

—election of the Director and the Deputy Director of the Secretariat.

5. The Consultative Committee shall establish a Technical Expert Group open to governmental experts from all Parties to the Treaty. The Technical Expert Group shall evaluate the technical performance of the international verification measures, including the techniques and procedures for on-site inspections, propose changes in the equipment and technical procedures used to verify compliance with the Treaty and to undertake any technical studies that the Consultative Committee may request. The Technical Expert Group shall further be a forum for technical discussions of events for which a Party seeks clarification through international measures.

The Technical Expert Group shall meet at least once a year. The Group shall establish its own rules of procedure and elect its own Chairman. The Group shall try to achieve consensus. In case consensus cannot be achieved, reports from the Group shall reflect the views of all the participating experts.

The Technical Expert Group shall report to the Consultative Committee on an annual basis or when requested.

6. To support the work of the Consultative Committee and the Technical Expert Group a permanent Secretariat shall be established.

The Secretariat shall:

—support the work of the Consultative Committee and the Technical Expert Group by organizing their meetings and by preparing requested background material and studies;

—supervise that the participating seismological stations are operated and data are reported as specified in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Protocol I of this Treaty;

—act as a contact with the WMO on matters of Data Exchange through its Global Telecommunications System and supervise and review, in co-operation with WMO, the data exchange specified in paragraph 6 of Protocol I of this Treaty;

—supervise the operation of the International Data Centres to ascertain that these Centres are established and operated as specified in paragraph 7 of Protocol I of this Treaty;

—supervise the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity to ascertain that the exchange is established and conducted as specified in paragraph 8 of Protocol I of this Treaty;

—compile and present operational statistics and reports on experiences of the International Data Exchange to the Technical Expert Group;

—organize and conduct international on-site inspections as specified in Protocol II of this Treaty, and report the result of such inspections to the Consultative Committee;

—maintain lists, in co-operation with the Parties to the Treaty, of international experts available to conduct on-site inspections and the equipment necessary for such inspections.

7. The Secretariat shall consist of a Director and a Deputy Director, elected for a period of four years by the Consultative Committee, as specified in paragraph 2 of this Protocol, and an appropriate number of officers and support personnel. The annual budget of the Secretariat shall be approved by the Consultative Committee, as specified in paragraph 2 of this Protocol. The cost shall be borne by the Parties to the Treaty in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale prorated to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the number of Parties to this Treaty. The Secretariat shall be located at . . . .

Statement by Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans to the Committee on Disarmament [Extract], June 14, 1983[1]

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In recent years, a sense of insecurity and instability has taken possession of many regions of our planet, and this situation is coming to be seen by the world as a whole as one of the fateful concomitants of our progress towards the year 2000. The disarray brought about by the world economic crisis has led to countless acts of aggression, invasions, tensions and conflicts and a regrettable waning of the ideals of conciliation and arbitration. The spectre of military rivalry and of possible confrontations is part of our daily life in a changing world often marked by violence and upheaval. It is perhaps in societies such as our own, where the freedom of the individual has expanded to an unprecedented degree, that this anxiety at the threatened loss of security develops most easily—that security which, as de Tocqueville foresaw, is the first among freedoms as it is the necessary precondition for all the others. The spectre of nuclear war is naturally at the forefront of our present concern. We European States are particularly alive to the nuclear danger; and our anxiety has inevitably increased over recent years as we have come to realize more clearly the specific threat that will arise for us from the deployment of a new type of medium-range nuclear weapons, creating the conditions for a limited war in Europe. The existence of these weapons makes us vulnerable to political pressures, possibly accompanied by threats, designed to isolate us from our allies and thus to jeopardize our security.

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[1] CD/PV.217, pp. 9–15.

For the States of Western Europe, which have so often experienced war, there is no other option but peace. This is why, given the new factors of instability and insecurity, we would appeal to the international community and urge that we should together apply ourselves to laying the foundations of a firm structure in whose shelter we may continue to live in peace.

Unfortunately, the discouragement of war is not simply a matter of armament levels. The political behaviour of States plays an essential part in it. Peace cannot be built without moderation and tolerance, without an absence of threats, without the renunciation of the use of political or military force. A peaceful world can be built only if the liberties of States are respected, if there are no political pressures from more powerful entities.

After the promising results of the 1960s and early 1970s, the negotiations on arms control and disarmament virtually came to a halt. This regrettable situation was due essentially to the deterioration in international relations. Although we may deplore it, we have to accept the fact that there is a natural link between the international political climate and the possibilities for negotiation. Fortunately, this is not always a one-way relationship, and sometimes tangible results in talks on arms levels can have an effect on the political relations between the negotiating States. Thus, negotiations such as the SALT talks or the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] have made an appreciable contribution to the improvement of political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is therefore to be hoped that the negotiations currently under way in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons on the one hand and on strategic arms reductions on the other will bear fruit and help to create a better climate. The interdependence of the climate of political relations and success in disarmament and arms control efforts no longer needs to be demonstrated.

It is because they were convinced of this that the countries of the Atlantic alliance took the initiative, in December 1979, of offering the disarmament option as an alternative to the programme for the deployment of nuclear weapons which was considered essential in order to counter the specific new threat that had arisen to the security of western Europe.

The great originality of this approach, the extent to which it represented a new departure in the search for security, has perhaps not been recognized clearly enough. To our knowledge, it was the first time that such an offer had been put forward in so coherent a manner. For what was offered—an offer which remains valid—was a choice between disarmament and the pursuit of a hopeless escalation which has already lasted too long. How often in the past have those working for disarmament not deplored the fact that negotiations are envisaged only after the weapons disrupting the balance have been acquired and deployed?

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[2] The text of the treaty is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

That is what happened in the case of the deployment by the USSR of a whole arsenal of medium-range SS-20 missiles, whose presence quantitatively and qualitatively alters the security conditions of western Europe. It is to this threat that we have responded, since 1979, by offering the choice to which I referred a moment ago, which is, to put it in other terms, a choice between balance at the lowest level and balance at the highest level. Can there be any reasonable doubt as to what the right choice should be?

Progress in the disarmament field takes place only through negotiations, and negotiations are only promising when they seek to establish or restore a balance. This concept of balance is naturally a complex one, for it rests not only on objective facts but also on the perception of the threat, and in assessing this threat, in a continent where the concentration of weapons is as high as it is in Europe, it is impossible not to take into account both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons.

The negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons arose from the concern of the countries of western Europe at the deployment—added to an imbalance in conventional forces—of these terrifying nuclear weapons whose target is Europe and Europe alone (and which, it must be stressed, are unable to reach the other nuclear superpower).

To prevent the deployment now of equivalent weapons by the West while leaving that alarming arsenal in place would be an approach that failed to take account of the security needs of western Europe and would, in addition, jeopardize any future disarmament negotiations, should one of the parties perceive that it can attain its goals without making concessions. Belgium therefore continues to favour a solution which would eliminate all longer medium-range nuclear weapons from arsenals. It is to be hoped that the negotiators will succeed in finding a solution for their elimination, in a single stage if possible, but in several stages if necessary. In expressing this hope, I should like to say that while I am fully aware of the right of public opinion to be kept informed about developments in the negotiations, I nevertheless believe that the talks should be held in an atmosphere of greater calm if they are to have the best possible chance of success. The time for polemics is past, and in the difficult phase through which we are now passing the governments concerned should display the greatest possible moderation in the expression of their views and, above all, continuously support the efforts of their negotiators.

With regard to the START talks, it may be recalled that even during the SALT negotiations Belgium and other countries consistently called on the parties to the talks to adopt negotiating positions aimed at substantial reductions in strategic arms. Consequently, we cannot but welcome the approach advocated by the United States in the negotiations as well as the willingness also expressed by the Soviet Union to reach agreement on a substantial reduction in strategic weapon systems.

Time is running out for the achievement of concrete results in the field of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban, one of the priority items on the agenda of your Committee. Good use must be made of this year, 1983, if the next NPT Review Conference, to be held in 1985, is not to be too formidable a task for the international community. For at that conference the non-nuclear-weapon States will take stock, as they did in 1980, of the efforts accomplished to reverse the trend in the nuclear-arms race. If the regime of horizontal non-proliferation, to which Belgium remains firmly attached, is to be maintained, the balance-sheet drawn up at the conference must include positive and encouraging aspects.

As Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, pointed out here in Geneva, on 15 February last,[3] there are aspects of the development of conventional weapons which are in the final analysis at least as worrying as the nuclear arsenals. As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, their design and deployment are based strictly on the deterrent role ascribed to them. They are there to ensure that the threat they represent will discourage a potential aggressor and that, ultimately, it will not be necessary to use them. The same also applies to so-called conventional weapons, inasmuch as nuclear weapons act as a self-deterrent because of their mutual assured destruction capability. As a result of advanced technologies, conventional weapons, too, are destined to become weapons capable of destroying human societies. In economic terms, such weapons represent more than 80 per cent of world military expenditure. There is no question here of horizontal non-proliferation. The hecatombs of the two world conflicts of this century were caused by conventional weapons alone. For reasons both of economic development and of global or regional security, Belgium regrets that, side by side with the work on nuclear disarmament, greater efforts are not being made by the international community to regulate, limit and, tomorrow, reduce conventional arsenals.

It seems to me that this is a duty incumbent upon all our States, a duty which the United Nations, and particularly the Committee on Disarmament, should no longer be able to neglect, once the General Assembly has before it the report currently being prepared by a group of international experts.

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[3] The Secretary-General's address to the Committee may be found in CD/PV.194, pp. 8–12.

Belgium hopes that the Committee on Disarmament will play a substantial part in the efforts which will be made during the rest of this year to give fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations.

The Committee's role as an international forum is unique. The Belgian Government is fully aware of the growing importance of that role, to which it wishes to lend its wholehearted support. It is for this reason that, following the example of several States members of the Committee, I have the pleasure of announcing to you today the appointment of a special ambassador for Belgium to the Committee on Disarmament. A special ambassador for peace questions will also be appointed shortly. In this way, we hope to enhance our contribution to the international community's action aimed at obtaining concrete results in these areas.

The Committee has yet to demonstrate its ability to finalize international treaties relating to the limitation or elimination of armaments. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, a start was made on the adoption of international legislation in this sphere. This legislative effort should be resumed as soon as possible. Since joining the Committee in 1979, Belgium has always advocated the identification of specific topics suitable for negotiations. Although important work has been done in recent years, particularly on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Committee has often wasted time on lengthy procedural discussions or academic debates sometimes on abstract subjects hardly lending themselves to negotiation. It is generally agreed that this year once again the most promising topic is that of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Belgium, on whose territory asphyxiating gases were used in an armed conflict for the first time in history, hopes that the Committee will devote all the necessary resources to these negotiations, which have reached a sufficiently advanced stage to permit their conclusion in the fairly near future. A willingness to negotiate was reaffirmed, here in the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of this year by Mr. Bush, the Vice-President of the United States,[4] and at the second special session of the General Assembly by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko.[5] In this connection, Belgium was encouraged by the proposals made at that time by the Soviet Union concerning systematic international on-site inspection, even if those proposals have not been sufficiently elaborated since then.

Concerned at the virulent discussions which have developed in recent decades as a result of allegations of the use in combat of chemical warfare agents, I put forward in New York in June 1982 detailed proposals for monitoring compliance with the prohibitions on their use laid down in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.[6] Since then, other suggestions have been made for dealing with this problem, both in the

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[4] *Ante*, Feb. 4.

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 352–363.

[6] The protocol is *ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

General Assembly and here in the Committee on Disarmament itself. Nevertheless, we consider that our proposal remains valid and should be kept in mind when considering the legal aspects of the scope of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Starting from the idea that the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons has, after the passage of more than 50 years, become universally accepted, it seeks solely to improve the range of concrete measures available to the international community to ensure compliance with this prohibition. However, I repeat, the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons is a priority matter and Belgium expects the Committee to devote the time necessary to it in order to produce the text of a treaty as soon as possible.

Another significant international agreement is within the Committee's grasp and that is an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons. If such an agreement were to be concluded, it could not only prohibit radiological weapons but also initiate a more comprehensive regulation than at present exists of the prohibition of deliberate attacks upon civilian nuclear installations. In order to facilitate these negotiations, Belgium intends to prepare a proposal for the inclusion in the convention of an undertaking to negotiate on the prohibition of attacks upon civilian nuclear installations. At the same time, we would endeavour to establish the precise modalities for implementing that undertaking without delay.

On these topics of chemical and radiological weapons, as well as on the other items under discussion within the Committee, particularly a nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, adequate verification measures must be established if we are to be successful. In the history of disarmament efforts since the Second World War, the discussions on verification have no doubt assumed such importance because of a fundamental opposition between the approach of the western countries and that of the socialist countries, an opposition due in large part to the political and military concepts and the types of society prevailing in the two groups of countries. We feel that with the passage of time a better understanding has developed of the absolute necessity of establishing adequate verification systems for international agreements in the field of disarmament. New verification technologies have been developed; efforts have been made to reach a synthesis, and it may be hoped that, in view of the recent position statements of the protagonists on this topic, in future disarmament negotiations the obstacle of verification will no longer be the stumbling block it has often been in the past.

In connection with the question of verification, there is the need to facilitate access to mutual knowledge of our respective defence efforts. Here again, many obstacles remain to be overcome. One possibility for progress is offered us by the reporting instrument for military budgets developed within the United Nations. If we are one day successfully to discuss proposals for the reduction of military budgets, it is first necessary that an instrument of comparability should have been developed which will make it possible to carry on negotiations in a climate of trust.

I therefore invite all States, and particularly those that are militarily the most important, to co-operate in this data collection effort so that the international community may have at its disposal credible bases for comparison. My country, along with others, has unilaterally given this token of trust and we are awaiting a similar step from others, in particular the Soviet Union and its allies, whose contribution to European security, and hence to world security, is essential. I also urge all States to follow up the initiative of my former Austrian colleague, Mr. Willibald Pahr, which was recently the subject of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, in which States are invited to publish for the international community, in addition to information of a purely budgetary character, supplementary information on their military potential. The international community should be prepared, on a basis of equality, to advance towards greater transparency in military programming and potentials.

In this connection, I believe that an area which we could usefully explore is that of mutual information on conditions of military service and other similar civic duties in the various countries. The conditions of military service have a direct effect on the size and state of readiness of armed forces. They are therefore an important element of comparison, in particular on a regional basis. At a later stage, it is conceivable that these States could seek to harmonize the conditions of these military obligations, in particular with a view to reducing the length of service, possibly with the substitution of civic activities, and without necessarily increasing the professional contingent of armed forces. I am not asking the Committee on Disarmament to take up this matter, which at the present stage falls rather within the purview of other appropriate bodies of the United Nations, but have mentioned this suggestion here in the hope that delegations will begin at once to give some preliminary thought to the matter. A regional approach to this question may perhaps initially be more promising than a global effort of harmonization. This is often the case with endeavours relating to security and disarmament. The initiative taken a few years ago by Belgium in the General Assembly with a view to encouraging a regional approach to disarmament is now well known to all.

The fact that at its thirty-seventh session the General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution calling on governments to consult on possible regional disarmament measures provides strong encouragement for our efforts. The regional approach to disarmament has been thoroughly studied by the General Assembly. The chief virtue of this detailed consideration has been to answer the doubts and fears expressed by a number of delegations concerning the concept itself. The regions are now in a position to undertake their own experiments, with the possible assistance of the United Nations. A system has been established which will make it possible to compare the experiments undertaken in full respect for the freedom of States and of the regions themselves.

All this reflection on the regional approach has made it possible to see more clearly how much the regions are interrelated and how much the security of each is the concern of all. I would ask member States of this Committee, and beyond them all States of the world, to make the fullest use of the possibilities offered by General Assembly resolution 37/100 F. Regional disarmament efforts could be undertaken in all parts of the world, and it will no doubt be possible in the near future for regional organizations to play a part in promoting and encouraging them.

The last subject which I should like to touch upon before bringing this necessarily incomplete statement to a close concerns the anxiety so often expressed at the nuclear threat, to which I referred at the beginning of my statement. Belgium shares the concern of the delegations endeavouring to elaborate concrete measures aimed at preventing war, and particularly nuclear war. I think that a new sphere of action is open here to the international community. I do not believe that the role of the Committee on Disarmament in this sphere should be confined to the conduct of theoretical debates. I believe that the most useful contribution which the Committee could make to the international community would be to advocate very specific and easily negotiable measures. At the end of the spring part of the Committee's session, the Belgian delegation put forward a proposal aimed at identifying confidence-building measures in the context of the prevention of nuclear war.

I should like today to appeal to all the nuclear-weapon powers to negotiate both among themselves and with the international community, possibly within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, on measures designed to build confidence and avert the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. These nuclear-weapon States have already negotiated, on a bilateral basis, a number of limited measures relating to nuclear information, notification of activities, prevention of accidents, behaviour, consultations in the event of crisis and communications. New proposals have been put forward this year by the President of the United States to the USSR, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization States have echoed them. Apart from these bilateral efforts, which we hope will soon reach a successful outcome, there is an enormous potential for supplementing the existing measures and applying them to all nuclear-weapon States.

This multilateralization of concrete measures would meet a need which is felt more and more widely by very broad sectors of the international community and has been voiced within this Committee. The beginnings of a dialogue among the five nuclear-weapon powers, on the basis of full respect for the positions of each on nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban, would constitute major progress and represent an important political achievement which the international community would be wrong to disregard. Under such an approach, the non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which have chosen the path of non-alignment, could also put forward their own particular concerns with regard to the risk of nuclear war. In this way, and through modalities which would remain to be defined, an international agreement could cover, for example, the areas which Belgium identified in its communication to the Committee on Disarmament.

I venture to hope that this suggestion on the part of my country will help towards the more precise determination of the contribution which the Committee on Disarmament can make in the area of the prevention of nuclear war, to which it has decided now to devote a part of its efforts.

Allow me to express the hope that on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament, your work may at last lead to tangible results which will demonstrate the Committee's ability to negotiate international agreements and so give our peoples new grounds for optimism.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Theorin) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban [Extract], June 14, 1983 [1]

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My predecessor, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, in her address to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) here in Geneva on 1 August 1962 stressed the necessity of, as she said, "an immediate stop to all testing—today". [2]

That was more than 20 years ago.

Today, we have every reason to reiterate this demand. No issue is now blocking international disarmament as much as the absence of serious negotiations on the ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. No course would be more sensible than the immediate cessation of all testing of nuclear weapons.

What has, in fact, happened during these more than 20 years?

The arms race has accelerated: sharply rising military expenditures, a constant stream of new records for the international arms trade and a dramatic increase in investment in military research and development are characteristics of the last two decades. The most significant development, however, is the persistent amassing of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons constitute the most imminent of all threats to the survival of the human race. This threat is drawing nearer and nearer. It is most strongly felt in Europe, where the two power blocs confront one another. But the survival of the whole world is at stake. Nuclear disarmament is, therefore, the life-and-death issue of our time.

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[1] CD/PV.217, pp. 16–20.

[2] ENDC/PV.64, Aug. 1, 1962, p. 18.

The total prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons must be the obvious starting point of every nuclear disarmament process. For more than a quarter of a century it has been regarded as a crucial measure necessary to halt the nuclear arms race. This has year after year been stated by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The importance of a comprehensive test ban has long been deeply rooted in international opinion. A comprehensive test-ban treaty has been given first priority by the unanimous decisions of the member States of this Committee.

I shall devote my statement today entirely to this crucial question.

Every attempt to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty has failed. A partial test-ban treaty was concluded in 1963.[3] This Treaty banned nuclear-weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It contributed significantly to the reduction of radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. As an arms limitation or disarmament measure, however, it was of very limited importance. It actually permitted testing underground. And since all nuclear-weapon powers did not become parties to the partial test-ban treaty the testing of nuclear weapons continued—even above ground—also in the southern hemisphere, where there is no nuclear-weapon power. Everyone knows the alternative to a comprehensive test-ban treaty: it is a continued nuclear arms race.

In the partial test-ban Treaty the nuclear-weapon powers undertook to seek to achieve a stop to any test explosion of nuclear weapons for all time, and stated that they were determined to continue negotiations to this end. This commitment was reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968.[4] But now, 20 years later, no real negotiations are being conducted on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On the contrary, it is being openly stated by one of the Superpowers that such a treaty is only a long-term goal within the framework of nuclear disarmament.

Since 1945—when the first atom bombs shocked the world—bombs which are many thousand times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb have been exploded. Such tests continue year after year at an unabating rate—on an average, one test a week. This entitles us to speak of a fatal threat to the whole human race. And we must not be inveigled into believing that the nuclear arms race can go on year after year without increasing the risk that it will one day end in a final catastrophe—the world will be turned into a "republic of insects", to borrow Jonathan Schell's words.

It is becoming more and more difficult for the nuclear-weapon powers morally to defend their behaviour—to defend why they let year after year go by without achieving any substantive results, at the same time as the warning signals from the incessant testing of nuclear weapons are ringing in our ears.

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[3] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[4] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

The nuclear-weapon powers are responsible for the fact that so far we have not been able to take the final step—to close up the loopholes and agree on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This does enormous damage to their credibility. They are evidently prepared to make only a gesture of disarmament and arms limitation when some type of weapon has become obsolete or when further weapons development has lost any military usefulness. They are playing a deceitful game against the world's need for peace and common security. It is a great disservice to all serious disarmament efforts.

It is also a great disservice to their own security. The very possession of nuclear weapons is a factor of insecurity. The risk of becoming the target of a nuclear attack is obvious.

And, furthermore, what kind of world will we have in a couple of years' time when the number of nuclear-weapon powers may be even greater? Where is such a horizontal proliferation going to stop? The nuclear-weapon powers should be aware of their responsibility and fulfil their legal and political obligations.

The reinitiation of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been an urgent matter for many years. The longer such negotiations are delayed, the more the inherent risks will increase. Time is not working in our favour. Politics and policies change. The pressure from the peace movements, the churches, professional groups and other concerned citizens is mounting. It is bound to yield results, and I am convinced that responsible politicians will have to respond to this growing public concern.

It is in this spirit that the Swedish delegation today submits a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. It is a revised and considerably extended version of the draft treaty submitted by Sweden in 1977 (CCD/526 and CCD/526/Rev.1).[5]

In making this new draft we have taken into consideration developments since 1977, above all the report from the trilateral talks between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (CD/130),[6] and the changing attitudes towards, for instance, on-site inspection. We have also considered new working papers and proposals from individual countries, notably the contributions made by Australia (CD/95), the Netherlands (CD/312), and the Soviet Union (CD/346).[7] We have, of course, also taken into account the progress made in the Committee on Disarmament's *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. As you will note, we have for the first time endeavoured to elaborate the texts of three draft protocols in order to provide a more concrete basis for the discussions on these matters.

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[5] *Ibid., 1977,* pp. 112–115, 402–405.

[6] *Ibid., 1980,* pp. 317–321.

[7] *Ante,* Feb. 16.

The draft treaty presented today is an honest attempt to find a compromise that should be acceptable to all as a basis for serious negotiations.[8]

The technical achievements in the field of verification are such that a viable international verification system is now within reach.

My delegation fails to see any insurmountable technical obstacles to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The only reason for a country to refuse seriously to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty is its own desire to continue the testing and development of nuclear weapons against the will of an overwhelming majority of the peoples of the world. This is a huge responsibility.

I shall comment on the individual articles in some detail later, but let me first say a few words about the general principles which have guided my delegation in its work on this draft treaty.

In a world where the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is obvious, it is more important than ever that a comprehensive test-ban treaty be designed so as to attract universal adherence. It must, therefore, be non-discriminatory.

The problem of preventing peaceful nuclear explosions from being used as a back door to the further refinement or the acquisition of nuclear weapons must be solved in such a way that it does not discriminate against any party to the treaty. This is not an easy matter, and it is, therefore, important to establish a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions in order not to further delay the long overdue complete ban on nuclear-weapon testing.

It has been widely recognized, *inter alia,* in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament,[9] that the nuclear-weapon powers possessing the most important nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. For this reason it is required in the present draft that those nuclear-weapon powers should have ratified the treaty before it enters into force. However, as regards the remaining nuclear-weapon powers, it goes without saying that there is a limit to the time one can tolerate their continued testing. This limit has been set at five years in the draft treaty.

Let me, in this context, renew the appeal made by many other countries to China and France to reconsider their decision not to participate in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

An adequate verification system is a most important element in a comprehensive test-ban treaty as it is in all arms control and disarmament agreements. The legitimate right and duty of all countries to participate in the verification of international treaties to which they are parties must be recognized. This political recognition must be supported by international technical arrangements that will make it possible for all countries to possess essentially the same verification possibilities. International co-operative measures are also the cornerstone of the verification arrangements of this draft treaty.

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[8] *Ante,* June 14.

[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968,* pp. 411–439.

These seismological measures, supplemented by surveillance of airborne radioactivity should, in combination with the proposed procedures for consultation and on-site-inspection, in our view provide an adequate verification system acceptable to all.

The Swedish Government is deeply committed to the work of establishing such international verification arrangements. I take this opportunity to reaffirm the offer of the Swedish Government to establish, operate and finance an international data centre in Sweden and also to contribute data from our Hagfors Observatory to such an international data exchange.

I will now present our draft treaty in more detail.

The purpose is to obtain a comprehensive treaty prohibiting any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment, by all countries and for all time.

As to explosions for peaceful purposes, a moratorium should be established until appropriate international arrangements for conducting such explosions have been worked out. It is suggested in the draft treaty that the parties keep under consideration the question of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis, including the aspect of precluding military benefits.

The treaty should be open to all States for signature and it is our hope that all countries will find it possible to adhere to the treaty. The treaty will enter into force when at least 20 governments, including the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, have become parties to it. If this treaty has not been adhered to by all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within five years after its entry into force, each party will have the right to withdraw from the treaty.

In our view, the verification arrangements must be part of the treaty and thus be worked out and ready for implementation when the treaty enters into force. We are therefore presenting three draft protocols containing provisions for an international data exchange, for on-site inspections and for a consultative committee.

The suggested arrangements for the international exchange of seismological and other data are based on the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. The international system has three basic elements, national recording stations, the data exchange system to be carried out through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization and, finally, international data centres. Each party should have the right to participate in the international data exchange by providing data from stations in its territory and by receiving all data made available through the exchange. To ensure that from the very beginning the station network has the necessary global coverage, agreements to contribute data should be made in advance with a number of countries. The stations designated to participate in the international exchange should have the same basic equipment and be operated, calibrated and maintained according to agreed specifications to be given in an operational manual for seismic stations.

Seismic data from designated stations should routinely be reported through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization or through other agreed communication channels. In addition to data thus submitted, each country should provide any additional data from its designated stations requested by any party to the treaty. The data to be reported, the reporting format and time schedule, as well as the procedures for the international exchange of these data, are to be laid down in an operational manual for data exchange.

International data centres should be established at agreed locations. Each centre should be under the jurisdiction of and financed by the party on whose territory it is located. Each international data centre should receive all contributed data, process these data without assessing the nature of observed events and make the processed data available to all parties. An operational manual for international data centres should also be worked out containing a specification of procedures to be followed at such centres.

In addition to an exchange of seismological data, the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity should be established. This exchange could be organized in a way similar to seismological data exchange and utilizing the same international data centres. The possibility of including additional measures such as hydro-acoustic signals in oceans and infrasound and micro-barographic signals in the atmosphere could also be considered. An operational manual must be worked out for such additional measures.

All parties to the treaty should, through the data provided by the international data exchange or through their national means of verification, obtain the technical data needed to verify the treaty. The parties should, further, through bilateral or multilateral consultations, co-operate in good faith to clarify any event relevant to the subject matter of this treaty. Each should, in that respect, be entitled to request and receive information from any other party.

Each party should further be entitled to request an on-site inspection for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a specified event was a nuclear explosion. A party may also invite on-site inspection in its own territory of large non-nuclear explosions or of any other events where it finds that such inspections might allay unfounded suspicion. The procedures for international inspections, including the rights and functions of the inspecting personnel, are laid down in a separate protocol.

The purpose of an international on-site inspection is purely fact-finding, and the inspection team should not make any assessment as to the nature of the inspected event, but only present a factual report of the observations made during the inspection. We have found that the technical material which is available and compiled today on the various inspection techniques and their potential usefulness is insufficient to propose a treaty text in this respect. The task of compiling such necessary additional technical material should be given to the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts.

A consultative committee should be established to oversee the implementation of the treaty and of the international verification arrangements. The consultative committee should also serve as a forum to discuss and resolve disputes concerning the treaty and its verification arrangements that might arise between parties to the treaty. Any party would be entitled to make inquiries in the committee and receive answers. They could also request an international on-site inspection and receive the factual results of such an inspection.

A technical expert group and a permanent secretariat should assist the consultative committee. The technical expert group, which should be open to all parties, should evaluate the technical performance of the international verification measures and propose changes in equipment and technical procedures. It should also be a forum for technical discussions of events of which a party seeks clarification through international measures.

The permanent secretariat should assist the consultative committee and the technical expert group. It should, *inter alia,* supervise that the technical components of the international data exchange are operated as specified in the treaty. The secretariat should compile and present operational statistics to the technical expert group. The secretariat should also serve as the point of contact for co-operation with international organizations such as WMO.

It is our hope that this draft treaty presented today will facilitate serious political negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. As I have mentioned, additional technical material is, however, needed. In our view the task of providing this technical material should be given to the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts.

My Government is presenting this draft comprehensive test-ban treaty in order to give a new impetus to the disarmament negotiations in the nuclear field.

The draft treaty with its protocol demonstrates that a combination of verification measures, such as seismic means, surveillance of airborne radioactivity and on-site inspection, creates the opportunity to establish a sound and reliable verification system.

This is now a definite possibility to lay the necessary foundation for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Certainly, considerable political and technical problems remain to be solved.

The technical obstacles are manageable. The present draft clearly shows that.

The political obstacles may be more difficult. However, the opportunity of creating a viable international verification system may help in shaping a political will, so sadly lacking up to this time.

The world's leaders should by now start to become aware of what has so long been obvious to all non-nuclear-weapon nations.

The nuclear-arms race is futile. Instead of creating security, it breeds insecurity for all. The first step towards nuclear disarmament—and thus towards enhanced security—should be the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We have a responsibility. We are getting the means. This is a chance. Let us together take this step now.

Statement by Secretary of State Shultz Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations [Extract], June 15, 1983 [1]

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Let me turn to arms control. We believe the only arms control agreements that count are those that provide for real reductions, equality, verifiability, and enhanced stability in the East-West balance. Success in our negotiations will not, of course, bring East-West competition to an end. But sustainable agreements will enable us to meet the Soviet challenge in a setting of greater stability and safety.

The United States is now applying these principles in an ambitious program of arms control negotiations including INF, START [strategic arms reduction talks], [2] MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions], and the ongoing discussions in the UN Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. If we can reach a balanced agreement in the CSCE at Madrid, we would be prepared to participate also in a conference on disarmament in Europe.

No previous administration has put so many elements of the East-West military equation on the negotiating table. You are aware of the U.S. position in the various talks, so I need not go into great detail. I will, however, touch on a few main points.

START. In the strategic arms reduction talks the United States has focused on the most destabilizing strategic systems—land-based ballistic missiles. Our objective is to strengthen deterrence while enhancing strategic stability through reductions. The President has proposed reductions in ballistic missile warheads by one-third. In presenting a comprehensive proposal, he has indicated that all strategic weapons are "on the table." Although our respective positions are far apart, the Soviets apparently accept the proposition that an agreement must involve significant reductions. This is progress.

We have recently undertaken a full review of the U.S. position, which included an assessment of the Scowcroft commission's recommendations and some thoughtful suggestions from the Congress. One week ago, the President announced that he is willing to raise the deployed-missile ceiling in accordance with the Scowcroft recommendations. He also announced that he has given our negotiators new flexibility to explore all appropriate avenues for achieving reductions. It is now up to the Soviet Union to reciprocate our flexibility.[2]

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, July 1983, pp. 70–71.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

Confidence-Building Measures. We have also tabled a draft agreement on confidence-building measures that calls for exchange of information and advance notification of ballistic missile launches and major exercises. We want to move forward promptly to negotiate separate agreements on these very important measures, which would enhance stability in a crisis as well as symbolizing the common interest in preventing war. Yet another effort to prevent misperception of military activities on either side, and thus to lower the risk of war, is the President's recent proposal to expand and upgrade crisis communications between Washington and Moscow. Here, too, we hope for early agreement.

INF. In the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, "equal rights and limits" between the United States and the Soviet Union is one of our key principles. President Reagan's proposal of November 1981 sought to achieve the complete elimination of those systems on each side about which the other side has expressed the greatest concern—that is, longer range, land-based INF missiles.[3]

We still regard this as the most desirable outcome. Yet after more than a year of talks, the Soviets continue to resist this equitable and effective solution. In fact, their position has not substantially changed since it was first put forward nearly a year ago. The proposal made by Mr. Andropov [General Secretary of the CPSU] last December would allow the Soviet Union to maintain its overwhelming monopoly of longer range INF (LRINF) missiles while prohibiting the deployment of even one comparable U.S. missile.[4]

In an effort to break this stalemate, the President has proposed an interim agreement as a route to the eventual elimination of LRINF systems. Under such an agreement, we would reduce the number of missiles we plan to deploy in Europe if the Soviet Union will reduce the total number of warheads it has already deployed to an equal level. This would result in equal limits for both sides on a global basis. Reflecting the concerns of our Asian allies and friends, we have made it clear that no agreement can come at their expense. We hope that in the current round of negotiations the Soviets will move to negotiate in good faith on the President's proposal, which was unanimously supported by our partners at the Williamsburg summit.

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[2] *Ante*, June 8.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

[4] *Ibid.*, *1982*, pp. 917–922.

MBFR. In the mutual and balanced force reductions talks in Vienna, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are discussing an agreement on conventional forces in Central Europe, the most heavily armed region of the world, where Warsaw Pact forces greatly exceed NATO's. Last year, the President announced a new Western position in the form of a draft treaty calling for substantial reductions to equal manpower levels. Although the Soviets and their allies have agreed to the principle of parity, progress has been prevented by inability to resolve disagreement over existing Warsaw Pact force levels and by problems of verification.

Chemical Weapons. In the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States has introduced a far-reaching proposal for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons—an agreement which would eliminate these terrible weapons from world arsenals.[5] This initiative has been vigorously supported by our allies and friends, as well as by many nonaligned nations. Our emphasis on the importance of mandatory on-site inspections has been widely applauded. An independent, impartial verification system, observed by and responsive to all parties, is essential to create confidence that the ban is being respected.

Nuclear Testing and Nonproliferation. In other areas, we have proposed to the Soviet Union improvements in the verification provisions of two agreements to limit underground nuclear testing. So far the Soviet response has been negative. We have also initiated a dialogue with the Soviets in one area where our respective approaches very often coincide: nuclear nonproliferation.

We should not anticipate early agreement in any of these negotiations. The Soviets have their own positions, and they are tough, patient negotiators. But we believe that our positions are fair and even-handed and that our objectives are realistic.

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Staff Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on "The United States and the Soviet Union: Prospects for the Relationship": Key Conclusions, June 15, 1983[1]

General

•United States-Soviet relations have clearly continued to deteriorate over the last 3 years following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and repression in Poland. The future evolution of the relationship will depend to a large extent on whether agreements can be reached on limiting nuclear weapons.

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[5] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

[1] *United States-Soviet Relations: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session.* Pt. 1, pp. 18–20. In preparation for the hearings, five staff members of the Committee on Foreign Relations spent the last week of March in the Soviet Union in order to obtain a better understanding of the Soviet view of the relationship and the prospects for changes. They also discussed the prospects for arms control with the negotiators in Geneva and Vienna. These are their key conclusions.

•The timing of the trip—shortly after the President's speeches in Miami on the evil nature of the U.S.S.R. and in Washington on space-based missile defense—highlighted Soviet sensitivities. While it is not always possible to discern what is said for effect and what is genuinely believed, virtually all the Soviets we met with complained bitterly that the belligerent, crusading tone of the Administration was raising the danger of superpower confrontation and an escalating arms race.

•The Soviets do not recognize the linkage between their vigorous military buildup and intervention in various parts of the world on the one hand and the Reagan Administration's efforts to upgrade American military capabilities on the other hand.

•The difficulties in improving the bilateral relationship are compounded by the fact that the two countries have quite different agendas in dealing with each other. The Soviets want arms control agreements and trade without strings; they reject the United States belief that human rights or disputes over Soviet actions in other regions (Afghanistan, Poland, the Caribbean) are appropriate issues between major powers. Conversely, the United States has consistently taken the position that arms control and trade policy cannot be considered independently from the degree of Soviet internal repression and external aggression.

Arms Control

•The United States and Soviet differences in the INF talks are fundamental. To avoid any sign that progress is being made, Soviet negotiations were reportedly "belligerent" and "nasty as hell" during the last negotiating round. It is unlikely that an INF agreement will be produced prior to the December 1983 missile deployment date. As European public demonstrations increase in intensity during the year, the West German and other European governments may begin to press the United States for additional modifications to the current U.S. proposal.

•The deployment in Europe of Pershing II and cruise missiles is likely to take place, but it will generate a harsh Soviet reaction. It appears unlikely, however, that the Soviets will deploy land-based nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere in response.

•Both sides lost an important opportunity for a mutually beneficial INF agreement when they rejected the informal proposal put forward in 1982 by negotiators Nitze and Kvitsinsky. Perhaps the best chance for agreement remains something along the lines of that proposal.

•Prospects for agreement in the START talks are worse than for the INF talks. One senior U.S. START negotiator summarized the situation by saying that "we are playing in different ball parks." He concluded that "if the Administration wants an agreement during its first 4 years in office, it will have to move fast and make dramatic changes."

•After disclosure of the so-called Rowny memorandum, Ambassador Rowny's subordinates maintained their professionalism and tried not to allow the incident to interfere with the immediate business at hand. Behind the scenes, however, morale on the START team has deteriorated to the point where its future effectiveness could be seriously impaired.

•The only prospect for movement in START appears to be modification in the U.S. position as outlined by the Scowcroft Commission combined with Soviet modifications based on an acceptance of the Administration's determination to proceed with strategic modernization.

•The prospects for Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks are somewhat better. Serious probing of the East's intentions is called for in the June round of talks.

•Perhaps the most disturbing finding of the trip is the extent to which the current arms control impasse has led to a deterioration in the bilateral relationship. The Soviets describe the overall state of bilateral relations using terms such as "a critical situation," "pushing us to the brink," "a highly dangerous path," and "extreme pessimism."

Foreign Policy

•American thinking about the Soviet Union occasionally lapses into extreme views ranging from an assumption that both countries share the same fears, values, and problems, to an assumption that the Soviet Union typifies the antithesis of American values. The Soviet Union is a more complex society and a more complicated participant in world affairs than extreme views would allow.

•The United States has only a marginal ability to affect Soviet decisions by means of rewards and punishments. The factors which determine Soviet strategies and priorities are only partially related to external developments. Soviet military spending, for example, is based on a range of considerations in addition to its perception of external dangers at any given time.

•Events in Poland have posed probably the greatest threat to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe since the war. Solidarity's challenge is that of a genuine worker's revolt in a system which purports to govern in the name of the worker. The ability of the United States or other Western countries to affect events in Poland will probably continue to be slight for the foreseeable future.

•Soviet officials acknowledge that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was, in the short run, a major shift in the regional correlation of forces against them. They argue that in the long run, however, the invasion will prove to be a strategic setback for the United States because the

United States is now "inextricably implicated" in the policies of the Israeli Government. The Soviet presence at SAM 5 sites in Syria raises the prospect for serious confrontation in the Middle East.

•The Soviets clearly intend to try to isolate the United States on the Namibian problem and the issue of Cuban troops in Angola. They intend to seek to use the delay in reaching a settlement to highlight the U.S. association with South Africa.

•In other areas of the world, Soviet officials denied the existence of Soviet policies despite the fact that they are well documented in the West. For example, they deny any involvement in the Salvadoran insurgency, they scoff at allegations that they use poison gas or biological toxin agents in Indochina and Afghanistan, and they say they are not seeking to gain advantage in United States-Soviet relations by "playing a China card."

East-West Trade

•The economic sanctions imposed because of Afghanistan and Poland have had a devastating effect on America's reputation as a reliable supplier. If disputes over East-West trade policy (resulting from these sanctions) continue among the allies, they will have a corrosive effect on the ability of the West to deal with other crucial issues of defense posture, arms control, and Soviet intentions elsewhere in the world.

•Trade between the Soviet Union and the West increased an unprecedented tenfold in the decade of the 1970's. The prospects for continued growth in the decade of the 1980's are much bleaker. The United States share of Soviet trade will probably decline as the United States becomes more of a supplier of last resort, and the Soviets diversify sources and as other countries try to bring their trade accounts into better balance with the Soviets.

Soviet Domestic Politics

•Although Andropov appears clearly in charge and able to speak for the Soviet Communist Party, he probably does so at this stage on the basis of a fairly fragile leadership consensus. If Andropov wants to make any significant policy departures, he must first be politically strong enough to overcome the tenacious resistance of a hierarchy whose positions and privileges are based on the status quo.

•The urgent Soviet priority is the economy. It is too early to tell what the Andropov leadership's economic policy will be. So far, Andropov seems to be buying time by focusing on worker discipline and political corruption.

•The current human rights situation in the Soviet Union is grim and getting worse. A renewed across-the-board crackdown began in 1979 and intensified in 1982. This attitude extends even to cases of 14 individuals who have U.S. citizenship by right of birth, whom the Soviets refuse to allow to leave.

Report by Foreign Minister Gromyko to the USSR Supreme Soviet: Outer Space Arms Control [Extract], June 16, 1983 [1]

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The problem of maintaining military-strategic stability at lower levels involves a complex set of issues. Many of them are rigidly intertwined. This is the correlation between offensive and defensive strategic arms.

The U.S. Administration made a step toward severing this link by deciding to commence the development of a broad-scale ABM system. This was done by far not for defensive purposes, but as a link in a vast militarist programme.

The Soviet Union thinks that measures must be taken to prevent the arms race from developing in new directions. We proposed this to the U.S. Government: Let the Soviet and American scientists, specialists in the field, get together and discuss the possible implications of establishing a large-scale ABM system. So far we have received no answer from the U.S. Administration.

It would be a tragedy for mankind if outer space became a source of quarrels between states, and, worse still, a sphere of their military clashes. Only with a total misunderstanding of the grave responsibility and extreme recklessness can one pursue the line that would make the space above the head of mankind carry a threat to its existence.

The priority task in this connection is to conclude an international treaty on the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space, which has been proposed by the Soviet Union. We are prepared to go even further—to agree on banning in general the use of force both in space and from space with respect to the earth. We are prepared to enter the respective talks without a moment's delay.

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Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Proposal for a Nuclear Freeze, June 16, 1983 [2]

Having heard and discussed the report by A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR foreign minister, "On the

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, June 16, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report,* June 17, 1983, vol. III, p. R12.

[2] Moscow *Izvestiya* in Russian, June 17, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report,* June 17, 1983, vol. III, pp. R20–R21.

International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

To wholly and fully approve the USSR Government's activity to implement the Leninist foreign policy course of the CPSU and the soviet state. To approve the measures being carried out to implement the principled provisions of the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums, which are aimed at easing international tension, achieving effective accords in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament, eliminating existing hotbeds of conflict and averting new ones, and developing equal peaceful cooperation with all states irrespective of their social system.

The USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously approves the measures to maintain the Soviet Union's defense capability at the requisite level and to safeguard its allies' security, which are being adopted, taking into consideration the military-political situation actually taking shape in the world. The objective of these measures is to preserve the existing balance of forces, which under present conditions constitutes a reliable guarantee against the unleashing of nuclear war.

In the present complex international situation everything must be done to halt the arms race, return to the path of detente, and strengthen peace. This would be greatly promoted by the adoption by all the other nuclear powers, following the Soviet Union's example, of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and also by the implementation of the Warsaw Pact countries' proposal on the conclusion between them and the NATO countries of a treaty on the nonuse of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace.

Ending the buildup of nuclear arms is one of the most urgent tasks of the present moment. The resolution of this task would be a major contribution of reducing the danger threatening the peoples.

Proceeding from this, the USSR Supreme Soviet instructs [*poruchayet*] the Soviet Government to address a proposal to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the PRC for a simultaneous qualitative and quantitative freeze by all nuclear powers of all nuclear armaments possessed by them. Such a freeze could initially come into effect with respect to the USSR and the United States at a definite date to be agreed, bearing in mind that the other nuclear powers would act in an analogous manner.

A freeze on all components comprising nuclear arsenals would sharply raise the degree of trust in relations between states possessing nuclear weapons and would enable a decisive turn to be made toward normalizing the general atmosphere in the world.

Halting the growth of nuclear arms would be an effective and relatively easily implemented action, and a starting point for their subsequent reduction and ultimately complete liquidation.

This would create a favorable atmosphere for reaching mutually acceptable accords at the current Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and also of nuclear arms in Europe in accordance with the principle of equality and identical security.

The USSR Supreme Soviet expresses the hope that the supreme legislative organs and governments of the United States, Britain, France, and the PRC will adopt a responsible, constructive position with respect to the proposal on freezing nuclear arms and will show the political will to enable the vicious circle of the arms race finally to be broken in the interests of all the peoples of our planet.

Letter From ACDA Director Adelman to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Percy): MX Missile, June 16, 1983[3]

At yesterday's hearing Senator Pell asked whether under any circumstances the U.S. would be prepared to give up the MX program?

The following is my answer for the record: "The President has made clear that the scale of MX deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reduction agreements. The MX is the U.S. response to a massive build-up of Soviet ICBMs over the last 10 years, and unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this build-up and forego their heavy and medium ICBMs, the U.S. will go forward with MX."

I have sent letters to Senators Pell and Tsongas, who inquired extensively about this matter.

I want to tell you once again how pleased I was to appear again before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday and how I look forward to frequent appearances to implement both of our plans for the closest possible consultations. I will be back to you soon regarding the TTB[4] and PNE treaties.[5]

British Working Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in Relation to a Nuclear Test Ban, June 17, 1983[1]

1. The Nuclear Test Ban Working Group has been considering some of the basic factors which might underlie a comprehensive test ban treaty. By "comprehensive" we mean a treaty that would prohibit all nuclear explosions in all environments; it would be our hope that such a Treaty would be accepted by all States.

2. In their discussions, the Working Group have addressed the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. Three main views emerged:

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[3] *United States–Soviet Union Relations: Hearings . . . on Arms Control Resolutions . . .*, Pt. 2, p. 51.

[4] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.

[5] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

[1] CD/383.

(i) Some delegations consider that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty should cover all nuclear explosions, whether tests of nuclear weapons or explosions for peaceful purposes, because of the identity of technology between all nuclear devices for whatever purpose they are intended (see paragraph 6 below);

(ii) Other delegations consider that a nuclear test ban should be concerned with the cessation of testing of nuclear weapons only. They propose however that there would also be an accompanying protocol which would provide for a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes until an appropriate regime for such explosions had been negotiated. In this respect account would have to be taken of the matters referred to in the June 1977 report of the IAEA *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group on PNEs (IAEA document GOV/1854 of 26 August 1977).

(iii) A third group of delegations believe that a nuclear test ban should apply only to the testing of nuclear weapons; but it is not clear whether these delegations believe that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should also be controlled in one way or another.

3. Some delegations who wish to restrict a comprehensive test ban treaty only to the testing of nuclear weapons base themselves partly on the wording of the preamble of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which states that the original parties sought "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".[2] This language is not surprising considering that the Treaty followed a period of intensive atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons; but it cannot reasonably be used as the basis for excluding a wider ban. To exclude such a ban would not be consistent with Article 1 of the 1963 Treaty in which each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

4. Furthermore, Article 1(b) states that its provisions are without prejudice to the conclusion of "a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble of the Treaty, they seek to achieve". The language of the Treaty is therefore at best inconclusive, as is the language of General Assembly resolutions which refer in different paragraphs both to "all nuclear test explosions" and to nuclear weapon tests (see for example, A/RES/37/72). The scope of a comprehensive test ban treaty must be decided on the basis of present day needs.

5. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibited *all* nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. We presume that those delegations who argue that a comprehensive test ban treaty should be limited to tests of nuclear weapons do not wish the new treaty to be less comprehensive than the earlier one. If this is the case,

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[2] The text of the treaty is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

then PNEs would, as a minimum, have to be constrained by the provisions in Article 1 of the 1963 Treaty.

6. In practice, we conclude that the immediate effect of adopting either the first or second approach would be very similar, in that the entry into force of the Treaty would be accompanied by a complete ban on all nuclear explosions. The two approaches differ only in that the second envisages the negotiation of a satisfactory arrangement for the control of PNEs so that they do not prejudice the comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon test explosions. This approach was reflected in the report (CD/130) on the trilateral negotiations where it was pointed out that any eventual arrangements for PNEs would need to be "consistent with the treaty being negotiated, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". [3] It was also agreed in the trilateral negotiations that the arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes "including the aspect of precluding military benefits" would be kept under consideration. [4] These very necessary conditions which have to be attached to any system of regulation of PNEs present serious problems to which no satisfactory solution has so far been proposed.

7. The need for a ban on all nuclear test explosions, if an effective comprehensive test ban treaty is to be realized, arises from the fact that the basic technologies for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives for peaceful applications remain identical; and of course any nuclear explosive is capable of being used as a weapon. Any organization competent to design one would have a high ability to design the other. Such differences in detail as might possibly exist between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives intended for peaceful purposes would be dictated largely by the separate purposes they were required to serve. For example, in weapon applications there is normally a premium on achieving a given weight, size and ruggedness whereas, in nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes there might be a requirement to minimize the amount of radioactive debris generated by the explosion.

8. If nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were completely uncontrolled by a test ban treaty there would be nothing to prevent a party to the treaty staging nuclear weapon tests and claiming that they were nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. There would be little objective evidence to dispute this claim. The test could be staged exactly as though it were part of a PNE programme and the explosive power of the test device could be used for peaceful purposes e.g. civil engineering. Seismic signals recorded by a verification network would show no differences between weapon test explosions and explosions for peaceful purposes.

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[3] The text of the nonproliferation treaty is *ibid.*, pp. 461–465.

[4] The trilateral report is printed *ibid., 1980,* pp. 317–321.

9. It therefore follows that, if PNEs were unconstrained, any State could carry out tests from which military benefits could be derived. Nuclear weapon States have no need of further testing to develop basic technologies but they could use PNEs for testing the continued serviceability of stockpiled warheads or for proving new warheads. A non-nuclear weapon State could use the programme to develop basic nuclear explosive technology; the carrying out of PNEs would demonstrate its capability to produce nuclear weapons. All this could be done without any risk of a breach of the proposed treaty being proven. This would obviously render the treaty ineffective.

10. For these reasons many of those delegations who wish a comprehensive test ban treaty to make provision for PNEs accept that they must be regulated, in order to ensure that military benefits are not being derived by the States carrying them out and so that PNEs do not in fact constitute disguised breaches of the treaty. It is, however, difficult to see how any foolproof system of verification could be devised and established. Its requirements would be quite different from those of a system designed to detect and identify seismic events. An organization set up for the purpose would need to have complete access to the explosive devices being used for peaceful purposes and to the sites of PNE projects, and its inspectors would have to have a close familiarity with the designs of the nuclear weapons of the State responsible for the PNE operations, to ensure that the device being used for peaceful purposes was not capable of assisting stockpiled weapon maintenance or improvement.

11. The IAEA *Ad Hoc* Advisory Group's Report contains a great deal of information about the considerations that would have to be taken into account in devising a PNE regime. It seems unlikely however, that nuclear weapon States would be prepared to offer other nuclear weapon States access to highly sensitive information on the design of nuclear explosives, whether or not such explosives were ostensibly for peaceful purposes.

12. Again, while in theory it should be possible for inspectors to have unrestricted access to check that neither existing nor new warheads were being tested under the guise of a PNE, in practice a nuclear device, apparently for peaceful purposes, could still be used to validate some element of a warhead design without this being detectable. In other words, information of military benefit could still be obtained from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, even with the most intensive form of verification.

Conclusion

13. While there may be detailed differences of design between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes, the basic technology remains the same, and any nuclear explosive device ostensibly developed for peaceful purposes is inherently capable also of being used as a weapon. We remain firmly convinced that the uncontrolled use and development of nuclear ex-

plosions for peaceful purposes is incompatible with the objectives of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The inherent difficulties—even the impossibility—of regulating the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such explosions neither constituted tests in breach of a test ban treaty, nor led to breaches of other international obligations of States parties, nor were being used to acquire military benefits directly or indirectly, are such that confidence in a comprehensive treaty could only be ensured if all nuclear explosions were banned.

Remarks by Vice President Bush: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], June 24, 1983[1]

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Recently, attention both in the United States and Europe has turned to the alliance position regarding intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Let me take a moment to set out the facts.

In a speech here in London in 1977, former German Chancellor [Helmut][2] Schmidt warned of the SS-20, the Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missile, a dangerous and destabilizing new weapon.[3] At that time the Soviets had mounted under 30 warheads on such missiles. By December 1979, the number of such Soviet warheads had increased to some 450. In March 1982, Chairman [Leonid I.][2] Brezhnev announced a moratorium on the further deployment of SS-20s.[4] At that time, the number of warheads had reached 900. The Soviets then ignored the moratorium they themselves had proclaimed, and today the number of warheads placed on SS-20 missiles exceeds 1,050. When the warheads placed on SS-4 and SS-5 missiles are included in the count, the number of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear warheads totals more than 1,200. I am speaking of nuclear missiles that can reach London or any other target in Western Europe in a matter of minutes.

The United States possesses no comparable intermediate-range nuclear weapons whatsoever. Surveys indicate that many in America and Western Europe do not understand that point, so let me repeat it. The Soviet Union has more than 1,200 warheads mounted on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The United States possesses no corresponding intermediate-range nuclear missiles whatsoever. None.

To counter the present Soviet monopoly, in December 1979, the NATO alliance took a double, or two-track, decision. The first track calls for the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union to achieve a reduction in INF missiles.[5] We are now doing so in Geneva. President Reagan first proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should eliminate all land-based INF missiles, not only from Europe but from the face of the Earth,[6] a position on the moral high ground [*sic*]. The total elimination of INFs remains the final outcome the United States seeks, but when the Soviets rejected that proposal the President offered instead to limit the number of INF warheads we would deploy if the Soviets in turn would agree to reduce their warheads to an equal number.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1983, pp. 4–5. The remarks were made before the International Democratic Union Party leaders in the United Kingdom.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 666–669.

[4] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 118–121.

As you know, the Soviets have stated that any count of INF systems must include British and French missiles. But the British and French weapons are not intended for the defense of NATO but for the ultimate defense of Britain and France themselves; and, as Moscow knows full well, the Soviet Union now possesses thousands of nuclear-capable aircraft and shorter-range missiles that more than compensate for the British and French deterrents.

The second track calls for the deployment of 572 Pershing and cruise missiles, less than half the number of INF warheads the Soviets have already set in place, should the failure of the Soviets to come to an agreement in Geneva make that necessary. Let me stress that if we must deploy, such a decision would not result in the addition of a single nuclear warhead to the existing U.S. stockpile in Europe. If the program does have to be carried out, for each Pershing or cruise missile deployed, one warhead from existing stockpiles will be removed. The alliance, moreover, is currently reviewing its nuclear requirements to make certain that it keeps in place the smallest number of nuclear weapons that its strategy of deterrence will permit; and in a move that has received surprisingly scant attention or credit, during the last 3 years the United States has unilaterally withdrawn 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe.

The planned deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces will take place over 5 years and involve only a few missiles at a time. If at any point agreement should be reached at Geneva, NATO would then bring the numbers of its Pershing and cruise missiles into line with the terms of the accord. What can go in can come out, and we shall remain not only willing but eager to remove missiles, should an accord so direct.

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[5] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 814–816.
[6] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 570–578.

Joint Statement of the Warsaw Pact Countries, June 28, 1983 [1]

The participants in the meeting, having jointly analysed the situation developing in Europe and the world generally, express on behalf of their socialist States their concern at the continuing increase in tension, the further destabilization of inter-State relations and the growing danger of nuclear war with its catastrophic consequences. They deem it necessary to draw the attention of all countries and peoples to those dangers.

The meeting confirmed the assessments and conclusions concerning the development of the international situation contained in the Political Declaration adopted on 5 January 1983 at the Prague session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. [2]

This relates in particular to the conclusion concerning the ever more resolute determination of the world's peoples and all progressive and peace-loving forces to put an end to the arms race, to proceed with disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, and to ensure the development of all States in conditions of equality and respect for sovereignty and national independence, in an atmosphere of co-operation, security and peace.

It also relates to the conclusion of the Prague Political Declaration concerning the negative factors affecting the state of international relations and aggravating the situation. These factors have recently become increasingly manifest.

The arms race is assuming unprecedented proportions. The United States and some of its allies do not even themselves conceal the fact that their actions pursue the objective of military superiority. Work is proceeding on the construction of bases for the siting of new United States medium-range nuclear missiles in certain West European countries members of NATO. Programmes are being carried out for the production and deployment of new strategic land-, sea- and air-based nuclear weapons. Military space systems for attacking targets in outer space and on earth are being developed. Completely new conventional weapon systems are being produced which, in their military characteristics, approach weapons of mass destruction. Sharp increases in military expenditures impose a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples.

Under these conditions, the meeting's participants express their concern at the lack of progress in the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of armaments. This applies to the negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons as well as the work of the Geneva

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[1] CD/386. The statement was issued at the conclusion of a meeting in Moscow of the party and state leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries.

[2] *Ante.*

Committee on Disarmament and the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe.

The meeting's participants also draw attention to the fact that the intensification of the arms race is being accompanied by statements alleging a desire for flexibility in the negotiations of the limitation and reduction of arms and asserting the false claim that the building up of military might can serve the interests of the peace and security of the peoples. The States represented at the meeting firmly reject such a policy.

The constant deterioration in the international situation is due to the intensification of the imperialist policy of force and dictation, confrontation between States and the strengthening and redistribution of "spheres of influence", and to the further increase in the aggressive actions of imperialism. Attempts to interfere in the internal affairs both of socialist and of many other States are becoming more frequent; mutually beneficial economic relations are being broken; the socialist countries are the target of hostile campaigns, and other forms of pressure are being used. In various regions of the world, existing hotbeds of military tension are being fanned further and new hotbeds and crisis situations created; there is a growing risk of their escalation; undeclared wars are being waged against a number of independent States; foreign military presence is being established which is alien to national interests. Legitimate demands for the establishment of a new international economic order are being refused, and the gap in the economic development of countries continues to widen.

This whole policy is in serious conflict with the fundamental interests and aspirations of the peoples of Europe and of the whole world, as clearly expressed in numerous mass anti-war demonstrations insisting on the right of people and nations to a free, decent and peaceful existence, as well as in statements by parliaments and by scientists, doctors and representatives of different spheres of society made in various international forums, such as the recent World Assembly for Peace and Life and against Nuclear War held at Prague.

The meeting's participants consider that the present situation raises, for all States and for all peoples, the question of how to prevent its further dangerous development, of how to prevent the world from sliding into catastrophe. In the Prague Political Declaration of 5 January 1983, the socialist States represented at the present Moscow meeting put forward a broad programme of action for reducing international tension and eliminating the danger of war.

They confirm the relevance and practical effectiveness of that programme and again assert their opposition to competition in the sphere of nuclear weapons and to any military rivalry in general. They are firmly convinced that no world problems, including the historic dispute between socialism and capitalism, can be settled by military means.

In the present situation, urgent measures are needed to avert the danger of war and redirect the course of world events towards détente and the improvement of inter-State relations.

The participants regard as the key issue of our time the speedy halting of the arms race and transition to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and consider it necessary to do everything to achieve those urgent objectives in order to preserve peace, civilization and life on earth. They reaffirm their willingness to make every effort to solve these problems through negotiations.

In this connection, it is of the utmost importance to eliminate the danger of nuclear confrontation on the European continent. The meeting's participants, in their desire to free Europe completely from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, consider it essential to reach, at the minimum, an agreement that would exclude the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in the countries of Western Europe and provide for appropriate reductions in existing medium-range weapons in Europe with a view to ensuring a balance at the lowest possible level. Such an agreement can be reached if the two sides show mutual comprehension and political will and are guided by broad concepts of peace and security. It is from those positions that the States represented at the meeting approach the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Full support was expressed at the meeting for the Soviet proposals aimed at an equitable reduction in existing medium-range nuclear weapons. The meeting's participants call for every effort to be made so that agreement may be reached in the negotiations this year, on the basis of proposals acceptable to both sides, concerning the non-deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the reduction of existing medium-range weapons.

They are convinced that if the two parties strictly observe the principle of equality and equal security, the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons can be reoriented in a constructive direction and that mutually acceptable agreement can be reached at them, corresponding to the interests of strengthening universal peace.

They consider it necessary to hasten the initiation of negotiations on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and to exclude the possibility of extending the arms race to outer space.

The meeting's participants express the conviction that in the interests of the peace and security of the peoples it is necessary:

to implement without delay the freezing of the nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon powers, and first of all of the USSR and the United States;

for the nuclear-weapon powers which have not yet done so to assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The States participating in the meeting once again appeal to the States members of NATO to begin direct talks without delay for the purpose of reaching an agreement on not increasing military expenditures as from 1 January 1984 and on concrete measures for their practical mutual reduction thereafter, with a view to using the resources thus released for economic and social development needs, including those of the developing countries.

They express the hope that the NATO States will respond to this appeal.

They also look forward to agreement by the NATO States to proceed to practical consideration of the proposal concerning a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, open to all States.

The States represented at the meeting again declare themselves in favour of the implementation of proposals on the creation of nuclear-free zones in northern Europe, the Balkans and other regions of the European continent, and the holding of appropriate negotiations on these questions.

Stress was laid on the importance and necessity of the speediest possible conclusion of the Madrid meeting with positive results responding to the expectations of the peoples of Europe, providing for the convening of a conference on measures to strengthen confidence, security and disarmament in Europe and ensuring the continuity of the multilateral process begun at Helsinki. That would constitute an important contribution to the consolidation of the policy of peace, détente and co-operation.

To reach concrete understandings on urgent issues in the field of stopping the arms race and improving the international situation, it is necessary to make maximum efforts, conduct business-like negotiations in a constructive spirit, take steps facilitating the creation of a favourable atmosphere for their progress, and not to engage in actions that might complicate them.

The States represented at the meeting again emphasize in the strongest terms that they are opposed to any steps leading to the expansion of NATO's sphere of activity or to the creation of any new military-political groupings. For their part, they declare that they are not seeking to widen their alliance's sphere of activity and do not intend to take any steps in that direction.

Basing themselves on the interests of peace and of their security, the States participating in the meeting state that they will in no case tolerate military superiority over themselves. They resolutely declare themselves in favour of ensuring a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. In this connection, they draw attention to the declared position of their highest State organs on this question.

They also confirm their basic position concerning the fact that the territorial and political realities of Europe today are inviolable.

The States represented at the meeting are firmly convinced that peace cannot be strengthened by way of the arms race. They are consistent opponents of its intensification. Only the limitation, reduction and destruction of armaments, only measures leading to general and complete disarmament under strict international supervision can bring mankind lasting and reliable peace.

In the Helsinki Final Act, the 35 States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe solemnly undertook to make détente both a continuing and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope. They unanimously declared their desire for the development of better and closer relations among them in all fields and thus for overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations, and for better mutual understanding.[3]

Guided by the spirit and the letter of those lofty commitments, the States participating in the meeting will continue to develop their relations with other States on the basis of peaceful coexistence. They call on the countries of Europe to do everything necessary to banish the nuclear threat from Europe, to make Europe a continent of peace free of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, a continent in which all States would co-operate on the basis of full equality and mutual respect in the interests of the progress and well-being of their peoples, of tranquillity, mutual understanding and security in Europe and throughout the world.

They address an urgent appeal to the countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to all countries of the world to ponder soberly and objectively the menacing trends in the current development of international relations, and to draw the logical conclusions in keeping with mankind's deepest interests.

They express their readiness to unite their efforts with those of all countries irrespective of their social and political systems, with all those who are in favour of strengthening peace and international security for the purpose of taking practical steps to avert the worst. For this, no time must be lost.

Statement by President Reagan on the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1983[1]

Fifteen years ago today, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and 58 other nations signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[2] This treaty, now with 119 parties, has the widest adherence of any arms control treaty in history. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states, developed and developing countries, and countries from every region of the globe have committed themselves to the NPT and its objectives.

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[3] The arms control portion of the Final Act is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 11, 1983, pp. 971–972.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty have agreed not to assist nonnuclear-weapon states to acquire nuclear explosives, and nonnuclear-weapon states have pledged not to acquire nuclear explosives. These mutual pledges recognize that the further spread of nuclear weapons threatens all nations.

The NPT also calls for parties to assist in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in nonnuclear-weapon states which are parties to the treaty. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy are important to the well-being of many other peoples, and the United States, takes its obligations for cooperation in this area seriously. We have long been in the forefront of those providing technical assistance and other cooperation in the nuclear field, and we are committed to continuing such cooperation under adequate safeguards.

The United States also recognizes its obligation under the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. This is an issue of major concern to all countries. I am personally committed to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real, substantive progress towards an agreement involving significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals to equal more stable levels and that would be in the national security interests of both sides. The United States will also spare no effort to negotiate an equitable and verifiable agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces that would reduce the risk of war in Europe and globally.

The United States played a major role in the negotiation of the NPT, and five U.S. Presidents over its lifetime have strongly supported the treaty as a cornerstone of the international effort to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries. As we plan for the important NPT Review Conference in 1985, the United States will continue to strive to strengthen the viability of this treaty. I urge all countries that have not yet done so to join the growing consensus against the spread of nuclear explosives by adhering to the NPT.

In July 1981, I outlined a policy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear explosives, and declared that this issue was critical to future international peace and regional and global stability.[3] But if we are to succeed in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, the nations of the world must work together. As I have announced on previous occasions, one key step would be for nuclear suppliers to agree on requiring comprehensive safeguards as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment. This is not a policy that denies nuclear assistance, but rather one that conditions assistance on a reasonable demonstration that a nonnuclear-weapon state's entire program is dedicated to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This demonstration has already been made by the 116 nonnuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT. It is my hope that agreement can be reached soon on this measure to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime.

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[3] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 278–280.

On this the 15th anniversary of the opening of the NPT for signature, all states should rededicate themselves to achieving the purposes of this important treaty and to ensuring its continued vitality. That is both our shared responsibility and a contribution to peace for future generations.

Interview With the Soviet Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (Mikhailov): Soviet Proposals at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, July 2, 1983 [1]

What is the essence of the new proposals submitted by the socialist countries in Vienna?

Mikhailov: To be able to answer more clearly your question I have to mention, if only briefly, the proposals of the socialist countries that were tabled in Vienna on 17 February 1983 with a view to overcoming the deadlock at the talks. In these proposals, first of all, a new, simple, and feasible approach to solving the tasks of reducing troops and arms in central Europe was suggested, which makes it possible to resolve them irrespective of all quarrels and differences regarding the assessments of the numerical strength of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces in the given area. Second, the proposals mentioned also contained a specific schedule of practical activities for achieving progress at the negotiations.

As a first step it provides for the immediate reduction of part of the USSR and U.S. forces in the central European region on the basis of mutual example, as well as for the subsequent freezing of the level of the armed forces and arms of all direct participants in the negotiations. This freeze would remain effective until the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement that should conclude the negotiating process.

The draft of a comprehensive "agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms, and measures connected with it, in central Europe" recently presented by the socialist countries specifies thoroughly and at the same time in conformity with the law of contract the concluding part of the schedule of practical endeavors proposed by them, and supplements it with new, exceedingly important stipulations.

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[1] Vienna *Volksstimme* in German, July 2, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report,* July 8, 1983, vol. III, pp. AA1–AA3.

What is the gist of the draft agreement itself? What are its essential points?

Mikhailov: The draft agreement provides for the sides to commit themselves to reduce, within 3 years after the agreement goes into effect, their land forces in central Europe in such a way that as a result the total strength of the armed forces personnel of each side is reduced to the same collective ceilings of 900,000 men on each side, including a 700,000-man land force on each side while at the same time limiting the Air Force personnel strength on each side to 200,000 men.

Each side would itself determine the extent of the reduction of its armed forces required to reach the same collective ceiling of the armed forces personnel of the two sides. The extent of the armed forces reduction by each participant in the agreement would be determined within the framework of each alliance, applying the principle of full collectivity as well as the formula that those participants in the agreement who maintain large units in central Europe should assume an essential share of the total volume of the armed forces reduction in their alliance.

No less important is the stipulation of the draft that the armed forces are to be reduced by formations, groups of units, and units together with their entire structural armament and technical equipment.

The draft provides for the sides' commitment to maintain the same collective ceilings in the future and stipulates that any, even a temporary exceeding of these ceilings, is not permissible.

As has been learned, verification and control measures are playing a noteworthy part in the new draft agreement. Can you give further explanations regarding the measures proposed by the socialist countries?

Mikhailov: Actually, a special section of the draft agreement provides for a group of measures to monitor compliance with the agreement. These measures fully and completely comply with the principle that they should be in reasonable proportion to the nature of the reduction. The draft provides for monitoring of the reduction process not only of the stationed but also of the domestic armed forces, as well as for an adequate check of the armed forces personnel strength level that remains after all the reductions are carried out.

The proposed measures include in particular:

—control with national technical means;

—invitation, on a voluntary basis, of observers from both sides for the withdrawal and reduction of the largest contingents of the stationed or domestic armed forces;

—after the conclusion of all reductions, the establishment of three or four permanent bases on either side for observing the withdrawal of the armed forces from the central European region, or their arrival in this region;

—the opportunity to carry out on-the-spot checks, provided that certain conditions are observed.

Moreover, such measures as mutual information about certain aspects of military activities, the exchange of information, and a mechanism for mutual consultations, including the establishment of a joint commission consisting of representatives of both sides, should serve the goal of effectively guaranteeing compliance with the agreement and of strengthening confidence-building.

We believe that all the mentioned measures together are fully adequate for each side to ascertain to a reasonable degree the other's compliance with the proposed agreement. Let us, for example, take only one measure—the establishment of permanent points to check entry into and exit from the area, and manning them with observers from the sides. Since any formations, groups of units, and units of the land and air forces of the participants in the agreement can enter or leave the reduction area only at these points of entry or exit, this measures alone, objectively speaking, for all practical purposes rules out any opportunity for either side to achieve any "secret" concentration of troops in the contract region that would constitute a real danger of surprise attack.

How do you assess the prospects for the Vienna negotiations in view of the proposals submitted by the socialist countries on 23 June of this year?

Mikhailov: Obviously, the possibility of truly equal and mutually acceptable agreements materializing in any negotiations depends on the wish and the readiness of the sides participating in such negotiations. The Vienna negotiations are no exception in this respect.

The Warsaw Pact countries, for their part, have done a great deal to lead the negotiations out of the ever-present cul-de-sac. Their new proposals in Vienna make it possible to overcome the obstacles artificially put up by the West, and to find a practical solution to the problem of reducing armed forces and arms in central Europe.

The draft of a comprehensive "agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms, and measures connected with it, in central Europe" that was recently presented by the socialist states in the overall context of their proposals of 17 February of this year provides the participants in the negotiations with a complete, realistic, and clear program of practical activities. They are aimed at leading the Vienna negotiations out of the cul-de-sac, at initiating without delay the beginning of a reduction of armed forces of the sides together with their arms, and at continuing this process until the establishment and maintenance of equal collective ceilings at a lower level for the NATO and the Warsaw Pact armed forces in the above-mentioned region.

It can be said without exaggerating that the socialist countries' proposals offer all the necessary prerequisites for mutually acceptable agreements. Now the ball is in the West's court.

Address by Vice President Bush [Extracts], July 4, 1983 [1]

Our basic agreement on fundamental issues is not always clearly recognized. While my conversations with the leaders I've visited so far have revealed many points of agreement, I have found during this visit to Northern Europe, and especially in talking with the press, that key aspects of American foreign policy are sometimes misunderstood.

The responsibility for explaining American foreign policy, of course, belongs to the United States, and I welcome this opportunity to dispel certain misconceptions—I call them myths—about what President Reagan is trying to accomplish.

Clarifying Misconceptions

Nuclear Arms Reductions. The first such myth holds that President Reagan is insincere about seeking nuclear arms reductions. Nothing could be further from the truth. The President's record speaks for itself. In the last 2 years, the Reagan Administration—working with Denmark and other close allies—has come forward with new and far-reaching proposals:

- To eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); [2]
- To reduce substantially intercontinental strategic forces; [3]
- To reduce troop levels in Europe to equal levels; and [4]
- To ban completely the production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. [5]

In negotiation after negotiation, we have demonstrated our flexibility. In the INF negotiations, for example, the President announced last spring that if the Soviet Union refused to eliminate an entire class of the missiles, the United States would be willing instead to enter into an interim agreement providing for lower levels of INF warheads.

More recently, the President has demonstrated his flexibility in strategic arms reductions by announcing that if the Soviet Union rejected the original American proposal for cuts in ballistic missiles, the United States would be willing to discuss a different limit. Now I know some people argue that this is all just a public relations ploy and that the President isn't really interested in achieving agreement. This is simply untrue. I know the President well, and I know his innermost feelings on this matter. President Reagan is a man deeply committed to arms reductions—a man with a vision of a world free from the burden of the nuclear threat.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1983, pp. 11-13. The address was before the Foreign Policy Society in Copenhagen.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570-578.

[3] *Ibid., 1982*, p. 286-289.

[4] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 570-578.

[5] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

The President demonstrated his sincerity again just last week when the United States announced that it would support the effort of the Spanish Government to find a compromise agreement at the Madrid meeting on security and cooperation in Europe. We are encouraged by what appears to be a favorable Soviet response to this effort, and we hope that the Spanish initiative soon produces an outcome that will enhance the prospects for both disarmament and the observance of human rights in Europe.

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Nuclear Arms Race. Returning to Europe, another myth considers it is longstanding American policy to seek not arms control but an unconstrained nuclear arms race. Yet once again, the record speaks for itself. The United States has always stood at the very forefront of arms control. It was an American, Bernard Baruch, who, in the aftermath of World War II before the Soviets even had nuclear weapons, proposed that all countries relinquish to the United Nations their right to deploy nuclear weapons. [6] The Soviet Union rejected that proposal. It was an American, President Dwight Eisenhower, who came forward with the "Open Skies" proposal designed to lower tensions by giving both sides the ability to observe each other's military programs with reconnaissance aircraft. [7] The Soviet Union rejected that proposal. It was an American, President Ronald Reagan taking the moral high ground, who called for the total elimination of an entire class of INF missiles. [8] Again, the Soviet Union rejected that proposal.

The United States adamantly opposes an arms race. Despite all the talk you hear of weapons piling up, the fact is that the United States has fewer nuclear warheads in its stockpile today than it did 15 years ago, and the total destructive power of those warheads is lower than at any point in the last 25 years. In a decision, moreover, that received surprisingly little attention or credit, the United States over the last 3 years unilaterally withdrew 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe. And if we are forced to deploy INF missiles, we have agreed with our allies that for every new warhead that is set in place, an existing nuclear warhead will be withdrawn.

In the interest of arms reductions, we are willing to consider every option, and we have not ruled out a summit meeting with the Soviet Union. For such a meeting to succeed, however, it must be thoroughly prepared, and President Reagan has made it clear that he will insist on such preparation. We owe too much to the American people—to the people of the world—not to do our best to ensure that a summit produces not frustrated hope but substantive results.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 7–16.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 486–488.

[8] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 570–578.

I did not come to Northern Europe to engage in confrontation, but I believe we would do well to pose certain questions to the Soviets.

•Why did the Soviet Union, with no warning, begin its buildup of SS-20s in the mid-1970s?

•Why did the Soviet Union, after NATO's December 1979 decision,[9] continue its SS-20 buildup when Soviet leaders themselves openly proclaimed that a balance already existed in Europe?

•And why, even after Moscow announced last year that there would be a moratorium on deployment, did the Soviet Union, nevertheless, deploy even larger numbers of SS-20s?

These questions bear directly on the lives of hundreds of millions of free men and women. The peoples of the West deserve answers.

Limited Nuclear War in Europe. A final myth holds that the United States is planning to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe. This is the most pernicious myth of all. It is not now, and never has been, American policy to fight a nuclear war or to try to limit any East-West conflict to Europe. Indeed, the whole NATO strategy of deterrence has been designed to make it absolutely unmistakable to any potential aggressor that, in the words of NATO doctrine, an attack on one is an attack on all. It is the very essence of deterrence that the prospect of American retaliation against an attack on Europe lowers the incentive for such aggression.

We have no illusions about the terrible consequences of nuclear war. President Reagan has repeatedly stated that in a nuclear war there can be no winners, only losers. And it is because we suffer no illusions that we stand utterly determined to do whatever we must to prevent a nuclear cataclysm.

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Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War [Extract], July 5, 1983 [1]

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The Soviet delegation wishes in its statement today to focus on the central issue of the present time—the question of the prevention of nuclear war. As is justly emphasized in the Appeal of the World Assembly for Peace and Life and against Nuclear War held last month in Prague, "Mankind has arrived at a crucial crossroads in its history. One step in the wrong direction and the world can be plunged into the abyss of nuclear war".

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[9] The NATO decision is *ibid., 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[1] CD/PV.222, pp. 19–24.

We would like to stress once again the particular significance of the adoption by the Committee of practical measures on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. We are deeply convinced that concrete talks on this item should be initiated without delay with a view to achieving at them tangible results as soon as possible. As we have already pointed out, there is no lack of concrete proposals designed to lessen the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war in practice. They have been put forward both by the socialist and by the non-aligned countries, as well as by some Western countries.

Last spring the USSR, together with other socialist countries, submitted document CD/355 in which they expressed their views concerning the measures which should be taken as a priority matter with a view to the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe. [2]

Among those measures the USSR raised *the question of the freezing* by all States possessing nuclear weapons, as a first step towards the reduction and ultimately the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, of the production and deployment of nuclear charges and their delivery vehicles, as well as of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons. This proposal was put forward by the socialist countries with one purpose—to stop the process of the building up of stocks of weapons of mass destruction, to place a freeze on them, qualitatively and quantitatively.

Consistently supporting a nuclear arsenals freeze, the Soviet Government on 21 June 1983, on the instructions of the highest organ of State power in the Soviet Union—the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—addressed a formal proposal to the governments of the other nuclear-weapon States—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China—for the nuclear-weapon States to freeze all the nuclear weapons at their disposal, both quantitatively and qualitatively. [3]

In its proposal, the Soviet Government pointed out that such a freeze would envisage the cessation of the quantitative build-up of all the components of the nuclear arsenals of the sides and their commitment not to deploy new types of nuclear weapons.

In addition to that, each side would declare a moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests, as well as on tests of new types of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles.

The proposal also noted that compliance with the freeze obligations could be effectively verified by national technical means. If necessary, some additional measures could be worked out and agreed on, on the basis of co-operation.

Of course, a nuclear freeze would be most efficient if undertaken by all the nuclear-weapon Powers simultaneously. However, the Soviet Government believes it possible—and this is made clear in the proposal—that this could be done initially by the Soviet Union and the United States, on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon Powers would subsequently follow suit. The proposal emphasizes that while putting forward this important initiative, the Soviet Union in no way considers the freeze as a goal in itself, but regards this measure as an effective first step towards the reduction and, ultimately, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and thus towards the total elimination of the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

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[2] *Ante*, Mar. 21.

[3] Cf. *ante*, June 16.

In addressing the freeze proposal to the other nuclear-weapon Powers, the Soviet Union believes that it should help to initiate the practical elaboration of a programme of stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament, mentioned in the well-known proposals of the socialist countries submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament. I would like to recall that in our view such a programme, in addition to the cessation of the development and production of nuclear weapons, could include also the gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles, as well as the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The idea of a nuclear arms freeze has in fact been the subject of broad discussion all over the world for a number of years now. Many public and political figures of various countries address this idea, regarding it as a key link in the chain of efforts designed to stop the arms race and prevent the growth of the threat of nuclear war. The freeze was also supported at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly which, on the initiative of India, Mexico and Sweden adopted resolutions calling upon the nuclear-weapon States, and in the first instance the USSR and the United States, to freeze their nuclear weapons.[4] The General Assembly resolutions qualify this measure as "an extremely urgent one", as "the first step towards the cessation of the nuclear weapons build-up and their improvement". The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to adopt "urgent practical measures to prevent nuclear war" (including the suspension of the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons) in the decision adopted by the non-aligned countries at the summit conference held recently in New Delhi.[5]

The idea of a freeze has been widely supported by public opinion in the NATO countries, and particularly in the United States. It is enough to recall that during a kind of referendum on this issue held last autumn in a number of States of the United States of America, more than 70 per cent of electors were in favour of the freeze. This attitude of millions of Americans is reflected also in the United States Congress. As you know, the House of Representatives of the United States Congress recently adopted a resolution calling for a "mutually verifiable freeze and reduction of nuclear weapons" by the USSR and the United States.

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[4] G.A. res. 37/100 A, introduced by India, and res. 37/100 B by Mexico and Sweden.

[5] *Ante*, Mar. 12.

But one cannot ignore the fact that the freeze idea has not only its partisans on the other side of the ocean but also very influential opponents, who spare no efforts in order to describe "the harm and danger" if the tremendous nuclear arms arsenals cease to increase and at the same time to sow doubts about the practical possibility of implementing a freeze and about its usefulness from the point of view of the prevention of nuclear war. The main "argument" which they use is to frighten people with the idea of "Soviet military superiority". They claim that the freeze would mean the preservation of an "unequal and unstable" level of nuclear forces "condemning" the United States to a "military and moral lagging behind".

Another method of the adversaries of a freeze is to claim that it would hinder the large-scale reduction of nuclear weapons because, they say, it would deprive the USSR of the incentive to make such reductions. It is also alleged that a freeze cannot be verified.

The artificial character of such arguments is clear. Concerning the notion of "Soviet superiority", I believe there is no need to dwell upon it. We have repeatedly explained that there is no Soviet nuclear superiority and moreover the USSR believes that in the current situation it is pointless for anyone to count on achieving military superiority.

Setting off the freeze against nuclear arms reduction is no less absurd. From our point of view the freeze is a necessary prerequisite, the first step towards reduction. It is difficult, in fact, to imagine a genuine reduction without a freeze. The reduction of some types of nuclear weapons with the simultaneous building up of others, obviously still more dangerous, would transfer the arms race into the qualitative field.

As for the allegation that the freeze would deprive the USSR of the incentive to reduce nuclear weapons, we regard it as a repetition of the old story about the need to have "bargaining chips" at the talks with the USSR in the form of ever newer and more dangerous types of weapons. History has shown more than once that such an approach to the talks with the USSR and attempts to talk with it from a position of strength do not produce positive results. For example, it is enough to recall the attempts of the United States at the beginning of the 1970s to use as "bargaining chips" the last word in United States military technology of that time—the MIRV systems. As is known, all the attempts of the United States to gain additional advantages for itself at the talks with the Soviet Union using the pressure put with the help of this "chip" gave no results. The only result of this policy was the spiralling upwards of the arms race to a higher and more dangerous level.

As regards the allegation about the "unverifiable" nature of a freeze, we believe that there is no reason to overestimate the difficulties connected with the verification of a freeze. The experience of verification of the SALT agreements can be successfully used for the freeze verification too. Besides, the proposal of the USSR makes it clear that, if necessary, some additional measures could be worked out on the basis of co-operation. In connection with the verification problem Mr. Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, pointed out: "Verification is no less important for us than for others. Our approach to verification problems is a practical one, and not a matter of general declarations. Such an approach was adopted in the SALT agreements. Our verification policy is far-reaching—up to the establishment of general and complete verification when we are dealing with general and complete disarmament. We are against the conversion of the verification problem into a stumbling block at the talks".[6]

It should be emphasized that the freezing of all the components of nuclear arsenals would sharply increase the level of confidence in the relations between nuclear-weapon States and considerably improve the political situation in the world. Proceeding from this notion, the participants in the summit meeting of the socialist countries held in Moscow on 28 June expressed their conviction that in the interests of peace and security it is necessary "to freeze without delay the nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon powers, and first of all those of the USSR and the United States".[7]

In view of the increasing danger of nuclear war, the cessation of the process of the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction and the freezing of them quantitatively and qualitatively offer a reasonable alternative to the growing threat of nuclear catastrophe. However, this does not mean that the proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries on the prevention of nuclear war consist solely of the freeze proposal. Another important proposal made by the socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament is the proposal for an undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.[8]

By its unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the USSR once again reaffirmed that the main concern in its policy is the elimination of the threat of war. This step on the part of the Soviet Union has met with a wide response both among States and among broad strata of the international community.

We expect the other nuclear-weapon Powers, which have not yet undertaken such a commitment, to take a similar step. No pretexts and excuses can outweigh the need to prevent nuclear war.

It is argued in the West that the USSR, while undertaking not to use nuclear weapons first, remains free to use conventional weapons, in which it allegedly has superiority. This argument is designed to mislead the peoples.

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[6] *Ante*, Apr. 24.

[7] *Ante*.

[8] *Ante*, Mar. 21.

The Soviet Union and its allies categorically reject such allegations. In the Political Declaration which the Warsaw Treaty countries adopted in Prague, they proposed the conclusion of an agreement between the States parties to that Treaty and the NATO countries, which would contain a mutual commitment not to use any weapons, either nuclear or conventional, in other words, not to use force in their relations at all.[9]

Quite some time has now passed since this proposal was put before our Western partners. However, their response, contained in the communiqué of the June session of the NATO Council, frankly speaking, is not clear.[10] It shows that apparently not all are able or wish to realize how drastically the situation in Europe and in the world could be improved if an agreement was reached on the non-use of force between the two groups of countries.

Another measure which could considerably reduce the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war is, in our view, the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on the conduct of any nuclear test explosions up to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This proposal has been widely supported by the States Members of the United Nations, as is shown by the fact that at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly 115 States voted in favour of the resolution calling for the declaration of such a moratorium.[11]

However, this idea also has opponents. One of the most widely used arguments against the moratorium is that on the one hand such a moratorium cannot be appropriately verified and on the other that it could hamper the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests by reducing the incentive for States to strive for its conclusion.

The Soviet Union holds a different point of view on these issues. Concerning the verification of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, we believe that this question is out of place, since what is involved here is not the assumption by States of commitments under the relevant treaty but a step based on the good will of States. Besides, it is absolutely clear that the resumption by anyone of nuclear tests could not remain unnoticed. We believe that the declaration of a moratorium on the conduct of nuclear explosions would create very favourable conditions for the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests because all States, and in the first instance the nuclear-weapon States which have declared a moratorium, will strive for the speediest possible solution of all the questions arising in connection with the cessation of nuclear tests, including questions of verification and compliance with the relevant obligations.

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[9] *Ante*, Jan. 5.
[10] *Ante*, June 10.
[11] G.A. res. 37/85; see *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 716–717.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to call on all the delegations participating in the Committee's deliberations to start without delay practical work on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. We confirm once again our support for the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group in the Committee on Disarmament to conduct negotiations on this problem, and we hope that either delegations will take a similar position. If some States continue to hamper the establishment of a working group, we would propose the convening of informal meetings of the Committee with a view to holding a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the existing proposals on measures aimed at preventing nuclear war, in order to identify those practical measures on which general agreement can be reached for the conduct of concrete negotiations for the elaboration of an appropriate agreement or agreements.

The Soviet delegation therefore makes a formal proposal for the holding of an informal meeting in the very near future, devoted to consideration of the organizational framework for the discussion of the question of the prevention of nuclear war, including the documents submitted to the Committee on this item.

U.S. Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Illustrative On-Site Inspection Procedures for Verification of Chemical Weapons Stockpile Destruction, July 6, 1983 [1]

I. *Introduction*

Procedures for destruction of chemical weapons, and for verification of the destruction, have been discussed in general terms in a number of working papers. A recent United States paper (CD/CW/CTC 28; 11 January 1983) contains United States views on general verification procedures.

However, the course of the negotiations has shown that a common approach to verification of stockpile destruction cannot be achieved through a discussion of concepts and general principles alone. It is necessary to understand how the approaches proposed would actually be carried out in practice.

The purpose of this paper is to facilitate further negotiations by illustrating in concrete terms how the United States approach to verification of stockpile destruction would work. For the purposes of illustration, we have chosen a specific destruction facility already operating in the United States, the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS). The paper outlines possible verification measures for this facility.

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[1] CD/387, pp. 2–16.

The specific procedures outlined here are preliminary, illustrative and tailored to a specific facility. While the concepts and general principles would be applicable to any facility, the actual procedures must take into account both the characteristics of a facility and of the items being destroyed. Thus, the procedures employed at another facility could be somewhat different.

II. *Over-all description of the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS)*

The Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) is an industrial-size prototype facility for destruction of chemical weapons and storage containers filled with mustard agent or the nerve agents GB or VX. The facility is located on the grounds of Tooele Army Depot; the site is approximately 45 road miles south-west of Salt Lake City, Utah.

CAMDS, which began toxic operations in September 1979, is being used to develop and demonstrate technology for demilitarization of toxic chemical munitions and to obtain technical data from which other similar plants can be designed and built.

Current activities are devoted to completion of a Technical Data Package for use in the design and construction of the first full-scale United States disposal facility, to be located at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. This planned facility, which might begin operations in the late 1980s, would have a destructive capacity two-to-five times greater than CAMDS.

CAMDS was designed to destroy mustard agent by incineration, GB by reaction with sodium hydroxide solution, and VX by treatment with chlorine. However, the experience obtained to date at CAMDS suggests that incineration is the method of choice for all three agents. Explosives and propellants are thermally destroyed. Inert components and metal parts are mechanically demilitarized and decontaminated by heat treatment. In view of the dangerous materials involved, the entire facility is highly automated and designed for remote handling of items being destroyed.

Figure 1 provides a diagram of the CAMDS facility. [2]

III. *Incineration of chemical weapons*

Incineration has several advantages over other methods for destruction of mustard agent, GB, and VX. Use of a common destruction method can reduce costs considerably by eliminating the need for different sets of process equipment. Furthermore, incineration produces less salt waste products to be disposed of than the chemical treatment processes do. From an arms control standpoint, incineration is preferable since it destroys the characteristic carbon-phosphorus bond of the nerve agents, thereby ensuring that the salt product cannot be recycled.

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[2] Not reproduced here.

Chemical agent can be incinerated without first draining it from a munition or bulk container. This approach, called *in situ* incineration, is used at CAMDS for destruction of mustard agent. In principle, GB and VX could also be destroyed by this method.

Alternatively, the chemical agent may be drained from a munition or container and then injected into an incinerator. The metal component would be passed through the incinerator or separate metal parts furnace. This approach allows greater control of the incineration process and is being investigated at CAMDS for destruction of GB and VX. A similar process was used for destruction of mustard agent at Rocky Mountain Arsenal (see document CCD/436).[3]

Since the two incineration processes present somewhat different verification tasks, they are described in detail separately below. Illustrative verification procedures, based on United States experience at CAMDS, are outlined in Section IV.

A. *In-situ incineration*

Figure 2 provides a schematic diagram for destruction of chemical weapons by means of *in situ* incineration. As indicated, the sequence of steps varies somewhat depending on whether the items being processed are in bulk storage (such as "ton" containers—commercial chemical shipping containers which hold approximately one ton of material), in munitions containing explosives, or in munitions without explosive components.

Munitions of all types and bulk containers are moved in a special van from a nearby storage area to a revetted munitions holding area on the CAMDS site. This holding area is designed to store approximately a one-day supply for destruction operations.

As needed, munitions are transferred with a special transporter vehicle from the munition holding area to the unpack building area of CAMDS. Here munitions are removed from their shipping and storage containers and prepared for the demilitarization process. The unpack area at CAMDS has a number of different configurations for handling bulk containers and different munition types (i.e., 115 mm rockets, mines, 105 mm burstered projectiles—i.e., 105 mm burstered projectiles containing an explosive charge to burst open the munition—105 mm non-burstered projectiles, 155 mm burstered projectiles, 155 mm and 8-inch non-burstered projectiles, 4.2-inch mortar cartridges).

From the unpack area, all munitions containing explosives travel to the explosive containment cubicle, where explosive components (e.g., propellant; fuse; burster) are removed. These components are destroyed by incineration in a deactivation furnace. Next, the munitions are transferred by conveyor to the projectile disassembly facility. Munitions without explosives are sent directly to this facility from the unpack area, bypassing the explosive containment cubicle.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 335–340.



FIGURE 2

SCHEMATIC FLOW DIAGRAM
FOR
IN SITU INCINERATION

STORAGE AREA
PROJECTILES
BULK ITEMS
MUNITIONS HOLDING AREA
UNPACK AREA
ITEMS WITH EXPLOSIVES
ITEMS WITHOUT EXPLOSIVES
EXPLOSIVE REMOVAL CUBICLE
EXPLOSIVE DEACTIVATION
DISPOSAL
BURSTER WELL REMOVAL MACHINE
INCINERATOR
GASEOUS PRODUCTS
METAL PARTS
DISPOSAL
SCRUBBER SYSTEM
DISPOSAL

In the projectile disassembly facility all munitions are processed through a device which removes the nose closure from non-burstered projectiles and pulls the burster well from all items ("burster well removal machine"). It can also be used to drain GB and VX from the projectiles.

For *in situ* incineration, the projectiles coming from the projectile disassembly facility are loaded into an "egg-carton" tray. (This tray holds 48–75 items, depending on the type of item.) The projectile-filled tray is transferred into the metal parts furnace on a small charge car. Bulk items, which arrive directly from the munition holding area, are also placed on a wheeled platform ("charge car") for transfer into the furnace.

The metal parts furnace processing system includes a rotary hearth furnace, a primary fume burner, an auxiliary fume burner, and equipment for removing destruction products from the exhaust gases. The furnace is made up of three chambers: a punching chamber, a chamber for controlled volatilization of agent, and a final burnout chamber for incineration of any agent remaining on metal parts.

In the punching chamber, holes are made in a ton container to permit release of agent vapour during the volatilization process. Other bulk items and projectiles are handled without punching. The punching chamber serves only a vestibule in this case.

In the volatilization chamber the item is heated to 600–900 degrees Fahrenheit to vaporize the agent. An oxygen-deficient atmosphere is maintained to avoid combustion at this stage. After the temperature/air flow profile indicates that vaporization is complete, the charge car is moved to the burnout chamber. In this chamber metal parts are maintained at 1000 degrees Fahrenheit or higher for 1–4 hours to complete the destruction of any small remaining quantities of agent or degradation products.

Detoxified scrap metal parts are removed from the furnace by the discharge car and transferred to the cooling chamber. After the scrap is cooled and certified free from agent it is loaded into trucks using a remotely operated crane and hoist. (Although 115mm rocket casings are destroyed by sawing or shearing while being processed, most metal items emerge basically intact.)

Agent fumes from the punching chamber and the volatilization chamber are incinerated in the primary fume burner. This chamber is operated with a flue gas temperature of 1450–1600 degrees Fahrenheit and provides a minimum residence time of 0.5 second.

Fumes from the burnout chamber, as well as the flue gases from the primary fume burner, pass through the auxiliary fume burner. This burner operates with a flue gas temperature of 1600 degrees Fahrenheit; the minimum residence time is 0.5 second.

Flue gases from the auxiliary fume burner are processed through a scrubber system, which removes agent destruction products, and are eventually exhausted to the atmosphere. The scrubber solution is evaporated to dryness, leaving a salt residue which is stored in drums for future disposal.

B. *Injection-method incineration*

Tests of this method are currently being conducted at CAMDS for destruction of GB and VX. It differs from the *in situ* method in that metal parts and agent are incinerated separately. Figure 3 provides a schematic diagram.

Projectile processing is the same as for the *in situ* method until the point at which the burster well has been removed in the projectile disassembly facility. At this stage agent is removed through a suction probe lowered into the projectile. This agent is drained into an agent holding tank, while the metal parts are processed through the metal parts furnace system.

Bulk items arriving from the munition holding area are drained in the bulk item facility area of the projectile disassembly facility. The metal parts are subsequently processed through the metal parts furnace system, while the agent is piped into an agent holding tank.

Agent from the holding tank is injected into a furnace, through a probe, onto a hot metal surface. The agent flash vaporizes and is processed through a fume burner and scrubbing system very similar *in situ* incineration. (For the CAMDS tests the metal parts furnace is being used. However, the Johnston Atoll destruction facility now being designed includes a separate liquid incinerator.)

IV. *Illustrative on-site inspection procedures*

Previous discussions have led to agreement that verification procedures for destruction of declared stocks should be designed:

—to confirm the identity and quantity of the materials destroyed; and,

—to confirm that the materials have actually been destroyed. In this respect, it would be important to confirm that the process destroyed the materials completely and that nothing was diverted in lieu of being processed.

Specific on-site monitoring and inspection procedures which might be used at the CAMDS facility to carry out these verification tasks are discussed below. While these procedures are designed for a specific facility, they incorporate several general principles which are applicable to any process for chemical agent destruction:

—a combination of human inspection and monitoring with sensors is necessary for effective verification;

—a detailed engineering review of the facility by international verification personnel, including on-site inspection, is necessary before destruction operations begin;

—inspection must be continuous during periods in which destruction operations are under way;

—inspectors must be qualified personnel and have a comprehensive, up-to-date knowledge of the design and operation of the destruction facility;

FIGURE 1

SCHEMATIC FLOW DIAGRAM
FOR
INJECTION METHOD INCINERATION


STORAGE AREA
PROJECTILES
MUNITIONS HOLDING AREA
UNPACK AREA
ITEMS WITH EXPLOSIVES
EXPLOSIVE REMOVAL CUBICLE
ITEMS WITHOUT EXPLOSIVES
EXPLOSIVE DEACTIVATION
DISPOSAL
BURSTER WELL REMOVAL + AGENT DRAIN
AGENT
STORAGE TANK
LIQUID INCINERATOR
GASEOUS PRODUCTS
SCRUBBER SYSTEM
DISPOSAL
METAL PARTS
BULK ITEMS
AGENT DRAIN AREA
METAL PARTS
METAL PARTS FURNACE
DISPOSAL
AGENT

—inspectors must be permitted to confirm the validity of all data used for verification purposes;

—to ensure confidence, data used for verification should be as closely linked as possible to the actual destruction step;

—monitoring and inspection procedures should be designed to minimize interference with the operation of the destruction facility, while providing effective verification; .

—to the extent consistent with verification needs, monitoring and inspection procedures should make use of data generated during routine facility operations;

—to the extent consistent with verification needs, common procedures should be used for different destruction processes within the same facility;

—close co-operation between international verification personnel and host state operating personnel is important for effective international verification.

A. *In situ incineration at CAMDS*

Figure 4 outlines the verification procedures discussed below.

For all liquid agents, including GB and VX the *identity* and *purity* of the material being destroyed could be confirmed by sampling it immediately before the item enters the metal parts furnace system and analysing the sample automatically with an on-line, dual-column gas chromatograph. At CAMDS samples could be taken from munitions with the automatic drain probe already built into the machine used to remove buster wells and drain projectiles. For bulk items, a slight modification of the operating sequence would be needed. Rather than transporting the item directly from the munition holding area to the metal parts furnace, the item would go first to the area equipped for draining bulk items. A sample could be obtained using the draining lines. The sample would be analysed automatically with an on-line, dual-column gas chromatograph. A different sampling procedure would be needed for mustard agent, since the pure agent is a solid up to about 15 degrees Celsius. One possibility would be to sample and analyse volatilized agent where it enters the primary fume burner. (This procedure would be unsuitable for the nerve agents since they already decompose at this stage.)

Since only one agent and one type of item would be processed during a given period, the same gas chromatograph could probably be used for all analyses, although it might have to be shifted from one part of the facility to another, depending on what was being destroyed. (Such an analytical system is not currently installed.)

The *quantity* of material destroyed could best be determined by weighing items (projectile-filled trays or bulk containers) immediately before and after passage through the metal parts furnace. The item to be weighed should be placed on a support containing an accurate load cell. The measured weight difference should be cross-checked against the value expected from the calculated content of the item. The



FIGURE 4

MONITORING OF *IN SITU* INCINERATION AT CAMDS

STORAGE AREA
PROJECTILES
MUNITIONS HOLDING AREA
UNPACK AREA
ITEMS WITH EXPLOSIVES
EXPLOSIVE REMOVAL CUBICLE
EXPLOSIVE DEACTIVATION
DISPOSAL
ITEMS WITHOUT EXPLOSIVES
BULK ITEMS
BURSTER WELL REMOVAL MACHINE
SAMPLING + ANALYSIS OF LIQUID
ITEM COUNTING/ WEIGHING/ TV MONITORING
SAMPLING + ANALYSIS OF LIQUID AGENTS/ TV MONITORING
INCINERATOR
(SEE DETAIL BELOW)
GASEOUS PRODUCTS
SCRUBBER SYSTEM
DISPOSAL
RANDOM SAMPLING + ANALYSIS OF WASTE SALTS
METAL PARTS
DISPOSAL
ITEM COUNTING/ WEIGHING/ TV MONITORING
DETAIL OF INCINERATOR
TEMPERATURE + AIR FLOW MONITORING
SAMPLING + ANALYSIS OF MUSTARD GAS VAPOR
INPUT
PUNCH CHAMBER
VOLATIZATION CHAMBER
BURNOUT CHAMBER
PRIMARY FUME BURNER
AUXILIARY FUME BURNER
TEMPERATURE MONITORING
SCRUBBER SYSTEM
METAL PARTS
DISPOSAL

number of items should be measured by mechanical or electronic item counters and visual observation at the same points as the weight is determined. (While current capability exists for counting the number of items, current weighing capability is only partial and approximate.)

Confirmation of actual agent destruction should rest on confirmation: (a) that the conditions in the destruction step are sufficient to destroy the material completely and (b) there are no pathways for diversion. In addition, the waste materials should be subject to sampling and analysis on a random basis to ensure complete destruction.

For CAMDS the key parameters of the agent destruction step which should be measured are the temperature-time profile of the volatilization chamber, the temperature of the primary fume burner, and the rate of the air flow through the primary fume burner (i.e., the residence time of agent). Temperatures would be measured by thermocouples, flow rates by orifice plates. These instruments are already used for process monitoring. The absence of diversion pathways could be confirmed by conducting an engineering inspection of the facility before destruction operations begin, television and direct surveillance of key process areas, particularly during shut-down and maintenance periods, and periodic reinspection.

Data from each sensor, including television cameras, would be transmitted to a central monitoring station in the control room and recorded to provide a permanent record.

To ensure that metal parts, such as shell casings, could not be reused, they should be destroyed by punching, sawing, or crushing. Confirmation would easily be obtained by visual observation of the scrap metal parts emerging from the destruction step.

B. *Injection-method incineration at CAMDS*

Figure 5 provides an outline of the verification procedures discussed below.

For this process the *identity* and *purity* of the material being destroyed should be confirmed by taking a sample close to the inlet of the liquid incinerator and analysing the sample with an on-line, dual-column gas chromatograph. (Such a system is not currently installed.)

The *quantity* of agent being destroyed would be determined by using an accurate flowmeter near the inlet of the liquid incinerator. However, uncertainty exists about whether sufficient accuracy is possible. If not, it would be necessary to weigh items, using load cells, before and after they were drained and to establish, through inspection, that no diversion pathways existed. A system would be incorporated to detect efforts to cut into the agent drain line ("continuity check").

Methods for confirming actual destruction would be similar to those for the *in situ* process; thermocouples would be used to measure the time-temperature profile of incinerator, and the flow rate through it would be determined with an orifice plate. The destruction of metal parts would be monitored visually.

FIGURE



MONITORING OF INJECTION METHOD OF INCINERATION AT CAMDS

STORAGE AREA
PROJECTILES
BULK ITEMS
MUNITIONS HOLDING AREA
UNPACK AREA
ITEMS WITH EXPLOSIVES
ITEMS WITHOUT EXPLOSIVES
ITEM COUNTING TV MONITORING
CONTINUITY CHECK
EXPLOSIVE REMOVAL CUBICLE
EXPLOSIVE DEACTIVATION
DISPOSAL
ITEM COUNTING/ TV MONITORING
AGENT DRAIN AREA
AGENT
METAL PARTS
BURSTER WELL REMOVAL + AGENT DRAIN
AGENT
METAL PARTS
CONTINUITY CHECK
STORAGE TANK
METAL PARTS FURNANCE
DISPOSAL
FLOW MEASUREMENT/ TV MONITORING/ SAMPLING + ANALYSIS
LIQUID INCINERATOR
TEMPERATURE/ AIR FLOW MONITORING
GASEOUS PRODUCTS
SCRUBBER SYSTEM
DISPOSAL
RANDOM SAMPLING + ANALYSIS OF WASTE SALTS

The measures necessary to ensure security of data, including the use of television surveillance systems at key points, are discussed in Section V below.

C. *Inspectors*

The verification procedures described above are intended to provide an optimum balance between monitoring with sensors and inspection by verification personnel. To some extent, use of sensors can reduce the inspection burden. However, continuous presence of inspectors during periods of destruction operations is essential for accomplishing certain technical tasks, particularly visual surveillance and ensuring that automatic sampling and analysis equipment is operating properly.

The functions described above would require a minimum of two inspectors to be present during each operating shift to monitor data from sensors and to conduct visual surveillance and at least one during each maintenance shift. During non-working shifts, sensors such as film cameras triggered by motion in the field of view or television cameras would suffice.

CAMDS has a 10-hour operating shift and a 10-hour maintenance shift, followed by a 4-hour non-working shift. Thus, for CAMDS, a minimum of three inspectors present for duty would be adequate. To accommodate illnesses and other absences from duty, a slightly larger number would have to be assigned to the facility.

The inspectors should all have technical backgrounds, be familiar with CW destruction operations, and receive special training as inspectors.

V. *Ensuring the validity of data used for verification*

If States are to have confidence that declared stockpiles have been destroyed, they must have confidence that the data used for verification are valid. To ensure validity of the data, inspectors at CAMDS would have to be able to inspect the facility before it began destruction operations and to participate in all calibration of thermocouples, load cells, flowmeters, gas chromatographs, and any other sensors, as well as observe closely their installation and daily operation. (Recalibration of instruments and reinspection of the process equipment would be required whenever the process is shut down for an appreciable time.) Furthermore, safeguards must be incorporated in the sensor systems to protect against efforts to tamper either with the sensors themselves or the data transmitted from them.

A. *Equipment security*

The security of the monitoring equipment itself would be ensured by a tamper-detecting design of each item. In effect, certain key components, such as signal-generating circuitry, would be enclosed in a box which protects the sensor against mechanical or electronic interference. Attempts to remove the box would disturb microswitches which would set off alarms to alert inspectors; if an attempt were made to cut off a segment of the protective containers without interfering with the microswitches, the tampering would be detected during the visual inspection of the equipment. Tampering with the microswitches would also cause the erasure of information used to "authenticate" the data. ("Authentication" is discussed below.)

Tampering with the sensors might also be attempted through electromagnetic radiation. Protection against this would be accomplished by placing proper shielding inside the tamper-detecting enclosure.

For each sensor, the status of the protective container, as well as the operating status of the equipment, would be monitored electronically by inspectors from the CAMDS control room.

B. *Data security*

The volume of data generated from the various sensors and transmitted to the inspectors' monitoring station in the CAMDS control room would be small. Measurements would be made infrequently (for example, only once every few minutes). Therefore, a relatively simple data transmission system would be adequate. Either radio frequency or cable transmission links could be used.

To assure the integrity of the data during transmission, the data would be converted from analogue to digital form whenever necessary and an "authentication" scheme would be adopted. Data would not be encrypted, but a unique identifier would be added to each group of data points transmitted. This identifying "tag" would be generated by the monitoring system. Any attempt to alter the data during transmission would be detected at the central monitoring station since it would cause a mismatch between the expected and received "tag". (Although encryption is not necessary in this case, it is a valuable method of ensuring integrity of data which may be useful under circumstances other than those described here.)

The availability of low-cost microprocessors means that such data authentication procedures can generally be carried out without substantially increasing the cost of the monitoring system. Inside the tamper-indicating enclosure of each sensor, a microprocessor would control the data collection function of the sensor, the authentication procedure, and the communications between each sensor and the central monitoring station.

However, in the case of television cameras, the amount of data generated is very large compared to that produced by other sensors. The cost of authenticating television images would be substantial. A less expensive solution to ensuring data integrity would be to enclose the television camera in a tamper-detecting box. This would ensure that the camera itself and its field of view are not tampered with. Proper shielding of the coaxial cable between the camera enclosure and the video recorder in the central monitoring station, along with a simple sensing circuit to detect attempts to cut into the cable, would be sufficient to detect any effort to interfere with data transmission.

Security of the central monitoring station would be achieved by enclosing data read-out and recording devices in tamper-indicating containers when inspectors are not physically present.

C. Other data security considerations

The integrity of data from sensors cannot always be ensured simply by ensuring the integrity of each sensor and of the transmitted data. For example, load cells and item counters could be manipulated mechanically to produce false data. A weight determination could be made either too high or too low by exerting force mechanically on a load cell when an item was being weighed. For this reason, visual surveillance of the weighing and counting equipment, using closed circuit television, is necessary.

Protection against deceiving a single sensor at a given time would be achieved by co-ordinating the operation of more than one sensor. For example, a projectile on a conveyor belt would trigger an item counter; in turn, signals from the counter would cause the activation of the television surveillance system at key points while also alerting other process monitors along the path of the projectile. Since it would be known what activities and data values are to be expected during the destruction process of the projectile, the appropriate sensors for these activities should give readings within a known range and time period.

Any sensor not recording the appropriate information within the normal time period would cause an alert in the monitoring system. Reactions to such alerts are part of the operating procedures of the inspectors. Such reactions would be determined by categorizing the various possible alerts into levels of significance. In turn, the significance of each alert would be related to the impact it has on the verification system.

Effective monitoring might also be prevented if a key sensor fails to work properly. Therefore, the over-all data collection system for monitoring the destruction of chemical stockpiles must be designed either with redundancy of sensors or redundancy of coverage or both. Redundancy of coverage means that information about any process step can either be collected with the corresponding sensor or it can be deduced from information collected by sensors at other steps of the process; redundancy of sensors means that every sensor is duplicated. Sensor duplication is feasible for inexpensive items such as temperature sensors or flow meters; however, it becomes impractical for such large items as television systems and gas chromatographs. The preferable approach, which is the basis for the procedures described in this paper, is to have redundancy of coverage whenever feasible so that no single monitoring step becomes a critical one. The development, therefore, of the monitoring system involves two major components: secure and reliable sensors and an effective system design.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War, July 7, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, the world has a particular horror of nuclear war, and mankind longs for an answer to the question of how to prevent it. The fear of nuclear war has compelled all peoples of the world to beseech their leaders to find a remedy.

In my statement today I would like to outline views of the United States on the causes of tensions in the nuclear age and focus on some practical proposals put forward by my Government to lessen those tensions. I will also propose some guiding principles which my Government firmly believes would lessen the danger of all wars, and in particular nuclear war. Along these lines, today I intend to outline how my delegation intends to approach this vital issue of the prevention of nuclear war during the current session of the Committee. Finally, I will address some comments made on this subject by some delegations at our last plenary meeting.

The problem of the prevention of war is not new. Mankind has wrestled with the problems of preventing war and preserving peace since Cain slew Abel.

It is, however, a melancholy fact of the modern age that man has conceived a means of warfare capable of his own destruction. For almost four decades mankind has had to live with the terrible burden of nuclear weapons. From the dawn of the nuclear age, these weapons have been the source of grave concern of our peoples and the focus of an active continuous public debate—at least in those societies where people are free to debate openly their fate. Every successive President of the United States of America has shared these concerns.

What divides various sides on the issue of nuclear disarmament is not disagreement about the danger of nuclear war but disagreement about how best to avert it. It is right that each succeeding generation should question anew the manner in which its leaders exercise such awesome responsibilities.

In discussing those issues, however, we should not allow either the enormity or the complexity of these problems to blind us to the common ground upon which we all stand. No rational person has ever advocated nuclear war, nor does any responsible voice ever dismiss its horrors.

On the contrary, from the earliest days of the post-war era, eliminating the threat of nuclear war has been at the forefront of United States policy. Our offer in 1946 to bring nuclear energy under effective international control is a matter of historical record. [2] Unfortunately, this bold initiative was rejected. Since that time, therefore, American and western strategy has assigned a single function for nuclear weapons: the prevention of war and the preservation of peace. At the heart of this deterrence strategy is the sombre fact that the risk of engaging in war simply outweighs any possible benefits of aggression.

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[1] CD/PV.223, pp. 11–17.

[2] I.e., the Baruch Plan. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 7–16.

This strategy has won the consistent approval of western peoples. It has enjoyed bipartisan support in the American Congress. It has been continuously endorsed unanimously by NATO Member Governments. Last March the Spring Ministerial Meeting of NATO reaffirmed that "the main purpose of the alliance is to prevent war, safeguard democracy and build the foundations of lasting peace" and that "deterrence and defence, together with arms control and disarmament, are integral to the achievement of this purpose".[3]

Western security policy, then, has long been based on two fundamental—and integrated—tenets: deterrence and co-operation. This is often conveniently forgotten by critics of deterrence. I again pledge here that my Government will continue to champion this dual-track approach to peace through deterrence and co-operation. This policy has been supported because it works. Nuclear deterrence and collective defence have preserved peace in Europe, the crucible of two global wars in this century. Clearly, neither improvement in the nature of man nor the strengthening of the international order has put an end to war or its brutality. The history of this century makes it sadly clear that peaceful intentions and well-meaning motives alone will not discourage aggression. Since 1945, millions have died in over 130 international and civil conflicts, all fought with conventional weapons. Yet nuclear deterrence has prevented a conflict between the so-called Superpowers—a conflict which, even without nuclear weapons, would surely be the most destructive in mankind's history.

Nevertheless, while my country recognizes the necessity of deterrence in the present climate of unstable security, we do not view deterrence as an end in itself. The present situation, in which the United States is compelled to maintain a large strategic arsenal, is unacceptable to us. We must reduce our dependence upon these dangerous weapons. We seek a more stable strategic balance at much lower levels of armaments. Accordingly, in this historic city of peace, my country has advanced bold proposals on strategic and intermediate-range ballistic missiles which, if accepted, would lead to balanced, verifiable and militarily significant arms reductions. The attainment of such a balance, at significantly lower and verifiable levels, would effectively enhance stability and strengthen security, thereby reducing the danger of nuclear war.

In addition to these negotiations, the United States has recently proposed a series of initiatives which would reduce the chance of nuclear war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation. On 11 June of last year, in a speech to the people of Berlin, President Reagan reiterated his determination "to assure that our civilization averts the catastrophe of a nuclear war" and announced his intention to put new proposals to the Soviet Union which would significantly reduce the risk of war through accident or miscalculation.[4] The following week he presented his "agenda for peace" in a major address to the United Nations second special session devoted to disarmament in which he outlined the steps he had envisaged in his Berlin initiative, including an ambitious proposal for a broad-ranging exchange of basic nuclear weapons data between the United States and the Soviet Union.[5]

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[3] *Ante*, Mar. 31.

Last November, President Reagan detailed some of the measures which he had proposed to the Soviet leadership. First, the advance notification of all United States and Soviet test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as sea-launched and land-based missiles such as those which are the subject of current negotiations. Secondly, the advance notification of major military exercises. Thirdly, a broad-ranging exchange of basic data about United States and Soviet nuclear forces. Lastly, a series of improvements in the current hot line direct communication system.[6]

These proposals were made to reduce surprise and uncertainty arising from missile tests and major military exercises and to remove some of the mutual ignorance and suspicion which exist between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is our view that jointly sharing such information would represent a qualitative improvement in the strategic nuclear environment and would reduce the chances of misunderstanding between our two countries. My Government already makes a great amount of such information available to our citizens, to our Congress, and indeed to the world. We earnestly believe that a mutual commitment to share this data would contribute greatly to better trust and confidence among nations.

At the last session of this Committee, in this very room, the Vice-President of the United States, the Hon. George Bush reiterated our commitment to significant nuclear arms reduction and the prevention of nuclear wars. He stated: "The elimination of the threat of nuclear war is clearly of paramount importance to all of us, and the United States fully accepts its special responsibilities in the area".[7]

But just as the only justifiable nuclear strategy is one of deterrence, so the overriding objective for arms control is to reduce the risk of war. Nuclear arms control agreements and the process of negotiating them are not ends in themselves. They cannot in and of themselves remove the causes of tension in the world today. Accordingly, these agreements must be based on certain fundamental principles of international behaviour. If all nations would adhere to these principles, it urely follows that the root causes of war—mistrust and misundertanding—would be eliminated.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 337–338.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 381–387.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 810–820.

[7] *Ante.*, Feb. 4.

First, adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. As President eagan noted in his response to General Assembly resolution 36/81 B n "Prevention of nuclear war", Member States are obligated to abide y the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Foremost among hese provisions are the principles set forth in article 2, including, in articular, the injunction for Member States to settle their disputes by eaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any nanner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Unforunately, over the past decade, the most fundamental tenets of international behaviour as enshrined in the United Nations Charter have een openly violated. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar dealt squarely with this point in the 1982 Report to the General Assembly, wherein he wrote:

> Our Charter was born of six years of global agony and destruction. I sometimes feel that we now take the Charter far less seriously than did its authors, living as they did in the wake of a world tragedy. I believe therefore that an important first step would be a conscious recommitment by governments to the Charter. [8]

It is ironical that in this very chamber we hear public professions of dedication to peace and disarmament by countries which daily disregard this solemn obligation under the Charter, including respect for the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of their neighbours. Only through respect for the Charter principles can we again create the climate of confidence necessary to save ourselves from the scourge of war.

Secondly, arms control negotiations cannot be divorced from the broader context of the international political and security climate. While my Government will not unnecessarily link our broader arms control efforts by tying them to specific improvements in the international behaviour or conduct of others, we dare not ignore the fact that these realities can and at times do have an impact on arms control efforts. For example, President Johnson's plans to begin SALT I negotiations were dashed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; President Carter's hope to achieve the ratification of SALT II [9] was undermined by the invasion of Afghanistan. The concluding document of the second special session devoted to disarmament noted, *inter alia,* that disarmament, relaxation of tension and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. [10] Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on the others; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others. Ultimately, of course, as Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the great theologians of the twentieth century, reminds us: "History has proven that any real disarmament was the consequence of relaxed international tensions, not the other way around".

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[8] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirty-seventh Session, Supp. No. 1* (A/37/1), p. 1.

[9] For the text of the SALT II Treaty and accompanying documents, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

[10] *Ibid., 1982,* pp. 421–430.

Thirdly, the prevention of nuclear war cannot be seen in isolation from the prevention of all war. Prime Minister Thatcher put it thus in her eloquent address to the second special session last summer: "Nuclear war is indeed a terrible threat; but conventional war is a terrible reality".[11] We should not allow those who attempt to exploit the justifiable fears of the people of the world about the theoretical dangers of nuclear war to blind us to the real and demonstrated dangers of conventional war. I can think of no better authority to illustrate this concern than Pope John Paul II. In his message to the second special session last summer, he wrote:

> In fact nuclear weapons are not the only means of war and destruction. The production and sale of conventional weapons throughout the world is a truly alarming and evidently growing phenomenon. No negotiations about armaments would be complete if they were to ignore the fact that 80 per cent of the expenditures for weapons is devoted to conventional arms.[12]

This deeply-felt concern over the allocation of the meagre resources of developing countries to the purchase of arms was reiterated to me personally during my visit to the Holy See last summer.

Fourthly, transparency and openness. For my country, transparency is not just an academic theory: it is a living instrument for increasing mutual trust and confidence among the peoples and nations of the world.

The constitution of UNESCO opens with the admonition that "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace must be constructed"; it goes on to warn that ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause of suspicion and mistrust between peoples of the world and has often led to war.

My Government is, therefore, convinced that unimpeded access by the public to a broad range of information—about military capabilities, about national motivations, about each other—can exercise a positive influence toward achieving meaningful arms control measures and ultimately towards preventing all wars.

It was with this in mind that my Government co-sponsored a resolution at last fall's session of the United Nations General Assembly which called for governments to facilitate the flow of a broad range of information on disarmament and to encourage their citizens freely and publicly to express their views on this issue and to meet publicly for that purpose. Unfortunately, this consensus resolution has

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[11] A/S–12/PV.24, p. 4.

[12] A/S–12/PV.8, p. 58.

en more honoured in the breach than the observance in some parts
our world.

Our final principle is that arms control measures must be realistic
d concrete. The United States has traditionally refrained from put-
g forward proposals which, while superficially attractive, are neither
forceable nor verifiable. Unfortunately, others have flooded the
orld stage with pious pledges, rhetorical resolutions and didactic
clarations. These mischievous proposals are designed more for prop-
anda purposes than to advance the cause of arms control. Moreover,
ey tend to create false expectations which, when disappointed, often
ad to acrimony, cynicism, and a hardening of positions.

I have outlined concrete and practical proposals that my Govern-
ent has advanced in order to lessen the danger of war and to create a
imate of confidence among nations. It was not my intention to enter
nto a debate on the familiar issues brought up by the distinguished
mbassador of the Soviet Union at our last plenary meeting on Tues-
ay. In light of the assertions he made, however, I believe I must
riefly respond to some of the main—if somewhat arbitrary—points of
he address.

First, the Soviet Ambassador addressed what he called the "artificial
rguments" of the United States Government relating to the so-called
uclear freeze and alluded to votes and referenda on the nuclear freeze
and the role of public opinion in NATO countries, and particularly in the United States.[13] I must say that I find it somewhat ironical that a representative of the Soviet Union should voluntarily bring up this issue. I recall that while I and many others in this forum, including Ambassador Issraelyan, participated in the second special session devoted to disarmament in New York last June, 700,000 peaceably and openly demonstrated for peace in the streets around the United Nations. At the same time seven in Moscow who dared unfurl the "seditious" banner calling for "peace, disarmament and bread" were summarily arrested for anti-State activities. My colleagues, the comparison is striking, is it not?

The views of my Government regarding the nuclear freeze are well-known. We have explained our position at the negotiating table with the Soviet Union during the past year here in Geneva. We do not believe that a freeze on the testing and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems such as that proposed by the Soviet Union would offer a sound basis for either major arms control reductions or a more stable balance in the strategic equation.

The freeze proposal, for instance, ignores the basic differences that exist between various weapons systems, does not differentiate between destabilizing and stabilizing systems, and thus would risk perpetuating and accentuating dangerous asymmetries in the strategic balance. There are also significant verification problems associated with the Soviet proposal.

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[13] *Ante*, July 5.

Such problems are major and they are most certainly real. Their negotiation would inevitably divert us from the negotiations on reductions already under-way in Geneva to accomplish a goal both our countries have already endorsed—not merely a freeze at existing levels but rather actual reductions in nuclear armaments.

Towards that end, the United States has in recent weeks made a number of new proposals at the START and INF negotiations in order to facilitate progress toward mutually acceptable agreements.

Specifically, in START, the President has recently reaffirmed our desire to negotiate a comprehensive and mutually beneficial settlement and our readiness to be flexible in reaching that end.

At the INF negotiations, again taking into account Soviet concerns and the objective of reaching an early resolution of these problems, we have offered an interim agreement for equal levels of warheads on Soviet and United States long-range intermediate nuclear force land-based systems—though we continue to believe that the complete elimination of that entire class of missiles would be in the best interests of both countries, if not indeed of mankind.

The United States attaches the greatest priority to the achievement of substantial reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces to lower and more stable levels.

Secondly, the Soviet declaration of no-first-use begs the question. Have the authors of this declaration forgotten the solemn commitment in the United Nations Charter concerning the non-use of force? As the distinguished French Foreign Minister, Mr. Cheysson, asked at the second special session, "What credibility could be given to proposals that would reduce the application of this basic clause to the nuclear threat alone?" [14]

The reality is in Soviet actions, not paper pledges. Evidence of Soviet abrogation of legally binding commitments regarding the non-use of other weapons long outlawed by the international community calls into question the sincerity of a unilateral pledge on non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, Soviet military doctrine, which emphasizes surprise, reliance on nuclear weapons and pre-emption, directly contradicts any renunciation of first use. Strategically, the Soviet Union and its allies can allude to no-first-use doctrines because of their vast superiority in conventional forces and their geographical proximity to western Europe. The Soviet Ambassador suggests that this Western claim of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority is aimed to "mislead" the peoples of the world. Interestingly enough, he did not dispute its truth. Indeed, the findings of every independent peace research institute in the world support the view of that superiority. If the Soviet Ambassador would still want to take issue with these facts, let his Government join the United States in publishing figures on military forces, which the Soviet Union has systematically and consistently refused to divulge to the world community or its people.

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[14] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 341–349.

Finally, regarding the Soviet assertion that discussion of verification of the moratorium on nuclear explosions is "out of place". I noted with dismay that the Soviet Union seems to be once again trying to downplay the necessity of verification in international agreements at a time when in critical negotiations in this Committee we seem to be at long last making some progress on those issues.

My delegation was frankly dismayed at the undue and unnecessary delay caused by some delegations last session over the inscription of an item on the prevention of nuclear war on our agenda. As is well known, my delegation and the delegations of the western group supported an appropriate inclusion virtually from the outset. We also suggested an appropriate procedure for beginning our consideration of this very critical issue. I therefore trust that at this session a larger number of delegations will actively participate in our discussion during the coming weeks. I note with satisfaction that others, including my distinguished Soviet colleague, supported this approach last Tuesday. The Committee should immediately hold a series of informal meetings with a view to identifying what appropriate role the Committee can undertake on this important subject.

Accordingly, my delegation looks forward to a comprehensive and in-depth exploration of the various ideas put forward on the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, during the current session of our Committee. We note that a number of delegations have already submitted papers on the subject and we applaud them. The draft working paper (CD/357) introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany offers a series of concrete and relevant measures for the prevention of nuclear war, as well as an insightful description of the international environment conductive to a policy of preventing all wars.[15] Similarly, the Belgian draft working paper (CD/380) introduces a series of practical confidence-building measure which would improve the international political climate and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. Both of these documents are valuable contributions to our work.

In conclusion, I return to the theme with which I began—that arms control and disarmament efforts can be useful instruments in lessening world tension, but they cannot—in and of themselves—preserve peace. In order to preserve the peace, which is the greatest yearning of mankind, all States must rededicate themselves to the fundamental principles of international behaviour, which are enshrined in the United Nations Charter. These principles are obligations solemnly and willingly assumed by the governments herein represented and over one hundred more. Let us then strive to honour these noble undertakings for peace.

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[15] *Ante,* Mar. 28.

Since wars begin in the minds of men, let us then construct the foundation of lasting peace in the minds of men. Let us prevent all wars by engaging in an unrestricted and unremitting pursuit of truth on the vital issues of war and peace.

Japanese Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Verification and Compliance of a Nuclear Test Ban, July 8, 1983[1]

The fundamental thinking of Japan on verification of arms control and disarmament agreements is stated in the Working Paper CD/379 which Japan submitted on 26 April 1983. On the basis of this Working Paper we would like to state here our basic position on the verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban in accordance with the Programme of Work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban (CD/NTB/CRP.3). We would like to make our standpoint clear at the outset that it is practically impossible at the present stage to make a distinction between a nuclear weapon test explosion and a peaceful nuclear explosion, and that in view of this fact the peaceful nuclear explosion should be prohibited unless an international agreement is reached on an international supervision and control system which will ensure that no nuclear weapon test explosion be carried out in the name of a peaceful nuclear explosion.

1. *Requirements and elements of verification*

(1) Verification in general should have the following basic functions:

(a) to ensure constantly the compliance of agreements, and to contribute to confidence building between States Parties in the sense that an effective implementation of agreements will be facilitated in an atmosphere of co-operation in the field of verification;

(b) to deter a violation of agreements by providing the technical means to detect evidence of actions which run counter to the provisions;

(c) to provide a forum for consultation and co-operation to prevent unnecessary conflicts between States Parties.

In order to fulfil these functions, we have to upgrade the level of technical capabilities of detection which would enable us to avoid subjective judgements and to conduct an as objective verification as possible.

(2) From this viewpoint the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should now undertake to examine on the basis of the previous work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts the following technical items in concrete terms in preparation for the appropriate

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[1] CD/388.

ation scheme of a future Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

What kind of verification techniques do we have at present and
of these techniques should be applied in our case?
What is the present level of capabilities of the verification
ques to be applied?
What is the required level of capabilities to verify the compli-
of a nuclear test ban?
What kind of measures should be taken if there is a gap be-
the present level and the required level of verification?

Verification of a nuclear test ban should have at least the
ving objectives:

to maintain surveillance on whether there is a nuclear explosion
t and to ascertain its absence;
in case of detection of an event indicating a nuclear explosion, to
a judgement on whether there is a violation and where (was the
really a nuclear explosion or caused by something else?).

order to attain these objectives we have to introduce the follow-
measures (2 to 7) and to see to it that they work properly,
lementing each other.

leans of verification

National Technical Means
in other arms control and disarmament agreements, the National
nical Means have in our view an important role to play also in
ying the compliance of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Noth-
should be undertaken to interfere with the National Technical
ns used in a manner consistent with generally recognized princi-
of international law. It is appropriate to provide on a voluntary
the information thus obtained to the other States Parties as much
ossible together with the relevant data concerning the credibility
he provided information.
) International Exchange of Seismic Data
om the viewpoint of ensuring objectivity of verification, it is very
ortant to detect and identify seismic events by means of interna-
al co-operation. A system of International Exchange of Seismic
a forms an indispensable part of this international co-operation.
will submit a separate Working Paper stating our views on such a
em.

rocedures and mechanism for consultation and co-operation

1) It is necessary for States Parties to consult mutually and to co-
rate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the
ectives of, or in the application of the provisions of the Treaty.
h problems can be solved in the following way:

a) by consultation in a "Consultative Committee of States Parties"
be established within the framework of this Treaty;

(b) on the basis of bilateral consultation between States Parties;

(c) by consultation through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, as is actually provided for in some of the past disarmament agreements (Biological Weapons Convention, Environmental Modification Convention).

(2) States Parties should be in a position to make a choice from among these three procedures, depending upon the nature of the problems as well as upon the importance and urgency they attach to the problems. However, it is most desirable to resolve the issues within the framework of the Treaty. Therefore, a request for consultation should be made first to the Consultative Committee, and, if there should be further need to do so, States Parties can have recourse to the procedures mentioned in (b) or (c).

(3) The Consultative Committee of States Parties should consist of representatives of all States Parties, and hold a yearly conference. It can also meet in the event of an emergency. The decision of the Committee will be made in principle on the basis of consensus.

(4) A Committee of Experts and a Secretariat have to be established to assist the work of the Consultative Committee. A serious consideration should be given to the question of how to keep the maintenance costs of these bodies to the minimum extent possible.

4. *Committee of Experts*

(1) The Committee of Experts should be composed of technical experts from all States Parties with expertise in seismic detection. In its capacity as a body of experts, it will assist the Consultative Committee only in subject matters of technical nature, and should not play any political role.

(2) The Committee of Experts will perform mainly the following tasks:

(a) to oversee the operation of the System of International Exchange of Seismic Data;

(b) to recommend to the Consultative Committee an effective means to cope with any technical difficulties in implementing the System;

(c) to recommend scientific and technical criteria for different stages of action including identification of on-site inspection techniques which correspond to a specific suspicion by challenge;

(d) to perform on-site inspections.

5. *Procedures for complaints*

(1) There are conceptually two kinds of complaints:

(a) complaints relating to problems which may arise from obstacles standing in the way of an effective implementation of the Treaty, mainly owing to a lack or insufficiency of co-operation on the part of States Parties;

(b) complaints relating to problems which would indicate the case of a grave violation of the provisions of the Treaty.

In the actual situation, there may be manifold reasons which give rise to a particular complaint, and it is hard to make a clear-cut demarcation between these two categories of complaints. Nevertheless, we think the difference can have an important practical bearing on the question of how we proceed to settle the complaints.

(2) We hold the view that the complaints of the first category should be brought to the Consultative Committee.

(3) As to the complaints of a more serious nature, we propose to proceed in two stages. First, a State Party which may entertain any suspicions concerning compliance of the Treaty will request the Consultative Committee to undertake factual investigations, including, as the case may be, an on-site inspection. Should the results of the investigations fail to meet the concern of the State Party, and should its complaints still persist, we think such complaints should be further directed to an organ with a full measure of competence and authority to deal with them. Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention,[2] Seabed Treaty,[3] Environmental Modification Convention,[4] which all open the way in such cases for referring the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations, we think it would be proper also for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to have a similar procedure for this kind of complaint.

6. *On-site inspection*

(1) At the request of States Parties, the Consultative Committee should make arrangements for conducting on-site inspections. It should make decisions on the following items, *inter alia,* in consultation with the State Party in whose territory an on-site inspection will be carried out:

—composition of an inspection team, (in principle members of the Committee of Experts),

—time and duration,

—area,

—activities.

(2) The inspection team will present a report to the Consultative Committee on the results of its fact-finding activities. The Committee will thereupon provide States Parties with this report.

(3) It is of crucial importance that the request for an on-site inspection will not meet with a refusal on the part of a State Party in whose territory it should be conducted. An attempt to leave room for the possibility of such a refusal would stand in the way of an early realization of a nuclear test ban.

(4) The details relating to the implementation of on-site inspection should be worked out on the basis of a thorough examination regarding appropriate verification techniques to be applied. In this regard, a

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 133–138.

[3] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 7–11.

[4] *Ibid., 1977,* pp. 322–326.

full measure of co-operation is expected especially of those countries which possess experience in nuclear weapon test explosion.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War [Extract], July 14, 1983 [1]

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The Soviet delegation would like to continue to express its views on the problem of the prevention of nuclear war. This problem touches upon the whole range of questions concerning various aspects both of the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear conflict and also its catastrophic consequences. One of the most important questions connected with the prevention of nuclear war is the need to understand clearly the policy of States and their goals and intentions in the world arena, including their military policy and military doctrines. All these questions are not raised in order to satisfy idle curiosity. The replies to them determine ultimately the choice of the means whereby the danger of nuclear war can be reduced and then completely eliminated. The need for a comprehensive approach to the problem of the prevention of nuclear war is indicated also by the formulation of the appropriate item of the Committee's agenda, which envisages the consideration of all questions connected with it.

In its statement today the Soviet delegation would like to touch upon the important issue of the military doctrines of the militarily most important States and military alliances. As you know, Mr. Chairman, this question has been frequently raised by some delegations during the discussions at the current and previous sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, and there have arisen around it too many not mere misunderstandings but various types of allegations which are designed, not to find the points of contact and mutual understanding but to produce a cheap propagandistic effect. The military doctrine of the State which I have the honour to represent was particularly distorted in some statements. I shall therefore try to explain Soviet military doctrine, an understanding of which, in fact, is important both from the point of view of the implementation of measures aimed at preventing nuclear war and from the point of view of an objective assessment of the world military and political situation in general.

First of all I would like to stress that military doctrine in general should be understood to mean the system of views officially adopted in a State for a certain period of time on the goals and character of a possible war and its consequences. Naturally, this applies also to Soviet military doctrine, which is formed on the basis of the following

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[1] CD/PV.225, pp. 22-28.

ental evaluations of the present-day world situation, taking
ount the level of development of military technology.

Soviet Union believes that nuclear war would mean global
phe and, most probably, the end of civilization. It would be
of destroying the whole of mankind. There will be no winner
a war. We are profoundly convinced that only those who have
to commit suicide could start a nuclear war in the hope of
g it. Whatever the capability of the aggressor, whatever the
of unleashing nuclear war he may choose, he will never achieve
als. Retribution will inevitably follow. This has been stated at
hest level in the USSR.

hermore, the Soviet Union considers that not a single political
m can be solved by the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore
military and political thought focuses, not on the idea of victo-
a nuclear war, but on the need to prevent such a war by all
le means.

inadmissibility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy is
ed, not merely in respect of general nuclear war but also in
t of the idea of so-called "limited nuclear war" in Europe or in
other region of the world. Only completely irresponsible people
pable of claiming that nuclear war can be conducted according to
rules elaborated in advance, according to which nuclear missiles
d explode in a "gentlemanly" manner only over certain facilities,
ut destroying the population. Consequently it is impossible to
"limited nuclear war" within certain bounds. There are no guar-
s that such a war would not escalate into a global nuclear catas-
e. Therefore, it is vain to set hopes on a "limited nuclear war" in
pe, counting on remaining in security on the other side of the
h.

ere is another important conclusion. At the present time security
be real and durable only if it is based on the existing approximate
ary equality of the opposing forces and a subsequent reduction of
levels. It is the existing military strategic parity that has served
should serve as a reliable guarantee of international stability. Our
try is doing and will do its utmost in order to preserve such a
nce.

uri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
mmunist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium
he Supreme Soviet of the USSR, stressed at the plenary meeting of
Central Committee held in June 1983: "Peaceful coexistence is
ctively promoted by the military and strategic balance between
alism and imperialism. The achievement of this balance is one of
most important results of recent decades. It required from our
ple and the peoples of other countries of the socialist community
at efforts and means, and we shall not allow it to be upset".[2]

FBIS *Daily Report*, vol. III, June 16, 1983, p. R12; *Pravda*, June 16, 1983, First Edition,
1-2.

At the same time, the Soviet Union does not seek military superiority over the West. We do not need it. We need only reliable security. The size of Soviet military forces and their armaments is determined on the basis of a strict assessment of the real international situation, the military and political goals of other States and their military potential, and it does not go beyond the defence needs of the Soviet Union.

The same applies to the defensive alliance of the socialist countries, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, of which the Soviet Union is a member. This alliance is intended solely for two political tasks—the prevention of war and the provision of defence against foreign aggression. Both of them require not only the elaboration of an effective concept of defence, but also the availability of the defence forces corresponding, at least approximately, to the forces of the potential aggressor. These forces should help the latter to realize the irremediable consequences aggression would have for it, should it try to launch such an aggression.

Soviet military policy is based on the principle that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons first. It is in general against the use of any weapons, both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. The unilateral commitment of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is not mere rhetoric. It is the most important and irrevocable constituent part of Soviet military doctrine. This commitment is reflected and taken into account in the structure of the USSR's armed forces, in the education of personnel, in the training of troops and headquarters staffs and in the provision of strict control precluding any unsanctioned use of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

Soviet military doctrine has a strictly defensive character. This has been stated at the highest level. The declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty of 15 May 1980 clearly says: "We do not, did not and will not have any strategic doctrine other than a defensive one".[3] Yuri Andropov stressed that the military potential of the Soviet armed forces is "a powerful factor of deterrence against the aggressive aspirations of imperialistic reaction". That is exactly what they are designed for.

The conclusion as to the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine is confirmed by the military technology policy of the Soviet Union. The USSR has never initiated the creation of the most destructive military combat systems. In fact, the atomic bomb, the atomic submarine with nuclear missiles aboard, ICBMs with MIRVs and the cruise missile—all of these were developed and put into service first not by the Soviet Union but by the United States, and in each case we were compelled in the interests of our security and that of our friends and allies to follow the "initiative" of the United States. But each time, before adopting appropriate measures in the interests of its

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, p. 223; variant translation.

y, the USSR proposed the renunciation of the creation of new
of armaments on a mutual basis. The basic position of the USSR
t the appearance of new types of nuclear weapons is clear also
our consistent policy with respect to the complete and general
oition of nuclear-weapon tests. This measure could substantially
the possibilities for the appearance of new types of nuclear
ons. Our proposal for the prohibition of the development and
ction of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction
ine with this policy.

viet military doctrine does not recognize the possibility of any
or preventive strike, nor of course, any "lightning intrusion" into
ern Europe. In this we proceed from political, moral and military
derations. Soviet military doctrine contains no aggressive con-
, since the Soviet Union has no political, economic, social or any
of military goals in Europe or elsewhere which it would intend to
by military means. There is also a clear understanding in Soviet
ary policy that it is not possible by "intimidation" or "pressure"
npose on a country with a different social system an alien political
or make it change its social structure. Such methods only increase
ion and the danger of conflicts. That is why the Soviet Union
ses, not on the creation of an atmosphere of military threat and
sure but on the exclusion of war in general as a means of solving
rnational problems.

hat is a very brief summary of Soviet military doctrine which, as
have had occasion to see even during the current session, is so
en the subject of distortions of various kinds in the West. Numer-
methods are used in order to prove the allegedly aggressive and
ensive character of the principles of Soviet military doctrine. To
end the statements of the Soviet participants in different public
herings are reproduced in a distorted manner and, what is more, in
lation of the rules about the off-the-record character of such meet-
s. Publications are also frequently quoted which are devoted, not to
ctrine or military policy but to specific military subjects such as, for
ample, combat tactics, and such quotations are presented as Soviet
litary doctrine. Such methods testify only to the lack of real argu-
ents. They do not give a picture of Soviet defensive doctrine, which
es not exclude the training of soldiers for different combat actions.
Precisely this method was used recently in respect of such an im-
rtant military notion as "surprise", when the distinction was delib-
ately blurred between surprise on the battle-field, in the course of
ghting to repel aggression, and surprise in unleashing a war, in
onducting a surprise military attack on another State.

In fact, surprise of both types played an important role during the
econd World War. For example, in this connection I can recall the
eacherous surprise attack of Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union
n 22 June 1941 or the surprise attack of Japan on the United States
n 7 December 1941.

Perhaps I may remind you of the way in which the aggression against the Soviet Union was carried out. For a number of days the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin in June 1941 had been attempting to secure an appointment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of what was then Germany in order to deliver a note explaining the difficulties which had arisen in the relations between the two countries. On 22 June at 3 o'clock in the morning, Berlin time, Ribbentrop summoned him to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to inform him that the Wehrmacht had attacked the Soviet Union and that war between the two countries had become a fact. A similar act of treachery was committed by Japan in the attack on Pearl Harbour, but obviously it is not for me to describe the details of that act of perfidy.

Those were surprise attacks of one kind, but there were other surprise attacks, legitimate and justified. For example, in the course of the world war unleashed by the fascists, there was the surprise for the fascist forces of the starting of the operation to destroy the Sixth Army of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad, or the landing operation of the Allied forces in Normandy on 6 June 1944, or again the surprise for the Hitlerites of the assault on Berlin.

In present conditions, when States are armed with weapons of tremendous destructive power, speed and accuracy, surprise as one of the most important principles of military art becomes even more significant. This is shown by the fact that the importance of surprise in present-day conditions is emphasized in the official manuals of many armies, including those of western States. The regulations, instructions and manuals of the armies of the NATO countries recommend, in order to achieve surprise, the strict observance of military secrecy, the conduct of covert preparations for combat actions, misinformation, the surprise employment of new weapons and the diversification of combat methods. The United States Army regulations of 1954 devoted to these recommendations a special chapter on "Measures to mislead the enemy", and a number of other manuals emphasize that the planning and implementation of such measures should be carried out in any type of combat activity of troops.

At the same time, of course, the danger of surprise attack and aggression has considerably increased now. The attitude of the USSR to this problem is shown by our initiatives in the international arena. Allow me to recall that in 1980 at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union raised the question of the prevention of surprise and authorized attacks. The Soviet memorandum "For peace and disarmament, for guarantees of international security" pointed out: "The Soviet Union has repeatedly and persistently raised the question of the need to elaborate measures for the *prevention of the possibility of surprise attack*. In present conditions, characterized by the arms race not only in the quantitative but also in the qualitative sense, this question becomes even more significant and requires urgent solution". The same document stresses that "The Soviet Union is prepared for serious discussion of these problems on a multilateral and on a bilateral basis, and is ready to co-operate in any measures designed to prevent nuclear war" (document A/35/482, p. 10).[4]

Allow me now to express our views on the military doctrine of the United States and its NATO allies which some have attempted to present here as a doctrine of "deterrence and co-operation".

First, some quotations:

> American nuclear forces must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek the earliest possible termination of hostilities on terms favourable to the United States.
>
> The United States' nuclear capabilities must prevail, even under the conditions of a prolonged nuclear war.
>
> Nuclear war strategy is based on what is known as decapitation, meaning strikes at Soviet political and military leadership and communications lines.

Those statements apply, so to speak, to "deterrence". And here are some remarks on the subject of "co-operation".

> In peace-time competition with the Soviet Union, the West's trade policies should put as much pressure as possible on the Soviet economy, already burdened by military expenditures.
>
> The United States should develop weapons that are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs on them, open up new areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment.

I believe that these quotations from the Pentagon's document "Fiscal Years 1984–1988 Defense Guidance", taken from *The New York Times* of 30 May and 4 June 1982, speak for themselves.

But before that, in June 1981, the United States Government officially declared that United States military doctrine for the 1980s would be based on the strategy of "direct confrontation" with the USSR. According to a statement by the United States Defense Department, this strategy is designed to achieve "complete and unquestionable military superiority of the United States", "to restore the leading role of America in the world" and "to provide intensive counteraction to the USSR in all regions of the world". The concrete provisions of United States military doctrine were virtually formulated in the "Defense Guidance", which I have just quoted. In addition to the claim about the possibility of winning a nuclear war against the USSR, this document also orients the United States towards achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. To this end a policy is being pursued aimed at the deployment of new systems of strategic weapons of all types and the deployment of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, and plans are being developed for the use of nuclear weapons first in theatres of military operations. At the same time, new systems of highly accurate guided conventional weapons are being rapidly

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, p. 428.

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developed, together with the development of the Army, Air Force and Navy.

The United States administration has recently concentrated its efforts on being able completely to neutralize a retaliatory strike against it by the USSR in the event of its waging war against the Soviet Union. To this end, it is planned to create a comprehensive (total) system of anti-missile defence on earth and in outer space which would guarantee the destruction of the enemy missiles. At the same time, United States strategic offensive arms are to be increased with the very specific goal of acquiring a first nuclear strike potential.

Such are the views of the Pentagon on preparations for a nuclear war, methods of waging it and the structure and use of armed forces. In other words, that is the military doctrine of the present United States administration.

The obstructionist policy of the United States at the bilateral talks with the USSR on the problems of nuclear arms limitation in Europe and strategic arms limitation and reduction corresponds to this doctrine.

The unconstructive and one-sided policy of the United States cannot be concealed by that country's proposals on confidence-building measures broadly advertised by United States representatives, including here in the Committee on Disarmament. Incidentally, in this connection I should like to put a question to the delegation of the United States. Is it likely that statements such as the one about the Soviet Union being the "focus of evil" will inspire feelings of confidence among the Soviet people in the authors of such statements? The fact is that the United States proposals, unlike the much more far-reaching proposals of the USSR, in no way limit the military activity of the sides and amount virtually only to an exchange of information between them on certain types of such activities.

In addition to that, the United States side keeps silent about the fact that it rejects the Soviet proposals which envisage the prevention of crisis situations and the strengthening of confidence. In short, the Soviet Union wishes not to permit danger and crisis situations, while the United States side proposes simply to exchange information on this issue.

It is becoming clearer and clearer that the present United States administration is aiming not at achieving agreements but at implementing its programmes for the building up of strategic and other weapons and deploying new medium-range missiles in western Europe. This aim is clearly apparent in a number of official documents of Washington, about which it prefers to keep silent in its propaganda. The high-flown phrases about wanting to conduct talks with the Soviet Union "to reduce armaments" and "lessen the danger of war" and about the peaceful intentions of the United States and the defensive character of its military doctrine mean nothing.

They are also in conflict with the more frank and, I would say, undiplomatic statements of Washington. For example, presidential directive No. 59 signed in 1980 openly sets as the goals of United States military policy the elimination of socialism as a social and political system, the use of nuclear weapons first, the achievement of superiority over the USSR in a nuclear war and its termination on terms favourable to the United States. Of the same open character are the statements of American leaders about United States intentions to write off communism from the history of mankind. How they, on the other side of the ocean, are planning to do this, in my opinion, is clear from all that I have said about the American military doctrine and the excerpts I have given from official United States documents.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Kampelman) to the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Conference on Confidence-Building Measures [Extract], July 15, 1983 [1]

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The negotiations that led to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 [2] had their conceptual origins in an original plan calling for establishment of a European security conference. The agreement that finally came out of Geneva and Helsinki was one that included a very significant humanitarian dimension, which the United States and its Western friends consider to be one of their major accomplishments. Nevertheless, the security questions that are a part of the Helsinki process remain of great importance to all of the participating states.

The NATO group of states in February 1981 presented a French proposal calling for the establishment of a conference to take place after the Madrid meeting to deal with military confidence-building measures. The problem of surprise military attack is one uppermost in the minds of Europeans. The United States joined the Western resolve that a conference on surprise military attack had to be carefully structured in Madrid so that it did not become a vaguely worded mandate for a "disarmament" meeting in which propaganda speeches rather than constructive decisions would be the major element.

Fortunately, the neutral and nonaligned states agreed with this Western objective. The East abandoned its proposal, originally submitted by Warsaw, and after long and intensive debate a mandate for the conference fully acceptable to us was adopted. It meets our four essential criteria:

•The conference will be an integral part of the CSCE process;

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 500, pp. 5–6.

[2] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

- The conference will not interfere with ongoing arms negotiations, such as MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions];
- The first stage of the conference will deal exclusively with confidence-building measures. This is stated in paragraphs two and six of the mandate for the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe which provide that ". . . the first stage will be devoted to . . . confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe" and that ". . . a future follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for . . . supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference. . ."; and
- Confidence- and security-building measures agreed at the conference are to be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe.

The extension of the area to the Urals is quite significant, because the limited confidence-building measures adopted in 1975 exempted the Soviet Union from their coverage, except for the first 250 kilometers within its borders. The Soviet Union, after first rejecting an extension to cover all of its European area, then urged that the geographic area be extended into the Atlantic Ocean as compensation for its extension to the Ural Mountains. The Soviet objective, of course, was to negate the international principle recognizing free use of the high seas and thus possibly to interfere with movement of U.S. forces in contingencies involving areas of the world outside Europe.

We presented a provision, which was in the original 1975 agreement, making certain that only "adjoining sea area and air space" would be included and only when activities in that area are a part of military activities taking place within Europe itself. This was eventually accepted by the East. We were pleased that this formulation was finally approved, because it clearly excluded independent air and naval activities from coverage. The mandate will now permit concentration at the meeting, which will be held in Stockholm, on the crucial confidence-building measures required to deal with the problem of surprise military attack on the European Continent.

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Address by President Reagan: Nuclear Arms Control, July 16, 1983 [1]

Today I want to talk to you about peace. Back in June of 1963, President John F. Kennedy delivered an arms control speech that is still remembered for its eloquence and vision. He told the graduating seniors at American University: "I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary, rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war and, frequently, the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task." [2]

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 25, 1983, pp. 1008–1009. The President was speaking to the nation by radio.

Twenty years have passed since those words were spoken, and they've been a troubled era, overshadowed by the dangers of nuclear weapons. We've seen the world's inventory of nuclear weapons steadily expand. Despite many sincere attempts to control the growth of nuclear arsenals, those arsenals have continued to grow. That's the bad news.

The good news is that now, at last, there is hope that we can finally begin to reverse this trend. Americans have joined together—Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives—to face the greatest challenge of our time: the urgent task of pursuing a lasting peace in the nuclear era. Our political process has forged a consensus, a bipartisan consensus that has united us in our common search for ways to protect our country, reduce the risk of war and, ultimately, dramatically reduce the level of nuclear weapons—the foundation we need for successful negotiations.

Remember, our MX Peacekeeper missile program calls for the deployment of 100 missiles. The level ultimately deployed, however, will clearly be influenced by the outcome in Geneva. If an agreement is reached which calls for deep reductions—which is, of course, our goal—the number of missiles could certainly be adjusted downward.

As the Scowcroft commission rightly pointed out, [3] the MX Peacekeeper missile is an essential part of a comprehensive modernization and arms control program to ensure deterrence today and in the future. We're building the MX Peacekeeper to strengthen deterrence. But it also provides vital negotiating incentives and leverage in Geneva.

Andrei Sakharov, the distinguished Soviet physicist and Nobel Prize laureate, recently published an eloquent article which forcefully makes the same point. He notes that, given the Soviet advantage in land-based, strategic missiles, talks about limitation and reduction of these systems could become easier if the United States were to have MX missiles, albeit only potentially. [4] Andrei Sakharov is a hard man for anyone to ignore.

When the Congress reaffirms its support for this program and authorizes the funds to modernize our strategic deterrent, our agenda for peace will be strengthened even further. In NATO, as in our other alliances, there's a renewed feeling of solidarity. Last May at Williamsburg, the leaders of the major industrialized nations demonstrated their commitment to vigorously pursue the twin objectives of arms reductions and deterrence in the Williamsburg communique.[5] This solidarity is a source of much strength.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, p. 215.

[3] *Ante*, Apr. 6.

[4] *The Boston Globe*, June 24, 1983.

For the graduates of June 1983, this is a time of opportunity and hope—a hope that they and their children will enjoy a safer, more secure world. That's why we must sustain our consensus. And that's why I've spent hundreds of hours meeting with members of this administration, with the bipartisan commission on strategic forces, with our arms negotiators, with Members of the Congress, and with concerned citizens.

My message to them and to you is that I have no higher priority than reducing and ultimately removing the threat of nuclear war and seeking the stability necessary for true peace. To achieve that objective, we must reduce the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. We must achieve greater stability; that is, we must be sure that we obtain genuine arms reductions, not merely agreements that permit a growth in nuclear arsenals or agreements that proclaim good intentions without the teeth necessary to verify and enforce compliance.

Our current goal must be the reduction of nuclear arsenals. And I for one believe we must never depart from the ultimate goal of banning them from the face of the Earth. That's why we presented ambitious but realistic proposals, and that's why I have been and continue to be willing to consider any serious Soviet counteroffer. And that's why I've made our original proposal more flexible and why I continue to seek new ideas for achieving an arms reduction breakthrough.

Indeed, the draft treaty our negotiators recently introduced in Geneva documents our flexibility. As opportunities permit, the U.S. position will continue to evolve. The United States will negotiate patiently but urgently and always in good faith.

But we cannot and we must not settle for less than genuine, mutual, and verifiable arms reductions. America's postwar generation has preserved world peace in its lifetime, but it's been an uneasy peace. Today's young Americans—indeed, all members of the human family—desire more and deserve more. And you deserve to know that your government is doing everything possible to meet your expectations.

Time and again our nation has proved that there are no limits to what we Americans can achieve when we work together. Well, today we are working together to do what is right. And as a result, we can look forward to a more secure tomorrow.

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[5] *Ante*, May 29.

Cancún Declaration on Peace in Central America, July 17, 1983 [1]

In view of the worsening of the conflicts in Central America, the Heads of State of Colombia, Belisario Betancur; of Mexico, Miguel de la Madrid; of Panama, Ricardo de la Espriella; and of Venezuela, Luis Herrera Campíns, decided to meet at Cancún, Mexico, today, 17 July 1983.

We considered the critical situation in Central America and agreed that we were all deeply concerned at the speed with which it was deteriorating, as evidenced by an escalation of violence, the progressive mounting of tensions, frontier incidents and the threat of a flare-up of hostilities that might spread. All this, combined with the arms race and outside interference, creates a tragic setting affecting the political stability of the region and ruling out any progress and consolidation of institutions responsive to the democratic yearning for freedom, social justice and economic development. The conflicts in Central America present the international community with the dilemma of either resolutely supporting and strengthening the path of political understanding by offering constructive solutions or passively accepting the accentuation of factors which could lead to extremely dangerous armed confrontations.

The use of force is an approach that does not dissolve but aggravates, the underlying tensions. Peace in Central America can become a reality only in so far as respect is shown for the basic principles of coexistence among nations: non-intervention; self-determination; sovereign equality of States; co-operation for economic and social development; peaceful settlement of disputes; and free and authentic expression of the popular will. The creation of conditions conducive to peace in the region depends mainly on the attitude and the genuine readiness for dialogue of the countries of Central America, which must shoulder the primary responsibility and make the major effort in the search for agreements ensuring coexistence.

Accordingly, it is essential that the political will to seek understanding, which has been displayed since the very beginning of the Contadora Group's activities should continue to be clearly expressed in continued efforts for peace, so that it may be translated into concrete actions and commitments.

It is also necessary that other States with interests in and ties to the region should use their political influence in helping to strengthen the channels of understanding and should unreservedly commit themselves to the diplomatic approach to peace. The efforts of the Contadora Group have so far led to the initiation of a dialogue involving all the Governments of Central America, the establishment of machinery for consultation and the drawing up, by unanimous agreement, of an agenda covering the salient aspects of the problems of the region.

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[1] A/38/303, S/15877, pp. 3–6.

These achievements, although still inadequate, have been encouraged by the support of many countries, of a number of organizations and of the most varied opinion groups at the international level. All are agreed that the activities of the Contadora Group have helped to mitigate the dangers and reduce the risks of a widespread confrontation and have made it possible to identify problems and causes of what is now a landscape of conflict and fear.

This generous support by the international community impels us to persist in our endeavours and to make every effort in a cause, the noble purposes of which outweigh any possible lack of understanding.

Inspired by our countries' broad spirit of solidarity with the fraternal peoples of Central America, we consider it necessary to expedite the process that may transform the will for peace into proposals which, if properly developed, can effectively contribute to the settlement of conflicts.

To that end, we have agreed on the general lines of a programme to be proposed to the countries of Central America which requires, in addition to strict compliance with the essential principles governing international relations, the conclusion of agreements and political commitments that will lead, region-wide, to effective control of the arms race; the elimination of foreign advisers; the creation of demilitarized zones; the prohibition of the use of the territory of some States for the development of political or military destabilization actions in other States; the eradication of transit of and traffic in arms; and the prohibition of other forms of aggression or interference in the internal affairs of any country in the area.

In order to implement this general programme, it will be necessary to conclude agreements embodying political commitments designed to ensure peace in the region. These agreements could include:

Commitment to put an end to all prevailing situations of belligerency;

Commitment to freeze offensive weapons at their current level;

Commitment to begin negotiations on agreements for the control and reduction of current stocks of weapons, with the establishment of appropriate supervisory machinery;

Commitment to prohibit the existence in national territory of military installations belonging to other countries;

Commitment to give prior notice of troop movements near frontiers, when the contingents exceed the limits set in the agreement;

Commitment to organize, as appropriate, joint boundary frontier or international supervision of frontiers by groups of observers chosen by common agreement by the parties concerned;

Commitment to establish mixed security commissions, with a view to preventing and, where appropriate, resolving frontier incidents;

Commitment to establish internal control machinery to prevent the transit of weapons from the territory of any country in the region to the territory of another;

Commitment to promote a climate of détente and confidence in the area by avoiding statements and other actions that jeopardize the essential climate of political confidence required;

Commitment to co-ordinate systems of direct communication between Governments with a view to preventing armed conflicts and generating an atmosphere of mutual political confidence.

Similarly, we consider that, simultaneously with the implementation of this general programme, the task of resolving specific differences between countries should be tackled initially by the signing of memoranda of understanding and the establishment of mixed commissions that will enable the parties to undertake joint action and guarantee the effective control of their territories, especially in frontier areas.

These measures, aimed at eliminating the factors which disturb the peace of the region, should be accompanied by a major internal effort to strengthen democratic institutions and guarantee respect for human rights.

To this end, it is necessary to improve methods of consulting the people, ensure that the various currents of opinion have free access to the electoral process and promote the full participation of citizens in the political life of their country.

The strengthening of democratic political institutions is closely linked to evolution and progress in the field of economic development and social justice. In fact, these are two aspects of a single process whose ultimate goal is the implementation of the fundamental values of mankind.

The economic backwardness which lies at the root of instability in the region and is the immediate cause of many of its conflicts should be approached from this standpoint.

Some of the steps most urgently needed to offset the effects of the world economic crisis are the strengthening of integration machinery, an increase in intra-zonal trade and the exploitation of opportunities for industrial complementarity. However, such efforts by the countries concerned must be supplemented by the support of the international community, especially the industrialized countries, through development credits, co-operation programmes and access of Central American products to their markets. The Governments of the countries of the Contadora Group reiterate their decision to continue the programmes of co-operation that benefit the subregion and offer their assistance in channelling international support towards these goals of economic reactivation. On the basis of these general outlines we have requested our Ministers for Foreign Affairs to prepare specific proposals that will be submitted to the Central American countries for their consideration at the next joint meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

We appeal to all members of the international community, especially those which have expressed sympathy with the efforts of the

Contadora Group, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairman of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, to contribute, with their experience and diplomatic capability, to the search for peaceful solutions to the problems of Central America. For all these reasons we have contacted the leaders of the countries of the Americas with a view to obtaining their solidarity, which is necessary.

We, the Heads of State of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, reaffirm the aims that unite our Governments in the task of seeking to contribute to the establishment of the just and lasting peace desired by the peoples of Central America.

Done at Cancún, Mexico, on 17 July 1983.

Signed

BELISARIO BETANCUR,
President of the Republic
of Colombia

MIGUEL DE LA MADRID H.,
President of the United
Mexican States

RICARDO DE LA ESPRIELLA,
President of the Republic
of Panama

LUIS HERRERA CAMPÍNS,
President of the Republic
of Venezuela

Address by the U.S. Representative (Kampelman) to the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Peace Movement in Eastern Europe [Extract], July 18, 1983 [1]

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The picture is no more encouraging when we turn to the very marrow of our objectives, the search for peace. A Soviet pacifist, Alexander Shatravka, was recently sentenced to 3 years in prison for circulating a petition calling for the universal abolition of nuclear weapons. The document had urged both the United States and the Soviet Union to scrap their nuclear arsenals. Mr. Shatravka had earlier been associated with a group of young people, who, a year ago, had been arrested for unfurling a banner in Red Square bearing only the Russian words for "bread, life, disarmament."

The arrest of these young Soviet citizens seeking peace stands in sharp contrast to the enthusiastic editorial which appeared in *Pravda* last January hailing antiwar movements in Western Europe as "vital causes of the people." Is it any wonder that we are reminded of a perceptive statement by Clausewitz: "The aggressor," he said, "is always peace loving. He would like to make his entry into our country undisturbed."

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 500, p. 7.

We know that the people of the Soviet Union, like all of our peoples, are peace loving. But we also know from the *Pravda* editorial of last week that Soviet authorities, who are not elected by their people, fear independent ideas and want their people "immunized" against them. General Aleksei Yepishev, the political head of the Soviet Army, recently complained that Soviet youth was being infected by pacifism. To stop independent ideas is a lost cause. Ideas, like the wind currents and the climate, reach all lands and cannot be stopped by artificial barriers.

It is the view of our delegation that in arresting and harassing those of its citizens who work for peace and universal nuclear disarmament, Soviet authorities not only maintain an indefensible double standard, they clearly demonstrate that the mantle of peace, in which they would like to cloak themselves, simply does not fit their shape, their ideology, or their practices, and it is not simply one country to which we wish to address these comments.

Similarly, a few weeks ago, more than 300 Czechoslovak young people were clubbed by the police, with many arrested, for holding a peace demonstration in Prague and chanting "we want peace and freedom." And in that country, Ladislav Lis, a spokesman for the Charter 77 human rights and peace organization, a Helsinki monitoring group, is expected to go on trial this week for his activities. Religious believers are also facing renewed repression for their expressions of faith.

In East Germany—where there is a growing unofficial peace movement that opposes all nuclear arms, including those of the Soviet Union and the United States—young people, many of them associated with churches, also find themselves harassed. At least 22 members of this group have recently been expelled. Patches worn on clothing depicting "swords into plowshares," distributed by East German church leaders, have been outlawed as "the expression of a mentality hostile to the state and proof of membership in an illegal political association." Students wearing the patch were threatened with expulsion from their schools and workers from their jobs.

The irony is not lost on us as we remind ourselves that the statue of peace given by Moscow to the United Nations has the same motif of "swords into plowshares."

A double irony is that the harassment of those who try to demonstrate for peace stands in stark contradiction to a UN General Assembly resolution of last December, cosponsored by the United States, calling on all states "to encourage their citizens freely and publicly to express their own views on disarmament changes and to organize and to meet publicly for that purpose." [2]

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[2] G.A. res. 37/100 J.

Once again, we have words; and we have deeds contrary to those words. We have the continuation of a pattern which has plagued the Helsinki process since 1975 and which continues to plague this meeting to this day.[3]

Letter From President Reagan to the Members of the House of Representatives: Production of the MX Missile, July 19, 1983[1]

This week the House will consider Title III of the Fiscal Year 1984 Defense Authorization Bill which implements the bipartisan recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission. Endorsing these recommendations will give this Nation a very solid chance to secure a balanced, verifiable arms reduction that, through greater stability, can make our Nation, our world, our people safer. In terms of speaking with one bipartisan voice, of standing up for U.S. vital interests, and of strengthening America's agenda for peace, this vote is of special significance.

When I endorsed the entire Scowcroft Commission Report,[2] I did so by recounting a quote from the report's conclusion: "If we can begin to see ourselves in dealing with the issues, not as political partisans or as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set of problems, but rather as citizens of a great Nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in the long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, a common perspective may finally be found."

These words, which guided the Commission, were instrumental in forging that bipartisanship which aims for deep reductions in both the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, coupled with necessary modernization of our strategic forces in a way which will enhance stability.

Andrei Sakharov, the distinguished Soviet physicist and Nobel laureate, made a supporting argument to those aims when he stated in a recent letter that "arms control talks with the Soviets would be much easier if the United States were to have the MX albeit only potentially."[3]

The MX Peacekeeper is being built, as an integral part of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission's package, to strengthen deterrence. It also provides vital negotiating leverage in Geneva. That lever is working.

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[3] For the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff. The arms control portion of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 25, 1983, p. 1025.

[2] The report is printed *ante*, Apr. 6.

[3] *The Boston Globe*, June 24, 1983.

Although the Commission called for the deployment of 100 missiles, the level ultimately deployed will be influenced by the outcome in Geneva. If an agreement is reached which calls for deep reductions—which is our goal—the number of missiles could certainly be adjusted downward.

We need the MX, not only for force modernization, but to keep the Soviets moving at the negotiation tables. That is why congressional endorsement of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations, as embodied in Title III of the Defense Authorization Bill, is so important.

The American people believe that this should not be a partisan issue. I hope that I can count on your help to implement all elements of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations. Together we can ensure a continuing national consensus that can lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Communique of the ANZUS Council [Extracts], July 19, 1983 [1]

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Following the review of the ANZUS Alliance, the Council members discussed a broad range of global issues and concerns which included the importance of the Western Alliance, United States-Soviet relations, and East-West issues generally. The Council members agreed that there are continuing threats to international peace, both globally and in a number of regions. These include the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and the continuing growth in Soviet military power. The Council members declared their commitment to negotiated solutions to major East-West problems and to other problems threatening international security.

The Council members reaffirmed their commitment to the negotiation of effective, equitable, and verifiable arms control measures, including reductions of nuclear armaments. They agreed that President Reagan's proposals in the START and INF negotiations offer a realistic opportunity for the two sides to achieve meaningful nuclear arms reductions, and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would approach these negotiations with an equal commitment to world peace.

The Council members reaffirmed their strong commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreed to intensify their efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime through multilateral and bilateral measures. They recognized that the international non-proliferation regime is strengthened when the nuclear weapons states are able to demonstrate progress in fulfilling their solemn treaty promise to pursue negotiations on effective and verifiable measures to reduce nuclear armaments and to end the nuclear arms race. In this context they reaffirmed their governments' policies of working towards the goal of a comprehensive and fully verifiable nuclear test ban treaty, and they took note of the continued examination of verification and compliance issues related to a nuclear test ban in the Committee on Disarmament. They also undertook to work in a constructive and cooperative manner to ensure the success of the third review conference of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1985. [2]

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[1] ACDA files. The Council met in Washington July 18 and 19.

The Council members noted that the international non-proliferation regime could be enhanced by measures designed to encourage the acceptance of comprehensive and full scope safeguards combined with binding undertakings by non-nuclear weapons states not to acquire a nuclear explosive capability. In addition they reaffirmed their commitment to seek improved national and international controls over the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology.

The Council members condemned any actions in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol [3] and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [4] and reaffirmed their support for the efforts being made in the Committee on Disarmament to conclude a comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

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The Council members noted the very deep concern over nuclear issues in the South Pacific and Australia's proposal to discuss the concept of a South Pacific nuclear free zone at the meeting of the South Pacific Forum in Canberra in August. In this connection they stressed the importance of upholding the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight as provided in international law. They also noted the importance to the Alliance and the region of security considerations, including access by allied aircraft and ships to airfields and ports in accordance with the sovereign right of states to receive such visits.

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The Council members discussed the Indian Ocean area and agreed that vital Western economic and security interests are engaged there. They agreed that the proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace should stress fundamental norms of international behavior and should focus on basic causes of tension in the region. They further agreed that it should in no way restrict the right of individual and collective self-defense or existing navigation rights, including effective exercise of high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, and straits transit passage in international straits. The proposal should be developed by agreement between the regional states and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, and should have as an important objective to bring about a lasting improvement in the security of the regional states, so facilitating political, social and economic development in the area.

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[2] For text of the treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[3] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

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Noting the increasing international interest in Antarctica, the Council members reaffirmed their conviction that the Antarctic Treaty,[5] which gives effect to the principles and purposes of the United Nations and is open to all countries, continues to provide the best means of preserving peace and international cooperation in Antarctica, a region where all three nations have important and enduring interests. The Council members agreed to continue their close cooperation concerning Antarctica and the strengthening of the Antarctic Treaty system.

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Letter From President Reagan to the Presidents of Four Latin American Countries: Peace in Central America, July 21, 1983[1]

Thank you for the letter which you and the Presidents of Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela have sent to me concerning the meeting held in Cancun on July 17, to review the current situation in Central America.[2]

I would like to congratulate you on the efforts which the Contadora Four are making to promote dialogue among the countries of Central America. My government has consistently expressed strong support for the Contadora process. The Cancun Declaration by articulating the crucial issues which must be treated to reach an effective and enduring resolution of the Central American conflict, is an important contribution to advancing that process.

I continue to believe that a solution to the crisis in Central America must encompass four basic principles:

First, it is essential that democratic institutions be established and strengthened as a means to resolve political differences within the

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[5] *Ibid., 1945–1959,* vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.

[1] ACDA files. This is the version sent to the President of Panama. The Cancun Declaration of July 17, which the four presidents sent to President Reagan, is printed *ante.* The four countries are known as the Contadora Group.

[2] Not printed here.

Central American states. Only by ensuring free and open participation in the Democratic process can the peoples of Central America achieve reconciliation within their societies.

Second, there must be respect for the principle of non-intervention, including a ban on support for subversive elements that seek to destabilize other countries.

Third, the conflict in Central America must be removed from the context of an East-West confrontation, through such measures as the verifiable withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers and a certifiable freeze on the acquisition of offensive armaments.

And finally, the countries of Central America must work among themselves and with their neighbors to achieve and sustain a level of economic growth that will guarantee the basic needs of their people.

I am pleased that the Cancun Declaration recognizes the importance of these fundamental principles. These issues are inextricably interrelated, and must be addressed on a comprehensive, regional basis which treats simultaneously the concerns of all the states affected by the Central American conflict. An attempt to resolve these issues sequentially, or on a piecemeal basis, will not achieve the goal we all share of a lasting peace for all of Central America.

Equally important is the need to ensure that all undertakings assumed by the Central American states be fully reciprocal and subject to comprehensive, fully adequate verification. Clearly, no initiative can bring true peace to Central America if one state is permitted to take unjust advantage of its neighbors through failure to abide by peace conditions which bind the others. The Charter of the Organization of American States makes clear that it should be the purpose of the OAS to either prevent unjust acts committed by one state against another, or to provide for common action on the part of the members in the event of difficulties. I believe the OAS, as this hemisphere's regional forum, is the appropriate mechanism to ensure that those who make commitments, comply with them.

The problems of Central America are complex, and their solution demands untiring efforts. The activities which you and your colleagues in the Contadora Group have undertaken are proof of your sincere dedication to the goal of a genuine and lasting peace throughout the region. My own efforts in this regard have been to dispatch my special emissary to the region and establish a bipartisan commission to examine the problems of Central America and to propose solutions. You have my prayers and those of my countrymen as you continue your work.

News Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (de Vos) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, July 21, 1983 [1]

During this round Western participants have continued to focus on essential requirements that must be met in an agreement leading to genuine and effectively verifiable parity in military manpower. The Western July 1982 draft treaty meets these requirements in its comprehensive approach to an accord which would lead to parity at the agreed common collective ceilings for combined ground and air force manpower in Central Europe through substantial stated reductions. We expect that the East will give continuing and constructive consideration to the ideas contained in our proposal and the legitimate concerns they reflect.

A crucial issue in our talks is the question of how many troops will be removed from the area as a result of any agreement reached here. This basic problem must be resolved in our negotiations and not simply circumvented. An agreement in the vital field of security cannot be based on ambiguity over the extent of obligations incurred.

Neither should there be ambiguity on whether those obligations are being implemented. It is an objective requirement for any workable arms control agreement that both sides have full confidence in compliance. Mutually agreed effective and cooperative verification is fundamental if an agreement in the Vienna negotiations is to contribute to a more stable East-West relationship and, thus, to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

Western participants, during this round, have devoted considerable attention to explaining the characteristics of a sound verification system. Such a system must include a set of mutually reinforcing measures which provide information and allow corroboration of that information. In addition to a mutual obligation not to interfere with national technical means, it requires such cooperative measures as regular exchange of adequately detailed information and on-site inspection and observation. The verification system must be in effect from the outset of an agreement in order to monitor both reductions and residual limitations, a fully effective verification system must also be accompanied by adequate measures which build confidence in the intentions of the other side, in order to help ensure that the security of all participants, including those with special status, is preserved undiminished.

As regards individual verification measures, Western representatives have, for instance, pointed out that in order for an exchange of information measures to be a useful verification tool, there must be full agreement at the outset on categories of forces to be covered, on the level of detail to be exchanged on those forces, and on the frequency of the exchanges. We have also stressed that such exchange must not be delayed until reductions are completed.

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[1] ACDA files.

As regards on-site inspection, which is an essential measure for corroboration of information received by other means, including the aforementioned exchange, we have explained that this should provide for the clearly spelled out right of each side to conduct inspections during and after the reductions process; the obligation of each side normally to allow such inspections as a matter of course; and clear, agreed, and adequate procedures of inspections to proceed in a timely and effective way.

We believe that this round has seen some progress in our negotiation, especially in this vital area of verification. The June 23 draft agreement and our informal discussions have revealed some Eastern willingness to consider a realistic framework for monitoring compliance with an agreement. However, further substantial progress will be required if we are to arrive at an effective system for verifying the kind of agreement we seek.

As we prepare to return to our capitals for the summer recess, we urge Eastern participants in their preparations for the coming fall round to take fully into account the fundamental requirements for an effective treaty as we have outlined them. They may be sure that for our part we will continue to study the recent Eastern proposals with care, objectively, and in a constructive spirit, in order to judge how they can contribute to progress in these negotiations.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Mikhailov) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks at the Final Plenary Meeting of the XXXth Round [Summary], July 21, 1983 [1]

Ambassador V.P. Mikhailov, Head of the USSR Delegation, made a statement at the final plenary meeting of the 30th round of the Vienna talks.

In the beginning of his statement, he emphasized that of late the Warsaw Treaty member-states have repeatedly launched appeals to the NATO countries soberly to weigh the dangerous trends of the current international situation, draw sound conclusions favoring practical steps to eliminate the danger of war, stop the arms race, especially nuclear arms race, and proceed to disarmament. In order to achieve concrete agreements in this field, improve the international situation, it is necessary to conduct negotiations in a business-like and positive spirit. Guided by this approach, realism and responsibility, the Soviet Union together with the other Socialist countries tabled new proposals in Vienna on 17 February and 23 June 1983, with a view to breaking the deadlock at the talks and in practice to untie the problems of reducing the excessive concentration of troops and armaments in Central Europe.

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[1] ACDA files. The summary was given to the press in a briefing by Soviet delegation spokesman Andrey Stepanov.

Ambassador V.P. Mikhailov went on to stress the fundamental importance of these proposals. Firstly, they are based on a new approach proposed by the Socialist countries, which under the prevailing conditions offers a simple and most advisable way to achieve the agreed goal of establishing equal collective levels in the military manpower strength of NATO and Warsaw Treaty [States] in Central Europe at a lower level of 900,000 men, including 700,000 men in the ground forces on each side, regardless of whatever disputes over or differences of assessments of this manpower strength. Secondly, the said proposals contain a concrete scheme of practical action to break the deadlock at the talks and advance them to their final goal. He reminded that the proposed scheme includes the following elements:

—making already in the near future a practical move aimed at reducing initially the armed forces and armaments of the USSR and the USA in Central Europe on the basis of mutual example;

—a follow-on interim freeze—while the negotiations continue of the level of the armed forces and armaments of all the direct participants in the talks;

—crowning the negotiations with a comprehensive Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, whose fully drawn-up draft was tabled by the Socialist countries on June 23 this year and remains on the table of negotiation.

The leader of the Soviet delegation said that the set of proposals by the Socialist countries provides all the required prerequisites for speedily achieving mutually acceptable solutions and understandings at the Vienna talks. These proposals and the new approach they embody have a pragmatic and compromise character. Retaining everything useful that has been achieved so far at the talks, they simultaneously take into consideration the Western position and go to meet it half way. For example, the draft agreement dated June 23 this year reaffirms the mutual understanding between the sides on achieving a lower-level parity which is given a specific numerical expression. The Western considerations regarding the application of the rule of collectivity in the apportionment of the necessary reductions among the participants in the alliances have been taken into account.

Ambassador V.P. Mikhailov pointed out that the draft agreement provides for a developed complex of associated measures, including adequate verification measures commensurate with the real reduction in and limitation of the armed forces. In particular, it envisages measures for verifying the process of reductions both of non-indigenous and indigenous troops, as well as effective measures for monitoring the post-reduction levels of the manpower strength of the armed forces and for observation of the maintenance of these levels.

Attention was also called to the fact, that the Socialist countries' draft envisages a three-year uninterrupted reduction in the armed forces of the sides to equal collective levels, which distinguishes it with advantage from the Western concept of multi-staged reductions, removing thereby a host of disputed issues which have so far hindered the progress of the talks.

All this significantly facilitates the task of achieving mutually acceptable understandings at the Vienna talks. The Soviet delegation just like the delegations of the other Socialist countries stands for completing the negotiations on a most compressed time scale. There exists all the prerequisites for that. The particular character of the period being endured imparts additional significance to the Vienna talks and the attainment of progress here.

The NATO countries have yet to give an official reply on the substance of the set of the Socialist countries' proposals. However, we are alerted to the fact that they are trying to operate from their old, fossilized and non-constructive positions.

In conclusion of his statement, Ambassador V.P. Mikhailov called on the Western partners to cast a new look at the state of affairs in Vienna and return to the table of negotiation after the recess demonstrating an attitude that would promote rather than block the attainment of positive and practical results at the talks.

Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Sixteenth Session of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Cooperative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events [Extract], July 22, 1983[1]

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5. The *Ad Hoc* Group took note of the letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (CD Working Paper No. 99 of 20 June 1983), in which he informed the Committee of the decision by the WMO Executive Council, at its thirty-fifth session, to approve Recommendation 18 (CBS-VIII) of the WMO Commission for Basic Systems concerning the "Inclusion of seismic bulletins in the global exchange programme". Thus the formal approval now exists to regularly exchange Level I seismic data through the Global Telecommunication System (GTS) of the WMO, starting 1 December 1983.

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[1] CD/399.

6. Under the current mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Group, information on national investigations related to the work of the Group has been presented by experts from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America.

7. During its tenth session, the *Ad Hoc* Group agreed to establish five study groups in order to achieve an appropriate compilation, summarization and assessment of the experience acquired through national investigations and co-operative studies in areas relevant to its work. These open-ended study groups each deal with a specific issue, and are each headed by a convenor and a co-convenor, as follows:

(1) Seismological stations and station networks: Dr. Basham (Canada), Dr. Schneider (German Democratic Republic)

(2) Data to be regularly exchanged (Level I data): Dr. Harjes (Germany, Federal Republic of), Dr. Waniek (Czechoslovakia)

(3) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level I data through WMO/GTS: Dr. McGregor (Australia), Dr. Mori (Japan)

(4) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level II data: Dr. Huseby (Norway), Dr. Christoskov (Bulgaria)

(5) Procedures to be used at international data centres: Dr. Israelson (Sweden), Dr. Alewine (United States of America)

8. The *Ad Hoc* Group reviewed a draft of its Third Report compiled by the Scientific Secretary on the basis of draft chapters elaborated by the Convenors of the Study Groups. In the course of the session, significant progress was made toward achieving consensus on the text of the main body of this report. The *Ad Hoc* Group agreed that it should seek to achieve consensus also on all the detailed technical instructions contained in the appendices to be annexed to its Third Report. However, in view of the large volume and the complexity of this material, the Group was not able to complete its review during its sixteenth session.

9. The *Ad Hoc* Group discussed a proposal for a new experimental exercise concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data using the WMO/GTS under a regular use basis. This experiment would be the first one conducted by the Group under new formal arrangements provided by WMO for regular use of the WMO/GTS, and should result in the further elaboration of operational procedures for Level I seismic data exchange and of operational procedures at the envisaged international data centers. The experiment as envisaged will be held in 1984 and would last for about two months, including preparatory operations for about two weeks. The Group recommends that final instructions for such an experiment should be discussed and completed at its next session.

10. The *Ad Hoc* Group also discussed the schedule for its further work. The Group envisages submitting its Third Report following its next session. The *Ad Hoc* Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Committee on Disarmament, should be convened from 27 February to 9 March 1984, in Geneva.

Australian Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: International Management Panel for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, July 22, 1983 [1]

As part of the institutional arrangements for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty Australia has suggested the establishment of an International Management Panel. Such a panel would broadly carry out those tasks usually envisaged for the "group of experts" established under other treaties. However in view of the unique character of a CTBT, Australia believes it worthwhile to take a fresh look at the role and responsibilities of the group of experts. The term "International Management Panel" has been chosen both to reflect more accurately the tasks we envisage being undertaken and to distinguish our proposal from those envisaged in the Soviet draft basic provisions (CD/346) [2] and the Swedish draft treaty (CD/381). [3]

The role of an International Management Panel

Assisted by a secretariat, and composed of scientific experts (mainly seismologists and geophysicists but also geologists) the role of the panel would be to ensure the smooth functioning of the monitoring and verification arrangements established under a CTBT. While for practical purposes independent in scientific and technical matters it would be responsible to the Consultative Committee on which all States Parties to the treaty would be represented. It would in effect be the successor body to the Committee on Disarmament's *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and would build on the experience of that body. (It is envisaged, in order that the treaty provisions be fully operational at the time the treaty enters into force, that the GSE continue its work up to that point.)

Composition and establishment

It is suggested that the panel should be established immediately upon entry into force of the treaty. It could comprise 15 experts appointed by the Depository on the recommendation of the Consultative Committee. In selecting the members due regard should be given to ensuring an appropriate geographical balance. Members would be named for a five year period, with three members being replaced each year. The panel should elect its own Chairmen and establish its own rules of procedure. It should meet at least twice a year and when requested by the Consultative Committee. The panel should decide procedural questions related to the organization of its work by consensus where possible, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There should be no voting on matters of substance. Where consensus cannot be achieved on matters of substance, reports of the panel including an annual report to the Consultative Committee should reflect the views of all participating members. Any State Party may appear before the Panel, through a nominated ex-officio expert, to present submissions or seek information.

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[1] CD/400.
[2] *Ante*, Feb. 16.
[3] *Ante*, June 14.

Tasks

(a) *General*

—evaluate the technical operation of the international monitoring, detection and verification measures, including the techniques and procedures for on-site inspections,

—propose changes as required to the equipment and technical procedures used to verify compliance,

—undertake any technical studies that the Consultative Committee may request,

—act as a forum for any State Party to make suggestions as to the functioning of the international monitoring, detection and verification measures,

—act as a forum for technical discussions of events for which a State Party seeks clarification (these may or may not, according to the preference of the Party concerned, be channelled through the Consultative Committee, although the Committee should receive a report on the results.)

(b) *Seismic and atmospheric*

—ensure that the participating seismological stations and International Data Centres are operated as specified in the treaty,

—act as a contact with WMO on matters of data exchange through its Global Telecommunications System and supervise and review, in co-operation with WMO, the specified data exchange,

—supervise any exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity if provision for such an exchange is specified in the treaty,

—maintain contact with national authorities of States Parties responsible for seismic (and atmospheric) detection.

(c) *On-site inspection*

—Conduct international on-site inspections, according to agreed procedures, at the request of the Consultative Committee and report the result of such inspections to the Committee.

The panel should be assisted in this task by the secretariat and where necessary by additional experts drawn from lists compiled in co-operation with the Consultative Committee.

In the event that a request is received for an on-site inspection both the requesting State Party and the accepting State Party should each be entitled to appoint an expert, ex officio, to the panel for the duration of the panel's consideration and implementation of the on-site inspection request.

Statement by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: The *Chadha* Decision and the Legislative Veto, July 28, 1983[1]

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee this afternoon. The Supreme Court has now decided in *INS* v. *Chadha*, and two related cases, that the legislative veto is unconstitutional.

The Department of State and this committee both recognize that the Court's historic decision affects a considerable body of legislation in the field of foreign affairs and national security. My principal theme here today is that our two branches of Government have a common interest in devising cooperative ways to fulfill our shared responsibilities. We owe the American people a constructive response to the issues we now face.

The Department of State is in the process of reviewing all the legislation with which we deal and which is affected by *Chadha*—the language of the statutes, their legislative history, and the record of executive-legislative relations in working with these statutes. We have reached some tentative conclusions which I am happy to share with the committee. Our review is still continuing, however, and we will keep the committee informed as we proceed toward firmer judgments.

In The Federalist No. 47, James Madison referred to the separation of powers as "this essential precaution in favor of liberty." The genius of our constitutional system is that a structure of dispersed powers and checks and balances, designed to limit government power and preserve our freedom, also has been able to produce coherent and effective national policy.

This success is a tribute to the Founding Fathers who built the structure. It is also a tribute to the generations of leaders and statesmen since then who have put the Nation's well being first and foremost as they played their constitutional roles in the various branches of government.

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[1] *Legislative Veto: Arms Export Control Act: Hearing . . . on S. 1050, a Bill To Amend the Arms Export Control Act To Provide Increased Control by the Congress Over the Making of Arms Sales*, pp. 13–17.

As Justice White acknowledged in his dissent in *Chadha,* "the history of the separation of powers doctrine is also a history of accommodation and practicality." The administration is prepared to work with the Congress in this spirit.

There are more than a dozen statutes in the foreign affairs and national security areas that are affected by the *Chadha* decision. I would say that four statutes or groups of statutes are of particular importance.

These are arms export controls, the War Powers Resolution, nuclear nonproliferation controls, and trade controls related to emigration. Let me discuss these in turn.

First, arms export controls. I know this subject is of pressing concern to this committee. It is also of importance to the administration. It is important to the administration because of the importance of such transactions to the security of friendly countries and to our political relations with friendly countries.

Under the *Chadha* decision we believe that the procedures for legislative vetoes in several sections of the Arms Export Control Act are not valid but that the reporting and waiting periods remain. The Court decision in no way alters the elaborate structure of reporting, consultation, and collaboration that the executive branch and the Congress have worked out over recent years to insure effective congressional oversight.

Under the Arms Export Control Act, for example, we have regularly and formally notified the Congress of proposed sales under the foreign military sales [FMS] [2] program and of proposed licenses of arms exports sold through commercial channels. We also provide the Congress with additional advance notification of many of those transactions.

As a matter of practice and accommodation, we have agreed to provide the Congress with informal prenotifications of proposed sales under the FMS program before the final notice is submitted. This procedure, which is not in the statute, has given Congress the opportunity to review and comment upon proposed transactions informally and privately before the executive branch makes a formal public submission.

In addition, under the Javits amendment we submit an annual Arms Sales Proposal covering all FMS sales and commercial exports above certain thresholds which are considered eligible during the current calendar year, as well as an indication of which ones are most likely to result in a letter of offer or an export license.

We also provide under section 28 of the act quarterly reports of each price and availability estimate provided to a foreign country, together with a list of requests received from a foreign country for a letter of offer to sell defense articles and services.

Thus, the Congress has received and will continue to receive annual, quarterly, and case-by-case information, formal and informal, on all actual and potential arms sales. In the last 3 years we have set up more than 240 formal reports of intended arms sales—110 in fiscal year 1981, 90 in fiscal year 1982, and 41 in fiscal year 1983 to date. In addition, three informal notifications are currently before you.

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[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

While Congress has never disapproved any proposed arms sale, the administration has on occasion modified the terms of a proposal in light of congressional concerns. We have done so even though the executive branch has long considered the legislative veto to be unconstitutional.

I think the record speaks for itself. The executive branch does not live in a vacuum, and we are acutely aware of the need for consultation and cooperation in this sensitive area of arms exports.

Our foreign policy and national interest require that a President, any President, be able to use this important policy instrument effectively, flexibly, and I might add, responsibly. We recognize the necessity of congressional oversight. As in any other important area of national policy, both Congress and the Executive have a heavy responsibility to work together in the national interest.

Next, the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution contains four major operative parts. The first of these is a consultation requirement. The second is a reporting requirement.

The third operative part, section 5(b), requires the President to withdraw U.S. troops not later than 60 days after a report of actual or imminent involvement in hostilities, unless the Congress has affirmatively authorized their continued presence.

The fourth operative part is a legislative veto. According to section 5(c), the President must withdraw U.S. troops introduced into hostilities even before the end of 60 days if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

The first and second provisions of the War Powers Resolution, on consultation and reporting, are in our view unaffected by the *Chadha* decision. We do not intend to change our practice with respect to consultation and reporting.

The fourth provision, which asserted a right of Congress by concurrent resolution to order the President to remove troops engaged in hostilities, is clearly unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's holding in *Chadha*. It must be said, however, that this holding is unlikely to have a significant impact in any way on national security policy and the way in which it is conducted.

In the decade since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, no U.S. forces have been committed to long-term hostilities. It is doubtful that Presidents have refrained from such commitments simply because of the legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution, and it is equally doubtful that Presidents will now feel freer of restraints because of *Chadha*. The lesson of recent history is that a President cannot sustain a major military involvement without congressional and public support.

The legislative veto provision of the War Powers Resolution is severable from the others, in our view, according to the Supreme Court's test and guidelines. The resolution itself includes a severability clause, and the other operative portions of the resolution need not be affected by the dropping of the veto provision.

In the portion of my statement that I have deleted in my reading, I go through the severability test under *Chadha*. I am just referring back to that here.

The third operative part of the resolution, requiring positive congressional authorization after 60 days, does not fall within the scope of *Chadha*. Its constitutionality is neither affirmed, denied, or even considered in the *Chadha* decision.

As you know, the executive branch has traditionally had questions about this requirement of congressional authorization for a Presidential disposition of our Armed Forces, both in the light of the President's Commander in Chief power and on practical grounds. Congress, of course, has had a different view.

I do not believe that any purpose would be served by debating these questions here in the abstract. This provision is unlikely to be tested in the near future. Here, too, I want to reaffirm the administration's strong commitment to the principles of consultation and reporting, confident that in a spirit of cooperation the Executive and the Congress can meet future challenges together in the national interest.

Let me now turn to nuclear nonproliferation. Nuclear nonproliferation is another important policy area in which statutes have contained legislative veto provisions. Various sections of the Atomic Energy Act, for example, have provided for a legislative veto of Presidential determinations to permit nuclear exports to foreign countries.

These statutory arrangements typically involve three elements. First, they establish very strict standards limiting the export of nuclear items. Second, they authorize the President to waive certain restrictions and permit exports if he makes certain findings. Third, they have provided for a congressional veto of the Presidential waiver.

We consider that those standards and that waiver authority, as well as the statutory requirement of notification to Congress and the observance of a waiting period, continue to be valid. We will continue to wait through the period during which the Congress in the past deliberated over its veto. During that time, the Congress may use its constitutional authority to enact new legislation if it chooses. The only provision that is invalid is the third, which permitted a legislative veto by concurrent resolution.

The administration and the Congress share the same concern about nuclear proliferation. We have been active diplomatically in this field as this committee well knows.

We vigorously oppose the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by additional countries. Each executive branch agency is required to keep the Congress, including this committee, fully informed of its activities in this field of significant developments abroad.

We have done so, and we are proud of our record of close consultation and collaboration with the Congress. We will continue that process.

A fourth important statutory area involving a legislative veto is the procedure for granting most-favored-nation [MFN] treatment to certain nonmarket countries. Under the Jackson-Vanik amendment, nondiscriminatory tariff treatment may be granted to these countries only when they comply with certain conditions affecting the right of emigration. These requirements may be waived on the basis of stated findings and determinations by the President.

The annual report required under that statute—for continuation of MFN for Hungary, Romania, and China—is now before the Congress. This report illustrates how we believe Congress and the Executive should continue to work together constructively.

We presented that report to the Congress before the Supreme Court decision was announced, but we would have done precisely the same thing if the *Chadha* decision had been handed down before the report was filed. We regard the report as fully effective to extend the waiver authority and to continue the waiver as currently enforced.

At the same time, legislative oversight hearings serve the salutary purpose of scrutinizing the implementation of statutory requirements, of airing public concerns and of making our Nation's deep commitment to human rights known to other nations.

As I have emphasized, little of practical significance need in fact change as a result of the Supreme Court decision. The Department of State is committed to continue working closely with the members and committees of Congress and to take their concerns into account in reaching decisions on issues of policy. If anything, I believe *Chadha* will make the departments and agencies of the executive branch more, not less, conscious that they are accountable for their actions.

Our Constitution has proved to be a wise and enduring blueprint for free government. In this period of our history, our Nation faces challenges that the drafters of that document could not have imagined.

The Federal Government has the duty to conduct this Nation's foreign policy and insure its security in a nuclear age, in an era of instantaneous communications, in a complex modern world in which international politics has become truly global. America's responsibility as a world leader imposes on us a special obligation of coherence, vision, and constancy in the conduct of our foreign relations.

For this there must be unity in our National Government. The President and the Congress must work in harmony or our people will not have the effective, strong and purposeful foreign policy which they expect and deserve. We have seen in the last 15 years that when Congress and the President are at loggerheads, the result can be stalemate and sometimes serious harm to our foreign policy.

We now have an opportunity, all of us, to put much of that past behind us and to start afresh. We have a chance to shape a new era of harmony between the branches of our government, an area of constructive and fruitful policymaking, of creativity and statesmanship. That is President Reagan's goal and the goal of all us in his administration.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Radiological Weapons, July 28, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, in its statement today the Soviet delegation would like to dwell on two subjects, namely, the question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy through the prohibition of the intentional destruction of nuclear facilities, and the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons.

As you know, the question of the protection of nuclear facilities against attacks is being actively discussed within contact group B. The group has conducted a series of discussions on a wide range of aspects of this problem. Although the work of the group has not yet been completed, the results of the meetings and informal consultations it has held can be summed up and a number of conclusions can be drawn.

The consideration of the subject of the protection of nuclear facilities against attacks is being carried out actively, in a constructive spirit and in a practical manner. The importance of the protection problem is now recognized by virtually all delegations. The great interest in it displayed by delegations and the animated discussions convincingly show that the problem of the protection of nuclear facilities is extremely important and urgent. The active interest of the participants in the discussions is clear not only from the intensive character of the exchange of views, but also from the number of documents submitted on this question, which have been the subject of careful study, analysis and comments by delegations. The reason why there is a need to work out international legal measures to prevent actions leading to the deliberate destruction of civilian nuclear facilities is that the destruction of nuclear facilities could have consequences similar to the effect of a nuclear explosion.

All this shows that the Committee on Disarmament is the best and most appropriate place in which to conduct negotiations on this urgent disarmament issue.

Discussions have been held on such key issues of the protection problem as the scope of the prohibition, the adequacy of existing international legal instruments in this field and their relationship with other agreements, the establishment of protective zones around nuclear facilities and measures of control and verification in respect of compliance with a possible agreement. This very fact bears witness to the great interest displayed in this question by the delegations of various States represented in our Committee.

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[1] CD/PV.229, pp. 17–20.

An understanding is growing among delegations that the problem of the protection of nuclear facilities against attacks is both specific and extremely complicated, not only from the political but also from the military, legal and technical points of view. The discussion which has been held has also been useful in revealing new dimensions of the problem. All this has helped to establish a general understanding that the current consideration of the protection problem represents only the beginning of its examination, comprehension and elaboration from the legal point of view. This process could be continued in the future with the participation of experts.

The main discussion was held on the fundamental issue of the scope of protection against attacks on nuclear facilities, namely, on the question what nuclear facilities, what types of nuclear installations should be protected by a possible agreement, for example, a convention. It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of delegations single out the problem of the scope of the prohibition as the most important of the whole range of questions involved.

Different views have been expressed in this connection. Two main approaches to this problem can be identified.

The majority of delegations, including our own, believe that protection against attacks should cover only civilian nuclear facilities. Some delegations considered that the future convention should protect only those civilian nuclear facilities which are covered by IAEA safeguards, since they believe that this is the most reliable way of solving the problem and the easiest to implement.

The other delegations advocate a different approach according to which protection should cover all nuclear facilities without exception, both civilian and military, arguing that the destruction of such facilities could be a source of radioactive contamination. True, they explain that, for example, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers and cruisers equipped with nuclear power reactors, as systems of weapons, should not be covered by a possible agreement on the protection of nuclear facilities against attacks.

The Soviet delegation firmly advocates the prohibition of deliberate attacks on civilian nuclear facilities.

Certain differences and at the same time a proximity of positions have also been identified on the subject of what specific nuclear facilities should be covered by the protection against attacks or, in other words, what should be included in a list of such facilities. The Soviet delegation proposed including in the list nuclear power stations, research reactors, nuclear fuel production and reprocessing plants and the places of storage of fissionable materials. A number of other delegations have approximately the same idea.

In our view, an extremely interesting exchange of opinions was held also in respect of the criteria for determining the nuclear facilities to be protected: the minimum threshold of heat and power output for nuclear power and research reactors, the minimum level of radioactive materials for other nuclear facilities, potential danger, etc.

Many delegations legitimately ask how the task before us should be resolved and what should be the aim of the current negotiations. A number of delegations are in favour of making a possible agreement the main and most important part of a treaty banning radiological weapons because, in their opinion, the destruction of nuclear facilities is the most probable and dangerous form of the use of radiological weapons and thus of waging radiological warfare. In particular, this is the point of view of the delegations of Sweden, Pakistan and Argentina.

However, the attempt to solve the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities within the framework of an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons has, as you know, become the main obstacle to progress in resolving both these issues. We are convinced that the prohibition of radiological weapons and the protection of nuclear facilities against attacks are different questions only incidentally connected.

The Soviet delegation has consistently advocated the independent consideration of the subject of the protection of nuclear facilities against attacks and the conclusion of a separate agreement on it. At the same time, as we have already repeatedly stated, we are ready to display a certain flexibility.

The discussion of the legal aspects of the problem has also shown that the majority of delegations consider the existing international legal instruments, including Additional Protocols I and II (1977) to the Geneva Convention of 1949 [2] concerning the victims of international conflicts to be inadequate. The necessity was stressed of elaborating a special separate agreement on the question of the protection of nuclear facilities against attacks. The Soviet delegation agrees with this view.

At the same time, like a number of other delegations, we are in favour of creating zones around the nuclear facilities to be protected and the elaboration of appropriate and effective verification procedures the nature and content of which, naturally, will be determined by the solution to the question of the scope of the prohibition.

The exchange of opinions was also necessary and useful because it revealed both the common approaches and the differences in the positions of delegations, thus opening the way toward the identification of the potential working possibilities in this direction as a whole.

I should now like to touch upon the question of the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. The situation here is different. This subject has been under consideration in the Committee on Disarmament for almost four years now. As you know, this was preceded by seven rounds of Soviet-American talks as a result of which, in 1979, a draft of the basic provisions of a treaty banning radiological weapons was submitted.[3] Many delegations have proposed alternative versions of the key provisions of the treaty, including provisions on such questions as the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of the prohibition, peaceful co-operation and the control and verification procedures. Positions have also been stated on the form of the future agreement. The points of view of delegations are known on practically all aspects of the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons.

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[2] For the texts of the Protocols, see *International Legal Materials*, Nov. 16, 1977, No. 6, pp. 1391 ff. and 1442 ff.

Contact group A, which is considering this problem, made a new attempt to draft the text of the future treaty, this time on the basis of the co-ordinator's composite paper, document CD/RW/CRP.20. As a result of the first reading of the greater part of the document, the group managed to agree *ad referendum* the wording of only four paragraphs of the preamble. In spite of the fact that the exchange of opinions on the content and wordings of other provisions of the draft treaty promoted a certain clarification of positions, progress on the key issues once again proved impossible. The position of the Soviet delegation on the text of the treaty, including the co-ordinator's version, was stated in detail in the contact group and there is no need for me to repeat it here at the plenary meeting. In the attempts to find mutually acceptable solutions on various aspects of the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons we, for our part, have displayed considerable flexibility and understanding. We believe that success in solving this problem requires realism and political will on the part of all the delegations represented in the Committee. We are firmly convinced that our main task in this field is to elaborate international legal measures for the prevention of an arms race in one of the potentially more dangerous directions, and not to weaken existing agreements.

It is high time to complete the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. Many people rightly consider the Committee's inability to achieve an agreement even on the prohibition of a non-existent type of weapon indicative of the ineffectiveness of the Committee in general.

We once again urge those delegations which are interested in the prohibition of this type of weapon of mass destruction to try to find a possibility for a final agreement during the remaining few weeks of the Committee's work. Naturally, this should not mean that the delegations that are not interested in this subject should join in such an agreement.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 357–361.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Ekéus) to the Committee on Disarmament: Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Radiological Weapons [Extract], July 28, 1983 [1]

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The subject of today's deliberations of the Committee is, among other matters, radiological weapons or, as my delegation prefers to call it, radiological warfare. I should like to take the opportunity to state my country's position on this subject.

The United States and the Soviet Union submitted four years ago a document entitled "Joint USSR—United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"—to quote the text in document CD/31. [2]

We studied the proposal and came to the conclusion that the substantial content of the proposed elements was extremely limited. The Swedish delegation then proposed that the treaty should include also a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, as such attacks could cause the emission of radioactivity on a massive scale. We did so because we considered it important that this means of waging radiological war too, should be banned. But we also did it in order to inject substance into the joint draft. Or at any rate—if one is prepared to admit that the draft is not entirely devoid of substance—in order to add considerably, even crucially, to its content.

The proposal of the United States and the USSR was, in our opinion, firmly rooted in the proposed joint draft. More precisely, we considered it a specified case under article III of that draft. The article laid down that "Each State Party . . . undertakes not to employ deliberately, by its dissemination, any radioactive material not defined as a radiological weapon . . . to cause destruction, damage or injury . . .". We adhered to the concept of radiological effect. We also adhered to the concept of mass destruction. However, we did not suggest that nuclear facilities were weapons, but that they, by an enemy, could be used for radiological warfare. Hence our preference for that broader term.

As to the nuclear facilities that should be protected from attacks leading to radiological consequences, we consider that four main types qualify, namely, nuclear power and research reactors above a certain thermal output, intermediate spent fuel storages, reprocessing plants and, finally, high-level waste deposits. Of the four types, no doubt, the nuclear reactors are the most dangerous.

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[1] CD/PV.229, pp. 20–22.

[2] Substantially the same as CD/32, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 357–361.

Most of the nuclear reactors in the world cannot, when attacked, become radiological warfare instruments as an unintended side effect, because they are strongly safeguarded against civil accidents. Swedish studies show that a combination of different systems must be attacked with high precision and even in a certain time sequence if the attacker wants to cause extensive radiological consequences. This means that such an attack must be carefully planned. It is also perfectly possible, by using modern weapons of high precision, to render them incapable of fulfilling their normal function, like supplying electricity, without causing radiological consequences.

Attacks on spent fuel storages, reprocessing plants and waste deposits could not, as we see it, have any other purpose than provoking dangerous situations from a radiological point of view.

A treaty prohibiting radiological weapons has now been discussed and negotiated in an *Ad Hoc* Working Group for some years. This year the deliberations have taken place in two separate contact groups within the framework of the Working Group. Without prejudicing the question of one agreement for the whole subject-matter or two, what has been termed "traditional RW" and "prohibition of attacks" have been discussed separately in groups A and B. The Swedish delegation actively participates in both groups.

Useful exchanges of views have taken place. They have shed light on the problems and at times suggested where solutions to the problems might lie. I will not, however, today enter into the question whether agreement will be reached this year or not.

There are several reasons for my reluctance to do so. Perhaps the main cause is that the problem of the so-called linkage remains. "Linkage" in this context refers to the link between the two halves of the subject-matter, "traditional RW" and "prohibition of attacks". Those desiring a combined treaty, like the Swedish delegation, do so to make sure that the negotiations on "prohibition of attacks" are carried to a successful conclusion, and that is the main reason.

My delegation's attitude was, as I have said, from the beginning that by proposing the inclusion of "prohibition of attacks" in the joint draft, the substance of that draft would become supplemented in an essential way. However, substance is to us more important than form.

In this context I would like to comment on Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. [3] It is sometimes suggested that this Protocol contains provisions that offer sufficient protection to nuclear facilities.

We do not deny that the Protocol is of some value in this connection. But it has shortcomings. The only facility specifically named is the "nuclear electrical generating station". Reactors for other purposes are not mentioned. Facilities, apart from "electrical generating stations", enjoy under the Protocol a certain protection, but only in a very general way. Besides, and this goes also for the one type of nuclear facility specified in the Protocol, their safety is entrusted to the judgement of military commanders. It is this subjective element in the protection which my delegation considers unsatisfactory.

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[3] *International Legal Materials,* Nov. 16, 1977, No. 6, pp. 1391 ff.

The Additional Protocol I I have referred to also suffers from the disadvantage of having a relatively small number of parties. This is illustrated by the fact that among the 40 countries represented in this Committee, only three have ratified the Protocol.

Finally, the Swedish approach to this problem is that Sweden would like to see the protection of the four types of nuclear facilities I have previously enumerated completed, namely, through a provision that States parties to a treaty prohibiting attacks stand absolute liability.

Interview of Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov by a TASS Correspondent, July 30, 1983 [1]

Question: Statesmen of the NATO member-countries, above all of the USA, are spreading the allegation that the USSR "continues building up its military might, which goes far beyond the limits of its defence needs". Is that so?

Answer: The Soviet Union and its allies are maintaining their defence potential at a level necessary for the defence of the Warsaw Treaty member-states. The essence of our military policy is effective defence and nothing above that. The USSR has never initiated the arms race and is not going to do so in the future. If we compare the military potential of the USA and the defence potential of the Soviet Union, they are roughly equal. Our military might is not greater than that of the United States. We do not strive for military superiority.

The question, however, arises: about what "limits" of the USSR's defence needs are the NATO leaders speaking? Proceeding from what do they determine the necessary, in their view, volume of our defence potential? They proceed from the premise that the defence might of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty should be inferior to the military might of the USA and NATO. The Soviet Union will not accept the "limits" which the USA is trying to impose on us.

We are for equality in nuclear and other weapons, for a renunciation of military superiority, not by words, but in deeds, as well as for talks without diktat and power pressure.

There exists a rough equality of military forces between the West and the East. It is a reality. This was recognised by three American Presidents—Nixon, Ford and Carter.

This is also recognised now by many prominent American figures. Only President Reagan and, recently, some other Western representatives, following in his footsteps, are speaking much and at length about the USSR's "superarmament". But in reality up to the early seventies the USA had superiority in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. There are fields, where it has advantages to this day. Look at some figures: the USA has at present more than 13,000 nuclear warheads in its strategic nuclear force, whereas the USSR has less; the strength of the NATO armed forces is 5.5 million men, while the Warsaw Treaty has, even according to official Western sources, 4.9 million men. The USA has 13 aircraft carriers with 520 nuclear-capable aircraft on board, which are in service off the Soviet Union's coasts. The USSR has no aircraft carriers. This list could be further continued. The claims about Soviet military superiority, about the Soviet Union's superarmament are a fabricated malicious lie, which is being constantly disseminated.

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[1] CD/409.

But if we are to speak about superarmament, it is the objective of the country, which has set up more than 1,500 military bases and installations in the territories of other countries; of the country which has created very big groupings of permanently ready armed forces and keeps in full readiness means for their delivery to most distant areas of the world; the country which instead of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons is building up strategic offensive forces on an enormous scale over and above its needs, is deploying medium-range missiles in Europe and is thus creating a potential for launching the first nuclear strike; is heading into outer space in order to take the globe into the sights of its nuclear strike weapons, laser and ray weapons; is now spending already trillions of dollars on military preparations, is turning down all proposals for reaching agreement on normalising the international situation. The name of that country is the United States of America.

Question: In connection with the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, Western propaganda continues accusing the Soviet Union of being unconstructive and intransigent, of allegedly striving to ensure unilateral advantages for itself. It is even claimed that the USSR has a "monopoly" on medium-range missiles. Are there grounds for such claims?

Answer: There are no grounds for such claims. Everyone at talks, naturally, presses for more advantageous conditions for himself. But if the subject of the talks are problems of fundamental interest for states, they can be conducted only with due regard for each other's legitimate interests.

This is precisely how the Soviet side is conducting things in Geneva. Our constructive proposals in Geneva are known. The USSR is for no nuclear weapons—either medium-range or tactical ones—in Europe. This is the real way to nuclear-free Europe, and it is acceptable to us, as the Soviet Union has no aggressive plans. The USA and NATO remain silent so far and do not give any answer to our initiative, although almost two years have passed since it was put forward.

The USSR has put forward yet another plan, according to which both sides should reduce their medium-range weapons in the European zone by more than two-thirds. In so doing, the Soviet Union is ready to preserve for itself the same number of missiles as Britain and France have. We expressed readiness to reach agreement on equality, in each mutually stipulated period of time, of nuclear potentials in Europe not only by the number of delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft), but also by the number of warheads for them.

As a result, the Soviet Union would have in the European zone far less medium-range missiles and warheads on them than prior to 1976, when we had no SS–20 missiles at all. In reaching agreement on such a basis, we are prepared to start equalising the number of missiles of the sides even tomorrow. But wherein does the unconstructive character of our proposals lie? On the contrary, our proposals are constructive and responsible ones. They are a way to a reasonable compromise.

They in the West are speaking much about the "intransigence of the Russians". But in what, properly speaking, are we expected to concede? Are we expected to give a go-ahead to the introduction of Pershing and cruise missiles into Europe? Are we expected not to count the nuclear weapons of Britain and France on NATO's side? Thus they are demanding unilateral concessions precisely from us, wishing that we should agree to a direct damage to our security and that of our allies. Why must we be tractable on that point? We are not demanding anything of the sort from the USA.

The question of the nuclear weapons of Britain and France is deliberately muddled up under cover of the thesis about the Soviet Union's "intransigence". It is impossible to find objectivity in the very attitude of not counting these weapons among the NATO's medium-range nuclear force in Europe. This is NATO's frank striving to preserve big military advantages for itself in Europe. As has been learnt now, it was in Guadeloupe way back in 1979 that the leaders of the USA and the other major NATO countries reached agreement that the USA would appear at the Geneva talks alone, so as to be able, by referring to the bilateral character of the talks, to exclude British and French nuclear weapons from the count, and put in circulation the allegation about a Soviet missile monopoly in Europe.

But in actual fact, there is, of course, no Soviet "missile monopoly". The Soviet SS–20 missiles are only a counterbalance to the nuclear potential of the NATO countries in Europe, including to their missiles. Speaking of monopoly, it is precisely the US side which would like to gain the privilege of keeping near the Soviet borders additional nuclear weapons, which is a strategic factor for the Soviet Union. "The USA would like to gain for itself a monopoly position by deploying near the USSR nuclear weapons, capable of hitting targets deep in our territory, while the USSR does not have and, certainly, if one is to follow American logic, should not have a comparable potential somewhere near the USA", this is precisely to what Yuri Andropov drew attention.

It must be noted, for that matter, that when evaluating the NATO force, the USA itself invariably takes into account the nuclear potentials of Britain and France. In the Report to Congress of US Defence Secretary Weinberger on the military budget for 1983 frankly says that the NATO's large distance naval systems include submarine launched ballistic missiles—the British "Polaris" and the American "Poseidon"—as well as carrier-based American planes. Mention is made in the same Report also of French ballistic missile submarines, the only reservation being that officially they are not part of NATO. In its "White Paper" on defence issues for 1978 the British government said that British submarines with "Polaris" missiles are part and parcel of NATO's strategic force. They are capable of doing such damage to the Soviet Union that the Soviet leadership should take them into account, it said further.

The demand that the nuclear weapons of British [*sic*] and France be counted on the NATO side is not a bargaining point for us, but an objective need stemming from the interests of ensuring our security. Under any circumstances the Soviet Union shall and will have an equivalent to the above-said weapons.

Question: Claims have been again widely made recently, on the initiative of the US Administration, that the USSR allegedly has a superiority over the USA in the field of strategic weapons. What will you, comrade Minister, say to that?

Answer: At the present time there is rough equality in the balance of the strategic nuclear force of the Soviet Union and the strategic offensive force of the USA.

Seven years ago when the USSR and the USA were drafting the SALT-2 Treaty,[2] not only each figure but even each comma was verified many times. And when the leaders of the USSR and the USA were signing that treaty in Vienna in 1979, they placed on record that there existed parity between the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of strategic weapons. It remains to this day. But the whole point is that they in Washington have set themselves the aim of breaking that parity, of achieving military superiority.

Whatever component of the strategic offensive force of the USA we may take, each of them is to be re-equipped with new weapons systems soon. The "MX" ground-based strategic missile with ten independently targetable warheads is being tested, a new mobile single warhead "Midgetman" missile and a new sea-based "Trident-2" missile are being developed, intensive work is under way to deploy in this decade two new strategic bombers (B-1b and "Stealth"), batch production has been started of long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, preparations are nearing completion for the deployment of such ground-based missiles. And, as the leading Pentagon officials say, the United States will continue implementing all the above-said programmes even if an agreement on a reduction of strategic weapons is concluded with the Soviet Union.

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[2] The SALT II Treaty and accompanying documents may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

The Washington leaders use various gimmicks to cover up their policy of ensuring military superiority. They have set afloat a concept, according to which the weapons that are most developed on the Soviet Union's side—modern intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMC)—are declared as being destabilising and subject to scrapping, while those in which the USA is most strong—the modern submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) and heavy bombers—are to remain intact.

Indeed, the American side is guided by precisely this concept at the Geneva talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. The stand of the USA, the way it is now presented at the talks, is selfish and aimed at the Soviet Union's unilateral disarmament. It disregards our legitimate interests and presupposes the attainment of an overwhelming advantage of the USA over the USSR. We are proposed actually to reshape the whole structure of our strategic forces. The aim of these proposals is to undermine the USSR's strategic nuclear power.

Question: What will you, comrade Minister, say about the propaganda campaign which has been launched in the USA and the other NATO countries with the aim of portraying the Soviet government's statement of May 28 as a growth of the "Soviet military threat" to the West?

Answer: The Soviet Union has never threatened and does not threaten anyone. By whipping up the "Soviet threat" myth, certain circles in the West are thus trying to distract the attention of the peoples from the real military threat, which is created by the US Administration and some of its NATO allies.

The US President has been recently ever more often saying, for example, that the "Pershing-2" missiles are indispensable, that America also very much needs "Trident" missiles in order to "deter the Russians". But the speculation on deterrence is a camouflage. The American leaders consider it to be a disadvantage to them to tell the truth about their military preparations. Yet, in actual fact, the Pershing-2 and "Trident" missiles are a first strike weapon. And the Washington strategists are concerned not with "deterring the Russians". The first nuclear strike doctrine has become the dominant one in the US military strategy. The creation of strategic weapons systems and the build-up of the strategic force as a whole is subordinated to the possibility of implementing precisely that doctrine.

In conditions of the growth of the military threat it would be absolutely inadmissible for us to expose to a risk the peaceful labour of the peoples of the countries of the socialist community and make it dependent on "peaceable assurances" of the instigators of the nuclear arms race. We know and duly appraise the policy of the imperialists, their attitude to the socialist countries and will never forget the tragedy brought upon the peoples by the policy of "appeasing" the aggressor. Mindful of that, we are duty bound to take measures and to respond to the growth of the nuclear threat. Respond in such a way that the sense of self-preservation should prevail in the potential aggressor over the intention to unleash an aggression against us.

We will take such counter-measures, that will make the military threat to the territory of the USA and the countries, on whose territories American missiles will be deployed, the same as the USA is trying to create for the Soviet Union and our allies. And may those who are building up the arms race today realise, at long last, the dangerous illusory character of the drive for military superiority and the pressing need for reaching agreement on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security.

Interview of French Defense Minister Hernu, July 31, 1983 [1]

[Excerpts] [2] ***Reiss***. France is not committed to automatic action regarding commitments to the Atlantic alliance. It will make its own national decision on war and peace. It is assumed in Germany, as your counterpart Woerner said, that France will be at our side from the first moment of an attack on the FRG. Can you confirm this expectation?

Hernu. I told my colleague Woerner the following here as well as in France: The fact that the French Armed Forces in the FRG number 50,000 men demonstrates France's determination to partake in the alliance. Without revealing a great secret, I would even add that we have taken special measures so that the French Armed Forces can become active, if necessary, at the side of the armed forces of the alliance, and especially the FRG, and to cooperate with them if the French Government or the president of the republic decides to do so. In addition, there is the following, which is most topical, namely, that we have envisaged the creation of a rapid deployment force of 47,000 men in the framework of restructuring the Army. It would be in a position to considerably increase France's ability to intervene in Europe.

Reiss. The new French defense planning to 1988 emphasizes strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. What role do these weapons play for the defense of France, and what significance do they have for the alliance?

Hernu. They are the very last means of deterring a potential attacker from aggression, from attacking us. These are weapons for the defense of the vital interests of our country, they are by nature national weapons. Who could doubt, however, that our neighbors would also benefit from these weapons, particularly our German neighbors, because they would introduce an element of uncertainty in the considerations of a potential aggressor in case of a conflict. The French Armed Forces contribute to peace not only in France, but in all of Europe, and that is a contribution to general security.

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[1] Baden Baden Suedwestfunk Network in German, July 31, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Aug. 3, 1983, vol. III, pp. K1–K3. The interviewer was a radio reporter.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

We must prevent a war, regardless what type it might be, whether it be a nuclear war, one involving chemical agents, or conventional weapons because any war in Europe today would be a holocaust. This is why it is obvious that France can maintain its role with regard to deterrence only if the highest degree of uncertainty prevails on the part of the potential aggressor. Therefore, France must continue to have full freedom to make decisions. It must be in a position to assess the threat as well as the circumstances as to when it would have to make use of nuclear weapons.

I would like to add, however, that if we had to use them, it would mean the failure of our nuclear deterrence, because it is a non-war force, a nonaggressive force. It is the uncertainty that should deter a potential attacker from aggression. For this reason, I, as the French defense minister, believe—and this also applies to the French military representatives and the French people—that we are perfect pacifists, that we are among the best pacifists of the world. I believe that pacifism is a postulate, the result of which is not peace. [sentence as published]

Reiss. What security interests does France have with regard to counterarmament in Western Europe with American intermediate-range missiles? Would the American-Soviet compromise formula resulting from the so-called walk in the woods of the chief negotiators in Geneva be a satisfying result for France, maintaining its security interests and not counting the French nuclear weapons?

Hernu. In order to maintain peace, Europe needs a nuclear security guarantee. It is not France's mission to produce this guarantee. We cannot and we do not want to take the place of our American friends. Who knows whether this would not cause our American friends to want to refrain from being involved in Europe? Thus, these are neither our talks, nor is this our desire.

Now let us turn to the compromise that had been worked out on the occasion of the so-called walk in the woods. By the way, it was the French president, Mr. François Mitterrand, who recalled this compromise a few months ago. The talk between the two gentlemen contained positive elements, namely a balance between American and Soviet missiles, the fact that the British and the French strategic nuclear forces should not be counted, and the renunciation of the deployment of SS–20 missiles against Asia, which I believe is very important and which involves Japan.

It is not my business to answer the question whether one should have examined that compromise more closely. I do not know the secrets of the gods, and I know even less about those of Mr Nitze and Mr Kvitsinskiy, if I may put it that way. However, what I know, in view of the personalities of these two gentlemen, is that they must have been authorized to say what they did, even if it was said in the shadow of the leaves. If Mr Kvitsinskiy felt he was in a position to mention these possibilities, it was—at lease, I assume so—because he had achieved the consent of the Soviet Union at a certain time to do that. I do not know more about those proposals because France did not take part in those negotiations. I only know that they could have been a good starting point for further negotiations. However, that is up to the two big powers. They have begun to talk to each other in a good way, which is evidence of the fact that ecology has its advantages if the forest creates such conceptions of peace among the gentlemen.

Reiss. Under what conditions would France be prepared to include its nuclear weapons in arms control or disarmament negotiations between the East and West?

Hernu. As I said before, French nuclear deterrence is valid for our national territory due to its uncertainty. However, it does not mean that we are hostile to disarmament. We can even make proposals in this connection, and the president of the republic has already done so. We maintain, however, that the two superpowers must begin disarmament, not those who have less arms. Regarding these powers, we know that in the field of nuclear intermediate-range missiles the Soviets are most overarmed with regard to the buildup of their SS–20 missiles, if I may put it that way. An imbalance between the armed forces could cause a conflict. However, at the moment, peace depends on a balance. It is absolutely clear that one must aim for disarmament between the big powers, disarmament down to the lowest level.

Thus France is not hostile to disarmament and would not be against control measures which could some day involve it. However, we would like those who are in a position to destroy the world several times over to be the ones to begin the disarmament.

Reiss. For French defense planning up to 1988, expenditures amounting to Fr830 billion are envisaged. Can this program be financed in view of economic and currency developments? Could cuts that could affect the French Armed Forces in Germany become necessary?

Hernu. One cannot negotiate about the security of a country, about the security of my country, namely France. If we spend Fr830 billion of the franc's current value despite the worldwide economic crisis, unemployment, and the difficulties created by the dollar's exchange rate, spend it in 5 years on our defense, we will not do it out of sheer pleasure. The long-term defense budget has some special characteristics. First, it will be reevaluated during its implementation; second, the content concerning planning, volume, and means described must be adhered to and are unimpeachable commitments. Defense planning will be adhered to.

Now let me turn to your questions concerning the relationship with the FRG. I have said to Mr. Woerner and I repeated it to the press that the planning includes the 50,000 men of the French Armed Forces who are stationed in the FRG. I can even tell you that the French Armed Forces in Germany will be additionally equipped with about 100 French combat tanks. In addition, there will be increased fighting power as well as mobility and the availability of combat helicopters.

Reiss. Paris and Bonn plan the common development of a combat helicopter. How do you assess the chances of this project, and what other common armament projects are being considered by France and the FRG?

Hernu. The decision on this matter is up to the Bundestag. It is not up to the French defense minister to indicate the way before the German parliament has discussed it. However, it is correct that we have discussed the problem of a future combat helicopter. I hope that our industries, not only the French and the German, but the industries of all of Europe will be able to build this combat helicopter. Chances are good.

In February, I discussed with Mr. Woerner the possible development of a future antitank missile, and we will discuss it with our British colleagues in the near future. Missiles to be used to fight ships were also discussed. For the period from 1995 to 2000, German-French cooperation with a view to a future combat plane could also be possible. There are very great possibilities.

Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: START, INF, and MBFR [Extract], August 1, 1983 [1]

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The fourth round of START concludes August 2. Our delegation has taken a number of steps during this round to move the negotiations forward and to demonstrate the flexibility emphasized by President Reagan on June 8. [2]

- As the President has indicated, we have relaxed our proposal for a limit of 850 on deployed ballistic missiles, to bring our proposal in line with the recommendations of the Scowcroft commission and closer to the Soviet-proposed 1,800 limit on missiles and bombers.
- Our delegation has emphasized U.S. flexibility in finding ways to ensure that a START agreement brings about substantial reductions in the destructive potential of strategic missile forces.
- We have tabled the draft text of a START treaty, in which we have demonstrated our readiness to accept equal and lower limits from

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 1983, pp. 69–70. The statement was made before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

[2] *Ante.*

the outset on the number of heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM).

The Soviets have made a number of minor adjustments to their position this round and filled in a number of blanks in their initial proposal. In themselves, these steps have done little to narrow the basic differences in the two sides' approaches or to address our particular concerns about the asymmetries in ballistic missile capabilities. Nonetheless, we are encouraged that the Soviets have begun to show some give in their position and hope to see further Soviet flexibility on the central issues in the next round of START.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). The single most important issue in U.S.-European relations for the remainder of this year is likely to be INF. On the one hand, the opponents of NATO's two-track policy have indicated that they plan major public demonstrations in an effort to sway allied governments. The Soviets will be exerting maximum propaganda pressure, including threats of deployments of additional nuclear-armed missiles targeted on our allies.

On the other hand, we and our allies are, today, in a much stronger position to carry through both tracks of the December 1979 decision on arms control and modernization [3] than at any point in the last 3 years. Our position in the negotiations is recognized as both serious and flexible; our preparations for deployments, should those be necessary, are moving ahead smoothly in all of the basing countries; and alliance unity has been solidly reaffirmed through the NATO and Williamsburg communiques.

The United States remains committed to seeking an equitable agreement in the INF talks which would either eliminate the entire class of U.S. and Soviet land-based LRINF [longer range intermediate-range nuclear force] [4] missiles—our "zero-zero" proposal—or result in significantly lower, equal numbers of LRINF warheads for the United States and Soviet Union. Our allies fully support this negotiating position.

At the same time, our allies are committed to begin deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II missiles by the end of this year, as called for in the 1979 NATO two-track decision, if there is no agreement making those deployments unnecessary. Continuing strong commitment to the deployment track is necessary to give the Soviets an incentive to negotiate seriously in Geneva and to offset their destabilizing monopoly of LRINF missiles if agreement cannot be reached.

Unfortunately progress in the Geneva talks remains blocked by Soviet unwillingness to take account of the legitimate security needs of NATO which prompted the 1979 dual decision in the first place. Although they have made minor tactical moves in the negotiations, the Soviet goal remains what it was when the talks began—to retain a sizable portion of the SS-20 force while denying NATO the right to counter that threat through deployments of its own.

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[3] For the NATO decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[4] These and following brackets are in the source text.

The core of the Soviet negotiating position is their demand to be compensated for the British and French independent strategic deterrent. The purpose of this demand is to block U.S. deployments and preserve the Soviet LRINF monopoly. Our allies are unanimous in supporting rejection of this demand. As the Soviets well know, the British and French forces are national deterrents different in nature and mission from U.S. and Soviet LRINF. The British and French systems cannot provide either the protection to the non-nuclear states of NATO or the vital linkage to the U.S. strategic umbrella which is so central to NATO's ability to deter war. Further the Soviet Union already possesses scores more warheads than Britain and France. It is simply absurd for the Soviets to maintain that they need SS-20s to counterbalance the small British and French forces.

You have doubtless seen reports in the press of the so-called walk-in-the-woods proposal. Many of these reports have been inaccurate, partly as a result of Soviet efforts to conceal their own intransigence and place responsibility for closing this informal channel on our shoulders rather than their own, where it belongs. For this reason, I would like to say a few words about the walk-in-the-woods episode.

The package reflected ideas worked out on an informal, exploratory basis by Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation to the INF negotiations] with his Soviet counterpart last July. We, for our part, had problems with the proposal as it stood—including the fact that it would have forced us to renounce the Pershing II, leaving us without a ballistic missile counter to the SS-20 and undermining the NATO deployment program in Germany, which begins with the P-II. Nevertheless, we decided that the informal channel should be kept open and so instructed our Ambassador.

The Soviet reaction, by contrast, was to reject both the substance of the proposal and the possibility of such talks. The Soviet negotiator made clear that he could not accept any agreement that provided for U.S.-Soviet equality or that accepted any U.S. deployment and added that he had been reprimanded for having had the initial conversations.

The next negotiating round begins September 6. The United States will continue to seek means of moving the talks forward, to achieve results which will meet the basic principles necessary for our security and that of our allies. We would hope that the Soviets will finally accept the need to negotiate seriously. However, we do not regard the coming round as the last round, as some have suggested. If deployments are necessary, we would expect negotiations to continue after initial U.S. deployments—as, indeed, they have been conducted all along in the face of existing and continuing Soviet deployments. And, as the Vice President said on his European trip earlier this year, "what goes in can come out." We are perfectly prepared to adjust the level of our deployed systems in accordance with any agreements which may be reached.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). Although it is much less in the news, it is well to underline the importance of MBFR, where we and our allies are increasingly concerned to move the negotiations toward our original goal of parity in military manpower in central Europe. The importance of reducing the massive Soviet advantage in conventional forces in the heart of the continent has not diminished with time.

Unfortunately, the Soviets and their allies have continued to be unwilling to agree on the size of their forces in the area or to the kind of verification measures necessary for an effective agreement. The latest draft proposal tabled by the East last month does make some movement toward our verification requirements. However, it falls well short of what is required for an effective treaty. We will be considering jointly with our allies what response should be made to the Eastern proposal.

British Working Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Verification Aspects of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, August 1, 1983 [1]

Introduction

1. A comprehensive test ban was originally conceived as one step on the path to general and complete disarmament. But the main impetus for opening formal negotiations in the 1950s came from concern over the possible biological effects of fallout from large scale testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The conclusion in 1963 of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (PTBT) [2] largely dispelled this concern. Testing of nuclear weapons has, however, continued underground. A serious obstacle to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty has been agreement on acceptable methods of verification which would also cover that environment.

2. An adequate verification system has to provide an assurance that the treaty is being complied with by all States Parties. If it does not, the treaty will not attract wide adherence since some States will consider that it poses unacceptable risks to their security. Second, a verification system subject to wide error would generate a lack of confidence which could lead to accusations of breaches of the treaty even when it was in fact being wholly respected. Such accusations could have damaging consequences on international relations.

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[1] CD/402.

[2] For text of the treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

3. Despite the impression created by some commentators, the verification of a comprehensive treaty would pose difficult technical problems, especially in respect of monitoring the underground environment. This is not to say the verification technologies available for the environments prohibited by the PTBT would necessarily be adequate if a comprehensive treaty were in force. The security risks which might follow if States Parties failed to comply with the PTBT are small because the testing needed to maintain the viability of existing weapon stockpiles and nuclear weapon systems can legitimately take place underground. There is little incentive to test in the prohibited environments; even if testing did take place in such environments instead of underground, the consequences for military balances are unlikely to be serious, even though a breach of the Treaty would have great political significance. If, however, a comprehensive treaty were in force, there would no longer be a legitimate route for continued testing, and if a State decided to evade its obligations it would select that environment for testing which offered the best chance of escaping detection. The need for further measures of monitoring of these other environments cannot therefore be dismissed without consideration.

Seismic Verification

4. The major problem in verification of an NTB is however undoubtedly connected with underground testing, methods for which have been highly developed over the last 20 years. Much effort has been devoted to the technology of monitoring the underground environment. But there have been no outstanding technical breakthroughs and reliance still has to be placed on seismic means of detecting and identifying underground events. No other methods promise to provide a way of obtaining information about underground explosions at long ranges—and long range systems are an essential element in any realizable verification arrangement.

5. There is general agreement within the informed scientific community (as the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts set up by the Committee on Disarmament shows) that available seismic methods allow seismic events with body wave magnitudes of about 4 or more to be detected with a high (say 90 per cent) probability. The threshold of detection is set by the earth's natural seismicity. But detection of a signal without being able to identify whether it was caused by an earthquake or an explosion is of little value for the purpose of verifying compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty. Indeed detection of an event without being able to identify it could be disadvantageous, because it could give rise to false suspicions of non-compliance with the Treaty. In any case, because earthquakes of significant magnitude occur relatively frequently, a monitoring system which could not distinguish them from nuclear explosions would rapidly be overloaded by earthquake signals. Thus it is of crucial importance to recognize that what is important from the point of view of verification is not detection alone but detection *and* identification, the threshold of which is

about half a magnitude higher than for detection alone. (It is conceivable that further work in this area could provide, at some time in the future, for a similar probability level at a marginally lower figure of body wave magnitude). Failure to recognize this fact can give rise to over-optimistic assessment of the ability of the proposed world-wide seismic network.

6. There is less unanimity in the scientific community about the relationship between the magnitude of a seismic signal and the yield of nuclear explosion which produced it. Extensive studies by United Kingdom scientists have shown that a seismic signal of magnitude 4½ can be related to about a 3 kiloton explosion which is close coupled with surrounding hard or water saturated rock.[3] For explosions in close contact with dry *and* soft rock in a stratum of sufficient thickness, a seismic magnitude of 4½ equates to a yield of about 30 kilotons. And, for explosions detonated in a sufficiently large cavity in a geologic formation (assuming that the formation is able to support a large cavity) a seismic magnitude of 4½ equates to a yield of up to 300 kilotons. Thus the detection *and* identification threshold currently achievable *in theory* by seismic means can be associated with explosive yields from about 3 kilotons to up to 300 kilotons.

7. Some of those who believe that existing methods of verification are already adequate tend to base their assessment on the assumption that clandestine testing would invariably be carried out with close coupling in hard rock and at sites already used routinely for nuclear testing. Where they do recognize that other possibilities exist, they tend to assume that sites suitable for close coupled tests in soft dry rock would not be available and that decoupled tests would not be practicable. Neither of these assumptions is valid except perhaps in relation to the practical problems of constructing a cavity large enough to decouple an explosion of say 100 kilotons or more. Our broad assessment is that decoupling offers the possibility of conducting nuclear weapon tests of up to a few tens of kilotons without producing seismic signals in excess of the detection *and* identification threshold of magnitude 4½. Any nuclear weapon State which was able to test up to a level of a few tens of kilotons in undetected breach of a comprehensive treaty would realize a very significant advantage.

8. The *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts has reported that the achievement of a detection and identification threshold of seismic magnitude 4½ requires the services of a global network of high quality seismic stations. The Group has, however, not been asked to consider the arrangements that would be necessary to ensure that these stations produced reliable seismic data of adequate quality and on a sufficiently fast time-scale. In so far as the Group has discussed the quality of data, they have found significant differences of view on what is necessary. Equally strong differences would be found on the

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[3] In CCD/492 (April, 1976), a magnitude of 4½ was rounded up to equate to 5 kilotons but the 3 kilotons figure given here is more accurate. [Footnote in original.]

means of ensuring that data were reliable and timely. Contrary to the opinions of some commentators, the establishment of a global network in which all Parties to a comprehensive treaty would have confidence poses many difficulties. This is especially true for those stations of the network which would be crucial for monitoring those countries with large land masses.

9. There are two other possible methods of evasion that should be considered. First, the criteria for differentiating between explosion and earthquake seismic signals are sufficient only if the seismic signals have a reasonable signal/noise ratio. This ratio could theoretically be depressed for an explosion signal by timing the explosion so that it coincided with the signal produced by a nearby earthquake. Any attempt to hide an explosion in an earthquake signal would be very constraining, both in time and place, on the nuclear test. But it cannot be ruled out as a possible method of evasion if the incentive for a clandestine test were sufficiently great. Second, the purposes of a CTBT would be completely undermined if the Treaty did not prohibit the conduct of so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) which could be used to derive information of direct nuclear weapons value. So far, as demonstrated in an earlier United Kingdom paper on the subject tabled as CD/383, there have been no verification proposals which offer the prospect of agreement being reached on measures which would allow a PNE as part of a CTBT.[4]

10. The discussion so far relates to verification capabilities theoretically achievable with a global seismic network of the type considered by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts but expanded somewhat to provide better coverage of the Southern Hemisphere. This would detect about 50,000 earthquakes at or above body-wave magnitude 4 each year and clearly would need to be furnished with a data transmission and signal processing system of high capacity and complexity. A global network does not, however, cater specifically for monitoring Treaty compliance within the boundaries of States with very large land areas.

11. It has previously been suggested that, for these special cases, enhanced confidence in Treaty compliance would be obtainable if the density of seismic stations within such countries were increased above the global average. It would be politically unacceptable, technically difficult and economically expensive to have a high enough density of seismic stations to make a significant reduction in the detection and identification threshold for *all* seismic events occurring within these large countries. The additional stations should perhaps be primarily regarded as offering the capability of monitoring more closely those areas within a large country where it might be technically feasible to implement measures for evading detection and identification by the regular global network. The possibilities of exploiting the data available from these regional stations for CTBT monitoring—especially

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[4] *Ante*, June 17.

data recorded at relatively close range from an event as opposed to data acquired at teleseismic distances—deserves more study. Obviously data from regional stations specifically installed to monitor events within the region would have to be authenticated more rigorously than data from the global network.

12. A limitation of all assessments of seismic verification capabilities is that almost all the underground explosions, from which seismic data have been recorded, have been carried out in areas of low seismic activity. Thus the transmission paths for the seismic waves from explosions to the detection stations have been geographically different from those for earthquake seismic signals. Consequently there must be some uncertainty about the verification capability of a seismic station network operating against underground explosions conducted in an area of high seismic activity.

On-site Inspection

13. No matter how good seismic verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty might be, the interpretation of seismic signals can never give completely conclusive proof that a nuclear explosion has taken place. There would always be the possibility of dispute; and there is in any case, no method of differentiating seismically between a nuclear explosion and an explosion of any other type. This last point is not trivial because there have been conventional explosions with yields in the sub-kiloton and very low kiloton range.

14. An almost unambiguous indicator of a nuclear explosion is the presence of fission products but, for an explosion conducted underground with complete containment, these fission products will be retained within the cavity formed by the explosion. There is no known way of detecting their existence at a distance. However, if an underground nuclear explosion had been carried out, there would be some signs which could be looked for at the actual site. Greater confidence in the effectiveness of verification would therefore be obtained through arrangements which permitted inspections of the sites where there is evidence that a clandestine explosion may have been carried out.

15. The negotiation of arrangements for on-site inspections raises many difficulties, because such inspections are seen as potential infringements of national rights and as potentially prejudicial to national security. Nevertheless verification arrangements would be regarded as unsatisfactory if they did not provide for on-site inspections on terms and under conditions acceptable to all Parties.

The Implications of a Detection/Identification Threshold

16. The fact that physical factors impose a threshold below which it is not possible to verify an NTB would be significant if testing below the threshold could serve a useful nuclear weapons purpose. It is the case that operational requirements for theatre nuclear weapons may call for yields of the order of 10 kilotons; such weapons could clearly

be tested at full yield within a verification threshold of some tens of kilotons. But low yield tests could also be used to prove the fission triggers which are used to initiate further nuclear reactions in high yield nuclear weapons. Although some progress has been made with the development of mathematical modelling and non-nuclear experimentation for assessing the behaviour of trigger designs, a final judgement on design integrity can be made only on the basis of results from nuclear testing, which, for this purpose, can be conducted at a yield level of the order of 10 kilotons. It follows, therefore, that an ability to test at this yield level is of importance in respect both of maintaining existing weapons stockpiles in the face of aging effects and of developing new warhead designs. This example is not unique. Other types of test at the 10 kiloton level would be equally important and all of them would serve to maintain the competence of weapon designers and confidence in their advice.

Conclusions

17. A worldwide system of seismic stations as proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts working to full capacity would permit seismic events of body wave magnitude of 4½ or more, to be detected *and* identified as coming from natural events or from explosions. This capability would, in the United Kingdom's view, not rule out the possibility of clandestine tests of nuclear weapons being carried out underground at yields up to a few tens of kilotons. These tests could have considerable military significance.

18. Unless significant improvements can be made to presently available verification techniques, a gap will remain which could be exploited to affect significantly the balance between nuclear weapon States. This conclusion runs counter to some commonly held views which may be based on assumptions about the realizability of an effective global network which are at the moment unjustified. It is doubtful whether some published assessments attach proper weight to various technical factors; in particular, some fail adequately to differentiate between detection alone and detection *and* identification.

19. Difficult problems remain with respect to on-site inspection which have yet to be solved. Further, there is no agreement on whether or not it is possible to accommodate arrangements for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes with a comprehensive test ban treaty. These difficulties formed an important part of the trilateral negotiations between 1977 and 1980, and were clearly identified in the report to the CD on those negotiations (Document CD/130). [5] But the work done in the Committee on Disarmament since 1982, particularly by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts, has been valuable in identifying areas where further progress might be possible. What is at issue is the political will to recognize that the correct path towards an agreed treaty—however long it may prove to be—leads through detailed con-

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[5] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 317–321.

sideration of the verification issues. Once we are confident that those problems have been resolved—and the solution must not permit disequilibrium in international relationships by allowing one side to gain advantage over another—then we can move towards the final banning of all nuclear tests.

Report by the House Committee on Science and Technology: Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War [Extracts], August 3, 1983 [1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Thirty-seven years ago, a nuclear device packing the yield of 12,500 tons of TNT was detonated 1,900 feet above Hiroshima, Japan, with unprecedented casualties. Today, the device detonated over Hiroshima would equal about one-half of the area destructive force of the smallest warhead on a U.S. nuclear re-entry vehicle. Yet, notwithstanding the unimaginable damage that lies within the capability of modern day weapons, the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and Soviet Union continue to grow.

Were a war to be launched using modern weaponry, the death toll would defy all comprehension. Even the most optimistic estimates project that between two and twenty million people in the United States would die as a result of a attack targeted solely on U.S. missile fields.

In spite of the unprecedented carnage embodied in such casualty projections, the Subcommittee had received reports and had heard of studies suggesting that the immediate death toll from a nuclear war would only represent the first of a series of health and ecological shocks that would jolt the planet and its survivors. Accordingly, on September 15, 1982, the Subcommittee held a hearing on the effects of nuclear war on the global environment. Testimony on both the mid-term health consequences as well as the longer term atmospheric and ecological consequences of nuclear war was taken at the hearing.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Issues considered by the subcommittee

1. Apart from the immediate death toll that would follow a nuclear war, what are the health and ecological risks that would confront mankind after such a war?

2. Are there any civil defense measures capable of dealing with the post-war health and ecological risks of nuclear war?

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[1] *The Consequence of Nuclear War on the Global Environment: Report by the Committee on Science and Technology, Together with Minority and Dissenting Views* (H. Rept. 98-344; 98th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 1-6, 38, 40, 85.

3. Is it likely that the damage inflicted on the environment by a nuclear war will render moot the question of who won or lost the war?

4. Has there been an orderly, well-conducted examination of the post-war health and ecological risks of nuclear war?

5. Are there scientific uncertainties that still remain?

B. Reason for the hearing

1. Predicted death toll from a nuclear exchange

In 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified that, in the event of a counterforce (i.e., anti-military attack against the United States, there would be casualties in the range of 15,000 to 25,000 people. [2] Secretary Schlesinger later revised this estimate to 800,000 casualties. [3] Subsequently, the assumptions built into the Secretary's estimates were evaluated by an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) expert panel. When changes were made in response to the OTA study, the official Defense Department projections ranged up to 20 million killed. [4]

Since the time of Secretary Schlesinger's statement and the upwardly spiraling casualty reassessments that followed his remarks, others have attempted to gauge the numbers of casualties that would perish in a nuclear war. Thus, in 1979, the Office of Technology Assessment, utilizing a January 1978 Congressional Budget Office nuclear force posture for both the U.S. and Soviet Union (see Appendix 1), provided casualty estimates for both a counterforce and full scale nuclear war. [5] Depending on the type of attack pattern used by the enemy (e.g., the season and accompanying wind patterns in which an attack would take place, the number of weapons that would be directed at a given target and whether those weapons would be air burst or ground burst), OTA estimated that between 2 and 20 million Americans would perish in a counterforce attack against U.S. military targets, in particular, the nine ICBM fields that are located in the western half of the nation. [6]

Were the attack to include other targets such as non-nuclear installations, petroleum fields and refineries, industrial installations and population centers, the number of Americans killed could be as high as 155 to 165 million people, or approximately 70 percent of the U.S. population. [7]

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[2] Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Committee on Foreign Regulations, March 4, 1974 at p. 19. [Footnote in original.]

[3] Statement of Frank Von Hippel before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology (hereafter the "Nuclear Aftermath" hearings), September 15, 1982, referring to September 11, 1974, hearings of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (hereafter the "Senate Arms Control Subcommittee) at p. 113. [Footnote in original.]

[4] Statement of Frank Von Hippel *supra* note 2 [*3*], citing "Analyses of Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare," committee print, Senate Arms Control Subcommittee, September 1975, at p. 23. [Footnote in original.]

[5] See OTA study, "The Effects of Nuclear War" (1979). [Footnote in original.]

[6] "The Effects of Nuclear War" at p. 82. [Footnote in original.]

More recently, in a study sponsored by the Swedish Academy of Science and published in Ambio, the Academy's bi-monthly international journal, noted scientists and strategists working in the nuclear arms arena were asked to evaluate the potential worldwide consequences of a nuclear war reference scenario provided by the magazine's authors and a distinguished board of advisors. [8] In the reference scenario, the Ambio board of advisors assumed that, by 1985, (i) the U.S. and Soviet Union would possess approximately 35,000 tactical nuclear warheads comprising about 4,400 megatons, [9] (ii) the U.S. would have at its disposal 12,840 strategic warheads with a total explosive power of about 3,510 megatons, and (iii) the Soviet Union would possess about 11,310 strategic warheads with an explosive power of about 4,140 megatons. [10] The Ambio advisory board then hypothesized that about one-third of the available warheads comprising less than one-half of the available megatonage would be used in a nuclear war. [11] Appendix 2 depicts the manner in which the Ambio advisory panel assumed that the weapons would be targeted.

Under the Ambio scenario, virtually every city in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, parts of China and in other countries possessing nuclear weapons would be targeted. [12] When all such areas are included in the projected casualty estimate, the results are staggering: Out of an estimated population at risk of 1,290 million people, the use of weapons comprising less than half of the projected 1985 arsenals of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would leave 750 million dead and about 340 million seriously injured. [13]

2. *The importance of investigating the longer term consequences of nuclear war*

The Subcommittee felt it imperative to take its inquiry beyond the immediate carnage that would be wrought by a nuclear war and to look into the longer term health and ecological consequences of such a war.

The Subcommittee believed that such an inquiry was important for the following reasons: First, even under the most severe projections, it is expected that, after the last bomb has been dropped and the radioactive dust has settled, there will be survivors in each the Northern and Southern Hemisphere. Though most such survivors will be in the southern half of the globe, it can be expected that many will be in the northern half including upwards of 70 million Americans. As to all such survivors, the Subcommittee felt it important to evaluate the type of world with which they would be confronted. Specifically, the Subcommittee thought it crucial to question whether the destructive forces unleashed by a nuclear war could wreak havoc not only on mankind but also on the environment in which mankind exists. Might it be the terrifying case that, for the survivors, the ability to continue life in an orderly fashion will become a fleeting illusion and that, in place of an organized society as we now know it, mankind will be relegated to foraging for food and protecting itself from unprecedented environmental, health and atmospheric adversities? If, as some have claimed, this is the setting that awaits the survivors of a nuclear war, the Subcommittee felt that all should know what nuclear war bodes for the future of mankind.

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[7] *Id.* at 95. [Footnote in original.]

[8] See Ambio, volume XI, number 2–3, 1982, at p. 99 for a listing of those who contributed to the reference scenario. [Footnote in original.]

[9] One megaton equals 1,000 kilotons of explosive power. One kiloton equals the explosive power of 1,000 tons of TNT. It is estimated that, in World War II, all of the weapons used possessed between 3–4 megatons of destructive capability. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima packed approximately 12½ kilotons of fire power, or about one-eightieth (1/80) of a modern day one-megaton warhead. [Footnote in original.]

[10] See Ambio, note 7 [*8*] *supra* at p. 94. [Footnote in original.]

[11] The exact number of warheads and megatonage assumed comprised 14,737 warheads and 5,750 megatons. *Id.* [Footnote in original.]

[12] *Id.* at 95–96. [Footnote in original.]

[13] H. Middleton, "Epidemiology: The Future Is Sickness and Death," *Id.*, Ambio at 102. [Footnote in original.]

Second, at a time when the public debate over arms policy and disarmament is becoming more widespread than it ever has before, there is still a tendency on the part of many to shy away from the debate. The Subcommittee believes the reasons for this are twofold: For many, the thought of nuclear war is too unimaginable to contemplate. Therefore, there is the tendency to withdraw from the fray and take solace in the view that no national leader on either side of the globe could ever believe that a nuclear war is winnable and, therefore, startable. The other side of the coin for most each [*such*?] individuals is the tendency to hope that were such a war started, they would be among the survivors.

It was with a view toward such individuals that the Subcommittee believed it important to discuss in a public forum what the Earth might be like after a nuclear attack. If, as some have claimed, the very atmosphere that surrounds us could be damaged allowing blinding rays to penetrate to the Earth; if, all of a sudden, the production of crops were to cease as a result of sun screening particles obscuring sunlight; and, if diseases, not known in the developed world for decades, were to return at epidemic levels, then, to paraphrase an oft-stated phrase, the living might envy the dead. With such knowledge in hand—grisly as it might be—the Subcommittee hoped that such [*each*?] American would assess what his or her role should be in helping to formulate a national arms and disarmament policy.

The third reason for the hearing was to provide a record for the leaders of both the U.S. and Soviet Union. If, as had been claimed, a nuclear war could not be waged without (a) sacrificing scores of millions of citizens and (b) risking the long-term ecological well being of the planet, then such leaders ought to be confronted with the facts in a way that clearly portrays the question of whether a nuclear war can be "won."

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

1. Issue—Apart from the immediate death toll that would follow a nuclear war, what are the health and ecological risks that would confront mankind after such a war?

Findings.—Large-scale nuclear war poses a number of post-war medical and ecological risks. Among these are the possibilities of (i) radiation levels capable of killing or debilitating civilian populations located scores of miles downwind from an attack; (ii) post-war epidemics that could kill 20–30 percent of a war's survivors; (iii) sun screening caused by the dust from widespread forest fires and capable of blocking enough sunlight to inhibit photosynthesis in plants; (iv) smog in amounts sufficient to impair food crops and pose health risks; and (v) depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer in amounts potentially capable of allowing blinding levels of ultra violet radiation to reach the Earth.

2. Issue.—Are there any civil defense measures capable of dealing with the post-war health and ecological risks of nuclear war?

Findings.—No civil defense measure brought to the attention of the Subcommittee will afford significant protection against the post-war health and ecological consequences of nuclear war.

3. Issue.—Is it likely that the damage inflicted on the environment by a large-scale nuclear war will render moot the question of who won or lost the war?

Findings.—Yes. Aside from the death toll, areas made uninhabitable by radiation and destruction of military, petrochemical, and industrial targets, large-scale nuclear war could wreak havoc with mankind's environment. Accordingly, whether or not a combatting nation can claim military victory, the cost of such "victory" may well be the loss of a sustainable environment.

4. Issue.—Has there been an orderly, well-coordinated examination of the post-war health and ecological risks of nuclear war?

Findings—No. Much of what is known today is the product of isolated discoveries of interested scientists coupled with the recording of chance happenings.

5. Issue.—Are there scientific uncertainties that still remain?

Findings.—Many questions remain to be answered, in particular, questions involving the relationship between nuclear explosions and atmospheric chemistry, the potential for climate alteration and the relationship between ozone depletion and blindness.

Recommendations

Rather than allow the nuclear aftermath issue to be directed by chance happenings and isolated discoveries, the Subcommittee believes that a world-wide coordinated effort, akin to that of the 1957 International Geophysical Year, must be mounted and that researchers round the world must dedicate themselves to exploring the global consequences of nuclear war. To this end, the Subcommittee calls for an international year of research, and is pleased to note that three major research efforts aimed at investigating the global effects of nuclear war are now being explored by different components of the international scientific community. One of these, the planned Conference on Long Term Worldwide Biological Consequences of Nuclear War, is well under way with a major international conference planned for the early Fall of 1983.

To provide a forum for disseminating the findings and conclusions reached by the scientific conferences that are now getting underway as well as any that may be initiated in the near future, the Subcommittee recommends that a comprehensive set of hearings at the conclusion of the international year of effort be held.

Finally, to impart the findings of the scientific community to the leaders and people of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Subcommittee can think of no better precedent than the recent televised meeting of U.S. and Soviet physicians [14] who, in a program that was broadcast live to the Soviet Union and later shown in the United States on public television, [15] candidly discussed the abhorrent medical nuclear war. The Subcommittee believes that no lesser treatment should be accorded the findings that flow from the international year of effort is as called for and urges the media of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to consider such a live broadcast when the year's scientific activities have been concluded.

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VII. MINORITY VIEWS

Review of the Consequences of Nuclear War on the Global Environment

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

The Minority concur that the effects of a nuclear war would be truly devastating and that a review of what some scientists believe to be the environmental consequences of such an event is appropriate.

We take issue, however, with the timing of the report's release. The hearing upon which the report is based was held on September 15, 1982, during the 97th Congress. Traditionally, and we think for good reasons, subcommittee reports are issued in the same Congress in which the original hearing was held. This policy is a wise one, and is especially important in protecting the rights of the Minority. To illustrate the problem, we would like to review our current situation on this report. First, none of the minority members who served on the subcommittee in the 97th Congress still serve on the subcommittee in the current Congress. In addition, the minority counsel serving the minority members in the 97th Congress is no longer with the subcommittee. The result places the minority members currently on the subcommittee in the untenable position of approving a controversial report without having the benefit of participating in the hearing or from the advice of the minority staff serving the subcommittee at that time.

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[14] Participating in this historic televised meeting were Drs. Bernard Lown and John Muller of the Harvard Medical School; Dr. John Pastore of the Tufts University Medical Center; Dr. Evgueni Chazov, U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister of Health; Dr. Mikhail Kuzin, Director of the Soviet Surgical Institute, and Dr. Mikhail Ilyin, Director of the U.S.S.R. Biophysics Institute. [Footnote in original.]

[15] The rebroadcast was aired in the United States on October 13, 1982, under the title "Nuclear War: Incredible Disease." [Footnote in original.]

We are being asked, subsequently, to support the issuance of a report in an informational and policy vacuum. We therefore have no basis upon which to judge the merits of the report's recommendations. We strongly disagree with this process, and feel it is indecorous for this subcommittee.

We support the committee's oversight activities in this area nevertheless, and look forward to the ongoing discussion of the issue.

JOE SKEEN
CLAUDINE SCHNEIDER
AL MCCANDLESS

VIII. DISSENTING VIEWS

We are all deeply concerned about the consequences of *any* use of nuclear weapons because we realize that *any* nuclear war, regardless of the scope of the nuclear force utilized, would be a catastrophe for all mankind. We agree that the potential consequences should be examined and discussed, and we feel strongly that any such discussion should be based on valid and well documented scientific data, and not on polemics arising from opinion and preconceptions.

To quote the excellent OTA study "The Effects of Nuclear War" (Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 79–600080), which was published in 1979:

> Nuclear war is not a comfortable subject. Throughout all the variations, possibilities, and uncertainties that this study describes, one theme is constant—a nuclear war would be a catastrophe. A militarily plausible nuclear attack, even "limited," could be expected to kill people and to inflict economic damages on a scale unprecedented in American experience; a large-scale nuclear exchange would be a calamity unprecedented in human history. The mind recoils from the effort to foresee the details of such a calamity, and from the careful explanation of the unavoidable uncertainties as to whether people would die from blast damage, from fallout radiation, or from starvation during the following winter. But the fact remains that nuclear war is possible, and the possibility of nuclear war has formed part of the foundation of

> international politics, and of U.S. policy, ever since nuclear weapons were used in 1945.[16]

Our first major concern regarding this report from the Committee on Science and Technology is that while it appears to be a serious scientific study of the possible environmental consequences of a nuclear war, in fact, it is based on an extraordinarily limited examination of the available data. It ignores a tremendous amount of excellent, and fully documented and peer reviewed data which were already available in well recognized American scientific literature. It relies almost totally on materials published in a single study in Ambio, the journal of the Swedish Academy of Sciences. While we do not denigrate Ambio, we cannot understand why the wealth of well recognized data available in the materials we have listed as an appendix to our views were not utilized in any consideration of this important topic.

It would seem to us that the Committee on Science and Technology has an affirmative duty to ourselves, to the House, and to the American people to be careful to present issues based on a broad range of scientific data and in a way that does not present a slanted or incomplete view. There are those who still instinctively fear the power of the atom, and a slanted report could easily manipulate that instinctive fear. To quote the World Health Organization Technical Report, "Mental Health Aspects of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy":

> There is, however, reason to believe that certain emotional responses are provoked by the advent of atomic energy also in a more direct manner and must in many instances, be considered as pathological. These responses, which seem to be due partly to the circumstances in which atomic power has been introduced and partly to its very nature, constitute perhaps the most important mental health aspect of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
>
> These unhealthy reactions appear to stem from anxiety, and from attempts which human beings make to deal with anxiety. Thus they may be manifested in the form of irrational fears, irrational hopes, or irrational power. Among these reactions, the most frequent is undoubtedly irrational fear, and this fact is certainly of the greatest importance for any analysis in this field.[17]

While the above cited WHO report was developed on the peaceful uses of atomic power, it is obvious that the same fears can be manipulated on questions concerning military uses of nuclear power. We feel a duty to provide both sufficient information, and differing views, so that the reader will be able to make an informed decision on the issues. Included in the main body of this report as Appendix 7 is an article entitled "Dangerous Myths About Nuclear Arms" by Dr.

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[16] "The Effects of Nuclear War," OTA, U.S. Congress, 1979, p. 3. [Footnote in original.]

[17] "WHO Technical Report," Series No. 151. Geneva, 1957, p. 12. [Footnote in original.]

Edward Teller, one of the most respected physicists in the world, and generally considered to be the father of the hydrogen bomb, which appeared in the November, 1982 issue of *The Reader's Digest.* The article sparked a debate in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* between Frank von Hipple, a senior research physicist at Princeton University, and Dr. Teller. At this point we include these articles,[18] which appeared in the March and April 1983 issues of the *Bulletin,* and particularly commend the source materials which they have cited. In our survey of these citations, we believed that succinctness required including only a representative portion. It should be noted that these scientific investigations (1) have continued for a number of years, indicating long-term concern and (2) make no particular point, either for or against any issue.

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Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban [Extract], August 4, 1983 [1]

* * * * * * *

The delegation of the USSR would like to make some comments in connection with one of the highest priority items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament—the question of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

One of the main reasons why the overwhelming majority of delegations in the Committee on Disarmament agreed to the setting up of an

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[18] Not printed here.

[1] CD/PV 231, pp. 12–15.

ad hoc working group on this question with a clearly limited mandate was their sincere desire to use every possibility now existing for the achievement of progress towards the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests. The question we have to answer now is whether the Committee, after two years' discussion of the problem, is any nearer to the attainment of the goal set before it by the international community, namely, the elaboration as soon as possible of a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and its submission for consideration to the United Nations General Assembly.

An objective analysis of the present situation and of the documents submitted by a number of delegations, and in particular by the United Kingdom delegation, leads us to the conclusion that we are now further away from such an agreement than we were a few years ago when mutually acceptable agreements were reached, as set forth in the tripartite report to the Committee on Disarmament (document CD/130).[2] It was precisely these agreements which the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban decided to take into account, amongst other things, in its work.

From the discussions which have taken place it is obvious that, evidently as the result of a political decision to put off indefinitely the conclusion of a treaty, the positions of two of the participants in the tripartite negotiations, at least in certain important respects, have undergone a change. In order not to make unsubstantiated statements, I shall give some examples.

Whereas these two powers earlier agreed to the drawing of a clear distinction between nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the provision of separate regimes for them under the treaty, they now insist that, as is stated in the United Kingdom working paper, document CD/383, "confidence in a comprehensive treaty could only be ensured if all nuclear explosions were banned".[3] That is not in accordance with either the letter or the spirit of paragraph 10 of the tripartite report (CD/130) which states in particular that the treaty will be accompanied by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which will be an integral part of the treaty, that the parties will establish a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and that without delay after the entry into force of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests the parties will keep under consideration the subject of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the aspect of precluding military benefits.

We wish once more to emphasize that the Soviet Union—and other countries, too, as has become clear in the course of the discussions—has always attached and continues to attach greater importance to the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and derives significant economic benefits from such use. Nevertheless, in the interests of the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the USSR agreed during the tripartite negotiations to the establishment of a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. That important step by the Soviet Union was welcomed at the time both by the participants in the tripartite negotiations and by the world community as a whole.

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[2] For the report, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 317–321.

[3] *Ante*, June 17.

Like many others, we consider that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is of secondary importance by comparison with the goal of a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and can be settled in the context of negotiations after the conclusion of the treaty.

We believe that the position concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes formulated in the Soviet document, "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", [4] offers a possibility for the solution of the question of the scope of the prohibition within the framework of a treaty on a mutually acceptable basis. It permits on the one hand the attainment of the principal goal, namely, the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and on the other the working out, during the period of the moratorium, of procedures for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions. Thus there are no insurmountable obstacles in this connection, unless, of course, deliberate efforts are made to create such obstacles.

Another question on which the positions of the two nuclear-weapon powers have undergone a change is that of seismic verification. While earlier they agreed in principle that the system for the international exchange of seismic data would be sufficient for the purposes of an international treaty, they evidently now have a different opinion. Whereas earlier they agreed to include in the text of the treaty only the broad outlines of a system for the international exchange of seismic data, leaving the details of the system to be worked out by a committee of experts, they now insist that all the details should be worked out before the entry into force of the treaty.

Essentially, what the United Kingdom working paper (document CD/402) submitted at our plenary meeting on 2 August implies is that until all the technical problems of verification have been resolved, there can be no negotiations. [5] This applies particularly to seismic verification. This would mean in practice that it would never be possible to devise a verification system that would be 100 per cent satisfactory to the States which consider this essential. All the more strange and incomprehensible, then, is the conclusion reached in the United Kingdom paper that "What is at issue is the political will to recognize that the correct path towards an agreed treaty—however long it may prove to be—leads through detailed consideration of the verification issues". This is an upside-down kind of logic. It shows, not a will to negotiate, but a will to block negotiations. It is obvious that no problems can be resolved by mere discussion, however detailed that may be. These problems can only be resolved at the negotiating table, not in a debating club.

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[4] *Ante*, Feb. 16.

[5] *Ante*, Aug. 1.

Furthermore, as is clear from the tripartite report, the two nuclear-weapon States did not earlier see any need for a supplementary system for the detection of airborne radioactivity. Now they are arguing in favour of such a system for the verification of compliance with a prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Lastly, whereas earlier these States agreed in principle to the carrying out of on-site inspections on a voluntary basis, they are now rushing to support a view put forward by certain delegations in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group which amounts in effect to the principle of verifications on a compulsory basis.

It is difficult to see how all this can be reconciled with what is stated in paragraph 19 of the tripartite report (CD/130), namely, that "the three negotiating parties believe that the verification measures being negotiated—particularly the provisions regarding the international exchange of seismic data, the committee of experts and on-site inspections—break significant new ground in international arms limitation efforts and will give all treaty parties the opportunity to participate in a substantial and constructive way in the process of verifying compliance with the treaty".

I have given these examples because they are extremely characteristic of the approach of these delegations to the work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and, indeed, to the entire problem as a whole. The main purpose of this approach is to play down the agreements reached in the past and to emphasize the divergences of views that subsist, with respect to practically all aspects of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, instead of trying to achieve mutually acceptable agreements on these aspects. The ultimate objective of all this seems to us perfectly obvious—to try to convince the States members of the Committee on Disarmament and the entire world community that it is not the lack of political will on their part that is the obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests but the difficulties of a technical and other nature that are, allegedly, objectively inherent in this problem.

The questions dealt with in the two documents submitted by the United Kingdom delegation, as everyone very well knows, are not problems which have only just arisen. They existed 20 years ago also. But as the history of the tripartite negotiations shows, they can be settled on a mutually acceptable basis if there is a sincere desire for and interest in the conclusion of a treaty. When that desire is missing, then we are presented with such documents, the sole object of which is to put us still further away from a possible agreement.

The position of the Soviet Union on the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, including the verification of such a prohibition, has been frequently and sufficiently clearly set forth at the most varied levels.

The Soviet Union belongs to the majority group of delegations which believe that the means of verification existing today, as, indeed, those which existed 10, 15 and even 20 years ago, are entirely adequate to provide an assurance of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and that what is required here is a political decision.

If we turn again to document CD/130, we can see that the participants in the tripartite negotiations worked out an extremely well-balanced system for the verification of compliance with the provisions of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The participants in the tripartite negotiations reached an agreement in principle not only on all the basic components of such a system but also on very many of its specific technical details. We do not wish to minimize the divergences of views which nevertheless subsisted between the participants in the negotiations. The important thing, however, is that the international verification system established under the treaty should give the parties to it sufficient—I repeat, sufficient—assurance that the provisions of the treaty are being complied with by the parties, that such a system should deter the parties from engaging in any activity prohibited by the treaty and that it should, to the maximum degree possible, preclude unwarranted suspicions arising in connection with events of natural origin.

We believe that such a system is to be found in the Soviet document, "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" (CD/346) and that it is adequate for the purposes of the treaty.

We are firmly convinced that the only way to achieve progress towards the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests consists in endeavouring, in a constructive spirit, to widen the area of agreement reached over many years of laborious negotiations, instead of trying to undermine that agreement, changing positions, raising more and more problems and emphasizing and exaggerating differences of views. The metamorphosis which has taken place in the attitude of two of the participants in the tripartite negotiations on the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is truly profound. This phenomenon is, generally speaking, extremely dangerous in negotiations. I should like to ask a question: supposing we had somehow reached an agreement yesterday, what guarantee would there be that the parties to the agreement who behave in such a way would not repudiate it today?

In conclusion, the delegation of the USSR would like to make a few brief comments on the progress report of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts which has been submitted to the Committee for its consideration.

The Soviet delegation has no objections to the report and agrees that the Committee should take note of it.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. The first and second reports of the Group of Experts, contained in documents CCD/558 of 1978 [6] and CD/43 of 1979, [7] provide a sound basis for the drafting of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

We should like to emphasize that the Group of Experts ought to continue its activity solely—solely—in the context of the negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests. Otherwise, its activity will mislead world public opinion as to the true situation in the Committee on Disarmament on this issue.

The Group's final report, adopted on the basis of consensus, should constitute a useful contribution to the successful furtherance of the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Statement by the Brazilian Representative (de Souza e Silva) to the Committee on Disarmament: Negative Security Assurances [Extract], August 9, 1983 [1]

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My statement today will be devoted to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As we know, despite the time and energy already spent on its consideration by this Committee, no progress has been achieved so far on this subject.

We have before us the five unilateral declarations issued by the present five nuclear-weapon Powers. As a general comment, one can say that they have two basic elements in common. First, none of them was submitted either to negotiation or consultation with the non-nuclear countries they are supposed to guarantee; secondly, none of them mentions the final objective of nuclear disarmament.

I shall now attempt to make a brief analysis both of their substance and of their object, that is, the countries to which they are meant to apply.

The assurance offered by China is the most comprehensive of them all, besides being the only one to be presented without conditions. The Chinese declaration, however, refers to "non-nuclear countries", an expression whose definition the Chinese Government did not care to make. [2]

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[6] An excerpt of this report has been included in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 103–110.

[7] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 476–481.

[1] CD/PV.232, pp. 14–18.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980,* p. 321.

The Soviet Union linked its assurances to two conditions: first, the renunciation of the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons, and secondly, their absence from the territories of the States to be guaranteed. Moreover, the Soviet Foreign Minister, explaining the Soviet assurances at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, stated the willingness of his country to enter into "appropriate bilateral agreement" with any non-nuclear-weapon country. [3] One might wonder: does that mean that the guarantees would apply only to those countries which have concluded such agreements with the Soviet Union?

France most recently updated the terms of its assurances when Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, at the second special session, announced his country's conditions for not using nuclear arms against non-nuclear-weapon countries. Such conditions include the familiar references to non-nuclear-weapon status and to the commitment not to seek such weapons, plus the event of aggression, in "association or alliance" with a nuclear-weapon Power, against France or a State with which France has a "security commitment". [4]

As no objective precision or juridical definition is provided for a clear understanding of key concepts such as "pledge not to seek nuclear weapons", or "association or alliance", or "security commitment", one might fairly conclude that the authors of that declaration reserve for themselves the right to its final interpretation according to the circumstances as they may present themselves.

The United States and the United Kingdom issued declarations of a quite similar nature. [5]

In addition to some of the same vague conditions and qualifications we find in the French assurances, those two Powers decided that non-nuclear countries, in order to enjoy an exemption from nuclear threat or nuclear aggression, must sign a binding instrument through which they would renounce not only the nuclear military option but also their right to full access to nuclear technology, including nuclear peaceful explosions.

The qualifications and conditions contained in the five declarations amount to a categorization of the object of the guarantees, that is, the non-nuclear-weapon countries.

Let me try to organize such categories of non-nuclear-weapon countries, drawing directly from the elements contained in the five declarations.

China's formula distinguishes between nuclear-weapon Powers, which are entitled to a non-first-strike guarantee, and non-nuclear countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones, which enjoy an unconditional guarantee against any nuclear strike.

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[3] *Ibid., 1978*, p. 348.

[4] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 341–348.

[5] For the U.S. declaration, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 384; for the U.K., A/S-10/AC. 1/30, June 13, 1978.

The Soviet Union's categorization makes a distinction between States that do not have such weapons in their territories and those that do have them.

For France, there are States that have pledged not to seek nuclear weapons and those that have not made such a pledge; in the case of an act of aggression against France, there are those non-nuclear-weapon countries that might carry it out in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon Power and those that do not have such an association or alliance.

Finally, the United States and the United Kingdom introduce their own categorization of non-nuclear-weapon States: those that belong to the non-proliferation Treaty,[6] or a similar instrument, and those that are not parties to it; in case of an attack against them or their allies a further categorization is made between those that are their allies and those that are not their allies; furthermore, they make the distinction between an attacking State that has an association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon Power and one that has not.

On the basis of those elements, set up by the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves, the non-nuclear-weapon countries would be subdivided into several categories for the purpose of becoming entitled to guarantees: (a) States that do not possess nuclear weapons; (b) States that have renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons; (c) States which have pledged not to seek nuclear weapons; (d) States that are parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone; (e) States in whose territories there are no nuclear weapons; (f) States that do not carry out an act of aggression against the guarantor or its allies in association or alliance with another nuclear-weapon Power; (g) States which are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, or a similar binding instrument, provided such unspecified instrument also forbids them to acquire nuclear explosive devices.

One must conclude, therefore, that in order to be assured by all five nuclear-weapon Powers, non-nuclear countries must meet all seven requirements without being able, however, to determine, either in practice or in juridical terms, whether the nuclear-weapon Powers will consider that the requirements have been met to their satisfaction.

In this mess of qualifications, conditions and categorizations, a few pertinent questions might be asked in order to clarify some of the issues at stake.

In the first place, who are the allies referred to in some declarations? We all know the members of the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. But the nuclear-weapon Powers may have, as indeed they have, other alliances and other allies that were not made public to the general knowledge of other countries. With what countries do nuclear-weapon Powers have security commitments? In both cases it seems elementary for this exercise that the names of the countries enjoying some special status should be clearly listed in order that by exclusion, at least, we know which are the non-nuclear countries that do not enjoy the same status as far as guarantees are concerned.

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[6] The text of the treaty is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

When the non-proliferation Treaty is mentioned, together with other internationally binding commitments to the same effect, what are these other legal instruments so evasively mentioned? When the expressions "association" or "alliance" are loosely used one might ask: what kind of association or alliance are we talking about?—military? political? diplomatic? economic?

If those simple questions cannot be clearly answered, one might as well conclude that vagueness and imprecision are the best weapons for applying or withdrawing the guarantees whenever and wherever it would suit the strategic interests of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

It is obvious, in this situation, that it is up to the nuclear-weapon Powers, if they so wish, to clarify the conditions which they have set for assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group of 21 already made that point very explicitly in document CD/280, issued just before the second special session on disarmament, and to which the nuclear-weapon Powers paid no heed. Document CD/407, introduced today by Ambassador Ahmad, the distinguished representative of Pakistan, reiterates the stand of the Group of 21, which my delegation fully supports. One way of making some headway would be for the nuclear-weapon Powers to present their categorization in a more orderly manner, by at least stating unequivocally what is meant by some of the more obscure elements contained in their formulations.

The situation described above is unfortunate enough. Recently, however, other events have contributed to heightening the doubts of non-nuclear-weapon countries about the credibility of the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon Powers on negative assurances concerning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

As we all know, the Latin American nations negotiated and concluded, in 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.[7] The parties to that instrument undertook unequivocally to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear materials and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and for that purpose to prohibit and prevent, in their respective territories, the testing, use, manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, together with any form of possession of such weapons. In order to ensure respect for the denuclearized status of the zone it established, the Treaty contains two additional Protocols. Protocol II deals, in its article 3, with security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States; Protocol I contains the undertaking, by the nuclear-weapon Powers, to apply the statute of denuclearization in respect of warlike purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty in territories for which they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty.

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[7] The treaty and its protocols are *ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

The commitment on the extension of negative assurances, contained in article 3 of Protocol II, is simple and unconditional; it provides unequivocally that the nuclear-weapon Powers signatories of the Protocol "undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties" to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. No qualifications or conditions whatsoever are attached to that formulation. Notwithstanding this, after signing the Protocol, the nuclear-weapon Powers immediately proceeded to qualify and condition that commitment.

Upon signing Protocol II, on 20 December 1967, the Government of the United Kingdom declared that it considered itself free to reconsider the extent to which it could be regarded as committed by the provisions of the Protocol, in the event of any act of aggression by a contracting party to the Treaty in which that party was supported by a nuclear-weapon State, and repeated that declaration upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of Protocol II, on 11 December 1969. The United States made a similar declaration. [8]

France stated that the obligation contained therein presented no obstacle to the full exercise of the right of self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, [9] which means, for France, the right to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries, even if they are parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Finally, the Soviet Union stated, at the time of its signature, that it would regard as incompatible with the obligations assumed by States parties to the Treaty any action by those States which are not compatible with their non-nuclear status, including an act of aggression with the support of a State which is in possession of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union went further in reserving its right to reconsider its attitude to the Protocol in the event of any actions on the part of other States possessing nuclear weapons—that is, the other nuclear-weapon Powers—which are incompatible, in the Soviet Union's view, with their obligations under Protocol II. [10]

All such interpretations amount to virtual reservations to the obligations entered into in the Protocol, even though article 27 of the Treaty, freely concluded by sovereign States, is clear in its provision that the Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. In other words, this is an attempt to subvert the established international juridical order.

This brief analysis shows that the simple, unconditional obligation meant to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon Powers under article 3 of Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been converted into several different qualified commitments, so as to fit their categorization of non-nuclear-weapon countries. It is as if the Treaty of Tlatelolco constituted, in the eyes of the nuclear-weapon Powers, a legally binding guarantee given to them by the non-nuclear-weapon countries of the zone that *they* will never, in any circumstances, threaten the nuclear-weapon Powers, either individually or in association with another nuclear-weapon Power.

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[8] Cf. *ibid., 1971*, p. 311.

[9] *Ibid., 1973*, p. 454.

[10] *Ibid., 1978*, p. 311.

Besides those unilateral interpretations, qualifications and reservations, the nuclear-weapon Powers are not even subject to a system or machinery of verification of compliance with the obligations they have undertaken as parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. At the recent meeting of OPANAL, which stands for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, several fundamental questions regarding compliance with the obligations contained in Protocol II were raised. The resolution adopted by consensus at the close of that meeting takes note of the denunciation formulated by a State signatory of the Treaty to the effect that a nuclear-weapon State had introduced nuclear weapons within the zone of application of the Treaty. It also takes note of the declaration by the nuclear-weapon Power concerned by which it affirms that it complied with its obligations under both Protocols I and II to the Treaty. The resolution concludes by requesting the Council of OPANAL to oversee the strict observance of Protocol II, and by asking the General Assembly to be seized of the question.[11] My delegation looks forward to the discussion of this important issue at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly later this year. It seems that verification of compliance might at last catch up with the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves.

The whole question of the extension of negative security assurances must be seen as part and parcel of the commitment to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. There can be no effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons if the nuclear-weapon States continue to cling to the notion that such weapons should be their exclusive and perpetual property, to the detriment of the security of all other countries. No unilateral declaration, especially when worded in general and imprecise terms, can offset the real threat to the security of non-nuclear-weapon countries represented by the very existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of a few Powers. The right to self-defence is certainly not the monopoly of the five existing nuclear-weapon Powers. If they recognize no limits to their own right to provide for their security, through the possession and threat of nuclear weapons, they cannot expect that others will refrain for long from exercising the same option. A stable world order cannot be built on double standards designed to perpetuate the might of a few and the powerlessness of many.

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[11] *Ante*, May 19.

Letter From Former Chancellor Kreisky of Austria to President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, August 10, 1983[1]

When I retired from the Austrian government you wrote me a letter in a spirit of friendship which I highly appreciated. This spirit has encouraged me to turn to you with some of my reflections on the current situation about which I am deeply concerned.

Let me make it very clear that I am not interested in publicity. For three months now, I have refused almost all requests for interviews. You will know that in the democratic countries of Europe there are enormous differences in public opinion. But what I consider much more important is that people in these democracies have come to be divided by a deep gap over the armament issue. I am profoundly convinced of your sincere commitment to the idea of peace, but I should like to add that I am equally convinced that Mr. Andropov does not want war. Yet, the experience of a long political career tells me that such events may occur even against the will of leading personalities in powerful states. And I am afraid that something of the kind might happen some day.

The point in question are the Geneva talks for which a deadline has been set. I am not under the delusion that I can make any contribution to these talks, but I should like to urge you not to be guided by prestige thinking. If no results should be reached by the deadline you have set, do prolong the negotiating period for another few months, and reasonable people throughout the world will understand that you seek to get a result. There is no sense in upholding prestige while letting negotiations founder. Please consider that a prolongation may also induce the other party to continue negotiating; and if it is made, it will be by far easier to explain to people who is responsible for a failure to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.

My particular concern is young people's relationship to democracy, because they are the main force in the peace movement. I am quite simply afraid that democracy may be headed for a crisis similar to the one I lived through in my youth, and that such a crisis might generate developments none of us would welcome. Democratic order is a delicate structure which cannot be maintained by rough interference from the state's law and order forces. What is at stake is the relationship of a major part of Europe's young generation to democracy, and I appeal to you, Mister President, to attribute just value to this stake. It will be of decisive and profound importance to the relations between our democracies, the European and the American one.

I belong to those who know what European democracy owes to American democracy. We are fully aware of the role played by the two big American parties. It is entirely up to the American people to choose their leaders, but the crucial point is solidarity between the democracies, which can only be strong, if democracy is deeply rooted in people's minds.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Sept. 18, 1983, p. 1265. The President's response to Mr. Kreisky, Sept. 12, 1983, is printed *post*.

This is why I ask you to reconsider if you really wish to adhere to that deadline. It might involve the danger of turning it into a "dead line" other than the one implied by Anglo-Saxon usage.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Outer Space, August 11, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation would like to dwell upon item 7 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the elaboration of international legal rules protecting outer space against various aspects of the arms race. As far back as in 1958, soon after the launching of the first Soviet artificial satellite, which marked the beginning of the space era, the USSR put forward a proposal for the prohibition of all types of military use of outer space without exception, [2] on the basis of strict observance of the principle of equal security and the non-admission of military advantage for any side.

In the following years, on the initiative of the Soviet Union and with its active participation, international agreements were elaborated and concluded aimed at the use of space only for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind.

The Committee on Disarmament has been dealing with the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space only relatively recently—since the last session. The inclusion of this item in the agenda was necessary because in spite of the existing agreements and treaties there are still wide gaps whereby outer space can be filled with lethal weapons. In this connection, the concern of the States members of the Committee reflects the legitimate concern of the entire international community, alarmed at the ominous prospect of the transformation of outer space into a potential theatre of military activities.

The rapid development of military space technology has made the extremely important task of firmly preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space a priority international problem. The maintenance of peace and security in outer space has tremendous significance for the preservation of peace on earth. In the final analysis, any space weapon has a terrestrial orientation. War in space will not be an alternative to war on earth; it will be a mere prelude to war on our entire planet.

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[1] CD/PV.233, pp. 22–26.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, p. 976.

Mr. Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in his reply to the address of a group of American scientists and public figures emphasized that "prevention of the militarization of outer space is one of the priority problems facing mankind, and much here on earth will depend on whether it is solved". [3]

The militarization of outer space would complicate the international situation as a whole, increase distrust in the relations between States, create obstacles to international co-operation in the sphere of the peaceful use of space, reduce the prospects for the limitation of the arms race in other fields, have a destabilizing effect on the strategic situation and inevitably increase the probability of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

But even if not used for its primary purpose, military space technology causes tremendous damage, depriving the international community of immense funds and material resources. For example, during the current fiscal year, the United States has increased the allocations for the development of space weapons systems up to $2 billion. The deployment of combat systems of space weapons would cost hundreds of billions of dollars. At a time when many countries need material assistance for their social and economic development, expenditure of truly astronomical sums on the arms race in outer space is nothing but the robbery of peoples.

Some delegations, hindering the starting of negotiations on item 7 of the agenda, argue that at present there are no specific types of weapons designed for use in and from outer space.

Such an approach seems to us incorrect. Common sense and logic call for the preventive prohibition of new types of weapons before their deployment, creation and development. The facts show that we are on the threshold of the appearance of space types of weapons. At present the United States is completing the development of an anti-satellite missile system (ASAT) on the basis of the F-15 fighter plane. There is no doubt that the deployment of anti-satellite weapons will threaten both peaceful activity in space and the existence of national systems of communication, control and command, which would lead to the most dangerous destabilization of the strategic situation.

It is also known that the United States is developing directed-energy laser- and particle-beam weapons, which it is planned to deploy in space. Their main task would be the destruction of space-, air-, ground- and sea-based targets. If anyone thinks that the appearance of laser weapons in space is possible only in the distant future, he is mistaken. The appearance of laser space weapons in the 1980s and 1990s is not improbable. According to information from the American press agencies published in the *International Herald Tribune* of 27 July 1983, the United States Air Force recently tested a laser weapon against real targets. An airborne laser device destroyed five "Sidewinder" missiles over the testing ground in the state of California. There is no doubt that after this weapon is fully developed it will be tested in outer space. Space-, air- and ground-based objects may become its targets.

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[3] *Ante*, Apr. 27.

In the opinion of United States experts, many of the key types of technology necessary for the development of combat space systems already exist. Other, more sophisticated types of technology for the conduct of war in space are being developed in research programmes. The press has published information about such projects as the stationing in space of huge mirrors which would aim a laser beam at missiles and destroy them during flight. The possibilities are being discussed of implementing the project of Edward Teller. The project envisages the creation of a powerful space-based X-ray laser which would have as its energy-source the radiation resulting from the explosion of a "small nuclear charge launched into orbit".

The creation of space weapons is being intensified. Large sums are being allocated for their development. According to information in the magazine *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, the United States Defense Department's plan envisages a more than twelve-fold increase in the amount spent on the development of laser systems for use in and from space by 1988.

During the current session of the Committee, our anxiety concerning the negative consequences of an arms race in outer space has increased still further as a result of the decision taken by the United States administration to begin developing a global anti-missile defence system which could be deployed in space. This was the subject, in particular, of the speech made by President Reagan on 23 March 1983.[4]

The decision to develop a new space-based ABM system is an extremely dangerous step which opens up a new avenue for the arms race in outer space. The implementation of this decision would inevitably destabilize the strategic situation in the world and would thus increase the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. There is a strict linkage between offensive and defensive systems of strategic weapons. This linkage was recognized by the official United States representatives at the SALT talks. If this linkage is upset by one side, that will inevitably lead to the adoption of retaliatory measures by the other side. As was pointed out by the eminent Soviet scientist, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences E.P. Velikhov, whatever the efficiency of a new ABM system, whatever the degree of its reliability in destroying missiles, efforts would immediately be made to improve them, precisely in order to overcome this system. The arms race would be raised to a new and more dangerous level, and military confrontation would become still more threatening. Academician E.P. Velikhov stated that "the so-called defensive weapon would be followed in space by the offensive one. This would represent the greatest threat to the security and sovereignty of all peoples on the planet, since the system would be deployed over their heads, in their sky".

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[4] *Ante*

The development of a global ABM system, while intensifying the strategic arms race as a whole, inhibits the adoption of new measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In addition to that, it inevitably undermines the foundation of the treaties and agreements existing in this field. The decision to develop a new ABM system is contrary to the 1972 Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. According to the Treaty (article V), the parties undertook "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based".[5]

It cannot be excluded either that in an attempt to implement the decision of President Reagan certain technical projects might be adopted which would jeopardize the implementation of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear explosions in outer space.[6] We have already mentioned one project which envisages nuclear explosions in outer space in order to provide X-ray lasers with energy. In connection with this project one of the participants in the negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, Mr. Averell Harriman, not long ago stated the following: "I am disturbed to hear consideration of discarding the limited test ban to test nuclear weapons for use in outer space in the naive belief that war in space will not reach back to earth". (*International Herald Tribune*, 28 July 1983).

The facts and examples stated above, in our view, quite convincingly show what a tragedy it would be for mankind if outer space were transformed into a source of disputes between States, and more particularly a sphere of military confrontation between them. Only a complete lack of understanding of a heavy responsibility and extreme madness can lead to a policy whereby the space over man's head contains a threat to his very existence.

The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet delegation on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space is designed to prevent such a threat.[7] We proposed that States should undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. According to the draft the parties to the treaty should use space objects in accordance with the principles of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and in the interests of maintaining peace and security and developing co-operation and mutual understanding. The Soviet draft was met with understanding by the international community. In its resolutions 36/99 and 37/83 the United Nations General Assembly urged the Committee on Disarmament to work out an appropriate international agreement. On this basis, the delegations of the socialist countries in the Committee already have for two years now been advocating the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to elaborate a treaty or treaties.

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[5] For text of the treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[6] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[7] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 334–336.

We are prepared to go even further—to agree on the prohibition in general of the use of force both in outer space and from outer space in respect of earth. The Soviet Union is ready to enter into negotiations on these subjects without delay. Our proposal for the holding of a meeting of Soviet and American scientists and experts to discuss the possible implications of the creation of a full-scale ABM system also remains in force. I wish to recall also that at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly the Soviet side reaffirmed its readiness to resume bilateral Soviet-American talks on anti-satellite systems.[8]

This is the essence of our position on item 7 of the agenda—not to start an arms race where there has been none, and to put a stop to it where it is now taking place. The Soviet delegation believes that further delay in starting negotiations on item 7 is inadmissible. Even during the short time since the inclusion in the Committee's agenda of the item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the ominous scripts of "star wars" have been embodied in quite real military space programmes.

Mr. Andropov stated in his reply to the address of the group of American scientists and public figures, "We have now reached a truly decisive moment: either the States concerned must immediately sit at the negotiating table and start to elaborate a treaty banning the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, or the arms race will spread to outer space".

This position corresponds to the interests of the overwhelming majority of peoples and States. The international community is becoming more and more clearly aware of the danger looming over it. The scientists of various countries have been warning mankind of the possible implications of the extension of the arms race to outer space. A special declaration on this subject was adopted by Soviet scientists. A number of scientists from the United States and other Western countries have also condemned the plans for the development of a full-scale ABM system. More than 100 United States congressmen and 40 eminent scientists and arms control experts have sent letters to President Reagan calling for immediate agreement with the Soviet Union on the establishment of a bilateral moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in outer space. The letter of the congressmen states: "We are deeply concerned at the threat of an arms race in outer space and are convinced that it is in the United States national interests to avoid it. Such an arms race will threaten our security and undermine international stability and the possibility of achieving future agreements in the arms control field".

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[8] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 753–757.

The representatives of 36 academies of sciences resolutely advocated a peaceful outer space in the declaration they signed in Rome in September 1982.

Finally, the secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament has received in recent weeks hundreds of letters from representatives of non-governmental organizations and private persons demanding the adoption of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Here is one of them, and it is echoed by thousands of others. United States citizen Mrs. L.E. Cole from Tempe writes: "I add my voice to the millions of Americans who long for peace. Please do what you can to achieve agreement among delegates attending the Committee on Disarmament—particularly for a treaty aimed at banning weapons of any kind in outer space. I understand there is a possibility that a working group might be set up to draft such a treaty".

The Committee can no longer disregard the desire of mankind for the boundless ocean of space to remain clean.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is closely linked with the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation of the arms race in its principal manifestations. These questions are at the centre of the attention of the world community and of many international forums, including the Committee on Disarmament. There were recently published in the Soviet Union the replies of the Minister of Defence of the USSR, Marshal Dmitri Ustinov, to questions put by a TASS correspondent, replies which express the Soviet point of view on a whole range of these issues. The replies of the Minister also explained the USSR position regarding the talks with the United States on nuclear arms limitation in Europe and on strategic arms limitation and reduction. Marshal Ustinov also gave the Soviet assessment of the state of affairs at these talks and their prospects.

The Soviet delegation has transmitted the text of the replies of the USSR Minister of Defence to the questions of the TASS correspondent to the secretariat for distribution as an official document of the Committee.[9] We hope that the replies of the USSR Minister of Defence will be carefully studied by delegations.

Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban [Extracts], August 16, 1983[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the Committee's decision at its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, as contained in document CD/358, the *Ad*

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[9] CD/409.

[1] CD/412, pp. 1, 3–9.

Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was re-established on the basis of its former mandate, to continue to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban. The Committee also decided that the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban might thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee which would consider this question with appropriate urgency. It further decided that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of its 1983 session.

II. ORGANISATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Gerhard Herder of the German Democratic Republic as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. At its 218th plenary meeting, on 16 June 1983, the Committee decided that the new representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Harald Rose, would succeed Ambassador Herder as Chairman of the Working Group. Mr. Victor Slipchenko, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Working Group.

3. As was the case in 1982, the delegations of two nuclear-weapon States did not participate in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. A number of delegations expressed their disappointment at this decision and reiterated their hope that it would be reconsidered.

4. At their request, the Committee on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States non members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group: Austria, Burundi, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal, Spain and Turkey.

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III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1983 SESSION

7. At its fourth meeting, on 29 April 1983, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group adopted the following programme of work:

> In discharging its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Group on a Nuclear Test Ban will examine issues of verification of and compliance with a NTB with a view to making further progress towards a corresponding treaty which would be non-discriminatory and could attract the widest possible adherence.
>
> In the examination of issues relating to verification and compliance consideration should be given to all relevant aspects of a treaty on A Nuclear Test Ban.
>
> After a general discussion on the subject matter entrusted to it the *Ad Hoc* Working Group will consider the following six items in the given order. Such consideration should be carried out in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 31 of the Final Doc-

ument of the First SSOD. If necessary, the Chairman will submit annotations pertaining to the various items.

1. Requirements and elements of verification
2. Means of verification, *inter alia:*
   (a) national technical means
   (b) international exchange of seismic data
3. Procedures and Mechanisms for Consultation and Co-operation
4. Committee of Experts
5. Procedures for Complaints
6. On-site inspection

Pursuant to its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on A Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, the Working Group will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Working Group will also take into account the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

8. In connection with the adoption of the programme of work a number of delegations expressed the view that the agreement reached would contribute to a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues entrusted to the Working Group under its mandate. Several delegations made reservations to the effect that their agreement to include in the programme of work a general formulation concerning a future nuclear test ban treaty should not in any way prejudge negotiations on such a treaty.

9. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group discussed and examined various documents submitted to the Committee during its 1983 session by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (CD/346),[2] Sweden (CD/381),[3] the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (CD/383), Australia (CD/384 and CD/400),[4] Japan (CD/388,[5] CD/389 and CD/390), Belgium (CD/NTB/WP.5) and Norway (CD/395). It also had before it the documents submitted towards the end of the session by the United Kingdom (CD/402),[6] Sweden (CD/403) and Australia (CD/405). Referring to certain proposals, in particular the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests" tabled by the USSR (CD/346) and the "Draft treaty banning any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment", submitted by Sweden (CD/381), a number of delegations maintained that they provided sufficient material to proceed

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[2] *Ante*, Feb. 16.
[3] *Ante*, June 14.
[4] *Ante*, July 22.
[5] *Ante*, July 8.
[6] *Ante*, Aug. 1.

without further delay to negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. Some delegations disagreed with this view.

10. In accordance with the programme of work, delegations exchanged views with regard to the scope of a nuclear test ban. A number of delegations stated that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty [7] were legally committed as per the preamble of that instrument to conclude a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time, and they had in the past acknowledged the distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon tests. These delegations maintained that the attitude taken by certain delegations with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was not in keeping with their obligations concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy assumed under agreements in the field of arms limitation and introduced an element of discrimination which was totally unacceptable. They held that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could easily be taken care of by applying the general purpose criterion. They further expressed the view that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were far from posing a unique problem in that respect, noting that indeed, in the case of most disarmament measures, notably a ban on chemical weapons, the purpose criterion had been generally accepted by the international community as the basis for solving the problems posed by the potential military applications of the relevant technology or materials. The question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was, as such, a peripheral matter, which should not be brought up to side-track the Committee from the central issue of achieving a nuclear test ban whose primary aim was to curtail the nuclear arms race.

Several delegations, including those of two nuclear-weapon States, considered it essential that any future nuclear test ban should cover both nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. They argued that this position, which they had always maintained, was consistent with the provisions of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and was based on their conviction that no distinction could be made between a nuclear-weapon test explosion and a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. It was, in their view, impossible in practice to work out a regime for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes that would preclude acquisition of military benefits. These delegations held that this was an issue of genuine concern in respect of the scope and verifiability of a nuclear test ban treaty. It would, in their view, be impossible to apply the general purpose criterion to a nuclear test ban given their conviction that any nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes could also be employed as a weapon.

The delegations of two nuclear-weapon States categorically rejected assertions made by other delegations, which were set out in other sections of this paragraph, explicit or implicit, regarding their national policies on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and regarding any obligations they had assumed respecting nuclear explosions in international agreements. These delegations pointed out that there was no feasible way to ensure that military benefits would not be derived from any nuclear explosion and that to be effective as an arms control measure any ban on nuclear testing must include all nuclear explosions. In their view, all attempts at arguments to the contrary had not been persuasive. They regretted the introduction of issues which in their view were inappropriate to the work of the Working Group.

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[7] For text of the treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

A number of delegations, including that of one nuclear-weapon State, were of the view that a nuclear test ban treaty should prohibit all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments and for all time. With a view to facilitating a speedy conclusion of such a treaty they proposed to establish a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes until appropriate arrangements for conducting them were worked out. Those delegations shared the view that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not be used in order to divert attention from the urgent need to conclude a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. They noted that while two nuclear-weapon States had previously agreed to draw a clear distinction between nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and to provide for them different treatment under a treaty, at present they advocated a ban on all nuclear explosions. Those delegations also considered that the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was a peripheral one in comparison with the aim of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and could be resolved in the context of negotiations after the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

11. There was also an exchange of views concerning participation in a nuclear test ban. It was generally recognized that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States was important to achieve an effective nuclear test ban treaty. Several delegations considered it essential that all nuclear-weapon States become Parties to it from the outset. Other delegations, conscious of the need to reach an early agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty, held that adherence by only the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States amongst the nuclear-weapon States should be a sufficient requirement for its entry into force. The remaining two nuclear-weapon States should then adhere to the treaty within a specified period of time.

12. Pursuant to its programme of work, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group conducted an examination of the substance of all the items contained in the programme. In order to contribute to an orderly discussion and definition of the issues under the Working Group's mandate, the Chairman submitted annotations on five of the items (CD/NTB/CRP.2, 4 and 5). Some delegations commented either orally or in written form on the Chairman's annotations. The results of the Working Group's discussions on each of the items of its programme of work are listed below.

13. *Requirements and elements of verification*

With regard to requirements of verification, a number of delegations maintained that a verification system of a nuclear test ban should be non-discriminatory and based on complete equality of rights and obligations of the Parties to a treaty. This system should be negotiated in a multilateral forum and should guarantee equal access to all States.

It was widely felt that requirements of a verification system of a nuclear test ban treaty depend on the scope of such a treaty. It was pointed out in this connection by several delegations that any agreement with regard to requirements of a verification system could only be reached in a wider context of actual negotiations on a treaty. Other delegations, however, maintained that even in the absence of negotiations some common understanding could still be found on verification requirements.

With regard to basic elements of a verification system of a nuclear test ban it was generally recognized that such a system should be based on a combination of national and international measures and could include, *inter alia:* (a) national technical means; (b) international exchange of seismic data; (c) procedures and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation; (d) multilateral organ or organs of States Parties; (e) procedure for complaints; (f) on-site inspection.

14. *Means of verification*

It was reaffirmed by a number of delegations including that of one nuclear-weapon State that the means of verification presently available were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. In this connection, they referred to the statement made by the United Nations Secretary-General to the CCD on 29 February 1972 in which he, *inter alia,* stated that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve final agreement.[8] Other delegations, including those of two nuclear-weapon States, however, reiterated their view that the question of adequacy of means of verification could only be defined by each State individually on the basis of its national requirements.

A number of delegations reaffirmed their view that the Working Group could usefully consider the institutional and administrative arrangements of a verification system of a nuclear test ban. Other delegations, however, were of the view that such arrangements should be looked into only in the context of negotiations on a treaty.

(a) *National Technical Means.* It was widely felt that national technical means could play an important role in verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. In this connection, a number of delegations stressed the need to ensure that all Parties to a treaty have an equal access to information obtained through national technical means. Some delegations, however, maintained that this information could only be provided on a voluntary basis.

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[8] CCD/PV.545, p. 8.

(b) *International exchange of seismic data.* It was generally recognized that an international exchange of seismic data constituted an essential element of a verification system of a nuclear test ban. It was further recognized that in setting up such an exchange the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events should be used as a basis. In accordance with those recommendations, an international exchange of seismic data could consist of the following main elements: (i) a network of seismic stations; (ii) an international exchange of seismic data over the Global Telecommunications System of the WMO; (iii) international data centers.

Several delegations held that to be effective an international system for the exchange of seismic data should provide for the widest possible global coverage and use advanced technology that could ensure detection and identification of low-magnitude seismic events. Some of them pointed out that the global coverage of potential international seismic systems should be improved in areas where currently deficient, *inter alia,* in areas of the Southern Hemisphere. Several delegations maintained that such a system should be fully operational at the time of a treaty's entry into force. Other delegations, however, were of the view that detailed arrangements for an international exchange of seismic data could only be worked out when it was known which countries would become Parties to a treaty, i.e. after the treaty entered into force. They also felt that for the system to be accessible to all Parties it should be based on widely used technology which all Parties could afford. In this connection, they argued that the technology presently available was quite sufficient for the purposes of verifying compliance with a treaty. Those delegations further maintained that there was a close relationship between political negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty and technical work on a verification system and that the latter should not be carried out as if it were an open-ended exercise that could go on indefinitely so as to take account of every scientific and technological advance. In their view, technical questions should not be used to endlessly postpone treaty negotiations. However, other delegations emphasized that a common view did not exist on all technical problems concerning verification of a nuclear test ban and that scientific and technological advances should be kept under review in order to render the envisaged data exchange system as efficient and effective as possible.

Some delegations pointed to certain improvements that, in their view, should be introduced to the present means of verification in order to ensure better effectiveness of a verification system. In this connection, several delegations maintained that, apart from seismic monitoring network, means of verification of a nuclear test ban should include a similar network to monitor airborne radioactivity. Other delegations, however, questioned the need of establishing such a network.

15. *Procedures and Mechanisms for Consultation and Co-operation*

It was generally recognized that procedures and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation provide an important means for resolving issues of compliance among Parties to a treaty. In this connection, several delegations maintained that consultations should first be held on a bilateral basis and that only if they failed to resolve the issues involved Parties should then have recourse to multilateral procedures. One delegation suggested that, in its view, it would be desirable to address a request for consultations first to a multilateral organ of Parties.

16. *Committee of Experts*

The view was generally shared that it would be desirable for a nuclear test ban treaty to provide for a multilateral organ of States Parties to facilitate consultations and co-operation among those States. It was further recognized that such an organ could be supported by appropriate subsidiary bodies. A number of delegations held that a multilateral organ should be assisted by a technical expert group and a permanent secretariat. Other delegations, however, questioned the need for setting up a cumbersome machinery financed by the States Parties. Various suggestions were put forward with regard to the character and functions of a multilateral organ and its possible subsidiary bodies.

17. *Procedures for Complaints*

It was generally recognized that a nuclear test ban treaty should contain procedures for complaints. In this connection, a number of delegations expressed the view that the possibility of bringing complaints to the Security Council would provide an additional guarantee of compliance with a treaty. Some delegations suggested that complaints could also be brought to a multilateral organ of States Parties.

18. *On-site inspection*

It was widely felt that a system of verification of a nuclear test ban treaty should include a provision for on-site inspection. A number of delegations expressed the firm view that on-site inspections should be carried out by challenge or on a voluntary basis. Some delegations held that it was of crucial importance that a request for an on-site inspection would not meet with a refusal on the part of a State Party in whose territory it should be conducted. Several suggestions were made with regard to procedures of on-site inspections, and rights and functions of inspecting personnel.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

19. Pursuant to its programme of work, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group held a structured discussion to define issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban. A large number of delegations considered that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group had fulfilled its mandate by discussing and defining all the issues relating to verification and compliance of a nuclear test ban during its 1982 and 1983 sessions, and held that the mandate of the Working Group should be changed in order to enable it to

proceed without further delay to negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. Some delegations, however, maintained that the subject was not exhausted and that during the discussions a number of views were expressed which required further examination.

In the absence of consensus, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group recalled the decision of the Committee on Disarmament that "the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee which will consider this question with appropriate urgency" (CD/358). [9] In this connection, a large number of delegations requested that this matter should be taken up by the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1984 session.

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Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War [Extract], August 16, 1983 [1]

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As regards the item on the prevention of nuclear war, about which I am going to speak, I must begin by pointing out that from a practical point of view the results of the Committee's work in that connection during its 1983 session, which is about to end, may be said to be virtually nil.

True, the States members of the Group of 21 and the socialist States, after two months of persevering efforts—to illustrate which allow me to recall the statements made by the Mexican delegation in February, March and April of this year, the texts of which can be easily consulted in the verbatim records of the Committee's 197th, 198th, 202nd, 203rd and 216th plenary meetings—managed to overcome the resistance, as obstinate as it was incomprehensible, of certain other States to the inclusion in the agenda of this subject which merits the maximum priority and which, as was rightly said, involves the vital interests of all the peoples of the world. Although almost in the last moments of the spring part of the Committee's session the opposing delegations felt obliged to abandon their front line of defence, that was only in order to resort more energetically during this part of the session to their delaying and obstructionist tactics, now opposing—as they have been doing for some time in connection with other items—the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group, which would be the most effective instrument for undertaking immediate negotiations "with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war", a task which the General Assembly entrusted specifically to the Committee on Disarmament as "a matter of the highest priority" in its last resolution on the subject, resolution 37/78 I, which, as you will recall, was adopted by 130 votes in favour and none against on 9 December 1982.

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[9] *Ante*, Mar. 29.

[1] CD/PV.234, pp. 15–22.

In the opinion which the Government of Mexico transmitted to the Secretary-General—it is reproduced in the Committee's document CD/282 dated 19 April 1982—in response to the request formulated by the General Assembly in its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981, the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the subject of the prevention of nuclear war, Mexico stressed that such prevention represented, in the words of the Final Document of 1978, "the most acute and urgent task of the present day". [2]

The opinion recalled a number of other emphatic declarations contained in the Final Document, such as that "enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority"; that "the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind"; that "existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth" and that "the existence of nuclear weapons" constitutes a "threat to the very survival of mankind".

On the basis of those declarations the communication stated that the few measures in the category "confidence-building measures" which the nuclear-weapon powers had so far managed to agree on, "however laudable they may be, may be termed, within the context of the terrifying situation confronting the world, cosmetic measures" and with the utmost justification the communication made the following categorical assertion:

> What all peoples of the earth whose vital interests are at stake have been awaiting for some time are effective measures which will enable the threat of a nuclear war to be permanently removed. The Government of Mexico is convinced that the recipe for achieving this is very simple: it would be sufficient to take seriously the provisions which were adopted by consensus in 1978 and which were outlined in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Such "effective measures", which basically means the same thing as the "appropriate and practical measures" referred to in the resolution adopted last year by the General Assembly, are to be found in plenty in the Final Document, although, as is done in the Mexican reply, the ones which could unhesitatingly be picked out as the most priority measures for the prevention of nuclear war are those contained in paragraph 47, which says that "it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons", and paragraph 50, which sets forth the objectives of the nuclear disarmament agreements the negotiation of which is the most urgent and which together ought to culminate in the "ultimate and complete elimination" of nuclear weapons.

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[2] I.e., Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

In the rest of this statement I should like to describe five specific measures of this kind which, in addition to being realistic, faithfully reflect the aspirations of mankind.

The first of these measures, which the peoples of the world have been anxiously awaiting for more than a quarter of a century, is the elaboration, through multilateral negotiations, of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

The adoption of this measure would mean simply that the three States which are depositaries of the Moscow Treaty signed in 1963 [3] would have finally decided to honour the legally binding commitments they assumed in that Treaty and reaffirmed five years later in the non-proliferation Treaty [4] to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and to "continue negotiations to this end". A first step in that direction which is urgently necessary is to respond to the appeal addressed to the Committee on Disarmament by the General Assembly in its resolution 37/72 to assign to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on item 1 of its agenda "a mandate which should provide for the multilateral negotiation" of the treaty in question.

This appears all the more necessary and advisable when we remember that, in addition to the numerous reasons set forth by the General Assembly in the resolution I have referred to—among which I may mention the fact that the continuance of testing "will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war" and that the treaty in question would constitute "a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons"—the Committee now has at its disposal, among the many documents which have been submitted to it during its 1983 session, the text of a "draft treaty banning any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment" submitted by Sweden (document CD/381), [5] that of the "basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" submitted by the Soviet Union (document CD/346) [6] and a working paper prepared by the United Kingdom concerning "peaceful nuclear explosions in relation to a nuclear test ban" (document CD/383). [7]

A second measure which would also constitute an important contribution to the prevention of nuclear war would be the implementation of resolution 37/100 B, adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December 1982, in which it urged the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear arms freeze with the structure and scope described in that resolution.

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[3] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.
[4] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.
[5] *Ante,* June 14.
[6] *Ante,* Feb. 16.
[7] *Ante,* June 17.

It is envisaged that the initial duration of the freeze would be five years, with the proviso that that period would be subject to prolongation "in the event of other nuclear-weapon States joining in such a freeze, as the General Assembly expects them to do".

The preamble to that resolution contains various points of special significance, among which I should like to mention the following.

The nuclear arms freeze is not an end in itself. It would, however, constitute the most effective first step that can at present be taken both to prevent any further increase in the vast nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers and to expedite the negotiations towards a substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear weaponry.

In order to dispel in advance any doubts about the strict observance of the undertakings involved in the freeze, the General Assembly provided expressly in its resolution that the freeze would be subject, not only to the relevant measures and procedures of verification already agreed on by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties [8]—which posed verification problems far more complicated than those that might arise in the case of the proposed freeze—but also to those agreed upon in principle by the same parties during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban held at Geneva between 1977 and 1980.

The foregoing, combined with the fact that the freeze would mean halting all activities under any arms programme, has led someone so well versed in the matter as Herbert Scoville, former deputy director of the CIA, to declare that "verification can no longer legitimately be invoked as an excuse for not proceeding towards an agreement on a freeze".

The General Assembly noted that the conditions prevailing in the world today are a source of even more serious concern than those which existed when the Final Document was adopted five years ago because of various factors such as the deterioration of the international situation, the increase in the accuracy, speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons, the promotion of illusory doctrines of "limited" or "winnable" nuclear war and the many false alarms which have occurred in recent years owing to the malfunctioning of computers which could very well result tomorrow in tragic and incalculable consequences for mankind.

Lastly, the General Assembly stated—with very good reason, for there are many and very authoritative declarations from the most varied sources supporting its claim—that "at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an over-all rough parity".

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[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff., and *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

The third measure I should like to suggest here as a very modest step towards the final goal envisaged at the first special session devoted to disarmament and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 at the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament, that is to say, the goal of the "complete elimination of nuclear weapons", is that of an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon powers not to be the first to use those terrible instruments of mass destruction.

This could be done in two stages: in the first stage the United States, France and the United Kingdom could solemnly undertake, through unilateral declarations—like those made by China in 1964 [9] and by the Soviet Union in 1982[10]—not to take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons. If they could do this the result, from the moral, psychological and practical points of view, would be virtually the same as if the five nuclear-weapon powers had become parties to a treaty or convention formally prohibiting the first use of such weapons. It would seem desirable, however, that an additional effort should be made to strengthen that obligation from the strictly legal point of view by incorporating it in an instrument of a kind recognized as being fully binding in the sphere of international law.

Since up to now it has been only in the United States and the European countries members of NATO that the first use of nuclear weapons has been seriously considered as a viable proposition, it is encouraging to note that in recent months many prominent personalities and institutions of that region have either given favourable consideration to the idea or have even gone so far as to propose openly that the United States and the other members of the Atlantic alliance should abandon that strategy. Here are some examples of this trend.

The article published in the 1982 spring issue of the review, *Foreign Affairs,* by four international experts of the United States of recognized renown in their respective fields, namely, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith; another article published in the *New York Times* on 10 May 1982 by Egon Bahr, a prominent member of the *Bundestag* of the Federal Republic of Germany; an address given at the National Press Club in Washington on 14 April 1982 by Paul C. Warnke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; an interview with George Ball, former Under-Secretary of State, published in the 7 June 1982 issue of the periodical, *The New Yorker;* a memorandum submitted to the General Assembly in June 1982 by a group known as the Generals for Peace and Disarmament which includes a field-marshal, a former President of Portugal, 10 retired generals and an admiral, also retired, all of them nationals of countries members of NATO, in which they have held a wide variety of important military posts; the declaration adopted in September 1982, after two successive meetings held in London and Rome in March and June of that year with the participation of representatives of 35 academies of sciences throughout the world, by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, a declaration which includes *inter alia* the significant words, "We appeal to all nations never to be the first to use nuclear weapons"; the report adopted in 1983 by the "Union of Concerned Scientists", whose headquarters are in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which was drafted with the assistance of a number of generals and admirals including Field-Marshal Lord Carver, Brigadier-General Karl Christian Krause and General Jochen Loser, as well as many experts of the stature of Lord Zuckerman, and which states: "The present first-use strategy will very probably lead to the catastrophe of a nuclear war; it is intellectually and morally unacceptable and internally constitutes a factor of division among the nations of the alliance"; the declaration adopted by the Synod of Bishops of the Church of England after a debate which took place on 10 February 1983 in which the Synod stated its belief that "it is a moral obligation of all countries (including the members of NATO) solemnly and publicly to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever", and to end this list, which is the product of a very rigorous selection from the wealth of material existing on this subject, the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace approved by the Bishops of the United States on 3 May of this year, which includes, among many other things, the following pithy statement: "We cannot visualize any situation in which the deliberate starting of a nuclear war even on the most limited scale could be morally justified. Any non-nuclear-weapon attack by any other State should be resisted by means that are also non-nuclear . . .".[11]

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[9] *Ibid., 1964,* p. 449.

[10] *Ibid., 1982,* pp. 349–352.

The fourth measure I should like to propose is one the execution of which depends exclusively on the Committee on Disarmament, for it consists in the establishment, in February next year, of an *ad hoc* working group to begin without delay multilateral negotiations on the item which has from the beginning occupied the second place on its agenda, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The work of such a working group would complement that of the working group on the prevention of nuclear war, a closely-connected subject, which we are sure will be set up at the beginning of the 1984 session with a mandate corresponding to the instructions contained in the General Assembly's resolution 37/78 I.

The question which forms the subject of item 2 of the Committee's agenda has been under discussion since 1979, the first year of the work of this negotiating body after its constitution with its present membership, and has been dealt with in working papers submitted by the Group of 21 and the Group of Socialist States as well as in innumerable statements. Both documents and statements have constantly stressed the urgent need to conduct multilateral negotiations with a view to putting an end to the unbridled arms race referred to in the title of the item. More than two years ago the Group of 21, in its working paper document CD/180, said the following:

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[11] *The New York Times*, May 5, 1983, pp. B16–B17.

> The competitive accumulation of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States cannot be condoned on the grounds that it is indispensable to their security. Such an argument is patently false, considering that the increase in nuclear arsenals, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it, and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Moreover, the Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.[12]

In the same document the Group reiterated its conviction, already expressed the year before, that the immediate objective of the consideration of item 2 by the Committee should be the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group with a mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues, as follows:

> (i) The elaboration and clarification of the states of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;
>
> (ii) Clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war;
>
> (iii) Clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;
>
> (iv) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted forums.

In spite of these constant efforts and of the fact that the proposal in question, in addition to being supported by the overwhelming majority of the States members of the Committee, has year after year been decisively supported by the General Assembly, the opposition of a small number of States has up to now prevented the establishment of the *ad hoc* working group in question, which would undoubtedly constitute an effective aid towards the prevention of nuclear war.

The fifth and last measure I should like to recommend is the fusion into a single forum of the two series of bilateral negotiations which have been taking place for some time now in Geneva between the

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[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 171–173.

United States and the Soviet Union, acting, presumably, in consultation with their respective allies, the first series, which began in November 1981, being concerned with the so-called intermediate-range nuclear weapons and the second series, which began in June 1982, being concerned with strategic nuclear weapons.

I should like to add to this suggestion, which might be considered institutional in nature, two other complementary suggestions of the same kind: the first is that the sphere of the negotiations should be broadened to include, in addition to strategic and intermediate-range weapons, what are called "tactical nuclear weapons" of which, as is known, there are some thousands deployed in forward positions in Europe. In this connection I should like to recall that the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues—also known as the Palme Commission after the name of its Chairman, Olof Palme, now the Prime Minister of Sweden—in its report entitled "Common security—a blueprint for survival", made the following observations, among others:

> Battlefield nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear air defence systems and atomic demolition munitions, raise important problems of stability. Air defence systems would likely create pressures for delegation of authority to use them before combat actually was initiated. Battlefield weapons also would create pressures for early use in any armed conflict. Their location near the front lines of any war would mean that political leaders may face a choice early in a conflict of either authorizing the use of battlefield weapons or watching them be overrun. Each side's fears that the other side might resort to 'first use' could intensify crises and multiply the dangers of the initiation of nuclear conflict and its escalation.

The Palme Commission concludes this section of its report by stating:

> Security for both sides would improve if these weapons were mutually reduced and withdrawn. These weapons are currently not the subject of East-West negotiations. They should be, and urgently. [13]

My second additional suggestion is that the negotiating superpowers should stop treating the "vital interest" of all the peoples of the world in disarmament negotiations—to which clear reference is made more than once in the Final Document—as some kind of intangible fantasy, the figment of the collective imagination of the United Nations General Assembly.

In order to correct that situation and to give reality to the expression of that interest, even if only symbolically, we believe that it would be desirable for the negotiations between the two superpowers, which would in the future, as I have suggested, be broadened to cover the nuclear trio I have mentioned—strategic weapons, intermediate-range weapons and tactical weapons—to be broadened also as regards the number of participants, through the inclusion among them of a personal representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. His function would be double. On the one hand he would be there in order to safeguard the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States which do not belong to either of the two alliances. On the other hand he could also, on occasions, act as a friendly arbitrator, to use the term customarily employed in international law, who would help the two powerful interlocutors to find a way out of the deadlock so frequently reached in their talks, as, alas, seems to have happened at the present time.

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[13] *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (A/CN.10/38, Apr. 8, 1983), pp. 111–112. An extract of the recommendations and proposals is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 227–256.

We believe that this suggestion of ours ought to be seriously considered by the two superpowers. For it should be borne in mind that, as the General Assembly has emphasized on many occasions and as I have said a number of times today, but I should like to repeat it once more, what is at stake is not solely the national interests of the nuclear-weapon States but, in the last analysis, the vital interests of all the peoples of the world and even the very survival of mankind.

A comparison between the irrevocable objectives in the sphere of nuclear disarmament solemnly enshrined in the Final Document and the conditions at present prevailing in this respect in the international order provokes not only understandable alarm but also justified indignation. The modest arsenals of 1945 which contained only a small number of bombs of very few kilotonnes have grown to a total of some 50,000 nuclear warheads whose destructive power is conservatively estimated at a figure rather higher than that of a million bombs of the kind dropped on Hiroshima, which means that the nuclear arsenals of today are more than enough to annihilate 60 times the total population of the earth.

This situation, justifying both alarm and indignation, was summed up in the working paper of the Group of 21 distributed on 4 February last in document CD/341, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:

> The greatest peril facing the world today is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, a war which would have devastating results on belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The actions of the nuclear-weapon States which are engaged in a new and frenzied round of the nuclear arms race and attempts by some nuclear-weapon States to promote the highly dangerous concept of a limited nuclear war and to minimize the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, have greatly increased the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines which are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing

> the outbreak of nuclear war. Concern for common security and global survival should be the basis of international peace rather than the concept of deterrence. International peace must be based on a commitment by all States to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual annihilation.[14]

In the light of the foregoing it seems to us that the "appropriate and practical measures" for the prevention of nuclear war to the negotiation of which the General Assembly asked the Committee on Disarmament to give the highest priority, should be measures commensurate with the gravity and imminence of the dangers that are to be averted. No one would think of trying to cure cancer with aspirin tablets or to put out a fire with thimblefuls of water. It is not a question of embarking on an interminable—if not impossible—academic exercise, as if we were required to prepare some kind of doctoral thesis on the subject which was supposed to be exhaustive. That would lead us to try to decide—as I have said once before—whether the account given in Genesis or Darwin's version were the true story of the origin of man. No. What we should be trying to do here is to make an effective contribution, through the negotiation of concrete measures having the two characteristics mentioned by the General Assembly, to the accomplishment of what the General Assembly rightly called "the most acute and urgent task of the present day". The five measures which my delegation considered it its duty to recommend in this statement are far from constituting a complete list of the measures which might appear desirable. But they are, we are convinced, truly illustrative of the type of measures which the General Assembly and the peoples of the world hope for as the fruit of the multilateral negotiations of the Committee on Disarmament and of the bilateral negotiations which have been taking place in this same city of Geneva which is the seat of the Committee.

TASS Communique Concerning the Meeting of Soviet President Andropov With a Group of U.S. Senators, August 18, 1983[1]

On 18 August Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, received in the Kremlin the United States Senators Claiborne Pell, Russell Long, Paul Sarbanes, Dale Bumpers, Patrick Leahy, James Sasser, Donald Riegle, Howard Metzenbaum and Dennis DeConcini, who arrived in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Parliamentary group of the USSR.

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[14] *Ante*

[1] CD/420

Talking with them, Yuri Andropov characterized the present-day state of relations between the USSR and the United States as tense virtually in every field. They have become such not because the Soviet side has chosen so. The Soviet Union would like to have with the United States a level of concord ensuring normal, stable and good relations in the mutual interests of both sides and to the great benefit of world peace.

If, nonetheless, someone hopes to attain superiority over the USSR amidst tensions, in a game without rules, this is a dangerous miscalculation.

Dwelling upon the issue of nuclear arms in Europe, Yuri Andropov emphasized that very much, including the future development of Soviet-United States relations, depended on whether a mutually acceptable solution of that issue would be found at the Geneva negotiations, whether it would be possible to stop a lethally dangerous new round of the arms race in that region. The stationing in Europe of United States "Pershing" and cruise missiles will have far-reaching consequences which will inevitably affect the United States as well. The Americans will also feel the difference between the situation which existed before deployment and that which will take shape after it.

Summing up the essence of a number of constructive proposals put forward by the Soviet Union at the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, Yuri Andropov said that if those proposals were translated into practice, the aggregate number of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe would be cut by approximately two thirds both on the Soviet Union's and on NATO's side. Moreover, NATO would only reduce its air force whereas the Soviet Union would also cut back its missiles, including a large number of modern SS-20 missiles. As a result, the Soviet Union would be left with far fewer missiles and warheads on them than it had in 1976, when no one in the West talked about the Soviet Union's superiority in weaponry of this type.

It was stressed that the success of the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe was still possible if the United States showed an interest in an honest agreement on an equal basis. However, we do not advise anyone to count on the Soviet Union's making unilateral concessions to the prejudice of its own security.

As the limitation of strategic weapons was discussed, the Senators were told that it was absolutely unrealistic to try, as the United States administration was doing, to convince or compel the other side to break down the structure of its strategic forces and to reduce their basic components, while keeping for oneself a completely free hand. This question, too, can only be resolved on the basis of parity. The lack of such a solution would mean the continuation of the strategic arms race and the escalation of the threat of nuclear war. The USSR is against this.

The Senators' attention was also drawn to the Soviet proposal to "freeze" the strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. We suggest, Yuri Andropov said, that not only should the number of the existing missiles not be raised but that the development and testing of new types and varieties of strategic arms should be renounced and that the modernization of the existing systems should be limited to the utmost. We would agree to an even broader option, namely, a freeze on all the components of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States. This could set an example to other countries. The freeze agreement could immediately halt the dangerous process of the runaway nuclear arms race, thus meeting the dreams of all the peoples. An entirely different political atmosphere would emerge, in which it would be easier to seek agreement on reductions in the stockpiles of such weaponry.

Yuri Andropov placed special emphasis on an issue of paramount significance, the serious and real threat of the arms race spreading to outer space. Recalling the idea he had expressed earlier concerning the prohibition of the use of force in general, both in space and from space with respect to the earth, he set forth new major initiatives of the USSR in that field.

First of all, Yuri Andropov said, the Soviet Union deems it necessary to come to terms on a complete prohibition of the testing and deployment of any space-based weapons for hitting targets on earth, in the air or in outer space.

Further, the USSR is prepared to solve radically the issue of anti-satellite weapons—to agree on the elimination of the existing anti-satellite systems and the prohibition of the development of new ones.

The Soviet Union will submit detailed proposals on that issue for consideration at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

In addition to these proposals, Yuri Andropov said, the Soviet leadership has taken an exceptionally important decision: the USSR assumes the commitment not to be the first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapon, that is, it imposes a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for the entire period during which other countries, including the United States, refrain from stationing anti-satellite weapons of any type in outer space.

That decision is a fresh concrete demonstration of the Soviet Union's goodwill and its determination to work in practice for stronger peace and security for the peoples. It is to be hoped that the United States will follow this example.

Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons [Extracts], August 18, 1983[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament adopted the following decision, relating to item 5 on its agenda, contained in document CD/358, which, *inter alia,* reads:

> . . .
>
> The Committee decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1983 session the *Ad Hoc* Working Groups on a Nuclear Test Ban, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons . . .
>
> It is understood that the *ad hoc* working groups may start their work on the basis of their former mandates . . .
>
> The *ad hoc* working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work before the conclusion of its 1983 session.[2]

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Curt Lidgard, representative of Sweden, as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. Dr. Lin Kuo-Chung of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held six meetings between 8 April and 29 April and between 13 June and 17 August 1983.

4. At its 1st meeting, on 8 April, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, upon the Chairman's suggestion, decided to establish two groups (A and B) to undertake substantive examinations of the two major issues before the Working Group.[3] Group A, under the coordinatorship of the representative of the United States of America, would consider questions relating to "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and Group B, under the coordinatorship of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, would examine issues related to prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. It was the understanding that the question of linkage between these two issues would be left aside for the time being and would be considered in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group itself at the end of the current session.

5. At their request, representatives of the following States, not members of the Committee on Disarmament, were invited to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group during the 1983 session: Austria, Burundi, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

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[1] CD/414, pp. 1-2, 4-6, and annexes 1 & 2.

[2] *Ante,* Mar. 29.

[3] A delegation, while not opposing the establishment of Group B, abstained from participating in that Group. [Footnote in original.]

6. In carrying out its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group took into account paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.[4] It also took into consideration the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in particular those adopted in connection with the Second Disarmament Decade in 1980.[5] In addition to various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its previous sessions, the Working Group took into account in particular resolution 37/99C of the General Assembly. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution read as follows:

> 1. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;
>
> 2. *Further requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue its search for a solution to the question of prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to it to this end;

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III. SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT DURING THE 1983 SESSION

8. In accordance with the Programme of Work adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group as contained in document CD/RW/WP.42, Groups A and B held three meetings each between 11 and 28 April, under the coordinatorship of Mr. Morris D. Busby (USA) and Mr. Yury Nazarkin (USSR) respectively. The Coordinators of Groups A and B submitted progress reports, as contained in Annexes I and II of document CD/RW/WP.44 respectively.

9. During the second part of the 1983 session, Group A held nine meetings between 13 June and 8 August, under the coordinatorship of Mr. Morris D. Busby (USA). The Coordinator submitted the report of the Group on its work to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, as contained in Annex I of this report. Group B held 11 meetings between 21 June and 12 August under the coordinatorship of Mr. Boris P. Prokofiev (USSR). The Coordinator submitted the report of the Group on its work to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, as contained in Annex II of this report.

10. At its 4th and 5th meetings, on 11 and 15 August, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group considered the question of linkage between the two major issues before the Working Group, namely "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities". Taking into account various suggestions and proposals made by delegations, the Secretariat prepared a compilation of alterna-

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 426.

[5] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirty-fifth Session Supp. No. 42* (A/35/42), pp. 8 ff.

tive mechanisms for the linkage between them (CD/RW/WP.51). The compilation contains the following alternative mechanisms:

(1) One single treaty on radiological weapons covering both issues, in light of the fact that attacks against nuclear facilities could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons;

(2) One general treaty on radiological weapons containing two protocols, namely: Protocol 1 dealing with "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and Protocol II dealing with "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities";

(3) One treaty with one protocol, either integral or optional, namely: the treaty itself dealing with "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and the protocol dealing with "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities";

(4) Two separate treaties dealing with the two issues with clauses of understanding that the conclusion of one treaty will be pending the conclusion of the other treaty;

(5) One treaty dealing with "traditional radiological weapons subject matter, with clauses of understanding that the relevant provisions contained in the existing legal instruments, in particular, the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should be amended in such a manner that the question of "prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities" be fully covered; [6]

(6) Two separate treaties dealing with the two issues independently without any linkage.

In addition the following alternative mechanisms were suggested:

(1) One treaty on the "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" with the insertion of a clause stipulating that the Contracting Parties undertake to start negotiations as soon as possible on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

(2) One treaty dealing with the "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" could have clauses of understanding to the effect that the question of prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities, including the question of the scope of such a prohibition, be further considered with a view to reaching agreement on these issues.

On the basis of this compilation delegations had a general exchange of views. The discussions revealed that positions of delegations on this question continued to be considerably far apart from each other.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11. Although certain outstanding issues continued to remain in the "traditional radiological weapons subject matter", the extensive discussions and intensive negotiations in Group A have further clarified many of the problems involved and would pave the way for future work on the subject. The substantive examination of the question of

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[6] *International Legal Materials,* Nov. 16, 1977, No. 6, pp. 1391 ff.

READEX FICHE pages tightly bound

prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in Group B was considered useful and necessary and to have led to a better comprehension of the problems. The various positions of delegations, especially as to the scope of prohibition and legal aspects of the issue, were clarified. The discussion contributed considerably to the examination of common approaches and of potential activities of the Group in the future.

12. It was recognized that the "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" and the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities were important and that these issues needed solution. The Committee on Disarmament could continue to be the most appropriate forum to deal with them.

13. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group agreed to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament to re-establish an *ad hoc* working group at the beginning of its 1984 session to continue its work and in that context to review and assess how best to make progress on the subject matter.

ANNEX I

REPORT OF GROUP A

1. As requested by the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons on 8 April 1983, Group A has considered the subject of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense. A separate group was requested to deal with the question of prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities. Group A held 12 meetings during the course of this session. The purpose of Group A, as defined by the Chairman, was to ". . . try to solve the still outstanding substantive issues and leave for the time being the question of the linkage between them."

2. At its initial meeting on 11 April 1983, Group A decided on a working method whereby there would be substantive discussion of four outstanding issues: the question of a definition of radiological weapons; the question of an appropriate article in the treaty regarding peaceful uses; the question of undertakings and obligations of states in the related field of nuclear disarmament; and the question of compliance provisions. The Co-ordinator proposed, and the Group agreed, that negotiations should be held on these issues, based on all existing proposals as well as suggested compromise texts which the Co-ordinator would prepare and present to the Group, in order to arrive at accommodations. Group A would attempt to find consensus and to forward to the full RW Working Group an overall treaty text.

3. Based on previously submitted consolidated texts and all relevant proposals, Group A considered each of the four outstanding issues. In this context, Group A took note of and expressed appreciation for the efforts of previous chairmen of the Radiological Weapons Working Group, Ambassador Komives of Hungary and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany. During the course of these deliberations, the Co-ordinator submitted, on his own responsibility, several

suggestions for compromise (CD/RW/CRP.20) which were in turn discussed by the Group.

4. Differences on matters of substance remain. On 3 August 1983, the Co-ordinator prepared a consolidated negotiating text of a radiological weapons treaty (CD/RW/CRP.20/Rev.1) and submitted it to the Group. The purpose of the Co-ordinator's text was to reflect in a single document the state of the negotiations, including areas of agreement and disagreement. The Co-ordinator pointed out that the text contained internal brackets and in some cases alternative language. This method had been employed not to indicate agreement on the unbracketed portion of the text but, rather, to highlight key issues upon which subsequent negotiations should focus.

5. The Group considered the Co-ordinator's text. There was no agreement on the text, but the Group agreed that the Co-ordinator forward it, along with this report, to the Radiological Weapons Working Group, it being understood that the text was prepared on his own responsibility.

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ANNEX TO ANNEX I

Treaty Prohibiting Radiological Weapons

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Determined to strengthen international peace and security and to preserve mankind from the danger of new means of warfare,

Desiring to contribute to the cause of halting the arms race and recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons would contribute to this end,

[Affirming the obligation of all States] [7] [Determined] to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the prohibition of recognized weapons of mass destruction and to bring about general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming in this regard the urgency of the pursuit and early conclusion of negotiations on effective measures aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Noting the provisions contained in other agreements relating to this objective,

Conscious that the use of [any form of] radiological weapons could have devastating consequences for mankind,

Stressing therefore the particular importance of accession to this Treaty by the greatest possible number of States,

[Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of radioactive materials should be available to all States Parties to this Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries, and recognizing the need for peaceful uses of sources of radiation from radioactive decay in different fields of human activities,]

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[7] These and following brackets are in the source text.

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has urged the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, transfer, or use radiological weapons. For the purposes of this Treaty, the term "radiological weapon" means:

(a) Any device, including any weapon or equipment, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material;

(b) Any radioactive material specifically [designed] for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes never under any circumstances to employ deliberately, by its dissemination, any radioactive material to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material, whether or not such material is specifically defined as a radiological weapon in paragraph 1 of this article.

3. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any person, State, group of States, or international organization to engage in any of the activities which the States Parties to the Treaty have undertaken not to engage in under the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

[ARTICLE II

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to contribute [to the fullest possible extent] [fully] to the strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of radioactive materials and of sources of radiation from radioactive decay[, and to the development of adequate measures of protection for all States against harmful effects of radiation].

2. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to facilitate, and has the right to participate in, the [fullest possible] [full] exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information regarding the peaceful uses referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, taking into account the needs of the developing countries.

3. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the States Parties to this Treaty to develop and apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to international co-operation in this field[, consistent with the need to

prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons]; and no provisions of this Treaty shall hinder the use of sources of radiation from radioactive decay for peaceful purposes, in accordance with generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law concerning such use.]

ARTICLE III

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to prevent loss of and to prohibit and prevent diversion to radiological weapons of radioactive materials that might be used for such weapons.

ARTICLE IV

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, to take any measures which it considers necessary to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Treaty anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE V

[1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not apply to nuclear explosive devices or to radioactive material produced by them.]

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from any existing rules of international law applicable in armed conflict or limiting or detracting from obligations assumed by the States Parties under any other relevant international agreement.

[ARTICLE V BIS

The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to pursue urgently negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of effective measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the achievement of nuclear disarmament.]

ARTICLE VI

1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may be raised in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Treaty.

2. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures may include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as of a consultative committee and a fact-finding panel as provided for in article VII of this Treaty.

3. The States Parties to this Treaty shall exchange to the fullest possible extent, bilaterally or multilaterally, information deemed necessary to provide assurance of fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

1. For the purpose of effective fulfilment of paragraph 2 of article VI of this Treaty, a consultative committee and a standing fact-finding panel shall be established. Their functions and rules of procedure are established in Annexes I and II, respectively, which constitute integral parts of the Treaty.

2. Any State Party to this Treaty which has reasons to believe that any other State Party may not be in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, or which has concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous, and is not satisfied with the results of the consultations provided for under article VI of the Treaty, may request the Depositary to initiate an inquiry to ascertain the facts. Such a request should include all relevant information, as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.

3. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 2 of this article, the Depositary shall convene as soon as possible, and in any case within 10 days of the receipt of a request from any State Party, the standing fact-finding panel established pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article.

4. If the possibilities for fact-finding pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article have been exhausted without resolution of the problem, [five or more States Parties] [any State Party] may request the Depositary to convene a meeting of the consultative committee of States Parties to consider the matter.

5. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with the consultative committee and with the fact-finding panel with a view to facilitating their work.

[6. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to provide assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party to the Treaty which has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Treaty.]

[7. The provisions of this article shall not be interpreted as affecting the rights and duties of States Parties under the Charter of the United Nations, including bringing to the attention of the Security Council concerns about compliance with this Treaty.]

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any State Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.

[2. Any State Party proposing amendments to this Treaty may request the Depositary to seek the views of the States Parties on whether a conference should be convened to consider the proposal. Thereupon, if requested to do so by a majority of the States Parties, the Depositary shall convene a conference to which he shall invite all States Parties to consider such a proposal.]

3. An amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Treaty which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary

of instruments of acceptance by a majority of the States Parties. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties[,] [and] to the Depositary[, and to the United Nations Security Council] three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE X

1. [Five] [Ten] years after entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of States Parties shall be convened by the Depositary to review the [scope and] operation of the Treaty, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized [and to consider any proposals for amendments then pending]. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments [likely to affect the provisions of] [relevant to] the Treaty. [States [not Parties] [signatories] to the Treaty shall be invited to the conference as observers.]

2. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of States Parties may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objectives.

3. If no review conference has been convened within 10 years following the conclusion of the previous review conference, the Depositary shall solicit the views of all States Parties on the holding of such a conference. If one-third or 10 of the States Parties, whichever number is less, respond affirmatively, the Depositary shall take immediate steps to convene the conference.

ARTICLE XI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by [fifteen] [twenty] governments in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into

force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments thereto, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XII

This Treaty, of which the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to the governments of the signatory and acceding States.

ANNEX I

[Consultative Committee]

1. The consultative committee of States Parties[, in addition to establishing the fact-finding panel as provided for in annex II,] shall undertake to resolve any problem which may be raised by the [States Parties] [State Party] requesting a meeting of the committee. For this purpose, the assembled States Parties shall be entitled to request and receive any information which a State Party is in a position to communicate.

2. The work of the consultative committee shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. The committee shall [decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work] [take decisions], where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. [There shall be no voting on matters of substance.] The chairman shall have no vote.

3. Any State Party may participate in the work of the consultative committee. Each representative on the committee may be assisted at meetings by advisers.

4. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as chairman of the committee.

5. The consultative committee shall be convened by its chairman[:

(a) within 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty for the purpose of establishing the standing fact-finding panel;

(b)] as soon as possible and in any case within 30 days after a request for a meeting pursuant to paragraph 4 of article VII of the Treaty.

6. Each State Party shall have the right, through the chairman, to request from States and from international organizations such infor-

mation and assistance as the State Party considers desirable for the accomplishment of the committee's work.

7. A summary of any [problem-solving] meeting, incorporating all views and information presented during the meeting, shall be prepared. The chairman shall distribute the summary to all States Parties.

ANNEX II

[FACT-FINDING PANEL]

1. The standing fact-finding panel shall undertake to make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views relevant to any problem referred to it by the Depositary pursuant to paragraph 3 of article VII of this Treaty. [Pursuant to paragraph 5 of article VII of the Treaty, the fact-finding panel may carry out on-site investigations when necessary.]

[2. The fact-finding panel shall be composed of not more than 15 members representing State Parties:

(a) Ten members shall be appointed by the [chairman] [consultative committee] after consultation with States Parties. In selecting these members due regard shall be given to ensuring an appropriate geographic balance. Members shall be named for a two-year period, with five members being replaced each year;

(b) In addition, those permanent members of the United Nations Security Council who are parties to the Treaty shall also be represented on the fact-finding panel.]

[2. The fact-finding panel shall be composed of not more than (blank) members representing States Parties. Members of the initial panel shall be appointed by the [chairman, after consultation with States Parties,] [consultative committee] at its first meeting, one-third being named for one year, one-third for two years, and one-third for three years. Thereafter all members shall be named for a three-year period by the chairman [of the consultative committee, following principles decided by the committee during its first meeting and] after consultation with States Parties. In selecting the members, due regard shall be given to ensuring an appropriate geographical balance.]

3. Each member may be assisted by one or more advisers.

4. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as chairman of the panel[, unless the panel decides otherwise under the procedures established in paragraph 5 of this annex].

5. The work of the fact-finding panel shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. [At the first meeting of the panel, to be held not later than 60 days after its establishment [by the consultative committee], the Depositary shall submit recommendations, based on consultations with States Parties and signatories, as to the organization of the work of the panel, including any necessary resources.] [The panel shall decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work,

where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There shall be no voting on matters of substance.] [The panel shall take decisions, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.] The chairman shall have no vote.

6. Each member shall have the right, through the chairman, to request from States and from international organizations such information and assistance as the member considers desirable for the accomplishment of the work of the panel.

7. The State Party requesting the inquiry and any State Party against which the inquiry is directed shall have the right to [participate in the work of the panel] [be represented at meetings but may not take part in decisions], whether or not they are members of the panel.

8. The fact-finding panel shall, without delay, transmit to [the Depositary] [all States Parties] a report on its work, including its findings of fact and incorporating all views and information presented to the panel during its proceedings[.] [, together with such recommendations as it may deem appropriate. If the panel is unable to secure sufficient data for factual findings, it shall state the reasons for that inability.] [The Depositary shall distribute the report to all States Parties.]

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ANNEX II

REPORT OF GROUP B ON THE QUESTION OF PROHIBITION OF ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR FACILITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the decision adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons at its first meeting on 8 April 1983, Group B was established with the purpose of considering the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities with the understanding that the question of linkage between this issue and the "traditional radiological weapons subject matter" would be left aside for the time being.

2. In carrying out of its task, Group B took into account all relevant proposals submitted on the subject and held three meetings between 18 and 28 April, under the Co-ordinatorship of Mr. Yury K. Nazarkin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, during the first part of 1983 session. The Group devoted its efforts to the consideration of various issues involved in the subject such as scope, legal question, zones, as well as compliance and verification. At the conclusion of the first part of the 1983 session, the Co-ordinator submitted a progress report on the work of Group B of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group

on Radiological Weapons at its second meeting held on 29 April 1983, as contained in Annex II of document CD/RW/WP.44.

3. During the second part of 1983 session, Group B held 14 meetings between 21 June and 12 August under the Co-ordinatorship of Mr. Boris P. Prokofiev, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. At the initial meeting of this period, the Group decided, upon the suggestion of the Co-ordinator to continue to concentrate its efforts on those issues which have been considered during the first part of the session.

4. In the course of its deliberations the Group also considered the various proposals, suggestions and commentaries contained in the documents and working papers submitted to the Committee and its subsidiary bodies before and during the 1983 session. The list of these documents is contained in document CD/RW/CRP.24, as annexed to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. In addition to these documents, the Group took into consideration the proposals made and the views expressed by delegations on the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in the Committee on Disarmament and the regular and special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. In this connection a number of delegations stressed the importance of the question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy as proposed at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was the other side of the problem of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

II. SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT

Objectives

5. The view was widely held that there was a need for effective international legal measures prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities because such attacks could result in mass destruction. In this connection, a view was expressed that attacks on certain nuclear facilities might lead to such a destructive effect as that of a nuclear explosion. There was also an exchange of views concerning the precise nature of the objective to be pursued, namely, whether the purpose should be:

—to prohibit attacks on such facilities as a form of radiological weapon or, more precisely, as a means of radiological warfare;
—to avoid effects of weapons of mass destruction;
—to strengthen the existing legal protection of such facilities;
—to ensure the safe development of nuclear power energy; or
—a combination of the objectives mentioned above.

While many delegations held that the objective, in keeping with the mandate of the Working Group, should be the avoidance of effects of mass destruction, no consensus could be reached on this issue. Some delegations argued that approaches which relied on the concept of an attack on a nuclear facility being equivalent to the use of a radiological weapon, or on concepts of "mass destruction" were unlikely to be fruitful. They suggested that a more practical approach should be adopted which would try to establish the primary purpose of any further ban of attacks on nuclear facilities, determine practical limits to the scope of any new ban and from these considerations determine how far existing instruments were already adequate in this respect. Other delegations stated that attempts to thwart negotiations on a subject of such high importance to international community should also not be allowed to be fruitful. They pointed out that avoidance of possible mass destruction through radiological warfare by attacks on nuclear facilities was indeed the basis as well as the primary purpose of the Group's work. The existing instruments were entirely insufficient in this respect.

Scope of prohibition

6. There was general understanding among the delegations that the question of a definition of the scope of the ban, or the kind of nuclear facilities to be protected, constituted one of the key issues of a future international instrument. In this connection a number of specific proposals and suggestions were made regarding categories or types of nuclear facilities to be covered by a possible agreement. Several main points of views were expressed in that regard and it was suggested that the prohibition of attacks should apply to:

—All nuclear facilities;
—All nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon developing States;
—Civilian nuclear facilities only;
—Civilian nuclear facilities above a specified power threshold for nuclear reactors and above a specified level of quality and quantity of radioactive materials for other facilities;
—All nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards system.

It was generally understood, however, that naval vessels, submarines, space vehicles as well as other devices having nuclear installations and designed as weapons systems would not be considered within the context of "nuclear facilities" as referred to under the subject of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

7. In connection with the scope of the ban, some delegations drew attention to the fact that there was also a problem of dual-purpose nuclear facilities, that is, facilities which can be used both for peaceful and for military purposes, and a problem of distinguishing between military and civilian nuclear facilities. Other delegations stated that the difficulty in strictly distinguishing between military and civilian nuclear facilities was another important reason for all nuclear facilities to be protected. A view was expressed in this regard that an effective existing criterion to identify nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes is the IAEA safeguards system and that therefore among nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes at least those facilities under the IAEA safeguards should be included in the scope of protection. Other delegations considered that this criterion was not sufficient.

8. Some delegations stated that all nuclear facilities in the non-nuclear-weapon States were civilian facilities, and at least, these should all enjoy protection from attacks. Other delegations held that the scope of any agreement should not automatically include all nuclear facilities whether located in non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon States. Further, a view was also expressed that the concept of "generic danger" might be applied when identifying the types of facilities to be protected, and that that concept might also be used to determine the points in time when protection should begin and cease to operate.

9. It was suggested that the scope of a possible future treaty could very well be limited to nuclear power and research reactors, nuclear fuel production and reprocessing plants as well as fissionable materials, spent fuel and high level waste storage.

Legal aspects of the question

10. The Group examined some legal aspects of the problem of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. The discussion centered on questions whether certain relevant provisions in the existing international instruments, in particular Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, are adequate, as well as possible types of an agreement to be elaborated. In this connection some delegations stated that the existing international law provided for a substantial protection of the nuclear facilities in question, and that they had not been convinced of the necessity for additional protection. Other delegations held that since the protection covered by the Additional Protocol I was inadequate in scope, contained a number of reservations and allowed a subjective interpretation of its relevant provisions by military commanders on a tactical level, there was a clear need for a new international agreement, for the necessary protection of nuclear facilities. In the course of discussion the question of the application of the ENMOD Convention to the issue of military attacks on civilian nuclear facilities was also raised. [8]

Zones

11. The Group also discussed the rationale of establishing protective zones around nuclear facilities to be protected. In this context zones based on circles with a definite radius were mentioned. However, substantial doubts were expressed as to the feasibility and usefulness of the concept of protective zones, especially in view of the existing differences in the design, typical inventory and location of the various facilities to be protected. Another view was held that there were difficulties with that concept in the case of nuclear power stations. It was suggested that, instead of protective zones, a provision should be included that an attacker should assume absolute liability if severe

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[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977,* pp. 322–326.

radiological consequences occur. The problem of clandestine use of protective zones for military purposes was also touched upon.

Compliance and verification

12. With regard to matters concerning compliance and verification aspects of a possible agreement it was argued that consideration of those issues would depend to a great degree on the scope of prohibition. It was felt in this connection that solution of this problem would be possible only after the scope of the ban had been determined. Some delegations pointed out that the question of verification and compliance should be seen in its proper perspective and in seeking a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities it is the prohibited action, not the mechanism of control on the potential victim, which ought to be the subject of verification and compliance. Other delegations considered this view somewhat over-simplified. A view was also held that the issue of compliance and verification was irrelevant since it was sufficient to establish the fact of an attack. Some delegations were of the opinion that if the scope of the agreement would be limited to those facilities which were placed under the IAEA safeguards system the control procedure could be much simplified and made more efficient with respect to all such facilities, except those in the possession of nuclear-weapon States. Other delegations believed that such an approach was discriminatory and had no relevance to the question of compliance and verification.

III. CONCLUSIONS

13. In spite of differences of opinion among delegations on specific matters, it was generally recognized that the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities was an important issue which needed solution and that it was also a complex problem. The exchange of views on the subject in the Group was considered as necessary and useful. It helped to clarify the various positions of delegations, in particular the scope of prohibition and the relevant legal questions. It also contributed substantially to the examination of possible common approaches and potential main avenues of the activities of the Group in the future.

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Statement by the Hungarian Representative (Kómives) to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War [Extract], August 18, 1983 [1]

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The subject of my statement today is the prevention of nuclear war. I would like to elaborate in particular on the question of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, addressing some of the points raised by various delegations in this connection.

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[1] CD/PV.235, pp. 6–13.

The prevention of nuclear war is an urgent and at the same time complicated task. It is not an easy job to find for it rapid-acting or tailor-made solutions. As was eloquently stated at our plenary meeting on 7 July: "Mankind has wrestled with the problems of preventing war and preserving peace since Cain slew Abel". The only addition that could be made to this idea is the following: the above-mentioned struggle of mankind with the dilemma posed by the threat of war and the necessity to avert it is really an ancient one. But the recognition of the only real way out of that dilemma is just as ancient, since it takes its origin from the very same scriptural source. Isaiah in his prophecy predicted the solution:

> They shall beat their swords into ploughshares
> and their spears into pruning-hooks;
> nation shall not lift up sword against nation
> nor study war any more. (Isaiah, 2,4)

This, I believe, was the first comprehensive programme of disarmament, which—some 28 centuries later—still awaits implementation. It is certain that the same prophecy, if it were to be made today, in 1983, would refer in a much more imperative tone to strategic bombers and MIRVed missiles. Not only because the emergence of nuclear weapons raised the danger of coercion to a higher level than that of conventional warfare. And not simply because nuclear weapons—as distinct from all earlier weapons which humanity suffered from—potentially carry in themselves the risk of the devastation of an entire civilization. But above all because recent, nuclear-weapons-related technological and doctrinal developments, initiated by a nuclear-weapon State in its striving for strategic superiority, are directed at overcoming the notion that although nuclear weapons do exist, they are politically and militarily unusable. This brings the risk of their use much closer than at any time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, from a remote possibility to an imminent danger.

As my delegation had the chance to state on several occasions in its statements and in working documents tabled together with other socialist countries, no efforts should be spared to avert the imminent threat of a nuclear war. The only safe way to deliver mankind from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe is to implement a programme of nuclear disarmament. This programme should include such measures, carried out stage by stage, as the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; the cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons; the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and the gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles till their total elimination.

In the present international situation, however, when the continuous build-up of ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons is coupled with slow progress—or perhaps no progress at all—in solving the problems related to the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments, when trust has been gravely undermined by efforts to gain military superiority, it is of paramount importance that new, additional approaches should be shaped to eliminate the nuclear threat.

Earlier and later proposals, like the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons, the mutual renunciation by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO of the first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons, the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a qualitative and quantitative freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on all the nuclear weapons at their disposal and a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, could be rightfully identified as endeavours to open up new vistas to avert the nuclear war.

The renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, or both nuclear and conventional weapons, might make a substantive contribution to lessening the danger of a nuclear war through strengthening confidence and weakening military confrontation. Guided by the desire to prevent a nuclear war, the Soviet Union assumed an obligation at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Several proposals on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons have been made in the European context as well.

It is worth pondering over those proposals, as an important lesson, affecting disarmament in a wider context, can be drawn from their evolution. Their fate goes to show that although objections to certain proposals might be taken into due consideration, the proposals will never come any closer to realization if those objections only serve as mere pretexts, and greater security is not sought after through disarmament measures based on the principle of equal security.

As far back as in 1976 the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in a declaration signed by their highest-level political leaders, proposed that all States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act should pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons one against the other. [2] Without giving an official answer, the NATO member States raised the objection that NATO could not give up the nuclear option in view of the alleged superiority of the Warsaw Treaty countries in conventional forces, and of the danger of an attack launched by conventional forces. They also stressed that the principle of the non-use of force cannot be narrowed down to nuclear coercion alone. On the basis of the objections, one could have expected that those alluding to conventional superiority on the other side would come forward with concrete proposals directed at the reduction of conventional weapons. However, at the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, the Western participants have not done that, apart from a single limited offer. Since the beginning they have been opposing the concept that, parallel with force reductions, there should be a mutual reduction of armaments as well. While allusions have been made to an overwhelming superiority in aircraft on the other side, Western participants have been constantly rejecting the idea that air forces with appropriate armaments should be the object of reductions.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1976,* pp. 855–856. The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found *ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–308.

The above-mentioned objections were nevertheless taken into account. In 1979, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member States proposed to the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe the conclusion of a treaty containing a commitment not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons. [3] This time it was objected to on the ground that with the existing enormous nuclear and conventional arsenals there was no guarantee that such agreements based on pure "intentions" would be complied with, and as intentions could not be verified such agreements are unverifiable. It was also stated that there is no need to reaffirm in such a form the principle of the non-use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter. One cannot but agree with the first observation. While nuclear and conventional arsenals remain untouched, there is no political or contractual-legal measure whatsoever which could safely guarantee that they will not be used. Such a guarantee could be received only as a result of concrete disarmament measures: the gradual reduction of those arsenals up to their total elimination. Since 1979 the Warsaw Treaty member States have urged that in addition to the Vienna negotiations, where not only the mutual reduction of conventional weapons, but that of nuclear weapons as well have been opposed by the Western participants, the European Disarmament Conference, after an initial stage dealing with confidence-building measures, should address the problems of conventional and nuclear disarmament. But because of a certain reluctance, no concrete mandate for the disarmament stages could be agreed upon at the Madrid meeting. In November 1981 the Soviet Union put forward a proposal aimed at freeing Europe from all medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. [4] If anything, that kind of total elimination of nuclear weapons would be a firm guarantee against their eventual use. The proposal still awaits realization. Pending the implementation of the more far-reaching proposals, the non-first-use commitment might still contribute to the preservation of peace through increasing confidence. But one cannot have it both ways—opposing the elimination of nuclear arsenals and deploring the lack of a perfect safeguard against their use.

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[3] *Ibid., 1979,* p. 176.

[4] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 617–620.

Taking into account the dilemma caused by the fact that the question of the limitation and reduction of strategic and European nuclear weapons still remains unsettled, while at the same time the danger of a nuclear war is ever increasing, the Soviet Union assumed an obligation at the second special session not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, [5] and in January 1983 the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization proposed to the States members of NATO the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force, be it with nuclear or conventional weapons. [6] No concrete measures have been taken up to now by the States addressed, but some arguments have been put forward, again questioning the practicability of the non-first-use commitment on the ground of the alleged conventional superiority of the Warsaw Treaty countries and of the need to avoid the mere repetition of the principle of the non-use of force contained in the Charter. The same thing happened at the Committee's 223rd plenary meeting. By those objections we are thrown back to 1976 when exactly the same observations were voiced, as if no proposals taking into account the security fears of the other side were made in 1979, 1982 and 1983. But let us have a closer look at some of those objections.

One of the main counter-arguments, raised even at the highest political level in some countries against assuming a non-first-use commitment, is of a legal character, stressing that there is no need to reaffirm or elaborate rules of international relations like that of the non-use of force, already enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and that such an exercise might even weaken the application of those rules. That kind of reasoning was put forward at our 223rd plenary meeting as well, with a reminder to the authors of the non-first-use declaration of "the solemn commitment in the United Nations Charter concerning the non-use of force". This is the most frequently repeated objection, and thus worth reflecting upon in detail.

Approaching the question empirically, let us examine existing international legal sources to see whether there really have been no instances where a rule enshrined in the United Nations Charter was reaffirmed or had been given a progressive development through contractual-legal instruments. The preamble to the United Nations Charter and its Articles 1 and 55 give definite expression to the idea that the United Nations has to strive to create all over the world such economic, social and cultural conditions as are necessary for the preservation of peace. The Charter, among other conditions, unequivocally lays down in Articles 1, paragraph 3, 13, paragraph 1.b, and 55, paragraph c, the rule of non-discrimination. This fact, however, did not preclude, hamper or block in any way, but on the contrary had a stimulating effect on the elaboration of treaties and special conventions aimed at eliminating all forms of discrimination, such as the

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[5] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 349–352.

[6] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, or the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid.* One is probably not off the mark in stating that the elaboration of those legal instruments did not challenge, weaken or undermine the rule of non-discrimination contained in the United Nations Charter. As a matter of fact, it is generally recognized that they brought about a progressive development of that rule and made a significant contribution to the creation of such conditions, set forth in the Charter, as are necessary for the preservation of peace.

One should not fail to mention another example derived from existing legal sources as well. An important contribution to the progressive development of the rule of the non-use of force was the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States on 22 June 1973. [7] In article I, the Parties, despite the solemn obligation assumed by the Charter, felt it necessary to "agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons", and that "they will act in such a manner . . . as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them".

For the opponents of the non-first-use obligation who are cautioning against creating a double regime, stating that there is no need merely to reaffirm the rule of the non-use of force enshrined in the Charter—although no one proposes a mere reaffirmation—let the following citation taken from article I of the North Atlantic Treaty be a reassurance: "The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, . . . to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations".

The proposed summarization and progressive development of a rule of international conduct, already laid down in the Charter, is a normal practice in international law. It might be another enlightening exercise to examine how far that practice is in conformity with the Charter. Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Charter, specifying the different functions of the General Assembly, states that "The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: . . . encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification". As to the term "progressive development", its use was decided on by the United Nations Conference on Organization in San Francisco in 1945. It "implied modifications of as well as additions to existing rules" (UNCIO, Vol. 9, pp. 177–178). Thus the United Nations Charter does not exclude—on the contrary, it provides for—the possibility of earlier established rules of international relations being summarized and laid down in a concrete form suited to the conditions of contemporary life.

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973,* pp. 283–285.

It would perhaps not be entirely without interest to pose the question whether the past 38 years have brought about any changes in international relations which demand appropriate political-legal steps concerning the rule of the non-use of force. In this respect two major developments could be identified, which emerged after the adoption of the Charter and could not be wholly foreseen at that time. First, the quantitative and qualitative changes within the ranks of the "peoples of the United Nations", that is, the emergence as a fact of life of new political-military alliances, and secondly, a major breakthrough and rapid development in military technology (the appearance of nuclear weapons and the development of ever more sophisticated types and systems of such weapons). Their undeniable impact on the rules of conduct among States members of the international community has clearly given expression to the necessity for the codification and progressive development of the rule of the non-use of force. The first development necessitates codification, which means, using the formulation given in article 15 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, "the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there has already been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine". The second one demands the progressive development of a subject which, according to the definition taken from the same source, "has not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States".

The latter necessity is also an explanation and answer to the question asked at the second special session and cited at the 223rd plenary meeting, namely: "What credibility could be given to proposals that would reduce the application of this basic clause to the nuclear threat alone?". The answer to that question lies not only in the fact that a proposal had been made in an early form three years before the second special session to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-first-use of either nuclear or conventional weapons. It stems as well from another fact: the above-cited proposals, instead of reducing the application of that basic clause of the Charter to the nuclear threat alone, endeavour to adapt its application unambiguously, through a legal contractual instrument, to the emergence and the continuous increase of the nuclear threat.

There is another argument also frequently raised, which is similar, as to its premises, to the one cited above. The gist of it was formulated at our 223rd plenary meeting in the statement: "Strategically, the Soviet Union and its allies can allude to non-first-use doctrines because of their vast superiority in conventional forces and their geographical proximity to western Europe". To cast some light on the question, let it suffice to refer to the conclusion of a well-known research institute. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, which has, to put it mildly, no interest whatsoever in underestimating the military force of the Warsaw Treaty countries, in its 1982–1983 yearbook gave a numerical comparison of the total

NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization manpower and equipment. From the 36 categories compared, it has found a superiority on the side of NATO in 21, among them in such categories as total manpower in uniform, total ground forces, total ground forces in Europe, divisions in Europe and manned in peacetime, divisions manned and available for immediate reinforcement, attack submarines, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, naval attack aircraft, ground attack fighters and so on. An analysis entitled "The East-West Conventional Balance in Europe" and published annually as a part of *The Military Balance,* year after year ritually concludes the assessment along the following lines: "The overall balance continues to be such as to make military aggression a highly risky undertaking" (*The Military Balance* 1982–1983, p. 131). The frequent repetition of an alleged conventional superiority on the part of the Warsaw Treaty countries cannot cast shadow on the fact that there is an over-all conventional balance between them and the NATO countries. And that is the lesson that might be drawn in regard to that point.

Among the major factors which led States to attach growing importance to the process of the continuing adaptation of international law, inventions related to nuclear weapons come readily to mind. Developments in military technology, such as the advances in missile accuracy warhead efficiency, the appearance of MIRV-, later MARV-warheads, the "advent" of cruise missiles and technologies like Stealth, all initiated by one of the nuclear-weapon powers during the last 10–15 years, might seem even unrevolutionary in comparison to the emergence of the nuclear weapon. At the same time, those developments could easily be identified as a conscious effort to improve nuclear warfighting capabilities. They were coupled with a doctrinal evolution along the lines of a strategic counterforce posture giving birth to concepts like limited and protracted nuclear war and pre-emptive first strike, as a proof of the constant feed-back existing between technology and policy. They did contribute to overcoming many of the technological and political barriers dividing, since 9 August 1945, the possession of nuclear weapons from their possible use. Would not this worrisome trend in itself, apart from all the other arguments, suffice to convince all without exception of the necessity to assume a non-first-use obligation? In any case, the existence of strategic plans like the one outlined in the Fiscal Year 1984–1988 Defense Guidance, calling for an ability to "render ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet allied) military and political power structure" and providing for the possibility that nuclear weapons intended for strategic strikes "might be used for attacking targets, such as military bases, in areas such as Eastern Europe" cannot be an acceptable *raison d'être* for the rejection of the immediate and basic need to restate and recast in the form of non-first-use commitments such legal rules as the prohibition of the threat or use of force.

These are some of our answers to the counter-arguments raised against assuming non-first-use obligations. And these are our arguments bearing witness to the timeliness and necessity of assuming non-first-use obligations. They also testify to the urgent need to adopt other measures directed at the prevention of nuclear war. The Hungarian delegation fully supports, in this connection, the proposal put forward by the German Democratic Republic concerning a list of items related to questions of the prevention of nuclear war which could be dealt with in the course of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament. It is the firm conviction of my delegation that the informal meetings have to lead to the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on the prevention of nuclear war at the beginning of the Committee's session next year, because what we urgently need are negotiations. And not simply negotiations for the sake of negotiations, but negotiations aimed at reaching agreements. Although it is an axiom of international relations that negotiations and agreements cannot be forced upon States, there is another fundamental truth of the nuclear age: there is no task more important than the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. My delegation is ready to take an active part in every effort to achieve that goal.

In conclusion, I wish to make a few remarks of a personal nature. The time has come for me to say farewell, as I shall soon be leaving Geneva at the end of my second term of duty here. On a similar occasion nine years ago, when I bade farewell to my colleagues in the CCD, it was a source of pleasure and satisfaction to recall the preceding five years. As the first representative of my country to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, I had the good luck to be able to join that body at a period when international détente, and a spirit of a sincere desire for peace and co-operation permeated the atmosphere. At the end of those five years, my sorrow on leaving Geneva was counterbalanced by a certain measure of pride and satisfaction because I had reasons to believe that the efforts of the Hungarian delegation had not been in vain. Our activity had contributed to the elaboration of two important international instruments.

When I returned here four years ago, I had profound hopes and expectations of the newly reconstituted negotiating forum. However, the impressions of only a few months were enough to make me state in plenary my disappointment over the many changes that had taken place. Today, four years later, the natural feeling of sadness is not relieved by any satisfaction whatsoever. The total lack of progress in the Committee's work, in spite of all the serious and sincere efforts of so many delegations—and I feel the Hungarian delegation belongs to them—is unfortunately the hallmark of the present time. It is, therefore, with sorrow that I take leave of the Committee on Disarmament. I can only derive consolation from the friendship and co-operation that I have enjoyed during these past four years with my colleagues in the delegations and my friends in the secretariat. Let me express my heartfelt gratitude and sincere good wishes to all of them. As a last word on record, let me ask them to maintain the same excellent relations with the Hungarian delegation and my successor at the head of it.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons [Extract], August 18, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, there is an item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament which by general recognition draws the greatest attention of its member States. This is the item on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This year we have repeatedly expressed our view on this item, both at the plenary meetings of the Committee and in the course of various bilateral consultations. In addition, of course, there has been the day-to-day participation of our delegation in the negotiations within the Working Group and its contact groups. Nobody will deny that important work has been done during the current session of the Committee. Many new proposals, documents and comments have been submitted, by the USSR delegation among others. In our view, what is of primary significance is the fact that, in spite of well-known attitudes, the Committee has managed in some respects to go beyond sterile academism and general theoretical debates, to overcome in part the formulophobia of some delegations and to start the process of the preparation and consideration on a preliminary basis, where it was possible, of the draft provisions for the future convention. This new working method, used in parallel with the search of solution for outstanding questions, began to prove its vitality and efficiency. There is no doubt that it should be used also in future. It should be noted that the co-ordinators of the contact groups have come to see the merits of such an approach. It is not their fault that it was not possible to adopt it in full measure. In general they have done a good job. We would like also to praise the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, Ambassador McPhail of Canada, who has supported the initiatives of the co-ordinators and who himself has not ignored new ideas and has displayed enthusiasm, energy and readiness for co-operation.

It is clear that the results of the work on the prohibition of chemical weapons done this summer could be considered as on the whole positive. Nevertheless, they are considerably below our expectations. I believe that any delegation represented here will agree that much more could have been done.

What are the reasons for this? Of course, the work has been affected, and it could not fail to be affected, by the very unfavourable situation prevailing in the world at present. But specifically, in the context of the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is impossible to ignore the fact that at the height of the negotiations on this item during the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Senate of the United States Congress approved allocations for the programme for the production of a new type of chemical weapons—binary weapons. One frequently hears it argued that the production of binary weapons is necessary to the United States so that it can bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. Those who cherish such illusions should not forget that peace is indivisible and there is such a notion as retaliatory measures. The decision adopted by the United States Senate to allocate in fiscal year 1984 130.6 million dollars for the production of binary munitions, including the creation of the "Big Eye" chemical air bomb and the production of shells for 155 mm howitzers, represents another step in the implementation of the United States $10 billion programme of preparations for chemical war, and threatens the renewed spiralling of the chemical arms race. The programme, it is known, envisages the mass production of new types of chemical weapons and the working out of methods for their use, as well as the stationing and storage of new types of chemical weapons primarily on the territory of Western Europe, near the borders of the socialist States. We cannot view this decision of the American Senate otherwise than as further evidence that the present policy of the United States in the matter of the prohibition of chemical weapons is determined, not by the declared desire of the official United States representatives to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons, but by the desire at all costs to keep a free hand in order to implement the Pentagon's large-scale plans for the stockpiling and building up of the United States chemical arsenal. Of course, this decision adopted in Washington has strengthened the doubts of many States as to the sincerity of the United States desire to achieve agreements in the Committee on Disarmament.

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[1] CD/PV.235, pp. 17–24.

But is it not possible that the very delicate thread of patience in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons may be broken when such things happen, for example, as the following: the Vice-President of the United States comes here to the Committee to advocate the speeding up of the negotiations in order to eliminate the threat created by chemical weapons, [2] and a few months later he gives a decisive vote in favour of the implementation of the programme which could kill these negotiations?

Nor has progress in our negotiations been facilitated by the fact that the same delegation, which submitted to the Committee last spring its version of the basic provisions of a convention and which was prepared in theory to take note of any concurring or similar views on the part of delegations on various aspects of the future convention, has avoided by every possible means the recording of such concurrences in the form of draft wordings for the future convention. As was justly stated by Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil, we badly need formulas recording the results achieved, which could be regarded as "a common basis for the future work of consolidation". Moreover we have even noticed the following trend. The position of the United States delegation has in some respects departed from the Soviet-American agreements reached after laborious negotiations over many years between the USSR and the United States.

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[2] *Ante*, Feb. 4.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly emphasized the tremendous significance of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Pointing out that the problem of the speediest possible prohibition of these weapons, which are one of the most barbaric means of annihilating people, is squarely before us, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, called on our partners at the negotiations to start the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The same view is held by all the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. In the Political Declaration adopted at Prague they stated that they deem it necessary to speed up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.[3]

With this noble goal in mind, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries bend their efforts to finding mutually acceptable solutions. They have always consistently pursued this policy in the Committee on Disarmament and they continue to do so now.

In our view, at this stage of the talks it is of key importance to achieve an agreement on the entire range of questions connected with the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, in other words, the questions entrusted to contact group A, headed by the representative of the Polish People's Republic, Colonel J. Cialowicz. It has in fact already managed to achieve something. But we believe that there have been and that there still are the preconditions for achieving considerably more, in fact for considering the problem of the destruction of stocks to have been solved in a preliminary manner.

It appears that one of the serious disagreements concerns the question of the specific content of the initial declarations by the States parties to the future convention of their stocks of chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation is convinced that at such an early stage of the implementation of the convention, i.e. 30 days after it has entered into force, from all points of view the declaration of stocks according to the categories of chemicals would be more than sufficient. That would give a general picture of the state of affairs as regards stocks and provide the necessary level of confidence. It is only natural that during the subsequent stages more detailed data would be submitted for the purposes of verification of the destruction process. However, some delegations, including those of non-aligned countries, have advocated that the States parties to the convention should submit more detailed data from the very start of its implementation.

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[3] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

With a view to resolving this problem, which has been deliberately complicated in many ways, the Soviet Union today proposes that the States parties to the future convention which possess chemical weapons should undertake to declare, not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force, their stocks of chemical weapons, both filled and unfilled, their precursors and the components of binary weapons, by their chemical names and by the toxicity of the chemicals, in metric tons (for example, chemical agent sarin—10 tonnes), and their stocks of chemical munitions by types and calibres and the number filled (for example, artillery munitions, 155 mm, filled with sarin—1,000 pieces).

We submit this proposal in the belief that it would largely resolve the entire problem of the declaration of stocks of chemical weapons and the declaration of the progress of their destruction at various stages of the process. In addition to the achievement of full agreement on the content of the initial declarations made after 30 days, it would open the way towards mutually acceptable agreements on the content of the general plans for the elimination of chemical weapons stocks which would be submitted by the States parties to the consultative committee, on the content of the periodic notifications concerning the implementation of these plans for the destruction of stocks, on the content of periodic notifications concerning each future stage of the implementation of such plans and on the content of the appropriate declarations after the completion of the process of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons.

Another question connected with chemical weapons stocks which has caused disagreement concerns the international verification of such stocks at the stage up to their elimination. Quite frequently, solutions have been proposed which could not be implemented in practice because they did not take into account a number of specific features connected with this question. In particular, it has been suggested that States parties to the future convention, after it enters into force, should declare the locations of declared stocks of chemical weapons, i.e. the storage places where they may be kept. Such a requirement is purely unilateral and unrealistic, since it does not take into account the possible general use of such places of storage, where chemical weapons are being kept, and might affect the defence interests of States not connected with chemical weapons.

After careful study of this question and some realistic proposals made in connection with it, the Soviet Union proposes that in order to ensure reliable verification of the declared stocks, provision should be made for the creation of store-houses at the specialized facilities for the destruction of these stocks, the location of which would be declared concurrently with the declaration of the destruction facilities mentioned above. At such places of storage, international verification on a "quota" basis would be permitted during the entire period of the destruction of the declared stocks.

Thus this question, too, could be considered to be resolved, with provision for the verification of the entire process of the destruction of all stocks of chemical weapons, on the understanding, of course, that everyone will display a realistic approach to it.

At the current session of the Committee on Disarmament a great deal of attention has also been paid to the question of the direct verification of the process of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. In this connection we would like to state once again that we are no less interested than other States in reliable verification assuring our security and that of our allies. This applies in full measure to the verification of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. But this approach in no way calls for extremes—the converting of verification into an end in itself.

What kind of approach to the verification of the destruction of stocks would we consider effective and at the same time sufficient and consequently the most feasible? As you know, the Soviet Union proposes the conduct of verification through systematic international inspections on the basis of an agreed quota at the facility (facilities) for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles.

The level of the quota, which in our view means an agreed number of international inspections per year at one destruction facility or another, could be determined by the consultative committee on the basis of criteria agreed on in advance.

Unfortunately, the rigid position of one delegation on the question of the verification of the destruction of stocks, which up to now has not wished to take into account anything except its own maximalist proposals, has hampered the solution of this problem. We appeal to it in the hope that it will be able to make an objective assessment of the proposals of other delegations too, primarily from the point of view of providing an assurance of the compliance of States parties possessing chemical weapons with the order for the destruction of their stocks which has been elaborated and agreed on.

Is it not clear, for example, that there is no need at all for the permanent presence of inspectors at a facility destroying, for instance, small lots of chemical weapon stocks that are, furthermore, obsolete or of low toxicity, during the entire process of destruction? The stock probably does not represent any significant danger from a military point of view, but rather creates problems for the State to which it belongs, because the time for its storage has expired and it presents a danger for the environment, but under the convention the same close attention would be paid to it as to the latest and most dangerous chemicals.

The Soviet Union proposes a differentiated approach whereby, for the purposes of verification, account would be taken of the quantity of the stocks to be destroyed at one facility or another, their characteristics according to toxicity and danger, the destructive capacity of the facilities, the level of their automation and some other factors. In practice this would mean that in some cases the inspectors of the consultative committee would visit the facility more frequently, and in others less frequently. Nerve gases are one thing and chloropycrine quite another.

All this we have already explained in the course of consultations with other delegations, in private talks, etc., and we are prepared to continue to do so in order to reach an agreement as soon as possible.

The specific feature of the Soviet position consists in the fact that we do not propose any final solutions about arrangements for the application of the quota during verifications, because we believe that this could best be done by joint efforts. It is in this direction that we intend to concentrate our efforts in the future.

This, in our view, is the general state of affairs as regards the problem of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. There is everything necessary in order to advance in the nearest future to its solution and the completion of work on this matter as soon as possible.

There are, of course, certain other questions connected with the elaboration of the convention which require solution. We do not think that it would be correct to wait until a time when all of them are agreed on in principle before starting the drafting of the convention where that is possible. The experience gained at the negotiations shows that the best results are provided by flexibility and a skillful combination of various working methods.

In this connection, we would like in particular to dwell upon the question of the facilities for the production of chemical weapons. During the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament on the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, different views have been expressed and are still held as regards the time for the declaration of the location of facilities that are to be destroyed.

The Soviet Union and some other delegations, taking into account the possible general use of some facilities producing, in particular, chemical weapons, and the importance of not causing any harm to the commercial interests of the States parties because of their accession to the convention, and a number of other considerations which I shall refer to later, propose the starting of the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities not later than eight years after the convention enters into force, and the declaration of their location not later than one year before that date. Consequently, the initial declarations of States parties would refer only to their existing capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

At the same time we would like to state today that a mutually acceptable solution on the time for the declaration of the location of facilities and the beginning of their elimination could be found at a later stage of the negotiations, taking into account the agreements of principle which could be reached, in particular, on the question of the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, the permitted production of supertoxic chemicals and the non-production of chemicals for binary weapons at commercial enterprises.

The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the solution both of the question of the verification of the destruction of stocks and of that of the verification of the production of supertoxic chemicals for permitted purposes, but at the same time it particularly singles out, in the context of chemical weapons production facilities, the question of the verification of the non-production of components for binary chemical weapons at commercial enterprises. The solution of these questions will, to a considerable extent, ensure confidence between the States parties to the future convention, regulate questions of balance and guarantee the viability of the convention as a whole.

The Soviet Union fully supports the relevant proposals of the German Democratic Republic concerning the elimination in the first instance of facilities producing binary weapons [4] and proposes for its part that their destruction or dismantling with partial diversion should begin not later than six months and be completed not later than two years after the convention enters into force. We believe that the number of these facilities should include not only those which are in fact producing binary chemical weapons, but also facilities which are fulfilling contracts on work connected with their production. We also believe that the closing down of these facilities, their maintenance in a state of non-production and their destruction or dismantling with partial diversion should be carried out with appropriate international verification.

Logically, the convention should also include a provision under which the destruction of stocks of binary and multicomponent weapons should start not later than six months and be completed not later than two years after the convention enters into force.

We believe it important to emphasize other specific features of our proposals. They are not discriminatory because they would apply to all States which wished to embark upon the production of binary chemical weapons, they permit the solution of the problem of the time of destruction and declaration of any chemical weapons production facilities, taking into account some other questions I mentioned earlier, and they would not create problems for anyone if binary types of weapons were not commissioned at all.

The Soviet delegation believes that work on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should continue at a considerably more intensive rate than has been the case up to now. The situation can hardly be considered normal when work in the Committee on such a priority item is done during only two or three months of the year, and for the rest of the time there is a recess. This aspect of the matter should be seriously thought over and we should try to improve the situation. We for our part, are ready to continue the negotiations for as long as is necessary to complete as soon as possible, the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

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[4] *Ante*, Feb. 22.

In conclusion, we would like to call on all delegations to display real and not sham constructiveness and flexibility. Recently in the Committee the representative of a Western country went out of his way to prove that the group which he represents allegedly displays "pragmatism" and "political flexibility". We would like to ask—where specifically is it displayed? On what issues have the delegations of Western countries in fact met half-way the positions of other States, including the country which I have the honour to represent? Apparently some in the Committee see their task as the stubborn and, I would say, sometimes obstinate repetition of rigid, inflexible positions and the adoption of a prejudiced attitude to the position of the other side.

Such an approach can only lead us to an impasse. We hope that the example shown by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which have repeatedly displayed during the current session of the Committee their readiness to take into account the reasonable demands of the other participants in the negotiations, will be followed also by those delegations which still do not go further than their declarations about their constructiveness.

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Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to U.N. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar: Conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Space Against the Earth, August 19, 1983 [1]

The Soviet Union requests the inclusion in the agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth".

In proposing this item, the Soviet Union is seeking to avoid the militarization of outer space. Of particular danger in this respect are the plans to create and deploy various space-weapons systems capable of destroying targets both in space and on the Earth.

The Soviet Union considers it most imperative to have a reliable means of counteracting these plans to make space a source of mortal danger to all mankind, by taking urgent and effective measures to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space, which it has not yet penetrated.

To this end, in 1981 at the United Nations the Soviet Union submitted a proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.[2] That proposal was approved by the General Assembly.[3] However, for well-known reasons, the drafting of that treaty has not yet actually begun.

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[1] A/38/194.

But time is running out, and now the Soviet Union is proposing that a further step should be taken forthwith in the form of an agreement on the general prohibition of the use of force both in outer space and from space against the Earth. It is submitting the relevant draft treaty for consideration at the current session.[4]

The most important feature of the draft treaty is the combining of the political-legal obligations of States not to allow the use of force in their relations with each other in space and from space with measures of a material nature aimed at banning the militarization of outer space.

More precisely, the Soviet Union is advocating a complete ban on the testing and deployment in space of any space-based weapon for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space.

It is also proposing a radical solution to the question of anti-satellite weapons: the unconditional pledge of States not to create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems that they may already have.

The parties to the treaty would also undertake to refrain in every way from destroying, damaging, disturbing the normal functioning or changing the flight trajectory of space objects of other States.

In addition, the treaty would ban the testing and use for military, including anti-satellite, purposes of manned spacecraft, which should be used solely to solve scientific, technical and economic problems of various kinds.

Action on the series of far-reaching measures proposed by the Soviet Union would be a major and truly tangible contribution towards the attainment of the goal approved earlier by the United Nations, namely, ensuring that space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

I request you to consider this letter as an explanatory memorandum under the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and to circulate it, together with the enclosed draft treaty, as an official document of the General Assembly.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 333–334.

[3] G.A. res. 36/99. The resolution was actually introduced by Mongolia (A/C.1/36/L.8).

[4] *Infra.*

Soviet Draft Treaty Submitted to the U.N. General Assembly: Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Space Against the Earth, August 19, 1983 [1]

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the principle whereby Members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Seeking to avert an arms race in outer space and thus to lessen the danger to mankind of the threat of nuclear war,

Desiring to contribute towards attainment of the goal whereby the exploration and utilization of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

It is prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force in outer space and the atmosphere and on the Earth through the utilization, as instruments of destruction, of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in space in any other manner.

It is further prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force against space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner.

Article 2

In accordance with the provisions of article 1, States Parties to this Treaty undertake:

1. Not to test or deploy by placing in orbit around the Earth or stationing on celestial bodies or in any other manner any space-based weapons for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.
2. Not to utilize space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner as means to destroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.
3. Not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States.
4. Not to test or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems that they may already have.

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[1] A/38/194*, Annex. The draft treaty was transmitted by Foreign Minister Gromyko, *supra*. In the First Committee, the delegation of Mongolia introduced a draft resolution on the "Conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Outer Space Against the Earth" (A/C.1/38/L.24). It did not, however, press for a vote on the resolution. The Soviet draft treaty was not submitted to the First Committee during the 38th session.

5. Not to test or use manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

Article 3

The State Parties to this Treaty agree not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States, international organization or natural or legal person to engage in activities prohibited by this Treaty.

Article 4

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 5

1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult and co-operate with each other in solving any problems that may arise in connection with the objectives of the Treaty or its implementation.

2. Consultations and co-operation as provided in paragraph 1 of this article may also be undertaken by having recourse to appropriate international procedures within the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Such recourse may include utilization of the services of the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Treaty.

3. The Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the depositary within one month after the receipt of a request from any State Party to this Treaty. Any State Party may nominate a representative to serve on the Committee.

Article 6

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to adopt such internal measures as it may deem necessary to fulfil its constitutional requirements in order to prohibit or prevent the carrying out of any activity contrary to the provisions of this Treaty in any place whatever under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 7

Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of States under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 8

Any dispute which may arise in connection with the implementation of this Treaty shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means through recourse to the procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 9

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 10

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have deposited instruments of ratification upon the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification, provided that such instruments have been deposited by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty as well as other notices.

Article 11

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament [Extract], August 19, 1983[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 176th plenary meeting, on 5 August 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to continue negotiations on the Programme as envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,[2] with a view to submitting a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, taking into account the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the second special session of the

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[1] CD/415*.

[2] For the Final Document, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was understood that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group would not conduct formal meetings during the remainder of the 1982 session of the Committee, but that informal consultations or meetings of an exploratory character would be held. In accordance with that decision, the Working Group resumed its work on 16 February 1983.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 176th plenary meeting on 5 August 1982, the Committee on Disarmament reappointed Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico) as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Working Group.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held 12 meetings between 16 February and 19 August 1983.

4. At their request, the Committee at its 208th plenary meeting on 31 March 1981 and 212th plenary meeting on 14 April 1982, decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group: Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

5. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group had before it the documentation submitted during previous sessions of the Committee on Disarmament.[3]

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1983 SESSION

6. In accordance with its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group took as the basis for its work the texts that resulted from the negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (A/S-12/32, Annex I), which, as stated in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee established at that session, reflected the persistence of significant differences of opinion on various aspects of the Programme, notably the chapter on Measures and stages of implementation (A/S-12/32, paragraph 28).

7. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group decided to establish Contact Groups to proceed with the elaboration of the various sections of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament as follows: Contact Group on Objectives; Contact Group on Principles; Contact Group on Priorities; Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation and Contact Group on Machinery and Procedures. The Working Group further decided to appoint Ambassador François de la Gorce (France) as Coordinator of the Contact Group on Objectives, Ambassador Baruch

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[3] The list of documents submitted during the previous sessions of the Committee on Disarmament may be found in the reports of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament which are an integral part of the Committee's reports for those sessions (CD/139, CD/228 and CD 292). [Footnote in original.]

Grinberg (Bulgaria) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Principles, Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Priorities, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation, and Ambassador Curt Lidgard (Sweden) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Machinery and Procedures. During the second part of the session, Ambassador Ahmad was unable to continue as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Measures and stages of implementation and, at his suggestion, the Chairman of the Working Group acted as Co-ordinator of that Contact Group. Also during the second part of the session, the Working Group appointed Ambassador Borislav Konstantinov (Bulgaria) as Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Principles in view of the fact that Ambassador Grinberg could not continue performing that function.

8. Efforts were made in the Contact Groups to achieve agreement on the sections of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament assigned to them. However, differences of view persisted. Further efforts to reconcile those differences were made in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. In addition, informal consultations were held during June, July and August under the guidance of the Chairman of the Working Group. With a view to reaching agreement, where it was not possible to arrive at generally acceptable new formulations, the language of relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was largely used.

9. The resulting texts are included in the Annex to this report. [4] As indicated therein, the texts of some paragraphs are pending. In addition, differences of view remain regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs and the desire to add further paragraphs. It was agreed that their placement in the Programme should be decided at a later stage, bearing in mind that duplication should be avoided.

10. In the time available to it, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group was not able to consider the Introduction. It agreed to include in the Annex to this report the draft of the Introduction prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that was established at that session, it being understood that this draft would, in any case, need to be redrafted in light of the over-all content of the Programme.

11. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group was also unable to devote attention to questions relating to stages of implementation, time frames and nature of the Programme.

IV. CONCLUSION

12. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group agreed to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the texts that are annexed to this report, on the

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[4] Not printed here.

understanding that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete. The Working Group further agreed to recommend to the Committee that those texts be submitted to the General Assembly for further consideration at the Assembly's thirty-eighth session with a view to the final adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

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Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons [Extracts], August 22, 1983[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee on Disarmament at its 207th meeting held on 29 March 1983, as contained in document CD/358,[2] the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons was re-established for the duration of the 1983 session on the basis of its former mandate. The Committee further decided that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group would report to it on the progress of its work before the conclusion of its 1983 session.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 207th plenary meeting on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador D.S. McPhail of Canada as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs continued to serve as Secretary of the Working Group.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held 23 meetings from 6 April to 22 August 1983. The Working Group benefited from the inclusion in delegations of national experts in the period 22 June to 22 July 1983. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

4. At the 216th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group reported on the progress of its work.

5. At their request, the representatives of the following States, not members of the Committee on Disarmament, participated in the work

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[1] CD/416, pp. 1, 5–7, and annexes 1 and 2.
[2] *Ante*, Mar. 29.

of the Working Group: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Viet Nam.

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III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE 1983 SESSION

9. During its 1983 session, the Working Group intensified its efforts aimed at elaborating a Convention on the basis of existing material and new proposals made by delegations. The main tasks of the Group were to attempt to resolve the remaining major items of substance on which there is still disagreement and to record the substance of agreement where this has already been reached. To this effect, it accepted the Chairman's proposal to set up four Contact Groups which dealt with specified aspects of the following spheres of the Convention as follows:

(a) Contact Group A: Existing stockpiles
(Co-ordinator: Colonel J. Cialowicz, Poland)
(b) Contact Group B: Compliance provisions and verification issues
(Co-ordinator: Mr. S. Duarte, Brazil)
(c) Contact Group C: Prohibition of use
(Co-ordinator: Mr. R.J. Akkerman, The Netherlands)
(d) Contact Group D: Definitions
(Co-ordinator: Dr. J. Lundin, Sweden)

10. Having considered and remitted these matters to Contact Groups, the remaining two major issues considered in 1983—destruction of existing means of production and non-production; and lesser issues requiring attention; were considered by the Working Group itself. Areas of seeming consensus—much of the scope of prohibition, many definitions, certain co-operative and confidence-building measures, certain aspects of national implementation and international verification, and preambular and additional provisions relating to substance—were not discussed in detail, but of course were taken into account on the basis of earlier work in arriving at the Working Group's conclusions in 1983. Specifically, the Working Group considered:

(a) Existing means of production—

Differences in this area are among the most difficult to resolve; problems exist regarding the declaration of plants; the need to inspect, close and seal declared plants was explored, as well as approaches to their elimination; problems of timing of declarations, the specification of location, the method of elimination, possible special requirements for binary facilities were also considered, proposals for systematic international verification were advanced;

(b) Non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry—

Basic differences remain in this area, particularly with respect to possible restrictions on chemicals for permitted purposes and the development of lists of e.g. key precursors, and the verification measures which might be applied. (Subsequently remitted to Contact Group D);

(c) Prohibition of transfer—

Agreement was reached that transfers, except for elimination purposes, would be restricted but the allowable circumstances and amounts for such transfers require further consideration:

(d) Non-development—

While there is agreement that future development of chemical weapons should be prohibited, verification by any systematic means would appear difficult because of the need to preserve the right to undertake work on protection or other permitted purposes.

The Working Group did consider other items including certain definitions, small-scale production for permitted or protective purposes, stockpile elimination, military preparations for the use of chemical weapons and the preparatory commission, and the results in some cases were further remits to the existing Contact Groups, and in others, simply a reconfirmation of the state of play reported in earlier Contact Group reports.

11. The Working Group's agreed conclusions on substantive matters are recorded in the systematic and integrated manner set forth in annex 1 for the consideration of Governments. Both common and unagreed views on individual provisions of a convention appear. Annex 1 does not, however, necessarily take full account of certain instances which need further reflection on individual understandings or undertakings. In particular this applies to the definitions of a "precursor", "key precursor" and "production facilities", existing stocks of chemical weapons, and the range of possible applications of on-site inspection.

IV. CONCLUSIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A POSSIBLE CONVENTION

12. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament:

(a) that the views set forth in annex 1 to this report, substantive provisions to be included in a chemical weapons convention, be used as the basis for the further work of the Working Group;

(b) that the views contained in the 1983 reports of Contact Groups appended as annex II to this report, including the draft formulations for possible use in a future convention, together with other relevant previous reports and documents of the Committee and future ones, also be utilized in the further elaboration of a convention; and

(c) that the Working Group resume negotiations immediately at the outset of the 1984 session of the CD with a view to intensive negotiation aimed at the final elaboration of a Convention at the earliest date.

ANNEX I

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons considers the following substantive provisions should be included in a Chemical Weapons Convention. (Portions not agreed to by all delegations are indented and introduced by:

1. *and,* where they are additional proposals;
2. *or,* where they are alternatives to other texts).

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. *Purpose and Commitments*

1. General Purpose of the Convention
   An undertaking to ban chemical weapons
2. Basic Undertakings
   (a) An undertaking not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons.
   (b) An undertaking:
   To exclude through the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, which complement the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,[3] the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict.
   or not to use chemical weapons in any armed conflict
   or not to use chemical weapons in any circumstances
   or to observe, by States not parties to the Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons the terms of its provisions, and to recall, by States parties to the Protocol, their commitments under it.
   (c) An undertaking to eliminate[4] existing stockpiles of chemical weapons.
   (d) An undertaking to eliminate[5] existing facilities for the production of chemical weapons.
   (e) An undertaking not to assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention.
   and An undertaking not to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons.

B. *Definitions and Criteria*

1. Definitions
   An understanding that, in accordance with the general purpose criterion of the Convention
   (a) Chemical weapons means:
      (i) super-toxic lethal, other lethal, or other harmful chemicals, and their precursors, regardless of the method of production, except for those intended for permitted purposes as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes
      or chemical warfare agents and their precursors;
      (ii) munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties or

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[3] For the text of the Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969,* pp. 764–765.

[4] II–A–3, below.

[5] II–B–3, below.

chemicals released as a result of the employment of such munitions or devices; or

(iii) any equipment

and or chemical

specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

and (b) Chemical warfare agents means:

e.g. toxic chemical substances whose types and quantities accord with hostile and military purposes and whose toxic effects are used to interfere directly with the normal functions of man, animals and plants in such a way as to lead them to death, temporary incapacitation, permanent injury, damage, and for the purposes of the Convention, chemical warfare agents can be divided into three categories, super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals.

(c) Permitted purposes means:

(i) non-hostile purposes, that is, industrial, agricultural, research, medical, law enforcement, or other peaceful purposes, or protective purposes; and

(ii) military purposes which are not related to the use of chemical weapons.

and (d) Protective purposes means:

purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons.

(e) Production facility means:

any building or equipment which in any degree was designed, constructed or used for the production of any chemicals, including key precursors, primarily useful for chemical weapons, or designed, constructed or used for filling chemical weapons.

or (to be determined)

(f) Precursor means:

a chemical that by any reaction takes part in the production of a toxic end product, [6] which for the purposes of the Convention is defined as a chemical in accordance with the general purpose criterion.

(g) Key precursor means:

a precursor which plays a most important role in the production of, or in determining the characteristics of the end product [6] and has little peaceful use [7]

and and used at the last stage of the synthesis.

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[6] Or, possibly, chemical warfare agent (to be determined). [Footnote in original.]

[7] As determined in an annex to the Convention referred to below indicating the criteria for inclusion and measures for ensuring compliance with the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

2. Toxicity Criteria

An understanding that for the purpose of classifying chemicals according to their toxicity the following criteria apply: [8]

(a) a "super-toxic lethal chemical" has a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation);

(b) an "other lethal chemical" has a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation) and less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m3 (by innalation); and

(c) an "other harmful chemical" has a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m3 (by inhalation).

C. *Compliance*

1. *National Implementation Measures*

An undertaking to adopt measures in accordance with constitutional processes to implement the Convention, to monitor compliance with it, and to prohibit or prevent any activity under national jurisdiction or control in violation of it.

2. *National Technical Means*

An understanding that technical procedures for collecting information on compliance that are under national control will be utilized in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

3. Systematic International Procedures

An undertaking to ensure systematic verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention by:

(a) data reporting

the provision of data on production and use and other information to the Consultative Committee on a periodic basis; and [9]

(b) on-site inspections

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[8] When measured by an agreed method set forth in an annex to the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

[9] In accordance with declarations referred to below and lists of chemicals set forth in annexes to the Convention that will be subject to revision by the Consultative Committee. [Footnote in original.]

on-site monitoring utilizing automatic instruments and/or mandatory inspections by an international inspectorate [10]

(i) "on an immediate basis", i.e. involving the presence of inspectors as soon as feasible,

(ii) "on a continuous basis", i.e. involving the presence of inspectors at all times during an operation,

(iii) "on a periodic basis", i.e. involving regular visits to an operation at fixed intervals as established by the Consultative Committee,

(iv) "on a quota basis", i.e. involving an agreed number of regular visits to be determined by the Consultative Committee on the basis of agreed criteria and data communicated by States,

(v) "on a random basis", i.e. involving an agreed number of visits which follow an irregular pattern with limited advanced warning,

(vi) on any other agreed basis arranged bilaterally or by the Consultative Committee.

4. Challenge Procedure.

An undertaking to ensure non-routine verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention by the application of fact-finding procedures including on-site inspection

on a voluntary basis

or on the basis of a stringent obligation to permit such inspection

arranged bilaterally or by a justified request to the Consultative Committee

II. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR ELIMINATION

A. *Existing Stocks of Chemical Weapons*

1. Initial Declarations [11]

(a) An undertaking to submit initial declarations to the Consultative Committee:

(i) not later than 30 days after entry into force or adherence to the Convention;

(ii) stating the possession or non-possession of any chemical weapons regardless of the quantity or location;

(iii) stating the presence of stocks of chemical weapons which are under the jurisdiction or control of someone else;

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[10] On the basis of agreed procedures set forth in an annex to the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

[11] On the basis of the provisions of the Convention and in accordance with procedures established by the Consultative Committee (note that this footnote applies to all declarations and reports referred to in this record). [Footnote in original.]

(iv) stating the composition of all stocks of chemical weapons; all chemicals, including precursors comprised in such stocks, should be declared by their chemical names, toxicities, where applicable, and weights in metric tons in bulk and filled into munitions; munitions should be declared by types, calibres, quantities and chemical fill; devices and "specifically designed" equipment should be declared,

and by type and quantity, and for devices, also by size and chemical fill,

and declaration of locations of all stockpiles and composition of the stocks at each location;

(v) certifying that the acquisition or transfer of chemical weapons

along with any assistance

or including technological equipment for the production of chemical weapons and relevant technical documentation

has ceased.

(b) An undertaking to submit the initial declaration of stocks of chemical weapons to verification by means of systematic international on-site inspection on an immediate basis

or on a quota basis for those stocks stored at specialized facilities for the destruction of stocks

or challenge procedure

2. Interim and Other Measures

(a) An undertaking to submit declared stocks to verification between the initial declarations and commencement of elimination by

continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and systematic international on-site inspection on a periodic basis

or on a quota basis for those stocks stored at specialized facilities for the destruction of stocks

or challenge procedure

(b) An undertaking not to move chemical weapons stocks from present locations after entry into force or adherence to the Convention except for purposes of elimination or for protective purposes

and other permitted purposes.

(c) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee

30 days

or 6 months

after entry into force or adherence to the Convention, initial plans for the elimination of all stocks of chemical weapons including type of operation, schedules with respect to quantities and types of chemical weapons to be destroyed, and products; and

simultaneously
or just before entry into operation
locations of destruction plants to be used

(d) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee
annual
or periodic
reports of progress on implementation of plans for the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons.

(e) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee
annually
or 3 months before the implementation of each stage
detailed plans for elimination of stocks of chemical weapons during the next
year
or stage.

(f) An undertaking to notify the Consultative Committee of the elimination of chemical weapons within 30 days of the completion of their elimination.

and (g) An undertaking to submit notifications to the Consultative Committee concerning old stocks found after the initial declaration, as to

- (i) within 30 days, the estimated quantity and type, how, where and when they were found, why they were previously unknown, and where they are stored;
- (ii) within 90 days, the exact quantity and type, including the chemical names, formulae and quantities of the chemicals found, and plans for their elimination, and
- (iii) within 30 days after completion, certification of elimination.

and (h) An undertaking to accept international control of stocks until their final elimination;

3. Elimination of Stocks

(a) An undertaking to eliminate as rapidly as possible all stocks of chemical weapons,
and including old stocks found after the initial declaration,
by destruction
or by destruction or diversion to permitted purposes
following non-reversible procedures which will allow systematic international on-site inspection and in accordance

with a schedule [12] which will maintain a balance of security during the entire elimination stage, with commencement within

6 months and completion within 10 years.

or 6 months in regard to binary and multicomponent chemical weapons only and completion of the operation within 2 years and commencement within 2 years in regard to all other chemical weapons and completion within 10 years after entry into force of the Convention.

(b) An undertaking to submit the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons to systematic international verification by continuous on-site monitoring with instruments, and by systematic international on-site inspection

on a continuous basis

or on a quota basis.

B. *Existing Means of Production*

1. Initial Declaration

(a) An undertaking to submit declarations to the Consultative Committee not later than 30 days after entry into force or adherence to the Convention

(i) stating the possession or non-possession of capacities for production of chemical weapons, the capacities themselves, and stating the presence or non-presence of production facilities and their capacities under the jurisdiction or control of someone else;

or stating whether or not any production facility is under its jurisdiction or control; stating the presence on its territory of any production facility, which is under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else and the location of any such facility; and stating the location, nature, capacity, types of products and chemical names of products for any production facility which has been under its jurisdiction or control at any time since . . . .

(ii) certifying that all production or filling in facilities possessed or present has ceased.

and (b) An undertaking to submit the initial declaration of production facilities to verification by

systematic international on-site inspection on an immediate basis

or challenge procedure.

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[12] To be agreed and set forth in an annex to the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

2. Interim and Other Measures

(a) An undertaking at entry into force or adherence to the Convention to cease all activities at any production facility except those required for closure and elimination or conversion to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, and to close each facility in a manner which will render it inoperative in a verifiable way.

(b) An undertaking at entry into force or adherence to the Convention not to undertake construction of any new production facilities or the conversion of any other existing facilities for purposes of producing chemical weapons.

(c) An undertaking to submit the inactive status of production facilities to verification between the declaration of their location and commencement of elimination by

continuous monitoring with on-site automatic instruments and systematic international on-site inspection on a periodic basis,

or challenge procedure.

(d) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee plans for

the closing and destruction of all production facilities, 30 days after entry into force or adherence to the Convention

or the elimination of each plant, one year before the commencement of its elimination, and its location.

(e) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee

annual

or periodic

reports of progress on implementation of plans for the elimination of production facilities.

(f) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee

annually, detailed plans concerning elimination of production facilities for the next year

or 3 months before the implementation of each stage, notifications concerning elimination of production facilities, including their location, for the next stage.

(g) An undertaking to certify to the Consultative Committee within 30 days that the elimination of production facilities has been completed.

(h) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee

within 30 days of entry into force or adherence to the convention

or within the time period provided for in the plan for the destruction of stocks plans for the temporary conversion of any production facility for the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, including its location.

(i) An undertaking to notify the Consultative Committee within 30 days that the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons in a temporarily converted production facility has been completed.

3. Elimination of Production Facilities

(a) An undertaking to eliminate all production facilities, including any facilities temporarily converted for the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, by

razing them

or destroying or dismantling them

employing procedures which permit verification and in accordance with a schedule [13] which will maintain a balance of security during the entire elimination stage, with commencement within

6 months and completion within 10 years

or 6 months in regard to facilities producing binary weapons with completion of elimination within 2 years; and commencement within 3 years in regard to the facilities producing all other chemical weapons and completion within 10 years.

(b) An undertaking to submit the elimination of each production facility to verification by

systematic international on-site inspections, of each facility at an agreed level

or challenge procedure.

III. OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

A. *Future Chemical Weapons Non-Production Verification*

An undertaking to submit the non-production of chemicals for use in chemical weapons to systematic international verification in addition to the use of a challenge procedure, by: [14]

1. Super-toxic Lethal Chemicals

(a) a limitation to an amount which is the lowest possible and in any case does not exceed one metric ton of the aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals

and their key precursors

produced, diverted from stocks, or otherwise acquired annually or possessed at any one time

for protective purposes

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[13] To be agreed and set forth in an annex to the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

[14] In accordance with procedures set forth in an annex and on the basis of lists of chemicals, including those of particular risk, to be determined by the Consultative Committee following agreed criteria. [Footnote in original.]

or for all permitted purposes?

(b) a limitation of the production of these chemicals to a single small scale facility having a capacity limit of——————;

(c) a notification to the Consultative Committee of the location and capacity of the small scale production facility within 30 days after entry into force or adherence to the Convention, or when constructed later,———days before the date of commencement of operations;

(d) monitoring of the small scale production facility by annual data reporting with justification, on-site instruments, and systematic international on-site inspection

on an agreed level

or on a quota basis

and 2. a prohibition of the production of compounds with methyl-phosphorus bond in commercial production facilities

and to restrict such production to the single small-scale facility.

3. Other Lethal and Other Harmful Chemicals

(a) monitoring of production and use by annual data reporting;

and (b) a declaration to the Consultative Committee of the location of facilities for the production of certain other lethal and other harmful chemicals deemed to pose a particular risk.

4. Key Precursors

(a) Monitoring by annual data reporting of production and use

and and declaration to the Consultative Committee of the location of facilities for the production of key precursors;

and and systematic international on-site inspection on a random basis.

B. *Verification of the Prohibition of Use*

An understanding that provisions for international verification by means of a challenge procedure [15] shall apply equally to complaints of the use of chemical weapons

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[15] On the basis of procedures to be agreed and set forth in an annex. [Footnote in original.]

C. *Permitted Transfers*

1. Transfer for Elimination Purposes

   (a) An understanding that, by mutual agreement, chemical weapons may be transferred between parties for purposes of elimination.

   (b) An understanding that all declaration and verification provisions normally applicable to the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons will also apply to stocks transferred for purposes of elimination with an additional notification to the Consultative Committee immediately before commencement of the transfer.

2. *Transfer for other purposes*

   (a) An undertaking not to transfer super-toxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors to non-parties;

   (b) An understanding to limit transfer to another party of super-toxic lethal chemicals
   and and of their key precursors
   for permitted purposes
   or for protective purposes
   to a maximum of
   100 grams
   or ____________________
   in any 12 month period

   (c) An undertaking by both parties to submit an advance report to the Consultative Committee for each transfer and an annual summary report of all transfers including in both the chemical names, weights and destination.

IV. OPERATIONAL PROVISIONS

A. *National Means for Implementation*

1. National Implementation Measures

   (a) An undertaking to adopt measures necessary in accordance with constitutional processes to implement the Convention, and in particular to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the Convention anywhere under national jurisdiction or control.

   (b) An undertaking to submit to the Consultative Committee information concerning the legislative and administrative measures taken.

2. Responsibilities

   (a) An undertaking to provide, through any national organization or authority assigned to implement the Convention, assistance to the Consultative Committee including data reporting, assistance for international on-site inspections and a prompt response to all requests for the provision of expertise, information and laboratory support.

and (b) An undertaking to co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee in the exercise of its verification activities and not to interfere in any manner with the conduct of legitimate verification activities.

B. *National Technical Means*

An understanding that national technical means may be utilized to collect information on compliance, that such means will not be interfered with, and that any State party that possesses national technical means of verification may place the information at the disposal of other parties.

or An understanding that where national technical means are utilized to collect information on compliance, and not interfered with, that all parties shall have access to such information.

or No provision

C. *International Means for Implementation*

1. Depository

To be determined.

2. Preparatory Commission

An undertaking to establish a Preparatory Commission composed of representatives of all signatory States to convene after the Convention is open for signature for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the entry into force of the provisions of the Convention and to prepare for the establishment of the Consultative Committee. [16]

3. Consultative Committee

(a) An undertaking to establish a Consultative Committee [17] composed of representatives of all States Parties, which shall convene not later than 30 days after entry into force of the Convention, to carry out broad international consultations and co-operation among States Parties, to oversee the implementation of the Convention and to promote the verification of continued compliance by performing scientific and technical review functions and by providing a forum for discussion of any problem related to the implementation of the Convention.

and to decide on practical measures to be taken by parties to the Convention in case of violation.

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[16] In accordance with guidelines set forth in an annex to the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

[17] In accordance with specifications, organization and functions set forth in an annex to the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

(b) An undertaking to meet in regular sessions of the Consultative Committee every . . . years, and to hold extraordinary sessions at the request of any State Party or the Executive Council.

(c) An undertaking to establish an Executive Council composed of representatives of . . . States Parties appointed by the Consultative Committee as well as a Technical Secretariat and other subsidiary bodies as necessary.

(d) An understanding that the Executive Council will carry out the functions of the Consultative Committee when it is not in session and will also be responsible for receiving and disseminating data and information, receiving requests on challenge procedures and deciding on specific action to be taken, and overseeing systematic on-site inspections.

(e) An understanding that the Technical Secretariat will provide administrative support to the Executive Council and the Consultative Committee and will render technical assistance to States Parties and the Executive Council.

V. CO-OPERATION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROVISIONS

A. *Consultation and Co-operation*

1. Bilateral Consultative Process

(a) An undertaking to consult and co-operate, directly or through appropriate procedures, including the services of appropriate international organizations and of the Consultative Committee in any matter related to the implementation of the Convention, and to endeavour to clarify and resolve, through bilateral consultation, any situation which may give cause to doubts about compliance with the Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous.

(b) An undertaking to provide information to assure compliance with the provisions of the Convention.

2. International Consultative Procedures

(a) An undertaking to co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs and/or international organizations, which may, as appropriate, give scientific, technical and administrative support to the Consultative Committee in order to facilitate fact-finding activities so as to ensure the speedy clarification of the situation which gave rise to the original request.[18]

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[18] In accordance with procedures set forth in an annex to the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

(b) An understanding that at any time a request may be submitted to the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary body to carry out a challenge procedure to clarify and resolve any situation considered to be ambiguous or which gives rise to suspicion about actions in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention.[19]

(c) An undertaking to treat favourably and in good faith a request for an on-site inspection by the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary body, and to submit a prompt and full explanation for the reasons for a refusal, which should be considered an exceptional response.

or An undertaking to treat favourably and in good faith a request for an on-site inspection by the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ. A refusal should be accompanied by the submission of a prompt and full explanation of its reasons. The Consultative Committee shall assess the explanation submitted and may send another request, taking into account all relevant elements, including possible new elements received by the Consultative Committee after the original request. If a second request is refused, recourse may be had to appropriate procedures under the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Assistance

(a) An undertaking to provide assistance and support the provision of assistance to a party to the Convention threatened or adversely affected as a result of the violation of the provisions of the Convention.

and (b) An undertaking to provide assistance or support being provided in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to any party to the Convention which has requested such assistance and which the Security Council decides has been exposed or is possibly being exposed to danger as a result of a violation of obligations assumed under the Convention by another party to it.

4. United Nations

(a) An understanding that parties will retain at all times their ability to take whatever action they deem necessary within the framework of the Convention or the Charter of the United Nations to resolve differences concerning the application of the Convention.

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[19] In accordance with detailed procedures to be agreed and set forth in an annex to the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

and (b) An undertaking to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Security Council which shall inform the parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation.

B. *Protection of Population and Environment*

An undertaking to protect the population and the environment in fulfilling the obligations connected with the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and production facilities.

C. *Promotion of Development Goals*

An undertaking to facilitate the creation of favourabl conditions for the economic and technical developmen and for international co-operation in the field of peacefu chemical activities while precluding interference with area of activity unrelated to the purposes of the Convention

or An undertaking to avoid hampering the economic o technological development of States Parties to th Convention or international co-operation in the fiel of peaceful and protective chemical activities, including the international exchange of chemicals an equipment for the production, processing or use o chemicals for peaceful and protective purposes.

VI. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

A. *Preamble and Other Provisions*

1. An understanding that the Convention will not limit or detrac from obligations assumed under other Treaties including:

(a) the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War o Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacterio logical Methods of Warfare;

(b) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Developmen Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biologica and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction;[20]

and (c) The Convention on the Prohibition of Milita or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modif cation Techniques.[21]

and 2. An undertaking to declare, within 30 days of ent into force or adherence to the Convention, the locati and nature of any facility under jurisdiction or control designed, constructed or used since —————————— for the development of chemical weapons.

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[20] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 133–138.

[21] *Ibid., 1977,* pp. 322–326.

B. *Withdrawal*

An understanding that withdrawal may be exercised if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Convention have jeopardized the supreme interests of a State. Notice of withdrawal will be given three months in advance including a statement of the extraordinary events.

ANNEX II

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF CONTACT GROUP A

In order to pursue its negotiations, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group needs to examine the issue of existing stockpiles in a comprehensive fashion. This involves consideration of, *inter alia,* the following areas:

1. Relative aspects in scope;
2. All declarations;
3. Timing of declarations;
4. Monitoring of declarations;
5. Destruction plans;
6. Timing of destruction;
7. Destruction methods;
8. Monitoring of destruction;
9. Other compliance requirements and confidence building measures; and
10. Resulting work requirements for national and international implementation organizations.

To assist the Working Group in its consideration of these matters, a contact group will be established.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GROUP A

To further the Working Group's objectives, the contact group will examine and report on specific questions relating to treatment of the issue of existing stockpiles as requested by the Working Group chairman. Specifically it will consider:

—the techniques suitable for monitoring the destruction of stockpiles; and

—the basic content of declarations required.

In examining these questions, the contact group should proceed in a systematic fashion, drawing on material from all areas as necessary, and taking national positions into account as alternatives to be considered. The contact group reports from 1982 should provide a useful starting point. The contact group should not focus on "technical matters" as such, although it should identify areas where existing technical advice is insufficient. Essentially, the contact group's task is to identify the political and operational decisions needed to permit the Working Group to negotiate successfully provisions on these questions for inclusion in a convention.

The contact group chairman will report orally as necessary to the Working Group chairman and will submit a short written report prior to the last Working Group meeting in April. To assist the Working Group in its negotiations, the contact group in this report should note in particular the consensus reached and areas in respect of each question in which differences have not been resolved.

Meetings of Contact Group

The contact group will meet at the discretion of its chairman and meeting times must be scheduled and announced through the Secretariat.

Meetings will be informal, but interpretation services must be available.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR ON THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF CONTACT GROUP A

The terms of reference approved by the Working Group directed the Contact Group to concentrate its attention on the consideration of the two subjects:

—the techniques suitable for monitoring the destruction of stockpiles, and

—the basic content of declarations required.

The Contact Group began to consider the actual steps of the destruction process for chemical weapons stocks in order to evaluate whether verification of destruction of stockpiles should be carried out by a quota system of inspections or by continuous inspections. In this connection the Contact Group took note of the United States document CD/387 of 6 July 1983, devoted to specific methods for on-site verification on a continuous basis. [22] Other documents have been also discussed. Delegations continued to hold differing views, as reflected in CD/294, [23] CD/343, [24] and other documents.

With respect to the consideration of the basic content of declarations, delegations continued to hold differing views, in particular, on the content of initial declarations of stockpiles, as reflected in CD/334. [25]

Some other questions related to the issue of existing stockpiles have also been discussed.

Common Views and Topics for Further Discussion

Based on consultations with delegations the co-ordinator presented, for consideration of the Contact Group, a paper outlining some points on stockpiles on which commonality of views appeared to exist and also outlining some points requiring further discussion. Consideration of the points confirmed that they could serve as a suitable basis for further work and future elaboration. These points are the following:

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[22] *Ante.*

[23] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 373–381.

[24] *Ante,* Feb. 10.

[25] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 649–685.

A. Possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, as defined, should be declared within 30 days.

B. The presence on a State's territory of stocks of chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else should also be declared within 30 days. (Thus, the same stocks would be declared by the possessing State and by the State on whose territory the stock is.)

C. States which possess chemical weapons should also provide specific information on their chemical weapons stockpiles at the same time. The information should cover not only toxic chemicals but also precursors in the stockpiles, munitions and devices, and specifically designed equipment.

D. Chemical weapons stocks should be destroyed/eliminated [26] as rapidly as possible.

E. To ensure that no party gains a unilateral advantage, destruction/elimination should be carried out according to a general schedule agreed during the negotiation of the convention.

F. The destruction/elimination process should begin not later than . . . months/years and be completed not later than 10 years.

G. General plans for destruction/elimination of stocks should be declared within . . . days/months. The plans should describe:

(i) type of operation;
(ii) details of implementation of the agreed general schedule;
(iii) what is to be destroyed and at what location;
(iv) destruction products.

H. The destruction/elimination process should be carried out employing agreed procedures which permit systematic international on-site verification. The process should not be easily reversible.

I. An annual/periodic notification should be provided regarding implementation of plans for destruction/elimination of chemical weapons stocks. The notification should include:

(i) a progress report of stocks destroyed/eliminated during the last year/period including details of types, quantities, and destruction methods;

(ii) plans for destruction/elimination during the next year/period including details of types, quantities, and destruction methods.

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[26] An understanding has been reached that here and subsequently in the wording destruction/elimination the first word ("destruction") reflects the approach of the delegations which are in favour of the complete destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons, while the second word ("elimination") corresponds to the approach of other delegations which envisage the possibility of both destruction and diversion of the stocks of chemical weapons for non-hostile purposes. [Footnote in original.]

J. A certification that all chemical weapons stocks have been destroyed/eliminated should be provided within 30 days after the process has been completed.

K. Destruction of stocks should be subject to systematic international on-site verification, including systematic international on-site inspection.

L. Provisions should be included regarding:

(i) transfer of declared stocks from one party to another for the purpose of destruction; and,

(ii) chemical weapons found after the initial declaration has been made.

M. A chemical weapons production facility could be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. The converted facility would have to be destroyed as soon as it was no longer in use for destruction of stocks but not later than the deadline for completion of stockpile destruction.

N. All necessary precautions should be taken for the protection of the population and the environment.

O. Specific principles for verification of destruction. (Separate section under preparation.)[27]

For further discussion:

—Should the location of CW stocks be declared as part of the initial declaration?

—What information should be provided about the CW stocks in the initial declaration?

—Should the declared stocks be subject to prompt and systematic international on-site inspection? If so, on what basis? Should the declared stocks be subject to systematic international on-site monitoring until they are eliminated? If so, on what basis?

—As an alternative to destruction, could some stocks also be eliminated by allowing them to be used for non-hostile purposes? If so, which chemicals could be used? What quantities? Under what verification provisions?

—Specific measures for systematic international on-site verification: (separate section under preparation)[28]

—What should be the deadline for beginning the actual elimination of stocks?

—In what terms should the agreed general schedule for stockpile destruction be defined?

—What should be the nature of the provisions regarding:

(a) transfer of declared stocks from one party to another for the purpose of destruction; and,

(b) chemical weapons found after the initial declaration has been made?

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[27] This section has not yet been prepared. [Footnote in original.]

[28] This section has not yet been prepared. [Footnote in original.]

Co-ordinator's suggestions for more precise wording on certain points

In an attempt to reflect, in more precise wording, certain aspects of the common points set forth above, the Co-ordinator presented to the Contact Group his suggestions. In the course of their elaboration, the views of some delegations were taken into account. The Co-ordinator stated that his suggestions in no way committed delegations. The Co-ordinator's suggestions are as follows:

1. States Parties to the Convention shall be guided, in accordance with their resulting obligation, to declare possession and non-possession of chemical weapons and their possible components, by the following:

Each State depending on whether or not it possesses chemical weapons, as defined in totality of paragraphs . . . of the article . . . (definition of chemical weapons) or in any one of those paragraphs individually, regardless of the quantity, on its own territory or elsewhere, under its authority:

(a) within 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention will send to the Consultative Committee a declaration, which confirms the fact that it possesses chemical weapons, or will give a negative answer;

(b) a State in possession of chemical weapons, not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention, will declare its stocks of chemical weapons (procedure for declaring such stocks is subject to negotiation).

Taking into account further consideration in Contact Group D of the questions connected with chemicals for permitted purposes, this formula could be supplemented by the provisions according to which each State Party, whether or not in possession of chemical weapons, will also be required to make declarations, if it possesses stocks of key precursors of supertoxic lethal chemicals, to be used for permitted purposes, and if it possesses stocks of other lethal and/or harmful chemicals, to be used for permitted purposes.

2. (1) Each State Party, having chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control on the territory of any other State, regardless if the latter is a Party to the Convention or not, undertakes to declare the presence of its chemical weapons stockpiles on the territory of that other State not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention or its accession to it; to withdraw those chemical weapons from the territory of such a State not later than .... (to be elaborated) after the entry into force of the Convention or its accession to it with a view to destroying/eliminating them; or to destroy/eliminate those chemical weapons stockpiles directly on the territory of that State in agreement with it, under the condition that the latter agrees to the verification procedures as provided for under this Convention.

(2) Each State Party, having on its territory chemical weapons stockpiles which are under the jurisdiction or control of another State, regardless if the latter is a Party to the Convention or not, undertakes, not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention or

its accession to it, to declare the known presence of such weapons on its territory.

3. The destruction/elimination of the stocks of chemical weapons shall be initiated by each State Party possessing such weapons not later than . . . months/years and should be completed not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force or accession of the State to it.

4. Each State Party to the Convention having chemical weapons stocks under its jurisdiction or control, undertakes not later than 30 days after destruction/elimination of the stocks of chemical weapons to certify that all chemical weapons stocks have been destroyed/eliminated.

5. (1) Each State Party is entitled to transfer its stockpiles of chemical weapons to another State Party for the purpose of their destruction.

(2) All such stockpiles would, notwithstanding their transfer to another State for the purpose of destruction, be subject to the provisions of the Convention and its related annexes which apply to stockpiles in general (e.g. declarations of stockpiles, timing of destruction, including the need to ensure a balanced schedule of destruction, agreed procedures for destruction, periodic notification of progress in destruction, etc.).

(3) Such transfers will be on the basis of an agreement between the participants, the text of which is to be elaborated in accordance with the guidelines contained in the annex and is to be transmitted to the Consultative Committee.

(4) Each State Party transferring its stockpiles for destruction to another State Party should also undertake to declare, before the commencement of the operations on transfer and transportation, the timetable of transfers and transportation including quantity and composition of stocks to be transferred at a given time and the location of the facility on the territory of another State Party at which the destruction of stockpiles will be carried out.

(5) The State Party conducting the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which belong to another State Party, should not later than 30 days after the completion of their destruction make an appropriate declaration about it.

(6) The transfer of the stockpiles of chemical weapons for purposes of destruction by one Party to the Convention to another State Party, the transportation of the stockpiles and their destruction are subject to verification in full measure, as it is envisaged in Chapter . . . of the Convention.

6. The destruction of stocks of chemical weapons shall be carried out by each such State Party at a specialized facility (facilities) or at facility (facilities) temporarily converted for such purposes, whose location and technical parameters shall be declared by this State Party in accordance with . . . In case of temporarily converted facility (facilities) for the purposes of destruction, it (they) shall be destroyed in

the agreed manner immediately after the termination of their use for the destruction of stocks and in any event not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force or accession of the State to it.

7. Each State Party during the destruction/elimination of the stocks of chemical weapons, undertakes to take all necessary precautions for the protection of the population and the environment.

REPORTS OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF CONTACT GROUP B

In order to pursue its negotiations, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group needs to examine in detail the procedures required for *the resolution of compliance questions.* This involves consideration of, *inter alia,* the following areas:

1. Information exchanges demonstrating compliance;
2. Sequence of events in resolution of compliance questions;
3. Evidence required to support challenges;
4. Fact-finding measures;
5. On-site inspections;
6. Obligations on nations;
7. Role of consultative committee;
8. Appeals to the United Nations;
9. Other relevant compliance procedures and confidence building measures; and
10. Resulting work requirements for national and international implementation organizations.

To assist the Working Group in its consideration of these matters, a contact group will be established.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GROUP B

To further the Working Group's objectives, the contact group will examine and report on specific questions relating to treatment of the issue of non-compliance as requested by the Working Group chairman. Specifically it will consider:

—the fact-finding measures which should be in place for dealing with challenges on compliance;

—the nature of the evidence which should be available to justify initiation of a challenge and an on-site inspection; and

—the obligation on nations to accept on-site inspections as a result of a challenge.

In examining these questions, the contact group should proceed in a systematic fashion, drawing on material from all areas as necessary, and taking national positions into account as alternatives to be considered. The contact group reports from 1982 should provide a useful starting point. The contact group should not focus on "technical matters" as such, although it should identify areas where existing technical advice is insufficient. Essentially, the contact group's task is to identify the political and operational decisions needed to permit the Working Group to negotiate successfully provisions on these questions for inclusion in a convention.

The contact group chairman will report orally as necessary to the Working Group chairman and will submit a short written report prior to the last Working Group meeting in April. To assist the Working Group in its negotiations, the contact group in this report should note in particular the consensus reached and areas in respect of each question in which differences have not been resolved.

Meetings of Contact Group

The contact group will meet at the discretion of its chairman and meeting times must be scheduled and announced through the Secretariat.

Meetings will be informal, but interpretation services must be available.

Progress Report by the Co-ordinator

The Contact Group examined the ten points contained in the general directions given to it by the Working Group, and in particular the three specific questions it was requested to consider. The following texts sum up the discussions held by the Contact Group.

Text No. 1

On *"the fact-finding measures which should be in place for dealing with challenges on compliance"*, the Contact Group reviewed the contents of Element XIII (Consultative Committee) as it appears in the Annex to CD/334.[29] It was generally felt that the Consultative Committee, composed of all States Parties to the Convention, should have as its subordinate bodies a technical secretariat and a sub-organ of reduced membership to operate on a permanent basis. The possibility of establishing additional sub-organs was not discussed. The technical secretariat would have routine administrative functions such as receiving requests from States parties, providing technical information, handling communications to and from States parties, organizing expert teams for action decided by the competent organ, etc. The other sub-organ would have a smaller membership than the Consultative Committee and would be composed of a fixed number of representatives of States Parties chosen on a basis yet to be determined. Such a number should be small enough to ensure its speedy convening and practical functioning and at the same time representative enough to ensure its authority. The Contact Group considered alternatives for the name of such a body ("Fact-Finding Panel" and "Executive Council" were suggested). It was also generally agreed that such a body should be able to be convened on short notice, and to take decisions on behalf of the Consultative Committee with regard *inter alia* to the following matters: to be seized with requests from States parties; deciding on specific action to be taken regarding the request (information, fact-finding, on-site inspections); evaluation of reports submitted to it as a result of the action decided; reporting to the Consultative Committee; requesting the convening of the Consultative Committee. In this respect, the decision-making process should be further discussed.

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[29] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 649–685.

Text No. 2

On *"the nature of the evidence which should be available to justify initiation of a challenge and an on-site inspection"* and *"the obligation on nations to accept on-site inspections as a result of a challenge"*, the discussions in the Contact Group touched on a number of points recorded on CD/334 and CD/342, in particular the results of the work of the Contact Groups established during the 1982 Session of the Committee on Disarmament. The result of the discussion in the Contact Group is summed up below.

It was generally considered desirable that in seeking the resolution of questions concerning compliance with the Convention, States parties follow the sequence of steps described in the text below. States parties should nevertheless retain at all times their ability to take whatever action they deemed necessary in the framework of the Convention or the Charter of the United Nations to resolve differences concerning the application of the Convention.

It was also generally considered that a refusal by a State party to accept on-site inspections requested by the competent organ of the Convention should be exceptional and accompanied by a full explanation of the reasons for such a refusal.

1. States parties to this Convention undertake to consult and co-operate, directly among themselves or through appropriate procedures, including the services of appropriate international organizations and of the Consultative Committee in any matter related to the implementation of this Convention.

2. States parties to this Convention shall endeavour to clarify and resolve, through bilateral consultation, any situation which may give cause to doubts about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related situation which may be considered ambiguous. A State party seized with a request from another State party for clarification of a particular situation shall promptly provide the requesting State party with all relevant information in connection with the request with a view to the satisfactory conclusion of the issue.

3. In order to facilitate the satisfactory solution of situations referred to in Section 2 above, the States parties concerned may request the co-operation and good offices of the Consultative Committee, or its subsidiary organs for the solution of the issue.

4. Having regard to the procedures contained in Sections 2 and 3 above, any State party may request the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ to carry out, in the exercise of its functions, appropriate procedures with regard to itself or another State party to clarify and resolve any situation which may be considered ambiguous, or which gives rise to suspicion about actions by another State party in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of

this Convention. Such a request may include a request for an on-site inspection.

4.1 Requests sent to the Consultative Committee or its subsidiary organ under Section 4 above should contain objective and concrete elements supporting a suspicion of non-compliance with the Convention and should be directly relevant to the complaint.

4.2 All States parties undertake to co-operate fully with the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs and/or international organizations, which may, as appropriate, give scientific, technical and administrative support to the Consultative Committee in order to facilitate their fact-finding activities so as to ensure the speedy clarification of the situation which gave rise to the original request.

4.3 A request for an on-site inspection by the Consultative Committee or its appropriate subsidiary organ shall be treated favourably and in good faith by the State party which receives it. A refusal should be accompanied by the submission of a prompt and full explanation of its reasons. The Consultative Committee shall assess the explanation submitted and may send another request, taking into account all relevant elements, including possible new elements received by the Consultative Committee after the original request. If a second request is refused, the State party which originated the request may have recourse to appropriate procedures under the Charter of the United Nations.

4.4 The Consultative Committee shall notify all States parties of the initiation of any of the procedures referred to in Section 4 above and shall provide all available information related thereto to any State party upon request.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR ON THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANS

1. A Consultative Committee, composed of representatives of all States Parties to the Convention and presided over by ..... , shall be established within 30 days after entry into force of the Convention.

2. The Consultative Committee shall convene in (venue) not later than (time) after the Convention enters into force.

3. The Consultative Committee shall subsequently meet in regular sessions every ..... (time). Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the request of any State Party or of the Executive Council.

4. ..... (time) after the Convention is open for signature,[30] a Preparatory Commission, composed of representatives of all signatory States, shall be convened for the purpose of carrying out necessary preparations for the coming into force of the Convention's provisions, including preparing the first session of the Consultative Committee. The guidelines for the activities of the Preparatory Commission are contained in Annex .... (suggestions: CD/343,[31] page 10).

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[30] Suggestions were made to the effect that a minimum number of signatures should be required for the convening of the Preparatory Commission. [Footnote in original.]

[31] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

5. The Consultative Committee shall carry out broad international consultations and co-operation among States Parties to the Convention, oversee the implementation of the Convention, and promote the verification of the continued compliance with the Convention,[32] and for those purposes it shall:

(a) review new scientific and technical developments which could affect the operation of the Convention;

(b) provide a forum for discussion of any questions relating to the implementation of the Convention.

6. In order to assist it in carrying out its functions, the Consultative Committee shall establish an Executive Council composed of representatives of . . . (number) States Parties appointed by the Consultative Committee, as well as a Technical Secretariat (and other subsidiary bodies to be agreed upon).

7. The Executive Council shall be responsible for carrying out the functions of the Consultative Committee specified in (a) and (b) of Section 5 above during the period when the latter is not in session. It shall also be responsible for the following functions:

(a) co-operate with States Parties to ensure the implementation of, and compliance with the Convention;

(b) obtain, keep and disseminate information submitted by States Parties regarding matters pertaining to the Convention;

(c) render services to States Parties, facilitating consultations among them;

(d) be seized with requests from States Parties;

(e) decide on specific action to be taken regarding such requests;

(f) receive the reports submitted to it as a result of the action undertaken;

(g) report to the Consultative Committee;

(h) request, when it deems necessary, the convening of the Consultative Committee;

(i) oversee the carrying out of systematic on-site inspections to ensure:

—destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles

—monitoring of small-scale production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for [permitted purposes] [non-hostile military purposes][33]

—as may be agreed upon, compliance with other obligations (e.g. non-production of chemical weapons, non-use, elimination of production facilities, etc.).

8. In addition to providing the necessary administrative support to the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council, the Technical

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[32] Suggestions were made to the effect that the Consultative Committee should carry out the functions of a Review Conference of the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

[33] Subject to further elaboration of relevant definitions. [Footnote and brackets in original.]

Secretariat (and/or other subsidiary bodies to be further agreed upon)[34] shall:

(a) render technical assistance to States Parties and to the Executive Council in implementing the provisions of the Convention;

(b) receive from States Parties and distribute to them data relevant to the implementation of the Convention;

(c) elaborate technical questions relevant to the implementation of the Convention, such as drawing up for recommendation to the Consultative Committee (or the Executive Council) of lists of key precursors, technical procedures, etc.;

(d) assist the Executive Council as further agreed upon in tasks related to information, fact-finding, systematic on-site inspection and challenge inspection.

9. The detailed specifications of the functions and organization of the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary organs shall be spelt out in an Annex to the Convention.

REPORTS OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF CONTACT GROUP C

In order to pursue its negotiations, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group needs to examine in depth the question of including a *prohibition of use* in the chemical weapons convention and its implications. This involves consideration of, *inter alia*, the following areas:

1. Alternative ways for including prohibition of use;
2. Relation to other items in scope;
3. Relation to similar provisions in other conventions;
4. Legal aspects relating to international law;
5. Application of general challenge and fact-finding procedures;
6. Requirements for special compliance and verification procedures;
7. Obligations on nations;
8. Role of consultative committee;
9. Other relevant aspects; and
10. Resulting work requirements for national and international implementation organizations.

To assist the Working Group in its consideration of these matters, a contact group will be established.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GROUP C

To further the Working Group's objectives, the contact group will examine and report on specific questions relating to treatment of the issue of prohibition of use as requested by the Working Group chairman. Specifically it will consider:

—legal and other restrictions on including a measure for prohibition of use in a chemical weapons treaty; and

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[34] See last sentence of Section 6 above. [Footnote in original.]

—special requirements, if any, in addition to the normal challenge and fact-finding procedures necessary to investigate suspected use.

In examining these questions, the contact group should proceed in a systematic fashion, drawing on material from all areas as necessary, and taking national positions into account as alternatives to be considered. The contact group reports from 1982 should provide a useful starting point. The contact group should not focus on "technical matters" as such, although it should identify areas where existing technical advice is insufficient. Essentially, the contact group's task is to identify the political and operational decisions needed to permit the Working Group to negotiate successfully provisions on these questions for inclusion in a convention.

The contact group chairman will report orally as necessary to the Working Group chairman and will submit a short written report prior to the last Working Group meeting in April. To assist the Working Group in its negotiations, the contact group in this report should note in particular the consensus reached and areas in respect of each question in which differences have not been resolved.

Meetings of Contact Group

The contact group will meet at the discretion of its chairman and meeting times must be scheduled and announced through the Secretariat.

Meetings will be informal, but interpretation services must be available.

Report by the Co-ordinator on the "Criteria for the Objective and Impartial Verification of a Prohibition of Use of Chemical Weapons"

1.1 The procedure assuring the verification of a prohibition of use of chemical weapons should allow for rapid action. This applies both to the administrative treatment of a request for verification, by the organ responsible under the Convention, and to access to site (if considered necessary). Access to site should at any rate take place within a time period after the reported event that would facilitate examination of any material including identification of symptoms in the human body of possible victims. Urgency would moreover be imperative in view of the seriousness of an allegation of use, the prohibition of which is after all the ultimate goal of the convention.

1.2 If the Convention should specifically state a time limit, this should in any case be an indicative one. The procedures established within WHO for rapid dispatch of WHO epidemical teams might serve as an example. Possible co-operation with WHO could be explored. It was argued with respect to a time-limit, albeit indicative in nature, that generally speaking the longer the time allowed to lapse after a reported event before an investigation is undertaken, the less likely it will be that the team produce decisive evidence. The likelihood of finding decisive evidence would decrease with time. Climatological and other environmental factors could influence the time factor both ways. Suggestions for the commencement of investigations varied from as early as 24 hours after the reported event, to up to four weeks thereafter. It was suggested that the question of the speed with which an investigation should be initiated might be usefully worked out in guidelines under the responsibility of the Consultative Committee.

II.1 The speed with which an investigation could proceed would depend to an important degree on the measure of preparation. A list of laboratories, equipment and qualified "inspectors" could be composed for the responsible treaty organ to draw from at short notice. A standardized methodology could be elaborated in the form of a guideline for the collection and analysis of information and samples, which would include an assured indisputable "chain of custody" with respect to a sample from the moment it was taken to the moment of its scientific analysis and identification.

II.2 Preparation could also focus on the availability of technical equipment to be used by an investigation team in an on-site inspection, including protective equipment for such a team.

II.3 Special arrangements should be concluded, preferably agreed beforehand, to ensure access to a zone of presumed use and to ensure safety if combat is imminent in the zone. A possible role for the International Committee of the Red Cross, as an organization with experience of working in conditions of armed conflict, was suggested. Danger could never be totally excluded and would have to be accepted.

II.4 In the case of an intended on-site inspection under combat conditions the responsible organ under the Convention should launch a strong appeal for cessation of hostilities. It was believed that in certain types of conflict access to the zone of combat was not feasible without cessation of hostile action.

II.5 The armed forces involved in the conflict could be asked to cooperate. National authorities of the State on whose territory use might have occurred should to the best of their ability assist the investigating team.

II.6 The investigation would be of an international nature. The authorities representing the armed forces allegedly involved in use of chemical weapons as well as the national authorities mentioned in paragraph 5 above could be conferred the right to be represented on the investigating team on an *ad hoc* basis.

II.7 It was suggested that wherever preparation was required as referred to above, a technical preparatory committee could be charged with the elaboration of the necessary details.

III.1 The investigation should comprise a "forensic" procedure; in this context it could focus on defining the confines of the reported site; date and time of the reported event; weather conditions at the time of the reported event; methods and means of delivery of the reported agents; impact on plant, animal and human life. A series of events might have to be contemplated simultaneously. It was observed that such a chain of elements of evidence was as weak as its weakest element. Attention should therefore be focused on all elements alike, individually, as well as in their interrelations.

III.2 For a final conclusion to be reached the availability of information on the presence of the chemicals under consideration in the region under consideration for reasons of a non-hostile nature could be essential. The same could be true for pathological phenomena related to contamination with or intoxication by chemicals of a non-hostile origin. The authorities in whose territory the phenomena occurred could extend useful assistance in providing such information.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR ON ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE INCORPORATION OF A USE PROHIBITION IN THE SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION

Discussions have centred on the desired coverage of a use prohibition in the Convention. Commonality of views has been observed to take shape on the following aspects:

—the prohibition should apply with respect to use against all States, not only States Parties to the Convention;

—the prohibition should apply in any armed conflict (to be further defined, for example in an agreed understanding);

—the Convention should provide for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons;

—the Convention should provide for a clause of non-interference with the relevant international treaties;

—the Convention should contain the "traditional" withdrawal clause;

—the Convention should in its preambular part contain a reference to the obligations set forth in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Other aspects as yet eluded consensus:

—whether the use prohibition should apply to riot control agents;
—whether the use prohibition should apply to herbicides;

Comment: a solution to these questions could be found in the framework of the definitions in the Convention.

—how to uphold in law the deterrence value of remaining stocks in the period preceding their destruction;

Comment: the right of any State to resort to reprisals seems not to be affected by any of the proposed draft texts. Rather the question seems to be how the States concerned could preserve, if they would choose to do so, a much broader right to retaliate during this period. The remaining question would then be in which form this concern could be met.

—the extent to which the 1925 Geneva Protocol has been subsumed in customary international law and how this should be reflected in the (preambular part of the) Convention;

Comment: though there was general recognition of the existence of a rule of customary international law regarding non-use of chemical weapons, positions varied as to the scope of such rule and, accordingly, as to the desirability and way to reflect such rule in the Convention.

The Co-ordinator, in an attempt to take account of the commonality of views referred to above, suggested formulations that are contained in Appendix I.

APPENDIX I

Preambular paragraph

"Taking cognizance of the obligations enshrined in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June, 1925."

Operative paragraphs

I. [See Appendix II] [35]

II. The States Parties to this Convention, having accepted to be bound by the obligation not to use chemical weapons in any armed conflict, in accordance with Article . . . , hereby accept that the procedure laid down in Article . . . shall apply to the verification of compliance with the said obligation.

III. 1. Nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June, 1925.

2. Nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

3. Nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. [36]

IV. Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

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[35] Brackets in original.

[36] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 322–326.

APPENDIX II

With regard to a first operative paragraph relating to non-use of chemical weapons, a suggestion was made for a formula in which an unequivocal undertaking to exclude the use of chemical weapons is placed in the framework of the recognition that such undertaking would complement the prohibitions in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This formula, as drafted by the co-ordinator, reads as follows:

> I. States Parties to the Convention undertake, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention which complement the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to exclude the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict.

The possibility of making this formula the basis for further work has been considered; however no agreement could be reached thereupon and delegations felt that the matter had to be further studied.

Meanwhile, a number of delegations maintain preference for solution to the incorporation of a use prohibition in the scope of the Convention through direct inclusion of such a prohibition in Element I (of CD/CW/WP.33), while other delegations continue to prefer a solution whereby commitment of Parties as well as non-Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol is reflected to observe the Protocol's provisions regarding prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in all armed conflicts.

The matter should be resolved in further intensive consultations.

CONTACT GROUP D

In order to pursue its negotiations, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group needs to examine some definitions further and to develop the criteria necessary to identify and list chemicals whose production must be prohibited for chemical weapons purposes and for which compliance with the ban must be verified. This involves consideration of, *inter alia*, the following areas:

1. Scope of the prohibition;
2. The basic prohibitions/general purpose criterion;
3. All terms requiring definition for purposes of the convention;
4. Terms where adequate definition is still lacking;
5. Categories, if necessary, within which chemicals may be identified for control and verification of production;
6. Criteria for assigning chemicals to categories including toxicity criteria and chemical criteria;
7. The preparation of lists;
8. The use of categories, criteria and lists in verification;
9. Verification procedures; and
10. The effects of verification procedures in industry.

To assist the Working Group in its consideration of these matters, a contact group will be established.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GROUP D

To further the Working Group's objectives, the contact group will examine and report on specific questions relating to definitions, criteria and precursors as requested by the Working Group chairman. Specifically, it will consider:

—reaching common agreement on the definition of the terms chemical weapons, precursors and key precursors;

—providing agreed criteria and one or more lists of precursors suitable for use in establishing controls and verification procedures to guarantee the non-production of chemicals for chemical weapons purposes; and

—verification methods and limitations that might be devised on the basis of the agreed definitions and criteria.

In examining these questions, the contact group should proceed in a systematic fashion, drawing on material from all areas as necessary, and taking national positions into account as alternatives to be considered. Previous contact group reports from 1982, the results from discussions in January 1983 and material already obtained in consultations and in the Working Group in 1983 should provide a useful starting point. The contact group should consider related technical information as necessary and identify the political and operational decisions needed to permit the Working Group to negotiate successfully provisions on these questions for inclusion in a convention.

The contact group co-ordinator will report orally as necessary to the Working Group chairman and will submit a first report by 13 July 1983. To assist the Working Group in its negotiations the contact group in its reports should note in particular the consensus reached and areas in respect of each question in which differences have not been resolved.

Meetings of Contact Group

The contact group will meet at the discretion of its chairman and meeting times will be scheduled and announced as agreed with the Secretariat.

Report of the Co-ordinator on the Work of Contact Group D

1. The discussions of the Contact Group concerned the mandate given to the Group by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, specifically: definitions of chemical weapons; precursors and key precursors; criteria for, and one or more lists of, precursors, as well as procedures for verification of production of such precursors. The Group was later given the task of discussing also small-scale facilities for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for agreed purposes.

2. The discussions were based on previously presented material as well as material presented during the discussions as given in the list of references attached to this report.

3. The report is set out in two parts. The first part contains views which the Co-ordinator feels have not met with objections from delegations participating in the discussions in the Contact Group although no delegation is bound by the specific formulations used. In the second part views, which have not met with full agreement, are recorded, including alternatives and objections which have been presented during the discussions.

PART 1

Structure

4. The convention should contain definitions of chemical weapon, precursor and key precursor, criteria for selecting key precursors as well as a list or, if agreed, lists of agreed key precursors.

Definitions

5. The following concepts regarding the definition of chemical weapon appearing in CD/334 [37] seem to continue to obtain general support:

(a) The definition should comprise only such concepts as are necessary for the purpose of the convention.

(b) The definition should express the typical effects of chemical weapons, i.e. that their effects are due to the utilization of the toxic properties of chemicals to cause death or other harm.

(c) The term *"chemical weapon"* should be applied to three different categories of items:

- (i) Toxic chemicals which meet certain criteria, and their precursors.
- (ii) Munitions and devices which meet certain criteria. This category includes binary and other multi-component munitions or devices.
- (iii) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

The *toxicity criteria* given in CD/334 were not discussed further in the Contact Group, since they seem to be generally agreed.

6. For the purpose of the convention *precursor* should be defined.

7. The definition of a *key precursor* should express the following concepts:

—It should be a substance which plays a most important role for the production of/toxic chemicals for chemical weapons purposes/chemical warfare agents/. [38]

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[37] *Ibid., 1982,* pp. 649–685.

[38] Pending final definition of chemical weapons. [Footnote in original.]

—For this reason production of a key precursor for permitted purposes might create conditions for the violation of the convention and should be subject to particular provisions under the convention.

—A key precursor should normally meet all agreed criteria in order to be selected for listing.

Criteria

8. Criteria, and provisions deprived from them regarding key precursors could be the following:

—One criterion should be that it would be particularly important in determining the characteristics of the end product.

—Another criterion is that it has relatively little use for non-hostile purposes.

Criteria could be revised when scientific or other development so required.

The purpose of the criteria would be to select key precursors which should be placed in a list or, if agreed lists.

List of key precursors

9. There should be a list or, if agreed, lists containing chemical substances which meet all the agreed criteria of key precursors. In addition, a chemical substance, notwithstanding that it does not meet all the criteria, could be, as an exception, included in the list of key precursors on the basis of decision taken by the States Parties to the Convention. Such decision should take into consideration the potential role of a chemical substance for chemical weapons and its role in the commercial chemical industry. The list should be reviewed periodically and revised, if necessary, with the aim of adding chemical substances or deleting those which no longer meet all the agreed criteria, or no longer need to be included as exceptions.

Permitted purposes

10. There was a common view that "permitted purposes" had been expressed in an equal way in CD/294, CD/334 and CD/343.[39] Differences in formulations did not detract from the common understanding of this issue in the three documents. Accordingly the concept of "permitted purposes", as well as "protection purposes" which form a sub-category of "permitted purposes", could be used as a common basis for the discussion of the problems connected with a "small-scale production facility". A preliminary formulation might be the following:

Permitted purposes means:

—Non-hostile purposes, that is: industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes, or protective purposes;

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[39] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

—Military purposes which are not related to the use of chemical weapons.

Small-scale production facility

11. With respect to provisions for a small-scale facility for protective/permitted purposes[40] the following views below were expressed:

(a) Production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective/permitted purposes should be limited to a single declared small-scale facility for each party;

(b) The capacity of the facility should not exceed an agreed limit;

(c) The aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals/and key precursors/for protective/permitted purposes should be as low as possible and not exceed an agreed limit;

(d) The single, small-scale facility should be subject to systematic international on-site inspection.

Verification procedures for non-production of key precursors for chemical weapons purposes

12. In order to verify the declared production for permitted purposes of listed key precursors, it was considered generally agreed that such production would, like all aspects of the Convention, be subject to verification by challenge under the provisions of the Convention. It was also agreed that regular exchange of information regarding such production should be provided for in the Convention.

The above-mentioned measures, or other measures to be agreed, should be set out alongside each chemical or class of chemicals on the list.

PART 2—ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

Definition of chemical weapons

13. Some delegations held that the definitions of chemical weapons should include the concept "*chemical warfare agent*" as was suggested as an alternative also in CD/334. Different suggestions were put forward for this purpose in written and oral proposals submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, the Working Group and the Contact Group or were contained in earlier documents (see list of references).

Definition of "chemical warfare agent"

14. It was suggested that a definition of chemical warfare agent should be included in the Convention.

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[40] The expression "protective/permitted purposes" reflects the common understanding that the production of a declared single small-scale production facility should relate to "protective purposes" which are part of "permitted purposes", irrespective of whether delegations held that such production should relate to all permitted purposes or only to protective purposes. [Footnote in original.]

Definition of precursor

15. A suggestion for the definition of "precursor" was the following: for the purpose of the convention a *precursor* is a chemical which, by isomerization, or reaction with another chemical, or both, lead to the formation of/chemical weapons/.

A view was put forward that the definition of precursor should be based on the concept of chemical warfare agent.

Definitions of key precursors

16. Some delegations felt that a definition of key precursors contained in chemical weapons or military stockpiles would not be necessary since the key precursors falling under such a definition automatically would have to be declared and eliminated under the Convention. Only key precursors to be produced under supervision for permitted purposes need to be defined.

The definition shall contain the concept that the key precursor shall be listed together with:

(a) The criteria or other grounds which constitute the reasons for putting it on the list;

(b) The measures for ensuring compliance with the Convention, agreed individually for each key precursor.

Others felt that the definition of key precursors should be related to all the chemicals which meet all the demands of criteria of key precursors, irrespective of for which purposes they are produced and where they are stored.

Such a definition must serve for the purposes of composing a list of key precursors, declarations, destruction or diversion of stockpiles, and verification of limitation of production in the peaceful chemical industry.

The definition of key precursor should serve as a guide for the evaluation of criteria to the future.

A view was put forward that the definition of key-precursors should be based on the concept of chemical warfare agent.

Criteria

17. Some delegations considered that a third criterion for selecting key precursors should be that the precursor takes part in the final stage of the production of the toxic chemicals used for chemical weapons.

Other delegations thought that this criterion, to be acceptable, should specify the "final stages". For alternative suggestions see the list of references.

Some delegations did not find it necessary to include this criterion at all.

Criteria would also guide in a general way the measures of verification (e.g. exchange of information) which should accompany the selected key precursors on the list.

List of key precursors

18. With regard to the content of the list of key precursors several suggestions and variations of earlier suggestions were put forward. Although all delegations seemed able to accept the inclusion of certain chemicals in a list (or lists), views differed with respect to other chemicals and, to the reasons why they should be put on a list of key precursors.

A list, or, if agreed, lists of key precursors to be produced for permitted purposes under supervision could contain all or some of the chemicals or types of chemicals which had been suggested earlier (see list of references), together with agreed verification measures to be applied for each substance or class of chemicals listed.

Small-scale production facility

19. In addition to the common views expressed on provisions for a small-scale production facility for protective/permitted purposes, it was considered that the following issues need further discussion:

(a) Should production of key precursors for protective purposes be limited to a single small-scale facility for each Party?

(b) Should production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes other than protective purposes be restricted to a small-scale facility?

(c) Should production of key precursors for permitted purposes other than protective purposes be restricted to a small-scale facility?

(d) Should production for protective purposes of all compounds containing methyl-phosphorus bonds be restricted to a small-scale facility?

(e) Should production for permitted purposes of all compounds containing methyl-phosphorus bonds be restricted to a small-scale facility?

(f) What should be the agreed amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors which a Party might have on hand for protective purposes?

(g) Should there be a limit on the amount of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors which a Party might have on hand for all permitted purposes, including protective purposes? If so, what should be the agreed amount?

(h) What should be the agreed production/capacity limit for a small-scale production facility for protective purposes?

(i) What should be the agreed production/capacity/limit for production of super-toxic lethal chemicals at a small-scale production facility for permitted purposes?

(j) If production for permitted purposes of super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors were allowed in commercial industry, should there be a production/capacity/limit?

(k) What should the verification objectives and guidelines be for each of the possible production restrictions above?

Verification procedures for non-production of key-precursors for chemical weapons purposes

It was proposed by the Co-ordinator that the following topics should be further discussed:

—Details on the kind of information to be exchanged, e.g. concerning declarations of production facility location and capacity, production level, civil use, etc.

—On-site inspection on a random or periodic basis.

The discussions did not deal with how the non-production of the chemicals or undeclared facilities could be verified.

Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements To Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, August 22, 1983 [1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament adopted the following decision, relating to item 3 on its agenda, contained in document CD/358, which, *inter alia*, reads:

> . . . The Committee decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1983 session the *Ad Hoc* Working Groups on a Nuclear Test Ban, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Radiological Weapons . . .
>
> It is understood that the *ad hoc* working groups may start their work on the basis of their former mandates. The mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee which will consider this question with appropriate urgency.
>
> The *ad hoc* working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work before the conclusion of its 1983 session. [2]

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 207th plenary meeting, on 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, representative of Pakistan, as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. Mr. S.K. Buo and Mr. M. Cassandra of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group during the first and second parts of the 1983 session respectively.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held nine meetings between 26 April and 29 April and between 16 June and 22 August 1983.

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[1] CD/417. The annex is not printed here.

[2] *Ante*, Mar. 29.

4. At their request, the Committee on Disarmament, at its 208th plenary meeting on 31 March 1983, decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group during the 1983 session: Austria, Finland, Norway.

5. In carrying out its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group took into account paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which ". . . the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". During the course of its work, the Working Group also took into account other relevant paragraphs of the Final Document.[3]

6. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group also took note of the letter of the Secretary-General in document CD/336 transmitting resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, and took note in particular of resolutions 37/80 and 37/81. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of resolution 37/80 read as follows:

> 3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations on the question of the strengthening of the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States during its session in 1983;
>
> 4. *Calls once again upon* all States participating in these negotiations to make efforts to elaborate and conclude an international instrument of a legally binding character, such as an international convention, on this matter;
>
> 5. *Calls once again upon* all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention, and recommends that the Security Council should examine such declarations and, if they all meet the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them.

Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of resolution 37/81 read as follows:

> 3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;
>
> 4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular

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[3] The Final Document has been included in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

> those considered in the Committee on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;
>
> 5. *Recommends* that the Committee on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

7. In addition to the previous documents before the *Ad Hoc* Working Group listed in CD/SA/WP.1/Rev.4, two documents from the 1981 session were recirculated to the Group: a working paper presented by the Netherlands (CD/SA/CRP.6) and another presented by Pakistan (CD/SA/CRP.7). A working paper was prepared by the Secretariat during the 1983 session, entitled "Declarations on Security Assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States made by the five nuclear-weapon States, including references to nuclear-weapon-free-zones, and Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America"[4] (CD/SA/WP.10), which updated the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States contained in CD/SA/WP.2. The Group of 21 presented a document (CD/407) to the Committee on the subject. The Secretariat also prepared a document dated 20 April 1983, entitled "A compilation of statements made at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly and during the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly, in 1982, on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Substantive Negotiations

8. In pursuing the task entrusted to it, the Working Group bore particularly in mind its special report to the Committee on Disarmament in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/281/Rev.1) [*CD/285/Rev.1**] wherein it reviewed substantive negotiations on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" during the 1979, 1980 and 1981 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as the state of negotiations on the subject before the second special session in 1982. The Working Group had held no meetings since that report until it was re-established in 1983 and the prospect of further progress on this issue was debated.

9. A number of delegations generally regretted the fact that there had been little positive movement forward in the negotiations on the question since the Group last met a year ago and they reiterated the Group of 21's view, contained in document CD/280, that further

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[4] The treaty and its protocols may be found *ibid.*, 1967, pp. 69-83.

negotiations in the Group were unlikely to be fruitful as long as nuclear-weapon States did not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. They were of the view that nuclear-weapon States were under the obligation to guarantee in clear and categorical terms that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be made victims of threats or attacks with nuclear weapons. One nuclear-weapon-State emphasized that these appreciations should take full account of the movement in its position that occurred at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Many delegations, including two nuclear-weapon States, shared the view that political will was the central requirement for progress on this issue. In this regard other delegations pointed to the specific difficulties that had been revealed in negotiations which stemmed from the differing perceptions of the security interests of some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States and showed that the question of negative security assurances, in their view, cannot in fact be divorced from the wider issues of security in general. Some delegations expressed their view on the inadmissibility of this concept and stated that perceptions of security interests could not be used as an excuse for not granting negative guarantees or for the placing of conditions on those declarations. One nuclear-weapon State declared that its unilateral commitment never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories was effective, reliable and met the vital interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. A number of delegations from non-nuclear-weapon States held that the inflexibility of the concerned nuclear-weapon States to remove the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in their unilateral declarations reduced to nothing the credibility of their declarations. Three nuclear-weapon States rejected this argument and stated that the assurances they had provided had been solemnly and formally given and remained fully in force.

10. Some delegations held that the unilateral declarations of two nuclear-weapon States were incompatible with the obligations of those two States under Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Those delegations further noted that the effectiveness of the treaty had been adversely affected by interpretative declarations to the Protocols which they held imposed conditions contrary to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and derived from multilateral instruments that in their view were inherently discriminatory. They also stated that the interpretative declarations amounted to reservations since they modified the terms of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and recalled in that connection the provisions of Article IV of Additional Protocol II. The nuclear-weapon States concerned disagreed that any such incompatibility existed. They maintained that the declarations made on ratification of the Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco were entirely consistent with the provisions of those Protocols and the Treaty.

11. The importance of effective security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was re-affirmed. It was widely held that there was an urgent need to reach agreement on a "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. There was also no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Some delegations were of the view that the Working Group had exhausted its discussions on the subject.

12. The Chairman suggested three mutually non-exclusive approaches for possible adoption by the Working Group in its consideration of the subject, namely, (1) to continue negotiations towards an agreement on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character; (2) to examine the relevance and the direct implications of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons to the so-called negative security assurances; and (3) to adopt any other approach which might help in the resolution of some of the problems.

13. Some delegations expressed the view that the Working Group should proceed immediately to the concrete elaboration of an international convention. It was pointed out however that an agreement first on the substance of the assurances would facilitate an agreement on the form.

14. An exchange of views was held on the relevance of non-first-use of nuclear weapons to security assurances offered to non-nuclear-weapon States. Some delegations felt that a non-first-use pledge evidently amounted to a clear guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used against non-nuclear-weapon States since these States by virtue of their non-possession of nuclear weapons could never provoke retaliation.

15. A number of delegations underlined the significance of the non-first-use obligations and pointed out that a unilateral non-first-use undertaking, if assumed by all nuclear-weapon States without exception, would constitute an important measure aimed at strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and therefore had direct implications and relevance to the Group's work. Some other delegations stated that the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons cannot constitute an effective and credible guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States, in so far as its validity *erga omnes* may at any moment be called into question by the actions of another nuclear-weapon State. Divergent views on this issue remained.

16. In the course of deliberations and with a view to clarifying the subject matter, a proposal was put forward that the question be examined according to the categories of non-nuclear-weapon States contained in the five unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon powers. These categories would be: (1) non-nuclear-weapon States that belong to a military alliance with nuclear-weapon States; (2) non-nuclear-weapon States that belong to a military alliance and have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory; (3) non-nuclear-weapon

States that belong to a military alliance and do not have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory; (4) non-nuclear-weapon States who do not belong to a military alliance, but have military arrangements with a nuclear-weapon State involving nuclear weapon assurances; (5) non-nuclear-weapon States that do not belong to a military alliance and enjoy a denuclearized status deriving from their participation in a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this context it was pointed out that some of the existing unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States specifically referred to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty [5] or to other internationally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices. Many delegations pointed out that non-nuclear-weapon States as a whole should be given clear and unambiguous guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Some delegations reiterated their position that in view of the manifest difficulties in providing effective assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States, at least those not belonging to any of the military alliances should receive such guarantees. The discussion on the suggested approach however remained inconclusive.

17. Some delegations, referring to what, in their view, has come to be known as the geographic proliferation of nuclear weapons, noted that the increasing introduction and deployment of nuclear weapons in various areas of the world should be averted, as it has serious implications for the non-nuclear-weapon States in their respective regions. Other delegations stated that this notion of geographic proliferation fails to take into account existing geographic asymmetries.

18. One nuclear-weapon State reiterated that it undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free zones.

19. One nuclear-weapon State stressed the importance of its unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The same nuclear-weapon State confirmed that its unilateral commitment never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories remained fully valid.

20. One nuclear-weapon State recalled the substantial expansion of its position presented during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and as contained in document CD/SA/WP.10.

21. Two nuclear-weapon States pointed out that their unilateral assurances had been offered in response to, and given in recognition of the security concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and that these assurances were credible and reliable and represented firm declarations of policy.

22. In connection with those unilateral declarations, some delegations expressed the view that Article 51 of the Charter of the United

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[5] *Ibid.*, *1968*, pp. 461–465.

Nations cannot be invoked to justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence in case of armed attack not involving the use of nuclear weapons. Other delegations maintained that no provision of the United Nations Charter limits the right of States to make use of the means they deem the most appropriate, subject to existing international agreements, in exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized in Art. 51.

23. Many delegations reiterated their belief that nuclear disarmament constituted the most effective security assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. A number of delegations further stated that if non-nuclear-weapon States were required to accept unilateral declarations, as a sufficient assurance of security, similarly nuclear-weapon States should accept unilateral declarations of non-nuclear-weapon States as sufficient assurance that they do not possess nuclear weapons nor intended to acquire such weapons.

Conclusions and Recommendations

24. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament. Negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements however revealed that specific difficulties related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a common formula acceptable to all continued to prevent agreement on such a formula, as well as on an international convention. Under these circumstances, no progress was achieved.

25. Against this background, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations to reach an appropriate agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a working group should be re-established at the beginning of the 1984 session and consultations should take place in order to determine the most appropriate course of action, including the resumption of the activities of the working group itself.

Address by President Reagan to the American Legion [Extract], August 23, 1983 [1]

Thank you very much, Commander Keller, Governor Spellman, Secretary Donovan, Senator Gorton, Members of Congress who are here, and all of you, my fellow Legionnaires. I thank you for that warm greeting, and the feeling is mutual.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 29, 1983, pp. 1159–1162. The President spoke to the Legion's 65th annual convention in Seattle.

It's always a special pleasure to address the Legion, and today is no exception. So, Legionnaire Ronald Reagan, Pacific Palisades Post—as you've been told—283, reporting for duty. My uniforms are long since in mothballs, but one of the major responsibilities that goes with my present job is being the chief advocate for America's Armed Forces and veterans, and I take that responsibility seriously.

One of the great lessons of life is that if you set high standards and do your best to live up to them, you won't go wrong. The Legion has set high standards for itself and for our country. And as long as America lives up to your standards, America will not go wrong.

At home and abroad, our country is on the right track again. As a nation, we've closed the books on a long, dark period of failure and self-doubt and set a new course. With your continuing support and the support of millions of other patriotic, God-fearing Americans, we've come a long way. But the task we face is still a challenging one, and a lot of hard work remains to be done. But let's be sure we know what needs to be done.

We've got a few people in Washington who don't want to hear when we tell of our arms control and strategic modernization program and America's responsibility to protect peace and freedom. My own concern with these issues is nothing new, as many of you know. Three years ago at your Boston convention, I pledged to restore America's military posture so that we could promote peace while safeguarding our freedom and security. With the help of groups like the Legion, we've kept that pledge.

Our military forces are back on their feet and standing tall. Modern equipment is being delivered to the troops, training is way up, and combat readiness rates have really soared. And once again, young Americans wear their uniforms and serve their flag with pride. We're getting and keeping very good people in all of the services. We've made great progress, and we're going to make more. And I hope that makes you as proud as it does me.

I have to interrupt and tell you a little thing—and I don't mean this that these young men and women in our armed services are hostile or warlike; they know that they're the peacekeepers. But an ambassador wrote me a letter—our Ambassador to Luxembourg—and he said that he'd been up on the East German frontier and visiting the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. And as he went back to his helicopter, he was followed by a young 19-year-old trooper, and the young man asked him if he thought he could get a message to me. Well, being an ambassador, he allowed as how he could. And the kid says, "Well, will you tell him we're proud to be here, and we ain't scared of nothing."

But while I'm on the subject of our military forces, I want to reaffirm our determination to account for every brave American who served in Southeast Asia. This administration has not forgotten and will never forget the sacrifices that they and their families have made. And we will not rest until the fullest possible accounting has been made.

The other half of restoring our military posture concerns our strategic forces. In the past, we paid a grim price for indecision and neglect—for a one-way restraint that was never returned by the other side. The resulting imbalance weakened the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, the deterrent that has been the single greatest bulwark for peace in the postwar era. While past American leaders hesitated or naively hoped for the best, the Soviet Union was left free to pile up new nuclear arsenals without any real incentives to seriously negotiate reductions.

Well, history doesn't offer many crystal-clear lessons for those who manage our Nation's affairs. But there are a few, and one of them is surely the lesson that weakness on the part of those who cherish freedom inevitably leads to trouble—that it only encourages the enemies of both peace and freedom. On the other hand, history teaches us that by being strong and resolute we can keep the peace—and even reduce the threats to peace.

And that was why, at your Boston convention in 1980, I pledged to strive for arms reduction agreements—not so-called arms control agreements that permitted further growth, but real arms reductions.

We've kept that pledge, too. For the past 2½ years, this administration has steadfastly followed a dual track of deterrence through modernization and the search for a more stable peace through arms reduction negotiations. There is no contradiction in this dual approach, despite what some of the critics in Washington might have you believe. The restoration of a credible deterrent and the search for real arms reductions and stability are two sides of the same coin—a coin that is inscribed with the words "peace" and "security."

Now, our efforts are designed to sustain peace, plain and simple. We don't seek an arms race; indeed, we seek to reverse the trends that cause it by beginning to lower the levels of the nuclear arms. But we will not, and we cannot, accept anything that would be detrimental to our security and to the freedom and safety of our children and our grandchildren.

And that's what is so important about the MX. The MX Peacekeeper missile and our program to develop a new, small, single-warhead missile are critical to our country's present and future safety. They will maintain state-of-the-art readiness against the Soviets' already modernized systems. They will also ensure stability and deterrence, making it clear that aggression by the Soviet Union would never pay. And they're an essential incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for genuine arms reduction so that we can move to a more stable world in which the risk of war is reduced.

Modernization goes hand in hand with deterrence. Both are necessary incentives for successful negotiations. Many of our critics willfully ignore this interrelationship. Instead, they focus their attention and their criticism on some single point which doesn't address the central issue. Often, it's based on wishful thinking or downright misinformation.

For example, one argument contends that the MX Peacekeeper would pose a first-strike threat to the Soviet Union. Well, in the most fundamental sense, this argument runs counter to the whole history of America. Our country has never started a war, and we've never sought nor will we ever develop a strategic first-strike capability. Our sole objective is deterrence, the strength and credibility it takes to prevent war.

And in any case, there is no way that the MX, even with the remaining Minuteman force, could knock out the entire Soviet ICBM force, so the argument is a false one, both philosophically and technically. What we really want and what we would have with the MX in place is enough force that tells the enemy we'd do them a lot of damage.

But the example that I've given is typical of the twisted logic of the anti-MX lobby. It reminds me of that tale told of an armed services poker game which took place a few years back on a western military base. The MP's were tipped off, raided the barracks. The four poker players just managed to hide the cards and poker chips in time. When the police got there, they were sitting at an empty table, staring innocently at each other, and the MP sergeant asked each one in turn if he'd been gambling. And the soldier bit his lip and replied, "No, sarge, I haven't been gambling." And the sailor paused, silently asked the Lord's forgiveness, and also said he wasn't gambling. And the airman answered the same way. And that finally brought them to the marine. And they said, "Have you been gambling?" And the MP looked the cop right dead in the eye and asked, "Who with?" [*Laughter*] [2] That was quick thinking, but the marine sure avoided a real issue, and the real issue's what counts.

The real national defense issue of our time is maintaining deterrence while seeking arms reductions. And today I'm pleased to be able to report some good news on the negotiating front. Our fundamental negotiating positions in both the START and INF talks have been strengthened by a number of related developments that have occurred this year. Let me share a few of them with you.

First on the list is that strong, bipartisan support is beginning to surface for our strategic program. Starting with the perceptive recommendations of the Scowcroft commission, [3] and strengthened by the bipartisan congressional support in strategic modernization votes in May and July, America has finally begun to forge a national consensus for peace and security.

The MX Peacekeeper program and the development program for a new, small, single-warhead missile will complement the B-1 bomber and Trident submarine programs, the other legs of the triad. But we aren't over the hump yet. There's still work to be done, and I'm counting on your continuing and active support as we approach the next legislative round on appropriations for the MX this autumn. If we see this mission through, the combined efforts of this administration and the Congress will restore the credibility of America's strategic posture—the essential foundation for deterrence and successful negotiations.

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[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] *Ante*, Apr. 6.

We've learned over and over again that only common resolve in the West can bring responsiveness from the East. And fortunately, Western allied unity today is a firm reality. Our negotiations have been preceded by close consultations with the Congress and with our allies. This process has continued during the negotiations in Geneva, and we've given our negotiators the flexibility to explore all possible avenues with the Soviets.

"Peace" is a beautiful word, but it is also freely used and sometimes even abused. As I've said before, peace is an objective, not a policy. Those who fail to understand this do so at their peril. Neville Chamberlain thought of peace as a vague policy in the thirties, and the result brought us closer to World War II. Today's so-called peace movement—for all its modern hype and theatrics—makes the same old mistake. They would wage peace by weakening the free. And that just doesn't make sense.

My heart is with those who march for peace. I'd be at the head of the parade if I thought it would really serve the cause of peace. But the members of the real peace movement, the real peacekeepers and peacemakers, are people who understand that peace must be built on strength. And for that, the American people and free people everywhere owe all of you a deep debt of gratitude.

Like you, our allies remain united in a common effort to strengthen both deterrence and the prospect for arms reduction through negotiations. They recognize the dangers to allied unity of Soviet propaganda and thinly veiled threats—at causing NATO to abandon its dual-track decision to modernize and negotiate. If we lack the will to provide a credible deterrent, then we could look forward to ever more aggressive Soviet behavior in the future. Because NATO understands this, NATO will persevere.

When you add it all up, despite the problems, there is strong reason for hope. This administration has worked very hard over the course of many months to refine our own negotiating objectives and positions. We've developed a sound, well-thought-out strategy to achieve them. We stand united with the Congress and our allies. Our strategic triad is being modernized. We're negotiating arms reductions in good faith. And there's been encouraging movement in these negotiations.

For the first time, in the START negotiations, the Soviets are willing to actually talk about actual reductions. In Vienna, at the mutual balanced force reduction talks, the Soviet negotiators have shown movement on the verification issues needed to permit us to negotiate reductions in the conventional force safely. There has also been progress in discussing confidence-building measures. All these indicators, modest though they may seem, point in the same positive direction—new hope for arms reductions and a more secure world.

Let's not kid ourselves. There are lots of ambiguities, and we've still got a long way to go, a long way from agreement. Plenty of tough, hard bargaining remains to be done at the negotiating table. But I can assure you that our highest priority is focused on this, the most challenging and important issue of our lifetime, and we're making headway for peace.

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Statement by the Group of 21 Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, August 23, 1983 [1]

The Group of 21 wishes to state its views regarding the question of the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Working Group on item 7, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".

Throughout the 1982 and 1983 sessions, the Group has consistently maintained that the establishment of such an *Ad Hoc* Working Group, with an appropriate mandate offers the only practical course for the Committee to fulfil its responsibility under this item. It was in this spirit that the Group of 21 proposed during the 1982 session the following draft mandate for the proposed *Ad Hoc* Working Group, as contained in CD/329:

> Reaffirming the principle that Outer Space—the common heritage of mankind—should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extension of an Arms Race to Outer Space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes; the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an *Ad Hoc* Working Group to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement/or agreements—as appropriate—to prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its aspects. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament.

In its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority resolutions 37/83 and 37/98 in which the Assembly specifically requested the Committee to establish an *Ad Hoc* Working Group to negotiate an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

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[1] CD/418.

It may be observed from the pattern of voting in the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, that no Member State voted against the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Working Group with such a mandate. This was in consonance with the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, which stated in paragraph 80 that:

> In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. [2]

During the 1983 Session of the Committee, consultations were held under the auspices of the Chairman with a view to reaching a consensus on a mandate for the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. In these consultations the Group of 21 was confronted by position consistently held by members of the Western Group, which sought to restrict the mandate of the proposed *Ad Hoc* Working Group to identifying "through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". While the Group of 21 expressed its readiness to accept such a task, as a necessary initial stage in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group it maintained that the mandate should spell out the ultimate objective of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, namely to reach an agreement or agreements aimed at Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space, as specifically requested by the General Assembly. The Group of 21 still displayed flexibility and showed willingness to accommodate the States in question.

To this end, it submitted various alternative drafts and proposed amendments to the draft mandates submitted during the informal consultations. For example, on 1 August 1983, it proposed the following draft mandate:

> In discharging its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, [3] the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an *Ad Hoc* Working Group under item 7 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space'.
>
> In carrying out its task, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and—in the first instance—identify, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the conclusion of an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space, and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament.

In the last round of consultations, the draft mandate contained in document CD/413 was submitted by its authors for consideration. The

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[2] For the treaty text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.

[3] The Final Document is *ibid., 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

Group of 21, in a further attempt to reach an agreed mandate, proposed to amend the second paragraph of the proposed mandate so as to read as follows:

> The Committee requests the *Ad Hoc* Working Group to identify, *in the first part of 1984 session,* [4] through substantive examination, issues relevant to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

Such a formula would have, if accepted, led to the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Working Group, and allowed it to carry out the task of identifying issues relevant to an arms race in Outer Space during the first half of the session. Following this, the Committee would be in a position to review the situation and hopefully be able to agree on the substantive mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. To the deep regret of the Group of 21 this proposal, moderate as it is, was not accepted by the authors of CD/413, who have proceeded with the formal introduction of their proposal as a draft mandate for the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.

The Group of 21 feels it necessary to put on record these developments with regard to which it wishes to express its deep disappointment. The Group of 21 considers the mandate contained in CD/413 as inadequate, since it failed to spell out the objective to be reached by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, namely the negotiation of an agreement or agreements aimed at the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

The Group of 21 believes that the absence of a time limit in the mandate proposed in CD/413 may only plunge the proposed *Ad Hoc* Working Group into unnecessarily prolonged discussions on a number of unspecified issues.

The Group nevertheless, in view of the urgent need of initiating action in connection with the task of preventing an arms race in Outer Space, has decided not to prevent the adoption of CD/413, if all other groups are willing to accept it.

In such a case, the members of the Group of 21 would participate in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group to be established, with the understanding that its mandate constitute only an initial stage. The Group of 21 would, therefore, reserve its right to raise the question at any time and in any manner it deems appropriate, in the light of the course of discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, and it would then ask the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its responsibility in providing the *Ad Hoc* Working Group with an adequate mandate.

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[4] The underlined words constitute the amendment proposed by the Group of 21. [Footnote in original. Printed here as italics.]

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Busby) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons [Extract], August 23, 1983 [1]

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Today, I intend to speak only about the Committee's efforts to ban chemical weapons. My delegation's views on the other areas of the Committee's work will be presented at the next plenary meeting. I would like to offer some general comments on the Committee's work on chemical weapons in 1983, then comment on some recent statements made by other delegations, and finally advance some ideas about next year.

Let me begin with some general remarks. The results of the 1983 session in the chemical weapons field have been meagre and quite disappointing to my delegation. This is true despite the best efforts of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador McPhail, and a number of other delegations, including my own.

The accomplishments of 1983 lie largely in the realm of better organization of work. For this we all owe a great deal to Ambassador McPhail. Under his leadership the tendency toward fragmentation of the discussions has been reversed. The Committee has been able to deal comprehensively with key problem areas and to consolidate work on related issues of scope, declaration, and verification in each area. Furthermore, for the first time the Committee has an agreed document which records the areas of convergence and divergence and can thus serve as a generally accepted basis for future work.

Certainly, useful and important work has been carried out by the four contact groups as well. We very much appreciate the efforts of the contact group co-ordinators. Some progress was made in crystallizing and recording convergence where it previously existed only in nascent form. However, except in the area of non-use of chemical weapons, little headway was made in finding mutually acceptable solutions to unresolved issues. It is notable that delegations which have held strong views on the non-use issue have displayed a spirit of co-operation and flexibility to enable progress to be made. We hope this spirit will continue and that remaining issues in this area, as well as others, can be resolved.

Having pointed to these positive aspects of our work, I must admit at this point that my delegation is, however, somewhat frustrated. We shared the general optimism that existed at the beginning of the 1983 session, when it was widely believed that great things were possible. Our Vice-President visited the Committee, and we introduced a comprehensive document designed to help intensify the work of the Committee. Later we introduced another major paper and brought a number of experts to Geneva. We participated actively and constructively in the deliberations. And yet, an effective ban is not much closer today than it was a year ago. We should determine the factors which may be responsible for this lack of progress.

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[1] CD/PV.236, pp. 25–29.

Most importantly, some key delegations have not been sufficiently prepared or willing to take an active part in discussion of some of the main issues. This fact has been pointed out eloquently in recent statements by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands and today the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom. My delegation is also deeply concerned about this development. In order to negotiate, delegations must know each other's views.

For our part, we note there has as yet been no detailed reaction by certain key delegations to either of the major papers we have put forward this year.[2] Nor has there been any detailed response to the important proposals made by the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/326 and the United Kingdom in document CD/353.[3] Only in the last week, when the work of the contact group on stockpiles had been completed, did the Soviet delegation begin to clarify for the Committee its proposal for verification of stockpile destruction by inspection on a quota basis. It must be remembered that they made this proposal over a year ago, and questions about it have been on the table ever since.

Furthermore, my delegation cannot understand why the Soviet delegation, which ardently professes its interest in completing a convention as soon as possible, refuses to discuss the subject of chemical weapons production and filling facilities. When the Working Group took up this issue, that delegation remained totally silent, neither presenting its own position nor responding to questions from others. The statement of the Soviet delegation on 18 August made quite clear their view that this subject should not even be discussed until all other issues have been resolved.[4] We do not see how such an attitude can help accelerate the Committee's work.

Moreover, a hardening of the Soviet position has been quite noticeable in the last few weeks. We have discovered that matters thought to be agreed, for example, in Contact Groups B and D, are apparently no longer acceptable to the delegation of the Soviet Union.

My delegation is also very disturbed about the failure of the Committee to re-establish the Chemical Weapons Working Group promptly at the beginning of the 1983 session. Matters totally irrelevant to the work on a Chemical Weapons ban were allowed to intrude. Two months of potential work were lost. This must not be allowed to happen again.

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[2] I.e., CD/343, Feb. 10, and CD/387, July 6, both printed *ante*.

[3] *Ante*, Mar. 8.

[4] *Ante*.

In addition, we are concerned that at this session there was a proliferation of meetings, and increasing formality took the place of a more productive form of work. To some extent we seem to be substituting the appearance of activity for real negotiation.

Let me now say a few words regarding the assertion of the Soviet delegation on 18 August that somehow my own delegation has been holding up progress.

Contrary to the assertions of the Soviet delegation, the lack of progress is not due to United States plans to produce binary chemical weapons. My delegation has fully explained the reasons for this interim measure to protect its national security in the absence of an effective agreement. We have welcomed discussions on our modernization programme and have gone to great lengths to ensure that our own proposals include provisions to ensure that binary weapons are completely covered by the ban, including the verification aspects. The United States has observed a moratorium on chemical weapons production for 14 years. Can the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union say the same for his country? We have made it quite plain that, rather than producing chemical weapons, we would prefer a sound agreement and we are willing to work hard to achieve it. It may be, as the Soviet representative said on 18 August, that the Chemical Weapons negotiations will be killed. But I can assure you it will not be the United States delegation that kills them.

In this connection my delegation deplores the unseemly *ad hominem* attack on the Vice-President of the United States made in the recent Soviet plenary statement. Such remarks do not belong in the Committee. I hope they will not be repeated.

Furthermore, the problem is not a lack of willingness on the part of the United States delegation to meet Soviet concerns about the intrusiveness of on-site inspection of stockpile destruction. The United States Working Paper of 5 [*6*] July (CD/387) includes several important new elements for just this purpose.[5] We now recognize the importance of co-operation between national and international personnel. We are now prepared to use data generated during routine facility operations for verification purposes. We have agreed that efforts must be made to minimize interference with the operation of a destruction facility. And, we are now prepared to restrict verification to the actual destruction step. In our view, these important steps to satisfy Soviet concerns seem to have been ignored by that delegation.

Nor is the lack of progress due to United States reluctance to draft treaty texts. Drafting of treaty texts cannot proceed any faster than resolution of key issues. While drafting can sometimes help clarify issues, in this case the issues have been clear for several years. My delegation's concerns about beginning to draft treaty texts at this stage have been explained previously, and I need not repeat them today. I would only say that these concerns have been heightened by developments in Contact Group A, which dealt with stockpile-related issues. In that group drafting of treaty texts on minor questions was substituted for efforts to resolve key questions.

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[5] *Ante*

I now want to respond to a number of the substantive suggestions made in the Soviet plenary statement on 18 August.

My delegation recognizes the generally constructive nature of the Soviet remarks on various substantive issues related to chemical weapons stockpiles.

We welcome Soviet willingness to provide a detailed declaration of the contents of stockpiles, along the lines advocated by a majority of delegations, including my own. It is to be hoped that the remaining unagreed points can be quickly resolved.

We also welcome the Soviet proposal for the establishment of special storage sites at stockpile destruction facilities and for the monitoring of these sites by systematic international on-site inspection on a quota basis. In this connection, we would like to ask the Soviet delegation to clarify which stocks would be located at the special storage sites. In addition, would all stocks be moved to these locations promptly after entry into force? Or would the special storage sites contain only some of the stocks at any given time, for example, those stocks to be destroyed in the next stage of the schedule for stockpile destruction?

We also listened with interest to the explanation of the Soviet concept of inspection on a quota basis for stockpile destruction, particularly the criteria which were given. As outlined in the United States Working Paper CD/387, our conclusions are different. But the criteria on which the United States conclusions are based are similar. For us a major problem with the Soviet approach is that the actual level of verification would not be known until after entry into force. We are being asked to undertake a commitment to disarm without having an agreement on verification levels. We would expect the Soviet delegation to take this concern into account.

On the other hand, the proposals to single out binary chemical weapons stocks and production facilities for specially severe treatment seem to my delegation to be extraordinarily one-sided. They can only be seen as efforts to preserve Soviet Chemical Weapons capabilities while eliminating those of the United States. What else is one to think of the Soviet proposal whose effect would be to eliminate totally United States binary production facilities within two years after entry into force and not even to *begin* elimination of Soviet Chemical Weapons production facilities until eight years after entry into force? Surely the Soviet delegation recognizes that such proposals cannot advance the work of the Committee.

I promised to make some suggestions for making the Committee's work more productive next year.

Clearly, it will be essential for delegations to come with instructions which will enable them to negotiate on all of the issues. We think that the five-months recess should provide adequate time for thorough preparation.

We believe that the working group should be re-established promptly when the Committee on Disarmament reconvenes, regardless of the status of other procedural issues and other working groups. Work on a chemical weapons ban must not be held hostage to disputes over unrelated issues. We must not repeat the sad experience of this session.

In our view the Working Group must next year try to come to grips with each of the four major problem areas: scope of prohibition, including non-use; stockpiles; chemical weapons production facilities; and non-production of chemical weapons, particularly in the chemical industry. We would favour continuing the type of broadly based contact groups instituted in 1983. The record of the negotiations prepared under the leadership of Ambassador McPhail, and the reports of the 1982 and 1983 Contact Groups should be the starting-point for this work.

I noted earlier the problems of proliferation of meetings and of increasing formality of meetings. It may be that having fewer meetings would facilitate progress by enabling delegations to focus their attention, rather than being compelled by circumstances to spread themselves too thinly. We would also urge that greater use be made of private efforts by the co-ordinators of contact groups to clarify problems and develop solutions. Such consultations cannot and should not become a substitute for the work of the contact groups or the Working Group, but they may help to overcome obstacles to progress.

Finally, as pointed out by the Soviet delegation on 18 August, consideration needs to be given to how to make better use of the time available. We share that view and I would today like to introduce a formal initiative from the United States delegation designed to facilitate the Committee's work next year.

As you know, my delegation attaches great importance to the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament to find a common approach to verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, which is one of the principal obstacles to agreement. The need to resolve this issue as soon as possible has also been stressed recently by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other member States.

To help accelerate the negotiations, the United States is today inviting member and observer delegations to participate in a workshop to be held at the United States chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. The workshop, which is scheduled for mid-November, will provide a first-hand look at actual procedures used by the United States for destruction of chemical weapons. It is our intention that it will also provide a forum for discussion of various means of verifying destruction of chemical weapons. A working paper outlining the arrangements for the workshop is being distributed today.

In addition to touring the destruction facility and being briefed on its operations, participants will also observe a mock on-site inspection exercise. That exercise will employ actual equipment installed at the destruction facility.

I would like to emphasize that the workshop will not be constructed solely as a platform for United States views. It will provide an opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion of *all* points of view regarding verification of destruction. It could also provide an opportunity for discussion of other issues closely linked with stockpile destruction, including those raised in the Soviet plenary statement of 18 August. To facilitate a balanced discussion we are inviting a number of delegations with particular interest and expertise in this field to make presentations.

We intend to circulate a more detailed agenda and would welcome suggestions from delegations, with a view to making the workshop as useful as possible. Furthermore, we hope that other countries with destruction facilities, including the Soviet Union, will also consider inviting delegations to their facilities.

As we end the 1983 session, I sense that the frustration and disappointment felt by my delegation are shared by others. But I also sense that we all share a common objective and a desire to achieve it as soon as possible. I trust that delegations will return in 1984 resolved and prepared to make it a year of accomplishment. My delegation certainly will.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Dubey) to the Committee on Disarmament: Prevention of Nuclear War [Extract], August 23, 1983 [1]

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Over five years ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the first special session of its kind, made an unprecedented declaration in the long history of mankind. It was a declaration made by consensus and without a single reservation, to the effect that mankind was confronted with the unique threat of annihilation in the event of nuclear war. The General Assembly resolved, therefore, that the removal of the danger of nuclear war was "the most acute and urgent task of the present day". [2]

The States Members of the United Nations and, in particular, those of them that possessed nuclear weapons, were required to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations their views and suggestions for the avoidance of nuclear war. At its last session, the General

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[1] CD/PV.236, pp. 30–34.

[2] Reference is to the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session; for the quoted passage, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 414, 416.

Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", requesting the Committee on Disarmament "to undertake, as a matter of highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war". This resolution of the General Assembly was also a consensus decision, as it should be, for it is designed to prevent a paramount danger through collective measures and action.[3]

The manner in which the Committee on Disarmament has dealt with this extraordinary request of the General Assembly concerning the very survival of mankind has been a source of the utmost regret and dismay. I am taking the floor today to give expression to this sense of dismay and to tell the sad story of how the Committee on Disarmament has been prevented from dealing with the most critical issue of concern to mankind.

We have before us the preliminary draft report of the Committee (Working Paper No. 103/Add.1) on the item "Prevention of nuclear war". This draft will certainly undergo several changes before it is adopted by the Committee. But its dismal conclusion will remain the same: and it is that because of the procedural hurdles raised by a group of countries, the Committee on Disarmament, during the entire 1983 session, failed to devote any serious attention to an issue affecting the very survival of the human race.

The subject, as my delegation has had the opportunity of repeatedly pointing out, derives its urgency from the realization by millions of people all over the world that human life and civilization, as we know it, are faced today with an unprecedented threat arising from the massive accumulation of nuclear weapons. The Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries, representing more than two thirds of mankind, in their meeting in New Delhi earlier this year, echoed in one voice the dreadful prospect of extinction of the human race when they said, "the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war".[4] What has lent an added urgency to this all-pervading concern about human survival is the present new round of the nuclear arms race and the open talk in some nuclear-weapon States of actually using nuclear weapons and winning a nuclear war.

It was the reflection of this concern that the non-aligned and neutral nations in this Committee proposed in their working paper CD/341 the inclusion in the agenda of a new item on the prevention of nuclear war, and suggested the most appropriate modality, i.e., the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to carry out negotiations on this subject.[5] The mandate for such an *ad hoc* working group was also put forward and the attention of the Committee was drawn to the enormous wealth of documentation and studies already available, on the basis of which negotiations could be undertaken in the proposed working group. One would have thought that this was an obvious procedural requirement and would have been accepted as a matter of course without much loss of time. Considering that so much ground work had already been done, it was not unrealistic to hope that by the end of this session of the Committee, an *ad hoc* working group would have been set up and at least the phase of preliminary discussions leading to actual negotiations would have been completed.

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[3] G.A. res. 37/78 I.

[4] *Ante*, Mar. 12.

[5] *Ante*, Feb. 4.

But the innocuous proposal of the non-aligned and neutral States in the Committee was opposed for two months with the sort of fanciful argument that one usually associates with a lawyer pleading a losing case. Eventually the proposed item was incorporated as a part of an already established item, but this prolonged and entirely unnecessary exercise naturally made one sceptical about the commitment of some States to the prevention of nuclear war.

As though this delay was not enough of a farce, the rest of the annual session was devoted to an equally absurd and dialectic exercise on whether this negotiating body should undertake negotiations! The Committee was dragged into this kind of a futile exercise in spite of the fact that the very inclusion of the item on the agenda implied the commitment of the States members of the Committee to negotiate on the subject. The mechanism of an *ad hoc* working group was opposed in spite of the fact that it is a well-tested and generally accepted procedure adopted by the Committee for handling negotiations on all the various issues before it.

All kinds of lame excuses and far-fetched reasons were advanced for not agreeing to the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group. In spite of the supreme urgency of the question of the prevention of nuclear war, it was argued that the subject was not mature enough for proceeding directly to negotiations. In the beginning, it was stated that there was just not an adequate number of concrete proposals on which negotiations could begin. Subsequently, when concrete proposals started flowing in, it was pointed out by the same countries that it would be necessary first to classify and sort out these proposals before starting the negotiating process, as though classification and exploration of methods is itself not a part of the negotiating process.

Towards virtually the end of this session, these countries advanced the ingenious and extraordinary suggestion of informal meetings for structured discussions on the prevention of nuclear war. Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to ask: why informal meetings, where no records are kept, in the analytical exploration of the full scope of measures for preventing nuclear war? Why not a working group for the entire period of the annual session for precisely the same purpose? Does the survival of mankind merit, for some member States, no more at present than an indefinite number of informal meetings?

The fact is that the very suggestion of informal meetings reflects a desire merely to debate rather than to reach agreement through negotiations on a set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It is an

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attempt to play with the subject rather than seriously deal with it. It is a clever device to convey a semblance of concern with a matter which just cannot be ignored in view of the upsurge of public opinion in these countries, while pursuing their dangerous doctrine of security through a balance of terror.

In spite of these considerations and in spite of the strong belief that the establishment of a working group was the most natural and logical way to proceed with this matter, a large number of delegations, including my own, approached the suggestion for informal meetings during this year in a constructive spirit. We expressed our readiness to join in informal meetings if these meetings were to be followed by negotiations as from the next session in the only appropriate subsidiary body of the Committee, i.e., a working group. A majority of the countries represented in the Committee accepted this as a compromise in the hope that at least some useful discussion would take place in the Committee during this session and actual negotiations would commence from the next session. However, the other group of countries rejected this compromise also, for reasons that carried little conviction.

The hollowness of the argument that a series of informal meetings were required for sifting suggestions and for analytical exploration, before the actual negotiations could begin, was exposed when the delegations making the suggestion refused to reach any understanding on the creation of an *ad hoc* group even from the beginning of the next session of the Committee. If any further proof was needed of their lack of seriousness and their reluctance to negotiate purposefully, this was provided by the working paper contained in document CD/411, submitted in the name of some of these countries.

This working paper is the most blatant travesty of the concern expressed by a large number of delegations in this Committee as well as the millions of conscientious people throughout the world on the grave issues of the impending and continuously growing threat of nuclear holocaust. This paper confuses the urgent task of the prevention of nuclear war with everything under the sun even remotely connected with the existence of differences or tensions among nations. This is a deliberate attempt to diffuse the issue of the prevention of nuclear war by introducing into the discussion on the item every conceivable subject ranging from Articles of the United Nations Charter to the rules of international conduct, from various doctrines of security to domestic legal reforms. We can go on discussing this cluster of non-issues for several decades to come without coming to the main issue of the prevention of nuclear war.

While stating that these are non-issues in this context, my delegation does not intend to minimize their importance. We are prepared to discuss them in their proper context as we have done in the past. We, however, refuse to be enticed into a repetitive exercise deliberately designed to divert us from our immediate concern. The very first item suggested in the working paper presented by these countries is the assessment of the risk of nuclear war. This once again shows that, in spite of their having subscribed to a large number of resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly to the effect that the danger of nuclear war must be averted by all means, these countries are persisting with the insane doctrine that the piling up of nuclear weapons and the escalation of the nuclear arms race need not pose any threat or involve any risks of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

No military doctrine, no security consideration, no principles of the Charter and no individual rights in a nation State can justify the continuation of a situation where this planet is living on borrowed time and where mankind, with each passing day, is coming closer to the stage of total annihilation.

A large majority of the delegations in this Committee have been waging a struggle in this Committee and in the General Assembly to avert that situation. Numerous fervent appeals have been received by the Committee from ordinary people from different parts of the world, urging the Committee to get on with the task of negotiating practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Why then are these few States bent upon holding the whole world hostage to their dangerous and illusory security doctrines? Is the prevention of nuclear war really against their national interest or security?

As if the situation was not unreasonable enough, the same group of countries opposed even the idea of the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament conducting consultations prior to the commencement of the next annual session on establishing a working group with an appropriate mandate. This is surely an abuse of the rules of consensus, because under the rules of procedure the Chairman is free to conduct consultations on organizational matters. My delegation would insist that the Chairman should not be prevented from carrying out his normal functions, and indeed we expect him to do so and to report on the results of his efforts to the next session as soon as it convenes.

Mr. Chairman, this is the tale of frustration and dismay that we have to carry to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. We have to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the systematic attempts to subvert the negotiating functions of the Committee on Disarmament. The General Assembly cannot allow this most critical issue before mankind to stagnate in the procedural quagmire of this Committee. It will either have to take effective measures for enabling the Committee to get on with the crucial task of negotiating measures for the prevention of nuclear war, or make its own arrangements for dealing with this issue of life and death for mankind.

Statement by the British Representative (Cromartie) to the Committee on Disarmament [Extract], August 26, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, in my statement on 23 August I welcomed the progress that we had made on chemical weapons; otherwise it has, unfortunately, to be admitted that this has not been a successful year for the Committee on Disarmament. We have allowed ourselves to be dominated by procedural issues to an extent which is to no one's credit. We lost eight weeks at the beginning of our Session over arguments on the agenda. Now, the last three or four weeks have been largely spent in writing reports, first in working groups and then in the Committee itself. With the exception of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, [2] these documents are little more than catalogues of opposing views. This experience has confirmed my delegation in the view, which I expressed in my first plenary statement to the Committee on 4 February, that changes must be made in our procedures. The first necessity is for delegations to recognize that, if arguments have not been convincing in debate, they will not be made more so by trying to force conclusions on a working group, when they are not generally shared. Secondly, it must be recognized that not every view expressed in a working group is worthy of record or indeed of answer. This failure to recognize these facts, and to exercise restraint in the common interest of all, has contributed most to the excessive length of the reports, and to the excessive amount of time which has been devoted to them; the effort which we spend in writing them is out of all proportion to the extent to which they will be read.

The delay in starting work in the first part of the session arose of course from the long argument over the addition to the agenda of an item dealing with the prevention of nuclear war. Many delegations from all groups stressed the urgency of this question; the point at issue was mainly whether it was possible to consider the prevention of nuclear war by itself or only in a wider context. The formula eventually adopted, "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", admits the wider context, and so meets the point which my delegation and many others advanced. As long ago as 26 April, four months ago today, I proposed on behalf of a group of western delegations that the Committee should immediately enter into discussion in depth of this subject in a "cluster" of informal meetings, in order to identify topics on which progress might be made. It appeared, however, at the beginning of the summer part of the session, that the sense of urgency previously felt by many delegations had evaporated, and that they were more interested in the procedural issue of the formation of a working group than in actual discussion of the substance of the problem.

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[1] CD/PV.237, pp. 12–16.

[2] For the report, see *ante*, Aug. 22.

Obviously everybody in this room agrees on the cardinal importance of preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war; but the problem of how to achieve this end is one of great complexity and difficulty. The first need is to seek areas where some convergence of view exists. Only when we have done so can we consider seriously whether any of them offer the prospect of progress towards our common goal by detailed negotiations, and, in particular, by detailed negotiations here in this Committee. A number of ideas have been put forward in working papers and plenary statements, but we have, unfortunately, not taken the essential first step of a preliminary discussion of them. I hope that we can do so early in the next session.

We have had no greater success in starting substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, because of the failure of the Committee to agree on a mandate for a working group, although all delegations are agreed in principle on its establishment. Some delegations want to start at once on what they describe as negotiations; others have argued that in the first instance we should have an exploratory discussion in order to identify areas where progress is needed and would be possible. Surely, where differences of view persist, and where it is obvious that a phase of initial discussion is in any case necessary, it makes sense to get discussion going under a limited mandate, rather than to attempt to prejudge the issue by insisting on a mandate which is unacceptable to a significant number of delegations. My delegation is grateful to the Group of 21 for their willingness to get discussion going on the basis of the mandate proposed by ten western delegations, including my own.[3] We were, however, surprised and disappointed to hear that the group of socialist countries were withholding their agreement and thus preventing the adoption by the Committee of a decision which would have enabled us to make a flying start on this important subject at the beginning of the 1984 session. We hope that the socialist group will reconsider their position during the recess, so that we can avoid the necessity of covering again in 1984 the same procedural ground as we have covered in this session, and can, instead, get down to discussing the substance of this important issue.

I should now like to comment briefly on the work of some of the working groups. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament could, with some justification, claim to have made some progress.[4] The document which was remitted from the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was a maze of contradictions and a forest of brackets. Consultations during the first half of the session failed to show how the outstanding differences of view were to be resolved. Experience in the contact groups, which discussed in detail sections of the document, was equally discouraging. It was obvious at the beginning of the summer session that a new approach was needed if any progress was to be made. The Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador García Robles, is to be congratulated for his courage in deciding to start afresh with clean drafts. The resultant intensive work during the last weeks of the session resulted in a number of texts which are shorter, simpler, and mercifully free from brackets. They are not, however, entirely free of reservations, and there remain gaps in the text on a number of key issues. Given the speed at which these texts were prepared, and the fact that they were not ready until the last minute, it is understandable that many delegations felt that their Governments needed time to study them before further action was taken. My Government will certainly do this. The preliminary view of my delegation is that, while much of what was objectionable in earlier drafts has been removed, it is equally true that much which we considered important has also been lost. In many cases the text relies word for word, or with only very slight adaptation, on the text of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. [5] Our Governments will all need to ask ourselves what these texts add to the programme of action already set out in the Final Document, and whether selective quotation from that Document preserves at least its existing balance. We shall be ready to give our views at the next stage of our work.

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[3] CD/413.

[4] For the report of this working group, see *ante*, Aug. 19.

Turning to radiological weapons, my delegation is very disappointed at the lack of progress. In an attempt to speed up matters the Working Group agreed to set up separate co-ordination groups to deal with what we have come to call the "traditional radiological weapons treaty", and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. The work in these two groups was ably and energetically led by Mr. Busby of the United States delegation and Mr. Prokofiev of the Soviet delegation, and I wish to pay tribute to both of them. Mr. Busby exerted the greatest efforts to break through the difficulties, which, for years, had surrounded the negotiations of a treaty on radiological weapons; and he has succeeded in producing a text which, we believe, would provide a good basis for further negotiations, even though we have reservations about a number of the suggestions which it contains. It is the view of my delegation that agreement could quickly be reached on such a treaty if we were to concentrate on essentials: but we shall not do so if some delegations continue to insist on trying to solve, in this context, problems which we have not been able to solve elsewhere, and which have slight, if any, genuine connection with the subject-matter of the treaty. [6]

My delegation is also disappointed at the outcome of the work on prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Once again, a small group of delegations has continued to insist that a prohibition must be all-embracing, in spite of the fact, which must be as obvious to them as it is to us, that such an all-embracing prohibition could neither be practically implemented nor theoretically justified. As a result, no progress has been made this year, and none is likely to be made until there is agreement on the general principles on which a future legal instrument could be based.

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[5] The Final Document is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 411 ff.

[6] The report of this working group, including the draft treaty, is printed *ante,* Aug. 18.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban had a useful discussion under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic; but its report shows clearly the wide differences which continue to exist between delegations on a number of key points.[7] Contrary to the view expressed by some delegations, a great deal of detailed work remains to be done if these differences are to be overcome. My delegation took an active part in this work, and we submitted two working papers, the first dealing with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,[8] and the second with verification.[9] Unfortunately, as the Working Group spent so much time in preparing its report, it did not have time to discuss or examine our second paper. The first, however, aroused a good deal of interest, and some critical comment to which I would like to respond today.

First, let me say that I believe there is essential agreement among the great majority of delegations that it is not possible to conclude a treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons which does not, at the same time, deal in some way with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The relevant documents before the Committee—the Trilateral Report (CD/130),[10] the Soviet Basic Provisions (CD/346),[11] the Swedish draft treaty (CD/381)[12] and the Australian amendment to that draft (CD/405)—all support this conclusion. What is at issue for the majority of delegations is not *whether* nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be addressed in a treaty, but *how* this should be done. In our working paper we drew attention to the solution proposed in the trilateral report, that is, that any agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be contained in a protocol, which would form an integral part of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The protocol would take into account the provisions of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty[13] and it would provide for a moratorium which would remain in force until arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes had been worked out, which would be consistent with the treaty being negotiated, with the Partial Test Ban Treaty[14] and with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The parties agreed that they would "keep under consideration" the subject of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including, and I emphasize this, the aspect of precluding military benefits. We do not see any inconsistency between the positions set out in the trilateral report and in the working paper which we presented. What that working paper does is to discuss in detail the difficulties that we see in making arrangements for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, bearing in mind the conditions set out in the trilateral report. What we are in fact saying is that a moratorium would, for the foreseeable future, amount to a complete ban. We see, in fact, much greater inconsistencies between the trilateral report and the articles of the Soviet Basic Provisions (CD/346), which deal with the same subject and which fail to mention any of the conditions agreed trilaterally. Are we to suppose from this that the Soviet Union no longer considers it necessary to impose such conditions on arrangements for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes? If they do, and believe that a solution can be found, perhaps they would tell us how.

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[7] *Ante*, Aug. 16.

[8] CD/383, see *ante*, June 17.

[9] CD/402, *ante*, Aug. 1.

[10] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 317–321.

[11] *Ante*, Feb. 16.

[12] *Ante*, June 14.

[13] For the text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[14] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

The distinguished representative of Brazil asked in his statement on 11 July whether the views set out in our paper (CD/383) are consistent with obligations assumed by States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under its article V. As I recall, the main object of this article was to avoid any economic disadvantage to the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States parties to the Treaty, in the exploitation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, for which good prospects were seen by some people at that time. Under this article, any nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty, which undertakes a programme involving the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, has an obligation to make the benefits of its programme available also to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, once the other conditions set out in article V have been fulfilled. On the other hand, the United Kingdom does not accept that a nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty has an obligation to undertake such a programme solely for this purpose. The United Kingdom has no interest in such a programme at present, and it would hardly be reasonable to expect us to go to the vast expense of undertaking one to secure for other countries the hypothetical benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Nor do we accept that the position we have adopted is inconsistent with the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which states explicitly in its article I that and I quote "it is without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions".

Finally, let me emphasize that the United Kingdom does not accept that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions is peripheral. On the contrary, we regard the satisfactory solution of this problem as crucial to the success of any nuclear test ban treaty. As I have already said, the majority of delegations accept that the subject must be treated in the context of a nuclear test ban treaty; but there remains a small group of delegations who appear to insist that any test ban should apply only to the testing of nuclear weapons, and that the treaty should not apply in any way to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We should be glad to be told that we had misunderstood their attitude; but such a conclusion is the only one that we can currently draw from the statements that they have made in the Working Group and in this Committee. Ironically, it is much the same group of delegations who press most urgently for the conclusion of a nuclear test ban as a means of curbing the nuclear arms race, while, at the same time, appearing to be content to envisage a test ban which would be easily circumvented and would, therefore, be ineffective in achieving this end. We are entitled to ask whether these delegations want the substance or only the form of a nuclear test ban.

We are inevitably going to re-examine at the beginning of the next session the question of the mandate of the Working Group, which many delegations wish to see revised. It is, however, evident from the report of the Working Group that we are divided still on very many points of substance. My delegation had hoped that through the substantive examination called for in the mandate we would attempt to reach some measure of understanding on many of these points. However, as I have already had occasion to remark, a number of other delegations have taken a different view, and have refused to take part in such a substantive examination. They have at each stage of the discussion tried to push through the work, and to gloss over our difficulties. My delegation regrets very much that the question of changing the mandate has been used to prevent discussion in depth on many of the issues before the Group under the existing mandate. I should like to emphasize that my delegation has at no stage attempted to limit discussion by reference to the mandate; and, indeed, we made it very clear at the beginning of the session that we would not do so. Any limitation on discussion which has been felt by other delegations has been self-imposed. What is at issue is not the wording of the mandate, but the political will to recognize that the correct path, indeed the only path, towards a treaty leads through detailed consideration of verification issues. This is not "an upsidedown kind of logic", as the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union would have us believe, because the confidence required to bring such a treaty into force can only come from verification provisions accepted as adequate by the potential Parties. Our approach is a realistic one: an approach which attempts to tackle the differences that exist between us, and not to evade them.

Mr. Chairman, let me end where I began, with a plea for the Committee to devote less time and effort to issues of procedure, in order to leave us more time and energy to address the serious issues of substance on our agenda. The purpose of this Committee is to negotiate binding international legal instruments in fields of exceptional complexity, involving sensitive issues of national security. The conclusion of such instruments will finally involve difficult decisions of substance in many countries. These decisions of substance will not be made easier by attempts to plunge into detailed negotiation, without the necessary preliminary work to identify common ground, and to establish that more formal negotiations would have some prospect of success; nor will they be speeded by trying to impose procedures that correspond to a more advanced stage in our work on a topic than we have in fact reached. If we cannot agree on these preliminary points, it is certain that our Governments will not authorize us to conclude any treaties. Let us, therefore, come back in 1984, resolved to seek areas of common ground, and then to build on them step-by-step, with a view to achieving our common goal of security through disarmament.

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Answers by Soviet General Secretary Andropov to Questions by *Pravda:* Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], August 27, 1983[1]

Question: On the eve of the new round of Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, we would like to know whether there is any correspondence with reality in the claims currently circulating in the West that at the previous round of these talks the U.S. side put forward some kind of flexible proposals making it possible to hope for progress?

Answer: No, there is not. So far there has been no progress at the talks and, unfortunately, there are no grounds for hope for it while the present U.S. position is maintained.

The entire "flexibility" of the U.S. position boils down to the following:

Previously the United States proposed that the USSR reduce to zero, in other words destroy, all its medium-range missiles not only in the European, but also in the Eastern part of the country (which is altogether irrelevant to the subject matter of the Geneva talks), while nothing at all would be destroyed on the NATO side—not a single missile, not a single aircraft—or, to put it figuratively, their reduction would be zero. This is the meaning of the U.S. "zero option"—zero missiles for the USSR and zero reduction for NATO.

And yet now the United States is agreeable, you see, to the USSR retaining a certain number of its medium-range missiles, but in this case the United States would not only again fail to reduce by a single unit its medium-range nuclear forces but would, in addition, acquire the "right" to deploy in Europe—in addition to the British and French missiles already existing here—new U.S. missiles in numbers equal to the number of retained Soviet missiles. In other words, it is not enough for us to unilaterally reduce our arsenal of medium-range nuclear forces, we must also give our blessing to the deployment of new U.S. missiles targeted on us and our allies.

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[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, Aug. 27, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report,* Aug. 29, 1983, vol. III, pp. CC1–CC3.

To speak of this as flexibility can be done only as a mockery of common sense.

If we are to speak of flexibility in the real, constructive meaning of this word, throughout the talks it has been manifested by the Soviet Union, but in no way by the United States.

It was the Soviet Union that proposed not a false but a real zero option for Europe: to destroy all nuclear facilities, both medium-range and tactical. But the United States is unwilling to even talk about this.

Since the West is not prepared for such a radical solution—and our readiness for it remains in force—we proposed another, not so radical option, but also a far-reaching one: to give up the deployment of any new medium-range facilities in Europe while reducing all existing ones by two-thirds, leaving for the time being, 300 units of such facilities for the USSR and for NATO.

In connection with Western claims about the injustice of this option, since the USSR could allegedly retain more missiles within the limit of the permitted 300 units than exist on the NATO side, we declared our readiness to retain in Europe, after the reductions, as many medium-range missiles as Britain and France possess.

Correspondingly, the sides would also retain an equal number of aircraft delivery vehicles for medium-range nuclear weapons.

Then some people mounted a new "hobbyhorse": They began maintaining that, given the sides' equal number of missiles, the Soviet Union will have the advantage in terms of the total number of warheads on its SS-20 missiles. But they could not keep astride this "hobbyhorse" for long either, as the Soviet Union voiced its consent to reach agreement on equality both in terms of delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) and in terms of the warheads on them.

As a result, the Soviet Union would have considerably fewer of both medium-range missiles in the European zone and warheads on them than before 1976, when we did not have any SS-20 missiles at all, which, according to the NATO version, was the spark that set the forest on fire.

So what, then, one wonders, is unfair and unacceptable in our position? It is an honest, consistent, and at the same time flexible position founded on the principle of the sides' equality and identical security. If the United States and its NATO allies were to get the slightest wish to really reach agreement on equal terms, things would go quite differently at the Geneva talks and we would not have to wait long for an agreement.

Question: Apart from the U.S. and NATO dodges which you have mentioned, people in the West frequently maintain that in agreeing to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country, the USSR intends just to transfer them to the eastern regions. What would you say about that?

Answer: Such allegations are a deliberate lie. There is no stratagem here. We ourselves proposed some time ago that the dismantling and destruction of medium-range nuclear arms should be the chief method of reducing them in Europe. At the talks we bluntly told the Americans: Let us agree what will be destroyed on both sides and how. They even evade this.

Today I can report our readiness to take one more big step.

In the event of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement, including the U.S. abandonment of the deployment of new missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union, in reducing its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to a level equal to the number of British and French missiles, would liquidate all the missiles so reduced. In this case a considerable number of the most sophisticated missiles, known in the West by the name of SS-20, would also be liquidated.

There is hardly any need to emphasize the exceptional importance of this new display of goodwill by the Soviet Union.

First, this removes any grounds from under the allegations being disseminated in the NATO countries that the Soviet Union in fact intends to retain the SS-20 missiles liable to reduction by simply redeploying them from Europe to the east.

Second, the concern currently being voiced by China and Japan regarding the possibility of such a redeployment [*perebazirovaniye*] [2] is also deprived of any foundation.

From all that has been said it must be clear to any unprejudiced person: The Soviet Union has done and is doing everything incumbent upon it to find an outcome at the talks, to achieve a mutually acceptable accord which would avert another—and extremely dangerous, moreover—spiral of the nuclear arms race in Europe.

Whether or not there is such an accord depends on the United States, on NATO as a whole. The upcoming round of negotiations beginning 6 September will be decisive in this respect.

Throughout the talks the Soviet Union—I wish to stress this once again—has displayed a constructive and flexible approach. But I would also stress something else: There are limits to our flexibility—they are dictated by the interests of the security of the Soviet state and its allies.

If the U.S. position at the talks continues to remain unconstructive and one-sided, and matters get as far as the actual deployment of the American Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe, we will naturally have to adopt corresponding countermeasures to preserve the balance of forces on regional, European, and global scales alike. Nobody must be at all unclear on this point.

Question: In connection with your reference to China in the context of nuclear weapons in Europe, I would like to ask what is the PRC's position on questions of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament as a whole?

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[2] Brackets in the source text.

Answer: As is known, the PRC has its own nuclear potential; it is gradually growing. As yet China is not taking any part in talks on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. As we understand it, the PRC leaders now seem to be displaying interest in certain questions relating to nuclear and other weapons under discussion at the United Nations and in the Geneva Disarmament Committee. If this trend develops there is no doubt that China could make a considerable contribution to the solution of problems linked with averting nuclear war and ending the arms race.

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Communique of the Fourteenth South Pacific Forum [Extract], August 30, 1983 [1]

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Regional nuclear matters—the forum considered the questions of continued nuclear testing in the South Pacific, the invitation of the French Government to forum countries for scientists to visit and assess the situation at the nuclear test site at Mururoa, nuclear waste disposal and dumping, the South Pacific regional environment programme, and the Australian proposal for a declaration of a South Pacific nuclear free zone. The forum recognized that the French Government's invitation had been made on a bilateral basis and that it was a matter for Governments to respond as they wished. The forum adopted the following statement of its position on nuclear matters.

The Fourteenth South Pacific Forum:

—Recalled that in the communiques issued following meetings over several years, they had taken a strong stand in opposition to nuclear testing and proposals for storage and dumping of nuclear waste material in the Pacific. Despite these unanimous expressions of view of independent and self-governing South Pacific countries, nuclear practices abhorrent to forum countries continued;

—Reiterated they would continue to make the strongest protests and condemnations so long as nuclear testing by France or any other country continued in the South Pacific region. They also reaffirmed their opposition to proposals for the dumping and storage of nuclear waste in the Pacific area.

—Commended the Australian initiative in reviving consideration of the concept of a nuclear free zone among the forum members. They expressed appreciation of the Australian working document which had provided the basis for the discussions and which made a valuable contribution to establishing the objectives which a zone concept would seek to achieve.

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[1] ACDA files. The forum was held in Canberra Aug. 29–30.

—Expressed the need for more time to consider the implications of the proposal and to carry out consultations on it. The foreign minister of Australia undertook to continue consultations on a bilateral basis to encourage further development of the zone concept both within the framework of the forum and more widely. He undertook to provide the forum countries with background on nuclear free zone concepts in other parts of the world.

—Noted that there had been a side agreement on the general principles of the concept as submitted by Australia. It affirmed that in further addressing the zone proposal it would be important to uphold the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight as provided in international law and in the treaty obligations of some forum members. It recognized the sovereign right of governments to make their own decisions on their alliance and defence requirements including access to their ports and airfields by the vessels and aircraft of other countries.

—Expressed their commitment to advancing the cause of general disarmament; supporting the negotiation and conclusion of an effective treaty which would outlaw all forms of nuclear testing by all states in all environments; and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices particularly through support for the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

—Decided to place the question on the agenda of its 1984 session to provide further opportunity for consideration and examination of the concept of a nuclear free zone.

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Statement by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany (Wegener) to the Committee on Disarmament [Extract], August 30, 1983 [1]

Mr. Chairman, many delegations have, in the final stages of our session, voiced their disappointment about its insufficient results, about fruitless debates and cumbersome procedures. Some have offered us their analysis of the root causes of our difficulties and given us—mostly sceptical—prognoses for the future of the Committee. My delegation understands and shares the dismay which many feel when they look at the waste of time which has so sadly marred our performance.

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[1] CD/PV.238, pp. 7–13.

This critical evaluation, however, does not change our deeply held conviction that the Committee on Disarmament is an indispensable forum for a universal dialogue on security issues, leading to multilateral negotiations wherever the prerequisites have been assembled. The outlook may sometimes seem dim from the perspective of those who put in so much work and yet see so few results. But seen in a wider perspective, we do believe in the future of the Committee, because there is no other solution to the most crucial security issues than a shared approach, a joint search for consensus. Our reaction to the present predicament must therefore not be discouragement, but renewed vigour and a new, creative effort.

Procedurally, our attention should now focus on finding ways and means how to avoid loss of time. In substance, we should concentrate our forces on those areas where results can realistically be expected.

It is not my intention to review all areas of our work under these auspices. Rather, I shall highlight the two most important and promising topics under consideration, namely chemical weapons and the prevention of nuclear war. My delegation has frequently spoken on either issue. Today I would like to make a brief reference to the former, and deal more fully again with the latter subject.

Like most others, my delegation has carefully registered and welcomed the conceptual gains of our work this year in the chemical weapons field. We are gratified with the production of a new consolidated text. There is no intention on our part to downgrade the measure of progress achieved, let alone the dynamic performance of the Chairman of the Working Group and his able associates. The balance sheet, however, is hardly positive.

On 11 August, my delegation expressed its preoccupation with the current state of negotiations, especially if measured in terms of earlier hopes. We observed that one group of delegations among us, the socialist group, showed reluctance to join in overcoming the central obstacles for a future chemical weapons ban.

Meanwhile the distinguished delegates of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, sharing our analysis, have voiced their concern in similar terms. Our own observations, substantiated by a number of facts, were coupled with an urgent appeal to the socialist group to show a greater measure of political flexibility and to document such a flexibility by practical contributions.

My delegation had presented these views against the background of growing apprehension among the population of the Federal Republic of Germany, for whom the prospect of any future use of chemical weapons is particularly terrifying.

Since then, Ambassador Issraelyan has spoken on 18[2] and 22 August to refute these affirmations. He furthermore submitted a number of technical proposals which my delegation has carefully studied. We have also observed the Soviet delegation's participation in the drafting of the "recording" and of the report of the session of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons.[3] We have examined the Soviet presentations as attentively and objectively as possible. As a result I must state that I can in no respect retract from my statement of 11 August. The position of the Soviet delegation in the recording exercise and the silence on key issues continue to cast doubt on its repeated professions of interest in the speedy completion of the convention.

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[2] *Ante.*

Our assessment has been reinforced by the impression that there is a hardening of the Soviet line, most markedly as regards the degree of stringency of the obligation to submit to on-site inspections in cases of challenge. Here the Soviet delegation seems to be retreating from positions which we had hoped they had accepted.

There is nothing wrong in analysing critically each other's positions. It is the right attitude towards criticism that counts. The critical remarks of the Soviet delegation on our own negotiating posture will also be examined carefully. We shall use their critical suggestions to reflect on an even greater flexibility on all open issues in order to be well prepared for the next round.

I trust that the Soviet delegation will distinguish between such constructive criticism in the interest of a shared objective, and sterile accusations designed to denigrate the adversary and to mask one's own inability to contribute in substance.

Negotiations need the former; they must avoid the latter. I should like to appeal to the Soviet Union to show more flexibility which would allow us to progress quickly in the next negotiating phase, particularly in the key areas of destruction of stocks, destruction of production facilities and compliance. My delegation firmly hopes that the Soviet delegation will honour our appeal to engage in a serious joint endeavour to overcome the obstacles on the way to concluding a ban on this particularly barbarous category of weapons.

We welcome the initiative of the United States delegation to organize a workshop on verification issues relating to stock destruction in Tooele, Utah.[4] My delegation believes that this endeavour will provide an excellent possibility for all negotiators to acquaint themselves with the problems of verification of the destruction of stocks in a practical manner. My delegation expects to contribute to the workshop in a substantive way. I wish to recall in this context that former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had announced at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the Federal Government would also on its part organize a workshop on the destruction of chemical weapons.[5] That event is now scheduled for

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[3] The report is printed *ante*, Aug. 22.

[4] *Ante*, Aug. 22.

[5] A/S-12/PV.10 (June 14, 1982), p. 57.

1984, and invitations will be extended to interested delegations in due time. The destruction facility where the workshop is to take place differs from the United States installation in design and throughout. The workshop is therefore expected to yield additional insights. We look upon the United States invitation and ours as being mutually reinforcing.

Let me now turn to our agenda item concerning the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. My delegation regrets that no appropriate institutional format could be found during the current session to allow for an in-depth consideration of this problem of supreme importance.

The topic of prevention of nuclear war is of such a nature that legend may easily originate and blame be ascribed by interested parties. I would therefore like to use this opportunity to go clearly on record for my own delegation. Jointly with others, we recommended the immediate beginning of in-depth debates on agenda item 2, in the least controversial format and with a great amount of flexibility pertaining to that format, as early as April of this year. As to substance, my delegation introduced a comprehensive working paper on the subject on 29 [*28*] March,[6] warmly welcomed another working paper from a western delegation, the Belgian working paper CD/380 of 25 April 1983, and co-sponsored one of the two available documents containing suggestions for the structuring of the debate. Several statements of my delegation, both in plenary and in informal contexts, were devoted to this agenda item.

My delegation hopes that no attempt will be undertaken to blur these evident facts.

It appears, however, necessary to clarify some obvious misunderstandings which have appeared in two recent statements before this Committee. I feel compelled to set the record straight lest the traditionally excellent co-operation with the delegations in question be impaired. It is not my intention to respond with the usual pungency or the incriminating terms which were evident in their comments. What the international community, so frequently invoked, requires of us is a rational discourse, an argumentative exchange, not ill-founded accusations or *procès d'intention.*

Let us rather look at issues of substance. A working paper put forward by several delegations and designed to promote a comprehensive and adequate treatment of the prevention of nuclear war has been described by one distinguished representative as "most suitable for a debate in any academy of political science". At the same time he held that the door to dialogue was closed. Such an attitude is, in my view, at variance with the mandate of our Committee. It is self-defeating to close the door to rational debate, thus obviating any possibility for a further meeting of minds.

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[6] *Ante.*

Another statement which we heard recently contained some elements which should not remain undisputed. Delegations around this table are of course aware that the resolution on the prevention of nuclear war at the last session of the General Assembly, resolution 37/78 I, was not passed by consensus, and they know well that decisions of the General Assembly to the effect that the danger of nuclear war must be averted "by all means" do not exist. I am sure that the assertions made to the contrary were rather the result of an oversight than an attempt to mislead the Committee. I shall therefore refrain from mentioning the various other factual inaccuracies which a thorough perusal of the statement I am referring to discloses.

Mr. Chairman, for clarity's sake let me briefly reiterate what I stated before this body on two previous occasions. In introducing working paper CD/357 on 29 March, I stressed particularly that not even in our own view could the Committee make an equally fruitful contribution to all the various chapters contained therein, and I pointed out that this was not the purpose of the paper. I affirmed that the paper "rather purports to heighten the consciousness of delegations. It should stimulate us not to lose sight of the total environment in which a successful strategy for the prevention of war has to be worked out". On 7 July, I elaborated on this approach in an even more concrete manner. I said then: "The approach to the various chapters contained in working paper CD/357 must, therefore, be different, while on the other hand all of them are important to delineate the broad sphere in which the subject matter needs to be looked at. Some aspects of a broad policy of war prevention have to be merely studied, others to be taken account of; still others to be reaffirmed as basic tenets on which our work has to be based. Only some of the chapters of the working paper will turn out to provide suitable subject matter for possible future practical and appropriate negotiable measures in the realm of war prevention". I have quoted these earlier statements to make it quite clear that there has never been any attempt on behalf of my delegation to shift the focus of our exercise away from the prevention of nuclear war to minor or marginal issues. What we had attempted and what we thought and think necessary is to provide a background, a wider context in which the question of the prevention of nuclear war has to be looked at. It was never our intention to deal with the various chapters of document CD/357 or with the various headings of document CD/411 in an equal manner. On the other hand, we were particularly careful to provide in those two working papers a possible framework which also covers the proposals put forward by other groups of States.

It is in particular for this latter reason that we wonder where the difficulties of some delegations with some of the chapters or headings lie. Is the question of the prohibition of the threat or use of force and, generally, the application of the Charter of the United Nations, a purely "academic" one? Are security assurances only suitable for debate "in an academy of political science"? Is highlighting the special responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States "an attempt to play with the subject"? Are military doctrines a "non-issue" with respect to the danger of nuclear war? Would, for example, a thorough examination of the real effectiveness of measures to stop the further development, testing and deployment of certain weapon categories not be indispensable for any comprehensive investigation of how nuclear war can best be prevented?

So much for the true relevance of the list of topics contained in documents CD/357 and CD/411. The unnecessary loss of four months of precious working time for this agenda item raises, however, some ulterior queries: Why was the interest in in-depth discussion of the subject so low on the part of some members of the non-aligned group? Why did they not jump at the occasion offered to them to engage in a substantial series of meetings on the subject, well structured and useful in many aspects, a promising prelude to further substantive negotiations? I cannot completely escape the suspicion that the emotionally charged subject of the prospect of nuclear war, allowing some delegations to raise their accusing finger and point to the alleged deficiencies of others, has the convenient side-effect of liberating them from any responsibility and constraints of their own. That stance, however, would have been difficult to preserve once the subject of prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters had been considered in the broad comprehensive perspective in which realistically it must be looked at. I hesitate to conclude that cliché-like calls for certain debates and negotiations would, in the view of some, be more important than a real in-depth confrontation with the subject matter.

In conclusion I wish once more to express the readiness of my delegation to see this agenda item considered on a priority basis and in an appropriate work format from the very beginning of our next session.

During the debate on the "Prevention of Nuclear War" some delegations have tried to cause confusion concerning the decision of the NATO Alliance of December 1979.[7] In order to set the record straight I would like to share with delegations some elementary facts, putting the INF controversy into perspective and explaining the key elements of the issue.

First, a word on the nature and dimension of the threat to Europe. Since the Vladiwostok understanding,[8] SALT had established parity between the Soviet Union and the United States in intercontinental strategic weapons.[9] In October 1977, Chancellor Schmidt pointed to the existence of over 560 Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles with more than 580 warheads. He felt that the security of Western Europe was threatened by the imbalance in the medium range field and asked the Soviet Union on several occasions to stop the process of installing more and more new INF missiles. It was only when the Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles continued that NATO finally took the double track decision of December 1979 concerning arms control and modernization in the field of LRINF. At that time, the Soviet arsenal had increased to 590 missiles with 870 warheads. This was, unfortunately, not the end—the Soviet Union continued to install one SS-20 after the other, even when the INF negotiations had started. In March 1983, when the United States offered their proposal for an interim agreement,[10] counting all land-based INF, there were 1,301 warheads, almost twice as many as in 1978, when General Secretary Brezhnev visited Bonn. In terms of SS-20 warheads alone, the deployment figure increased from 180 in the year 1978 to 1,053 in the year of 1983. This constant build-up was in clear contradiction to the understanding given by the Soviet Union in the joint Soviet-German declaration of May 1978 which reads: "Both sides consider it important that nobody strives for military superiority. They believe that approximate equality and parity are sufficient to guarantee defence."[11]

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[7] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[8] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 746–750.

[9] The SALT I Treaty may be found *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

Why has the Soviet Union built these awesome weapons, why does she continue to produce them, when there was—and is—no comparable system on the Western side? In the absence of any convincing answer from the Soviet Union we must assume that she wanted to bring about a disequilibrium in the most sensitive spot of the Western Alliance. We observe that the Soviet Union does accept the principle of parity with regard to the United States, but that she claims a right to uncontested superiority in strategically significant adjacent regions like Western Europe, and also the Far East. The threat to Western Europe posed by this one-sided nuclear armament is compounded by the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and its ever-growing arsenal of chemical weapons.

The West could not passively watch this growing threat if it did not wish to lose the credibility of its defence posture. However, the response of the NATO Alliance was as moderate as it was transparent. NATO, and this is the new and exemplary nature of the decision of December 1979, decided to begin to deploy a limited number of United States one-warhead land-based missiles only at the end of 1983 and combined this decision with a concrete offer of negotiations. It was—and is—the prime objective of NATO to make the deployment of the new weapons unnecessary by successful negotiations. NATO is not driven by the wish to deploy new American LRINF weapons. Its guiding thought is to achieve negotiated balanced results at the lowest possible level between the United States and the Soviet Union and to remove the concerns existing not only in Europe but in other parts of the world as well.

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[10] *Ante*, Mar. 31.

[11] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 283.

Mr. Chairman, I do not purport to retrace the ongoing negotiations in detail. I would like to draw your attention to what Foreign Minister Genscher underlined in a letter of 24 August to Foreign Minister Gromyko: that the chances for early agreement still exist and that we will do everything possible to achieve the desired concrete results. Minister Genscher also pointed out that the major stumbling block of the present negotiations is the Soviet insistence that French and British systems be counted against their own threatening weapons, and he called upon the Soviet Union to remove this obstacle.

Let me also use this opportunity to state that the change in the Soviet negotiating position as announced by General Secretary Andropov on 26 [*27*] August does not dispose of this obstacle.[12] Certainly, it is to be welcomed that the Soviet Union is now prepared to scrap those missiles which would be the subject of reductions under an agreement, and not only to move them eastwards. However, the Soviet Union would in this eventuality preserve her monopoly of land-based intermediate-range missiles, and, according to the Soviet position, the United States would be prevented from deploying even a single INF missile for the protection of Europe. What Federal Minister Genscher had pointed out in his aforementioned letter to Foreign Minister Gromyko would remain true: the inclusion of British and French systems into negotiated ceilings, as demanded by the Soviet Union, would, in the face of existing Soviet potentials, drastically change the security situation of Europe to our detriment. Minister Genscher further underlined in his letter that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany, as a State which formally renounced the production of and control over nuclear weapons by treaty obligation, depends on the nuclear umbrella of the United States. British and French systems are of a strategic nature and—as the Soviet Union acknowledged as late as summer 1980—do not belong in the INF context. If the Soviet Union would choose to revert to this erstwhile position, a breakthrough in the negotiations would become possible. The example of the Madrid CSCE negotiations has demonstrated that, in the presence of corresponding political will by all concerned, an agreement between East and West is possible even on political issues of the highest significance.

There should, however, be no misconception on the Soviet side. The Western Alliance is firmly determined to look after its security in a responsible manner.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by quoting from Chancellor Kohl's statement made during his recent visit to Moscow on 4 July. Federal Chancellor Kohl underscored on this occasion "the vital importance for the Federal Republic of Germany of lowering and limiting military armament through balanced and verifiable arms control agreements". He added: "At present, the West has presented to the Soviet Union a broad offer containing operational proposals for arms control and disarmament on an unprecedented scale. They are the expression of an unequivocal desire to attain mutual understanding and a balance of interests with the East. All these proposals originate in our deep commitment to the preservation of peace. They merit not suspicion, but an earnest examination. They are both designed, and have the potential, for the attainment of agreements which serve either side and enhance peace."

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[12] *Ante.*

In this very spirit I should like to appeal to the Soviet delegation to see to it that these evident facts are taken into account in the coming negotiation round. Another aspect of Federal Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow should be given due recognition in this context. I have alluded to this earlier. One of the important purposes of the Chancellor's visit was to demonstrate tangibly that it is not the intention of his Government to reduce West/East relations to the INF negotiations and to our security concerns. His Government's hopes for an acceptable settlement of this important nuclear issue are accompanied by every imaginable effort to strengthen and broaden our peaceful relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. We have an immense interest in expanding the intensive dialogue already conducted. We are attempting to show the Soviet Union that a business-like attitude on her part in all domains, including the security field, will open up considerable prospects for a positive development of West/East relations. We pin our hopes on peaceful co-operation, and not on ever-more strident rounds of confrontation.

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Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament [Extract], August 30, 1983 [1]

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The 1983 session of our Committee is drawing to a close, and it is a time for stock-taking. I cannot believe that anyone will regard this as a vintage year. Thus, it is important that we engage in some serious reflection on how we have performed and give thoughtful consideration to how we might do better. I recently had some time for reflection while lying in a hospital bed, and I would like to share some of those thoughts and the views of my delegation with you in this final plenary.

My delegation presented our assessment of the progress of work on the critical issues of negotiating a complete prohibition of chemical weapons on 23 August. [2] We described our progress as meagre, but it is, nonetheless, real. Today I would like to complete that picture by dealing with the other issues which the Committee has addressed during this current session.

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[1] CD/PV.238, pp. 14–20.

[2] *Ante.*

This year, under the able guidance of Ambassador García Robles, we have moved a step closer to the conclusion of a Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament (CPD). Chairman García Robles, exercising his well-known skill and diplomacy, has guided these negotiations into a channel which has produced a text that, for the first time, is virtually devoid of brackets. He has done this by exercising the authority of the Chair and prodding delegations to new efforts to resolve issues through mutually acceptable accommodation. We applaud his efforts and are in general agreement with this approach. To be sure, we, like others, cannot at this stage of our work agree to every provision in his text. But, we do believe these negotiations are moving in the right direction, and I pledge our co-operation in future attempts to conclude a CPD.

I should like also to mention the dedicated efforts of Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan to continue to move the Working Group on Negative Security Assurances towards a successful conclusion. In spite of his patient and skilful direction, those deliberations are apparently at an impasse and the gap which separates the position of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States remains. We regret that it has not been possible to arrive at a successful conclusion to the issue and believe that the subject matter entrusted to the Working Group should continue to be kept under review by the Committee. I would reiterate that the assurances given by my Government are credible, reliable, and represent a firm declaration of United States policy.

Let me turn now to the question of a nuclear test ban. This year, for the first time, we began substantive work under the mandate agreed to last year. It is truly lamentable that only at this late date were we able to get down to substantive work on this important issue. My delegation has spoken on this issue before, and I shall not belabour it now. We came to this session prepared to engage in serious work and have attempted to do so. The proceedings of the Working Group were conducted fairly and skilfully by two successive and equally distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassadors Herder and Rose. For our part, we have put forward a number of ideas and raised issues where further extensive work is required. What has resulted has been amicable, but, frankly, unsatisfactory. While we have held polite discussions in the Working Group, the fact remains that little substantive work has been accomplished. In virtually every instance where we or other delegations have pointed to issues which require substantive treatment, work has been shunted aside with arguments that either the issue is too technical or that it must be dealt with only in the context of full-scale treaty negotiations. And so, sadly, we are back to the situation which prevailed at the beginning of this session, with some delegations arguing that the only way for the

Committee to proceed is to change the mandate of the Working Group to enable it to negotiate on a treaty.

Accordingly, it seems obvious that at the beginning of next year's session we will be faced again with another difficult situation involving the future of this Working Group. In fact that process has already begun with the preparation of this year's report.

In that connection, my delegation deplores the continued attempts to insert inappropriate issues into the nuclear test ban Working Group and reflect them in the Group's report. I refer specifically to the allegations with regard to the compliance of States parties to existing treaties with their obligations under those agreements. My delegation addressed this matter at length in a plenary statement last year, and this year was required again to respond in the Working Group's report to the Committee.[3]

Mr. Chairman, a full 40 percent of the Working Group's activity this summer was devoted to the preparation of its report. A central issue was the mandate question. And, despite the misleading title of this section of the report, the Working Group was unable to agree on any recommendation in this regard. We deplore this development, but we understand it as well. We will have to come here next year prepared to make some fundamental decisions as to whether the Committee can continue to undertake useful work on this issue in a way which does not impinge upon any member's legitimate national security concerns. We sincerely hope it will be possible to do this, but we are under no illusions.

The test-ban issue will be vastly complicated if certain delegations persist in attempting to link the mandate question with the future work of the Group of Scientific Experts, as they have indicated. This is plainly unacceptable to my delegation and enervative to our efforts to make progress in the technological aspects of the test-ban question. It would reflect a lack of interest in furthering the important work which the Group of Scientific Experts continues to perform and, as well, would be yet another example of the type of procedural linkage which held up the work of our Committee for eight weeks this spring.

Now let me address the subject of radiological weapons. My delegation had the honour during 1983 to co-ordinate the work of Group A of the Radiological Weapons Working Group. That Group was entrusted with what has become known as the traditional radiological weapons subject matter. Significant progress was made during this session; however, it was largely procedural in nature. The intensive negotiations held by Mr. Busby and the considerable efforts of others should have produced more substantive gains. We should ask ourselves why this is the case. After all, we have now spent four years in multilateral negotiations on this subject. The prohibitions and other operative provisions are not difficult, nor would they cause major adjustments in the national security posture of any State represented in the Committee.

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[3] For the report, see *ante*, Aug. 16.

But a radiological weapons treaty is not, by virtue of these considerations, irrelevant. It is well known that my Government, some three decades ago, invested considerable effort and money in a serious investigation of radiological weapons. And, on one occasion during this period, a senior military commander in the field raised the possibility of laying down barriers of radioactive waste material across the major supply lines of an adversary. These matters were not pursued to the point that radiological weapons were actually developed, produced, or used, and consequently these weapons of mass destruction remain, as some delegations have termed them, "hypothetical". But in the past 30 years, as my delegation has pointed out before, the amount of radioactive material that could be put to weapons use has increased dramatically. Consequently, the United States believes strongly that there are genuine and significant security reasons for prohibiting such use and for negotiating provisions that protect radioactive material against its diversion to banned activities.

Regrettably, conclusion of a radiological weapons treaty remains hostage to a set of complex linkages which are related more to the character of this body than to the substance of the treaty itself. This is a matter of serious concern to my delegation. We must ask ourselves, are we prepared to negotiate limited measures which may fall short of the expectations of some of our members, or will we forever be putting aside the possible in the illusory pursuit of the perfect? The answers to these questions have an impact on the assessment of many Governments, including my own, as to whether this body is in fact an appropriate forum for serious arms-control initiatives.

Let me explain my concern.

My Government is convinced that a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons could be concluded with dispatch. But, at the same time, it appears impossible to negotiate it in the Committee. There are those who take the position that there will never be a radiological weapons treaty submitted to the General Assembly unless there is submitted at the same time a treaty on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In a consensus body that position, even if held by only one delegation, is definitive of what is possible.

So what are the chances of success?

We should look at what has become known as Track B. As is well known, with the exception of excluding such things as nuclear-powered warships from consideration, the issues are as yet undefined, and there may be differences of view which are perhaps wider than had been thought before. Consequently, a great deal of work remains to be done even to arrive at a widely-shared understanding of the problem. In fact, the situation may be even more bleak. There are delegations among us who take the position that the Committee on Disarmament is not competent to deal with the material entrusted to Group B.

Indeed, at least one delegation does not even participate in its meetings.

My colleagues, the time has come for us to face reality. Let us not continue to delude ourselves and the world community by pretending that we are making progress when, in fact, none is possible until we collectively decide to go forward.

There is another "linkage". Some delegations from the Group of 21 take the view that, even if a prohibition on attacks against nuclear facilities were to be concluded, a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons still would not be appropriate for the Committee on Disarmament. These delegations maintain that the most pressing issue facing the world today, and therefore facing the Committee, is nuclear disarmament and that, if the Committee is to be seen as a relevant body, it must conclude as a first endeavour a treaty dealing with nuclear disarmament.

How many of us here today believe that view to be realistic in the short term? There is no more complex issue facing the world today. My Government is sparing no effort to arrive at a solution in both the START and INF negotiations which will achieve a positive outcome. But should we hold all other progress hostage to these complicated deliberations? Delegations who hold this view are presenting us with a situation which is "all or nothing" and, therefore, preventing progress from being made on more limited measures which could contribute measurably to the security of all of us. I do not, in speaking frankly as I have, mean to deride the position of any delegation or any group, but I think it is a fair question to ask whether we are to continue along the same lines year after year pretending to make progress where none is possible. We should have a very frank and open discussion regarding these issues, which manifest themselves most apparently in the field of radiological weapons, but which are, I suspect, present in other areas of our endeavour as well. My delegation intends to raise this issue when we return in 1984.

Although not the subject of detailed consideration by working groups, there are several other subject matters which deserve comment. Let me speak first on the prevention of nuclear war. Many delegations, including my own, have advanced views on this issue. We witnessed at the beginning of this session an unprecedented stalemate while certain delegations insisted that their own views be accepted and linked such acceptance to the work of the Committee in all other areas except on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. As if this were not enough, we have continued to fail to agree even to the procedure by which the Committee will address this issue in the future.

The lack of progress on the issue of prevention of nuclear war is appalling to my delegation. It is an issue to which every nation should ascribe its highest priority. We came to this session fully prepared to discuss the substance of this complex matter on its merits, in order to arrive at a better understanding of exactly what was at issue between us and what would be achievable in future work. That remains our objective. But, we are now back where we started on this important subject, with the prospect of further haggling over the form—not the substance—of the prevention of nuclear war. Regrettably, this serious issue has been reduced by some delegations to mere polemics, most recently illustrated by the intemperately toned speech of our distinguished Indian colleague. The cause of preventing nuclear war is not well served by tactics of this sort but, rather, by resorting to reason, persuasion, and mutual accommodation. My delegation is as prepared as any delegation in this room to carry this subject as far as possible. I am asking again—as I have before in this forum—for all of us to begin serious discussions at the earliest feasible date and at the appropriate level—with a view to achieving a coherent and manageable definition of both what unites us and what divides us. Then, and only then, can serious progress be made toward meaningful negotiations.

In my statement of 7 July of this year, I outlined my own Government's policies regarding the prevention of nuclear war.[4] In that statement I said that Western security policy was based on two fundamental—and integrated—tenets: deterrence and co-operation, and we have just heard the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany deliver an eloquent and compelling statement of his Government's position on the important questions of peace and security which are at the heart of the doctrine of deterrence. I dwelt at some length on the deterrence aspect at that time. Let me today touch on one of the most important and successful international co-operative ventures ever negotiated in the nuclear field, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, known as the NPT.[5]

In the search for ways to reduce the potential for nuclear conflict, the Committee on Disarmament and the international community as a whole should continue to recognize and emphasize the critical role played by this Treaty, negotiated through the multilateral process, in maintaining the security of all States. The importance of this Treaty in inhibiting the further spread of nuclear weapons is broadly recognized, as demonstrated by the fact that the NPT has the widest adherence of any arms-control treaty in history.

Several weeks ago, on 1 July 1983, we marked the fifteenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In his statement commemorating this occasion, President Reagan reiterated the importance which the United States attaches to this Treaty and to United States obligations thereunder. The President went on to reaffirm the importance of the NPT as "a cornerstone of the international effort to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries" and to urge "all countries that have not yet done so to join the growing consensus against the spread of nuclear explosives by adhering to the NPT". He also emphasized recognition by the United

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[4] *Ante.*

[5] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

States of its obligation under the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and stressed his personal commitment to those efforts. Finally, he called upon all States to "rededicate themselves to achieving the purposes of this important Treaty and to ensuring its continued vitality". [6]

President Reagan's statement serves as a significant reminder to us all of the importance of preserving both the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the broad support which this Treaty enjoys from the international community. Increasing this support even beyond its current, unprecedented level would serve to reinforce our collective security and further promote confidence in the continued development of peaceful nuclear energy programmes. Conversely, decreasing support for this Treaty would serve only to erode the security of all States and to reinforce international tension and controversy.

We are all cognizant of the compelling need for additional efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. In our search for agreed measures to reduce this risk, however, let us not overlook the need to support and preserve those important barriers to conflict which already exist. Just as we cannot afford to slow our search for new ways to strengthen international peace and security, we cannot afford to be complacent and assume that existing measures to promote peace such as the NPT will remain effective in the absence of active support. As President Reagan stated on 1 July, the NPT is a contribution to peace for future generations. It is both our obligation and our privilege to preserve and strengthen this vital agreement, and we should keep this thought in mind as we proceed with our deliberations on the prevention of nuclear war during our next session.

Let me briefly touch also on agenda item 7, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We conducted long and difficult consultations on this subject under our distinguished Chairman, Ambassador Morelli Pando, of Peru, and my delegation was hopeful for a positive outcome. Unfortunately, at the last moment we were denied that success by the position of one group, a situation surely to be regretted by us all. My delegation has admittedly been among those who were the most sceptical of the usefulness of a working group on this subject. But we listened to the arguments of our colleagues and, while not entirely convinced, we dropped our opposition to a working group *per se*. And the western group, after long consideration, proposed a compromise mandate contained in document CD/413 which was found acceptable to our colleagues in the Group of 21. With this development we had hoped that the dedicated and strenuous efforts made by successive Chairmen of this Committee to resolve the issue would be rewarded.

I would like to take a moment of the Committee's time to review the events of the past few weeks concerning outer space. The Chairman's consultations produced a series of compromise proposals for a mandate for an outer space working group. The members of the socialist group told us throughout the consultations that they would support the proposal of the Group of 21. Yet, when the Group of 21 accepted the final proposal of the western group, the group of socialist countries was apparently stunned and could only plead that it had come so late in the session that the Governments of that group of socialist countries had insufficient time to study the text and would, therefore, reject it.

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[6] *Ante*.

Having thus ended the chance for a working group on agenda item 7 for this year—and possibly the next—the group of socialist countries referred the Committee to—and I quote from the Committee's report—"new initiatives (by the Soviet Union) including" a "draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space . . . submitted to the United Nations General Assembly".[7] Thus we have the curious situation in which the Soviet Union, possessor of the only operational ASAT system in the world and whose group prevented the Committee on Disarmament from forming a working group, now chooses to bypass the Committee and refer to its outer space proposal directly to the General Assembly. Perhaps our distinguished Soviet colleague, who once spoke of the "cemetery of disarmament", is seeking to make this gloomy characterization a reality.

Before closing, there is another issue I would like to address, and that is the procedure by which we conduct our business. This is a matter which I brooded upon at some length during my hospitalization. Let me begin with a comment on an area where we can, and should, make some adjustments.

I refer to the improved effectiveness of the Committee. My delegation commends the work of the informal group of "wise men" which is reflected in their excellent document, Working Paper No. 100. These efforts are laudatory and should be continued at our next session. Changes will, of course, come slowly; but there is one area which desperately needs attention and where improvements are long overdue. I refer to the subject of our annual report. It has become our "annual agony", a matter of increasing embarrassment, as others have pointed out. Large portions of it contain year after year repetitions of the well-known and oft-stated positions of member States and groups. We spend—indeed, waste—an inordinate amount of time and effort in its preparation. This exercise has impeached the old cliché "practice makes perfect" because this year's report is even more unreadable than our previous efforts and its utility as a historical record of the proceedings of the Committee is doubtful. At our next session, the Committee should seriously scrutinize the procedures by which the report is prepared and adopted with a view to ensuring that it more accurately and concisely reflects the proceedings of the Committee. Moreover, we should drastically reduce the time spent in its preparation.

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[7] *Ante*, Aug. 19.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee has now completed its fifth year and our record is certainly not good! However, I am, like my friend and colleague, Ambassador McPhail, not discouraged. I try to form my judgements through a cold analysis of the facts. Part of that analysis includes an assessment of just what is possible—and in what time frame—in a forum such as this, which is, by any standard, representative of the body of international opinion on disarmament questions. Viewed from that vantage point, we should not overindulge ourselves in lamentation for our lack of progress but, rather, pursue the issues, procedurally and substantively, with greater vigour and seek compromise. Nor should we engage in artificial comparisons with our predecessors who were more successful in reaching agreements. We are the products of different times, indeed, more difficult times. There is value in what we do today. We are building more solid foundations for future arms control and disarmament agreements. Verification is such a foundation, and on it we will construct conventions which will instill greater confidence and better stand the tests of time. We have, as I have mentioned earlier regarding the radiological weapons treaty, played a useful role in developing prophylactic approaches to disarmament—cutting off the possibility of arms development and deployment before they occur. Lastly, we serve a worthwhile education and communication purpose, which we must be ever mindful of.

Thus, rather than haranguing each other, we should seek greater understanding so that accommodations can be reached and look diligently for better ways to improve our effectiveness. In that context, I can only applaud the thoughtful and statesman-like valedictory statement of Ambassador McPhail at our plenary meeting on 23 August. His belief that we are moving—however slowly—towards a recognition that international security is a shared responsibility, and that this augurs well for our efforts to come to grips with the difficult issues which separate us, is an encouraging word for all of us to take away with us and reflect upon. I bid you all Godspeed until we meet again.

Letter From ACDA Director Adelman to the Comptroller General (Bowsher): ACDA Internal Controls, September 1, 1983 [1]

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has reviewed the General Accounting Office's draft report on "Need for Internal Control Improvements, Including Adequate Internal Audit Coverage (GAO/NSIAD-83-68)", as forwarded with your August 17 letter.

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[1] U.S. General Accounting Office. *Report to the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Need for Internal Control Improvements at ACDA, Including Adequate Internal Audit Coverage* (GAO/NSIAD-83-68, Sept. 30, 1983), pp. 13–17. For a part of the GAO report, see the letter from the Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division (Conahan) to ACDA Director Adelman, *post*, Sept. 30.

While parts of the report will be useful as we continue to review ACDA's operating practices and procedures, certain sections do not present an accurate or complete assessment. Our detailed comments on those areas requiring clarification or correction are attached.

ATTACHMENT

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT "NEED FOR INTERNAL CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS, INCLUDING ADEQUATE INTERNAL COVERAGE" (GAO/NSIAD-83-68)

OMB Circular A-123 Implementation

ACDA has been planning its internal control activities to meet the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act since early 1983 so that the Agency's Director will be able to provide the required report to the President and the Congress by the December 31, 1983 deadline. Following passage of the Act on September 8, 1982, interest in expanding internal control systems has increased throughout the Federal Government. Detailed guidelines for establishing an internal control evaluation, improvement and reporting process were forwarded by OMB in January 1983 and ACDA began planning its implementation efforts on a schedule similar to other small agencies.

ACDA has taken several actions to ensure that the Agency will be in a position to meet the reporting deadline set by the Act, including: (1) several meetings with various responsible OMB personnel concerning ACDA's program for assuring compliance with the Circular and the Act; (2) preparation of a vulnerability assessment and internal control plan; (3) meetings with representatives of the GSA External Service Branch and the Inspector General Office concerning GSA plans for supporting the A-123 effort, as a part of the administrative support agreement ACDA has with GSA; and (4) conclusion of a contract with a major independent accounting firm to supplement the capabilities of the Agency's small administrative staff for the conduct of vulnerability assessment and internal control revisions and further implementation of Circular A-123.

The above actions are at least equal to and on a time schedule that meets or exceeds those of other small agencies. These actions demonstrate the Agency management's commitment to improved internal controls through compliance with OMB Circular A-123. (See GAO Note A.) [2]

Internal Audit Coverage

The report incorrectly states that ACDA management believes that increased audit coverage will produce only "increased costs and no benefits." The Agency's management has consistently stated that any suggested improvements in the Agency's audit practice would receive serious consideration. (See GAO Note B.) [2]

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[2] Not printed here.

Consistent with this approach, ACDA management has: (1) reviewed the provisions of OMB Circular A–73 and the appropriateness of previous ACDA managements' decisions on internal audit in light of current conditions; (2) reviewed with the Executive Secretary of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency the Agency's compliance with any directives from the President or the Council; and (3) reviewed with GSA the various checks within the GSA system related to ACDA's expenditures and the possibility of expanding GSA audit coverage. As a result of these and other ACDA initiatives, ACDA formally informed GSA that the Agency will require expanded audit coverage during FY–84. Starting this coverage sooner in FY–83 was not possible because GSA audit capabilities have been fully committed.

ACDA management believes that the establishment of an internal audit group staffed by full time permanent agency employees is only one of several ways to obtain expanded audit coverage. For an agency of ACDA's size (169 full time permanent personnel estimated for FY–84), this alternative appears less cost effective than other contract approaches. (See GAO Note C.)[3]

Out-of-Date Policies

The review of manuals, procedures and instructions for an Agency the size of ACDA is a continuing process. Following a long-established practice, ACDA's Instructions and Notices and other properly executed documents supersede sections of the ACDA Manual until these changes have been incorporated in the Manual. This is a procedure that has been followed since 1971.

During the period October 1981 to August 1983 ACDA issued, revised or reviewed 26 Instructions and issued 61 Notices on Administrative procedures. Notice of reorganization including changes of responsibilities and organizational structure were provided in writing by ACDA's Director to all ACDA staff members. These actions were taken to keep ACDA's personnel informed on organizational responsibilities, procedures and other aspects of the Agency's operations.

Differences in the duties assigned versus those performed.

Verification issues cut across a number of ACDA's line functions. The Verification and Intelligence Bureau was established in late 1981 to provide a focal point for verification activities. The intent of this action was not to restrict verification decision making to a single bureau but rather to provide an organizational point of emphasis for these matters.

The Verification and Intelligence Bureau is a new organization and until March 10, 1983 was without a confirmed Assistant Director because of inaction by the Congress on the President's nomination for this position. The report properly mentions ACDA's plans to strengthen the capabilities of the VI Bureau and the President has approved an increase in ACDA's financial and personnel resources in part for this purpose. (See GAO Note D.)[4]

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[3] Not printed here.

No comprehensive assessments done on what ACDA's authorizing legislation requires.

ACDA maintains close and frequent contact with the Congressional Committees having principal jurisdiction over arms control. The Agency has found that through relevant legislation and the accompanying legislative histories the Congress clearly makes known its intent to ACDA on arms control matters. Oversight by ACDA's authorizing committees is detailed and a close working relationship exists between the Agency and interested Congressional staffs to ensure that the will of the Congress expressed through legislation is carried out.

ACDA's Director plans to have the Agency's General Counsel review past legislative analyses and make recommendations on the need for any additional legislative analyses that may be appropriate.

Non-compliance with legislative and administrative requirements.

The draft report asserts that ACDA has not fulfilled its responsibilities under Section 37(a)(1) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to submit reports to Congress on the verifiability of significant arms control proposals. To support this assertion, the draft report states that ACDA has not submitted reports for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Talks, and other negotiations.

This assertion fails to take adequate account of the meaning of Section 37 as is made clear by its legislative history. The Conference Committee report (HR Rpt No. 95–563) noted that Section 37(a)(1) was not intended to interfere with the President's ability to conduct arms control negotiations. President Carter noted this statement when he signed the bill and reiterated that the control of negotiations with other states is the responsibility of the President.

It is clear from the above that ACDA is in compliance with Section 37(a)(1) concerning negotiations between the U.S. and other States. ACDA has submitted such verification reports when directed by the President. Also, it should be noted that the legislation calls for reports on a "timely" basis and upon request of appropriate Committees. All such Committee requests have been met. (See GAO Note E.)[4]

Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research Programs

ACDA has in the past carried out its research coordinating responsibilities through its participation in the interagency process to avoid duplication of research among agencies of the Executive Branch. ACDA's Director plans to institute a review to determine the amount and type of arms control research coordination that is appropriate to present circumstances. If necessary, new procedures will be instituted or legislative relief sought to eliminate this requirement. With respect to the reporting procedures noted in the draft report, it is the Agency's understanding that the Executive Branch ceased reports to OMB on the coordination of Government-wide arms control research in consultation with the Committees of Congress having primary jurisdiction over the Agency and no objection was interposed.

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[4] Not printed here.

RECOVER

The draft report uses as an example of inadequate internal controls certain conclusions contained in the report GAO/ID–83–9 on ACDA's RECOVER program. After an exhaustive investigation involving GAO interaction with all involved parties in the U.S. and abroad, GAO did not attribute its findings to inadequate internal controls. GAO stated in the title of GAO/ID–83–9 its principal conclusions that ACDA had developed in RECOVER a "potentially useful technology for nuclear safeguards, but (that) greater international commitment is needed." While GAO has identified certain "management problems" in the RECOVER program, ACDA understands that these were related to factors other than internal control and were addressed in the Director's comments on GAO/ID–83–9. (See GAO Note F.)[5]

Statement by the Chairman (Nitze) of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, September 3, 1983[1]

I have just been to see the President about the next round of INF negotiations, which begins in Geneva on September 6.

We are all deeply concerned about the irresponsible Soviet action which led to the death of 269 persons, including over 50 Americans, aboard the Korean Air Lines jet. We must, nevertheless, continue our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict through negotiated, fair, and verifiable agreements.

I return to Geneva prepared to pursue constructive approaches to the issues which divide us. The President has assured me of his personal and strong support as we enter this crucial round of talks. We have no illusion that the going will be easy. We expect the Soviets to stress apparent movement in the public press, as they have already done. But we will be looking for substantive movement at the negotiating table, where it counts. If the Soviets are prepared to address the basic issues squarely and seriously, I have the flexibility for real progress.

Remember that the United States first proposed complete elimination of the entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to lower dramatically nuclear tensions. When the Soviets made clear their refusal seriously to address this, we offered a flexible approach to an interim solution at lower, equal levels. Again they repeated their previous arguments in favor of a position that would essentially perpetuate the current imbalance in INF missiles.

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[5] Not printed here.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 1983, pp. 41–42. The statement was made at the White House.

The time is at hand for the Soviets to move with us promptly to achieve an agreement restoring stability and nuclear balance in the INF realm.

We will continue the process of the closest consultation with our NATO allies. I leave tomorrow to consult with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn on Monday and will then continue to Geneva later in the day.

Letter From ACDA Director Adelman to the Comptroller General (Bowsher): Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research and Management of the ACDA External Research Program, September 9, 1983 [1]

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has reviewed the United States General Accounting Office draft report "ACDA's Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research and Management of Its External Research Program are Still Inadequate (GAO/NSIAD–83)" which was forwarded with your August 25 letter. [2]

This report will be useful to me as I continue the review of ACDA's operating practices and procedures. However, some sections require comment to clarify ACDA's position on several aspects of the Agency's external research policies, and those comments are enclosed. In this regard, I would particularly note that I am initiating two reviews. The first covers our existing external research planning and procedures to see if they can be improved; the second deals with steps, working with other agencies, to determine how coordination of Federal arms control research can be effectively pursued.

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[1] U.S. General Accounting Office. *Report to the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. ACDA's Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research and Management of Its External Research Program Still Need Improvement* (GAO/NSIAD–83–67, Sept. 30, 1983), pp. 24–27.

[2] For a brief extract of the GAO report, see the letter from the Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division (Conahan) to ACDA Director Adelman, *post*, Sept. 30.

APPENDIX

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

COMMENTS ON "ACDA'S COORDINATION OF FEDERAL ARMS CONTROL RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT OF ITS EXTERNAL RESEARCH PROGRAM ARE STILL INADEQUATE (GAO/NSIAD-83-67)"

Management of ACDA's External Research Program

Procedures which are presently in use for review of ACDA's external research provide for the intimate involvement of the Deputy Director, Assistant Directors, Counselor and Administrative Director. Because of this direct involvement, the Agency's senior line management personnel are aware of the proposed projects in the entire program and Assistant Directors are provided an opportunity to justify their individual programs in light of needs of the other bureaus. The Agency believes that the present system of planning external research budgets is suitable for an external research program of ACDA's type and size; however, these procedures are being reviewed to see if changes would be beneficial.

Research funding has been declining

The $5.8 million peak for external research funding which occurred in 1966 was early in the formation of the Agency. At that time the research needs of the Agency were different from those which exist after ACDA has been in operation for 17 years. The Agency's in-house technical and research capabilities are much stronger now than they were in ACDA's formative years. The Agency does not believe that any essential research has been sacrificed because of lower funding levels. If currently budgeted levels prove to be inadequate ACDA will take appropriate action to have them increased. This has been the case in FY-84, a year for which ACDA has requested an appropriation amendment which will result in an increase in the external research budget from the present $1 million to approximately $1.5 million.

Research funds used for other purposes

Reprogramming funds within the restrictions imposed by the Appropriation Committees is a common and accepted practice. For small agencies this flexibility is essential to the prudent management of the agency's resources. Budget restrictions by line item would prevent any redirection of ACDA efforts to meet unpredictable changing conditions and force the Agency to work to a budget plan that was established many months in the past.

Budgets which are prepared for submission to the Congress well in advance of the fiscal years in which they will be obligated are subject to revision because of changing internal and external conditions. It is not possible to predict precisely so far into the future the amount of funds which will actually be expended for each budget category. ACDA is a small agency with over 50% of the Agency's appropriation used for personnel expenses. Many of the remaining object classes are fixed in nature with few discretionary accounts available for adjustment as actual expenditures become known. External research is one of the budget categories that can be adjusted to meet changing demands. In spite of these factors downward revisions of ACDA's originally budgeted research expenditures have been nominal.

Meeting payroll expenses is the Agency's first budgetary priority. In recent years the Congress has not acted on supplemental pay raise appropriation requests until late in the fiscal year. This has required delays in the obligation of research monies and reprogramming of funds. In FY–83, as an example, the Congress did not pass ACDA's supplemental pay raise request until the eleventh month of the fiscal year.

Criteria for systematically selecting research projects

ACDA's senior officials have considerable experience in Government, management and arms control policy. Although some senior officials have been in their current positions for relatively short periods, their backgrounds qualify them to make informed decisions on the research needs of their bureaus. The bureaus themselves are staffed with senior professionals who are long term ACDA employees. Their expertise is at the immediate disposal of the Agency's top management during the planning of research programs.

The review which ACDA's Director is initiating on the Agency's procedures for preparing external research programs and the methodology for selection of individual research projects will include consideration of formalizing criteria for budget preparation and project selection.

Coordination of ACDA research

The Agency's external research budget planning documents are circulated to all bureau heads as the budget progresses through the Agency's top management decision-making process. After the external research budget has been approved, the Contracting Officer is informed and instructed to implement the plan. Monthly Status Reports are prepared on external research contract progress and made available to a number of staff members in each bureau. This process provides the bureaus with up-to-date information on the Agency's external research activities and identifies areas where cooperation and coordination are useful. We are not aware of any significant duplication in ACDA's research program. The number of projects in a typical year's research program ($1 million to $3 million) is relatively small and coordination problems that are found in large agencies with much bigger programs do not exist in the same magnitude. As noted above, the review of the Agency's external research procedures will address the establishment of a more formal coordination process that is appropriate to ACDA's operations.

Use of available listings

Action necessary to ensure that ACDA's external research project officers use all readily available means to identify research that is related to their projects will be taken. The Agency will amend ACDA's "Guide for External Research Requests" to instruct project officers to access existing data bases such as the National Technical Information Service, the Defense Technical Information Center and other similar data bases.

Contractor evaluations

ACDA management agrees that contractor evaluation statements are important to the effective management of our contracting resources. The Agency's staff has made a best efforts attempt to have these evaluations completed. The draft report states that the Agency has only 77% of the required evaluations on file. The Agency plans to take appropriate action to ensure that all required evaluations are completed in the future in an appropriate manner. The Agency will also review the content of the evaluation statements to identify any needed revisions to ensure that research results are properly evaluated.

ACDA's Research Coordinating Mandate

ACDA has been carrying out its Federal arms control research mandate through participation in the interagency process. The Director is taking steps to review and further define, if necessary, the scope of Federal arms control research coordination, including review to determine the amount and type of arms control coordination that is appropriate under present circumstances. ACDA has already begun informal discussions with other agencies on possible additional mechanisms for the coordination of arms control research. If necessary, new coordinating procedures will be instituted or legislative relief sought to eliminate this coordinating requirement.

Document of Objectives Adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Contadora Group and of Five Central American Countries, September 9, 1983 [1]

Considering:

The situation prevailing in Central America, which is characterized by an atmosphere of tension that threatens security and peaceful coexistence in the region, and which requires, for its solution, observance of the principles of international law governing the actions of States, especially:

The self-determination of peoples;

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[1] S/16041, Oct. 18, 1983, pp. 4–7. The Contadora Group comprised Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. The five Central American countries were Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

Non-intervention;

The sovereign equality of States;

The peaceful settlement of disputes;

Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Respect for the territorial integrity of States;

Pluralism in its various manifestations;

Full support for democratic institutions;

The promotion of social justice;

International co-operation for development;

Respect for and promotion of human rights;

The prohibition of terrorism and subversion;

The desire to reconstruct the Central American homeland through progressive integration of its economic, legal and social institutions;

The need for economic co-operation among the States of Central America so as to make a fundamental contribution to the development of their peoples and the strengthening of their independence;

The undertaking to establish, promote or revitalize representative, democratic systems in all the countries of the region;

The unjust economic, social and political structures which exacerbate the conflicts in Central America,

The urgent need to put an end to the tensions and lay the foundations for understanding and solidarity among the countries of the area;

The arms race and the growing arms traffic in Central America, which aggravate political relations in the region and divert economic resources that could be used for development;

The presence of foreign advisers and other forms of foreign military interference in the zone;

The risks that the territory of Central American States may be used for the purpose of conducting military operations and pursuing policies of destabilization against others;

The need for concerted political efforts in order to encourage dialogue and understanding in Central America, avert the danger of a general spreading of the conflicts, and set in motion the machinery needed to ensure the peaceful coexistence and security of their peoples;

Declare their intention of achieving the following objectives:

To promote détente and put an end to situations of conflict in the area, refraining from taking any action that might jeopardize political confidence or prevent the achievement of peace, security and stability in the region;

To ensure strict compliance with the aforementioned principles of international law, whose violators will be held accountable;

To respect and ensure the exercise of human, political, civil, economic, social, religious and cultural rights;

To adopt measures conducive to the establishment and, where appropriate, improvement of democratic, representative and pluralistic systems that will guarantee effective popular participation in the decision-making process and ensure that the various currents of opinion have free access to fair and regular elections based on the full observance of citizens' rights;

To promote national reconciliation efforts wherever deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic political processes in accordance with the law;

To create political conditions intended to ensure the international security, integrity and sovereignty of the States of the region;

To stop the arms race in all its forms and begin negotiations for the control and reduction of current stocks of weapons and on the number of armed troops;

To prevent the installation on their territory of foreign military bases or any other type of foreign military interference;

To conclude agreements to reduce the presence of foreign military advisers and other foreign elements involved in military and security activities, with a view to their elimination;

To establish internal control machinery to prevent the traffic in arms from the territory of any country in the region to the territory of another;

To eliminate the traffic in arms, whether within the region or from outside it, intended for persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries;

To prevent the use of their own territory by persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries and to refuse to provide them with or permit them to receive military or logistical support;

To refrain from inciting or supporting acts of terrorism, subversion or sabotage in the countries in the area;

To establish and co-ordinate direct communication systems with a view to preventing or, where appropriate, settling incidents between States of the region;

To continue humanitarian aid aimed at helping Central American refugees who have been displaced from their countries of origin, and to create suitable conditions for the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, in consultation with or with the co-operation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies deemed appropriate;

To undertake economic and social development programmes with the aim of promoting well being and an equitable distribution of wealth;

To revitalize and restore economic integration machinery in order to attain sustained development on the basis of solidarity and mutual advantage;

To negotiate the provision of external monetary resources which will provide additional means of financing the resumption of intraregional trade, meet the serious balance-of-payments problems, attract funds for working capital, support programmes to extend and restructure production systems and promote medium- and long-term investment projects;

To negotiate better and broader access to international markets in order to increase the volume of trade between the countries of Central America and the rest of the world, particularly the industrialized countries; by means of a revision of trade practices, the elimination of tariff and other barriers, and the achievement of price stability at a profitable and fair level for the products exported by the countries of the region;

To establish technical co-operation machinery for the planning, programming and implementation of multi-sectoral investment and trade promotion projects.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Central American countries, with the participation of the countries in the Contadora Group, have begun negotiations with the aim of preparing for the conclusion of the agreements and the establishment of the machinery necessary to formalize and develop the objectives contained in this document, and to bring about the establishment of appropriate verification and monitoring systems. To that end, account will be taken of the initiatives put forward at the meetings convened by the Contadora Group.

Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe [Extract], September 9, 1983 [1]

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The participating States,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Act according to which they recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament. [2]

Have agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

1. The aim of the Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 1983, pp. 54–55. The representatives of the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe met in Madrid from Nov. 11, 1980 until Sept. 9, 1983.

[2] For these provisions, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308.

and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

2. Thus the Conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

3. The first stage of the Conference will be held in Stockholm commencing on 17 January 1984.

4. On the basis of equality of right, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interest of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole as well as the adjoining sea area [3] and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area [3] and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.

5. Taking into account the above-mentioned aim of the Conference, the next follow-up meeting of the participating States of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4 November 1986, will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the Conference.

6. Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Act, and having reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the Conference, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the

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[3] In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe. [Footnote in the source text.]

next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

7. A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda, time-table and other organizational modalities for the first stage of the Conference, will be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25 October 1983. Its duration shall not exceed three weeks.

8. The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

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White House Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, September 12, 1983 [1]

The United States is constantly reviewing the progress of the negotiations to see how best to move the talks forward, and we are continuing intensive consultations with our allies on the INF talks. The sixth round of these talks has just begun, and the United States is engaged in serious negotiating efforts to obtain an agreement that meets alliance security concerns. Both sides are bound to respect the confidentiality of the negotiations. Press speculation about the substance of the talks is not helpful.

As in the previous round, U.S. negotiators have great flexibility to consider any serious Soviet proposal according to criteria set forth by the President earlier this year. These five criteria remain the basis of our position: equal rights and limits for the United States and U.S.S.R., no compensation for third country systems, global limits with no shifting of the threat from Europe to Asia, no adverse effect on NATO's conventional deterrent, and effective measures to ensure verifiability.

We and the allies remain convinced that the best long-term results of the negotiations would be the elimination of all land-based U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles, and that as long as the Soviets remain unwilling to accept this outcome, the President's interim agreement proposal provides a flexible framework for progress.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Sept. 19, 1983, pp. 1237–1238.

Letter From President Reagan to Former Chancellor Kreisky of Austria: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, September 12, 1983 [1]

I appreciated your thoughtful letter concerning the impact of arms control questions on public opinion in Europe. Let me assure you that the points you raise are also of great concern to me. It is especially troublesome that NATO's dual-track decision is not clearly understood by young people in Europe, despite our constant efforts and those of our Allies to articulate and clarify it. [2]

During your appearance before the National Press Club in Washington last February you stated clearly and succinctly the principle behind the Alliance decision. NATO did not, as you noted, decide to station new weapons in Europe on its own initiative. NATO's dual-track decision was necessitated by the rapid proliferation of Soviet nuclear forces, especially the intermediate-range SS-20. The introduction of this highly accurate and lethal missile system threatened to break the security link between the United States and our European Allies. This link has served as the underpinning of European stability for nearly four decades.

In response, the NATO Allies approved the deployment of new intermediate range weapons, while emphasizing their common determination to make every possible effort to limit or make these weapons unnecessary via negotiations with the Soviet Union. We also made it clear that if it proved impossible to achieve a satisfactory arms agreement, we would take the steps necessary to protect our security by proceeding with the missile deployments. Let me underline that we set no deadline to the negotiations; only a small number of the total planned missiles will be deployed at the end of this year and we are prepared to continue negotiations thereafter. Let me stress as well that any missile that is deployed can always be withdrawn, if negotiations are eventually successful.

In this connection, I wish to reiterate that the United States adamantly opposes an arms race. There are certain facts that receive almost no publicity. For example, the United States has fewer nuclear warheads today than we had fifteen years ago. And over the last three years we withdrew unilaterally 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe. Moreover, if we are forced to deploy INF missiles, we have agreed with our Allies that for every modern warhead introduced, an existing nuclear warhead will be withdrawn.

We are willing, in the interest of arms reductions, to consider every option. I reaffirmed this to Ambassador Nitze prior to his return to Geneva for the current round of negotiations, which we are earnestly pursuing, despite the Korean airline tragedy. But the USSR's approach to negotiating reductions has been disappointing, particularly in that the Soviets have continuously refused to acknowledge the security interest of the nations on their periphery.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Sept. 18, 1983, pp. 1263–1265. The former Chancellor's letter is printed *ante*, Aug. 10.

[2] The NATO decision is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

As you will recall, Moscow initially refused to negotiate at all. It was NATO's modernization decision that brought the Soviets to the negotiating table. Since commencement of the Geneva talks in 1981 the Soviet Union, however, has refused to move from its insistence on maintaining a missile monopoly despite flexible proposals we tabled aimed at stimulating progress. Our negotiating positions, which have been developed through extremely close cooperation with our NATO Allies, insist only on U.S.-Soviet equality, a principle that the Soviet Union has so far refused to honor. When the Soviets made plain their opposition to the zero option, we proposed parity at the lowest possible level. The Soviets have said this is equally unacceptable. It is Soviet intransigence that is blocking progress.

While I know that some young people are opposed to the prospect of new weapons deployments, there are much larger numbers who support our determination to maintain the common defense. If, as you say, we will disappoint many of our citizens by beginning deployments on schedule, how many more will be affected if we go back on our joint decision and postpone implementation of the dual-track decision? A delay in our deployments would only encourage the Soviets to believe that NATO's resolve was faltering and that they could stretch our negotiations endlessly without addressing our legitimate security concerns.

I wholeheartedly agree with your point that solidarity among the democracies is our objective, a bond that can only be strong when it is deeply rooted in people's minds. What a striking contrast presented to us by the Soviet example, where the leadership can commit such a horrible deed as the destruction of the KAL civilian airliner and not feel compelled to answer to its people. The Soviet Union openly professes its desire to impose its totalitarian system throughout the world, an objective we can repulse by maintaining our common defense and resolutely promoting our democratic ideals.

I do not believe that the relationship of European youth to their democratic systems is as tenuous as you suggest. In my travels, I have seen strong evidence that young people in both Europe and the United States, and elsewhere respect both the responsibilities as well as the privileges of democracy. Our joint task is to demonstrate to them, through both words and deeds, the meaning and continued validity of Western principles. Securing the common defense is one of the most important of these responsibilities.

I assure you that I am deeply committed to seeking every possibility for peace, in Europe and throughout the world. I know that I can count on you and other leaders to help Europe's young people find their way among the difficult choices facing them today.

Letter From ACDA Director Adelman to the Comptroller General (Bowsher): Management of ACDA's Automatic Data Processing and Operations Analysis Functions, September 12, 1983 [1]

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has reviewed the United States General Accounting Office draft report "Need to Improve Management of ACDA's Automatic Data Processing and Operations Analysis Functions (GAO/NSIAD-83-66)", as forwarded with your August 26 letter.

Parts of the report will be useful as we continue to review ACDA's operating practices and procedures. Certain sections, however, require clarification or correction. Our comments in this regard are enclosed. I would also like to point out that four reviews related to areas covered by the report will be undertaken. These will cover ADP planning procedures, computer security, operations analysis needs of the Agency, and the Paperwork Reduction Act as it applies to ACDA.

ENCLOSURE

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT "NEED TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF ACDA'S AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS FUNCTIONS (GAO/NSIAD-83-66)"

ACDA Estimate of Savings Resulting from Closing of the Rosslyn Facility

The GAO draft report states that $684,000 savings were related to the reorganization and relocation actions that effected the former Office of Operations Analysis (OA) and computer support and implies that ACDA overstated these savings. ACDA's estimate of $1.3 million savings referred to in the draft report included total Rosslyn savings identified for contract, library and computer changes.

ACDA does not agree with the conclusion that no salary savings resulted from the reassignment of OA personnel, because six of them were reassigned to existing vacancies in the line bureaus for which they were qualified. If these transfers had not occurred the line bureaus would have needed to recruit more staff at added salary expense for the Agency. In this respect, the abolishment of OA and the elimination of a secretarial position created a savings of $406,206. (See GAO Note 1.) [2]

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[1] U.S. General Accounting Office. *Report to the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Need To Improve Management of ACDA's Automatic Data Processing and Operations Analysis Functions*, (GAO/NSIAD-83-66, Sept. 30, 1983), pp. 37-40. For a part of the GAO report, see the letter from the Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division (Conahan) to ACDA Director Adelman, *post*, Sept. 30.

[2] Not printed here.

ACDA also does not agree that recurring savings that are realized year after year should be reduced by $90,939 for a one-time moving and construction cost for the WANG computer. This is not a generally accepted financial analysis technique and understates actual annual savings. The one time charge should be amortized over the years of the recurring savings. (See GAO Note 2.)[3]

Regardless of the personnel savings for the six OA analysts, recurring savings resulting from closing of portions of the Rosslyn facility are as follows:

Description	*Recurring $ Savings*
Computer Support	$784,740
Library	69,248 (See GAO Note 3.)[3]
Contract Office	58,984
Total Rosslyn Changes	$912,972

Compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act

ACDA management had previously discussed with OMB the Agency's compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, and OMB indicated that the ACDA's actions under this Act are appropriate given its size and data sources. However, ACDA will again review the requirements of the Act with OMB and the ACDA's General Counsel to see if any corrective action would be in order.

ADP Management Systems

During 1981–1982 ACDA was in the process of adjusting computer analytical support capabilities to bring them in line with the Agency's financial and personnel resources and to ensure that available analytical support was of the type required for the activities of the Agency's line bureaus. At that time, computer capacity was in excess of the Agency's requirements with the principal equipment (DEC 2060) operating at considerably less than full capacity and incapable of handling any classified material. Prior to the reorganization all line bureaus were requested to identify the computer assistance they needed to accomplish their mission, and all such requests for support were approved.

The Agency has in the past considered requests for computer and analytical support by line bureaus or other organizational units through the budget process. Both top and mid-level managers of the Agency are involved in support justifications for budget requests. ACDA's Budget and Accounting Officer has been incorrectly quoted as saying "Data processing users do not participate in ADP planning through the budget process." (See GAO Note 4.)[3]

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[3] Not printed here.

After ACDA terminated the lease on the DEC 2060, a study was initiated to determine how new computer technology could be used to meet ACDA's present needs. This study has been done with consideration of the support requirements of the line bureaus, and ACDA is in the final selection process for additional ADP equipment. ACDA's Director is initiating a review of the Agency's ADP planning procedures including consideration of a more formal ADP user survey to assist in ADP decision making.

Computer Security

Presently ACDA is obtaining computer support from two principal sources: (1) Computer Services Agreement with the U.S. Railway Association (USRA), and (2) support provided by the Agency's Computer Group which operates and maintains the ACDA-owned WANG facility. USRA has assured ACDA that it has taken all reasonable precautions to ensure the security of service provided ACDA. The Agency's owned WANG computer is installed in a secure facility which meets existing classified data security requirements. While the Agency is not aware of any computer security problems, the Director will initiate a review to ensure that the intent of OMB Circular A–71 is being followed and, if necessary, to take corrective action.

Review of Operations Analysis Capabilities

Operations Analysis techniques are a support function to assist the line bureaus in meeting their objectives. These and other support requirements vary with changing external and internal conditions. Line bureaus are authorized to request the type of support they require to accomplish their mission. ACDA's Director will review with the Agency's top management the need for instituting a more formal assessment of these requirements to determine if management system changes are needed to help the Agency carry out its work effectively.

Enclosure IV—Summary of Operations Analysis Abolishment and GAO's Claimed Savings

Enclosure IV states some ACDA officials believe that the abolishment of the Office of Operations Analysis was at least in part politically motivated. There is no basis for this claim. No Agency official took any action related to the abolishment of the Office of Operations Analysis during the current Administration which was based on political considerations. (See GAO Note 5.) [4]

Enclosure V—Current ACDA Use of ADP

Enclosure V improperly states the views of ACDA's Multilateral Affairs Bureau (MA) concerning Operations Analysis and computer support. The MA Bureau senior officials believe that Operations Analysis support for their bureau varies with changing conditions and the statement that "they envision no future needs" is incorrect. The

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[4] Not printed here.

Bureau is currently using the SNAP/D model and has requested the use of AIRS. (See GAO Note 6.)[5]

Report by the General Accounting Office to the Chairman of a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services (Stratton): ACDA's Personnel and Budget Levels and Related Matters, September 13, 1983[1]

Subject: Information on ACDA's Personnel and Budget Levels and Related Matters (GAO/NSIAD–83–61)

This report responds to questions you recently asked about the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

Our work focused principally on departmental activity since the current Director's confirmation earlier this year. It highlights the results of past actions eliminating ACDA's Office of Operations Analysis and the recent executive branch decisions providing ACDA with increased budget and personnel levels.

Information was compiled through a review of ACDA documents and related, readily available sources. We also discussed each matter with ACDA officials.

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As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of the report. At that time we will send copies to interested parties and make copies available to others upon request.

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS CONCERNING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (ACDA)

Q. What is the Agency personnel level as of September 1, 1983, and anticipated for fiscal years 1984 and 1985? How do those levels compare with periods of intense arms control activity, like 1968–1969, 1972–1975, 1977–1979?

A. As of September 1, 1983, ACDA had 146 full-time permanent employees and 35 employees in various other categories. The table below shows personnel information for the years requested.

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[5] Not printed here.

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office. *Information on ACDA's Personnel and Budget Levels and Related Matters* (GAO/NSIAD–83–61), letter of submission and pp. 1–7. Congressman Stratton was chairman of the Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems.

Fiscal year	Permanent		Other	
	Authorized	On board at year end	Authorized full time equivalent	Reimbursable [2]
1968	184	170	7	79
1969	189	156	7	79
1972	180	168	5	69
1973	174	141	5	70
1974	156	156	5	35
1975	162	161	7	42
1977	179	169	13	50
1978	185	185	27	51
1979	199	199	27	52
1983	159	—	24	32
1984 (anticipated)	169	—	24	37
1985 (anticipated)	174	—	24	37

Q. What is the status of the Presidential appointments positions of the Agency as of September 1, to include those filled and in the process of being filled?

A. Agency officials told us that ACDA has seven statutory positions subject to Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. Five are filled—Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director for Verification and Intelligence, Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, and Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations. Two other Assistant Director positions are authorized by legislation. ACDA's current organization provides for the following positions:

(1) Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control, and

(2) Assistant Director for Strategic Programs.

As of September 1, 1983, both are unfilled and no candidates have been formally nominated. ACDA officials told us that background investigations on two potential candidates are nearly completed and formal nominations are expected shortly.

Have any career ACDA officials been discharged during the tenure of the current Director?

Personnel in the following positions have left the Agency since the current Director was confirmed. The following table lists, by position, all personnel separations from April to September 1, 1983. The General Counsel—the highest ranking person to leave—decided to retire, and the Physical Scientist accepted a position elsewhere. All reimbursable detailees left as part of a normal rotation cycle.

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[2] Includes military and foreign service officers on detail to ACDA. The number shown is derived from the budgetary allocation. [Footnote in original.]

Position	*Separation date*
ACDA Employees:	
Secretary	8/13/83
*Clerk-Typist	8/25/83
Staff Assistant	6/24/83
Physical Scientist	6/24/83
*Clerk-Typist	8/05/83
Student Assistant	5/23/83
General Counsel	8/31/83
*Clerk	8/17/83
*Summer Students	
Reimbursable—Military Officers:	
Major/USA	7/18/83
Colonel/USAF	8/12/83
Commander/USN	6/30/83
Reimbursable—Foreign Service Officers:	
Foreign Affairs Officer	4/29/83
Foreign Affairs Officer	4/29/83
Foreign Affairs Officer	6/28/83
Foreign Affairs Officer	6/28/83
Foreign Affairs Officer	9/01/83

Q. Are the new library facilities more or less accessible to ACDA personnel than the previous space in Rosslyn? What cost savings resulted from moving the library facilities and eliminating the Office of Operations Analysis?

A. At the end of fiscal year 1982, ACDA loaned most of its library to George Washington University (GWU) and moved its reference and periodical collections to two separate locations in its offices at the State Department. At the same time, ACDA relocated the librarian to the State Department building, and reassigned her assistant to duties as a secretary in the Public Affairs Unit. The librarian maintains the collections in the State Department building and the card catalog for the collection at GWU. The librarian also does much of the reshelving at GWU and serves as liaison between the ACDA and GWU staff.

While ACDA staffers have essentially the same access to library materials as they did before the move, ACDA officials stated that some library services are no longer provided since the librarian has no assistant. For example, the librarian used to prepare a weekly bibliography of arms control publications. This is no longer done on a regular basis. One ACDA official told us that he found the weekly bibliography useful, but no longer relies on it since it is done so infrequently. Also, staff can no longer order photocopies of library materials from the librarian.

According to ACDA officials, the Agency saved $69,655 in fiscal year 1983 by moving its library facilities, excluding the one-time cost of moving the collection. Of this amount $22,407 represents the cost of office space the library formerly occupied. The remainder represents the personnel costs for library staff who were relocated or reassigned within the Agency, and remained on ACDA's payroll. ACDA could only justify counting these costs as savings on the basis that transferring the library staff enabled the Agency to forego outside hires. We question these claimed savings, since there were no outstanding vacancy announcements at the time of the transfers.

When OA was abolished, ACDA took a series of actions related to OA and other computer activities that may have saved about $683,000 in fiscal year 1983. These actions principally involved abolishing four military detailee positions, cancelling the contract for the Digital Equipment Corporation DEC-20 computer, turning the office space formerly occupied by OA over to the Department of State, and making other reductions in computer support.

Q. Have there been any increases in the Agency's budget or personnel ceilings, or any other measures to strengthen the Agency, during the tenure of the current Director?

A. Since the current Director's confirmation, ACDA's budget and personnel resources have been increased for fiscal year 1983 and are projected to increase in future years. In addition, legislation is being requested to increase the rank of seven key ACDA officials. ACDA's fiscal year 1983 budget request of $15,443,000 (including a $301,000 pay supplement) was increased by $563,000, or 3.6 percent, to $16,006,000. ACDA's fiscal year 1984 budget request of $21,385,000 has been increased, by $2,095,000 or 9.8 percent, to $23,480,000.[3] The administration has also approved an increase of 25 positions (including 5 detailees from other agencies) to ACDA by fiscal year 1985.

	Increased positions
1983	5
1984	15
1985	5

The additional money and people are to be used primarily to (1) strengthen ACDA's support of negotiations, (2) support its verification activities, and (3) provide it with additional ADP capability.

Finally, the administration is requesting legislation to increase the rank of seven ACDA executives in order to put them on the same level as their counterparts in other agencies. The legislation would increase the rank of ACDA's Deputy Director, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Negotiator, and Intermediate Nuclear Forces Negotiator to Executive Level III; and increase the rank of ACDA's four Assistant Directors to Executive Level IV.

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[3] Both ACDA's original budget request and its revised request include $4,980,000 for the proposed transfer of the "Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors" program from the Department of Energy. The Congress rejected a previous attempt to transfer this program to ACDA. [Footnote in original.]

Q. Has ACDA retained computer capabilities after the elimination of the Office of Operations Analysis, and were the analytical personnel discharged or integrated into the Agency? Are there any plans for enhancing ACDA's computer capabilities?

A. Before ACDA abolished OA, it had a small WANG computer; a larger Digital Equipment Corporation DEC-20 computer on a lease-purchase arrangement; and access to a Control Data Corporation CYBER computer and a Department of State IBM computer. When OA was abolished, ACDA gave up its leased DEC computer and its ready access to the Control Data CYBER. ACDA retained the small WANG and access to the Department of State IBM computer. ACDA also signed a reimbursable agreement with the U.S. Railway Association for the use of DEC computer similar to the one ACDA had given up.

When ACDA abolished OA, it gave OA's former analysts new titles and transferred them to positions in the line bureaus. None of ACDA's OA personnel left the Agency at that time; but four military reimbursable detailee positions were eliminated.

ACDA plans to strengthen its computer capabilities by purchasing a mini-computer which will be able to operate all the programs now run on the U.S. Railway Association computer, and possibly some of the programs which were shelved when ACDA eliminated OA. In addition, ACDA's Computer Services Group wants to increase its staff from 3 to 5, but no decision has been made on this request.

Q. Does the Director have contact with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs?

A. Officials in the Director's office believe the current ACDA Director has greater access to the President and his major advisors than the more recent former ACDA Directors. We were told that Director Adelman participates in all National Security Council meetings with the President when arms control issues are on the agenda. From confirmation to September 10, this has included six meetings covering major arms control issues. He has also met privately with the President along with Ambassador Rowny prior to the START round and has had private conversations with the President on other occasions. The Director has met privately with Vice President Bush when the Vice President was preparing for his trip to Europe in June and on other occasions.

In addition to the daily staff meetings with the Secretary of State, Director Adelman has met with Secretary Shultz six times privately since late May. These meetings now occur most weeks that the Secretary is in Washington. This is an average of one meeting at least every other week. The Director also participates with the Secretary in other meetings and briefings when arms control issues are involved. The Director has met privately more than a dozen times with the Deputy Secretary of State.

Director Adelman participates in the newly established Senior Arms Control Review Group chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In addition, he has met privately with Mr. Clark almost every week that he has been in Washington.

Statement by President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, September 21, 1983 [1]

One of my first decisions in the aftermath of the tragic shooting down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was that the United States must continue its efforts in the interest of peace to pursue equitable and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

On September 3, I met with Ambassador Nitze to discuss the INF negotiations in Geneva and to reaffirm my commitment to seeking a successful result in those talks.

Since then, the United States has held extensive consultations with our NATO allies and Japan regarding the U.S. position in the talks. These consultations have included both direct correspondence between myself and allied leaders, meetings of the NATO Special Consultative Group, and bilateral consultations with the Japanese.

In those consultations, suggestions for U.S. initiatives to move the negotiations forward were offered. These suggestions were welcomed by allied leaders, who reaffirmed their strong support for the U.S. negotiating effort. Our NATO allies also reaffirmed their commitment to the NATO double-track decision.

Based on the results of these consultations, Ambassador Nitze has received new instructions to pursue these U.S. initiatives with the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. These initiatives represent significant further development of the U.S. proposal for an interim agreement which the U.S. put forward last March. They address a number of Soviet concerns.

The U.S. action in taking these additional steps is further demonstration of U.S. commitment, and that of our allies, to achieving a positive outcome in the Geneva talks.

We call on the Soviet Union to respond in a constructive manner to these proposals, so that the Geneva negotiations can arrive at a positive result.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Sept. 25, 1983, p. 1292. The statement was read to reporters by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes.

Address by President Reagan Before the U.N. General Assembly, September 26, 1983 [1]

Thank you for granting me the honor of speaking today, on this first day of general debate in the 38th Session of the General Assembly. Once again I come before this body preoccupied with peace. Last year I stood in this chamber to address the Special Session on Disarmament. [2] Well, I've come today to renew my nation's commitment to peace. And I have come to discuss how we can keep faith with the dreams that created this organization.

The United Nations was founded in the aftermath of World War II to protect future generations from the scourge of war, to promote political self-determination and global prosperity, and to strengthen the bonds of civility among nations. The founders sought to replace a world at war with a world of civilized order. They hoped that a world of relentless conflict would give way to a new era, one where freedom from violence prevailed.

Whatever challenges the world was bound to face, the founders intended this body to stand for certain values, even if they could not be enforced, and to condemn violence, even if it could not be stopped. This body was to speak with the voice of moral authority. That was to be its greatest power.

But the awful truth is that the use of violence for political gain has become more, not less, widespread in the last decade. Events of recent weeks have presented new, unwelcome evidence of brutal disregard for life and truth. They have offered unwanted testimony on how divided and dangerous our world is, how quick the recourse to violence. What has happened to the dreams of the U.N.'s founders? What has happened to the spirit which created the United Nations?

The answer is clear: Governments got in the way of the dreams of the people. Dreams became issues of East versus West. Hopes became political rhetoric. Progress became a search for power and domination. Somewhere the truth was lost that people don't make wars, governments do.

And today in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the North Pacific, the weapons of war shatter the security of the peoples who live there, endanger the peace of neighbors, and create ever more arenas of confrontation between the great powers. During the past year alone, violent conflicts have occurred in the hills around Beirut, the deserts of Chad and the western Sahara, in the mountains of El Salvador, the streets of Suriname, the cities and countryside of Afghanistan, the borders of Kampuchea, and the battlefields of Iran and Iraq.

We cannot count on the instinct for survival to protect us against war. Despite all the wasted lives and hopes that war produces, it has remained a regular, if horribly costly, means by which nations have sought to settle their disputes or advance their goals. And the progress in weapons technology has far outstripped the progress toward peace. In modern times, a new, more terrifying element has entered into the calculations—nuclear weapons. A nuclear war cannot be won, and it must never be fought. I believe that if governments are determined to deter and prevent war, there will not be war.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 3, 1983, pp. 1325–1330.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 381–387.

Nothing is more in keeping with the spirit of the United Nations Charter than arms control. When I spoke before the Second Special Session on Disarmament, I affirmed the United States Government's commitment, and my personal commitment, to reduce nuclear arms and to negotiate in good faith toward that end. Today, I reaffirm those commitments.

The United States has already reduced the number of its nuclear weapons worldwide, and, while replacement of older weapons is unavoidable, we wish to negotiate arms reductions and to achieve significant, equitable, verifiable arms control agreements. And let me add, we must ensure that world security is not undermined by the further spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear nonproliferation must not be the forgotten element of the world's arms control agenda.

At the time of my last visit here, I expressed hope that a whole class of weapons systems, the longer range INF—intermediate nuclear forces—could be banned from the face of the Earth. I believe that to relieve the deep concern of peoples in both Europe and Asia, the time was ripe, for the first time in history, to resolve a security threat exclusively through arms control. I still believe the elimination of these weapons—the zero option—is the best, fairest, most practical solution to the problem. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union declined to accept the total elimination of this class of weapons.

When I was here last, I hoped that the critical Strategic Arms Reduction Talks would focus, and urgently so, on those systems that carry the greatest risk of nuclear war—the fast-flying, accurate, intercontinental ballistic missiles which pose a first-strike potential. I also hoped the negotiations could reduce by one-half the number of strategic missiles on each side and reduce their warheads by one-third. Again, I was disappointed when the Soviets declined to consider such deep cuts, and refused as well to concentrate on these most dangerous, destabilizing weapons.

Well, despite the rebuffs, the United States has not abandoned and will not abandon the search for meaningful arms control agreements. Last June, I proposed a new approach toward the START negotiations. We did not alter our objective of substantial reductions, but we recognized that there are a variety of ways to achieve this end. During the last round of Geneva talks, we presented a draft treaty which responded to a number of concerns raised by the Soviet Union. We will continue to build upon this initiative.

Similarly, in our negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, when the Soviet leaders adamantly refused to consider the total elimination of these weapons, the United States made a new offer. We proposed, as an interim solution, some equal number on both sides between zero and 572. We recommended the lowest possible level. Once again, the Soviets refused an equitable solution and proposed instead what might be called a "half zero option"—zero for us and many hundreds of warheads for them. And that's where things stand today, but I still haven't given up hope that the Soviet Union will enter into serious negotiations.

We are determined to spare no effort to achieve a sound, equitable, and verifiable agreement. And for this reason, I have given new instructions to Ambassador Nitze in Geneva, telling him to put forward a package of steps designed to advance the negotiations as rapidly as possible. These initiatives build on the interim framework the United States advanced last March and address concerns that the Soviets have raised at the bargaining table in the past.

Specifically, first, the United States proposes a new initiative on global limits. If the Soviet Union agrees to reductions and limits on a global basis, the United States for its part will not offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through U.S. deployments in Europe. We would, of course, retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere.

Second, the United States is prepared to be more flexible on the content of the current talks. The United States will consider mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles.

Third, the United States will address the mix of missiles that would result from reductions. In the context of reductions to equal levels, we are prepared to reduce the number of Pershing II ballistic missiles as well as ground-launched cruise missiles.

I have decided to put forward these important initiatives after full and extensive consultations with our allies, including personal correspondence I've had with the leaders of the NATO governments and Japan and frequent meetings of the NATO Special Consultative Group. I have also stayed in close touch with other concerned friends and allies. The door to an agreement is open. It is time for the Soviet Union to walk through it.

I want to make an unequivocal pledge to those gathered today in this world arena. The United States seeks and will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist. We're ready to be flexible in our approach, indeed, willing to compromise. We cannot, however, especially in light of recent events, compromise on the necessity of effective verification.

Reactions to the Korean airliner tragedy are a timely reminder of just how different the Soviets' concept of truth and international cooperation is from that of the rest of the world. Evidence abounds that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated with the

Soviet Union will be fulfilled. We negotiated the Helsinki Final Act,[3] but the promised freedoms have not been provided, and those in the Soviet Union who sought to monitor their fulfillment languish in prison. We negotiated a biological weapons convention, but deadly yellow rain and other toxic agents fall on Hmong villages and Afghan encampments. We have negotiated arms agreements, but the high level of Soviet encoding hides the information needed for their verification. A newly discovered radar facility and a new ICBM raise serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements already negotiated.

Peace cannot be served by pseudo arms control. We need reliable, reciprocal reductions. I call upon the Soviet Union today to reduce the tensions it has heaped on the world in the past few weeks and to show a firm commitment to peace by coming to the bargaining table with a new understanding of its obligations. I urge it to match our flexibility. If the Soviets sit down at the bargaining table seeking genuine arms reductions, there will be arms reductions. The governments of the West and their people will not be diverted by misinformation and threats. The time has come for the Soviet Union to show proof that it wants arms control in reality, not just in rhetoric.

Meaningful arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union would make our world less dangerous; so would a number of confidence-building steps we've already proposed to the Soviet Union.

Arms control requires a spirit beyond narrow national interests This spirit is a basic pillar on which the U.N. was founded. We seek a return to this spirit. A fundamental step would be a true nonalignment of the United Nations. This would signal a return to the true values of the charter, including the principle of universality. The members of the United Nations must be aligned on the side of justice rather than injustice, peace rather than aggression, human dignity rather than subjugation. Any other alignment is beneath the purpose of this great body and destructive of the harmony that it seeks. What harms the charter harms peace.

The founders of the U.N. expected that member nations would behave and vote as individuals, after they had weighed the merits of an issue—rather like a great, global town meeting. The emergence of blocs and the polarization of the U.N. undermine all that this organization initially valued.

We must remember that the nonaligned movement was founded to counter the development of blocs and to promote détente between them. Its founders spoke of the right of smaller countries not to become involved in others' disagreements. Since then, membership in the nonaligned movement has grown dramatically, but not all the new members have shared the founders' commitment of genuine nonalignment. Indeed, client governments of the Soviet Union, who have long since lost their independence, have flocked into the nonaligned movement, and, once inside, have worked against its true purpose. Pseudo nonalignment is no better than pseudo arms control.

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[3] For the arms control portion of the Final Act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp 304–308; the complete text is in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp 323 ff

The United States rejects as false and misleading the view of the world as divided between the empires of the East and West. We reject it on factual grounds. The United States does not head any bloc of subservient nations, nor do we desire to. What is called the West is a free alliance of governments, most of whom are democratic and all of whom greatly value their independence. What is called the East is an empire directed from the center which is Moscow.

The United States, today as in the past, is a champion of freedom and self-determination for all people. We welcome diversity; we support the right of all nations to define and pursue their national goals. We respect their decisions and their sovereignty, asking only that they respect the decisions and sovereignty of others. Just look at the world over the last 30 years and then decide for yourself whether the United States or the Soviet Union has pursued an expansionist policy.

Today, the United States contributes to peace by supporting collective efforts by the international community. We give our unwavering support to the peacekeeping efforts of this body, as well as other multilateral peacekeeping efforts around the world. The U.N. has a proud history of promoting conciliation and helping keep the peace. Today, U.N. peacekeeping forces or observers are present in Cyprus and Kashmir, on the Golan Heights and in Lebanon.

In addition to our encouragement of international diplomacy, the United States recognizes its responsibilities to use its own influence for peace. From the days when Theodore Roosevelt mediated the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, we have a long and honorable tradition of mediating or damping conflicts and promoting peaceful solutions. In Lebanon, we, along with France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, have worked for a cease-fire, for the withdrawal of all external forces, and for restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In Chad, we have joined others in supporting the recognized government in the face of external aggression. In Central America, as in southern Africa, we are seeking to discourage reliance upon force and to construct a framework for peaceful negotiations. We support a policy to disengage the major powers from Third World conflict.

The U.N. Charter gives an important role to regional organizations in the search for peace. The U.S. efforts in the cause of peace are only one expression of a spirit that also animates others in the world community. The Organization of American States was a pioneer in regional security efforts. In Central America, the members of the Contadora group are striving to lay a foundation for peaceful resolution of that region's problems. In East Asia, the Asian countries have built a framework for peaceful political and economic cooperation that has greatly strengthened the prospects for lasting peace in their region. In Africa, organizations such as the Economic Community of West

African States are being forged to provide practical structures in the struggle to realize Africa's potential.

From the beginning, our hope for the United Nations has been that it would reflect the international community at its best. The U.N. at its best can help us transcend fear and violence and can act as an enormous force for peace and prosperity. Working together, we can combat international lawlessness and promote human dignity. If the governments represented in this chamber want peace as genuinely as their peoples do, we shall find it. We can do so by reasserting the moral authority of the United Nations.

In recent weeks, the moral outrage of the world seems to have reawakened. Out of the billions of people who inhabit this planet, why, some might ask, should the death of several hundred shake the world so profoundly? Why should the death of a mother flying toward a reunion with her family or the death of a scholar heading toward new pursuits of knowledge matter so deeply? Why are nations who lost no citizens in the tragedy so angry?

The reason rests on our assumptions about civilized life and the search for peace. The confidence that allows a mother or a scholar to travel to Asia or Africa or Europe or anywhere else on this planet may be only a small victory in humanity's struggle for peace. Yet what is peace if not the sum of such small victories?

Each stride for peace and every small victory are important for the journey toward a larger and lasting peace. We have made progress. We've avoided another world war. We've seen an end to the traditional colonial era and the birth of a hundred newly sovereign nations. Even though development remains a formidable challenge, we've witnessed remarkable economic growth among the industrialized and the developing nations. The United Nations and its affiliates have made important contributions to the quality of life on this planet, such as directly saving countless lives through its refugee and emergency relief programs. These broad achievements, however, have been overshadowed by the problems that weigh so heavily upon us. The problems are old, but it is not too late to commit ourselves to a new beginning, a beginning fresh with the ideals of the U.N. Charter.

Today, at the beginning of this 38th Session, I solemnly pledge my nation to upholding the original ideals of the United Nations. Our goals are those that guide this very body. Our ends are the same as those of the U.N.'s founders, who sought to replace a world at war with one where the rule of law would prevail, where human rights were honored, where development would blossom, where conflict would give way to freedom from violence.

In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower made an observation on weaponry and deterrence in a letter to a publisher. He wrote: "When we get to the point, as we one day will, that both sides know that in any outbreak of general hostilities, regardless of the element of surprise, destruction will be both reciprocal and complete, possibly we will have sense enough to meet at the conference table with the understanding that the era of armaments has ended and the human race must conform its actions to this truth or die." He went on to say, ". . . we have already come to a point where safety cannot be assumed by arms alone . . . their usefulness becomes concentrated more and more in their characteristics as deterrents than in instruments with which to obtain victory. . . ."[3]

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, as we persevere in the search for a more secure world, we must do everything we can to let diplomacy triumph. Diplomacy, the most honorable of professions, can bring the most blessed of gifts, the gift of peace. If we succeed, the world will find an excitement and accomplishment in peace beyond that which could ever be imagined through violence and war.

I want to leave you today with a message I have often spoken about to the citizens of my own country, especially in times when I felt they were discouraged and unsure. I say it to you with as much hope and heart as I've said it to my own people. You have the right to dream great dreams. You have the right to seek a better world for your people. And all of us have the responsibility to work for that better world. And as caring, peaceful peoples, think what a powerful force for good we could be. Distinguished delegates, let us regain the dream the United Nations once dreamed.

Statement by Soviet President Andropov: Relations With the United States, September 28, 1983[1]

The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to make known to Soviet people, other peoples and all those who are responsible for shaping the policy of States its assessment of the course pursued in international affairs by the present United States Administration.

Briefly speaking, this is a militarist course which poses a grave threat to peace. Its essence is to try to ensure for the United States domineering positions in the world without reckoning with the interests of other States and peoples.

Precisely these aims are served by the unprecedented build-up of the United States military potential and large-scale programmes for the manufacture of weapons of all types—nuclear, chemical and conventional. Now it plans to spread the unrestricted arms race into outer space too.

The American military presence is being expanded under invented pretexts of all sorts thousands of kilometres from United States territory. Strongholds are being set up for direct armed interference in the affairs of other States, and for the use of American weapons against any country which rejects Washington's diktat. As a result, tension has grown all over the world—in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Central America.

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[3] Source not found.

[1] A/38/459, S/16017.

Other NATO countries are becoming increasingly involved in the implementation of all these dangerous plans of Washington. Moreover, efforts are being made to revive Japanese militarism and attach it to that bloc's military-political machine. When doing so, attempts are made to compel people to forget the lessons of history.

Peoples judge the policy of a Government first of all by its actions. That is why, when the United States President speaks grandiloquently from the United Nations rostrum about commitment to the cause of peace, self-determination and sovereignty of peoples, these mere declarations can convince no one.

Even if someone had any illusions as to the possibility of a turn for the better in the policy of the present American Administration, the latest developments have finally dispelled them. For the sake of its imperial ambitions, it goes so far that one begins to doubt whether Washington has any brakes at all preventing it from crossing the mark before which any sober-minded person must stop.

The sophisticated provocation, organized by United States special services with the use of a South Korean plane, is also an example of extreme adventurism in politics. We have elucidated the factual aspect of this action in a thorough and reliable manner. The guilt of its organizers, no matter how hard they may have dodged and no matter what false versions they may have put forward, has been proved.

The Soviet leadership has expressed regret over the loss of human lives resulting from that unprecedented, criminal subversion. It is on the conscience of those who would like to assume the right not to reckon with the sovereignty of States and inviolability of their borders, who master-minded and carried out the provocation, who literally the next day hastily pushed through Congress colossal military appropriations and are now rubbing their hands with pleasure.

Thus, the "humanism" of statesmen who are seeking to lay on others the blame for the death of the people aboard the plane is turning into new heaps of weapons of mass destruction—from MX missiles to nerve gas containers.

In their striving to justify in some way their dangerous, inhuman policies, the same people pile heaps of slander on the Soviet Union, on socialism as a social system, with the tone being set by the United States President himself. One must say bluntly—it is an unattractive sight when, with a view to smearing the Soviet people, leaders of such a country as the United States resort to what almost amounts to obscenities alternating with hypocritical preaching about morals and humanism.

The world knows well the worth of such moralizing. In Viet Nam, morality, as understood by leaders in Washington, was brought home with napalm and toxic agents; in Lebanon—it is being hammered in by salvoes of naval guns; in El Salvador—this morality is being imposed by genocide. And this list of crimes can be continued. So, we do have something to say about the moral aspect of United States policy as well: both by recalling history and by talking about the present time.

Now in Washington they are violating not only morality but also elementary norms of decency, showing disregard not only for statesmen and States, but also for the United Nations. The question arises: can the international organization, called upon to maintain peace and security, remain in a country where an outrageous militarist psychosis is imposed and the good name of the Organization is insulted?

Under cover of anti-communism, contenders for the role of rulers of the destinies of the world are seeking to impose the systems which they favour wherever they do not encounter a rebuff.

The concepts themselves, used in attempts to justify such a manner of actions, would not attract any attention if it were not for the fact that they are preached by leaders of a major Power, and not merely preached but practised.

The transfer of ideological contradictions to the sphere of inter-State relations has never benefited the one who resorted to it in external affairs. This is simply absurd and inadmissible at present, in the nuclear age. Transformation of the battle of ideas into military confrontation would be too costly for the whole of mankind.

But those who are blinded by anti-communism are not, probably, able to ponder on this. Starting with a scare about the "Soviet military threat", they have now proclaimed a "crusade" against socialism as a social system. Attempts are being made to convince people that there is no room for socialism in the world. But they do not specify, though, that they mean the world according to Washington.

But wishes and possibilities are far from being the same thing. No one will ever be able to reverse the course of history. The USSR and the other socialist countries will live and develop according to their laws—the laws of the most advanced social system.

The Soviet State has successfully overcome many trials, including severe ones, during the six and a half decades of its existence. Those who encroached on the integrity of our State, its independence and our system found themselves on the scrap-heap of history. It is high time that everybody to whom this applies understood that we shall be able to ensure the security of our country and the security of our friends and allies under any circumstances.

Soviet people can rest assured that our country's defence capability is maintained at such a level that it would not be advisable for anyone to stage a trial of strength.

For our part, we do not seek such a trial of strength. The very thought of this is alien to us. We do not dissociate the well-being of our people and the security of the Soviet State from the well-being and security of other peoples and other countries or, still less, contrast them. One should not look at the world in the nuclear age through the prism of narrow and selfish interests. Responsible statesmen have only one choice—to do everything possible to prevent nuclear catastrophe. Any other position is short-sighted, nay, suicidal.

The Soviet leadership does not hesitate about what line to follow in international affairs in the present critical situation as well. Our course remains aimed at preserving and strengthening peace, lessening tension, curbing the arms race and expanding and deepening co-operation between States. This is the unfailing will of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of all Soviet people. These are, we are convinced, also the aspirations of all peoples.

Of course, malicious attacks on the Soviet Union produce in us a natural feeling of indignation, but our nerves are strong and we do not base our policy on emotions. It rests on common sense, realism, and profound responsibility for the fate of the world.

We proceed from the premise that mankind is not doomed to destruction. The arms race can and must be terminated. Mankind deserves a better fate than living in a conflict-torn world, suffocating under the burden of deadly weapons.

By advancing far-reaching proposals on limitations and reductions of nuclear armaments, both strategic and medium-range in Europe, we show our concern not only for the security of the USSR and the States of the socialist community, but also for the security of all other countries.

As to United States policy, its growing militarization is manifested also in the unwillingness to conduct serious talks of any kind and to come to agreement on questions of curbing the arms race.

Soviet-American talks on a burning problem—the reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe—have been going on for two years now. The position of the Soviet side is directed at finding mutually acceptable solutions on a fair, just basis—solutions which do not infringe anyone's legitimate interests. At the same time, over these two years it has become clear that our partners in the Geneva talks are not at all there in order to reach an understanding. Their task is different—to play for time and then start the deployment in Western Europe of ballistic Pershing 2 and long-range cruise missiles. They do not even try to conceal this.

All they do is prattle about some flexibility of the United States at the Geneva talks. Another portion of such "flexibility" has just materialized. And the deception contained in it has become clear this time as well. To leave aside details, the essence of the so-called new move in the United States position, billed as "superb", boils down to a proposal to agree, as before, on how many Soviet medium-range missiles should be eliminated and how many new American missiles should be deployed in Europe in addition to the nuclear potential already possessed by NATO.

In brief, it is proposed that we should talk about how to help the NATO bloc to upset to its advantage the balance of medium-range nuclear systems in the European zone. And this move is presented brazenly as something new.

The operation of stationing these American nuclear missiles in Europe is seen from Washington's control room as simple in the extreme and supremely advantageous for the United States—advantageous at the expense of Europe. The European allies of the United States are regarded as hostages. This is a frank, but cynical policy. But here is what is not really clear: does this thought occur to those European political figures who, disregarding the interests of their peoples and the interests of peace, are helping to implement the ambitious militarist plans of the United States Administration?

There should be no room here for reticence. If, contrary to the will of the majority of people in Western European countries, American nuclear missiles appear on the European continent, this will be a step against peace taken as a matter of principle by the United States leaders and the leaders of other NATO countries who act in concert with them.

We do not see that the American side is truly willing to consider and solve the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments. In the American capital they are now busy launching the production of ever new systems of these armaments as well. They are to be followed shortly by types of weapons which may radically alter the notions of strategic stability and the very possibility of effective limitation and reduction of nuclear arms.

No one should mistake the Soviet Union's goodwill and desire to come to agreement for a sign of weakness. The Soviet Union will be able to make a proper response to any attempt to disrupt the existing military-strategic balance, and its words and deeds will not be at variance.

However, we are opposed in principle to competition in the production and stockpiling of weapons of mass annihilation. This is not our path. It cannot lead to a solution of any problem facing mankind: economic development of States, conservation of the environment, creation of at least elementary living conditions for people, their diet, health and education.

The release of the material resources senselessly wasted on the arms race, and the unfolding of the inexhaustible creative potentialities of man: this is what may unite people, this is what should determine the policy of States at the junction of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. To achieve all this, the forces of militarism must be checked, and the world must be prevented through concerted effort from sliding into an abyss.

All peoples, every inhabitant of our planet, should realize the imminent danger. Realize it in order to join efforts in the struggle for their own survival.

Mankind has not lost, nor can it lose its reason. This is forcefully demonstrated in the scope of the anti-missile, anti-war movement which has emerged in the European and other continents—a movement which draws people of different social, political, and religious affiliation.

All who today raise their voice against the senseless arms race and in defence of peace can be sure that the policy of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries is directed at attaining precisely these aims. The USSR wishes to live in peace with all countries, including the United States. It does not nurture aggressive plans, does not impose the arms race on anyone, and does not impose its social systems on anyone.

Our aspirations and strivings are embodied in concrete proposals aimed at achieving a decisive turn for the better in the international situation. The Soviet Union will continue to do everything possible to uphold peace on earth.

North Atlantic Council Statement: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, September 28, 1983 [1]

At its meeting today, the North Atlantic Council discussed the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the new U.S. initiatives announced by the President of the United States in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 26th September. [2] The Council warmly welcomed and strongly supported the efforts made by the United States to promote progress in the negotiations.

Like the interim solution announced in March, [3] these latest initiatives taken by the United States are the result of intensive and continuing consultations among allies participating in the Special Consultative Group. They represent additional significant steps designed to move the INF negotiations toward achievement of a balanced, equitable, and verifiable agreement before the end of the year and respond to concerns expressed by the Soviet Union. Allies concerned consider that these proposals are fully consistent with the criteria developed by NATO in the December 1979 two-track decision. [4] It is incumbent upon the Soviet Union to consider this offer with the utmost seriousness and to respond constructively.

The allies hope that, in the near future, a verifiable agreement providing for equality between the United States and the Soviet Union can be reached in Geneva. In the absence of concrete results, deployments will proceed in accordance with the original schedule as foreseen in the 1979 decision.

The Greek delegation reiterated its position as explained in previous statements. [5]

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 1983, p. 29.

[2] *Ante.*

[3] *Ante*, Mar. 31.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[5] E.g., in the minutes of the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group held in Vilamoura, Portugal on Mar. 22 and 23, 1983, and in the North Atlantic Council communique of June 10, *ante*.

Statement by the U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (Kennedy) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Nuclear Nonproliferation, September 30, 1983 [1]

I welcome the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the Administration's program for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It has been about a year since we have had an oversight hearing on this important issue before your committees. You have invited me to discuss a number of very significant topics, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the question of spare parts for the Tarapur reactors in India; recent discussions we have had with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Argentina, and Brazil; our plutonium use policy and the status of negotiations with the European Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan; the hexapartite safeguards agreement; and the impact of the Supreme Court's *Chadha* decision. These are very significant issues and I will attempt to cover each of them in this statement.

As you may recall, in a previous appearance before you, I outlined the responsibilities and organizational relationships in the nonproliferation area—relationships which were contemplated by the President and Secretary Shultz when nominating me as Ambassador at Large with responsibility for nonproliferation matters. In that role, I coordinate the efforts of the executive branch and act as the special representative of the Secretary and the President in discussions and negotiations with other countries on nonproliferation. I am pleased to note that over the past many months, these organizational relationships have worked well and have provided an increasingly cohesive approach to a complex, difficult, and vital task. In particular, I want to express my admiration and appreciation for the excellent work done by the staff in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs of the State Department and, indeed, by all of the various bureaus of the Department which contribute to a fully coordinated effort. I also want to note the effective contributions of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of Energy, and Department of Defense, which work together with us in support of the effort. They contributed greatly to the progress which we have made. And, of course, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continues its important export licensing role, as well as assisting other nations with their own nuclear regulation activities. Through this effective coordinated relationship, we have been able to focus attention on the problem of proliferation, as we believe the Congress had intended.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 1983, pp. 52–57. The subcommittee involved here was the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Governmental Processes.

All of our nonproliferation efforts, of course, are conducted under the guidelines provided by the President in his statement of July 16, 1981.[2] In that statement, the President laid out seven basic guidelines.

- The United States will seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective.
- The United States will strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by working to improve regional and global stability and to promote understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states.
- The United States will continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[3] and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (treaty of Tlatelolco)[4] by countries that have not accepted those treaties.
- The United States will view a material violation of these treaties or an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and U.S. bilateral relations and also view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapons state with grave concern.
- The United States will strongly support and continue to work with other nations to strengthen the IAEA to provide for an improved international safeguards regime.
- The United States will seek to work more effectively with other countries to forge agreement on measures for combatting the risks of proliferation.
- The United States will continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands, and to seek agreement on requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in a non-nuclear-weapons state as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment.

To these guidelines, I would like to add one additional concept which underlies our policy and which I have asserted in numerous fora—that is that the United States will never allow its nonproliferation objectives to be undercut for commercial gain. Our policy is to put in place the most effective nonproliferation regime which we, in combination with other concerned nations, can achieve.

I would now like first to bring you up to date on several important events which have taken place since we last met and then turn to the specific areas which you asked me to address.

Update on Recent Events

President Reagan's Comprehensive Safeguards Initiative. U.S. law requires IAEA safeguards on all existing nuclear activities in the recipient non-nuclear-weapons state as a condition for major U.S. nuclear exports. President Reagan has called upon all supplier states to require comprehensive safeguards for their own exports. Our objective must be the establishment of agreed norms which all suppliers will honor. We have pursued this objective through bilateral consultations in capitals and in a number of discussions in Washington. These discussions will continue.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 278–280.
[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[4] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

Additional Parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The United States strongly supports universal adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The Administration continues active diplomatic efforts to encourage countries not yet party to the treaty to ratify this central instrument of the international nonproliferation regime. During 1982 four additional states became parties—Papua New-Guinea, Nauru, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and Uganda. There are now more than 115 states which are parties to the NPT, making it the most widely accepted multilateral arms control agreement. We also are taking steps to encourage implementation of the treaty of Tlatelolco.

New Bilateral Agreements for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. As you know, Section 404 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978[5] requires that the United States seek to renegotiate agreements of cooperation under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. We have renegotiated our agreement with the IAEA, entered into force May 6, 1980;[6] Canada entered into force July 9, 1980; Australia entered into force January 16, 1981; and Colombia (not yet in force). We anticipate that revised agreements with Norway and Sweden will be submitted to the Congress in the near future. We have also concluded new agreements of cooperation with several nations—Morocco (entered into force May 16, 1981), Bangladesh (entered into force June 12, 1982), Peru (entered into force April 15, 1982), Indonesia (entered into force December 30, 1981), and Egypt (entered into force December 29, 1981).

Bilateral Consultations. During the past year, U.S. officials have consulted with more than a dozen countries in Europe, Latin America, and Asia on how to pursue more effectively our common goal of preventing proliferation. In these talks, we have paid specific attention to improving nuclear export controls, including the difficult task of controlling "dual-use" commodities—items which have both conventional and potential nuclear uses. These meetings have helped others to understand our policies and have contributed significantly to an improved nonproliferation regime.

Improvement of U.S. Nuclear Export Regulations. On February 4, 1983, the Department of Energy issued revised and strengthened regulations which serve to control the transfer of unclassified and unpublished nuclear technology, the "part 810" regulations.

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[5] *Ibid., 1978*, pp. 118–164.

[6] *Ibid., 1980*, pp. 3–5.

U.S. Reprocessing of Research Reactor Fuel. The Department of Energy extended through 1987 its policy of receiving and making financial settlement for U.S.-origin spent fuels from research reactors. This policy applies to highly enriched uranium fuels which raise proliferation concerns because of their potential use in nuclear explosives.

Implementation of Voluntary Safeguards Offer. The U.S. voluntary offer, made several years ago, to accept safeguards on civil nuclear facilities entered into force during 1980. Under this offer, four U.S. facilities were selected by the IAEA for the application of safeguards, and in 1982, the detailed arrangements under which they are now being safeguarded were brought into force. The most significant of these four is the Exxon fuel fabrication plant where valuable experience has been gained in the effective implementation of safeguards.

Nuclear Export Alerts. Steps to make it more difficult technically for a sensitive country to acquire particular equipment or materials in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability can buy time for other initiatives to reduce its motivations to acquire those weapons. The United States has worked in close and frequent consultation with other supplier states to shut off specific export transactions of proliferation concern. During the 1982 calendar year, approximately 100 such export alerts were pursued, and about 50 have been issued so far this year.

Assistance to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States in Spent Fuel Storage and Disposal. Under Section 223 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, a *Federal Register* notice has been published offering to augment U.S. international cooperative arrangements in the area of spent fuel storage and disposal. Non-nuclear-weapons states were contacted through diplomatic channels to solicit expressions of interest. The United States was the host for a major IAEA international conference on radioactive waste management in Seattle, Washington, in May 1983.

Emerging Suppliers. A potential problem which the Administration has begun to address is the expansion in the number of nations capable of exporting nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. Consultations with other nations have been directed toward alerting these new suppliers to the need for effective controls on their nuclear trade to assure that it is not misused for explosives developments, thereby undermining the current system of nuclear supplier guidelines.

Ratification of Physical Security Convention. President Reagan sought and obtained enactment of domestic legislation making certain acts involving nuclear materials serious Federal crimes. This law implements certain provisions in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.[7] In late 1982, the United States ratified this convention, a major step in dealing with threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. The Administration also remains committed in its efforts to work with other countries to assure the adequacy of physical security measures, especially where nuclear materials of U.S.-origin are involved.

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 129–138.

Chadha *Decision and the Legislative Veto.* Various provisions of the Atomic Energy Act as amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 have provided for a legislative veto by the Congress of Presidential determinations to permit nuclear exports. Basically these statutory provisions contain three distinct elements.

First, they establish very strict and specific standards which limit the export of nuclear items.

Second, they authorize the President to waive certain restrictions and permit exports if he makes certain findings. There are also requirements that such waivers and findings be reported to the Congress with specified waiting period before those actions may become effective.

The *third* was the legislative veto.

The Department of State made its position clear on this issue last July when Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam testified before this committee and at a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Secretary Dam testified that the Department of State considers that those standards and that waiver authority, as well as the statutory requirement of notification to Congress and the observance of a waiting period, continue to be valid.[8] We will continue to wait through the period during which the Congress, in the past, deliberated over its veto. During that time, the Congress may use its constitutional authority to enact new legislation if it chooses. The only provision that is invalid is the third, which permitted a legislative veto by concurrent resolution.

Secretary Dam emphasized last July, and I reiterate today, that neither the Department nor the Administration intends to take advantage of the situation created by the *Chadha* decision to take any action which would disturb the relationship of cooperation and collaboration we have developed with the Congress over the years in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. We intend to continue consulting regularly with the Congress and its committees and taking your counsel and advice into account in reaching important decisions. Our commitment to that spirit of cooperation is strengthened rather than diminished by the *Chadha* decision. As Secretary Dam said last July: "If anything, I believe *Chadha* will make the departments and agencies of the executive branch more, not less, conscious that they are accountable for their actions."

Spare Parts for the Tarapur Reactors in India

With regard to India's Tarapur atomic power station, the Government of India is seeking to obtain from the United States and other countries spare parts for the Tarapur reactors, which were designed and built by U.S. companies. India considers the continued operation of this facility, which is subject to IAEA safeguards, as vital to meet its electric power needs. The parts it seeks are important to furthering the safe operation of the plant. We are principally concerned with the health and safety of individuals working at the Tarapur facility and those living nearby.

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[8] *Ante,* July 28.

It was in these circumstances that Secretary Shultz informed the Government of India during his recent visit to New Delhi that the President would be prepared to take measures designed to ensure the availability from the United States of required parts that could not be supplied from other sources.

Notwithstanding the significant health and safety aspect involved, the steps which have been taken so far in this matter—and the steps we will take in the future—will be with full and careful attention to the nonproliferation considerations involved, both from the standpoint of our overall policy and that policy *vis-a-vis* India.

To date, we have not been able to determine whether all of the required parts will be available from non-U.S. sources. Discussions between India and potential non-U.S. suppliers are continuing.

Discussions With the People's Republic of China

Over the course of the last several years, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) has developed plans for an ambitious program for the installation of a substantial number of nuclear power stations in those areas of the country where coal and hydroelectric resources are not available. Those plans call for the importing of the initial plants and, at the same time, the acquisition of the technology and the facilities to permit China's industry to manufacture much of the equipment required for the later plants.

The Chinese authorities have expressed an interest in obtaining the services of experienced U.S. firms in implementing that program. Accordingly, since 1981, the possibility of a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as required by the Atomic Energy Act for significant exports of the kind that would be sought by the P.R.C., has been discussed with China. This Administration believes that, under appropriate conditions, such cooperation would be in the interest of the United States. Conclusion of an agreement for cooperation within the terms of the Atomic Energy Act would demonstrate the readiness of the United States to expand its relationship with the P.R.C. in areas of mutual interest and could lead to cooperation in other areas as well. It would also provide additional opportunities to encourage China to adopt nonproliferation policies, including those related to its exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies—policies which would be consistent with those which have been developed and adopted by the major suppliers.

The most recent discussions with the Chinese authorities took place in July, when a delegation visited Washington at the invitation of Secretary Shultz. In those discussions, nonproliferation matters were addressed extensively. Overall, good progress was made in clarifying the views of both sides. At that time, we were told that the P.R.C.

was considering joining the IAEA. Since then, Director General Blix has visited Beijing to discuss the P.R.C.'s interest in membership, and just recently its formal application has been submitted. We welcome this action by the P.R.C. as an indication of its intention to play a constructive role in nonproliferation and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Within the next few days, I will lead a delegation to Beijing to continue the discussions with the P.R.C. We will seek to confirm that we share the same basic principles regarding nonproliferation as a basis for further discussion of possible cooperation.

Bilateral Discussions With the Soviet Union

The United States and U.S.S.R. have held two rounds of bilateral meetings on a broad range of nonproliferation issues. The first session was in Washington December 15–17, 1982, and the second took place in Moscow June 14–16, 1983. I headed the U.S. delegation at both sessions, and the Soviet side was headed in December by Ivan Morozov, until recently Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, and in June by A. M. Petrosyants, Chairman of the State Committee. The talks during both rounds were frank and positive, with a very constructive exchange of views.

The discussions were divided into plenary and working group sessions. In the plenary, a wide range of issues was covered. These included prospects for strengthening the international nonproliferation regime, assuring the safe development of nuclear energy, and encouraging additional countries to sign and ratify the NPT and the newly established Convention for the Physical Security of Nuclear Materials. Discussions also took place on ways to strengthen the IAEA and on preparations for the third review conference for the NPT to be held in 1985.

Working groups held detailed discussions on specific issues, such as export controls, and multilateral issues, including the IAEA and its safeguards system.

The two sides agreed that the IAEA safeguards system was crucial to the success of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. They agreed to take steps to try to strengthen that system and also agreed that other IAEA-sponsored activities, such as the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and Technical Assistance and Cooperation activities, should also be strongly supported. The Soviets expressed support for the concept of comprehensive safeguards, as recently proposed by the President, but believe the policy cannot be effective until all major suppliers adopt it.

On export issues, it was clear that the United States and the Soviets share the view that meaningful controls over nuclear exports can make a significant contribution to achieving our nonproliferation goals. The need to ensure that controls evolve in respect to technological change and the spread of nuclear capabilities was dealt with in some detail. The Soviets also agreed with us that it will be important for emerging new suppliers to apply meaningful export controls and adopt standards equivalent to those in the current international nonproliferation regime.

The two rounds of discussions and the accompanying exchange of views with the Soviets on nonproliferation issues have made a useful contribution to our efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear explosives.

EURATOM and Japan Negotiations—Plutonium Use

Regarding the EURATOM and Japan negotiations on plutonium use, you may recall that in September 1982, I testified before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Process of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs on the policy decisions made by the President in June 1982 on these matters.[9] At that time, the President decided on a new approach to give our close allies in EURATOM and Japan a firmer and more predictable basis upon which to plan their vital energy programs, while at the same time furthering our nonproliferation objectives, including strengthened controls over civil plutonium.

At that time, I reported that the United States was offering Japan and the countries of EURATOM new, long-term arrangements for implementation of U.S. consent rights over the reprocessing and use of materials subject to our agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation. This advance, long-term approval would apply only to facilities and activities which we determine meet our strict statutory criteria. The United States would be prepared to state its intention to consent to other facilities and activities in these programs when we have sufficient information about them to make the necessary determinations under our law.

Finally, I noted that these offers were being made in the context of seeking new or amended peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with Japan and EURATOM and that the approvals would be valid only as long as the conditions provided in the agreement, including nonproliferation and statutory conditions, continued to be met. Our willingness to take these steps presumed a continuing strong commitment of these countries to our common nonproliferation efforts and to developing and implementing more effective controls over plutonium.

We have provided detailed proposals on this subject to the Government of Japan and in the last year have had seven negotiating sessions with the Japanese, in Washington and Tokyo, in an effort to reach agreement both on the long-term arrangement for plutonium use and on the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. I can report to you that we have made significant progress in a number of areas but that there are important matters that remain to be resolved as well. As the substance of these issues is under negotiation between the two governments, I cannot go into the details in open session. I can say, however, that both sides continue serious and intense efforts to find solutions and approaches that will permit them to reach agreement at an early date. As I have always done, I will keep the Congress briefed on significant developments.

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[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 609–616.

Progress with EURATOM is slower. This is understandable, since negotiations with EURATOM are complex by their nature, given the institutional arrangements that apply within the European Communities, and the need for the EC Commission to consult with member states. I can report that we provided the EC with details of our new proposals last spring. The EC Commission requested time to study those proposals and to consult informally with member states. This month we have just received a number of detailed questions concerning our proposals, and we would anticipate early talks with the commission to clarify our proposals and to agree on how to proceed thereafter.

Trigger List Upgrade

You have requested an update on our efforts to improve international guidelines for controlling exports which could be used for nuclear explosives development. As you know, there are two internationally agreed trigger lists adopted by nuclear suppliers in the mid-1970s to control their export activities. They are called "trigger lists" because the export of any listed item triggers the application of safeguards on that item. The first list is linked to the NPT which requires safeguards on items "especially designed or prepared" for the processing or production of fissionable material. This list is implemented through the 21-member NPT Exporters Committee—also called the Zangger committee, after its Swiss chairman. In addition to the Zangger list, there is a substantially identical trigger list not linked to the NPT but which was implemented through the informal nuclear suppliers' group—often referred to as the London group because it initially met in the United Kingdom.[10]

Both these lists have been extremely important for the effort to control sensitive nuclear exports to countries of proliferation risk. Over the past few years, however, it has become clear to us, and several other suppliers, that it would be useful to further refine and clarify the lists, in response to technological developments and the spread of nuclear capabilities to additional nations.

I am pleased to report that substantial progress has been made on this initiative. We have made a commitment to other participating governments that the detailed status of the negotiations would remain confidential until administrative arrangements can be completed. This will take a few months. I would be pleased to go into specifics with you or members of your staff in closed session; however, I can make a few comments in open session which give a general picture of our approach and the progress achieved so far.

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[10] For the latter list, see *ibid., 1978*, pp. 14–26.

We have decided to approach the trigger list upgrade on a technology-by-technology basis. We have begun the discussions of each process on a technical basis, with a small group of the key technology holders in that field. Once a technical consensus has been achieved on what refinements in the trigger list are necessary, the discussions have been expanded to other nations. The additional nations may not be centrally involved with the industrial applications of a particular technology, however; they may nonetheless be able to export certain items related to that process. Therefore, the participation of such nontechnology holders is important if the control regime is to be effective.

We began our efforts over a year ago with the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment process because of its sensitivity and the interest being shown in the process by nations of proliferation concern. After much effort, we are near final agreement on a revised trigger list for this technology. We are making good progress on other sensitive nuclear processes, but it will take sustained effort to achieve broad agreement on the range of technologies which must be considered.

In concluding my remarks on this subject I would like to emphasize two points.

First, we regard this important initiative as fully consistent with our nonproliferation obligations under Article III of the NPT and other commitments we have undertaken in the nuclear suppliers group. The group's guidelines recognize that periodic review and updating of the trigger lists may be necessary to assure that they remain effective. We are committed to this process of continuing review.

Second, implementing strict nonproliferation controls and revising them periodically is not an exercise in technology denial, as some have charged. If nuclear power is to play a role in meeting the world's energy needs, world public opinion must be assured that this technology will not be diverted from its intended peaceful purposes to explosives development. Our export control system plays a key role in providing that assurance. Therefore, all nations have a stake in a nonproliferation regime which clearly demonstrates that nuclear technology will not be misused, a regime which adjusts to meet changed circumstances—whether technical or political.

Hexapartite Safeguards Project

As you may know, we have recently concluded an important international effort to strengthen IAEA safeguards. In this effort, known as the hexapartite safeguards project, the countries which have developed gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology assisted the IAEA inspectorate—and the EURATOM inspectorate—in the development of a safeguards approach for enrichment plans using this new technology.

Several years ago several countries had developed gas centrifuge enrichment technology to the point where they began to build demonstration or commercial scale plants and, pursuant to their NPT obligations, make these plants available for IAEA safeguards. The IAEA at that time had no experience safeguarding gas centrifuge enrichment plants—or any other type of enrichment plant, all of which had been located in nuclear weapons states. At the urging of the United States, a special international project was established, comprising technical experts from the six countries that have this technology and from the safeguards inspectorates of the IAEA and EURATOM. During the next 2½ years, these experts developed a safeguards approach that provides effective safeguards while properly protecting the technology.

In April 1983, the project was concluded, and the six technology holders undertook, in an exchange of diplomatic notes in Vienna, to permit the implementation of international safeguards based on the limited frequency unannounced access approach at their existing and planned commercial gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. Four of the project participants have gas centrifuge enrichment plants in operation or under construction. The operating plants include the two URENCO facilities at Almelo in the Netherlands and at Capenhurst in the United Kingdom and the Japanese pilot plant at Ningyo Toge. In the United States, the Department of Energy's gas centrifuge enrichment plant is currently under construction and is expected to begin recycle operations in the summer of 1984, with actual production scheduled for late summer of 1985.

We understand that the facility attachment negotiations for the Dutch and Japanese plants will be begun in the near future. The United Kingdom has listed its Capenhurst plant as eligible for IAEA safeguards under the U.K. voluntary offer; the IAEA has selected this plant for safeguards, and facility attachment negotiations are also expected to begin in the near future.

For our part, following the exchange of notes, we immediately took steps to place our gas centrifuge enrichment plant on the list of facilities eligible for safeguards under the U.S. voluntary offer, as required by our commitment in that offer to make available for safeguards all U.S. facilities deemed not be of direct national security significance.[11] Following notification to Congress, the IAEA was informed that this plant was eligible for selection for safeguards, and the IAEA was invited to participate in a facility orientation visit to the plant. At the end of July, the IAEA formally selected the gas centrifuge enrichment plant for safeguards, and the first IAEA inspection was conducted in early August, as the first small quantity of nuclear material was brought onto the site. The IAEA team responsible for negotiating facility attachments for all gas centrifuge enrichment plants was given a special orientation briefing and tour of the facility at this time. Once plant construction is sufficiently advanced, we will provide the appropriate design information to the IAEA and initiate facility attachment negotiations. We expect to provide the design information sometime around the first of next year.

To summarize then, all the hexapartite safeguards project participants are currently engaged in the implementation of their respective undertakings, as made at the conclusion of the project. We fully expect that by the time that the facility attachment for our gas centrifuge enrichment plant is completed and enters into force, the other parties will have completed similar arrangements with respect to their existing gas centrifuge enrichment plants.

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[11] *Ibid. 1977*, pp. 738–775.

Reestablishing Dialogue—Brazil and Argentina

A key element in our nonproliferation efforts has been to reestablish or strengthen a dialogue on nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation matters with states where such dialogue may have languished. This effort is perhaps best exemplified in the cases of Brazil and Argentina. For several years our relations with these two countries in the nuclear area were severely strained. The export of nuclear fuel and facilities to these countries had been prohibited by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act unless full-scope safeguards were adopted and each country has indigenously developed nuclear facilities which have not been submitted to safeguards. Both countries have declined to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty, although both have signed, but not brought into force, the treaty of Tlatelolco.

We have stressed to both Brazil and Argentina the importance of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the benefits of full adherence to IAEA safeguards, and we have urged both countries to waive into force the treaty of Tlatelolco. We have urged both to strengthen their support for the IAEA and its safeguards programs. Meanwhile, we believe it important to carry on a dialogue on nuclear matters with those countries so that we can create a stronger sense of mutual confidence and an informed understanding of each other's nonproliferation concerns and objectives. In this respect, the Administration is looking to limited nuclear cooperation in the area of nuclear safety and waste management, consistent with the Atomic Energy Act, while engaging these countries in renewed discussions regarding our nonproliferation goals.

Our discussions with Brazil have taken place under the aegis of the U.S.-Brazil joint working group, which was established jointly by President Reagan and President Figueiredo, following President Reagan's trip to Brazil last winter. The working group was tasked with exploring bilateral problem areas and exploring new opportunities for cooperation. Five subgroups were established, one of which dealt with nuclear matters.

Last May, I led a U.S. delegation for the first meeting of the nuclear subgroup in Brasilia. At that time we outlined potential areas of nuclear cooperation and also had a full discussion of nonproliferation matters, including the importance of controls over nuclear exports and adherence to the treaty of Tlatelolco. Significantly, the Brazilian side stressed that by virtue of signing the treaty of Tlatelolco, Brazil considered itself legally and morally bound by its principles even though the treaty was not yet in force.

The U.S.-Brazil nuclear subgroup met again in Washington in August and agreed to pursue a number of areas of nuclear cooperation.

including nuclear safety, spent fuel and waste management, and reduced enrichment for research and test reactors. The meeting also afforded the opportunity to discuss President Reagan's initiatives on comprehensive safeguards and a series of nonproliferation and multilateral issues, including reducing politicization in the IAEA, the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply, and the prospects for an international plutonium storage regime.

We also discussed the U.S.-Brazil enrichment services contract. We have been unable to complete our side of the contract in the existing circumstances because we cannot export the enriched product to Brazil given the limits of the Nonproliferation Act. Accordingly, the United States and Brazil agreed that it would be in their mutual interest to suspend indefinitely the contract, as to which we had already suspended the first reload. We will continue discussions with Brazil concerning safeguards matters and would hope that a situation could be developed which would permit reinstating the fuel supply contract.

We believe that the working group meetings were highly successful and have led to a renewed spirit of cooperation between the United States and Brazil. For our part, we will be continuing these contracts, taking the opportunities to discuss with Brazil our nonproliferation concerns.

Argentina has presented a similar situation for many years. Our relations in the nuclear area have been strained, and it has been difficult to find opportunities to pursue our nonproliferation objectives with the Government of Argentina. For this reason, the Administration is also working to regain a dialogue with Argentina—a dialogue which would encompass renewed discussion of our nonproliferation goals, while at the same time we seek areas where the United States and Argentina can cooperate, within the limits of our law.

During my trip to South America last May, I had extensive discussions with Admiral Castro Madero, the President of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission. I stressed the importance of bringing into force the treaty of Tlatelolco, the necessity of strengthening IAEA safeguards, the desirability of comprehensive safeguards, the need for emerging nuclear suppliers, such as Argentina, to follow agreed rules of nuclear trade, and the need to support and strengthen the IAEA. As in the case of Brazil, we discussed possible areas of nuclear cooperation between the United States and Argentina.

Argentina has since followed up on our discussions and indicated an interest in pursuing cooperation in nuclear safety, waste management and spent fuel technical assistance, systems of accounting and control, reduced enrichment for research and test reactors, and laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges. Over the next few weeks, we will be examining these possibilities with a view to further talks during the IAEA general conference in October.

Again, I believe that our initiative toward a dialogue is proving productive. Our discussions were frank and cordial and, while differences of view are evident, our talks have shown that there is a considerable measure of agreement on the need for common efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

South Africa

South Africa is another country with which we are re-establishing a dialogue on nonproliferation matters. In the absence of South Africa's acceptance of full scope safeguards, the United States has not permitted the export of significant nuclear materials or equipment to South Africa since 1978. Unfortunately, over the same period our discussions with South Africa on nonproliferation matters had languished.

During the past year, we have revived our discussions with South Africa across a broad range of safeguards and nonproliferation matters, including adherence to comprehensive safeguards and the Nonproliferation Treaty, strengthening the IAEA safeguards regime, and requiring safeguards on all significant nuclear fuel and facilities placed in international commerce. We have also taken the opportunity to stress to the South Africans the benefits of placing their enrichment facilities under IAEA safeguards. At the same time, we have also discussed the possibility of resolving our differences on the existing uranium enrichment services contract between South Africa and the U.S. Department of Energy.

We believe that South Africa recognizes the importance of safeguards, as they might apply to their semicommercial enrichment facility. We also believe that South Africa understands the importance of safeguards on international nuclear commerce. As these discussions continue, I plan to keep the Congress fully and currently informed on any developments which may occur.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Since I last testified before the committee, a great deal has occurred in the International Atomic Energy Agency. As you are aware, we left last September's general conference in protest against the illegal rejection of the credentials of the Israeli delegation. Since then, we have been pleased that our message to the IAEA membership seems to have been heard and heeded. Our extensive consultations with many members demonstrated that the great majority agreed with us on the need to reduce politicization in the IAEA. Following an extensive reassessment of U.S. participation in the IAEA, the President approved the resumption of U.S. participation and agreed that the IAEA safeguards system performs a critical role for U.S. national security, nonproliferation, and peaceful nuclear cooperation interests. Significantly, both the February and June meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors were businesslike and devoid of excess rhetoric or divisive dispute.

Thus, we are encouraged that the majority of the membership appears to agree that (1) the IAEA is a useful and worthwhile organization, (2) that extraneous political posturing and actions which threaten to destroy the IAEA are counterproductive, and (3) it is time to concentrate on the main objectives of the IAEA—to spread the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards.

Nevertheless, I cannot claim that this year's general conference will be totally free from problems. We will continue, however, to take strong measures to protect Israel's rights of membership in the IAEA, to assert our view that the agency must act in accordance with the precepts of its statute and concentrate on its mandate to assure the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with safeguards to guard against its misuse.

Letter From the Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office (Conahan) to ACDA Director Adelman: Management of ACDA's Automatic Data Processing and Operations Analysis Functions, September 30, 1983[1]

Following our testimony in March 1983 before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee asked us to examine the (1) management of computer-based support functions, (2) adequacy of internal controls, and (3) management of arms control research programs, at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This report, which discusses weaknesses in ACDA's management of computer-based activities, is one in a series of three reports addressing issues raised by the Subcommittee.

ACDA has used automatic data processing (ADP) and operations analysis for more than 15 years. In 1977, ACDA replaced its Operations Analysis Division with an Office of Operations Analysis (OA). OA was responsible for performing quantitative and interdisciplinary studies, and reported directly to the Office of the Director. In 1979, in an effort to reduce its reliance on commercial timesharing services, the Agency acquired a Digital Equipment Corporation DEC-20 computer. At the end of fiscal year 1982, however, ACDA abolished OA (then located in ACDA's Rosslyn, Virginia, offices); transferred its analysts to other parts of the Agency and gave them new titles; and cancelled its contract for the DEC-20 computer. ACDA kept its small Wang computer (purchased in 1976) and purchases time-sharing services from other agencies.

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[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report to the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Need to Improve Management of ACDA's Automatic Data Processing and Operations Analysis Functions* (GAO/NSIAD-83-66, Sept. 30, 1983), pp. 1-3. For ACDA comments on this report, see the letter from ACDA Director Adelman to the Comptroller General (Bowsher), *ante*, Sept. 12.

During hearings on ACDA's authorization for fiscal years 1984 and 1985, the Congress expressed interest in ACDA's decision to abolish OA, and in whether any savings resulted. ACDA stated that OA was abolished, in part, to help cope with an estimated 7.9 percent fiscal year 1983 budget reduction imposed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).[2] ACDA has responded to a congressional inquiry regarding OA-related savings by claiming that over $1.3 million was saved in fiscal year 1983 by relocating ACDA's Rosslyn facility. However, we estimate that only about $683,000 in savings can be properly attributed to ACDA's actions regarding OA and computer support. (ACDA disagrees with our analysis of its claimed savings; see appendices IV and VI.)

Currently, ACDA does not adequately plan for or evaluate the use of ADP systems. Moreover, it is not complying with OMB guidance on computer security, although we are not aware of any loss of data. Considerable disagreement exists within the Agency concerning the adequacy of operations analysis capabilities to meet future needs, for which ACDA has not systematically planned. Further, ACDA has limited access to Department of Defense operations analysis resources.

To address these issues, we recommend that the Director, ACDA

—develop a comprehensive ADP planning process that requires top management involvement, well-supported justification of stated needs, and periodic feedback from users;

—implement an ADP cost accounting system which complies with OMB guidance;

—establish a computer security program which complies with OMB requirements; and

—periodically assess ACDA's operations analysis needs and capabilities, and determine what adjustments in allocated resources, organizational structures, and access to other agencies' resources are required to best meet identified needs.

We requested comments on this report from ACDA, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Defense. Subsequently, an OMB representative told us that, although OMB would not provide separate comments, it had concurred with the comments submitted by ACDA.

In his response to our draft report, ACDA's Director stated that parts of the report would be useful to ACDA as it continued to review its practices and procedures, and that he is initiating four reviews, covering (1) ADP planning procedures, (2) computer security, (3) ACDA's operations analysis needs, and (4) the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980. However, he did not comment on our recommendation that ACDA implement an ADP cost accounting system which complies with OMB guidance. We believe that ACDA should have such a system and the Director should include its requirements in the Agency's review of ADP management.

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[2] Initially, OMB reduced ACDA's budget by 7.9 percent. (Because a subsequent supplemental request for $564,000 was approved by the Congress, however, ACDA's fiscal year 1983 budget authority will actually be 4.5 percent less than in fiscal year 1982.) For comparison, the four largest agencies with international responsibilities (all of which are considerably larger than ACDA) received operating budget increases from OMB ranging from 1.5 to 42.1 percent. [Footnote in original.]

The Director stated his belief that certain sections of our draft report required clarification or correction, and he enclosed detailed comments. The Director's comments and our analysis are in appendix VI.

We received unofficial comments from a Department of Defense official indicating that the Department would have no substantive comment on our findings and recommendations.

A full discussion of our work is included in the appendices.

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As you know, 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of this report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the requestors; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; the cognizant congressional appropriation and authorization committees; and others upon request.

Letter From the Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office (Conahan) to ACDA Director Adelman: Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research and Management of the ACDA External Research Program [Extract], September 30, 1983 [1]

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ACDA needs to improve the operation of its external research [2] program and to fulfill its responsibilities for coordinating all Federal arms control and disarmament research or seek relief from them. The same or similar problems which we found were hindering the research program's efficient operation more than 3 years ago are still present.[3] For example, ACDA's external research program has no formal project selection criteria, little internal coordination, no routine review of available research listings to help avoid project duplication, and inadequate use of contractor evaluations. In addition, ACDA is not meeting its legislated responsibilities for (1) planning a program of arms control research, (2) advising other agencies on their research roles, (3) maintaining a continuing inventory of Federal activities related to research, and (4) submitting periodic schedules of activities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Appendix I provides more detail on these and other matters affecting ACDA's ability to fulfill its research mandate. The objectives and scope of our work and the methods we used are summarized in appendix II.

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[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report to the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: ACDA's Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research and Management of Its External Research Program Still Need Improvement* (GAO/NSIAD-83-67, Sept. 30, 1983), p. 2. For ACDA comments on this report, see the letter from ACDA Director Adelman to the Comptroller General (Bowsher), *ante*, Sept. 9.

[2] External research involves projects done for ACDA by others and does not include research done by its own staff. [Footnote in original.]

Recommendations

We recommend that the Director, ACDA, take several actions to better manage the external research program. Specifically, he should (1) establish criteria for developing and selecting proposed research projects, (2) require Project Officers to more comprehensively identify research related to proposed projects, (3) direct that contractor evaluations be properly completed and used, and (4) establish a system to determine the actual use made of ACDA research products. (See app. I, p. 11.)[4]

The Director should address ACDA's difficulties in meeting its Government-wide coordination responsibilities by (1) defining the scope of arms control research conducted by or for the Federal Government, (2) estimating the resources needed for effective coordination, and (3) determining whether ACDA will fulfill its Federal coordination role or seek relief from the requirements. (See app. I, p. 15.)[4]

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[3] Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research Program to be Improved" (ID-80-6, March 17, 1980). Appendix V is the digest from the report. [Footnote in original.]

[4] Not printed here.

Letter From the Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office (Conahan) to ACDA Director Adelman: ACDA Internal Controls, September 30, 1983 [1]

Following our testimony in March 1983 before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee asked us to examine certain aspects of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This report, which discusses internal controls and internal audit, is one in a series of three reports addressing issues raised by the Subcommittee.

Although relatively small, ACDA is an executive branch agency and, therefore, obligated to comply fully with the legislative and administrative requirements related to internal controls, including internal audit. Internal controls include the entire system of organization, policies, and procedures used in managing an agency's affairs. Such a system begins with delegated authority and planned operations, and continues through performance and internal reporting on performance. A well-designed system of control helps to ensure efficiency, economy, and achievement of planned results. It should be well-documented, effectively conveyed to all personnel, and reviewed by management on a continuing basis.

Our work focused on whether ACDA was complying with legislative and administrative directives on internal controls and internal audit. We found that, although ACDA has established many internal controls, it needs to implement important internal control requirements, including those related to internal audit coverage. Also, ACDA needs to address other management issues, such as resolving differences in assigned versus performed verification duties and thoroughly analyzing its authorizing legislation. The objective and scope of our work, and the methods we used are summarized in appendix I.

BACKGROUND

Since the early 1950s, executive branch agencies have been responsible for maintaining internal controls over operations, including internal audit. 31 U.S.C. 3512(a)(3) requires executive branch agencies to:

> . . . establish and maintain systems of accounting and internal controls that provide . . . effective control over, and accountability for, assets for which the agency is responsible, including appropriate internal audit. . . .

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[1] U.S. General Accounting Office. *Report to the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Need for Internal Control Improvements at ACDA, Including Adequate Internal Coverage* (GAO/NSIAD-83-68, Sept. 30, 1983), pp. 1-11.

Over the years, we have issued numerous publications to guide agencies in establishing and maintaining their internal control systems; and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-123 in October 1981, prescribing policies and standards to be followed by executive branch agencies in designing, installing and maintaining their internal control systems. In spite of these actions, numerous problems continued throughout the Government, dramatically demonstrating the need for better, more effective internal controls. Consequently, increased attention has been focused recently on improving controls over Government operations.

The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (31 U.S.C. 3512) directs renewed emphasis on the need to strengthen internal controls. Among other things, the Act requires that agencies' internal control systems be established in accordance with our standards; and be periodically evaluated and annually reported on by the heads of executive agencies in accordance with OMB guidelines. Of primary importance is executive agency awareness of weaknesses in existing controls and the identification of such weaknesses for corrective action.

ACDA NEEDS TO IMPLEMENT KEY INTERNAL CONTROL REQUIREMENTS

As a forerunner to the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982, OMB Circular A-123 identified many basic design features and standards for internal control systems. Their implementation would allow agencies to be in a better position to meet the requirements of the recent legislation. For example, design features such as adequate, written organizational documentation is important to receiving a favorable evaluation under OMB's evaluation guidelines.

When we started our review in April 1983, ACDA had not yet begun to implement A-123. As noted later in this report, our work disclosed problems with such basic internal controls as assigning and implementing organizational responsibilities. Consequently, we focused on A-123 implementation since problems in this area would adversely affect ACDA's ability to comply with the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982.

A-123 specifically directs that, among other things, each agency prepare an internal control directive which:

—sets out the frequency of internal control reviews;

—provides for a vulnerability assessment plan;

—establishes specific responsibilities for seeing that agency internal control systems are developed, maintained, evaluated, and improved as necessary in accordance with the internal control guidelines; and

—assigns responsibility for internal control to specific officials in each organizational component.

After our work began, ACDA started implementing certain aspects of the OMB guidance. For example, ACDA met with OMB officials concerning ACDA's planned program for compliance and

—established an Internal Control Committee to coordinate guidance, develop procedures for conducting reviews, and supervise review and assessment activity;

—assigned responsibility for internal control to key officials; and

—prepared an internal control plan.

Also, ACDA officials told us they planned to do vulnerability assessments and internal control reviews, and report their results to the Director.

ACDA HAS NOT HAD THE EXPANDED SCOPE INTERNAL AUDIT COVERAGE IT NEEDS

OMB Circular A-73 dated March 1978 "Audit of Federal Operations and Programs", revised June 20, 1983, was issued to promote audit practices, achieve more efficient use of audit staff, improve coordination of audits, and emphasize the need for early audit of new or substantially changed programs. Although the Circular applies to all executive branch agencies and includes all of their audit functions, ACDA has not implemented its provisions.

A-73 directs, among other things, that each agency

—establish procedures requiring periodic review of its programs and operations to determine coverage, frequency, and priority of audit required for each program;

—issue policies, plans, and procedures for the guidance of its auditors; and

—prepare an audit plan at least annually.

A-73 defines an audit as a systematic review or appraisal that determines and reports on various aspects of agency programs and operations. Further, A-73 requires the audit function to be conducted in accordance with the Comptroller General's *Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions,* and have sufficient scope to cover the following elements.

1. *Financial and compliance*—determine (1) whether financial statements present fairly the financial position and the results of financial operations in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and (2) whether laws and regulations that may have a material effect upon the financial statements have been properly implemented.

2. *Economy and efficiency*—determine (1) whether resources (such as personnel, property, space) are being managed and used economically and efficiently; (2) the causes of inefficiencies or uneconomical practices, and (3) whether laws and regulations concerning matters of economy and efficiency have been properly implemented.

3. *Program results*—determine whether (1) the desired results or benefits established by the legislature or other authorizing body are being achieved and (2) whether alternatives that might yield desired results at a lower cost have been considered.

Collectively, we believe the audit function with the above elements—known as expanded-scope auditing—can benefit executive agency management and improve internal controls over operation. Not every individual audit assignment has to include all these aspects, but should be tailored to meet management's needs. However, over time, management needs to have adequate expanded-scope coverage of its programs and activities.

ACDA's Internal audit coverage is inadequate

ACDA has no internal audit staff and its very limited internal audit coverage falls short of meeting the requirements of A-73. A small imprest fund and some research contracts have been audited for ACDA by other agencies. While the General Services Administration (GSA) occasionally audits aspects of ACDA financial transactions, these audits have a very limited scope and do not cover all of ACDA's internal controls.

With regard to A-73 and the internal audit function, ACDA reviewed the situation and after consultation with OMB staff, explained that:

> . . . In general, ACDA is covered by this circular [A-73].[2] However, the real question is to what extent OMB Circular A-73 is applicable to agencies with audit staffs. ACDA does not have an audit staff and, therefore, the provisions of Circular A-73 do not apply directly. . . . Previous managements of ACDA have historically decided that the Agency did not need an internal audit staff. We understand that this conclusion was made because the Agency is small and that the checks . . . [by] GSA . . . and audits by GAO and the independent audit agencies were adequate for the type of operations ACDA conducts and the size of the Agency's appropriation.

We disagree with this position for the following reasons:

—A-73 applies to *all* executive branch departments and agencies, including ACDA. If the existence of an audit staff was the key to A-73 applicability, any executive branch agency could make A-73 requirements inoperative by eliminating its internal audit function. Clearly, OMB did not intend this when it issued A-73 and would not tolerate such actions.

—ACDA officials advised us in January 1979 that ACDA planned to use an internal auditor, thus, recognizing the need to establish an internal audit function.

—ACDA can establish expanded-scope audit coverage without hiring staff. Adequate coverage can be acquired in a variety of ways, discussed later in this report.

Apart from technical compliance requirements, there are logical management benefits from adequate internal audit coverage. ACDA officials say that ACDA has operated for more than 20 years with minimum internal audit coverage and, believe there will be increased costs and limited benefits from expanding such coverage. We recognize that to establish adequate expanded-scope internal audit coverage would increase ACDA's costs, however, our current and past work in ACDA provides numerous illustrations of the potential benefits to be derived from adequate internal audit coverage. For example, the following situations are typical of those that could be addressed under expanded-scope audits of Agency programs and activities; however, none would be addressed under the type and level of internal audit coverage ACDA now obtains.

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[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

Seriously out-of-date policies and procedures in the official ACDA Manual and Instructions

Although ACDA has issued 26 Instructions and 61 Notices on administrative procedures since October 1981, most documentation governing the structure and operation of ACDA is outdated. The most recent update to the Manual was in 1978 and more than 60 percent of the Instructions we reviewed were in need of revision for more than 4 years. ACDA officials explained that this situation did not affect ACDA's ability to control its operations and resources. We were told most officials are aware of each others' responsibilities. However, functional statements of the responsibilities of organizational units have not been formally updated in the ACDA Manual even though a major reorganization occurred in October 1981. This matter relates to the instances described below, of inconsistencies between assigned and performed duties, of not preparing verification reports to the Congress, and of noncompliance with administrative requirements. ACDA officials told us that the Manual is going to be updated.

Differences in the duties assigned versus those performed

ACDA's statement of responsibility for arms control verification activities assigns them to the Bureau of Verification and Intelligence (VI). However, other bureaus are performing verification activities instead of VI. Specifically, ACDA's Assistant Director in charge of the Bureau stated that VI was not

—meeting all the responsibilities identified in VI functional statements,

—reviewing all the verification papers which other organizations in ACDA prepare, or

—attending high-level meetings on verification issues.

ACDA has said that steps are being taken to enhance VI's capability as the focal point for ACDA verification work.

ACDA's authorizing legislation needs to be more thoroughly studied

Laws passed by Congress are an important element of internal control since they authorize agencies to carry out the functions of government, and can establish the extent to which such functions are to be performed. A standard starting point for defining and assigning responsibilities for performing these functions within agencies is a thorough legislative study to determine what the law requires.

Although ACDA officials believe the Agency accomplishes all its required mandates, ACDA's General Counsel told us that comprehensive legislative analyses have not been done. The General Counsel could provide us with only two limited-scope analyses dealing with (1) ACDA's authority to participate in interagency groups and (2) the congressionally mandated title of the ACDA Assistant Directors. After our fieldwork was completed, we became aware of an additional analysis done in 1977 of ACDA's obligations under the then-new Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. This analysis was directed at the Director's responsibility for congressional reporting on the verifiability of arms control proposals and agreements.

Without thorough legislative analyses we do not believe ACDA has a defensible basis for concluding that it is meeting all of its required mandates. In our opinion, legislative analyses are important criteria for measuring agency resource utilization and performance. In commenting on a draft of this report, ACDA agreed to determine the need for additional legislative analyses.

Section 37 reporting to the Congress and noncompliance with administrative requirements

ACDA has not provided the Congress reports on the verifiability of significant arms control proposals, under Section 37(a)(1) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. § 2577(a)(1)). Reports for significant proposals have not been provided for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, and Intermediate Nuclear Forces. However, on two occasions a report has been submitted upon request, to a committee of Congress, in keeping with Section 37(a)(1): last year, a report was made to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and in 1979 on SALT II negotiations.

In recent years ACDA has not provided OMB with the arms control research reports required by Executive Order 11044,[3] nor had it implemented various OMB directives when our work began, such as:

—A-71 (Transmittal Memorandum Number 1) on "Security of Federal Automated Information Systems."

—A-73 on "Audit of Federal Operations and Programs."

—A-123 on "Internal Control Systems."

Past GAO work

Our past work yields further examples of the types of issues that can be developed under expanded-scope audits and brought to ACDA's management attention for corrective action. In our March 17, 1980, report, entitled "Coordination of Federal Arms Control Research Programs To Be Improved" (ID-80-6), we discussed inadequacies in Government-wide arms control research coordination in the sense of

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, pp. 788-791.

—ACDA's failure to implement required research coordination procedures and

—the uncertainties in the scope of research to be coordinated.

The report also pointed out that ACDA needed to improve management of its external research program.

More recently, in our January 25, 1983, report on "RECOVER: A Potentially Useful Technology for Nuclear Safeguards But Greater nternational Commitment Is Needed" (GAO/ID–83–9), we pointed out that

—the REmote COntinual VERification system, designed by ACDA and costing over $4.0 million through 1982, had an uncertain future;

—ACDA lacked in-house capability to develop the system; and

—the project was behind schedule by as much as 2 to 3 years.[4]

Additional examples of the value of expanded-scope internal audit coverage are provided in our companion reports on ACDA's computer-based support activities and its arms control research program. (See GAO/NSIAD–83–66 and 67.)[5]

VARIOUS APPROACHES TO OBTAIN INTERNAL AUDIT COVERAGE

ACDA must decide which type of arrangement would best ensure effective internal audit coverage in compliance with legal and administrative requirements. The usual way Federal agencies, even small ones like ACDA, provide coverage is to establish an organization and hire a staff. If ACDA does not elect to create a small, in-house audit staff, other approaches include:

—*Contracting with an Inspector General or GSA.* ACDA could contract with an inspector general organization in another Federal agency or with GSA, provided that the auditing personnel have the security clearances and access to the documents needed to conduct the audit.

—*Contracting with a non-Federal organization.* ACDA could contract with a non-Federal organization, such as a private consulting firm, to perform its internal audit function. This approach, however, could present difficulties when the expanded-scope audit activity requires access to classified information. Executive Order 12356 limits ACDA's ability to authorize access to classified information to anyone outside the executive branch except under conditions that ensure that the information will be given protection equivalent to that afforded within the executive agency.

The use of any alternative to an in-house organization does not eliminate or reduce ACDA's responsibility under A–73, A–123, and other internal control directives. For example, ACDA would still be responsible for (1) seeing that the audit group, whether in-house or under contract, met applicable audit standards, (2) developing the annual audit plan required by A–73, and (3) establishing and implementing other policies and procedures related to internal control, including internal audit.

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[4] *Ante.*

[5] *Ante,* Sept. 30, and *supra.*

In May 1983, ACDA officials met with GSA officials and others about obtaining expanded-scope audit coverage for ACDA activities; however, a final decision had not been made by the time we completed our audit work.

CONCLUSIONS

ACDA recognizes the need to comply with internal control requirements and has taken some actions. Much more remains to be done, however, regarding adequate internal audit coverage. We recognize that internal audit coverage will increase costs to the Agency but such coverage is an important internal control element. We have long advocated the benefits of effective internal audit to good management and the problems discussed in this report clearly illustrate situations which internal audit coverage—either in-house or under contract—could bring to management's attention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Director, ACDA:

—Establish an internal control system which is in accordance with legislative requirements and administrative directives.

—Establish internal audit coverage in accordance with the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 3512 and of OMB A-73, "Audit of Federal Operations and Programs."

—Correct the matters discussed in this report related to (1) updating the ACDA Manual and Instructions, (2) resolving the differences in assigned versus performed verification duties, (3) assessing all of ACDA's legislative authorities, and (4) preparing reports specified by Section 37(a)(1) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

We sent a draft of this report to ACDA and OMB for official comment. The official responsible for this area within OMB told us that ACDA would respond for both agencies.[6] In general, ACDA said it is acting on most of our recommendations, indicating, for example, that efforts to improve internal controls had begun; GSA would provide expanded-scope internal audit coverage; ACDA's General Counsel would review existing legislative analyses and recommend to the Director additional ones that may be appropriate; and VI's resources will be increased to enable it to perform assigned verification duties. ACDA believes that it has fulfilled its responsibilities under Section 37(a)(1) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. We comment on this as well as other parts of ACDA's response in our notes to appendix II.

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[6] For the ACDA response, see the letter from ACDA Director Adelman to the Comptroller General (Bowsher), *ante*, Sept. 1.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of this report, and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the requesters; Director, Office of Management and Budget; Administrator of General Services; the cognizant congressional appropriation and authorization committees; and others upon request.

Statement by the Soviet Permanent Representative (Troyanovsky) to the U.N. General Assembly [Extract], October 4, 1983 [1]

* * * * * * *

The countries of the socialist community have made the prevention of nuclear war the centrepiece of their foreign policy. Who among responsible leaders and sober minded, thinking people in general could fail to agree that this is the most urgent task of our time? There have already been so many speeches made on this subject, here in the United Nations and elsewhere, since the advent of nuclear weapons, but a solution has yet to be found. The degree of progress in limiting and reducing nuclear arms will largely determine the development of the international situation in the forthcoming period.

The present moment is particularly crucial, given the state of affairs with regard to the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe. The plans of the United States to deploy, under cover of the NATO decision, new nuclear missiles in some West European countries have long been poisoning the political atmosphere on that continent and beyond. The implementation of these plans would have an adverse effect on the entire European and international situation and would significantly exacerbate nuclear confrontation. We believe that plans and ideas with regard to what is to be done with nuclear weapons—both in their totality and as regards nuclear systems in Europe—should be reversed.

The Soviet Union has supported the most radical solution, that is, that all such nuclear systems, both medium-range and tactical, should be removed from Europe. This would really be the zero option. However, NATO has made it pointedly clear that its members are not ready to accept this.

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[1] A/38/PV.18, pp. 43–55.

We have proposed that the deployment of any new medium-range systems in Europe be cancelled and that all existing systems, both of the USSR and of NATO, be reduced by approximately two thirds; in other words, two thirds of the road towards totally ridding Europe of these weapons would have been covered.

Surely, it is quite clear what the Soviet Union is calling for in proposing this far-reaching step, which it is of course understood would not be the last word in the solution of this problem.

Why, then, has such a furore been created around the supposed desire of the USSR to gain the advantage in medium-range nuclear systems?

Why has it been concealed that the Soviet side is prepared, as has been repeatedly stated at the very highest level, not to have in Europe a single missile, a single aircraft or a single warhead in excess of what NATO countries would have?

Where is the objectivity in this approach? Any politician who claims to be objective is supposed to know at least the basic relevant facts and to make an honest assessment of them.

Recently the Soviet Union demonstrated once again its desire to reach agreement. Our initiative envisages that once a mutually acceptable agreement has been reached, including the renunciation by the United States of the deployment of new missiles in Europe, the USSR, while reducing its own medium-range missiles in the European part of our country to a level equal to the number of missiles possessed by Britain and France, would eliminate all the missiles affected by that reduction, including a considerable number of SS-20 missiles.

This renders totally groundless allegations that the USSR intends to retain the SS-20 missiles which are affected by the reduction, merely relocating them from Europe to the East.

Progress at the talks is being held up by the United States position, which in practice amounts to a demand for unilateral disarmament by the Soviet Union while the arsenals of medium-range nuclear weapons of the NATO countries would remain intact.

This position is merely disguised by talk about some flexibility on the part of the United States at the Geneva talks. Another instance of this so-called flexibility has just materialized, and the deception contained in it has become clear this time too. Yuri Andropov has stated that

> Leaving aside details, the essence of the so-called new move in the United States position, which is billed as a splendid move, comes down to the proposal to agree, as in the past, on by how many the Soviet medium-range missiles should be reduced and how many new American missiles should be deployed in Europe in addition to the nuclear potential already in the possession of NATO.
>
> In brief, what is being proposed to us is to talk on how to help the NATO bloc to disrupt to its own advantage the existing

> balance in medium-range nuclear systems in the European zone; and this move is presented unabashedly as something new.[2]

The unacceptability of such an approach is so obvious as to indicate only one thing: a persistent reluctance on the part of our negotiating partners to search for a solution based on equality and equal security and their intention to station their missiles on European soil at any cost.

Whether or not agreement is to be reached depends on the United States and on NATO as a whole. The current round of Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe is crucial in this sense.

If Washington's position remains just as unconstructive, if Washington goes so far as actually to deploy new United States missiles in Europe, then we of course will have to take countermeasures to preserve the balance of forces on both a European and a global scale.

It is to be hoped that Washington and other NATO capitals will ponder deeply over the existing situation and the grave consequences which would result from another twist in the spiral of the arms race.

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty States do not seek military superiority, but they will not allow anyone to acquire military superiority over them. They have been invariably advocating equality, and equality at the lowest possible level.

The USSR proposals in the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms are also based on the same approach. They call for, among other measures, a substantial reduction—a reduction by more than a quarter—of the total number of strategic delivery vehicles with a concurrent reduction to agreed equal limits of the aggregate number of nuclear weapons carried by these delivery vehicles. In our proposals we are motivated by an interest in strengthening the overall military strategic stability while strictly observing the principle of equality and equal security.

In the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons the United States has taken a one-sided approach. The position of the Washington Administration is actually aimed at promoting, rather than halting, the strategic arms race in areas where the United States sees advantages for itself.

The fatal consequences of a nuclear war are not to be regarded as fictional conjectures, and its flames would not spare a single country or people. This is the unanimous view of the most eminent scholars and competent military and civilian experts.

There is and can be no justification for any actions that push the world towards the abyss, or for doctrines and designs based on the admissibility of a nuclear war and the possibility of winning it.

Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Union proposes the inclusion in the agenda of this session of the United Nations General

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[2] *Ante*, Sept. 28, is a variant translation.

Assembly of an important and urgent item, entitled "Condemnation of nuclear war".

Such war must be condemned resolutely, unconditionally and for all time as the most hideous of crimes that can be committed against the peoples. We propose that States Members of the United Nations declare as criminal acts the formulation, enunciation, dissemination and propagating of political and military doctrines or concepts designed to substantiate the "legitimacy" of the first use of nuclear weapons and the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war in any circumstances.

The USSR is submitting a draft declaration on this point to the United Nations General Assembly for its consideration.[3] Its adoption would contribute to generating a political climate which would make more difficult the actions of those who are devising plans calling for the first use of nuclear weapons.

The approval of this declaration, following the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe,[4] adopted in 1981 on the initiative of the Soviet Union, would be a major move by the United Nations towards removing that threat.

The condemnation of nuclear war should be effectively backed up by practical steps to curb the nuclear arms race.

In this context a freeze on nuclear weapons by all States which possess them would be an extremely timely and truly tangible measure. The idea of such a freeze has been winning ever increasing support in the world—both in nuclear and non-nuclear countries.

Our country has already proposed some time ago, in the course of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, that both strategic weapons and medium-range weapons in Europe be immediately frozen for the duration of the negotiations.

Now the Soviet Union is submitting an urgent and important question, entitled "Nuclear arms freeze",[5] to this session of the United Nations General Assembly for its consideration.

Our proposal is for a cessation, under effective verification, of the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of both delivery vehicles and weapons, a renunciation of the deployment of new kinds and types of such weapons, the establishment of a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and of new kinds and types of delivery vehicles, and a halt in the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating arms.

A simultaneous quantitative and qualitative freeze on nuclear weapons by all nuclear Powers is the best way to achieve this goal. Our country is also prepared to agree that, initially, this be done by the

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[3] *Post*, Oct. 4.

[4] G.A. res. 36/100.

[5] *Post*, Oct. 4.

USSR and the United States on a bilateral basis as an example to other nuclear States.

Giving practical effect to this initiative would markedly raise the degree of trust among the nuclear weapon countries and would make it possible to move decisively towards breaking the vicious circle of the arms race. Moreover, this would also promote the reduction and, eventually, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We express the hope that Member States of the United Nations and, above all, the other nuclear Powers will take a responsible and constructive stand on our proposal and will support it.

The Soviet proposal entitled "On the completion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against Earth",[6] submitted to the current session for consideration, has been prompted by concern for preventing the militarization of outer space, an issue which is becoming extremely important. Positive action on this initiative which is a follow-up to our 1981 proposal made here at the United Nations for a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, would be in keeping with the urgent task of ensuring peaceful, and exclusively peaceful use of outer space in the interest of and for the benefit of all people. Specifically, the idea is to have a comprehensive ban on the testing and deployment in outer space of any space based weapons designed to destroy targets on earth, in airspace or outer space.

At the same time, provision is made for the complete renunciation of the development of new anti-satellite systems and the elimination of existing systems. If it would be of any help, we are also prepared to conduct separate talks on anti-satellite systems, including talks with the United States on a bilateral basis.

The obligation assumed by the USSR not to be the first to place any kind of anti-satellite weapons in outer space is yet a further manifestation of its desire to see the problem of such weapons solved in a radical way. This unilateral moratorium declared by our country is to last for as long as other States, in particular the USA, refrain from placing anti-satellite weapons of any kind in outer space.

The initiatives we are taking at this session of the United Nations General Assembly are a logical extension of our foreign policy based, as it is, on principle and of the undeniably peace oriented proposals that the Soviet Union has been putting forward in recent years.

Among the many other steps taken by the Soviet Union in the key areas of international affairs, I would like to single out the following:

—The obligation by the USSR not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.[7] If a similar obligation were to be assumed by all the nuclear Powers, this in practice would be tantamount to a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Our appeal for this remains in force.

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[6] *Ante*, Aug. 19.

[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 349–352.

—The proposal for a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.[8] This is consistent with the task of preventing the possibility of developing new kinds of nuclear weapons, and of consolidating the nonproliferation régime. The Committee on Disarmament should take measures as a matter of priority, with a view to producing the draft of such a treaty.

—The proposals for banning neutron weapons[9] as well as for preparing an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.[10]

These and other Soviet initiatives aimed at limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament deserve the most serious attention.

I would like to make special mention of the joint proposal of the socialist countries for a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the States of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance.[11] The obligation not to use weapons of any kind—nuclear or conventional—that is to say, not to use force in any shape or form, would help to dispel mutual fear and distrust. This initiative is gaining increasing prominence in European and world politics.

It has always been our view that the problem of security on the European continent should be treated with particular circumspection. It is precisely here in Europe that the two militarily most powerful groupings of States—the Warsaw Treaty and NATO—are facing each other. In view of all this, not a single move in Europe leading to the easing of tensions and the positive development of relations among States could be redundant or superfluous.

It is time to break the deadlock in the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe where the level of military confrontation is particularly high. The draft agreement submitted by the socialist countries in Vienna creates real conditions for narrowing the gap between the positions and for reaching agreement.

The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe which is scheduled for next January in Stockholm should play an important role in enhancing European and international security. The USSR to the extent it can, will seek to ensure that the work of the Conference is fruitful and lives up to the expectations placed in it by political circles and broad sectors of public opinion in European and other countries.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to preserving and expanding its diverse ties with the countries of Western Europe. We intend to continue to maintain relations with them along the lines traced by the Helsinki Final Act, in a spirit of trust and co-operation.

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[8] *Ante*, Feb. 16.

[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 167–168.

[10] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 373–381.

[11] *Ante*, Jan. 5.

The successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting of representatives of States participating in the European Conference is quite rightly viewed as an indication that the policy of détente which has been so beneficial for all the peoples of Europe still retains a great deal of vitality. Even though there has been a coolness in relations in the current international situation, this proves that despite considerable divergencies in their policies, States with different social systems are capable of solving together problems that are not at all easy to solve, and of searching for and finding areas of agreement. We would like to believe that appropriate conclusions will be drawn from this, and not only as regards Europe and relations among European States.

This November marks the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA. The whole history of Soviet-American relations makes it abundantly clear that whenever these two States have followed a course of mutual understanding and co-operation, it has been their peoples as well as universal peace and security that have gained thereby. It has been our invariable view that the maintenance of normal stable relations between the Soviet Union and the United States is in their mutual interest, and we are in favour of their overall improvement and peaceful co-operation.

It is not through any choice of ours that Soviet-American relations are currently marked by tensions which also affect the international situation. Today, the urgency of the problem of preventing the threat of war requires that each State be fully aware of the degree of its responsibility and to reaffirm, both in word and in deed, its commitment to the policy of peace. The Soviet Union is in favour of combining our efforts on the broadest possible basis in order to achieve this noble goal.

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Remarks by President Reagan: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, October 4, 1983 [1]

Ladies and gentlemen, later today Ambassador Ed Rowny and the other members of the START delegation will depart for Geneva for the opening of the fifth round of the strategic arms reduction talks. They'll carry with them a new set of instructions. From the first day of these negotiations our highest goal has been to achieve a stable balance at reduced levels of nuclear arsenals. We want to reduce the weapons of war, pure and simple.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 10, 1983, pp. 1387–1388. The President spoke to reporters assembled in the Rose Garden.

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All our efforts in both the START and the INF negotiations continue to be guided by that objective. Just this morning, I repeated this commitment to President Carstens of the Federal Republic of Germany. As I pledged to the United Nations, the United States will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist.[2] We want significant reductions, and that pledge stands.

In the last round of negotiations we proposed a number of new initiatives which were in harmony with the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces and which provided additional flexibility to our negotiations. Those initiatives supported our basic goals, and they also responded to a number of Soviet concerns.

I deeply regret that the Soviet Union has yet to give any significant response. Throughout the negotiating process it's the United States who's had to push, pull, probe, and prod in an effort to achieve any progress. The heartfelt desire shared by people everywhere for an historic agreement dramatically reducing nuclear weapons could and indeed will be achieved, provided one condition changes: The Soviet Government must start negotiating in good faith.

Now, let me emphasize that the United States has gone the extra mile. We've removed the dividing line between the two phases of our original proposal; everything is on the table. We're still most concerned about limits on the fast-flying, most dangerous systems, but we're also prepared to negotiate limits on bomber and air-launch cruise missile limits below SALT II levels. We've shown great flexibility in dealing with the destructive capability of ballistic missiles, including their throw-weight. We've also relaxed our limits on the number of ballistic missiles.

We've gone a very long way to address Soviet concerns, but the Soviets have yet to take their first meaningful step to address ours. Particularly in the INF talks, but also in START, they've been stonewalling our proposals. When we proposed confidence-building measures that could be agreed to right now, they said wait. Apparently they believe that time is on their side, that they can exploit one democracy against another, and that their uncompromising attitude and delay will ultimately win out.

Well, we'll prove them wrong. The diversity of our democracies is a source of strength, not weakness. From free discussion among free people comes unity and commitment. The sooner this is understood, the sooner we'll reach an agreement in the interests of both sides. We'll continue to press Moscow for an equitable, fair, and verifiable agreement.

When the START negotiations resume tomorrow, the United States delegation will again have sustained flexibility. Within the framework of the basic principles that have guided us throughout these negotiations, I am directing Ambassador Rowny to offer the following new initiatives. We're incorporating into START a series of build-down proposals. The United States will introduce a proposal for a mutual, guaranteed build-down, designed to encourage stabilizing systems. The proposal will include specific provisions for building down ballistic warheads and, concurrently, for addressing a parallel build-down on bombers.

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[2] *Ante*, Sept. 26.

To discuss these major new initiatives, we will also propose the establishment of a U.S.-Soviet build-down working group in the Geneva talks. On another front, and in our effort, again, to be absolutely as flexible as possible, we will be willing to explore ways to further limit the size and capability of air-launch cruise missile forces in exchange for reciprocal Soviet flexibility on items of concern to us.

We seek limits on the destructive capability of missiles and recognize that the Soviet Union would seek limits on bombers in return. There will have to be trade offs, and the United States is prepared to make them, so long as they result in a more stable balance of forces.

The Soviet Union should not doubt the bipartisan support for our efforts. During our review process I looked for ways to broaden America's bipartisan approach to our overall arms control effort. We've consulted with many Members of the Congress and again with the Commission headed by Brent Scowcroft. Their counsel has been invaluable, and I want to thank them for their tireless efforts and helpful advice.

A solid, national, bipartisan consensus, sustained from year to year and from administration to administration, is crucial if we are to keep America safe and secure and if we're to achieve successful arms reductions. Therefore, I've decided to take a number of new steps. Among these are to designate a member of the Scowcroft commission, James Woolsey, as a Member at Large to our START negotiations. These actions reflect America's democratic process at its best.

Ambassador Rowny, as you and your team depart for Geneva, you go with the certain knowledge that you're negotiating with the full support of the American people. Our bipartisan support is stronger than ever before, and you carry with you fair, equitable proposals that are in the interest of both nations and all humankind.

It's fitting today to repeat what I said last week. The door to an agreement is open. All the world is waiting for the Soviet Union to walk through. Should the Soviet leadership decide to join us now in our good faith effort, the fifth round of these negotiations will be the one in which, finally, a breakthrough was made, and finally the world began to breathe a bit easier.

So, to the entire START delegation, Ambassador Rowny, good luck and Godspeed.

Soviet Draft Declaration Submitted to the U.N. General Assembly: Condemnation of Nuclear War, October 4, 1983[1]

The General Assembly,

Expressing its alarm at the growing threat of nuclear war, which can lead to the destruction of civilization on earth,

Drawing the attention of all States and peoples to the conclusions arrived at by the most eminent scientists and military and civilian experts to the effect that it is impossible to limit the deadly consequences of nuclear war if it is ever begun and that in a nuclear war there can be no victors,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear catastrophe is the most profound aspiration of billions of people on earth,

1. *Resolutely, unconditionally and for all time condemns* nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right—the right to life;

2. *Declares* to be criminal acts the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to justify the "legitimacy" of the first use of nuclear weapons and in general the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war;

3. *Calls upon all States* to unite and redouble their efforts aimed at removing the threat of nuclear war, halting the nuclear arms race and reducing nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated.

Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the U.N. General Assembly: Nuclear Weapons Freeze, October 4, 1983[2]

The General Assembly,

Expressing its alarm that the continuing nuclear arms race seriously increases the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

Taking into account the great responsibility of nuclear States for the preservation of universal peace and the prevention of nuclear war,

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[1] A/38/243. The draft declaration was attached to a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Secretary-General. Ambassador Troyanovsky submitted the draft declaration to the General Assembly on the same day and the Soviet Delegation submitted substantially the same draft, but containing an additional fourth preambular paragraph (A/C.1/38/L.1), to the First Committee on Oct. 17. This version was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 38/75.

[2] A/38/244. The draft resolution was attached to a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Secretary-General. It was submitted to the General Assembly on the same day by Ambassador Troyanovsky, submitted to the First Committee on Oct. 17, and formally introduced in that Committee on Nov. 17 as A/C.1/38/L.2 (A/C.1/38/PV.33, pp. 37–39) along with A/C.1/38/L.1 *(supra)* by Ambassador Timerbaev. It was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 38/76.

Recalling its resolution 37/100 B, in which it expresses the firm conviction that at present the conditions are most propitious for a nuclear-weapon freeze,

1. *Urges* all nuclear-weapon States to proceed to freeze, under appropriate verification, all nuclear weapons in their possession both in quantitative and qualitative terms, namely:

—To cease the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons;

—Not to deploy nuclear weapons of new kinds and types;

—To establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems;

—To stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons;

2. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, to freeze, in the first place and simultaneously, their nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis by way of example to the other nuclear States;

3. *Believes* that all the other nuclear-weapon States should subsequently and as soon as possible freeze their nuclear weapons;

4. *Points to* the urgent need to intensify efforts aimed at the speedy achievement of agreements on substantial limitations and radical reductions of nuclear weapons with a view to their complete elimination as the ultimate goal.

Communique of the Non-Aligned Countries Ministers and Heads of Delegation to the Thirty-eighth Session of the U.N. General Assembly: Disarmament and International Security [Extract], October 7, 1983 [1]

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12. The resurgence of cold war animosities, which have been accompanied by the emergence of new power configurations, pose new and grave threats to global peace and security. Competition for spheres of influence and for expanding relations of domination and exploitation continue to be manifested in wider areas of the world. The arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, has escalated to unprecedented levels. There have been renewed efforts at deployment of military forces and the acquisition by great powers of various types of bases and other facilities in the various regions of the world; new chemical weapons and nuclear weapons with increased lethality and greater accuracy are being deployed; there

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[1] A/38/495, pp. 6–8.

is also the danger of the nuclear confrontation being spread to outer space and efforts are underway to develop and deploy anti-satellite space weapons. These developments not only undermine international security but in their total impact could lead to the increasing "conventionalisation" and legitimisation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear deterrence is unlike deterrence in the pre-nuclear age. Where the entire civilian populations of the world are held hostage to the strategic interests of one or other nuclear weapon States, such policies represent "nuclear terrorism" rather than deterrence.

13. The persistence of the arms race has produced high budgetary deficits in the industrialised world which have led to a cutback in economic aid to developing countries. Recessionary conditions in the developed world have reduced trade with developing countries, thus affecting the ability of these countries to reduce their high debt burden and aggravating their economic problems. Instability resulting from these conditions has increased the danger of intervention and interference by affluent and powerful States in the developing world thus further endangering international peace and security.

14. The Ministers and Heads of Delegation reiterated the conviction expressed at previous Non-aligned Conferences that international peace and security can only be ensured through general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, under effective international control. They stressed that urgent measures for disarmament should be negotiated within the framework and under the aegis of the United Nations. In this context, they called upon the Committee on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament to fulfil its mandate and adopt concrete measures of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. In order to prevent effectively the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should adopt urgent measures for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. The Ministers and Heads of Delegation called for an immediate prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapon States pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. They further called for a freeze on the production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons and rejected all theories and concepts pertaining to the possession of nuclear weapons and their use under any circumstances. They expressed serious concern that even the limited negotiations on arms reduction and disarmament which were already underway had been stalled and, in some instances, unilaterally suspended. The aggravation of the international situation, far from being a reason for suspension of important negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament should, in fact, justify their more intensive pursuit. The major nuclear weapon States were urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament with greater vigour and to keep the United Nations informed of the progress achieved in these negotiations.

15. The Ministers and Heads of Delegation also reiterated that the nuclear-weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. They recommended that negotiations should proceed without delay for the conclusion of an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to insure all non-nuclear-weapon States, without any discrimination, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They affirmed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure. The establishment of such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

16. Despite the urgent call of the international community, efforts for a comprehensive treaty banning the testing of all types of nuclear weapons in all environments for all time have so far failed to produce any result. The Ministers and Heads of Delegation called for an exercise of the political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States so as to facilitate the speedy finalisation of such a Treaty.

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Message From President Reagan to the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, October 10, 1983 [1]

Mr. President, Mr. Director General and delegates, I am delighted to join Secretary Hodel in greeting you once again as you attend the twenty-seventh General Conference of the IAEA.

The United States has always taken the position that the Agency has a singularly important role to play in fostering the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Most importantly, we are encouraged that most nations agree that the Agency should be able to function in a businesslike manner, that its predominantly technical and scientific orientation should be preserved, and that it be insulated, to the extent practicable, from divisive political debates or regional conflicts.

Similarly, we are very pleased that most IAEA members share our view both that the Agency is essential to the preservation of peace and stability in the world through its non-proliferation safeguards programme, and that nuclear energy is making a continued and increasing contribution to economic and social progress throughout the world.

The technical co-operation programme of the Agency is crucial to this continued progress and we ask others to join us in a rededication to the principles that have made the IAEA one of the most effective international bodies.

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[1] GC (XXVII)/OR.247, pp. 24–25.

It is vital that we continue our efforts to ensure that nuclear energy fulfils its promise to ease the burdens on mankind while continuing to protect the technologies involved against misuse.

We look forward to a new era of closer collaboration within the Agency and I send you my sincere best wishes and hopes for a successful meeting.

Record of the Statement by Secretary of Energy Hodel to the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, October 10, 1983 [1]

96. Mr. Hodel (United States of America) read out the following message to the Conference from President Reagan:

[The message is printed *supra*.]

97. At a time when the Agency was completing the first year of its second quarter-century of service to the world, he believed that Member States should take the opportunity of renewing their dedication to its principles, and of demonstrating again their willingness to work together to achieve its goals.

98. If the promise of nuclear energy was to be realized, nations had to resolve that the potential benefits would not be lost to them as a result of efforts to misuse scientific and technical developments. That meant that support had to be given to institutions that provided for effective international safeguards and gave meaning to the IAEA—namely, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [2] and regional treaties such as the Tlatelolco Treaty. [3] It also meant that nations had individually and collectively to accept responsibility both for reaffirming and strengthening their commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for guarding against its misuse.

99. For those reasons, President Reagan had committed the United States, and sought the commitment of others, to worldwide safeguards administered by the IAEA.

100. Since the founding of the IAEA, most of its Member States had proved that they were able to work together to develop an unprecedented international safeguards and inspection system. That system served as a foundation for the global non-proliferation regime, and provided a basis for civil nuclear co-operation throughout the world.

101. Together, the Agency's Members had launched numerous scientific meetings, conferences, symposia, and information and training programmes designed to enhance the peaceful uses and transfer of

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[1] GC (XXVII)/OR.247, pp. 24–34.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968,* pp. 461–465.

[3] *Ibid., 1967,* pp. 69–83.

nuclear technology. They had established guidelines and developed codes of practice to assist peaceful nuclear programmes throughout the world. They had conducted technical assistance programmes that had been the key factors in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear energy in the fields of power, agriculture, health and medicine served the developing nations in their striving for social and economic betterment.

102. Those had been impressive achievements, which had not happened by accident, but rather were a reflection of the statesmanship and spirit of co-operation that had long distinguished the activities of Member States and the Secretariat.

103. Common to most—if not all—IAEA Member States, regardless of their political persuasion, was the recognition that nuclear energy simply had to be treated differently from other technologies, and that man's basic survival as well as his ability to profit from the atom depended on an effective non-proliferation regime coupled with an imaginative approach towards international co-operation.

104. In the past, Governments had been guided by the common ideal of sharing the atom's potential bounty, together with a basic understanding that everything to do with the atom was a serious matter. Indeed, they had known then as they did now that the world's security depended on developing ways of securing the benefits of nuclear energy while protecting humanity against its destructive potential. While there had been political differences, in general they had been kept within bounds and had been subordinated to the need to do substantive work.

105. The United States was attending the Conference because the effective functioning of the Agency was of crucial importance to the entire world, and because it wanted to help it maintain the dedication and sense of purpose that was, and would continue to be, its greatest strength.

106. The Agency was also needed as a strong and vital organization because the world still had chronic and potentially devastating energy problems. It had had a respite from the shortages and price escalations of a few years earlier, but it had to be recognized that that was only a respite, and not a sign that the problems had disappeared. Everyone recognized the fragility of the world's energy supply systems and knew that in order for countries to maintain and accelerate their progress towards increased social and economic health, a reasonably priced, adequate and reliable supply of energy was essential.

107. Along with minimization of government interference in the market place, development of such a supply system was one of the key goals of United States energy policy, and he wished to mention one or two aspects of that policy of relevance to the work of the Agency.

108. An essential element of United States plans to develop an adequate and reliable energy supply was its efforts to diversify the sources of energy and to reduce dependence on unreliable sources. In that process, it would of necessity reduce its consumption of oil,

thereby making supplies available to nations that were heavily dependent on imported petroleum and reducing the pressures on world prices brought about by demand.

109. Although it considered that only a balanced approach to the problem of meeting energy needs would be successful, the United States believed that electricity was a particularly versatile and valuable form of energy and that, if the necessary energy supplies were to be available to the world, there had to be a steady growth in electricity generation. It was convinced that nuclear power was an essential part of energy supply. The United States had the world's largest nuclear power programme and, by 1990, the contribution of that programme would reach some 20 per cent of the country's installed electrical capacity. However, it also intended that fossil fuels, the various renewable energy sources, promising advanced technologies, and improvements in efficiency and conservation should play their roles in its energy supply scheme.

110. The United States Government knew that nuclear power would continue to play an important part in the world's energy supply system, one that was even more important than at present, when nuclear power supplied almost 200 000 MW(e), with nearly another 200 000 MW(e) of capacity under construction. His Government wanted to continue to play a substantial part in making sure that that rate of progress was maintained through its co-operation with and assistance to others.

111. It believed that the benefits of nuclear energy, for power and other peaceful purposes, had to be fully and fairly available to any country that had both the need and the capacity to utilize it and had demonstrated its understanding of the obligations that nuclear energy entailed.

112. That sharing of knowledge and experience was one of the key reasons for the existence of the IAEA. However, in order for such a sharing to take place, it was necessary to retain the co-operative spirit that was so important to the work of the organization.

113. During the past two years, major efforts had been made by the United States and others to restore the confidence and trust between suppliers and consumers that had so long distinguished international nuclear commerce.

114. It should be clear to all that the Reagan Administration had little enthusiasm for making unilateral changes in the conditions of export supply, and his Government was continuing to search for new ways to improve relations between it and its partners in co-operation, between the various parties to NPT, and between parties to NPT and those that were not party to the Treaty. He emphasized, however, that the United States viewed NPT and an effective international safeguards regime as being essential to the continued contribution of nuclear energy to the entire world.

115. It also recognized the nature of the original bargain that was the basis for NPT and considered, therefore, that so long as such co-

operation was consistent with the spirit and intent of the Treaty and so long as it fostered the goals of arms reduction, the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty had an obligation to co-operate with others to ensure that the benefits of nuclear energy would be made widely available.

116. It viewed the 1985 NPT Review Conference as an event of fundamental importance and looked forward to co-operating actively with other nations to make it a success. The common desire of every State for improvements in the non-proliferation regime, and for more effective technical assistance programmes, made that Conference important to all.

117. His Government wanted to ensure that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were further developed and it looked forward to the day when the atom was utilized solely for peaceful purposes.

118. In his statement, the Director General had discussed the possibility of increased international co-operation with regard to nuclear safety. The United States' Government welcomed that initiative and wished to encourage him to proceed with a further examination of his proposal. There were many questions that needed to be considered, and a careful examination of the proposal would make that possible.

119. Every State had an interest in nuclear safety throughout the world. That interest had been most recently examined by the International Nuclear Societies Group at a meeting in Vancouver, Canada. Their report had encouraged a consistent approach to nuclear safety so that nations pursuing peaceful nuclear activities could rely, if they so desired, on internationally developed recommendations concerning nuclear safety matters.

120. He hoped that the Director General would consider that matter further and develop a programme for a review by the Secretariat in conjunction with nuclear societies that could be considered by the IAEA's Scientific Advisory Committee and the Board of Governors.

121. The United States, for its part, was prepared to work diligently with nations in the developing world, both bilaterally and through the IAEA, to ensure that they could benefit from its experience in reactor development, operation and safety.

122. He wished to add that the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission had been especially active in co-operating with others in training, in providing technical advice, and in sharing in other ways the results of United States safety studies and his country's extensive experience in building and operating light-water reactors.

123. There was likely to be continued strong interest among nations in collaborating in the field of nuclear waste management. In the past year, the United States Congress had passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, which President Reagan had signed on 7 January, 1983. That important piece of legislation established a demanding schedule and a procedure for the financing, siting, licensing, and operation of geological repositories for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste. During the past nine months, the United States had

made significant progress in working with the relevant State authorities, Federal agencies, utilities and other interested parties in implementing the Act.

124. In 1982, his Government had also hosted the IAEA Conference on Radioactive Waste Management in Seattle, Washington. The United States intended, furthermore, to introduce a resolution at the present session of the General Conference on the subject of waste management, which he hoped would help to strengthen the Agency's work in that field.

125. He also noted that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act explicitly instructed both the United States Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to co-operate with non-nuclear-weapon States for technical assistance in the areas of spent fuel storage and disposal. Expressions of interest in such co-operative activities were being received.

126. Turning to some of the Agency's main programme areas and their importance to Member States, he said that it was unproductive to try to impose an artificial equality on resources provided for the IAEA safeguards system and those for Agency activities related to technical assistance. Similarly, it would be unrewarding for Member States to divide themselves into two factions, with one being interested mainly only in technical assistance and the other in safeguards. The fact was that both areas of endeavour were important to the national interests of all countries, and, although each must be viewed and judged on its own merits, both warranted the strong and balanced support of all. The Agency must be supported as a whole, not only in a particular aspect of its work.

127. It was hard to imagine what would become of the civilian nuclear world in the absence of IAEA safeguards. He suspected that, without them, international nuclear co-operation would be severely curtailed and that there would be a myriad of overlapping, competitive and confusing bilateral control arrangements. More broadly, the world would lose a vitally important international mechanism which, however imperfect, was crucial in helping to assure nations that their neighbours were acting responsibly and were not attempting to acquire the capacity to manufacture nuclear explosive devices. If there was a nuclear war on earth, no-one would be immune, regardless of where he lived or of the size or innocence of his country.

128. Thus, all shared a common self-interest in strengthening the global non-proliferation regime and in preserving the crucial role that IAEA safeguards played in that framework, and safeguards must be of concern to everyone. The whole world was a nuclear world, and it was vital that all Member States should unite their efforts to ensure that the IAEA safeguards system remained credible, that it was continuously subject to rigorous examination, and that the system maintained its technical credibility and kept pace with advances in nuclear technology.

129. In his message, President Reagan had mentioned the importance that the United States attached to insulating the Agency, to the extent practicable, from divisive political debates so that it could focus on the substantive issues so vital to the orderly, safe and productive use of nuclear energy. As he had stated, the United States had been encouraged by the fact that many other nations shared the same view. It was his profound hope that a new consensus might be evolving on that matter. Nations had come to realize how much was really at stake in endeavours to preserve a healthy and effective IAEA. All Members suffered when its operations were disrupted.

130. In the area of technical assistance, the IAEA had played a crucial role in assisting the developing nations. It was necessary to work harder to reduce the gap between needs and resources and, where applicable, to co-ordinate the Agency's activities with programmes of bilateral aid that might be carried out with either governmental or private resources.

131. As evidence of the continued importance that the United States attached to that activity, he announced that his Government had pledged $2,150,000 for fellowships and $1,800,000 for so-called "footnote [a]" projects in 1983, in addition to other in-kind and extra-budgetary assistance to the IAEA. That served once again to emphasize the United States' commitment to the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme, to NPT and to the special needs of the developing countries.

132. When considering what was at stake at the Conference, it should be recognized that many of the programmes now funded under the Regular Budget of the IAEA were of considerable relevance to the developing countries. The nuclear power, fuel cycle and safety programmes were fundamental to the role the IAEA played in helping to introduce and to expand nuclear power in an orderly and safe manner. In his view, the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme had been particularly effective and well received. It was obvious that a serious nuclear accident could have very far-reaching effects on the continued use of nuclear energy. Thus, the IAEA was playing a vital role when it assisted nations to acquire the capacity to deal with reactor safety issues in an effective manner.

133. Because of the urgency of the need for nuclear power in some nations, the important role that was already being played by other applications of nuclear energy in fields such as agriculture and the life sciences was often overlooked. Those were contributions of unquestionable benefit and importance to many countries. Radiation techniques were being used, or were being developed with IAEA support, to increase soil fertility and the efficiency of water use, to improve crop production through induced mutations, and to help control chronic pests such as the screw worm and the tsetse and the Mediterranean fruit flies.

134. In medicine and biology, radiation had long made invaluable contributions in both diagnosis and therapy, and wider applications of

such techniques as the sterilization of pharmaceuticals would make their mark in improving the world's health.

135. Thus, nuclear energy was providing new approaches to the problem of feeding the world. Advances in nuclear medicine were producing new and highly effective weapons in the common fight against disease. In those vitally important areas, the benefits of the atom were rapidly, although frequently without loud publicity, being spread throughout the world. Information on such IAEA programmes should be the subject of more vigourous dissemination work all over the world.

136. His delegation believed that the achievement of a truly effective international non-proliferation regime would very much depend on the active participation of all members of the international nuclear community. It particularly welcomed the announcement by the People's Republic of China that it intended to join the IAEA. That decision by the world's most populous country, a nation with a growing nuclear programme, was of great significance. The United States' Government looked forward to the time when the People's Republic of China joined the Agency, and to working with it in a co-operative and constructive manner.

137. In conclusion, the United States was optimistic about the future of the Agency and believed that Member States would be able to meet the challenges that lay ahead if they all worked together. It was to be expected that the vast majority of Members would fully respect the conventions that had enabled the Agency to achieve so much over the years.

138. Unfortunately, some non-nuclear-weapon States still stood apart from the majority and had either not foresworn nuclear explosives or had not submitted all of their civil nuclear programmes to IAEA safeguards. One of the main challenges over the next decade would be to deal effectively with the sense of insecurity and other factors that induced such nations to go their separate ways. That would be achieved only if all nations believed that they would be treated fairly and objectively in the conduct of IAEA matters and that their national self-interest would be satisfied rather than the reverse through full participation in the Agency. The United States would do what it could to make that possible.

139. Examination of the accomplishments of the past showed that there were ample grounds for optimism about the future. He had already commented upon the IAEA's achievements regarding nuclear energy and other beneficial uses of nuclear technology. It was also worth remembering that only two decades earlier people had been becoming more and more fatalistic about the prospect of further proliferation with many nations possessing nuclear weapons.

140. He believed that it was now clear that the vast majority of nations emphatically rejected the acquisition of nuclear explosives and were willing to co-operate constructively in reducing incentives to proliferation. His Government was, therefore, enthusiastic about the

opportunities for peaceful uses of the atom and about the future of the Agency, and it viewed the challenges the Agency faced as presenting exciting opportunities, as long as all were prepared to work together.

White House Statement: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, October 11, 1983 [4]

While threats to disrupt the Geneva talks have consistently been part of Soviet propaganda tactics designed to undercut support for planned U.S. INF deployments to Europe, the Soviets have not asked for a recess either in START or INF talks.

For our part the U.S. has made clear that we will stay at the negotiating table in Geneva. We will continue to work for progress, and if the deployment of Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles has to begin because we have not reached an agreement in the INF negotiations, we will remain at the negotiating table thereafter. In that event, if an equitable agreement to reduce or eliminate U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles can be reached, the U.S. stands ready to halt its deployments or reverse them.

I should point out that the U.S. has continued to negotiate with the Soviets despite the fact that Soviet deployment of SS-20's has continued unabated. Over 100 Soviet SS-20's with over 300 warheads have become operational since the negotiations began in November 1981.

Record of the Statement by the Chinese Representative (Wang Shu) to the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Admission of China to the Agency, October 11, 1983 [1]

24. Mr. Wang Shu (People's Republic of China) expressed his delegation's sincere gratitude to all the countries participating in the Conference for their unanimous support for the resolution concerning the admission of China into the IAEA. In particular, he thanked the Socialist Republic of Romania and 12 other countries which, back in 1971, had put forward at a meeting of the Board of Governors a draft resolution demanding the expulsion of Chiang Kai-Shek's representatives and the recognition of the representation of the People's Republic of China in the Agency. Lastly, he thanked the Director General for facilitating his country's admission into the Agency.

25. In its 26 years of existence, the Agency had made a great contribution to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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[4] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 17, 1983, p. 1419.

[1] GC (XXVII)/OR.249, pp. 7–9.

China therefore regarded it as an honour to be a Member of the Agency.

26. China had entered the nuclear arena way back in the 1950s. Thanks to the joint efforts of all the departments concerned, a relatively complete nuclear fuel cycle system had been evolved over the past 30 years, incorporating uranium ore prospecting, mining and processing, fuel-element production, reactor technology, spent-fuel reprocessing and radioactive waste management. In order to achieve the great strategic goals of Four Modernizations and quadruple its gross annual industrial and agricultural product, China was working hard to strengthen its transport and communication as well as energy sectors. While China was rich in hydro-electric power and coal resources, their uneven geographical distribution restricted their availability to the coastal areas, thus hampering the latter's industrial and economic development. China therefore needed to develop nuclear power as well. At present, preparations were under way for the construction of the first units of nuclear power plants in East and South China. In developing nuclear power plants, China was largely self-reliant, but at the same time it sincerely looked forward to co-operating extensively with other countries on the basis of mutual respect for the principles of sovereignty, equality, mutual benefit and non-interference in internal affairs. It was also prepared to share its experience with other countries and to learn, in turn, from their experience so as to contribute to the cause of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all countries. China was confident that it would benefit from the Agency's assistance and make its own contribution to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

27. China would accept the Statute of the Agency and duly meet its consequent obligations. Its membership did not imply, however, any change in its position regarding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[2] While remaining critical of the discriminatory nature of the Treaty, China respected the desire of a great many non-nuclear-weapon States not to test, use, manufacture, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. He solemnly declared that China neither stood for nor encouraged the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy involved various sensitive issues which should be dealt with cautiously. China had consistently taken a conscientious and responsible attitude towards such co-operation and would continue to do so after becoming a Member of the Agency. It would take account of the relevant provisions of the Statute, including safeguards provisions, in its future international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in its transfer of nuclear materials, technology and equipment. Since the latter was a sensitive area of co-operation, the adopting of certain necessary but appropriate measures by consensus would be understandable and acceptable to all the Members. However, China could

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

not condone any attempt to widen arbitrarily and unilaterally the scope of restrictions and controls ostensibly for the purpose of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Such a practice would hamper the world-wide development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the economic and scientific development of various countries and the peace and security of the world.

28. Taiwan had become a Member of the Agency and signed NPT by usurping China's name after the founding of New China. It was common knowledge that Taiwan was an integral part of the People's Republic of China and that the measures taken by the Taiwan authorities were absolutely illegal and null and void. The resolution entitled "Representation of China in the Agency", adopted by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 9 December 1971, also explicitly recognized "that the Government of the People's Republic of China" was "the only Government which had the right to represent China in the International Atomic Energy Agency" and requested "the Chairmen and the Director General to take all the actions" resulting from that resolution. China believed that the Agency would respect the above-mentioned resolution and China's consistent principled stand and take practical steps to rearrange its safeguard relationship with Taiwan in such a way as to make it non-governmental.

29. Upon becoming a Member of the Agency, China would strengthen its ties with Members of the Agency and strive to make the Agency's work more productive and to contribute to the expansion of its international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

30. The President thanked the representative of the People's Republic of China for his statement and suggested that further consideration of item 5 should be postponed until a report from the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole in respect of the Romanian proposal was available.

Communique of the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact Member States, October 14, 1983 [1]

The Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance held a regular meeting in Sofia on October 13 and 14, 1983.

The meeting was attended by: P. Mladenov, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; P. Varkonyi, minister of foreign affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic; H. Krolikowski, state secretary and first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the German Democratic Republic; S. Olszowski, minister of foreign affairs of the Polish People's Republic; S. Andrei, minister of foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania; A.A. Gromyko, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and B. Chnoupek, minister of foreign affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Oct. 14, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Oct. 14, 1983, vol. III, pp. BB1–BB6.

In the light of assessments and conclusions made in the Political Declaration of January 5, 1983, [2] adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states at a meeting in Prague, and in the joint statement of June 28, 1983, [3] adopted by the party and state leaders of seven socialist countries at a meeting in Moscow, the ministers discussed questions connected with the further development of the situation in Europe in the context of the general course of international events.

1. After pointing out that these events fully bear out the assessments and conclusions contained in the documents adopted by the Prague and Moscow summit meetings, the participants in the meeting expressed their governments' alarm and concern in connection with the fact that the situation has become ever more tense and dangerous.

Further steps are being undertaken to whip up the arms race, which is increasing the threat of nuclear catastrophe. As was pointed out in the joint statement issued in Moscow, the United States and some of its allies do not conceal themselves that their actions pursue the aim of gaining military superiority.

The imperialist policy of resorting to force and diktat, consolidating and redividing "the spheres of influence", and making direct use of military power against states and peoples is being toughened even further, old military conflicts are being kindled anew, and new seats of tension are being cultivated. Actions are being carried out to further heighten political confrontation, and attempts at external interference in the internal affairs of states are being stepped up. The positions of the military-industrial complex, of the most reactionary militarist forces are being strengthened, and military psychosis is being fomented.

Statements are being made which aim to put in question the territorial and political results of World War II and post-war development. More obstacles are erected to the attainment of accords on pressing international issues and to the development of equitable economic relations free of any discriminatory restrictions. The gap in the economic development of states is being widened, and the economic position of developing states is being worsened.

At the same time the participants in the meeting emphasised that the struggle by peoples, by all progressive and peace-loving forces to remove the threat of nuclear war, stop the arms race and ensure the development of all states in the conditions of peace and security and a consistent observance of the inter-state treaties and agreements determining the peaceful development of the situation in Europe and in the world is assuming an ever greater scope.

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[2] *Ante.*

[3] *Ante.*

Demands are mounting that relations between all states should be based on respect for independence and sovereignty, the non-use of force or the threat of force, the inviolability of borders, a peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and the other fundamental principles of inter-state relations.

After analysing the situation that is taking shape, the participants in the meeting stressed the special importance and urgency of the proposals and initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty member states towards averting nuclear war, carrying on and enhancing the process of detente, halting the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and launching disarmament, strengthening security and developing cooperation in Europe and the world as a whole. They expressed the determination of their states to make every effort to implement these proposals and initiatives.

2. The question of further efforts to prevent the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and ensure progress towards fully delivering the European Continent from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons held an especially important place at the meeting. When discussing it, the participants in the meeting proceeded from the fact that a fresh escalation of the nuclear arms race in Europe, if not forestalled, will inevitably lead to a sharp aggravation of the situation in the European Continent and in the whole world and increase the threat of nuclear war with catastrophic consequences to the peoples. In this connection they stressed the exceptional danger of intentions to begin the deployment in some West European NATO countries in the near future of new U.S. medium-range nuclear missile systems, for which practical preparations are already under way. In this context growing concern was voiced about the lack of progress at Geneva talks on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe.

It was declared once again at the meeting that the Warsaw Treaty member states are firmly in favour of an early accord at these talks, which have entered the decisive phase. Confirming their position on the substance of the matter, which was set forth in the joint statement adopted at the Moscow meeting on June 28, 1983, they believe that such an accord should provide for the renunciation of the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and for a corresponding reduction of the existing medium-range nuclear systems, with the reduced missiles to be scrapped, as was proposed by the Soviet Union. The accord on medium-range nuclear systems in Europe should be based on the principle of equality and equal security and should make for the stability of the strategic military situation and the balance of forces. This balance should rest, not on the buildup of nuclear arms, but on their reduction to ever lower levels.

The participants in the meeting expressed the conviction that there still is an opportunity for attaining an accord to meet the interests of the peoples at the Geneva talks. In this connection they pointed out that if agreement is not reached at the talks by year's end, it is essential that the talks should be continued with a view to reaching it in the conditions of the renunciation by the United States and its NATO allies of their schedule for deploying new medium-range nuclear missiles. In emphasising this, attention was called to the fact that the Soviet Union's readiness in these conditions to continue maintaining its unilateral freeze on the medium-range missile systems deployed in the European part of its territory and carry out the unilateral reduction of such systems, which was started at the same time as the introduction of the freeze, is an important contribution to creating pre-requisites for the talks' successful completion.

Departing from the exceptional significance of fending off the threat of nuclear confrontation in the European Continent, the Warsaw Treaty member states issued an urgent appeal to the NATO member states to concentrate every effort on ruling out the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and reducing medium-range nuclear systems on station in the continent. They also urged all other European states to assist in every way the removal of that threat and vigorously facilitate the success of the Geneva talks on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe. No opportunity should be missed for reaching agreement which meets the interests of all peoples.

The participants in the meeting pointed out that the broadly-based popular movements for peace are campaigning daringly, determinedly and consistently to thwart the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, ward off the threat of nuclear war, and bring about disarmament.

At the same time the participants in the meeting drew attention to the fact that those states, which would allow the stationing of new medium-range nuclear missiles in their territories, would assume grave responsibility before all peoples for the ensuing consequences for peace and tranquility in Europe, as this would precipitate another round of the nuclear arms race in the continent.

The states, which were represented at the meeting, are convinced that progress can be ensured also at Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting and reducing strategic arms, which have tremendous significance to peace and international security but have so far been making no headway. Provided the principle of equality and equal security will be strictly observed, mutually acceptable solutions can be found at these talks.

The ministers confirmed once again that their states never strove and do not strive for military superiority for themselves and reminded about the June 28, 1983 statement by member states of the Moscow meeting that they will never allow military superiority over themselves. The governments of NATO countries would make a serious mistake by underestimating the significance of that statement of socialist countries and refusing to give a positive answer to their call to promote the strengthening of peace and security on the basis of a balance of forces and at ever lower levels of armaments.

3. It was stressed at the meeting that in the Prague Political Declaration and then in other joint and individual statements the Warsaw Treaty member-states have set forth an alternative to nuclear catastrophe—a wide complex of proposals directed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war, ending the arms race, at disarmament and detente, including the proposals on direct talks with NATO member-countries on a number of important questions of peace and security in Europe.

The proposals of the Warsaw Treaty member-states have evoked a broad positive response in the political and public circles of many countries, especially in Europe.

When analysing, at the same time, the attitude of the governments of NATO countries to the proposals set forth by the participants in the Warsaw Treaty, the ministers noted in particular that these governments to this day have not yet sent a response to a proposal connected with a concrete and already close dateline—not to increase military spending starting with January 1, 1984 and then to go on to their practical mutual reduction, [4] this necessitating the prompt commencement of direct talks.

They stressed further the importance of getting at an earliest date a positive reaction to such proposals by the Warsaw Treaty member-states, which are urgent by their nature, as:

On the assumption by all nuclear powers, which have not yet done so, of the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear arms.

On the simultaneous freezing by all nuclear powers, first of all by the USSR and the United States, of their nuclear arms both quantitatively and qualitatively.

On the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

On the prohibition of the militarisation of outer space and the use of force in space and from space in respect to earth.

On Europe's deliverance from chemical weapons as a step towards their complete prohibitation and elimination on a global scale.

On ways of resolving the question of reducing armed forces and armaments in central Europe.

Expressing concern about the continued absence of positive reaction to these proposals, the states, represented at the meeting, remind those concerned that they are still looking forward to a constructive response to them.

This wholly concerns also the proposal for concluding a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty member states and the member states of the North Atlantic alliance, a treaty which will be open to all other states as well. Bearing in mind the nature of comments on this proposal, the participants in the meeting reiterated the readiness of their states to develop exchanges of opinions with the NATO member states and all other countries on its various aspects and to begin jointly discussing it in a businesslike manner. They expressed the conviction that in the current, complicated international situation it will be especially important to make progress towards a positive resolution of the issue of concluding the above treaty.

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[4] *Ante*, June 28.

Also reaffirmed at the meeting was the importance of creating nuclear-free zones in the north of Europe, the Balkans and other areas of the European Continent.

As always, the states, which are represented at the meeting, are open for contacts and dialogue on each of the proposals put forward by them. They are invariably ready to examine the proposals of other states aimed at averting the threat of nuclear war, at curbing and ending the arms race, at disarmament.

4. Conviction was stressed of the Warsaw Treaty member-states that even in a complex, aggravated international situation it is possible to find through talks a settlement of all problems in relations between states, if political will to that, a well-balanced and constructive approach and spirit of cooperation are displayed, if the vital interests of the peoples, the interests of peace and security are taken into consideration.

In this connection the states represented at the meeting are expressing gratification with the successful completion of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the states—participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

This success, achieved as a result of complex, difficult and long talks, is evidence of the vital force of the all-European process, which was started in Helsinki, and ensures its continuity on the solid basis of the Helsinki Final Act. The Warsaw Treaty member-states, which made their contribution to the success of the Madrid meeting, appear as convinced supporters of continuing and developing this process.

Determination was reaffirmed at the meeting of all states represented at it to implement—in the interests of developing detente and cooperation—the agreements reached at the Madrid meeting and expressed in the final document adopted by it. The implementation of these agreements requires, certainly, the efforts by all the states—participants in the meeting on European security and cooperation in strict accordance with the principles and provisions of the Final Act as a single whole.

The states represented at the meeting attach special significance to the agreement reached in Madrid to convene a conference on measures to build up confidence, security, and on disarmament in Europe, which is scheduled to open in Stockholm on January 17, 1984. They proceed from the premise that this conference is called upon to become an important factor in lessening tensions in the European Continent and reducing the threat of military confrontation, in achievement [of] [5] disarmament in Europe.

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[5] Brackets in the source text.

The importance was stressed that all the participants in the conference should make every effort for its success.

5. The participants in the meeting maintain that the debate on the fundamental issues of the world situation, which is currently underway at the 38th session of the U.N. General Assembly, is also indicative of the possibilities for overcoming the present dangerous stage in the development of international affairs. Manifest in that debate is the deep concern of the peoples about the heightening of international tensions.

Speeches at the U.N. General Assembly express the demand that all states should actively and with utmost responsibility contribute to further progress in eliminating the threat of nuclear war, putting an end to the arms race, especially of nuclear arms, and passing over to disarmament, settling interstate conflicts through negotiations, completely abolishing colonialism, neocolonialism and racism, developing equitable order.

This is precisely what is seen from the numerous statements at the session for carrying out specific measures to prevent nuclear war, putting an end to the nuclear arms race, for reducing nuclear arms and their scrapping. Resolute and unreserved condemnation of nuclear war forever as the gravest crime against humanity, as the crudest flouting of man's paramount right—the right to life would meet these aspirations.

A quantitative and qualitative freeze on nuclear weapons of all states possessing such weapons would go in the same direction of lessening the threat of nuclear war, a war which, as is generally admitted, would call in question the existence of civilization and the very life on earth. In this connection the participants in the meeting noted the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union that these commitments on a freeze should come into force above all for the USSR and the USA on a bilateral basis, and thus an example be shown for the implementation of similar steps, as soon as possible, by the other nuclear powers.

Indicative of the firm will of the peoples to a resolute elimination of all manifestations of the policy of force and threat of force are the speeches at the U.N. General Assembly by representatives of many states, which insist that the existing seats of war be liquidated and new ones be averted, an end be put to the imperialist policy of undeclared wars. In this connection the states represented at the meeting reaffirmed their solidarity with the peoples fighting for freedom and independence, for the right to decide independently the ways of their development in conditions of peace and without outside interference, whether it be in Asia, Africa or Latin America.

The states represented at the meeting also support the demands put forward at the session for the speediest start of global talks on the most important economic issues in accordance with the U.N. decisions on deepening cooperation between the developed and developing states, creating an atmosphere of trust in economic relations between states in the interests of development and progress of all peoples. They are convinced that ending of the arms race and passing over to disarmament would contribute to resolving many economic problems, which the countries of the world, including the developing states, face.

The meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Committee proceeded in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and comradely cooperation.

The next meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states has been scheduled to be held in Budapest in April 1984.

Resolution of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, October 14, 1983 [1]

The General Conference,

(a) *Having* considered agenda item 8,

(b) *Recalling* resolution GC(XXV)/RES/381 adopted by the General Conference on 26 September 1981, which, inter alia, expressed grave concern that Israel's military aggression against a safeguarded nuclear research facility has caused considerable damage to the safeguards regime and could seriously jeopardize the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

(c) *Taking note* of resolution A/RES/37/19 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 22 November 1982 which "considers that Israel's threat to repeat its armed attack against nuclear facilities, as well as any other attack against such facilities, constitutes, inter alia, a serious threat to the role and activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the development and further promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes",

(d) *Aware* that the promotion of application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the ensurance that these activities are not used to further any military purposes are the main objectives of the Agency as envisaged in the Statute,

(e) *Noting* that serious radiological effects would follow from an armed attack with conventional weapons on a nuclear installation,

(f) *Noting further* that radiological warfare could also in this manner be initiated through the use of conventional weapons,

1. *Notes* that statements made so far by Israel have not removed apprehension that its threat to repeat its armed attack against nuclear facilities, as well as any similar action against such facilities will continue to endanger the role and activities of the Agency, and other international instruments, in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and in safeguarding against further proliferation of nuclear weapons;

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[1] GC (XXVII)/RES/409.

2. *Urgently calls on* Israel to withdraw forthwith its threat to attack and destroy nuclear facilities in Iraq and in other countries;

3. *Decides* to withhold Agency research contracts to Israel, to discontinue the purchase of equipment and materials from Israel and to refrain from holding seminars, scientific and technical meetings in Israel if, by the next General Conference, Israel has not complied with paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

4. *Requests* the Director General to re-examine and report to the Board of Governors with respect to Israel on the Agency's research contracts, purchase of equipment and materials, and the holding of meetings outside Agency Headquarters;

5. *Calls* for the early consideration of the conclusion of an international agreement to prohibit military attacks on nuclear installations;

6. *Urges* Member States to initiate or support actions in the proper international fora with the aim to prohibit military attacks against "civilian" nuclear installations since such attacks could result in the release of dangerous forces and could be tantamount to an attack by nuclear weapons;

7. *Reaffirms* the right of Iraq and all other developing countries in exercising their right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and for their development programmes;

8. *Considers* that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel, and urges the Security Council to take the appropriate measures in accordance with its resolution 487 of 19 June 1981;[2]

9. *Requests* the Director General to prepare a report on the consequences of an armed attack on peaceful nuclear installations and the threats thereof on the Agency safeguards system and the peaceful applications of atomic energy; and to submit this report to the twenty-eighth regular session of the General Conference; and

10. *Further requests* the Director General to report to the twenty-eighth regular session of the General Conference on the implementation of the present resolution.

Statement by the Prime Ministers of the Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [Extract], October 20, 1983[1]

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The arms race has already attained unprecedented proportions. The USA and some of its allies make no secret of the fact that they are seeking military superiority. Steps are being taken in an attempt to aggravate the political confrontation even further. The positions of the military-industrial complex, of the most reactionary militarist forces are growing stronger. A war psychosis is being whipped up.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 227-228.

[1] A/38/537, Annex II. The Council members are as follows: Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, Czechoslovakia. The session, the Council's 37th, was held Oct. 18-20, in the GDR sector of Berlin.

Particularly dangerous is the intention to go ahead shortly with the actual deployment of new American medium-range missiles if [*in*] a number of West European countries.

For this reason the Prime Ministers turn to the Governments of all States in Europe and in the world at large to draw their attention to the disastrous consequences which the continuation of this course would entail. It would underline [*undermine*] European and world peace, increase the threat of a nuclear inferno and seriously impair the economic and social situation of all mankind. International economic relations would come under severe strain. The reasons are as follows.

First, the renewed escalation of the arms race would lead to another substantial increase in national arms spending and tie up even more material and intellectual resources for non-productive purposes to the detriment of the living standards of the people. The economic problems facing many countries in the world would become even greater, and new obstacles would be put in the way of their resolution.

Second, inflation and unemployment would mount in many countries. This would have negative effects on the situation of the mass of the working people.

Third, the accelerated pace of the arms race would reduce the potential for giving effective aid to the developing countries in which three quarters of mankind live. They would encounter far greater obstacles in their socioeconomic development than those they have to contend with even now. These are the grim realities.

Fourth, prospects for a New International Economic Order would greatly deteriorate if international tensions were to rise further and the danger of nuclear war was to increase. The distortion and instability of international economic relations would be aggravated to the detriment of all nations. The Prime Ministers express the readiness of their respective countries to cooperate with all States in Europe and the world at large, with all peace-loving forces to prevent a further escalation of the arms race.

This is the paramount task of our day. Therefore, broadly based mass movements are making a courageous and determined effort to remove the danger of nuclear war and to bring about disarmament. All endeavours must be geared to these aims. This is the only way to truly beneficial development for all nations and for the whole human race.

The Prime Ministers underline the relevance of the wideranging initiatives contained in the political declaration issued by the Warsaw Treaty States in Prague on 5 January 1983 [2] and the Joint Statement made by the Leaders of the Parties and States of seven Socialist Countries in Moscow on 28 June 1983. [3] These proposals are designed to eliminate the danger of nuclear war, to end the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, and to achieve disarmament and detente. They declare that the policies of the socialist countries are geared to this end and that this will remain so. At the same time, they are prepared to examine other countries' proposals which reflect the interests of peace and international security.

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[2] *Ante.*

[3] *Ante.*

The Prime Ministers urgently appeal to the USA and the other NATO States to seriously weigh up the dangerous consequences which the deployment of new nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe would entail and to work towards an agreement meeting the interests of peace in Europe and in the world at large. Such an agreement must provide for the renunciation of the deployment of new nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe and a corresponding reduction of existing medium-range nuclear weapons, with the missiles covered by the reduction being destroyed, as proposed by the Soviet Union. This agreement must be based on the principle of equality and equal security, promote the stability of the military-strategic situation and preserve the balance of forces.

The Prime Ministers express their hope that the other European States will also contribute to the success of the Geneva Talks on the Limitation of Nuclear Arms in Europe. They are convinced that the chance of coming to an agreement at the Geneva Talks still exists. However, if no accord has been reached by the end of the year, the talks must be continued in the interests of securing an agreement. This, however, presupposes that the USA and its NATO allies dispense with the deadlines they have set for the development of new nuclear medium-range missiles. Under these conditions the Soviet Union is prepared to continue to abide by its unilateral moratorium on the medium-range missiles deployed in the European part of its territory and to continue the unilateral reduction of these weapons begun in that way. The Prime Ministers emphasize that the Soviet Union is thereby making an important contribution to paving the way for a successful conclusion of the talks. Common sense must prevail. The decision must fall in favour of world peace, security and international cooperation.

Statement by ACDA Director Adelman to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, October 20, 1983 [1]

It is a real pleasure to be here today. Looking around this chamber, as I have, I see many colleagues with whom I have enjoyed immensely working in the past, over the past two years. It is a good feeling to come back to such familiar ground, especially as in my new position I look back to my United Nations days in general and to the First Committee meetings in particular with a special fondness. I am especially pleased that a dear personal friend, Ambassador Tom Vraalsen, has assumed the chairmanship of this important Committee.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.7, pp. 16–30.

The First Committee is, as we all know, confronted with many critical security and arms control issues. Resolving those issues is the major challenge of our times if we are to help make the world a safer place for succeeding generations in the place that we inherited from previous generations. Our task is nothing short of doing everything in our power to ensure that all people may realize their potential in a world that offers them security and freedom.

Last year in this same forum, my predecessor and my friend, Gene Rostow, called for a change in the climate of world opinion. He appealed for a demonstration of universal goodwill, for the exercise of the powers of reason and for all nations to heed the words and to follow the spirit of the United Nations Charter. [2]

I wish that I could tell Gene Rostow today, and that I could tell everybody in this chamber today, that all nations had heeded those calls. But I cannot. The continuing troubles in the Middle East have been of grave concern to my Government and to the Governments of many other representatives sitting in this room. We see continuing aggression in Afghanistan and wars in the Near East, South-East Asia and Africa. We see attempts to foster conflict in Central America, in particular to destabilize the duly-elected Government in El Salvador. The Korean airliner tragedy underlines the different standards that exist and that run counter to what is right for the family of nations.

My purpose here is not to belabour the troubles which separate this body, but to try to focus on a better future. The United States is dedicated to that goal. When President Reagan stood before the General Assembly just a few weeks ago on 26 September he reaffirmed the United States Government's commitment, and his personal commitment, to reducing nuclear arms. He made an unequivocal pledge to those gathered in the General Assembly, saying that:

> The United States seeks and will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist. We are ready to be flexible in our approach—indeed, willing to compromise. [3] *(A/38/PV.5, p. 7)*

I take this opportunity to reinforce that pledge made by President Reagan.

The United States is embarked on one of the most ambitious arms control agendas ever. That fact often is insufficiently understood and is sometimes, if not often, misrepresented.

Our goal is, pure and simple, to enhance stability by significant nuclear arms reductions. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

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[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 764–775.

[3] *Ante.*

(START) we have repeatedly demonstrated flexibility on key issues which divide the two sides. During last summer's round we proposed a draft treaty that addressed several of the concerns voiced by the Soviet Union. Our draft treaty provides a basis on which an agreement that serves the interests of all can be found.

During the current round we are continuing to press for progress. As President Reagan recently announced, the United States delegation will propose a mutual guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads and a build-down of bombers, all designed to encourage stabilizing systems. The United States is willing to negotiate trade-offs between United States advantages and Soviet advantages in ways that will move towards a more stable balance of forces.

In the START negotiations our basic objectives remain unchanged. We seek a safer, more stable strategic balance at force levels much lower than those which exist today. We seek in particular to remove any incentives on either side to launch a first strike. For our part, we cannot be satisfied with merely capping the nuclear arms race at the current, very high, levels.

We have seen some movement in the negotiations, but not nearly as much as we had hoped. So far, the Soviet Union has failed to respond to our initiatives in a manner that would permit significant progress.

In these negotiations our primary focus has, of course, been on weapons systems. But we also recognize that other measures can help promote stability and reduce the risk of war. With this in mind the United States has proposed confidence-building measures in START calling for the pre-notification of ballistic missile launches and major military exercises. We have proposed specific means of improving communications between the two Governments in a crisis. These initiatives are designed to strengthen barriers against the outbreak of war through accident or miscalculation.

The unprecedented and relentless Soviet buildup of triple-warhead SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles—these are the SS-20s that were explained so well by Ambassador van Dongen in his statement this morning—threatens our allies in Europe and in Asia and heightens tensions around the globe. Faced with this problem, the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been seeking a negotiated solution to achieve a balance in such longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

To achieve that balance, the United States initially proposed the elimination of this entire category of nuclear weapons on both sides. In short, we undertook to cancel all planned deployments and production of such missiles if the Soviet Union would eliminate its existing SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and agree not to produce any more such missiles. We continue to see this as the best solution for Americans, for Europeans, for Asians, and for the Soviet people. It is also the very best—to be parochial about my interests—for arms control itself.

The Soviet Union has been unwilling to accept this far-reaching approach to security and stability. I think it is fair to say that the only thing that anybody has seen wrong with the zero option is that the Soviets have refused to accept it. Therefore, to try to move these negotiations forward, the United States, in close consultation with its allies, put forward a proposal earlier this year for an interim agreement that would result in substantially reduced, equal levels of United States and Soviet warheads on a global basis. More recently, President Reagan proposed other steps to try to meet stated Soviet concerns.

As representatives here realize, he expressed, first, a willingness to consider in the context of equal global limits a commitment not to offset the entire Soviet global longer-range INF missile deployment through United States deployments in Europe. We would, of course, retain the right to deploy such missiles elsewhere within the global ceiling.

The President expressed, secondly, a willingness to consider proposals involving aircraft that are consistent with our criteria for an agreement. The President expressed, thirdly, in the context of significant reductions to equal levels, his willingness to apportion the reduction of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in an appropriate manner.

Quite clearly our hope is that this further demonstration of our flexibility will lead to agreement in Geneva. The Soviet Union, however, has refused to negotiate on the basis of equality. Instead, the only basis on which they have said they would negotiate is what amounts to what the President called at the United Nations a "half-zero" option, that is, zero deployments for our side and substantial deployments for their side. They want in effect to perpetuate a complete Soviet monopoly in these missiles, with all the threats to free peoples and to stability that this monopoly implies.

In both the strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms control negotiations we look to the Soviet Union to reciprocate the flexible and constructive approach taken by the United States. With such co-operation from the Soviet side we could report substantial progress in these vital efforts at next year's Assembly, unlike this year's Assembly, where, unfortunately, we cannot announce such progress.

While we push ahead to reduce existing nuclear arsenals, we must also continue vigorous efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Few principles have been more widely accepted in these halls than the fact that nuclear-weapon proliferation constitutes a grave threat to international stability and to the security of all nations We can be encouraged by the progress we have made working closely together. The number of countries that have opted for nuclear weapons is much smaller than many feared or predicted earlier. I am reminded that in the early 1960s President John F. Kennedy said tha there was a prospect of some 25 or even, I believe, 30 nuclear-weapo States in the early 1980s, and because of efforts that we have bolstered and summoned on this issue we are not in the situation tha President Kennedy feared over 20 years ago.

But we cannot become complacent about this consensus or rest on our record. Preventing proliferation requires continued dedication, constant vigilance, fresh initiatives and steadfast support for the barriers to proliferation that now exist.

The third conference to review the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), [4] to be held in 1985, affords all parties the opportunity to renew their commitment to the Treaty. As we start planning the conference—which we in the United States Government are helping to do—it is my hope that we can encourage all States which have not yet adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so. Let us also work together to reaffirm and strengthen the vital function this Treaty serves in support of the peace and security of all States.

We are, of course, actively engaged in a number of other arms control endeavours. One of the most important—and one which was discussed earlier by our colleague from the Netherlands—is the effort to rid the world of chemical weapons. To this end the United States is working with other members of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, where our representative is Ambassador Lou Fields, to elaborate a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on the destruction of existing stockpiles.

As evidence of the importance we place on this, Vice President Bush launched a major United States initiative at the Committee on Disarmament last February to accelerate the negotiations being undertaken by Ambassador Fields. [5] At that time we introduced a comprehensive document detailing our views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban. [6] Then in July Ambassador Fields shared with the Committee our work on illustrative procedures for destroying chemical weapons and for verifying that procedure. [7]

To give those involved in the negotiations a better insight into the problems involved, and a better personal feel for the issues we are dealing with in the Committee on Disarmament, we have now invited the member and observer delegations to that Committee to attend a workshop in mid-November at the chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele Army Depot in Utah. [8] That workshop will demonstrate the United States programme for chemical weapons destruction. We hope that this workshop will stimulate further discussion and progress on means of verifying a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

As we pursue such arms control measures, we must not close our eyes to the environment in which we are working or to actions that go against and can undermine what we are seeking to accomplish. President Reagan's recent address noted areas in which we have serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements already negotiated—agreements the Soviet Union has itself agreed to. It is particularly tragic that the use of chemical warfare in Asia—about which this Committee has heard a great deal from me personally over the last two years—continues today, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,[9] the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention,[10] customary international law, and our sense of human decency—I think everybody's sense of human decency.

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[4] The text of the treaty is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[5] *Ante*, Feb. 4.

[6] *Ante*, Feb. 10.

[7] *Ante*, July 6.

[8] *Ante*, Aug. 23

We cannot turn our back on this tragic situation. If we are serious about arms control, then we are serious about compliance issues and we must continue to call attention to problems of compliance so long as they exist. In the chemical weapons area we should actively support efforts to investigate evidence of their use. We look forward to the recommendations of the experts on means to deal with the matter pending completion of a new chemical weapons treaty. Their recommendations will be given very careful attention.

We should also rededicate efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to banning a whole class of radiological weapons before they are ever produced. Given the political will it should be possible, in our view, to reach agreement soon on a consolidated treaty text to outlaw such weapons. We and others in the Committee recognize that, compared with more compelling priorities, a radiological weapons treaty may be viewed as a modest accomplishment. But even modest accomplishments can have value and can help move us further along in our critical work.

The arms control agenda does not end with START, INF and the Committee on Disarmament. The United States and its allies in Western Europe, for example, have taken initiatives to seek reductions in conventional forces in Europe. The East has recently shown some willingness in principle to consider a more realistic framework for monitoring such reductions. We hope that concrete progress is possible. The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is getting under way to work out agreements to reduce the risk of war arising through error or miscalculation. The United States, with its allies, will be taking a positive approach to this important undertaking.

The United States is, as well, reviewing other possible areas for significant arms control measures. We continue, for example, to seek ways effectively to verify nuclear testing limitations. We are also reviewing possible ways of reducing the risks of conflict in space.

The simple fact is that arms control is one of the most intellectually challenging, emotionally gripping and profoundly important endeavours of our era. Working together we have come a fair distance in only two decades. The limited test ban Treaty,[11] the nuclear Non-

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[9] The text of the Protocol is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[10] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

[11] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America—the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[12] the biological and toxin weapons Convention, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the SALT I Treaty,[13] and the outer space[14] and sea-bed Treaties[15] have all been successfully concluded. I believe they serve, to varying degrees, as critical cornerstones in channelling and curtailing weapons programmes and thereby leading to greater stability.

Our work is far from finished, however, and future progress is likely to present even more challenges. The key issues we face today are extremely complicated, technically, politically and militarily. There are no simple solutions. Sweeping and unverifiable declarations of intent must not be confused with effective arms control.

Reaching agreements that actually strengthen security and promote peace may well prove much more difficult and time consuming now than they have in the past. The task is also ever more compelling.

As we seek to reduce the threat of war it is useful to remind ourselves of some very key principles. These are principles of arms control and of security in a larger sense.

First, arms control agreements and the process of negotiating them are not ends in themselves. They are a means to enhance stability, security and understanding between nations and thereby to reduce tension and conflict. Accomplishing those objectives requires agreements that are equitable, verifiable and militarily significant.

We cannot and must not sacrifice progress for the sake of perfection. At the same time we must not be lured by agreements which might appear appealing but, on reflection, do not really serve the goals for which they are intended. Empty agreements would be easy. But agreements that inflate expectations without much in the way of concrete benefit would not, on balance, serve our interest.

Secondly, just as effective arms control does not come easily, it also takes considerable time and patience. Negotiation of the NPT, for example, took more than five years. Other agreements required even more time. There is no quick and easy route. I am often reminded that the Austrian State Agreement took over 10 years of negotiations. We might not have a free, democratic, neutral and independent Austria today, without the presence of Soviet troops, had the West compromised its principles and objectives at any point in that 10 year span.

A third principle is that the attempts of the United States and its allies to maintain an effective deterrent and military balance are essential for stability in the world and as an incentive for the arms control process really to work. In this light, the Reagan Administration has pursued programmes to strengthen defences and redress the imbalances that have come about over the past decade. These are the imbalances that I have described in detail to this Committee over the past two years. These programmes provide strong incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate with us for genuine arms reductions.

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[12] *Ibid.*, *1967*, pp. 69–83.
[13] *Ibid.*, *1972*, pp. 197 ff.
[14] *Ibid.*, *1967*, pp. 38–43.
[15] *Ibid.*, *1971*, pp. 7–11.

Effective deterrence and effective arms control have both become more difficult to achieve quite simply because of Soviet conduct and Soviet weapons build up over the past decade. Since 1972 the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons have increased threefold. It has dedicated an estimated 12 per cent to 14 per cent of its gross national product to defence. This compares with less than 8 per cent for the United States. Moreover, while the West has unilaterally retired over 1,000 nuclear warheads in Europe since 1979, the Soviets have steadily increased theirs. By word and deed, the Soviets have shown that they regard military power and the correlation of forces, as they call it, including nuclear forces, as the foundation for projecting their power and influence around the world.

The United States has no interest in an "arms race" with the Soviet Union. The "arms race" of course has been discussed a great deal in this room over the last two years. President Reagan has made it clear that we seek only to restore a stable military balance and to do what is necessary to assure deterrence and reduce the risk of war.

The fact is that the number of weapons in the United States nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years. Despite all the talk that takes place in parts of the United Nations about the relentless ever-increasing arms race on both sides, I repeat that the number of weapons in the United States nuclear stockpile is today at its lowest level in 20 years. Since the mid-1960s, the nuclear stockpile quantity has declined considerably. The number of nuclear weapons in our total inventory was one third higher in 1967 than it is today. In more graphic terms, the United States today deploys some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than it deployed in the late 1960s. The total megatonnage of our nuclear weapons today is one fourth—that is, 75 per cent less than what it was in 1960. Statistics of that kind defy the rhetoric about the ever-increasing arms race and are to the credit of the American side. The goal of our programmes and arms control policies, as I outlined at the beginning, is to reduce nuclear arms even further, and in an equal manner as between the United States and the Soviet Union, in a way that will increase stability.

A fourth general principle is that arms control cannot be divorced from the broader context of the international climate. President Johnson's plans for a Moscow visit to launch SALT I and the whole SALT process were dashed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. The Carter Administration's approach to SALT II was very deeply affected, as everyone knows, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

The United States and other policy makers on the world stage should not—and the United States and the Reagan Administration will not—unnecessarily link or burden arms control efforts by tying them to other facts of Soviet behaviour and conduct in various parts of the world. At the same time, we in democratic societies with freely elected representatives of the people cannot ignore that those realities can, and at times will inevitably, have an impact on the climate for our arms control efforts.

The final principle is that success in arms control requires sustained political will and purpose. Only by our being steadfast will success be at all possible.

It is important to recognize that, in the long run, success will hinge on the ability of the political leadership in free societies to inform and to build consensus on arms control issues. Our deepest values and our democratic principles demand this. Discussion, debate and dissent form the very fibres of free societies and are key signs of our strength. Regrettably, those voices for real peace and against war, for human rights and against tyranny, for effective arms reductions and against arms build-up are stifled in closed societies. As reflected in last year's relevant United Nations resolution, which was adopted unanimously, those voices should now be allowed to be heard. The United States delegation will have more to say later on this issue to build upon the work of the First Committee on a consensus basis last year.

We are on a long and difficult road on which every nation has an important responsibility. We recognize that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, but no State can escape some responsibility for the arms control issues that confront us today. Since 1945 we have witnessed over 150 conventional wars or guerrilla actions which have killed over 10 million people—staggering statistics.

The continuing struggle for peace is in many respects indivisible. Like my predecessor, Eugene Rostow, I hope for a brighter tomorrow. I believe it is possible. It is not easy, but it is possible. It will require that we all admit the existence of the problems we confront. They cannot be resolved if they are denied.

The continuing struggle for peace is not a casual undertaking. It is deadly serious and it is everybody's business. If all States in this Assembly involve themselves constructively there will be a real prospect for a brighter tomorrow.

Radio Address by President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, October 22, 1983 [1]

I'd like to talk to you today about the deep desire we share to reduce nuclear weapons and to make our world more safe. Just as important I want you to know why, despite all our good faith efforts, we are being frustrated in our goal to negotiate an arms reduction agreement.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 31, 1983, pp. 1479–1480.

No issue concerns me more and has taken up more of my time—not just in meetings with advisers but in deliberations with Members of the Congress and close and constant consultations with our allies—than this quest for a breakthrough on arms reductions. And believe me, I do so willingly, because as your President and also as a husband, father, and grandfather, I know what's at stake for everyone.

The trouble is, the obstacle to that agreement we want so dearly is not Washington, and it never has been; it's Moscow. And that's been the case in all our current arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union.

But today I'd like to focus on the longer-range INF missile negotiations now underway in Geneva. Some have asked, "If we do want an agreement, why are we, the United States, planning to base new missiles in Europe?" Well, the question reflects some basic misunderstandings. It's been the Soviet Union who's been deploying such forces for a number of years, while the West watched and worried.

In 1977 the Soviets had in place 600 warheads on their longer range INF missiles. More significantly, they began adding the SS-20, a new, highly accurate mobile missile with three warheads, which could reach in minutes every city in Europe and many cities in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. NATO had no comparable weapons.

In October 1979, Soviet leader Brezhnev announced a balance now exists.[2] The Soviet Union—800 warheads; NATO—zero. Some balance. It was only at this point at the end of 1979 that the NATO alliance, not the United States alone, decided the Soviets' large and growing advantage in both nuclear and conventional forces would threaten our safety. So the alliance made what was called "the dual-track decision." We would redress the imbalance by deploying comparable weapons, while seeking an agreement at the negotiating table that would eliminate the need for deployment.[3]

Nothing more dramatically illustrates our sincere desire for peace than our willingness not to deploy if the Soviets would stop threatening Europe with their missiles. How did the Soviets respond? By adding one new missile every week. They now have 1,300 warheads or more, and that number is growing. NATO still has zero.

All along we've been negotiating in good faith. We asked the Soviets to consider the total elimination of these missiles. It took them less than 24 hours to answer, "Nyet." So we proposed an interim solution, some equal but lower number, and the lower the better. With knee-jerk speed, the same answer came back again, "Nyet." And it's remained the same for all our new proposals, because the Soviets insist on a monopoly of longer-range INF missiles. They offer what can only be called "a half-zero option," zero for us, hundreds of warheads for them. As I told the members of the United Nations, that's where things stand today. We will continue our efforts to make the Soviets heed the will of the world, stop stonewalling, and start negotiating in good faith.

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[2] Cf. *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, p. 605.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 814–816.

But that wish should not become father to the thought. We must look at Soviet words and deeds with a clear head and ask some long overdue questions. Why does a regime which says it seeks peace repeatedly reject equitable proposals that would preserve peace? What are we to think of Soviet threats against NATO countries: warning Turkey it could become "a nuclear cemetery;" telling Scandinavian countries they are "a bridgehead for aggression;" and advising West Germany if new missiles are deployed, the military threat to it will grow manifold?

These are not words of a peacemaker but of a nation bent on intimidation. It is inconceivable that any Western leader would make such crude and provocative threats.

Finally, what is the credibility of a regime which exploits peace demonstrations in the West, but brutally puts down any demonstration for reduced weaponry in its own country? As President Mitterrand of France recently observed, "Pacifism is in the West, and Euromissiles are in the East. I consider that an unequal relationship."

My fellow Americans, the values of Western civilization and the beliefs that bind free people together are being tested. The Soviets are engaged in a campaign to intimidate the West, but it will not work. At home, bipartisan support in the Congress remains strong. And the unity of our NATO Alliance will not break. Just this week, Prime Minister Craxi of Italy visited the White House and assured me of Italy's continued staunch support. Earlier this year, at the Williamsburg summit, the leaders of the industrialized nations agreed the policy is correct, fair, and should go forward. [4] The spirit of Williamsburg is as strong as ever.

There is simply no sensible alternative to the parallel goal of deterrence and arms reduction. We will remain at the negotiating table just as long as it takes to reach a breakthrough. But the Soviets must understand: NATO's mission is to defend Europe and preserve peace, which it has done for 34 years. And NATO will continue to meet its responsibilities. Our countries will remain united, strong, and we will protect the safety of our people.

Report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Nuclear Freeze [Extract], October 24, 1983 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 2) calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons, having considered the same, reports unfavorably thereon.

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[4] *Ante,* May 29.

[1] *Nuclear Freeze Proposal: Report [To accompany S.J. Res. 2] together with Minority and Additional Views* (S. Rept. 98–276; 98th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 1–14.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 2 is to express the sense of the Congress with regard to national arms control priorities and objectives. Accordingly, the resolution states that, as an immediate arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should (1) "pursue an immediate and complete halt to the nuclear arms race;" (2) "decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and" (3) "give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve."

The resolution also provides that, "proceeding from the freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability."

BACKGROUND

The Committee hearings and mark-up on the nuclear freeze proposal and other arms control resolutions took place against the backdrop of continued public mobilization and debate on issues related to nuclear war and arms control. The heightened American awareness of the horrors of nuclear war continues to be reflected in petitions, seminars, town meetings, public demonstrations, and state and local referenda. Despite considerable diversity among the public organizations and individual citizens involved in this grassroots movement, one theme has been recurrent: an insistence that the United States and the Soviet Union move without delay to achieve a negotiated agreement that would effectively halt the nuclear arms race.

In response to the public demand for prompt action on arms control, hundreds of Senators and Representatives have introduced resolutions recommending various approaches to achieving this goal, including a joint resolution calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons. This resolution was first introduced last year as S.J. Res. 163 by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, joined by eighteen other Senators, and was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.

On June 9, 1982, the Committee met for the purpose of marking up S.J. Res. 163 and twelve other arms control resolutions. During the mark-up, the Committee approved by a 12–5 vote an original joint resolution on nuclear arms reductions (S.J. Res. 212) introduced by the Chairman as a complete substitute for all thirteen resolutions. S.J. Res. 212 did not include the language of the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze proposal, and a Pell-Cranston amendment that would have added the resolved clauses from S.J. Res. 163 to the Chairman's resolution was disapproved by a vote of 10–7. S.J. Res. 212 was never made the pending business of the Senate.

On January 26, 1983, the nuclear freeze proposal was reintroduced as S.J. Res. 2 by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, joined by 32 other Senators, and referred to the Committee. A companion resolution was introduced in the House. This measure, H.J. Res. 13, as modified by a substantial number of amendments, passed the House on May 4, 1983, by a vote of 278–149. H.J. Res. 13 was placed on the Senate calendar on May 9 in lieu of referring it to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The Committee held four days of hearings on S.J. Res. 2 and other arms control resolutions, as follows:

June 21, 1983—Congressional witnesses (Senators Cohen, Nunn, Hatfield, Kennedy, Levin, Garn, Dole, Specter, and Hart, and Congressmen Markey and Leach).

June 22, 1983—Former Directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Messrs. Smith, Warnke, Seignious and Rostow) and other public witnesses (Randall Kehler, Susan Catania, Harold Willens, Terry Herndon, Noel Gayler, William Colby, and Irwin Redlander).

June 23, 1983—Administration witness (Deputy Secretary of State Dam).

September 14, 1983—Administration witness (Executive Session—Top Secret, with Admiral Howe, Department of State).

On August 2, 1983, the Committee met in accordance with Senate Rule 26, which provides that a special meeting of the Committee shall be held upon the written request of a majority of the Members of the Committee. Such a request was made in writing on July 27 by Senators Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. During the meeting, Senator Cranston made a motion that the Committee vote on S.J. Res. 2 without amendment at a time certain that morning. Senator Helms objected to voting at the time certain, and the Chairman ruled that under Senate rules a motion to vote at a time certain required unanimous consent, thereby denying the motion. A Cranston appeal of the ruling of the Chairman was defeated on a vote of 9–8. Accordingly, the Committee did not complete action at this meeting on S.J. Res. 2 or any of the other arms control resolution under consideration.

On September 20, the Committee met for the purpose of marking up S.J. Res. 2 and the following arms control resolutions:

S.J. Res. 12—Relative to arms control negotiations.

S.J. Res. 29—To prevent nuclear testing.

S.J. Res. 74—To express the sense of the Congress that the United States should promote the goal of strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war through a balanced program of force modernization together with negotiations to achieve substantial, verifiable, and militarily significant reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers.

S. Con. Res. 46—Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding negotiations for the reduction and control of nuclear arms.

S. Res. 57—Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should adhere to the principle of a mutual guaranteed builddown of nuclear forces.

S. Res. 83—For Strategic Talks on Prevention (S.T.O.P.).

S. Res. 107—Relating to nuclear arms reduction negotiations.

S. Res. 142—To limit multiple warhead ICBM's.

S. Res. 159—Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose a mutual pause in flight tests of new MIRV'd ICBMs and seek an arms control agreement in the START talks incorporating the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission.

All of these resolutions except S.J. Res. 2 were consolidated into an original joint resolution introduced by Senators Percy, Pressler and Boschwitz. For a review of Committee action on the Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz resolution, see the Committee report accompanying this original joint resolution.

During the markup, the following record votes were taken on S.J. Res. 2:

A motion by the Chairman to report S.J. Res. 2 without amendment with a favorable recommendation was defeated by a vote of 10–7. Those present and voting nay were Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Those present and voting aye were Senators Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Senators Baker and Zorinsky voted nay by proxy. Senator Biden voted aye by proxy.

A Mathias motion to report S.J. Res. 2 and the original Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz joint resolution, both without recommendation was not approved by a majority of those present and voting. The vote of those present and voting was 7–7. Those present and voting aye were Senators Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those present and voting nay were Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Senators Biden and Zorinsky voted aye by proxy, and Senator Baker voted nay by proxy.

A Cranston motion to report S.J. Res. 2 and the original Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz joint resolution both with an unfavorable recommendation was passed by a 10–4 vote. Those voting aye were Senators Percy, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. Those voting nay were Senators Helms, Lugar, Pressler and Murkowski.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

Congress is vested with the special, and extremely important, responsibility of translating the outcry of public concern about nuclear war into practical, and prudent, policies. However fervently the freeze or any other resolution may be supported by segments of our society, any treaty that eventually incorporates a particular arms control approach will have to receive a two-thirds approval in the Senate to enter into force.

We continue to have serious concerns about S.J. Res. 2 in its present form, concerns which explain why the freeze does not command the support of a majority of the Committee. The first problem is that the resolution would sanction each side's keeping what they now have, and clearly the levels of nuclear weaponry deployed on each side are unacceptably high. For example, if we were to freeze now, the Soviets would be authorized to maintain 308 SS-18 ICBMs, each with ten warheads, 330 SS-19 ICBMs, each with six warheads, 150 SS-17 ICBMs, each with four warheads, 610 older ICBMs with one warhead each, 145 heavy bombers, (excluding Backfire), 160 Delta-class submarine-launched ballistic missiles, each with three warheads, and 790 other SLBMs, each with one warhead.

That is a total of 7,540 strategic warheads, and there are, in addition, thousands of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. The United States has comparable numbers. Under the terms of S.J. Res. 2, negotiations on reductions would have to await the outcome of lengthy negotiations on the freeze. The Soviets have already offered in START to cut their strategic forces by more than 25 percent. The question can be raised, why should we spend time negotiating an agreement that would let them keep what they have when they have already indicated willingness to reduce by at least 25 percent.

Second, in our judgment and that of our European allies, a total nuclear freeze would undermine NATO's December 1979 "dual track" decision on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) [2] and undercut the Alliance's efforts to negotiate the total elimination of all nuclear land-based missiles of intermediate range deployed in Europe—the so-called "zero option." This year, the German and British people overwhelmingly re-elected Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Thatcher, respectively, and in so doing indicated that they are fully prepared to accept the deployment of new INF systems on their soil, should the arms control talks in Geneva fail to provide a negotiated solution to the threat posed by the Soviet SS–20 missiles. An American endorsement of the freeze proposal now would pull the rug out from under the German and British governments and our other close allies in NATO.

Third, a freeze would be enormously difficult to verify. This is not to say that verification provisions for a freeze could not conceivably be worked out. If we were able to gain Soviet consent to an unprecedented degree of on-site inspection and monitoring, a freeze might be verifiable. But this would take a very long time to negotiate. And this time could be better spent negotiating significant reductions.

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[2] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

Lastly, we do not accept the central premise of the freeze that all strategic modernization is necessarily detrimental to strategic stability. Some modernization is needed simply because older systems, like our B-52 bombers, are literally falling apart. Other programs, such as the new, small single-warhead ICBM recommended by the Scowcroft Commission,[3] could enhance the survivability of the U.S. retaliatory force and thereby discourage the Soviets from entertaining any notions of a first strike. A total freeze—one which allowed for no exceptions—would thus not only force us to maintain increasingly obsolete and unsafe systems but also perpetuate current instabilities.

In summary, we applaud the freeze movement for bringing public awareness to bear on the problem of lessening the prospects of a nuclear war occurring. This has indeed been a remarkable accomplishment. But we do not think that S.J. Resolution 2 offers a realistic or prudent solution to this problem.

COST ESTIMATE

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that there will be no budgetary impact from the passage of this Resolution. The following estimate was provided by the Congressional Budget Office:

U.S. CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
Washington, D.C., September 30, 1983

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed S.J. Res. 2 calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 20, 1983.

The passage of this resolution will not mandate any changes to military procurement or operations. Accordingly, it is expected that no additional cost to the government would be incurred as a result of enactment of this legislation. In addition, passage of this resolution would have no impact on costs to state and local governments.

Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further detail on this cost estimate.

Sincerely,

RUDOLPH G. PENNER
Director

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[3] *Ante*, Apr. 6.

REGULATORY IMPACT AND CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraphs 11(b) and 12 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee concludes that there will be no regulatory impact from the passage of this joint resolution. There will also be no repeal or amendment of existing law.

MINORITY VIEWS OF MESSRS. PELL, BIDEN, GLENN, SARBANES, TSONGAS, CRANSTON, AND DODD

INTRODUCTION

There is no question that nuclear weapons pose a threat of unimaginable proportions to the United States, its adversaries, indeed, the whole world. We must find ways to halt the arms race between the superpowers, and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. We must then find ways to begin the process of steadily reducing arms levels until nuclear weapons are removed from the arsenals of the nations of the world. Only through such a process can we reduce the possibility of nuclear war and create a safer world for generations to follow.

Despite this imperative, and despite earlier successes in arms control, establishment of a solid and effective arms control regime remains an elusive goal. At a time when so much needs to be done, very little is in prospect.

In the year since the Committee on Foreign Relations last considered various arms control approaches, there has been little evidence of any concrete progress in the several ongoing negotiations. At the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva, the two sides appear at impasse. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks, also in Geneva, are only now showing signs of increased activity.

Other major negotiations on such critically important issues as a ban on chemical weapons, a ban on anti-satellite weapons, and a ban on nuclear explosions remain moribund. The Administration continues to oppose ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [4] negotiated in the Nixon Administration and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, [5] negotiated in the Ford Administration.

The current negotiations in START and INF could, if successful, mitigate the future threat. We do not quarrel with the objectives of either negotiation. There is no question, however, that agreement in these negotiations will likely be long in coming, if it is achieved at all. We are convinced of the necessity of having some sort of restraint regime in place pending agreement in START and INF and the initiation of other arms control efforts.

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[4] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.

[5] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

NUCLEAR FREEZE

We believe that a negotiated mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear warhead missiles and other delivery systems is an excellent and commendable first step in establishing a process of arms reductions. This concept is relatively new, yet it has caught the attention and enthusiastic support of millions of Americans. The freeze movement served to push the Administration to begin the START and INF negotiations. Those who support the freeze have been in the forefront of efforts to halt the arms race and begin the process of reductions. Earlier this year, a consensus resolution endorsing the nuclear freeze was approved by the full House of Representatives in a 278–149 vote.

Last year, Senators Pell and Cranston offered, during the markup of a multifaceted arms control resolution, an amendment incorporating the Kennedy–Hatfield resolution calling upon the Administration to pursue a nuclear freeze with the Soviets. At the markup on September 20, 1983, Senator Cranston, supported by Senator Pell and others, moved the adoption of the nuclear freeze as set forth in S.J. Res. 2, introduced by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and 32 other cosponsors. Unfortunately, this motion was rejected, 7–10, but the Committee decided in a 10–4 vote to give the full Senate an opportunity to pass judgment on this critically important issue.

S.J. Res. 2 would have the Congress resolve:

> That (1) as an immediate arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should—
>
> (a) pursue an immediate and complete halt to the nuclear arms race;
>
> (b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and
>
> (c) give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.
>
> (2) Proceeding from the freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability.

It is important to underscore that this freeze would be negotiated with the Soviet Union to cover controls which could be verified. If a freeze on a specific arms program could not be agreed upon, it would not be applied unilaterally. If a provision could not be verified, it would not be applied.

Critics of the freeze proposal often overlook the importance given to reductions in the proposal. The resolution clearly states that, proceeding from freeze, the two sides should pursue "major, mutual and verifiable" reductions in a manner that enhances stability. In other words, the freeze would be a first step towards meaningful arms reductions. A number of proposals for reductions have been offered. Not one of them can match the combination of freeze and reductions as a rational way to ensure stability while negotiated reductions occur.

Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration has never given the freeze the attention it deserves and has rejected it out of hand. As a consequence, there has never been a meaningful dialogue with the Executive Branch as to how a freeze and reductions regime might be set up and put into place.

Many who criticize the nuclear freeze do so out of ignorance or because they have no interest in such an approach to ending the arms race. Others are expressing genuine concerns. The Committee explored these concerns with a number of witnesses in the course of its hearings, and we have taken care to weigh them carefully. Here are the key questions which have been raised, together with pertinent testimony and assessments:

1. *Would a freeze perpetuate present instabilities and Soviet advantages?*

Answer: The freeze is not designed to perpetuate the present strategic situation, whether it is stable or unstable. It is designed to halt the arms race and open the way to reductions.

Numerous witnesses have testified to the Committee that present differences in the nuclear forces of the two sides are not significant. Virtually all serious students of nuclear weaponry agree that rough strategic parity exists. Earlier this year, the Scowcroft Commission underscored that point as it rejected the concept that the United States faces a so-called window of vulnerability which must be closed.

With regard to the existing mutual parity, retired Admiral Noel Gayler, former CINCPAC and former Director of the National Security Agency, told the Committee:

> I do not think the Soviets have an advantage of any kind and if there were in fact a discrepancy between the nuclear forces at this level it would not make any difference anyway. I think it has no political utility. It has no military utility. I think a freeze which actually stopped the weapons growth on both sides would simply adhere to the advantage of both sides.

Critics charge that the freeze would allow the Soviets to retain their present formidable force of 308 SS-18 heavy ICBMs, 480 other MIRVed ICBMs, 610 older single-warhead ICBMs, 145 heavy bombers, 10 Delta-class submarines with 16 missiles carrying three warheads each, and 790 single warhead missiles on other submarines.

What these critics fail to mention is that we could also maintain our present vigorous and balanced Triad of forces. We could keep 550 Minuteman III missiles—300 of which have just been equipped with three new higher-yield warheads each, as well as 450 single warhead Minuteman II missiles and the 42 remaining Titan missiles with their huge single warheads. We have just completed the deployment of new longer-range Trident missiles on 12 submarines, with eight higher-yield warheads per missile, to complement the existing 19-submarine

Poseidon fleet. We have already launched five Trident submarines and deployed two of them. We have already deployed about 700 air-launched cruise missiles on a portion of our 264-plane B-52 fleet, and more will come in short order.

What these critics also fail to point out is that the freeze could permanently stop Soviet programs which otherwise would increase the threat to us. The new Blackjack bomber and Typhoon submarine missile programs would be cut off. Backfire bomber deployments would be halted, and the Soviets' embryonic modern air-launched and ground-launched cruise missile programs would be stopped. Finally, they would be prevented from pursuing either the SS-24 or the SS-25 ICBM programs. No one who cares about our national security should be blind to the advantages such cutoffs afford.

2. *Would not an across-the-board freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear weapons be very time-consuming, if not impossible, to negotiate?*

Answer: We are calling upon the United States to approach the Soviet Union with a proposition of applying the freeze across the board on testing, production and further deployment of nuclear systems. We understand that each control must be negotiated and that each must be verifiable. Thus, some controls may be worked out and agreed upon more readily than others. Accordingly, if agreement would occur on a step-by-step basis, both sides should be willing to proceed in such a fashion, ensuring all the while that strategic stability was maintained. Thus, the benefits of a freeze would be realized at an early date.

The former SALT II negotiator and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul C. Warnke, urged a step-by-step approach to the freeze:

> . . . dealing first with the technological advantages that constitute a setback for true security, and completing, of course, a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Significantly, neither Mr. Warnke, nor other witnesses with long experience in negotiating and dealing with the Soviet Union, including former Ambassadors W. Averell Harriman and Thomas J. Watson, Jr., expressed doubts as to the feasibility of negotiating the freeze with the Soviet Union.

3. *Would the freeze proposal endorse keeping the weapons of both sides at unacceptably high levels in contrast with deep reduction proposals?*

Answer: No. The freeze resolution calls for reductions of major proportions. Once the freeze was in place, negotiations would move to the more complex matter of working out reductions. However, the negotiating task would be simplified by the existence of the freeze, which would ensure that weapons developments and deployments would not outpace the negotiators. Instead, the negotiators would be dealing with relatively static forces.

Of course, we would not stop with a freeze. As a necessary prelude to genuine reductions, the freeze would cap the arms race; we would then pursue negotiations on reductions assiduously.

In contrast to the freeze, under other proposals, the Soviets would be allowed extensive modernization of their strategic land, sea and air forces. Under some other proposals, the Soviets and the United States would pay a price for modernization, but it would be allowed. Under the freeze, we and they could keep what we have, but only temporarily, before both sides moved on to reductions which would allow only the necessary modernization steps required to enhance stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war.

4. *Would a freeze undercut the INF negotiations?*

Answer: No. We support both the freeze and the INF negotiations. We hope that the negotiations are successful at the earliest possible date. If so, we anticipate that a freeze would be implemented at a reduced level of armaments. It is important that the effort to achieve reductions continue after imposition of a freeze to ensure that the lowest possible levels of nuclear armaments in Europe are achieved.

Of course, we would only institute a freeze including Europe—as part of a comprehensive, global freeze of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces—in close consultation with our allies and with their support. It is inconceivable that either we and our allies would institute a freeze which would undercut the INF negotiations.

5. *Would a freeze undercut the START negotiations or any other efforts to reduce arms levels?*

Answer: No, since the incentive for the Soviets to negotiate would remain and since negotiation would be simplified if the forces subject to reduction were relatively static, rather than rapidly expanding and changing.

Former Director of Central Intelligence William Colby told the Committee:

> The Soviets have the same incentive after a freeze as right now without one. Their incentive is to lessen the danger of nuclear war to themselves, aside from to us, and I think that would continue, that a freeze would actually lessen that danger because of the restriction it would place on the development of the new more destabilizing weapons, the higher accuracies and the other features of the newer weapons that are making it more dangerous rather than less.

Mr. Warnke disputed the theory that an arms buildup is the way to get the Soviets to agree to reductions. He said:

> The apparent theory is that we can scare the Soviet Union into making sensible moves toward stabilizing systems by deploying destabilizing systems of our own. Now, the rationale is expressed in terms of bargaining chips, but the theory seems to be that we can make the Soviet Union cry uncle at the bargaining table by deploying MXs, D-5s and by threatening to build still more. This, I submit, is not bargaining. It is instead the arms race theory of

arms control, a theory that somehow the Soviets, faced with our determination to go ahead with this massive buildup, are going to give us arms control by default.

Admiral Gayler told the Committee:

> A freeze is a way of maintaining the status quo while making serious efforts in arms negotiations to make cuts. These are not exclusive ideas. It is only the common sense idea that we do not add to weapons while we are negotiating cuts in them. So my reaction is it would not mitigate against serious arms reduction proposals.

Mr. Colby emphasizes that the freeze would simplify achievement of reductions:

> . . . I believe (that) a freeze would assist the process of reduction because without a freeze then the momentum of development of new weapons, of testing of new weapons—in our case the MX, in the Soviet case a new intercontinental weapon—will complicate any attempt to work out a sensible system of reductions.

It is only possible to believe that a freeze would undercut negotiations if one assumes that the freeze would be both the beginning and the end of the negotiating effort.

6. *Would our allies accept a freeze if it were imposed while disparities exist between the intermediate-range missile forces of the two sides?*

Answer: It is conceivable that, with the agreement of our allies, disparities would exist on a temporary basis before agreement on reductions was achieved. The overall global balance in nuclear forces would be maintained. However, as Mr. Colby told the Committee:

> I think at the moment you have to say that the existence of an SS–20 does give an apparent advantage to the Soviets in that theater. However, I think at the same time you have to say that any use of those SS–20s would be more than adequately retaliated for by the forces in the theater—both the American forces in the theater, the British and French forces, which would obviously be available—and by our strategic backup. A freeze would not eliminate any of those, and, therefore, the retaliation would be complete and absolute.

7. *Would a freeze be verifiable?*

Answer: Yes. First, controls which could not be verified would not be applied. Second, specific and tight controls would be applied on a case-by-case basis. This would ensure a high verification standard under a freeze.

Mr. Colby made these points in his testimony with regard to verification:

First, the U.S. will monitor the development of Soviet weaponry with or without an agreement, in order to protect the country. He said:

> If there is an agreement, that process becomes easier, not harder, because those agreements in recent years have all contained provisions which make it easier to monitor the matters limited by the treaties.

Second, under a freeze, the process would be simpler. He said:

> A freeze which says stop, you merely look to see if there is any activity in violation of the freeze. Therefore, a freeze by definition is easier to monitor than one of these complex reduction arrangements and formulae.

Third, a freeze treaty would give the opportunity for additional communication about ambiguous Soviet behavior.

Witnesses made it clear that verification under a freeze would not depend in any regard upon trust of the Soviet Union. Standards for verification under a freeze would be as tough or tougher than those in any other approach to arms control.

8. *Would the freeze stop strategic modernization?*

Answer: The freeze would stop the kind of unbridled arms race, characterized by some as strategic modernization, which has brought us to the present frightening point.

During a freeze, steps could be taken to maintain nuclear forces at their existing level of capability, but not to modernize or increase their destructive power.

Following a freeze, strategic modernization could be pursued during the reductions period in order to enhance stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war.

The overriding consideration would be whether a modernization step would enhance stability—and not be just another lap in the arms race.

Senator Kennedy pointed out to the Committee the central importance of the reductions section, noting that "I think there would be maximum opportunity available to negotiators to breathe life into those words, understanding that the test is whether it is adding stability or whether we are talking about additional new dangerous weapons systems."

CONCLUSION

The superpowers are now pursuing negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range arms. In addition, they must deal with an arms control agenda which encompasses space-directed and space-related weapons, chemical weapons, biological warfare, further controls on nuclear tests and an array of confidence-building measures. Since arms control is not a zero-sum game we can envisage an arms control agreement which enhances simultaneously the security of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the Soviets continue to profess strong interest in arms control efforts, it is in our national interest to put them to the test of answering to strong and effective arms control measures with solid verification.

The Soviet Union has demonstrated, time and again, that it is a potent and unrelenting adversary with which we must deal shrewdly and dispassionately. We must continue to have a strong defense to ensure that the Soviet Union is never able to threaten our national security. Similarly, we must reinforce our national security through continued efforts to restrain the threat posed by the nuclear and other forces of the two sides. We must be tough and determined in our negotiations. The two superpowers should do their utmost to find areas of potential agreement despite their fundamental differences—not only to serve interests in common, but to fulfill their solemn responsibilities.

We must not underestimate the importance of a freeze and reductions. At this juncture in our nation's history, we seem to have reached a low point in relations with our adversary, with no certain improvement in sight. It is no wonder that millions of Americans fear that the threat of nuclear war is increasing, not diminishing.

Soviet behavior should demonstrate that we must limit the threat that they pose to us and other nations. As the negotiator of SALT I, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, told the Committee during its hearings, "the deeper we get into the valley of death of nuclear confrontation, the more obvious it should be that solutions do not lie in more and better weapons systems."

Effective arms control is essential to the national security of the United States. We believe that a nuclear freeze followed by reductions offers the most promising course toward a comprehensive and enduring arms control regime.

We are convinced that the nuclear freeze is a logical and practical way to curb the arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear war. No other approach yet presented offers the same refreshing promise.

Claiborne Pell
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
John Glenn
Paul S. Sarbanes
Paul E. Tsongas
Alan Cranston
Christopher J. Dodd

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Report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Nuclear Arms Reductions [Extracts], October 24, 1983 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Relations having had under consideration an original joint resolution with respect to nuclear arms reductions, reports unfavorably thereon.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The purpose of the joint resolution is to express the sense of the Congress with respect to the objectives of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the negotiations of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and other arms control matters. The resolution urges the President to coordinate closely with the Congress in formulating a Mutual Guaranteed Builddown proposal which would immediately cap and then significantly reduce the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear warheads and their overall destructive capacity. It also recommends steps to ensure Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty, [2] the unratified SALT II Treaty, [3] and the unratified treaties on nuclear testing. [4] Lastly, the resolution would establish as an ultimate goal the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The following resolutions were referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and were considered and consolidated into an original joint resolution:

S.J. Res. 12—Relative to arms control negotiations;

S.J. Res. 29—To prevent nuclear testing;

S.J. Res. 74—To express the sense of the Congress that the United States should promote the goal of strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war through a balanced program of force modernization together with negotiations to achieve substantial, verifiable, and militarily significant reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers.

S. Con. Res. 46—Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding negotiations for the reduction and control of nuclear arms.

S. Res. 57—Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should adhere to the principle of a mutual guaranteed build-down of nuclear forces;

S. Res. 83—For Strategic Talks on Prevention (S.T.O.P.);

S. Res. 107—Relating to nuclear arms reduction negotiations;

S. Res. 142—To limit multiple warhead ICBM's;

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[1] *Nuclear Arms Reductions: Report, together with Minority and Additional Views [To accompany S.J.Res.185]* (S. Rept. 98-277; 98th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 1-7, 9-13.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197-201.

[3] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225-229, and *ibid., 1976*, pp. 328-332.

S. Res. 159—Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose a mutual pause in flight tests of new MIRV'd ICBM's and seek an arms control agreement in the START talks incorporating the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission.[5]

The Committee also considered and voted separately on S.J. Res. 2, calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons. For a review of Committee action on S.J. Res. 2, see the Committee report accompanying this resolution.

The Committee held four days of hearings on these ten resolutions as follows:

June 21, 1983—Congressional witnesses (Senators Cohen, Nunn, Hatfield, Kennedy, Levin, Garn, Dole, Specter, and Hart and Congressmen Markey and Leach).

June 22, 1983—Former Directors of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Messrs. Smith, Warnke, Seignious and Rostow) and other public witnesses (Randall Kehler, Susan Catania, Harold Willens, Terry Herndon, Noel Gayler, William Colby, and Irwin Redlander).

June 23, 1983—Administration witness (Deputy Secretary of State Dam).

September 14, 1983—Administration witness (Executive Session—Top Secret, with Admiral Howe, Department of State).

On August 2, 1983, the Committee met in accordance with Senate Rule 26, which provides that a special meeting of the Committee shall be held upon the written request of a majority of the Members of the Committee. Such a request was made in writing on July 27 by Senators Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. During the meeting Senator Cranston made a motion that the Committee vote on S.J. Res. 2 without amendment at a time certain that morning. Senator Helms objected to voting at the time certain, and the Chairman ruled that under Senate rules a motion to vote at a time certain required unanimous consent, thereby denying the motion. A Cranston appeal of the ruling of the Chairman was defeated on a vote on 9–8. Accordingly, the Committee did not complete action at this meeting on S.J. Res. 2 or any of the other arms control resolutions under consideration.

On September 20, the Committee met for the purpose of marking-up S.J. Res. 2, S.J. Res. 12, S.J. Res. 29, S.J. Res. 74, S. Con. Res. 46, S. Res. 57, S. Res. 83, S. Res. 107, S. Res. 142, and S. Res. 159. During the mark-up, the following record votes were taken on the original joint resolution, which was introduced by Senators Percy, Pressler and Boschwitz as a complete substitute for all of the above resolutions except S.J. Res. 2:

A Pressler amendment, which would have replaced Section 1, paragraph (1) of the resolution with a new provision calling upon the U.S. and Soviet Union to negotiate arms control agreements which would provide for deep and mutual reductions to equitable and balanced force levels, adhere to the principle of a strategic build-down, freeze these forces at lower levels, and include on-site inspection where necessary, was defeated by a vote of 10–6. Those voting in favor of the amendment were Senators Percy, Baker, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pressler and Murkowski. Those voting nay were Senators Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd.

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[5] *Ante*, Apr. 6

A Murkowski amendment, declaring that any agreement reached at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations should not come at the expense of the security of our East Asian allies, was adopted on a voice vote.

A Mathias amendment proposing a mutual and verifiable moratorium on the further deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) as a means for advancing the goal of achieving a START agreement that would provide for the elimination of all such weapons, was defeated on a vote on 10–7. Those voting in favor of the amendment were Senators Mathias, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Tsongas, and Cranston. Those voting nay were Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, Glenn, Zorinsky, and Dodd.

A Pressler amendment, amending Section 5, paragraph (1) of the resolution to express the sense of the Senate that the President should request Senate consent to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNE) provided the Administration makes a best effort to gain Soviet agreement to the establishment of a consultative mechanism for the TTBT comparable to that provided for in the PNE treaty, was approved on a voice vote.

A Pell amendment, which would have deleted Section 2 from the resolution, failed on a tie vote (7–7). Those Senators voting in favor of the amendment were Senators Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those voting nay were Senators Percy, Baker, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Senator Helms voted "present."

A Helms amendment, which replaced Section 5, as amended by the Pressler amendment, with new language expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States should negotiate procedures to assure Soviet compliance with the TTBT, was approved by a vote of 8–6. Those Senators voting in favor of the amendment were Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Lugar, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Those voting nay were Senators Kassebaum, Pell, Glenn, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

A Percy motion to report the Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz resolution, as amended with a favorable recommendation failed on a tie vote (6–6). Those Senators present and voting in favor of the motion were Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler and Murkowski. Those present and voting nay were Senators Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Cranston, and Dodd. Senators Baker and Boschwitz voted aye by proxy. Senators Biden and Tsongas voted nay by proxy.

A motion by Senator Mathias to report the original joint resolution and S.J. Res. 2, both without recommendation, failed on a tie vote (7–7). Those present and voting in favor of the motion were Senators Mathias, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those present and voting nay were Senators Percy, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, and Murkowski. Senators Biden and Zorinsky voted aye by proxy. Senator Baker voted nay by proxy.

A Cranston motion to report the original joint resolution and S.J. Res. 2, both with an unfavorable recommendation, passed on a 10–4 vote. Those voting aye were Senators Percy, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd. Those voting nay were Senators Helms, Lugar, Pressler, and Murkowski.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

The build-down concept was put before the Congress on February 19 in S. Res. 57, which set forth the idea of a guaranteed strategic build-down of strategic forces, subject to agreed procedures on verification and compliance. At the time, the concept was explained as calling for the retirement of two ballistic missile warheads for every new one deployed. To meet criticisms, the ratios proposed have been made more flexible, and, last month, the proposal was expanded to be a "double build-down" of both missile warheads and in "overall destructive capacity", under some agreed fashion of each side's nuclear forces.

These modifications were not put before the Committee formally for its consideration. Unfortunately, the Administration did not provide any judgments on build-down prior to markup. Its sponsors had intended that the build-down proposal be incorporated into the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in the round beginning in October, but, as of markup, the Administration was still struggling with its decision. This performance was particularly regrettable in the aftermath of Chairman Percy's decision to call upon the Committee at the August markup to delay its decision until after an anticipated August 20 deadline for an Administration response. A month after that deadline, the Administration still had not responded.

Accordingly, the Percy/Pressler/Boschwitz resolution was drafted to commend the President for endorsing the concept and to urge him to coordinate with the Congress in formulating a specific proposal.

Specifics on build-down were omitted.

Subsequently, on October 4, the President announced that the build-down concept would be incorporated into the U.S. position at the START negotiations.[6] According to the President, the proposal will call for a guaranteed annual build-down in missile warheads of about 5 percent and reductions under variable ratios of existing warheads as new ones are deployed. According to press reports, the deployment of each new warhead on a MIRVed ICBM would require the retirement of two ballistic missile warheads. The ratio would be three warheads retired for every two deployed in the case of MIRVed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and one for one in the case of new warheads on single-warhead missiles, according to reports. The rule producing the greater reductions would govern, according to the President. There was no indication whether a precursor agreement would be sought or whether a build-down agreement would only come about in the context of an overall START agreement.

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[6] *Ante.*

It would have been helpful for the Committee to have details on the Administration's approach to build-down. However, the Committee was familiar with the concept and its evolution and was thus fully able to judge the build-down concept on its merits. The subsequent Administration decision on build-down affected the details, not the concept.

The build-down failed to win the support of a majority of Committee Members. It was clear that several major concerns underlaid that decision:

First, the build-down concept, if put into practice, appears to be simply too open to continued nuclear weapons development, testing, production and deployment. Rather than stopping massive nuclear arms programs, it could well encourage them. By institutionalizing a system of nuclear weapons modernization, build-down could help guarantee a qualitative arms race well into the next century.

Clearly, modernization by one side would be watched closely by the other. If build-down encouraged widescale revamping of strategic forces, the potential for an arms race would increase. Since build-down would allow the deployment of more accurate, more powerful and more sophisticated weapons, both sides might fear being left behind. It is legitimate to question whether build-down might indeed encourage, rather than discourage, spending on strategic arms, with the prospects that the side spending the most might achieve some strategic advantage.

Second, build-down could force changes in our strategic arsenal detrimental to our national security.

Such an outcome would be possible if a reduction formula were adopted and applied which forced cuts in stabilizing systems as a price for new deployment. For example, as build-down has been presented, it is envisaged that two ballistic missile warheads would be retired for each new warhead on a MIRVed ICBM. This would mean that the deployment of 100 MX missiles with 1,000 warheads would require the retirement of 2,000 ballistic missile warheads. That is close to the 2,145 warheads on our existing ICBM force. Thus, it would appear that both land-based and submarine-based warheads would have to be retired to save a significant part of the existing ICBM force. Congress would have to weigh carefully, under such circumstances, whether the price of cutting into our stable deterrent force in order to have MX was outrageously high. A choice to reduce MX deployment could mitigate the problem, but raise the question whether very low levels of MX deployments made any strategic or financial sense. A question whether to deploy MX at all would have to be raised anew if build-down were implemented.

Third, build-down appears to be based on the assumption that strategic planners will exercise the right options to move the sides to more survivable systems, thus stabilizing the arms race. Unfortunately, there is nothing in build-down to guarantee that force changes would be in the direction of stability. As we have seen with MX, newer weapons systems are not necessarily more stable than the systems they replace. The MX and the Soviet SS-24 show that the choices are not always toward greater stability. It is important to understand that under build-down, destabilizing choices can still be made. The only difference is that, in some cases, a price would be exacted, but no prohibition would be imposed.

We do not question the sincerity of many build-down supporters in their desire for stability. However, most strategic analysts would agree that reductions do not necessarily promote stability if the resulting mix of weapons undermines strategic deterrence. It is quite possible to envisage forces with 5,000 ballistic missile warheads per side—including new more powerful and more accurate warheads—which would be less stable than the present total of about 7,500 per side. If build-down were not all-encompassing, it is possible to foresee increases in one type of system, such as cruise missiles, which would leave the two sides with more warheads than at present despite reductions. The outcome would depend largely upon the decisions made by the two superpowers, either by choice or because of obligations under agreement.

Fourth, build-down does nothing to meet the desires of those who would halt the arms race and reduce our arsenals in order to lessen the threat of nuclear war. A number of Members of the Committee support the approach embodied in the nuclear freeze and reductions resolution, S.J. Res. 2. The freeze would stop the arms race and serve as a prelude to genuine reductions, which would be pursued assiduously. Thus, the freeze would deal effectively with the problems posed by both the quantitative and the qualitative arms race. Build-down would do nothing to stop the qualitative arms race and it would only deal with the quantitative arms race in a convoluted and uncertain fashion.

Finally, the question of build-down's negotiability must be raised. There has been scant progress to date in START. We should be very wary of any approach which might reduce, rather than enhance, prospects for a solid, productive agreement.

Having made these points, it should be understood that many of us believe that build-down might be of value in charting a course for reductions, once the arms race is halted. At that point, build-down or other formulas might be helpful in achieving agreement, so long as any formulation assured that only the modernization necessary to ensure stability is permitted. In such a fashion, both the freeze and build-down might strengthen our security, so long as build-down was not a substitute for an effective way to stop the arms race and reduce nuclear arsenals.

Other aspects of resolution

The Committee also considered carefully other sections relating to objectives in START and INF, calling for continued restraint from actions which would undercut SALT I and II, calling upon the Soviets to observe encryption constraints and expressing full support for Administration efforts to gain detailed information from the Soviets on SALT compliance.

In an instance of a step backward, the Committee dropped paragraphs urging the President to seek Senate consent to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties and calling for negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. A similar call won strong approval last year and merited similar support this year.

Unfortunately, the resolution represents more a business-as-usual approach to the arms race than a comprehensive plan. The overall effect is to endorse and commend the status quo. There is no sense in the resolution that there are any real and pressing problems in arms control, other than those for which the Soviets are responsible.

Given the questions raised and not resolved in the resolution, its omissions and the lack of any compelling case for the resolution, the Committee concluded that rejection was the proper course and ordered the resolution reported unfavorably by a 10–4 vote.

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MINORITY VIEWS OF MESSRS. PERCY, LUGAR, BOSCHWITZ, PRESSLER, AND MURKOWSKI

We support the original joint resolution offered by Senators Percy, Pressler and Boschwitz because it prescribes a prudent and practical approach for pursuing a broad range of priority U.S. arms control objectives. As stated by the Administration, the resolution is "consistent with the thrust of U.S. arms control policies and objectives." At the same time, the resolution expresses support for important arms control initiatives that have originated within the Senate, in particular, the Mutual Guaranteed Build-down proposal

START

In Section 1, the resolution affirms the view of the Congress that the objective of the START negotiations should be to achieve significant reductions in each side's strategic inventory as a first priority. The emphasis in this section on reductions contrasts with the approach recommended by the nuclear freeze proposal, which would defer negotiations on real reductions until after lengthy negotiations were completed on a freeze. The resolution fully supports the position taken by the U.S. in START calling for significant reductions to equal levels in the aggregate number of ICBMs and the SLBMs and the aggregate number of warheads deployed on these systems, with comparable reductions in other types of strategic offensive systems.

We believe that the President is to be commended for his recent initiatives in presenting the Soviet Union with revised and more flexible U.S. START proposals. Although the Soviets have recently dropped some of their unrealistic demands, we believe the Soviets' START proposal remains unacceptable and must be further modified if notable progress is to be made in concluding a mutually acceptable treaty. The U.S. should of course be prepared to respond flexibly to any constructive Soviet proposal, with good-faith bargaining by each side aimed at achieving an acceptable agreement at the earliest practical time.

Section 1 also reaffirms the central premise of the Scowcroft Commission report, i.e., that if a more stable and secure nuclear balance is to be established with the Soviet Union, both sides must transition from highly MIRVed ICBMs, such as the MX and its Soviet counterparts, toward missiles which are individually less attractive as targets. The resolution declares that an ultimate goal of the START negotiations should be the elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs.

BUILD-DOWN

On October 4, President Reagan announced that he had instructed the U.S. START delegation to propose a number of new initiatives in START, specifically including a proposal for a Mutual Guaranteed Build-down designed to encourage stabilizing systems. This decision, taken two weeks after the Committee mark-up on this resolution, fully implements the spirit and letter of Section 2 of the resolution, which commended the President for endorsing the build-down concept and called on him to coordinate closely with the Congress in formulating a specific build-down proposal that could be presented to the Soviets at the October/November 1983 START negotiating round.

As outlined by the White House, the build-down proposal will include:

> A provision which links reductions to modernization using variable ratios which identify how many existing nuclear warheads must be withdrawn as new warheads of various types are deployed;
>
> A provision calling for guaranteed annual percentage build-down (an approximately 5 percent mandatory build-down per year);
>
> A provision that ensures that the reductions would be paced by whichever above rule produces the greatest reductions.
>
> In addition, the U.S. delegation will be prepared to:
>
> Address concurrently the build-down of bombers;

Discuss additional limitations on the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by U.S. bombers;

Negotiate trade-offs, taking into account Soviet advantages in missiles and U.S. advantages in bombers, in ways that provide each side maximum flexibility consistent with movement towards a more stable balance of forces;

Propose the establishment of a working group in START to discuss the U.S. build-down initiative in Round V.

The effect of the new build-down proposal, if accepted by the Soviets, would be to place an immediate cap on each side's missile warheads and bombers and on the overall destructive capacity of these systems. The build-down does not require new systems to be deployed nor is it dependent on new deployments to achieve reductions. Indeed, even if no deployments take place each side must at a minimum reduce their strategic weapons by 5 percent per year. In those cases where valid modernization requirements prompt either side to deploy new systems, they must dismantle existing weapons at about a two-to-one ratio. The immediate objective is to achieve a one-third reduction both in current levels of weaponry and in their overall destructive capacity, while permitting modernization programs that promote stability or enhance deterrence to go forward.

Some observers have expressed concern that under the build-down each side could add powerful and more deadly new weapons while only having to take out obsolete and less effective weapons. This is simply not the case. First, the build-down in its final form includes a restriction on overall destructive capacity. By the terms of the build-down itself, neither side can increase the destructive capacity (i.e., deadliness) of its strategic forces. For example, for each new "unit" of nuclear destructiveness added, two "units" of existing nuclear destructiveness could be taken out. In addition, the final build-down proposal establishes definite disincentives for going forward with large-scale deployments of the most destructive and deadly kinds of weapons, such as MIRVed ICBMs. The build-down plan in effect offers strategic planners a choice: if they deploy multiple-warhead ICBMs (which we all agree leads to great instability), they will have to dismantle far more warheads than if they turn to more stabilizing systems, such as bombers, single-warhead ICBMs, or sea-launched ballistic missiles.

We believe that the build-down proposal outlined by the President, coupled with the other changes in our START negotiating position, warrant the full, bi-partisan support of the Congress. The principal congressional sponsors of the build-down concept, including Senators Cohen, Nunn, Percy and Pressler, have all announced their strong support for this specific proposal, which resulted from several months of consultation between the Administration and the Congress. Moreover, the new U.S. START proposal, including the initiative on build-down, has been praised by a number of leading strategic experts in the House, including Representatives Aspin, Gore and Dicks, who were also deeply involved in the consultations.

In our opinion, the new U.S. START proposal represents a historic occasion. It is the first time that a major arms control proposal has ever been worked out jointly between the Executive and the Legislative branches. The Soviet Union would be wise to recognize that the President and the Congress are united as never before behind President Reagan's arms control and strategic modernization policies. The President has again demonstrated that he is willing to go the extra mile to ensure that our arms control negotiating position is reasonable and flexible. In START, as in INF, he has opened the door for a mutually acceptable accord. As the *Los Angeles Times* said in an October 5 editorial, "It is now up to the Kremlin either to accept the U.S. proposal or come up with something better."

We regret that the Administration was not able to complete its preparation of the build-down prior to the Committee vote on the resolution. Had this happened, we believe that the resolution would have garnered more support and been passed by a strong majority. We recognize, though, that final Administration decisionmaking on the build-down was delayed by two developments: (1) the Scowcroft Commission was asked at a late date to propose new recommendations on modifying the U.S. START Proposal, and the Commission needed time to review fully the build-down concept; and (2) on September 9, Senators Cohen, Nunn and Percy unveiled a significant refinement in the original build-down proposal, one intended to broaden the concept to include qualitative considerations, such as overall destructive capacity. The Administration required some time to assess the new "double build-down" proposal before agreeing, as they did, to incorporate this feature into the final build-down package.

SALT RESTRAINT POLICY

Section 3 indicates the support of the Congress for the President's May 1982 announcement that the U.S. would continue to avoid actions that would undercut the SALT I and SALT II agreements as long as the Soviets show equal restraint. We would stress, though, that compliance with this informal restraint regime must be reciprocal. In this regard, we are concerned by reports that the Soviets have been encrypting missile test data to such a degree that the U.S. ability to use national technical means to verify Soviet compliance with these agreements has been impeded. We are also alarmed by reports that the Soviets may be developing a second "new type" ICBM in contravention of the provisions of SALT II and that they are constructing a new radar in central Siberia that may contravene the ABM Treaty. We fully support the efforts of the Administration to attain a detailed description by the Soviet Union of the pertinent characteristics of its new PL–5 ICBM and the function and capabilities of the new Soviet radar at Abalakova.

INF

We fully support the President's efforts to negotiate an INF agreement that provides for a stable and equal balance of U.S. and Soviet INF systems at the lowest possible level. We commend the President for showing flexibility in his approach to these negotiations, as underscored by his announcement of a new "interim" INF proposal in March and the recent modifications which he announced in his speech to the United Nations on September 26.[7] We regard the Soviet Union's current INF proposal as unacceptable and believe it must be further modified if progress is to be made toward concluding a mutually acceptable accord. Should the Soviet Union demonstrate genuine flexibility in its approach to these negotiations, the U.S. should be willing to continue bargaining in good-faith, with an eye towards achieving a final, acceptable treaty at the earliest practical time. It is our firm belief, though, that any agreement reached in INF should not come at the expense of the security of our allies in the Far East. In particular, we would disapprove of any INF accord that permitted an increase in the level of Soviet INF systems deployed in Asia or that permitted the redeployment from Europe to Asia of Soviet INF systems that must be reduced under the terms of an eventual INF treaty.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Section 5 of the resolution expresses the sense of the Congress that the U.S. seek to negotiate procedures with the Soviet Union that would enable us to verify whether the Soviets were complying with the threshold limitations established in the TTBT. The Administration has taken the position that it is prepared to request the advice and consent of the Senate on the TTBT and PNE treaties provided the Soviets agree to new verification measures that will allow us to maintain greater confidence in their compliance with the provisions of these accords. To date, the Soviets have rejected repeated U.S. demarches proposing such discussions and have insisted that the treaties be ratified before they will discuss enhanced verification. Some Members of the Committee have noted that the treaties contain verification provisions that have not been implemented because the treaties have never been ratified. These Members contend that the U.S. should put the treaties into force, implement the verification provisions, and then decide whether additional measures are needed. As amended by the language proposed by Senator Helms, Section 5 is silent on the question of whether the successful attainment of new, negotiated verification procedures should or should not be a precondition to the ratification of these treaties.

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[7] *Ante.*

ULTIMATE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

Section 2 of the 1951 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended declares that "an ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments." In creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the act directs ACDA to "deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament."

Section 6 of the joint resolution, which is identical to a paragraph in last year's Committee resolution (S.J. Res. 212), reaffirms this ultimate goal of U.S. arms control policy. Its inclusion in the joint resolution is intended to express the Committee's commitment to a dynamic and continuing arms reduction process, one which carries beyond the initial efforts to bring the arms race under some control and leads eventually to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world.

This section also underscores the crucial linkage between the U.S. commitment to continuing nuclear arms reductions and our efforts to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons states. Only if the rest of the world is convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union are dedicated to reducing, and eventually eliminating their inventories of nuclear weapons will non-nuclear States forego acquiring similar capabilities.

CHARLES H. PERCY
RICHARD G. LUGAR
RUDY BOSCHWITZ
LARRY PRESSLER
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

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Interview of Soviet President Andropov: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, October 27, 1983 [1]

[Text] [2] ***Question:*** What is the state of affairs at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, under way in Geneva? Is any progress at all being made there?

Answer: Unfortunately, there is no progress in the direction of an understanding [*dogovorennost*] at the talks. The impasse situation there continues. Why this is so is now clear, it seems to me, even to the most faithful U.S. allies, and only bloc loyalty prevents them from acknowledging this openly.

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[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, Oct. 27, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Oct. 27, 1983, vol. III, pp AA1–AA3

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

During the 2 years of talks the Soviet Union has proved convincingly that it is ready to resort to bold solutions for the sake of diverting the nuclear danger from Europe and strengthening security on our continent and throughout the world. The proposals we have made provide for a wide range of possible measures: from substantial reductions in medium-range nuclear means to the complete elimination of both tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. They contain all the necessary elements for a mutually acceptable understanding infringing no one's interests—neither those of the USSR and its allies, nor those of the United States, nor those of the West European states.

Numerous statements have been made in Washington recently to the effect that the United States also favors an understanding and that it has begun demonstrating great flexibility at the talks. We have carefully analyzed all these statements as well as what is being said by the American delegation in Geneva. It proves on examination that the American flexibility is no more than verbal. The substance of the U.S. line in fact remains unchanged: It aims at securing significant military superiority for itself over the USSR by deploying the new American missiles in Europe.

As long as the United States adheres to its unrealistic, one-sided position, according to which the USSR is supposed to reduce its medium-range nuclear arms while the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty allies increase theirs, it is of course impossible to count on progress at the talks.

Question: Are all possibilities for achieving an understanding exhausted?

Answer: That depends above all on the United States, and on whether it is prepared to embark on a businesslike discussion. The Soviet Union will not give up the search for an understanding as long as the United States does not make that impossible by its actions.

We have displayed and are displaying flexibility in finding specific solutions, given the observance of a single but immutable demand: The balance of forces in Europe in terms of medium-range nuclear armaments must not be violated. The level of these armaments on both sides can and must be radically lowered, but in such a way that the correlation of forces between them remains unchanged.

This means, first, that the new American missiles must not be deployed in Europe, inasmuch as this would sharply alter the entire military-strategic situation in NATO's favor. Second, all the nuclear means of the relevant range on both sides must be taken into consideration—with no exceptions.

We will not retreat from this fair demand. But within the framework of this principled approach we, I repeat, are displaying flexibility and constructiveness. I can mention now certain additional steps of ours in this context.

FIRST. The Soviet Union, as is known, has voiced its readiness to negotiate a reduction in medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe down to identical levels for both sides in terms both of delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) and of the charges on them. Some people are asking: But how will the Soviet Union act if, in order to ensure equality in warheads on the missiles of the USSR on the one hand and of Britain and France on the other, it would have to have fewer missile launchers [*puskovyye ustanovki raket*] than the NATO side already possesses?

Well, we are prepared to agree to this too. We are not troubled by the fact that with such an approach—and bearing in mind the number of warheads on the British and French missiles at present—the USSR could have approximately 140 SS-20 missile launchers in Europe, that is, appreciably fewer than the medium-range missile launchers possessed by Britain and France.

SECOND. Not so long ago we stated that, given the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement—including the abandonment by the United States of the deployment of the missiles in Europe—the Soviet Union would eliminate all its missiles subject to reduction in the European zone instead of relocating them in the east. And again some people ask: But will it not happen that, parallel with the elimination of the missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union, the number of such missiles will be built up in the Soviet Union's eastern regions, which could subsequently be redeployed [*perebrosheny*] from east to west?

There are no grounds for such fears. But to eliminate altogether any doubts on this score I can state unequivocally: Soviet missiles will not be moved from east to west; in the event an agreement is reached on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and it is implemented, from that moment there will be a halt to the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the eastern regions of the USSR. And we will proceed firmly from this, provided there are no substantial changes in the strategic situation in the Asian region. This means primarily that the United States does not deploy new medium-range nuclear means in regions from which they could reach the eastern part of the USSR's territory.

THIRD. It is sometimes said that our proposal that each side would retain, after reduction, no more than 300 medium-range nuclear weapon carriers very much curtails [*podrezayet*] American airborne means with a corresponding range of action.

Our objective is not to restrict [*ushchemlyat*] the United States. Although in fairness it is worth recalling that Soviet medium-range aircraft are not based in other countries from which they could reach U.S. territory.

But here too we are prepared to display additional flexibility: To establish for the USSR and NATO equal total levels of medium-range carrier-aircraft in a mutually acceptable quantitative range which could be substantially different from the range proposed by us previously. The specific size of these levels could be agreed upon, and also the composition of the carrier-aircraft subject to limitation could be specified.

There is a way out of the impasse in which the Geneva talks have found themselves. It is only necessary to make use of it. If the United States were to display a real desire to proceed to a mutually acceptable accord it would not take much time to formulate an agreement.

Question: Some people in the West express the view that, as a display of goodwill, the Soviet Union could proceed right now to reduce its missiles in Europe unilaterally. What would you say on this?

Answer: Yes, appeals of this kind are known to us. Sometimes they even come from people who are truly concerned about preserving peace in Europe.

It is not for us to show goodwill. On our side there has been no shortage of steps, including unilateral steps, aimed at creating the most favorable situation for achieving success at the talks.

I would remind people that 1 and ½ years ago the USSR imposed a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in its European part. And, despite all the slanders, this moratorium is being unswervingly observed. The additional deployment of missiles beyond the Urals was also stopped—in regions from which they could reach West European countries.

Moreover, during the period that the talks have been in progress the Soviet Union has removed from its armory several dozen [*ne odin desyatok*] of its medium-range missiles in Europe. SS-5 missiles which were previously deployed in the European zone and which, incidentally, had a range no less than that of the SS-20 and were greatly superior to them in terms of size of charge, have now been taken completely out of commission [*vyvedeny iz boyevogo sostava*].

Those who are calling on the USSR to reduce unilaterally the number of its medium-range missiles may not know that in fact we are already doing this. But of course, both the U.S. Government and the governments of the other NATO countries are well informed about the true state of affairs. However, they are concealing the truth from their own peoples and are deceiving them.

Meanwhile Washington is stubbornly working toward embarking on the deployment of its Pershings and cruise missiles in West Europe in the very near future. Nothing indicates that the United States would be prepared to renounce this deployment if the Soviet Union were to continue in the future unilaterally to reduce its missiles. On the contrary, everything indicates the reverse. Therefore the Soviet Union naturally cannot and will not risk its own security and the security of its allies.

It would be another matter if the United States were to renounce the deployment of its missiles in Europe at the announced time and were thereby to provide an opportunity to continue the talks and the quest for mutually acceptable solutions. Then we could embark right now on the reduction of our SS-4 missiles (and we have over 200 of them) and complete the elimination of them in 1984–85. And if it were possible to conclude an agreement in Geneva on the fair basis that we have repeatedly mentioned, a considerable proportion of the existing SS-20 missiles would also be eliminated, of course.

Question: Statements are being made in the Western capitals to the effect that the talks will receive fresh impetus and will become more productive with the start of the deployment of the American missiles. How do you assess such statements?

Answer: They are sheer deception aimed at abating the intensity of the West European peoples' struggle against the appearance of American nuclear missiles in Europe.

There must be total clarity on this point: The appearance of new American missiles in West Europe will make it impossible to continue the talks now being held in Geneva. On the other hand, the Geneva talks can be continued if the United States does not embark on the actual deployment of the missiles.

Communique of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, October 28, 1983 [1]

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) held its Autumn Ministerial meeting at Montebello, Quebec, Canada on 27 and 28 October, 1983. Spain attended as an observer.

Ministers discussed a wide range of security matters. In particular, they discussed a comprehensive study prepared by the High Level Group. The terms of the Montebello Decision taken on 27 October, 1983 which resulted from this are set out in full at Annex to this Communique.

Ministers reaffirmed that the supreme objective of the Alliance is the maintenance of peace in freedom. A stable military balance to be established at the lowest possible level is essential to this objective. They emphasized that it was not necessary for the Alliance to match the Soviet Union system-for-system or warhead-for-warhead. Although nuclear forces at all ranges play an important role in maintaining an unbroken spectrum of deterrence, only the minimum number of these forces necessary to support the Alliance's agreed strategy of deterrence and defence should be retained in NATO's inventory.

Ministers noted that, in contrast to NATO's policy of restraint, the Soviet build-up is continuing relentlessly at all levels. In recent months the Soviet Union has continued construction of at least three new SS-20 bases east of the Ural Mountains, in addition to the already deployed 351 operational SS-20 launchers comprising 1,053 warheads. They are also retaining older shorter-range missiles by a new generation of more accurate systems, namely the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23, which have been under development for a number of years.

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 5 (Dec. 1983), pp. 32–33. The annex to the communique, called the Montebello Decision, is printed *infra*.

SS-21s have already been forward deployed in Eastern Europe for some time. Ministers noted that the Soviet Union has recently threatened to deploy forward additional shorter-range missiles and to adopt other military and political measures should NATO proceed as planned with the deployment of LRINF in Europe. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to match NATO's restraint and to reduce rather than increase the levels of its nuclear weapons.

Ministers supported the determination of the United States and the United Kingdom to maintain the deterrent capabilities of their strategic forces, while recognizing that only the strategic forces of the United States have the capability to provide the ultimate guarantee of security for all members of the Alliance. At the same time, they welcomed the proposals the United States has made in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks to reduce the most destabilizing weapons and to reduce substantially the level of United States and Soviet strategic arms, including the 'build-down' concept recently tabled in Geneva. Ministers agreed that such proposals could serve as the basis for an effective agreement which would enhance the stability and security of all countries concerned.

Ministers emphasized their determination to move ahead with the dual-track approach of modernization and arms control with respect to LRINF. They noted with satisfaction that the flight testing of both the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in the United States had been successfully completed, that production of the missiles is on schedule and that the preparations in the European basing countries would permit initial operational capability, as planned. Ministers emphasized NATO's commitment and determination that, in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement obviating the need for that deployment, deployment of a mixed force of ballistic and cruise missiles as decided in the dual-track decision of 1979 will begin by the end of the year.[2]

Ministers reaffirmed that the United States proposal in the INF negotiations, developed in close consultation with the Allies, to eliminate the entire category of United States and Soviet land-based longer-range INF missiles remains the best and most equitable outcome. They welcomed the continuing close consultations within the Alliance on the negotiations. Ministers fully supported the United States' offer of an interim agreement providing for United States and Soviet equality in missile and warhead numbers. They also supported the United States determination in Geneva to explore every proposed solution for an INF arms control agreement that meets the legitimate security concerns of the Alliance. The basic criteria of such an agreement are: significant reductions based on equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union, no inclusion of or compensation for third-country systems, global limitations, no weakening of the United States contribution to NATO's conventional deterrence and defence, and effective verification.

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[2] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

Ministers welcomed the latest United States initiatives which address concerns that the Soviet Union has expressed in Geneva on aircraft, geographic scope and reductions of the Pershing II as well as cruise missiles. The Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated similar flexibility. Each Soviet modification of their original proposal made so far would have the same basic outcome: the prohibition of any NATO LRINF missile deployments while the Soviet Union retained a monopoly in such missiles. This is because of their insistence to take into account British and French forces and their refusal to accept the principle of equality in LRINF missile deployments. The Alliance cannot accept this Soviet approach which is apparently intended to further their long-term aim of dividing the Alliance and to erode seriously the linkage between the United States strategic deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe. This linkage is essential for NATO's security.

Ministers noted with attention the most recent Soviet proposals. The Soviets are invited to explain fully their proposals at the negotiating table. Ministers stated that NATO would continue to examine carefully all proposals in light of the Alliance's agreed criteria described above. As reported, however, the Soviet Union regrettably continues to insist on a monopoly in land-based LRINF missiles. The West has continued to negotiate for two years while the Soviet SS-20 build-up has continued. The Soviets therefore have absolutely no justification for breaking off negotiations as NATO's deployment goes forward, as they have threatened. Ministers stressed that the Alliance commitment to negotiations would continue even after initial deployments and that they remain willing to reverse, halt or modify deployments—including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed—if and when a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement is achieved in Geneva.

Ministers accepted with pleasure an invitation from Mr. U. Haluk Bayülken, the Turkish Minister of National Defence, to hold their next meeting in Turkey in Spring 1984.

The Danish Minister of Defence repeated Danish Government support for the double track decision but at the same time he recalled the motion passed by the Folketing on May 26.

Greece has expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes.

Montebello Decision of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, October 28, 1983 [1]

At Montebello, Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Ministers declared that the policy of the Alliance is to preserve the peace through the maintenance of forces at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat.

Consistent with this policy the Alliance since 1977 has been conducting analyses aimed at assuring that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury are held to the minimum number necessary for deterrence, taking account of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces.

On the basis of the initial results of these analyses, the Alliance decided in December 1979 that, unless obviated by successful negotiation with the Soviet Union, the development of longer-range weapons (Pershing II and cruise missiles) was essential to restoring the balance and maintaining the integrity of NATO's deterrent posture. The Alliance remains committed to the dual-track decision and its implementation.[2] At the same time Ministers decided to reduce the NATO stockpile by 1,000 warheads. This withdrawal has been completed. Moreover, Ministers mandated further analysis to determine whether the withdrawal of weapons beyond the 1,000 then decided could be accomplished safely, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of deterrence at the lowest possible level of weapons.

With the Alliance analysis now complete, the Nuclear Planning Group has decided on 27th October, 1983 to withdraw 1,400 warheads during the next several years. The Ministerial decision, taken together with the already accomplished withdrawal of 1,000 warheads will bring to 2,400 the total number of warheads to be removed from Europe since 1979. Moreover, this reduction will not be affected by any deployment of Longer-Range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will be removed for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) warhead deployed.

The detailed implementation of this decision as to the precise composition of the stockpile is a matter for the responsible military authorities to determine and a programme to effect this will be worked out and implemented over the next five to six years. In this context, appropriate consideration will be given to short-range systems. NATO's military authorities should report their findings at a future NPG meeting.

Recognizing that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective. Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements. Ministers established broad criteria which will remain valid for the next decade, including the continuing importance of strengthening conventional forces. The Alliance must, however, take account at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities during this period.

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 5 (Dec. 1983), p. 33. The Montebello Decision is an annex to the Nuclear Planning Group communique, printed *supra*.

[2] Greece has expressed its views in the minutes of the NPG at Montebello. [Footnote in original. For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.]

Contrary to the impression that NATO has been fuelling an arms build-up by adding to its nuclear armoury, this sustained programme of reductions will have reduced NATO's nuclear stockpile to the lowest level in over 20 years. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to follow the example set by the Alliance, to halt and reverse its build-up of nuclear forces, and to join NATO in the search for a safer future.

Radio Address by President Reagan: Reduction of NATO Nuclear Weapons, October 29, 1983 [1]

Before getting into today's subject, I would just like to say a heartfelt word of thanks to all of you for the thousands of wires and calls that have come in, supportive of the actions of these last few days and, particularly, supportive and grateful to those young men in uniform who are performing so magnificently.

Now today, I'd like to talk about a very important decision that was made Thursday by the Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, as it's commonly called.[2] This decision has great importance for us and for the NATO alliance as a whole, because it addresses the future size and composition of our shorter range nuclear forces in Europe.

As you know, we're negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva on the longer range missiles. The current imbalance on those systems is over 350 to 0 in their favor. But with regard to the shorter range missiles, the tactical missiles, I think you'll be very pleased with today's news. But first, a little background.

The nuclear forces in Europe are fundamental to our overall strategy of deterrence and to protecting our allies and ourselves. The weapons strengthen NATO and protect the peace because they show that the alliance is committed to sharing the risks and the benefits of mutual defense. Just by being there, these weapons deter others from aggression and, thereby, serve the cause of peace. Unfortunately, we must keep them there until we can convince the Soviets and others that the best thing would be a world in which there is no further need for nuclear weapons at all.

The alliance's goal, as General Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, has so often said, is to maintain no more military forces than are absolutely necessary for deterrence and defense.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 7, 1983, pp. 1507–1508.

[2] *Supra.*

In December of 1979, NATO reached a decision to reduce immediately the number of shorter range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.[3] In 1980 we carried out that decision by removing 1,000 of these weapons. The same decision also committed the alliance to a further review of the remaining systems of this category, and that brings us to our decision of Thursday.

Drawing on the recommendation put forward by a special, high-level study group, the NATO Defense Ministers decided that in addition to the 1,000 nuclear weapons which we withdrew in 1980, the overall size of the NATO nuclear stockpile could be reduced by an additional 1,400 weapons.

When these 2,400 weapons have been withdrawn, the United States will have reduced its nuclear weapons in Europe by over one-third from 1979 levels, and NATO will have the lowest number of nuclear weapons in 20 years. What this means is that the alliance will have removed at least five nuclear weapons for every new missile warhead we will deploy if the negotiations in Geneva don't lead to an agreement.

This step, taken by the alliance as a whole, stands in stark contrast to the actions of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders have so far refused to negotiate in good faith at the Geneva talks. Since our 1979 decision to reduce nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has added over 600 SS-20 warheads to their arsenal. Coupled with this, they offer threats and the acceleration of previous plans, which they now call countermeasures, if NATO carries through with its deployment plan intended to restore the balance.

The comparison of Soviet actions with NATO's reductions and restraint clearly illustrates once again that the so-called arms race has only one participant—the Soviet Union.

On Thursday NATO took a dramatic and far-reaching decision, a decision that puts us a giant step along the path toward increased stability in Europe and around the world. As we reduce our nuclear warheads in Europe and, of equal importance, take the necessary actions to maintain the effectiveness of the resulting force, we will continue in the future what we've accomplished so well in the past—to deter Soviet aggression. We seek peace and we seek security, and the NATO decision serves both.

Now, let me bring you up to date on the negotiations in Geneva. Progress toward an equitable, verifiable agreement on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear missiles has been slow to come. Most recently, I proposed three initiatives which go a long way toward meeting important concerns expressed by the Soviet Union. By our actions on the talks we have ensured that all of the elements of a mutually advantageous agreement are on the table. The Soviet Union has now advanced some additional proposals of its own. We'll study these proposals, and we'll address them in the talks in Geneva.

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[3] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

Unfortunately, the Soviet proposals permit them to retain SS-20 missiles while not allowing NATO to deploy its own. The proposals are also coupled with an explicit threat to break off the Geneva talks. I hope that the Soviet Union is truly interested in achieving an agreement. The test will be whether the Soviets, having advanced their latest proposals, decide finally to negotiate seriously in Geneva.

For our part, we continue to seek an equitable and verifiable agreement as quickly as possible. We will stay at the negotiating table for as long as necessary to achieve such an agreement.

Statement by the U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (Kennedy) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Two of Its Subcommittees: Proposed Amendments to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act [Extract], November 1, 1983[1]

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Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to a discussion of some of the Administration's basic concerns about the nuclear legislation you have pending before you and then address the specific provisions of H.R. 1417 and H.R. 3058.

In 1981 the administration undertook a preliminary review of U.S. laws, regulations and procedures in the nonproliferation area to determine whether changes should be sought. A number of possible areas for modification in the law were identified. But it was concluded that a contentious debate, which might ensure [*ensue*] were the changes pursued at the time, would injure our ability to achieve our overall nonproliferation objectives. Thus, the administration decided not to propose changes to the law.

Since the NNPA's enactment, [2] foreign governments have come to a better understanding of the mandated procedures and the functioning of the system has gradually increased in efficiency. It remains the Administration's view that changes in the law at this time would be seriously disruptive and would impede rather than aid our non-proliferation efforts.

The modifications to the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act embodied in the bills before the Committee would seriously undercut our efforts to restore the position of the United States as a predictable and stable nuclear trade partner, and to convince foreign countries that they may deal with the United States confident that the rules will not be changed arbitrarily and unilaterally. Further changes at this time would create a high degree of uncertainty both at home and abroad about the future content and direction of U.S. non-proliferation law, policy and procedures.

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[1] *Proposed Amendments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 1983: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade . . . on H.R. 1417 and H.R. 3058*, pp. 124–128.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

This uncertainty could so undermine the U.S. role in international nuclear affairs that our ability to achieve our non-proliferation objectives would be seriously diminished. It would also hinder our efforts to reforge cooperative ties with the other major nuclear suppliers and to strengthen rules of nuclear commerce.

We are particularly concerned about any attempt to impose retroactive requirements on transactions which have already been concluded. Such a move seriously erodes the confidence of our allies and trading partners and eliminates any possibility that new and important non-proliferation initiatives can be pursued successfully.

Now let me address some specific aspects of the bills now under consideration in the House. The administration's views on the proposed legislation are set forth in the letters to full committee Chairman Zablocki of July 14 and September 14, 1983 and I request that these letters be inserted in the record.

COMMENTS ON H.R. 1417

Title I of H.R. 1417 would amend the procedures that currently apply to technology exports under section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act. We recognize the concern reflected here over blanket authorizations which might involve countries of proliferation concern. It was with this concern in mind that the Departments of State and Energy have revised part 810 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The revision extends the requirements for specific review and authorization for direct or indirect activities involving production of special nuclear material by U.S. persons beyond the countries previously listed, which were essentially Eastern bloc countries. Now such specific authorization is also required for countries that do not accept full-scope safeguards as well as for certain countries in regions of particular volatility and sensitivity.

H.R. 1417 would require application of the current export licensing criteria for facilities and nuclear fuel to the export of any nuclear technology exports. Such an approach is misdirected. Exports of information should not be restricted in the same fashion as we restrict exports of fuel and equipment.

Even when dealing with reactor equipment, different controls are applied to each of the three different classes of nuclear components regulated by statute. Each class of components has a different level of proliferation significance, and hence a different level of control.

H.R. 1417 lumps together the technology for all these components and would apply the most stringent controls even to relatively insignificant technology. A more productive approach is to review cases where there may be a specific non-proliferation concern, under a specific authorization framework—and to decide on a case-by-case basis what requirements should be attached to the technology transfer.

H.R. 1417 would further require that technology export or retransfer authorizations related to sensitive nuclear technology be subject to specific authorization requirements. This is unnecessary. It is already the case under 10 CFR Part 810. Moreover, the requirements of sections 123, 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act and those in the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines already apply to any exports of sensitive nuclear technology. The H.R. 1417 provision would duplicate these provisions.

H.R. 1417 also would impose specific controls on the export of highly enriched uranium [HEU].[3] As you know, the administration's policy, reflected in the President's July 16, 1981, non-proliferation statement,[4] encourages the use of low enriched fuels where feasible. This policy is reflected in procedures under which the executive branch prepares an analysis of the technical and economic justification for the use of HEU prior to recommending approval of any license for its export. In addition, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors [RERTR] program, which involves development of low enriched fuels and which has received considerable support from foreign countries, promises in the future to reduce significantly the need for exports of HEU. Thus, the substantive concerns of the bill in this regard are already being fully addressed.

Moreover, not only are the provisions in H.R. 1417 applicable to HEU unnecessary but they would also present a number of serious problems. These provisions would require the NRC to determine, before authorizing export of such material, that there is no alternative fuel, that the proposed recipient has provided assurances that, when an alternative fuel is available, it will be used, and that the Executive Branch is taking the necessary steps to develop an alternative fuel. The requirement for these findings would compel the U.S. Government to second guess the judgments of foreign nations on their own ability to take the technical, regulatory and licensing steps necessary to convert their facilities from HEU fuels, and on the desirability of doing so. This problem would be compounded by an element of discrimination, because United States reactors would operate under no parallel limitations.

H.R. 1417 would also require that the NRC, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determine an overall in-country kilogram limit on the amount of HEU of U.S. origin that would be allowed in each foreign country and at each reactor site at any given time. This would impose on the agencies of the U.S. Government an unworkable administrative burden with respect to foreign stocks of HEU. Moreover, its intrusive nature would be both resented by and unacceptable to the nations at which it was directed.

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[3] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 278–280.

These provisions could well result in sharply reduced willingness on the part of foreign governments to cooperate in the RERTR program and to apply its results. Research in this area has not yet fully examined the properties and behaviors of alternate fuels, and a number of technical questions require resolution before it can be stated authoritatively that all legitimate reactor needs can be met with alternate reactor fuels.

H.R. 1417 also would require that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission both oversee and pass judgment on the adequacy of Executive Branch programs to develop alternate reactor fuels. Providing the NRC with such a role would distort the relationship between the Commission—a health and safety regulatory authority—and the Executive Branch.

H.R. 1417 would provide for expanded Congressional review, and a legislative veto, of subsequent arrangements involving reprocessing abroad either in-country or in a third country, or subsequent retransfer of more than 500 grams of plutonium resulting from reprocessing. We do not believe that the provisions for lengthier congressional review are necessary. The Atomic Energy Act already provides for a review period of 15 days of continuous session. This period is sufficient to permit Congress to initiate hearings on cases of particular interest. Moreover, in cases of special sensitivity, the executive branch has been cooperative in delaying entry into force of subsequent arrangements. To create a general rule, however, that lengthens the processing and administrative time for subsequent arrangements would create a further and unnecessary procedural impediment that foreign nations would face in dealing with the United States as a nuclear supplier. It would be perceived as a further indication of instability in our efforts to carry out peaceful nuclear cooperation. In short, it would further damage the efforts to establish a sound, effective nonproliferation regime.

H.R. 1417 also contains provisions which would require that the Secretary of Defense make certain formal findings paralleling those made by the Secretaries of State and Energy in processing agreements for cooperation, nuclear exports, and subsequent arrangements. The administration opposes this provision. The Department of Defense already participates in inter-agency procedures developed to implement the NNPA, and has ample opportunity to make its views known in that process with respect to export license applications and subsequent arrangements. These existing procedures also establish a mechanism for disagreements to be raised and resolved The Department of Defense participates in the formulation of major policy decisions with regard to agreements for cooperation. Thus, the DOD is fully involved in our non-proliferation decision-making, and the administration believes that it is undesirable and unnecessary to establish by statute a formalized, rigid requirement for DOD findings and participation.

Finally, H.R. 1417 contains a number of provisions which would purport to authorize both Houses of Congress to adopt concurrent resolutions binding the Executive Branch in matters concerning the execution of the Atomic Energy Act. In its recent ruling in *Immigration and Naturalization Service* v. *Chadha,* the Supreme Court made clear that when Congress exercises its legislative power, it must act in conformity with the requirements of Art. I, § 1 and 7 of the Constitution: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President for approval or veto.[5] We believe that Congress already has ample legislative and oversight authority to provide direction to U.S. policymakers in the nonproliferation area and that the provisions in H.R. 1417 calling for congressional approval by concurrent resolution are unconstitutional and should be deleted.

COMMENTS ON H.R. 3058

The Administration shares the concerns of the authors of H.R. 3058 regarding the threat posed by the unchecked proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. However, we do not agree with the sweeping and categorical findings in H.R. 3058 that group together some of our closest and most reliable allies with others of genuine proliferation concern.

In matters of non-proliferation, as in every other aspect of foreign policy, distinctions must be made among various countries of the world. President Reagan has stated that the United States will not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder development in countries with advanced nuclear programs where there is no proliferation risk. This policy recognizes that countries such as Japan and the members of EURATOM have decided to pursue advanced fuel cycle activities to enhance their energy security. But it does not encourage reprocessing or advanced fuel cycle activities where there is a proliferation concern. We recognize that plutonium and highly enriched uranium are dangerous materials, the use of which must be carefully controlled and safeguarded. For this reason, we are taking steps to improve the technical effectiveness of safeguards for enrichment and reprocessing facilities.

Turning to the specific provisions, H.R. 3058 would prohibit the export of major critical components of any facility for, and information or assistance relevant to, enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production. This would result in a total ban on any exports of material, equipment or information for or any assistance to any facility for enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water production. Such an across-the-board ban is not appropriate.

Such exports are already subject to strict regulation under sections 57b, 123a(9), and 127(6) of the Atomic Energy Act, section 402(b) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, and under regulations in 10 CFR Part 810 and 15 CFR section 378.3, as well as under the pertinent provisions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines (INFCIRC/

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[5] For Deputy Secretary of State Dam's statement on the Chadha decision, see *ante*, July 28.

254).[6] These controls, coupled with the policy set forth by President Reagan, already provide an appropriate level of constraint and fully support United States nonproliferation objectives.

We must recognize that sensitive nuclear facilities will exist. Where there is an advanced nuclear program and no proliferation risk, as in EURATOM and Japan, and if all the applicable requirements in law and the Suppliers Guidelines are met, we should not foreclose U.S. participation in the construction, design and maintenance of any such facilities in the future. Such participating could enhance our ability to shape the structure of the enterprise, including its safeguards, and to achieve increased governmental cooperation from our allies in Japan and EURATOM in dealing with real proliferation problems.

H.R. 3058 also would sharply limit approvals of subsequent arrangements for reprocessing, or use or retransfer of plutonium resulting from reprocessing, of U.S.-origin special nuclear material or special nuclear material produced through the use of U.S.-origin material, equipment or sensitive nuclear technology. Approval would be permitted only when all of the following requirements are met:

> When it is for use in research, development or demonstration purposes for reprocessing;
>
> When it is for use in a nuclear weapons state or one accepting full-scope safeguards;
>
> When it is for use in a facility in operation or under construction when the bill was enacted;
>
> If no other stock of plutonium is available; and if adequate physical security measures are maintained.

The restrictions would be lifted only upon a finding by congressional joint resolution that effective international safeguards would be applied to reprocessing and to separated plutonium and that effective international sanctions for violations of nonproliferation commitments have been established. Presumably, this provision is based on a policy judgment that use of plutonium, particularly commercial use, is inherently and in all cases highly undesirable. While the use of plutonium should be and is closely regulated and monitored, this judgment is neither appropriate nor realistic, given that many of our cooperating partners have concluded that it is desirable and economic to use plutonium in their civil programs. It is our view that plutonium reprocessing and use are adequately controlled under the very rigorous provisions of existing statutes, and that a change in this area is not only unnecessary, but would be harmful to our nonproliferation efforts. It would severely damage our nuclear relationships with our close allies in western Europe and Japan and could cripple our ability to work with them to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

H.R. 3058, like H.R. 1417, would impose the same counterproductive restrictions on the already carefully controlled export of U.S.-

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 7–26.

origin HEU. As I stated with respect to the HEU provisions of H.R. 1417, the administration's Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program already addresses the substantive concerns of these HEU provisions.

H.R. 3058 would forbid approval of any subsequent arrangement for reprocessing or retransfer for reprocessing of special nuclear material or for retransfer of plutonium resulting from reprocessing, unless the requesting country or countries agreed not to substitute or exchange without U.S. approval material not subject to the NNPA for material subject to the NNPA, and to accept the same controls on the substituted material as on the original material. Substitution represents a reasonable and appropriate balancing of the need to maintain controls over exported materials and the economies which can often be achieved by using material already at a particular location. Substitution can also reduce the number and volume of physical transfers of nuclear material and thus limit the risk of loss and the health, safety and environmental risk which flow from transporting such substances. For example, if the material subject to U.S. control were in France, and France wished to substitute other uncontrolled material of comparable quality—for any of the foregoing reasons—we believe this should continue to be permitted. This causes no nonproliferation concern, and we see no need for a U.S. prior approval right. To the extent substitution may result in any diminution of nonprolifeation controls, these situations can be dealt with far more effectively on a case-by-case basis rather than by imposing a range of U.S. controls on new quantities of material in every case. Where a particular substitution would pose nonproliferation concerns, the Executive Branch is able to respond to such problems within the scope of existing authority to disapprove particular transfers.

H.R. 3058 would permit authorizations under section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act only if an agreement for cooperation with the country in question were in effect, and if all the criteria in sections 127 and 128 had been met. H.R. 3058 would impose similar requirements on exports of items on the Nuclear Referral List and components, respectively. There is no convincing nonproliferation justification for imposition of such sweeping controls. These proposals would discard the legal framework of the NNPA and Atomic Energy Act, which was carefully tailored to provide varied levels of control for each type of item or activity based on its proliferation sensitivity, and would establish instead a new regime of the utmost rigidity. Further, U.S. companies would be eliminated from many areas of commerce, to the advantage of foreign suppliers. This would include a broad range of dual-use items, such as many types of computers and advanced machine tools. With respect to technology exports, the Department of Energy has recently brought into force revisions in 10 CFR Part 810 which allow it to review on a case-by-case basis any proposed export of nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapon states that do not accept comprehensive safeguards.

H.R. 3058 contains the identical provisions as H.R. 1417 regarding new, formal findings to be made by the Secretary of Defense and the Administration opposes these provisions for the reasons already stated.

H.R. 3058 would extend the controls of the NNPA on exports to all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including in particular foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations. Although the United States clearly has the legal authority to extend such controls, this proposal raises extremely complex and controversial issues, including the extraterritoriality concept which has caused great political difficulties recently between the United States and other nations. We believe an attempt to extend controls in this manner would generate enormous resentment on the part of the foreign countries whose cooperation in non-proliferation is most critical to a successful and effective non-proliferation regime, and would undermine rather than support U.S. non-proliferation goals. The administration accordingly strongly opposes this provision.

Finally, H.R. 3058 would extend section 129 of the AEA to Commerce-licensed nuclear items and DOE Part 810 authorizations, and would permit Presidential waiver only with congressional approval by concurrent resolution. We question the need or desirability of extending section 129 sanctions. Moreover, this and several other provisions in H.R. 3058 also clearly constitute an unconstitutional attempt to exercise legislative power in violation of the Supreme Court's recent ruling in *Immigration and Naturalization Service* v. *Chadha* and we oppose them for the reasons I have stated above.

In sum, the administration strongly opposes H.R. 1417 and H.R. 3058 in their entirety. They would undermine the position and influence of the United States in international nuclear affairs and thereby seriously damage our non-proliferation efforts.

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U.S. Reply to the U.N. Secretary-General: Reduction of Military Budgets, November 4, 1983 [1]

1. General Assembly resolution 37/95 B notes that an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures has been established and that a number of Member States are now reporting. However, it also points out that the broadest possible participation by States from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems is needed, and calls for new initiatives to give fresh impetus towards broader participation. [2]

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[1] A/38/353/Add.1.

[2] The resolution requested that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts and the voluntary cooperation of states, construct price indices and purchasing-power parities for the military expenditures of participating states. It also asked the Secretary-General to ascertain the willingness of states to participate and to enlist their voluntary cooperation.

2. The Government of the United States is in full agreement with this resolution, which was supported by a hundred Member States and opposed in the main only by the Soviet bloc. The United States considers that the wider participation of States, particularly the Soviet Union—the largest military spender in the world—and other States in the Soviet bloc, is needed in order to:

(a) Further refine the standard reporting system;

(b) Increase openness and confidence among States in military matters, thereby facilitating the achievement of various arms control and disarmament agreements and enhancing security;

(c) Improve the possibilities and prospects for effective agreements to limit and reduce military expenditures.

3. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union in 1973 proposed to the General Assembly that the permanent members of the Security Council agree to reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent (and allocate a share of the reduction to development assistance), the Soviet Union itself makes virtually no information known about its military expenditures. The annual "Military budget" of the Soviet Union consists of one word—"Defense"—and one total figure. The word has never been defined, explained, or elaborated upon in any way. There is universal agreement by expert observers throughout the world, including experts from the Soviet Union, that whatever the word "Defense" may signify, it is not even remotely comparable to what most other countries include in their military budgets and expenditures. Thus, this single total figure is useless and is used by no one, not even by Soviet economic analysts. Because of this, non-Soviet observers are obliged to make their own estimates of Soviet military spending. These estimates are at least three times larger than the official Soviet "Defense" figure and, in the case of the more soundly based estimates, seven or more times. Under these conditions, agreements to reduce the military budgets and expenditures of Western States, which are public and well known, and to impose strict controls over their military efforts in return for unverified reductions in the completely unknown Soviet and other Eastern figures are obviously inconceivable.

4. The Soviet Union and its allies have had ample opportunity to consider the question of making known their military expenditures since 1973, when the Soviet proposal for agreed reductions of military budgets put the issue on the General Assembly's agenda, and since 1974, when the first expert group reported on the problems associated with this proposal. Despite the substantial progress made in the ensuing decade by a series of expert groups and by participating States in developing and demonstrating a functioning reporting system, the Soviet Union has not made the slightest movement towards relaxing

the shrouds of secrecy over its military establishment and making its own proposal workable.

5. The repeated calls of the great majority of States in the General Assembly for wider participation of States in the standardized reporting of military expenditures have gone unheeded by the Soviet bloc. There is every prospect that such calls will continue to receive the same response. This is evident from the recent report of the Disarmament Commission on its working group dealing with the reduction of military budgets (A/CN.10/1983/CRP.4).[3] In an annexed paper submitted by five Eastern bloc countries[4] with the support of the Soviet Union, the Eastern position is that:

(a) Negotiations on agreements to limit military expenditures should begin immediately [That is, while the Eastern expenditures remain a complete mystery and the Western expenditures are made extensively known to the world];[5]

(b) Efforts within the United Nations to bring about a better balance of openness and transparency are aimed at deflecting attention from effective disarmament agreements;

(c) It is almost impossible to solve practical and theoretical problems involving data and thus discussion of them would be futile [This despite, the steady and encouraging progress made by the United Nations expert groups in reporting and comparing standardized military expenditures];

(d) Existing total figures are completely sufficient for the conclusion of effective agreements [That is, there is no need for more data either before or during negotiations or after agreements are concluded, and this in the face of the claim that:]

(e) It is impossible to compare military expenditures between countries with different social systems [That is, market economies and centrally-planned economies—ignoring the fact that economic comparisons between such economies and involving similar problems are frequently made and accepted where sufficient data is available].

6. Thus, the Eastern position is that negotiations should begin immediately to agree to mutual reductions of things that are not and cannot be made comparable, and no efforts to make them comparable should be made. In essence, therefore, Eastern claims would need to be taken at face value, without a valid data base by which to assess current spending levels and reach agreements on reductions and without a means of verifying actual reductions.

7. The obvious unreasonableness of this position makes it evident that the potential for reaching effective and verifiable agreements to limit and reduce military spending, and thus to increase international security and the availability of resources for development, is an insuf-

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[3] Reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/38/42), para. 23. [Footnote in original.]

[4] *Ibid.*, annex X. [Footnote in original.]

[5] Brackets in subparagraphs a–e are in the source text.

ficient incentive for the Soviet Union to give up its obsession with secrecy. A decade of repeated calls and patient waiting by the international community have produced no results. New approaches, perhaps involving other kinds of incentives, are clearly needed to produce movement. It is for this reason that President Reagan proposed to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, in July [*June*] 1982,[6] that an international conference be held to seek ways to encourage wider participation in reporting and greater openness on military matters generally, particularly by the Soviet Union.

8. The search for such new incentives and initiatives must be made primarily by those States that do participate (or are considering participation) in making known to the world the details of their military spending, that do see the advantages of openess and transparency both to themselves and to others. They should give thought to the various possibilities open to them and have their representatives meet in conference to consider these ideas. Such an international conference should be open to all who are interested in participating, and any results should be transmitted to the General Assembly.

9. Greater openness and the loosening of the secrecy obsession are of great importance for the objectives of arms control, disarmament and international security. Those States which recognize that fact should make immediate and concerted efforts to help bring about such conditions.

Statement by the Chinese Representative (Qian Jiadong) to the U.N. General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extract], November 4, 1983 [1]

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As a member of the Agency,[2] China will accept its statute and fulfil obligations arising therefrom. As is commonly known, China remains critical of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[3] for its discriminatory nature. We do not, however, stand for or encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We respect the desire of a great many non-nuclear-weapon States to avoid testing, producing, acquiring or using nuclear weapons. When making transfers of nuclear material, technology and equipment in the area of international co-operation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, China will take into account the relevant provisions of the statute, including those concerning safeguards. Since the nuclear trade is a sensitive area of co-operation, the adoption of certain appropriate necessary measures after consultation will be understood and accepted by various countries. But the attempt by some States at arbitrary and unilateral widening of the scope of restrictions and controls in the name of non-proliferation will conduce neither to the extension and development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy nor to the peace and security of the world.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 381–387.

[1] A/38/PV.46, pp. 36–37.

[2] I.e., the International Atomic Energy Agency. China became a member on Oct. 11, 1983.

[3] For text of the treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

After the founding of New China, the authorities in Taiwan joined the Agency and signed the NPT by usurping the name of China. This is entirely illegal and invalid. Taiwan is an integral part of the People's Republic of China, and the resolution entitled "Representation of China in the Agency" adopted by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 9 December 1971 also explicitly "recognizes that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the only government which has the right to represent China in the International Atomic Energy Agency". In accordance with this resolution and the spirit of resolution 2758 (XXVI) of the United Nations General Assembly in 1971, we hold that the Agency should rearrange its safeguard relationship with Taiwan in such a way as to make it non-governmental.

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Statement by the U.S. Representative (Solarz) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, November 4, 1983 [1]

Today I should like to address the troubling and troublesome question of the use of illegal chemical weapons and what needs to be done about it.

Since August 1980 the Government of the United States has reported periodically to this Committee, to the Secretary-General and to Member States on its findings regarding chemical warfare in Afghanistan and South-East Asia. I refer members in particular to the reports "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan", released on 22 March 1982 [2] and distributed in United Nations document A/37/157, and "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update", released in November 1982 [3] and distributed in United Nations document A/C.1/37/10.

The United Nations is a singularly appropriate institution to address this question, because the use of illegal chemical weapons poses a threat to every nation in the world, but most of all to those developing countries least able to protect themselves against such attacks.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.24, pp. 11–23.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 151–157.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 776–786.

Since the First World War, it is, indeed, only in developing nations that such weapons have been used. I submit that only if we speak out and take appropriate action here will the terror end over there.

Based on United States Government reports, as well as on international studies on this issue, we believe that the Soviet Union and its allies have violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons [4] and the 1972 Convention on biological and toxin weapons. [5] It is a long way from the walls of the Kremlin to the rugged mountains of Afghanistan, the serene hills of Laos and the lush jungles of Kampuchea, but by some evil logic, and in callous disregard of human life, the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to use chemical weapons to further its expansionist foreign policy aims, or at least to test these weapons on Asian peoples.

My Government realizes full well that these are serious charges, as do the other Governments that have made them. Yet there are still countries which question their validity. Similarly, while many experts who are technically qualified to make judgements on this matter have concluded that chemical warfare has taken place, there are others who challenge the validity or relevance of that conclusion. In such circumstances, it is perhaps understandable why so many Governments and individuals should be genuinely perplexed about the accuracy or validity of these charges.

There can be little doubt that most Governments genuinely share the abhorrence with which the United States regards chemical warfare, or that they share our commitment to end it once and for all. Allow me, then, to review my Government's evidence and to tell this Committee why, in spite of the conflicting claims, we believe that beyond a shadow of a doubt illegal chemical weapons have been used in South-East Asia and Afghanistan.

First, as of late last year several thousand refugees had reported over 200 chemical warfare attacks in Laos, over 100 in Cambodia and around 60 in Afghanistan. The earliest attacks took place in Laos in the mid-1970s, and the most recent in South-East Asia this past summer. The refugees described substances of various colours having been released from airplanes or helicopters on to villages or resistance forces. In many cases, according to the reports, the symptoms associated with trichothecene poisoning appeared in both humans and animals soon after the attacks took place.

Secondly, scientific analysis by highly sophisticated methods of scrapings of agent residue taken from rocks and vegetation in reported attack areas in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan have revealed concentrations and combinations of mycotoxin trichothecenes never before observed anywhere in nature. Mycotoxins are not present in control samples taken from areas surrounding the point of attack. The testing of these samples was conducted by both United States Government and independent university scientists. The samples have been shared with other Governments.

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[4] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[5] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

Thirdly, scientific analysis by highly sophisticated methods of 20 samples of blood, urine and tissue from reported victims of chemical warfare attacks have shown unprecedented concentrations and combinations of trichothecenes. The toxins were not found in control samples taken from individuals with a life history similar to that of the victims and who did not report being attacked.

Fourthly, doctors who have worked as part of the international and private relief effort along the borders to which the victims of chemical warfare have fled almost uniformly report finding signs and symptoms which are not consistent with any known disease, but which do conform to symptoms associated with trichothecene poisoning. These doctors include citizens not just of the United States, but of France, India, the Philippines and Canada.

Fifthly, testimony from defectors who served in the Lao, Vietnamese and Afghan armed forces, and some of whom were involved in actual attacks, describes in minute detail the procedures employed in chemical warfare attacks and documents supervision by Soviet personnel.

If chemical warfare is occurring, as my Government is convinced it is, the Soviet Union is surely responsible. It is highly doubtful that Viet Nam, Laos and Afghanistan have by themselves the scientific or technical capacity to manufacture these illegal substances. The Soviet Union does have that capacity. Can anyone doubt who has provided chemical weapons to those countries?

A number of people and nations have attempted to deny or explain away the accumulating evidence. Given the scientific complexity of the issue and the difficulties of collecting data, fair-minded Governments and individuals can be excused if they are somewhat uncertain. On close examination, however, none of the alternative hypotheses that have been put forward stand up to critical examination.

Most easily dismissed is the Soviet Union's own defence, which is hardly a defence at all. Moscow's undocumented charges of slander, distortion and fabrication by the United States are not worth a reply. The United Nations own group of experts examined the Soviet critiques and gave them no credence whatsoever.

Some observers have taken issue with the testimony of refugees, which they suppose to be the principal foundation of the United States Government's case. These accounts are unreliable, it is said, because they are offered by individuals who have a political or personal axe to grind or who are in the grip of some sort of cultural hysteria.

Even if my Government were relying solely on refugee testimony—which it most certainly is not—the stories of the victims are not to be dismissed. They come from a wide variety of Khmer, Hmong and Afghan refugees, several thousand in number, ranging from little children to the elderly, who came from a variety of locations over a period of several years. The fact that many refugees do not report chemical attacks belies the theory of mass hysteria, thus lending greater credence to the accounts of the victims.

Regrettably, many people continue to regard refugee reports as inherently unreliable. History should teach us to open our ears. Refugees have a record of being excellent sources of information on inaccessible societies and situations.

The first early reports of the Holocaust occurring in Nazi-occupied Europe were brought by people fleeing the terror. Despite the tendency of those who received these reports to dismiss them as implausible and inconceivable, they turned out to be true. Tragically, millions died before the horror ended.

I could cite other, more recent, cases where the stories of refugees in Asia, Africa and Latin America had been initially dismissed but were subsequently confirmed. It strains credulity to believe that the refugees escaping yellow rain in Asia, alone among all the victims of repression, are uniquely engaged in a monumental hoax.

Finally, there are claims that mycotoxins are naturally present in South-East Asia as a result of fungi growing on vegetation and on pollen excreted by bees. This would explain, it is argued, why trichothecenes have been found in the scrapings and medical samples. However, I refer representatives to the following conclusion of a Canadian toxicologist who prepared a report for the Department of External Affairs of the Government of Canada:

> Potential producers of trichothecenes exist in South-East Asia, but neither naturally occurring diseases due to these toxins occur, nor are there any detectable levels of mycotoxins in the natural environment.

The concentrations found in the yellow rain samples are orders of magnitude higher than those found by sophisticated techniques to have occurred naturally. The combination of trichothecenes in the yellow rain samples are unique. And, it should be remembered, trichothecenes are known to exist in nature only in temperate climates.

The truth is that, no matter how hard those who prefer to see, hear and speak no evil may try, the evidence simply cannot be explained away. I must confess that I, too, was originally sceptical of the validity of the yellow rain case when it was first presented by our own Government. But on the basis of a thorough review of the evidence—Congressional hearings in which I have participated, and conversations with doctors who have treated yellow rain victims, scientists who have examined the physical evidence, and the victims of yellow rain attacks themselves—my doubts have vanished.

Other countries have conducted their own investigations. We hope that more will do so. I have already made reference to the studies conducted for the Government of Canada, the principal conclusions of which are as follows:

First, the events that are reported to have taken place at the time of alleged chemical warfare attacks cannot be explained on the basis of naturally occurring diseases.

Secondly, to judge on the basis of eyewitness reports, it appears that three different types of agents have been employed as warfare agents, one of them being yellow rain; the others are green and white.

Thirdly, most of the features ascribed to yellow rain attacks are consistent with trichothecene mycotoxicosis.

Fourthly, although certain types of mycotoxins occur in Thailand and probably also in surrounding countries, there is no history of evidence that they result in diseases with the symptomatology of trichothecene poisoning.

The Governments of other countries have come to conclusions similar to those of the Government of the United States. Member countries of the United Nations have expressed their concern about the use of these weapons in General Assembly resolutions 35/144 C, 36/96 C, 37/89 D, and 37/98 E. Predictably—and to no one's surprise—the Soviet Union and its allies voted against all those resolutions.

The United Nations own Group of Experts has played an important investigatory role. Formed in December 1980 in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 35/144 C under the auspices of the Secretary-General, the Group submitted its interim report a year later. [6] By resolution 36/96 C, the General Assembly extended its mandate for another year.

That Group of Experts, consisting of impartial experts from nonaligned countries, submitted its final report to the General Assembly on 1 December 1982. [7] That report regarded as "unlikely to be valid" the Soviet interpretation that the presence of trichothecenes in samples tested was somehow connected with United States use of Agent Orange in Viet Nam. The Group of Experts did conclude, however, that on the basis of interviews with doctors and victims and of examination of physical samples, "it could not disregard the circumstantial evidence suggestive of the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance in some instances".

The Group of Experts did not reach a more definitive judgement because it was not permitted to make an on-site investigation in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The inability of the Group of Experts to arrive at a more definitive conclusion should not be laid at the door of the Group. It was due solely to the rejection by the authorities controlling those countries of the Group's request to undertake such investigations.

If the allies of the Soviet Union are really innocent of the charges, why did they not permit an independent inquiry to clear their name? If United Nations agricultural experts are welcomed in Laos, why are not chemical weapons experts also welcomed? The areas in which these alleged attacks have taken place do not contain vital military installations knowledge of which would jeopardize the security of those countries. What do they have to hide?

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[6] A/36/613.

[7] The "Conclusions" of the final report are printed in *Documents on Disarmament: 1982*, pp. 848-851.

The Government of the United States believes it important that impartial and objective investigators have access to the affected areas. The rulers in Moscow, Hanoi, Vientiane and Pnom Penh do not appear to share that belief. It seems clear that they know full well that such an investigation would not be exculpatory.

My government hopes that appropriate arrangements will soon be in place to allow the continued investigation of any further report of chemical weapons use. Meanwhile, the only responsible course for those Governments which believe that such weapons have been used is to speak out and to act in accordance with the preponderance of evidence.

We must not minimize the implications of this affront to the international conscience and of this retreat into inhumane barbarism.

The first implication concerns warfare itself. For over five decades chemical and toxin weapons had been successfully eliminated from the battlefields of the world. In the Second World War fear of retaliation was an effective deterrent to the use of chemical warfare among the developed countries, and remains so today. Developing countries, however, do not possess the means to retaliate. Condemnation of the Governments responsible for using chemical weapons is therefore the only recourse they have.

The second implication bears on international law. The prohibition of the use of chemical weapons has, by reason of the practice and affirmations of States, become a part of the rules of customary international law which are binding on all States. Toxins—biologically-produced chemical substances—fall within the prohibitions of both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention. Unless those that cynically violate these agreements are called to account, the continued viability of those agreements will be called into question.

Thirdly, violation of the world's oldest arms control agreement, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, puts other arms control and disarmament agreements in potential—I repeat, potential—jeopardy. Some have argued that Soviet defiance of international norms through the use of chemical and toxin weapons proves that arms control cannot work. If the Soviets blatantly violate two important international treaties, some ask, what will keep them from violating other arms control agreements as well?

By this logic one would soon adopt a defeatist attitude regarding any arms control agreement. My Government cannot and will not accept such a gloomy scenario. It believes that arms control agreements with effective verification and compliance mechanisms are both possible and necessary.

The position of the Government of the United States is clear. Let me repeat that we are committed to the development of a convention that would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of chemical weapons. The convention should mandate the declaration and destruction of all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and of facilities for their production and stockpiling, and it should include effective verification provisions to provide confidence that all parties are complying with all provisions of the convention. My Government deeply regrets that the Government of the Soviet Union has been unwilling to negotiate seriously on verification procedures, specifically on-site inspection, on which such an agreement clearly and unmistakably depends.

Until such a convention is concluded, the Government of the United States will continue to work with other members of the international community in an effort to stop the outrage of chemical warfare in South-East Asia, Afghanistan and anywhere else. Moreover, we support efforts to strengthen the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention and to enforce the existing legal constraints on the use of these weapons.

In December 1982 the United Nations General Assembly recommended by an overwhelming vote that the States that are parties to the biological and toxin weapons Convention be called on to hold a special conference to establish effective procedures for compliance with its provisions.[8] In addition, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish procedures to investigate promptly possible violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.[9] We believe it is important that both resolutions be implemented promptly, and we will continue to participate in follow-on action.

Having said that, I cannot stress too strongly that the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and South-East Asia, in violation of international law and any moral standard, should stir all nations of the world. This is not a propaganda match between East and West. This is not simply a quarrel between the super-Powers. This is a conflict between right and wrong, between morality and immorality, and between humanity and inhumanity. One would hope that the United Nations would make clear on which side it stands.

As a representative of the United States Government and a member of the United States Congress, I wish to convey the deep concern that my colleagues in the Congress and the American people as a whole feel about this issue, and it is in that spirit that I would like to conclude with the timeless words of the English poet, John Donne, who wrote:

> No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece on the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were: Any

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[8] G.A. res. 37/98 C. The vote was 124 to 15, with 1 abstention.

[9] G.A. res. 37/98 D.

> man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind. And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

I cannot resist the obvious paraphrase: ask not on whom the yellow rain falls—it falls on thee.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Petrovsky) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, November 4, 1983 [1]

The Soviet delegation would like first of all to express its satisfaction at the fact that the discussion which has been taking place in the Committee has been concentrating on the truly principal questions of concern to millions of people throughout the world: the aggravation of tension and the growth of the danger of nuclear war.

Our discussion also reflects the principal demand of the exceptionally alarming times in which we live—that is, that the development of events be halted, the nuclear threat removed and the arms race curbed. Effective and fast-acting means of doing this must be found, and this is impossible without a definition of the reasons for and a knowledge of the objective picture of the situation. In order to cure an ailment it is necessary first, of course, to make a correct diagnosis.

During the discussion we have occasionally heard the view expressed that the source of the difficulties is a confrontation of two Powers and two blocs, the Soviet Union and the United States, the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, it is claimed, bear equal responsibility for the arms race and the lack of progress towards ending it. Such a way of presenting the question not only does not correspond to the facts, but, objectively speaking, makes the search for ways of overcoming the extremely dangerous development of the international situation more difficult.

The contemporary situation in the world is determined primarily by an intensive opposition between two basic political courses which are pursued by States without regard to which system of co-ordinates they find themselves in, East or West, North or South. If we were to discern the prime differences between these courses, it would be the attitude to the cardinal question of our time: the problem of the prevention of nuclear war.

The first course, espoused by the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, is that, leaving aside any ideological or other considerations, joint practical measures should be taken to resolve the problem. In these conditions when, as Mrs. Indira Gandhi said at this session:

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.25, pp. 33–67.

> Scientists, scholars and some notable soldiers have vividly described the outcome of a future nuclear war. *(A/38/PV.9, p. 6)*

Only such an approach is in keeping with the demands of political realism.

Meanwhile, attempts are being made to declare advocates of this position as nothing less than dreamers, out of touch with life; whereas the realists, it is claimed, are those who, if not in words at least certainly in practice, do not place the prevention of nuclear war above all other considerations. The latter are pursuing a militaristic course with the intention of disregarding the interests of other States and peoples, trying to impose the rule of might in international relations, resurrecting imperialistic arrangements and halting social processes in the world.

It is this course which is the source of the confrontation. No matter how hard the American representatives try, *inter alia*, at this session, and also at today's meeting to manipulate the facts, asserting that their country was not the initiator and is not still the principal source of the arms race, the facts point to the opposite conclusion.

In the mid-1940s not only was the United States the first to manufacture nuclear weapons, but it used them against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, the nuclear chariot of Washington has been marking out its path with warning signs of lethal danger. One of these signs was represented by Bikini atoll, which has been turned into a place unfit for human habitation as a result of United States nuclear testing there. In looking at those who have been expelled from that atoll, mankind will find food for thought.

At the end of the 1940s the United States was the first to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe, and transferred B-29 aircraft to Britain as their means of delivery. This was the start of the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

In the 1950s it became the initiator of the strategic arms race by setting in motion a broad programme for the construction of intercontinental strategic bombers and, in the 1960s, of ballistic missiles. Having raised its strategic forces to high quantitative levels, the United States then proceeded to engage in their rapid qualitative upgrading. In the 1960s it carried out an intensive rebuilding and modernization of all the components of its strategic forces. As far back as the second half of the 1960s the Pentagon proceeded to equip submarine-launched ballistic missiles with independently targeted warheads. The United States was the first to use independently targeted warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles.

We are constantly being told here that the United States has reduced its nuclear megatonnage. But at the same time, nothing is said about the fact that in the 1970s when, according to the information of the United States representative, the United States was virtually sitting twiddling its thumbs, the nuclear potential of the strategic offensive forces of the United States in terms of quantity of warheads was approximately doubled, and reached some 10,000 units, with a significant rise in strike accuracy and the possibility of the retargeting of missiles.

All of this sharply increased American capacity for striking at the strategic potential of the other side. At the same time, in the United States preparations proceeded on a technical basis for the next phase in the build-up of strategic arms. The efforts of the Soviet Union and its allies in the 1970s were only designed solely to eliminate the supremacy in the sphere of strategic nuclear armaments which the United States had in the 1960s, and to prevent it from regaining such supremacy in subsequent years.

We must point out, however, that at all stages the Soviet Union has always preferred political solutions to military and technological solutions. When on the threshold of the 1970s it became evident that there was a danger of the introduction of the MIRV-type of missile, we proposed that the door should be shut on this destabilizing and costly trend in the arms race; subsequently we were guided by the same considerations of principle in proposing that before new spirals in the strategic arms race could begin, the deployment of new types and systems of such weapons as the B-1 bomber, the cruise missile and the Ohio submarine should be ruled out.

At the present time there is an approximate equality between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and conventional armaments. But, of course, formulas such as equality, balance and parity do not mean that both sides have equal amounts of identical armaments. Because of the specific features in the make-up of the armed forces, this cannot be so. For example, although in the strategic forces of the Soviet Union there are more land-based intercontinental missiles, the United States, which has traditionally emphasized the development of strategic aviation, has an edge over the Soviet Union in that arm of the services.

There are also objective disproportions in respect of general parity in conventional weapons. For example, the NATO bloc has an advantage in terms of the general numerical strength of manpower and the number of divisions ready for action, while being at a disadvantage in terms of the number of tactical aircraft.

The existence of parity is well known to American leaders and was officially recognized by Washington in the 1970s. In such circumstances it is surprising to hear the American representative come here and say that the United States is seeking

> to restore a stable military balance and to do what is necessary to assure deterrence and reduce the risk of war. *(A/C.1/38/PV.7, p. 27)*

The facts reveal a quite opposite picture. The present Administration is clearly striving for military supremacy and to establish a nuclear first-strike potential. It is planning to spend almost $2 trillion on its military programmes over the next five years. Intercontinental ballistic missiles of the MX type are being developed or are already being deployed, together with Midgetmen, nuclear submarines armed with new Ohio-type missiles and new strategic B-4 bombers, not to mention stealth and cruise missiles, both land-based and sea-based. There are plans to increase the overall quantity of strategic nuclear warheads from 15,000 to 20,000 by 1990 and the number of warships to 600. The tactical air force will have approximately 3,000 new planes, and land-based forces will have more than 7,000 new tanks.

While there are already more than 1,500 American military bases and facilities on foreign territories, work is going forward on the establishment of new springboards in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Central America for the use of armed forces against any country that rejects the diktats of Washington. It is evident that the United States war machine that has been built up under the pretext of the alleged Soviet threat is being used to an ever wider extent for interference in the internal affairs of other States and to impose upon peoples the systems and arrangements that suit Washington.

As for what the representative of the United States had to say today about the principles of law and morality, there has been no doubt for a long time about what the United States means by its attachment to those principles. American researchers have had their hands full studying the use of force and the threat of use of force by the United States in the recent past. There have been between 200 and 600 such instances, and that nicely disposes of the United States notions of morality.

In Viet Nam law and morality, as understood by Washington, were inculcated with napalm and toxic chemicals. In Lebanon they are being hammered home with salvoes of gunfire from warships. In El Salvador they are being introduced through genocide. In Grenada, the main instrument of American fist-fight law—the Marines and their weapons—have been given battle training which they will put to use in the Middle East and, eventually, in other places too.

Eloquent evidence of the United States desire for military supremacy can be found in the history of efforts in the field of arms limitation. The Baruch Plan, introduced at the dawn of the nuclear age, was the first American proposal.[2] That plan provided for the establishment of an international control organ through which the United States, which then had a guaranteed majority of votes in the United Nations and the Atomic Energy Commission, intended to institute control over all nuclear facilities and all the nuclear energy production of other countries. It wanted control over everyone and everything and, in substance, no control over the United States fissionable materials and the atom bombs that were already being prepared. That, at least, was the idea of the Baruch Plan, which clearly indicated the desire of the United States to use multilateral machinery to consolidate its own nuclear monopoly, not in military terms only, but in the uses of nuclear energy generally.

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[2] The Baruch Plan is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 7–16, 44–47.

To counter that plan, the Soviet Union submitted in 1946 a proposal for the prohibition of the production and use of weapons employing nuclear energy for purposes of mass destruction and for guarantees of the exclusively peaceful uses of such energy.[3] However, that proposal was rejected by the United States.

The desire to attain one-sided advantages, first expressed in the Baruch Plan, continues to be a prominent part of United States nuclear policy. That policy, which is marked throughout by a double standard, manifests itself in disregard of the lawful security interests of the other side and in the use of negotiations to leave the United States armaments programme untouched while limiting to the fullest possible extent the opportunities of the other side to take responsive action.

The propagandistic underpinning of that policy is strengthened by the deliberate sowing of confusion among the public, by giving an appearance of comprehensiveness to American projects and by blasphemously labelling weapons devised for the mass destruction of human beings "protectors of peace". Madison Avenue, the centre of the American advertising industry has a great deal to learn from the experts in Washington about the marketing of such shoddy political goods. One such propaganda ploy is the justification of the establishment of new armaments with the argument that they will serve as bargaining chips in negotiations and, thus, be a way of getting results. Aside from the absurdity of the notion of arming in order to disarm, it should be pointed out that it has been impossible to achieve agreements on any of the many types of weapons that are being manufactured on that pretext.

All of this is mere juggling with words. Another example of this is the myth according to which the Soviet Union has a monopoly on a whole class of medium-range weapons in Europe of which the West allegedly has no counterpart. At the same time the forward-based United States weapons are forgotten, along with the British and French nuclear armaments. Under the SALT I[4] and SALT II[5] agreements intercontinental ballistic missiles are deemed to be those with a range of approximately 5,500 kilometres, that is, those that can attain the territory of the Soviet Union from the territory of the United States, and vice versa. Intermediate-range weapons in Europe would be considered those with a range of 1,000 kilometres and above, not intercontinental but capable of striking at the vital centres in the territory of the Soviet Union when launched from the territory of the Western European countries of NATO or from the adjacent seas. The existence of weapons of this type—and NATO has 162 such missiles, land-based and sea-based, and about 700 aircraft—means that for several years there has been an approximate balance in Europe, with a ratio of 1:1 in terms of delivery vehicles and 1:1.4 in favour of NATO in terms of warheads. This ratio did not change even when the numerical strength of the Soviet missiles known in the West as SS-20 increased up to 1982, when the Soviet Union unilaterally introduced a freeze on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union, because as each new missile became operational, one old missile was removed, sometimes even two.

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 17-24.

[4] *Ibid.*, 1972, pp. 197 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*, 1979, pp. 189 ff.

During the period when negotiations have been taking place on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe the Soviet Union has removed from service not merely a dozen of its medium-range missiles in Europe. Today I would emphasize that the SS-5 missile has been completely withdrawn from service, a missile formerly deployed in the European zone which in fact had a range no less than that of the SS-20 and in terms of warheads was considerably larger. In actual fact the Soviet Union is unilaterally reducing the number of its medium-range missiles.

It is appropriate to recall also that implementation of the Soviet proposals would have led to the Soviet Union having considerably fewer missiles and warheads than before 1976, when the SS-20 was not in service. In these circumstances what kind of supremacy is the Soviet Union supposed to have? The United States would like to put itself in a position of supremacy by deploying close to the Soviet Union nuclear weapons capable of striking at targets deep inside Soviet territory. All the United States steps in the negotiations have been designed on this clearly invalid basis, starting with the so-called zero option, including the intermediate versions and leading up to the latest proposals which were put forward in the portentous statement of the President of the United States in the United Nations on 26 September.[6]

A great deal has been said about the flexibility of the new United States approach, but this flexibility does not go beyond mere words. The substance of the United States policy remains unchanged: securing for itself a significant military edge by the deployment of the new missiles in Europe. As a result, in the Geneva talks a deadlock remains, as before, and we must say this quite openly. While displaying false optimism and trying to placate the peoples by saying that everything is going normally in the negotiations, Washington is stubbornly pressing on to ensure that its Pershings and cruise missiles will be deployed in Western Europe in the near future. So the situation is now critical and it cannot be described in any other way. The United States is bringing the entire world to the threshold of a new and exceedingly dangerous spiral in the arms race.

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[6] See [illegible]

Here we must be absolutely clear. The emergence in Western Europe of new United States missiles will make it impossible to continue the negotiations now taking place in Geneva. On the other hand, the Geneva negotiations can be continued if the United States does not proceed actually to deploy these missiles.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, during the two years of negotiations it has shown convincingly that it is prepared to agree to a broad range of bold solutions. The Soviet proposals contain all the necessary elements for a mutually acceptable agreement not detrimental to anyone's interests—not to those of the Soviet Union and its allies or to those of the United States or the Western European States. We have shown and are still showing flexibility in the quest for concrete solutions while maintaining one unalterable condition: the balance of forces in Europe in terms of medium-range nuclear weapons must not be upset. On our side there is no desire for supremacy, but we will not permit a NATO supremacy in these systems.

In the framework of such an approach based on principle, we are prepared to seek equitable arrangements. A routine confirmation of this was provided by some additional steps announced by Mr. Andropov in replies to questions by *Pravda* in an interview published on 27 October,[7] on which we have already reported in detail to members of the Committee in our statement on 31 October. Unfortunately, many of our proposals, including some very substantial ones, have for some curious reason gone unnoticed by the United States side. Yesterday's statement by the representative of the United States, in which he tried to accuse the Soviet Union of attempting to achieve supremacy in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,[8] showed that the Washington experts do not seem to have any idea about the whole range of our proposals relating precisely to that category of armaments. How could they not know that the delegation of the United States spent many years on the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of forces and armaments in Central Europe, and rejected all the proposals by the socialist countries to include tactical nuclear weapons in the reductions and limitations discussed there? Can the representative of the United States be unaware of that?

I would also ask him who is to blame for the fact that there was no development in response to the very timely and constructive proposal by Sweden for the establishment in Europe of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, not only did it support that idea but it also proposed that the width of the zone should be 500 or 600 kilometres instead of 300 kilometres: in other words, 250 or 300 kilometres from east to west on each side of the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries. Furthermore, how can the United States side be unaware that during the Geneva negotiations the Soviet Union has been calling for a genuine zero solution of the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe—the complete elimination from the continent of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons?

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[7] *Ante*

[8] A/C.1/38/PV.23, pp. 31–42

A very clear example of Madison Avenue propaganda and the double standard is to be found in the United States approach to the strategic arms limitation talks (START).

The present Administration, which also failed to ratify the SALT II treaty, has made proposals designed to give the impression that the United States seeks radical reductions in strategic weapons. But these reductions would affect primarily the Soviet Union and, if its plan were put into effect, the United States would in terms of delivery vehicles achieve an advantage of one and a half times and in terms of nuclear warheads a threefold advantage. For its part the United States, by withdrawing its obsolete weapon-systems from service would have an opportunity to deploy unimpeded all the new weapons designed for first-strike nuclear capability.

The United States "flexibility" in the negotiations, was demonstrated merely by adjusting the conditions for the START agreements to suit the intended programme for the build-up of the American strategic arsenal.

The latest example of such "flexibility" is the American proposal for "reduction through modernization" (build-down). This formula, which is at first sight quite incomprehensible, on closer inspection turns out to be merely a cover for a build-up of the arms race. In the first place, it involves replacement of old nuclear weapons by new, even more dangerous, weapons. At the same time, the ratio between warheads being introduced and removed is so arranged that the reduction would affect primarily land-based ICBM warheads, which historically—as I have pointed out—are predominant in the Soviet strategic arsenal, and, to a much lesser extent, would require a reduction of submarine-based warheads and strategic air forces, on which the United States relies.

As justification for such an American approach, we constantly hear arguments about strengthening "strategic stability": land-based ICBMs—the Soviet Union having slightly more of these than the United States—are arbitrarily and one-sidedly declared to be "destabilizing systems" which should come first in line for basic cuts. At this point, a question is in order: on what basis is the United States arrogating to itself a monopoly right to hang such labels on the strategic weapons of both sides, while surreptitiously shifting the notion of stability to suit the specific needs of its own strategic forces? How, for example, can we regard as a "stabilizing" element a cruise missile of unprecedented accuracy and extremely difficult to intercept by early-warning systems once it has been launched and whose numerical strength and deployment are extremely difficult to monitor with national technical means of verification? How can one calculate as part of the stabilizing systems sea-based ballistic missiles which are capable of striking from unexpected directions and with shorter flight times than ICBMs and are just as accurate? It is clear that a selective restriction of some weapons in the context of START is quite as unacceptable as an arbitrary removal of other weapons beyond the framework of the agreements. We favour an integrated limitation and reduction of all the components of strategic potential, on the basis of the principle of identical security and equality.

The Soviet position at the START negotiations provides for a reduction of Soviet and American strategic delivery vehicles by approximately 25 per cent compared with the ceilings established in SALT II, and also a substantial reduction of nuclear warheads to equal agreed levels. Such a reduction, which would assure a military strategic balance at much lower levels, would rule out the acquisition by either party of one-sided advantages or supremacy.

With regard to confidence-building measures designed to strengthen the stability of the strategic situation and prevent the outbreak of crisis situations, there is no need for persuasion. The widely touted American proposals do not, unlike the Soviet proposals, in any way limit the military activities of either side but may reduce them to an exchange of information about certain types of activity. The point is not that the American proposal differs from the Soviet proposal on this, it is, rather, that the United States, without any serious grounds for doing so, has rejected the earlier and much more far-reaching proposals of the Soviet Union. These proposals are: prohibition of flights of heavy bombers and the movement of aircraft carriers of one side in agreed zones adjacent to the territory of the other side, and, in due course, it would be necessary to notify each other of the mass take-off of heavy bombers and forward-based aircraft; it would also be necessary to establish, in the case of missile-equipped submarines, zones in which any anti-vessel activity of the other side would be prohibited.

Many countries in their statements in the First Committee have expressed concern also with the state of affairs in a number of other areas of arms limitation. The answer to the question of who is to blame for this is easier to arrive at if one considers the facts. In 1978 the United States unilaterally broke off the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of the sale and supply of conventional weapons; in 1979, on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean; and in 1980, on the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

In the statement of the United States reference was made several times to the need to prohibit chemical weapons—and it has shown rather naive activity in this matter.[9] But today's statement of the American representative was useful in that it helped us get to the substance of all this and understand that the attainment of agreement does not figure at all in the plans of the United States. Today's statement was more eloquent than all others we had heard before. It really revealed the substance of the American position and in that respect it is helpful. But if the United States were in actual fact and not merely in words to want the conclusion of a convention and reach agreement, well, it would not be that complicated, particularly since the Soviet proposals for the prohibition of chemical weapons include something the United States has already agreed to in bilateral negotiations. However, as today's statement has shown us, Washington does not need agreement, it simply needs a screen behind which it can go on building up its own arsenals of chemical weapons, the biggest arsenals of such weapons in the world. This demagoguery is simply an attempted cover-up.

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[9] *Supra.*

They then bring out myths about incidents of the use of chemical weapons of Soviet manufacture in Afghanistan and South-East Asia. We would have thought that these myths had already been proved to be totally ludicrous, they certainly do not withstand contact with reality. The Group of Experts on Chemical Weapons working at the United Nations reached the conclusion that it was impossible to confirm that such weapons had been used and direct pressure on the experts and attempts by the United States special services to feed them specially prepared witnesses were of no avail in changing the Group's position. In a recent Australian press release we read that so-called poisoned leaves from Laos bore no traces of chemicals—it was all pure imagination. The conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science reached the conclusion, as we read in the British press, that the State Department's samples which it claimed proved the use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia have not the remotest connection with chemical weapons. No matter how hard the United States representatives have tried to deceive everybody, it is well known that the Soviet Union has never used chemical weapons and has never transferred them to anyone, but has consistently advocated and still advocates the need for the complete elimination of the means of chemical warfare.

As for this propagandistic hullabaloo whipped up by Washington over the alleged use of chemical weapons of Soviet manufacture, there is no doubt that another purpose is being pursued here. The purpose is to force people to forget the real facts concerning the use of chemical weapons by the United States Army in Viet Nam in the 1960s and 1970s and to try to lull public opinion in connection with plans to equip the American Armed Forces with new binary weapons.

The United States approach to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons convincingly demonstrates that Washington has been sabotaging—we cannot use any other word—the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The medieval alchemists used to try and find ways to turn base metals into gold. Now the Washington alchemists are trying to present the ignoble position of the United States as something noble.

I think a very similar response could be made on the United States position on the nuclear test ban. The United States has been virtually refusing to engage in negotiations, thus disregarding the obligations

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that it assumed under the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban Treaty.[10] I would go further than that: it is not just disregarding them but is not carrying out its Treaty obligations in that respect.

We cannot fail to be concerned by the general trend of the policy of the current United States Administration towards disruption of the system of arms limitation agreements reached earlier and its tendency to cancel out all the positive experience that has been accumulated in this field in previous years. This applies particularly to the SALT II treaty. Washington has not applied it and has now virtually cut out the ground from under it. Nothing has been done to implement the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which the United States refuses to ratify, raising the question of their review. What about the 1925 Geneva Protocol?[11] Let us see a clear picture of the way things stand.

For 50 years the United States refused to ratify that Protocol and quite blatantly violated the generally accepted rules of international law prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Then, having become a party to the Protocol, the United States unilaterally reserved its right to be the first to use a number of chemical warfare agents and now, under the pretext of the elaboration of verification procedures, is doing its utmost to disrupt this important instrument of international law from within.

This is the substance of the American position on this question: to weaken existing barriers to the arms race and prevent the establishment of new ones, on which Washington is now basing its plans for military supremacy with this—supremacy which the United States intends to use to impose systems that it prefers and for the suppression of the will of other peoples and countries. However, these aims cannot be achieved. The material and technological capacities of the parties are now such that any violation of parity will be restored as inevitably as the level of fluids balances out in communicating vessels.

Military rivalry is not the choice of the Soviet Union. We do not seek confrontation with the United States. But we cannot remain indifferent to actions that are pushing the world towards the edge of the nuclear abyss and we stress the need to curb the forces of war and thus avert nuclear madness, so that all those who cherish peace can be heard.

This requires a realistic, responsible approach enabling the overcoming of the tension in international relations that has now reached such a dangerous level. Yuri Andropov has emphasized that

> mankind is not doomed to destruction. The arms race must and can be stopped. Mankind deserves a better lot than to live in a world torn apart by conflicts and stifling under the burden of death-dealing weapons.[12]

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[10] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963,* pp. 291–293.

[11] *Ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.

[12] *Ante,* Sept. 28; variant translation.

As you, Mr. Chairman, have rightly observed, the atmosphere is of great importance for international relations and one of our main tasks is to try to improve it, as this would help produce results from ongoing negotiations on the limitation and reduction of arms. Many speakers in this Committee have said this and we entirely agree with them.

It was precisely for that reason that the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly a draft declaration condemning nuclear war.[13] The Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1981, states that wars are born in the minds of men, therefore it is essential to create barriers in their minds that would prevent a nuclear catastrophe.[14] According to Albert Einstein, the danger of such a catastrophe flows from the fact that, having discovered atomic energy, the human race has failed to learn to think in accordance with that new reality. At the current session of the General Assembly, Ministers and heads of delegations of non-aligned countries have rightly expressed concern over the possibility of legitimizing nuclear weapons and making them appear as something ordinary. In this connection, it is particularly important to recognize and to bring home to everyone a demand, prompted by common sense and a sense of responsibility for the fate of the world, that the very notion of nuclear war and all designs to unleash it must be rejected as criminal and incompatible with human conscience and morality.

Law, morality and conscience in any civilized society not only reject and condemn attempts on human life but also rightly qualify the premeditated preparation for murder as a grave crime, and this is generally recognized as an effective measure of crime prevention. Accordingly, premeditated preparation for unleashing nuclear war is nothing other than a crime, but in this case a crime involving billions of human lives. After the victory of the United Nations in the second world war, the nazi criminals who had unleashed that war were condemned at the Nuremberg trials. What tribunal will pass a *post factum* verdict on nuclear war, the gravest crime against humanity, if we fail to prevent it? Those who take part in preparations for unleashing such a war must be put on trial by the peoples of the world now.

The condemnation of nuclear war would constitute a forceful reminder by the United Nations that all nations have a common interest in escaping nuclear war and this is what should underly the concept of universal security, as was rightly pointed out by Ms. Theorin, the representative of Sweden.

As for the statements made here with respect to the need to renounce not only nuclear war but any war and any use of force in violation of the United Nations Charter, I should like to reiterate that the Soviet Union is consistently advocating that the non-use of force in relations among States should become an immutable law governing international affairs. The proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations and for a treaty on the mutual non-use of force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty States and the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are aimed at precluding the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, but it is precisely through the fault of those who are now trying to question the necessity of condemning nuclear war that those treaties have not so far been concluded and that work on negotiating their texts is being blocked.

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[13] *Ante*, Oct. 4.

[14] G.A. res. 36/104.

Fabricated arguments are also being used by the United States and the other NATO nuclear Powers to justify their negative attitude on the question of following the example set for them by assuming the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. As Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico has rightly observed

> the result [of this], from the moral, psychological and pragmatic points of view[15]

would be very substantial in terms of diminishing the nuclear threat. One's attitude towards the issue of a freeze of nuclear arsenals puts to the test one's will to adopt measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war in physical terms. Agreeing on a freeze, like using the emergency brake on a train, would immediately halt the dangerous process of the unchecked nuclear arms race. An altogether different political climate would ensue, making it easier to reach agreements on reducing the stockpiles of those weapons.

The whole course of the discussion has shown that, save for a few well-known exceptions, the overwhelming majority of delegations attach priority to the task of freezing nuclear weapons, the speedy fulfilment of which is the objective of the Soviet Union's proposal submitted at this session. However, we have also heard some objections, in particular to the effect that "deep reductions in nuclear arms" are preferable to a freeze. This position amounts to pushing at an open door. The Soviet Union has repeatedly indicated its readiness to go far beyond a freeze. The Soviet proposals concerning a programme of nuclear disarmament are before the Committee on Disarmament. That they are not being given serious consideration is entirely the fault of the United States and some of its allies.

Furthermore, there is no contradiction between the beginning of a reduction process and a freeze; on the contrary, should there be no freeze another spiral of the qualitative arms race—that is, the production of even more sophisticated and powerful means of destruction, which is possible even within lower quantitative ceilings—would threaten to upset the stability of the military strategic situation to an even greater degree, make peace even less stable and greatly increase difficulties in working out arms limitation agreement.

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[15] A/C.1/38/PV.3, p. 26. Brackets in the source text.

In the absence of convincing arguments, the representatives of certain countries have claimed here that a freeze is unacceptable because it is not verifiable. Meanwhile, many competent specialists in the field of nuclear weapons, including high-ranking United States politicians, have stated on more than one occasion that compliance with freeze obligations could be effectively verified by national technical means. Among those who have arrived at this conclusion in the United States are the former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Clifford, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Colby, the former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Warnke, Mr. Harriman, the prominent politician, and many others.

The argument over verification is all the more untenable when one takes into consideration the willingness expressed by the Soviet Union to work out, if necessary, certain additional verification measures in that field on the basis of co-operation, taking due account of the results of earlier and on-going arms limitation talks.

The work of the First Committee has been characterized by, among other things, its increased attention to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. We are gratified to note that this issue now rightfully ranks among the most urgent problems of disarmament. Its solution has been advocated by representatives of a great number of socialist and non-aligned States, as well as by a number of Western countries.

Against this background, all the more visible are the attempts by those to whom we have addressed our new proposals to evade a straight answer to them, including a specific answer as to willingness to adopt verifiable substantive measures to prevent the militarization of outer space.

The conclusion of a Treaty on the non-use of force in and from space—a draft of which has been submitted by the Soviet Union to the present session [16]—would establish a political and legal régime for the non-use of force in and from outer space and would, at the same time, ensure reliable material guarantees for such non-use. For instance, provisions contained in the Soviet draft treaty to the effect that tests of any anti-satellite systems should be prohibited, that the development of new anti-satellite systems should be banned and that the existing systems should be eliminated make it possible to find a comprehensive and radical solution to the anti-satellite weapons problem. If anyone is not clear about the meaning of these direct words, we can clarify them: this prohibition would cover both Soviet satellite killers and United States systems based on F–15 aircraft, as well as others.

Is the United States side willing to say "yes" to this solution? Or is American talk about a priority United States concern over anti-satellite systems nothing more than another round—this time a space round—in a scare tactic using the "Soviet threat" for the sole purpose of providing a cover for its own militaristic outer space programmes?

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[16] *Ante*, Aug. 19.

The situation with regard to verification is no less clear. The verification provisions contained in the Soviet draft treaty ensure reliable implementation of the obligations to be assumed under it by the parties. Nevertheless, we are prepared—if it becomes necessary in the course of specific work on the treaty—to prepare and agree upon some additional measures to ensure mutual confidence by the States parties to the treaty that it will be observed.

Reflecting as they do the interests of the majority of United Nations Member States, the Soviet proposals constitute major reference points for urgent joint efforts of States designed to stop the growth of the nuclear war threat. In the alarming international situation of today, the entire vast potential of the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining international security must be tapped. As you rightly noted, Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of our deliberations:

> We have a duty towards the Charter, and towards the peoples of the world who are deeply concerned about the present situation, to act together in a sense of common purpose and common destiny. *(A/C.1/38/PV.3, pp. 8–10)*

As for the Soviet Union, it expresses its willingness to join in the efforts of all-countries, irrespective of their socio-political systems, and of all those who advocate security through agreements and co-operation as well as practical steps that could prevent the worst from happening. This opportunity should not be wasted, while there is still time.

Summary of a Statement by the Soviet Representative (Petrovsky) to the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Outer Space [Extract], November 7, 1983 [1]

32. Mr. Petrovsky . . . said that outer space must not become an arena for military confrontation. It must be explored peacefully and creatively in order to promote co-operation among States. There were those, however, who considered outer space as an area for deploying the most sophisticated and deadly systems of destruction. COPUOS had done much to promote the elaboration of fundamental norms of international law limiting the militarization of outer space. Its work had led to the adoption of the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. COPUOS should continue its

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[1] A/SPC/38/SR.21, pp. 8–9.

useful work in that field and should consider, as a matter of priority, effective measures to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space.

33. From the very beginning of the space age, it had been the position of the Soviet Union that the concepts of the exploration of outer space and war were incompatible. In 1958, his country had proposed in the United Nations a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes, [2] which had played a decisive role in the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. [3] In accordance with that policy of principle the Soviet Union had submitted to the United Nations in 1981 a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of any types of weapons in outer space. [4] However, the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on urgent measures to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space were being sabotaged by those who sought to achieve military superiority through the militarization of outer space.

34. In the past 12 to 18 months alone, a number of top-level decisions had been taken in the United States to develop and deploy in earth orbit a series of weapon systems. The mass media in the United States had been literally inundated with sensationalist reports about ways and means of waging space war.

35. The hypocritical attempts to depict future United States space weapons as defensive deceived no one. Their purpose was to destroy the space early warning command, control and communications systems of the other side in order to make it as vulnerable as possible to a pre-emptive strike. The objective was to be able to deliver a nuclear first strike and remain safe from a retaliatory strike. Such a concept could only increase the risk of a nuclear conflict by undermining strategic stability, which was an important factor in preventing the threat of nuclear war.

36. The massive expenditures required in such an endeavour would be greater than all the resources which mankind had thus far wasted for destructive purposes. Well-known scientists in the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries had convincingly demonstrated the inherent danger of developing the means for space warfare. Many of them had called upon the leaders of the two super-Powers to reach, without delay, an agreement which would prevent such a course of events. His country, which was aware that the current juncture was crucial, had given those appeals great attention. The Soviet Union had reiterated its proposal to ban the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and was prepared to reach agreement on the total prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the earth. As was well known, the Soviet Union had submitted a draft treaty on that subject at the current session of the General Assembly. [5]

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* vol. II, pp. 973–977.
[3] *Ibid., 1967,* pp. 38–43.
[4] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 334–336.
[5] *Ante,* Aug. 19.

37. The objective of the draft treaty was to prohibit the threat or use of force in outer space, in the earth's atmosphere and on earth through the utilization of any space objects as instruments of destruction. An important distinctive feature of the draft treaty was the combination of political and legal obligations with concrete practical measures to guarantee the fulfilment of those obligations. He emphasized that the draft treaty envisaged a radical and final solution to the question of anti-satellite systems. Such weapons must disappear from the military arsenals of all countries without exception.

38. The obligation unilaterally assumed by the Soviet Union not to be the first to station any kinds of anti-satellite weapons in outer space provided that other States refrained from launching such weapons was convincing proof of its sincere commitment and good will. The United States should follow that example as the first step towards a complete prohibition and elimination of anti-satellite weapons.

39. The Soviet proposal on the non-use of force in and from outer space would be a major contribution towards achieving the goal of using outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. It was time to move from rhetoric to the concrete elaboration of an international treaty. COPUOS was the most appropriate forum for that endeavour.

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Remarks by President Reagan: Nuclear War and Negotiating From Strength [Extracts], November 11, 1983 [1]

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Many years ago, after he became President, Dwight Eisenhower, as President, wrote a letter to a noted publisher in our country. And he said in that letter that we had to face the fact that weapons were being developed in which we could no longer see a war that would end in victory or defeat as we had always known it. But the weapons were such that it would end in the destruction of human kind. And, as he said, when we reach that moment, then let us have the intelligence to sit down at a table and negotiate our problems before we destroy the world.

I see it also in another way that he didn't mention. Once upon a time, we had rules of warfare. War is an ugly thing, but we had rules in which we made sure that soldiers fought soldiers, but they did not victimize civilians. That was civilized. Today we've lost something of civilization in that the very weapons we're talking about are designed to destroy civilians by the millions. And let us at least get back to where we once were—that if we talk war at all, we talk it in a way in which there could be victory or defeat and in which civilians have some measure of protection.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 21, 1983, pp. 1569, 1570. The remarks were made in Tokyo in an interview with NHK Television.

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Yes, and this is part of that realism that I meant. I once did a lot of negotiating across a table as a labor leader on behalf of a union, and I think I know and understand the give and take of negotiations. But for a number of years now, recently, we have sat at the table in meetings with the Soviet leaders who have engaged in the biggest military buildup in the history of mankind. And they sat on their side of the table looking at us and knowing that unilaterally we were disarming without getting anything in return. They didn't have to give up anything. They saw themselves get stronger in relation to all of us as we, ourselves, made ourselves weaker.

I think realistically to negotiate arms reductions they have to see that there is a choice. Either they join in those arms reductions, or they then have to face the fact that we are going to turn our industrial might to building the strength that would be needed to deter them from ever starting a war.

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Italian Draft Resolution Submitted in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and Prohibition of Antisatellite Systems, November 11, 1983 [1]

The General Assembly,

Believing that any activity in outer space should be for peaceful purposes and carried on for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of the degree of their economic development,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations in the interests of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding, [2]

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[1] A/C.1/38/L.28. The draft resolution was co-sponsored by Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, FRG, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Uruguay. It was withdrawn on Nov. 25 (A/C.1/38/PV.41, p. 9).

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Aware of the fundamental contribution that space activities make to international peace and security, to the task of averting the outbreak of war, in particular a nuclear war and to the implementation of disarmament agreements,

Recognizing that an arms race in outer space would gravely threaten international peace and security and jeopardize peaceful activities in this new area of human endeavour,

Aware of the need to prevent an arms race in outer space and, in particular, of the threat posed by anti-satellite systems and their destabilizing effects on international peace and security,

Reaffirming paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which states that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,[3]

Recalling its resolutions 37/99 D and 37/83 of 18 January 1982,

Taking note of the section of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space",[4]

1. *Reaffirms* that further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the International community;

2. *Notes with appreciation* the increased attention given by Member States to this question and their contributions to the discussion of this item in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* that there is no objection in principle in the Committee on Disarmament to the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

4. *Notes further* the various proposals submitted by Member States to the Committee on Disarmament concerning the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group and its mandate and the progress achieved in the elaboration of a mandate acceptable to all;

5. *Expresses the hope that,* at the beginning of its 1984 session, the Committee on Disarmament, in discharging its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, will establish, without delay, an *ad hoc* working group with an appropriate mandate, to deal with the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

6. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue its consideration of the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements

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[3] *Ibid., 1978,* p. 426.

[4] General Assembly *Official Records: Thirty-eighth Session, Supp. No. 27* (A/38/27), pp. 167–169.

aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, including ways of strengthening the outer-space legal régime with regard to the protection of satellites;

7. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on its consideration of the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

U.S. Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Peace and Disarmament Movements, November 12, 1983 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that well-informed discussion and debate on all points of view relating to disarmament issues may exercise a positive influence on the attainment of meaningful arms limitation measures, progress in disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Convinced that one of the best ways to build trust and confidence and to advance the conditions which contribute to the cause of disarmament is through the co-operation and participation of all States and by the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinion on questions of arms limitation and disarmament,

Desirous of promoting the freedom of all citizens to participate in an informed and free discussion of such matters,

Recalling that the world disarmament campaign was launched at the twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction that at its twelfth special session the General Assembly called, *inter alia,* for the world disarmament campaign to be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner, for the universality of the campaign to be guaranteed by the co-operation and participation of all States and by the widest possible dissemination of information, for unimpeded access by all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions, and for the campaign to provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions,

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[1] A/C.1/38/L.61. Initially sponsored by Australia, FRG, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, U.K., U.S., and Uruguay; subsequently, also sponsored by the Bahamas, Costa Rica, Netherlands, Portugal, and Singapore.

Czechoslovakia submitted amendments on Nov. 21 (see *post*). The United States submitted sub-amendments for those amendments on Nov. 23 (*post*), and a revised draft resolution on Nov. 25 (*post*). Both Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria submitted further amendments on Nov. 29 (*post*). On Nov. 30, the United States, on behalf of the sponsors, withdrew the revised draft resolution (*post*). The Soviet Union challenged the right of the sponsors to withdraw a draft resolution which had been the "subject of amendments or sub-amendments" (A/C.1/38/PV.46, pp. 18–19); whereupon the chairman ruled that according to Rule 122 a draft resolution remained the property of its sponsors until it had actually been amended (*ibid.*, pp. 19–20).

Recalling its resolution 37/100 I, adopted without a vote, which approved the general framework of the world disarmament campaign,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 37/100 J;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to permit their citizens freely and publicly to express their own views on disarmament questions and to organize and meet publicly for that purpose;

3. *Further calls upon* Member States to permit free exchange of such information between their citizens and the Secretary-General;

4. *Expresses regret* that some citizens and peace groups have met with difficulties in engaging in activities promoting peace and disarmament pursuant to resolution 37/100 J;

5. *Encourages* Member States and non-governmental organizations to furnish information to the Secretary-General pertinent to the monitoring of compliance with the commitment to further free discussion and debate on disarmament questions;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly utilizing the reports submitted by Member States and non-governmental organizations on implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

U.S. Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, November 12, 1983[1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,[2] and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,[3]

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[1] A/C.1/38/L.64. The draft resolution was co-sponsored by Swaziland, U.K., and Uruguay. It was withdrawn by the sponsors on Nov. 17 (A/C.1/38/PV.33, p. 48).

[2] The text of the Protocol is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

Noting reports that such weapons have been used in military operations in various regions of the world,

Noting also efforts under way to strengthen relevant international constraints, including efforts to develop appropriate fact-finding mechanisms,

Rededicating its efforts to protect mankind from chemical and biological warfare,

1. *Calls anew* for strict observance of existing legal constraints on chemical and biological weapons and condemns actions that contravene these constraints;
2. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts to ensure the most effective possible constraints on chemical and biological weapons;
3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations aimed at complete and effective elimination of chemical weapons.

Address by ACDA Director Adelman, November 17, 1983 [1]

It is a great pleasure to be here with all of you today. I want to thank you for this welcome opportunity to discuss one of, if not the most intellectually challenging, emotionally gripping, and profoundly important issues of our era—how to control arms and reduce the risk of war.

It is a matter of survival and also of how we make a better, safer world wherein freedom and justice flourish. It is, in an era of nuclear weaponry, a matter of global dimensions. And it is, I can assure you, an area that deeply and personally involves the President. It receives the highest priority of all of us serving under his leadership.

In a few days, many television viewers across the land will witness a powerful, draining portrayal of the horrors of nuclear war and its aftermath. The movie is, as you probably know, "The Day After." Believe me, it is moving. Recently, scientific panels also have reminded us that nuclear war would have horrible and far-reaching consequences that would, by no means, be limited to the participants or to their hemisphere.

The thought of a "nuclear winter nightmare," the drama of the destruction of a typical American city—such as Lawrence, Kansas—and of society as we know and cherish it are piercing reminders of the need to do everything possible to eliminate the chances of nuclear war from ever occurring. As President Reagan has said on several occasions: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." [2] And: "There are no winners in a nuclear war—only losers." [3]

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 1984, pp. 45–49. Mr. Adelman spoke before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

Avoiding war while preserving freedom is by no means easy. It is, in fact, a tough business. It requires not just defense efforts but an array of diplomatic relationships and security, cultural, and economic ties with other countries. It often entails hard choices with each one having risks and costs. It requires—perhaps above all else—our mightiest moral, intellectual, and emotional resources.

The dramatizations of these weeks depict the horrors. They show the problem but not the solution. Given the overwhelming—indeed, unimaginable—tragedy if we fail and the heavy demands made on us to succeed—as we must—it is only natural that simple formulas gain popularity. The ideas of a "freeze" on nuclear weapons or unilateral nuclear disarmament are, in this respect, understandable.

But these ideas are deceptively alluring. As H. L. Mencken said: "There is always an easy solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong." Contrary to appearances, a freeze or unilateral disarmament will not help achieve greater stability or reduce the chances of war. They run a high risk, in fact, of inviting just the opposite results.

Paradoxes

The paradoxes of arms control are glaring, often to the confusion of many concerned citizens. History has taught us that we must be prepared for war in order to avoid it. Strength can and does deter aggression. Weakness may invite it, and thus weakness is provocative.

Nuclear balance is essential to keep the peace. Deterrence means that a potential aggressor realizes that the costs to him will be unacceptably high. To pose that prospect, we must have forces and be seen as able and prepared, if necessary, to use those forces against key elements of Soviet power. Deterrence hinges upon the Soviet leaders' views of our capabilities and of our will. Deterrence may be difficult to comprehend and somewhat abstract, but it works. It has, for example, kept the peace in Europe for 38 years.

Another paradox is that a strong U.S. defense posture is necessary, not just for deterrence but also for effective arms control. The Soviets are not unlike any tough negotiator. If they can realize their goals without giving up anything in return, they will surely prefer that deal. If we grant them strategic superiority by neglecting our force modernization, we cannot hope to regain strategic parity by pursuing arms control ever so diligently. On the other hand, if we pursue programs to redress the imbalances that have developed through the unparalleled Soviet military buildup, the Soviets will have strong incentives to negotiate for genuine arms [control] and reductions.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 218–219.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 185–187.

Our actions cannot, of course, guarantee that the Soviets will agree to substantial reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. We might fail if we try. But we will surely fail if we don't try. No effective arms control will come about if we do not pursue deep reductions and needed defense programs. Weakness not only diminishes deterrence but also undercuts arms control.

Problems

A number of problems, as you can imagine, arise between the paradox and the promise of arms control. These problems include:

- The unabated Soviet buildup of military forces;
- Asymmetries between the two sides' force structures; and
- American impatience.

Both effective deterrence and real arms control have become tougher to achieve because of Soviet conduct and the Soviet weapons buildup over the past decade. Since 1972 the Soviet Union has tripled its number of strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviets dedicate at least 12–14% of their gross national product to defense, or basically double what the United States spends on defense relative to its GNP.

The Soviets have kept production lines open and active for all three legs of the strategic triad—land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and bombers—whereas the United States had an open production line only for submarines when President Reagan took office. The Soviets have also steadily increased their intermediate-range, land-based nuclear forces targeted on Western Europe and Asia, having for years a monopoly on these weapons.

The United States has no interest in an arms race with the Soviet Union. In fact we have not been racing at all. Our increase in strategic weaponry has been at a much slower pace. The destructive capability of our strategic weapons is today 60% less than that of the Soviets. Looking at our total nuclear stockpile, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons is at its lowest level in 20 years, and the megatonnage of our nuclear weapons today is only a quarter of what it was in the late 1960s. In more graphic terms, we have deployed today some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than in the 1960s.

As President Reagan noted in his radio address last month, Western restraint stands in stark contrast to the Soviet buildup in intermediate-range nuclear forces. The Soviets began in the mid-1970s to increase these forces targeted on our allies in Europe and Asia with a new, triple-warheaded, more accurate missile—the SS-20. They have continued to deploy these mobile missiles. They now have 360 SS-20s with 1,080 warheads.

For its part, the United States has withdrawn 1,000 nuclear weapons from 1980 and has just this month announced that another 1,400 will be withdrawn. For each new nuclear weapon that may be deployed in Europe over the coming times pursuant to NATO's 1979 decision,[4] more than five nuclear weapons will have been withdrawn from Europe.

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[4] The NATO decision is *ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

This is as it should be. We should tolerate only the bare minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for effective deterrence. Moreover, together with our allies, we are dedicating ourselves toward less reliance on nuclear weapons and more on new conventional methods for preserving our freedom. This, too, is as it should be.

The President has taken major initiatives to try to eliminate this intermediate-range class of weapons entirely—our zero-zero solution. Since the Soviets have continued to refuse to do that, the President has taken other initiatives to reduce these weapons to the lowest possible equal level.

His efforts—in the INF [intermediate range nuclear forces] [5] talks in Geneva—have regrettably met with Soviet stonewalling. We are faced this week with the prospect that the Soviets may not negotiate if U.S. deployments go forward, as NATO has planned since 1979, to balance this Soviet military threat. A Soviet walk-out would be ironic and unjustified. We have negotiated for several years while the Soviets steadily deployed new weapons, on an average of one new SS-20 a week. Since negotiations began, the Soviet Union has fielded over 100 additional SS-20 systems with some 300 warheads.

Now that U.S. deployments are starting according to the schedule established 4 years ago, the Soviets threaten to walk out unless we agree to give them a monopoly on these missiles. All their proposals have had the same bottom line: hundreds of these missiles for them and zero for us.

If the Soviets were serious about an agreement, they would stay at the table and negotiate. The United States will negotiate as long as necessary to reach a sound settlement. We are also prepared at any time to modify or reverse our missile deployments if such a settlement is achieved.

Pressure tactics are, of course, standard Soviet methods. In 1979 the Soviet Union said that there could be no negotiations if NATO decided to deploy these missiles. Nine months later they agreed to talks after NATO showed its determination. In 1982 the Soviets threatened to suspend negotiations if NATO moved forward with preparations for deployment. These preparations have gone forward, and the talks have continued.

We do not know exactly what the Soviets have in mind now. But we do know that we should not be surprised by their pressure tactics. Nor should we be cowed or intimidated. Staying the course we are on provides the only opportunity for a balance or reduction of these weapons that will enhance stability and reduce the risk of war.

Another problem for arms control relates to the broader context of Soviet conduct around the world. Arms control cannot be immune from major outside forces, and it has not been. President Johnson's plans for a Moscow visit to launch the first strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) were dashed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba in the Fall of 1979, plus the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, adversely affected Senate consideration of the SALT II Treaty signed in June of that year.[6]

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[5] These and following brackets are in the source text.

The Reagan Administration does not seek to link arms control efforts to other areas of Soviet behavior. In the wake of the tragedy of the Korean commercial airliner shot down by the Soviets, for example, the President did not suspend the arms talks. On the contrary, he continued to review problems in the negotiations and to undertake steps to overcome them.

But Soviet behavior can and at times will impact on our arms control efforts, like it or not. This is inevitable in a democracy, where neither the public nor its representatives can place aspects of Soviet conduct in totally separate boxes. Soviet adherence to existing arms control treaties or to pledges on their part also raises perplexing problems.

It is particularly tragic that the use of chemical warfare in Asia continues today in violation of international agreements, international law, and civilized behavior. These actions by the Soviet Union or its allies have accounted for an estimated 10,000 deaths among the Afghan hill peoples and Asian peasants. This assaults everyone's sense of human decency. Other Soviet actions raise serious questions about their compliance with the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty[7] and with their political undertakings related to the SALT II Treaty.

We cannot turn our back on evidence of such violations. If we are serious about arms control, we must be equally serious about problems of compliance. The Reagan Administration is comprehensively reviewing these issues, and we continue to raise them with the Soviets at high levels.

Another major problem in nuclear arms control stems from the two sides' different force structures and approaches. The United States has, for example, over time leaned toward smaller missiles with improved accuracy and technology and toward a balance between the three legs of the strategic triad. The Soviets, on the other hand, have placed greater emphasis on destabilizing heavier, land-based missiles.

Differences of perspective resulting from geography, from history, and from tradition further compound the difficulties of negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets see any weapons targeted on the U.S.S.R. as "strategic," whereas we differ on that definition since some of our weapons in Europe are there only to offset Soviet weapons targeted on our allies in Europe.

Differences lie also in that the Soviets seek forces that far outnumber all their potential adversaries combined. But were we to agree with that formulation, the Soviet Union would be far stronger than any single potential adversary, such as the United States. Granting the Soviet Union superiority by arms control is obviously unacceptable.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[7] The ABM Treaty and the other SALT I agreements are printed *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

Simply put, the two sides' forces are not comparable in many respects. Thus even with good faith and major efforts by both sides, it is difficult intellectually to bridge the wide gaps.

But that is precisely the challenge of negotiations and, I can assure you, one of the things that makes my job and others so extraordinarily stimulating. How to balance systems that are comparable and to make tradeoffs between systems that are not is easier said than done, but still possible.

Last month President Reagan made clear that the United States is prepared in the strategic arms reductions talks (START) to negotiate tradeoffs between Soviet advantages and U.S. advantages. He also called for a mutual, guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads and bomber platforms.[8] This would reduce the number of missile warheads by a third on both sides, an approach which offers a promising beginning if the Soviets are willing.

A third problem—besides the Soviet military buildup and asymmetries between the U.S. and Soviet forces—is uniquely ours: It is traditional American impatience. This, of course, has many beneficial and noble aspects. We are an active people. We see problems, and we want to solve them—sooner rather than later. Our creativity and problem-solving impulse have built the kind of society which we are so fortunate and justifiably proud to have today.

But effective arms control, like most worthwhile endeavors, does not come quickly. The key issues we face today are extremely complicated, as you might have discerned from my remarks above, progress will be more difficult than in the past, and, needless to say, it was not particularly easy then. Achieving militarily significant reductions and sound limitations promises to be a long, hard road.

We cannot be discouraged by the difficulty of the passage. As we travel down this road, we should be wary of the lure of agreements which may look appealing but, on reflection, do not really serve the goals for which they are intended. We should be wary of any so-called simple solutions and should not allow sweeping, unverifiable declarations of intent to be confused with real arms control.

Empty agreements would be easy and quick. We could have one tomorrow. But they would inflate expectations without offering much in the way of concrete benefit.

Effective arms control will, thus, take considerable time and patience. Negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[9] for example, took some 5 years. Other agreements have required even more time. The Austrian state treaty took more than 10 years to negotiate and conclude. Would we have a free and independent Austria today if the West had, at any stage, given up or compromised its basic principles and objectives? There is, I am sorry to report, no quick and easy route to a better world.

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[8] *Ante*, Oct. 4.

[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Promise

Under President Reagan, the United States has been embarked on one of the most ambitious arms control agendas ever developed. That fact is often insufficiently understood and sometimes baldly misrepresented.

I do not plan to bore you with all the intricate details of our negotiations. A summary review of our major efforts clearly illustrates just how broad the current arms control agenda is.

•In the strategic arms reductions talks in Geneva, we seek deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. We should not be satisfied with merely capping nuclear arms at high levels. Since SALT I and SALT II, we have seen substantial increases in the Soviet nuclear forces that have created strategic imbalances. Arms control needs to do better.

•In the talks on intermediate-range, land-based nuclear forces in Geneva, we continue to seek the complete elimination of these weapons but are willing to accept any agreement that would substantially and effectively reduce the systems to equal and low U.S. and Soviet levels on a global basis.

•While we push ahead to reduce existing nuclear arsenals, we also continue vigorous efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is imperative that the spread of nuclear weapons around the world be halted.

•In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we are actively engaged in trying to rid the world of all chemical weapons. As expressed by one keen observer, these weapons have all the potential for becoming "the poor countries' weapons of mass destruction." The world cannot afford that, and we are redoubling our efforts to work out a complete and effective ban on all chemical weapons. I personally feel strongly about this important area. The moral, legal, and political barriers that have been built up over the decades on chemical weapons use are in danger of being eroded and of tumbling down. We need to buttress and build on them, just as we have done in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

•In the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, we have, with our allies, taken initiatives to seek reductions in conventional forces in Europe.

•In the upcoming Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, we are again working with our allies to achieve agreements that will reduce the risk of war arising through error or miscalculation.

Despite this impressive agenda, some critics argue that the Reagan Administration is not serious about arms control. Nothing could be further from the truth, as you can see.

Another line of criticism is, ironically, that the President's arms control proposals are too ambitious. I am not entirely sure what such criticisms mean. Should we not seek deep and militarily significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons? Should we not ensure that reductions are balanced in a way that contributes to, rather than detracts from, stability? Should we not seek much lower levels of nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe? Should we not seek to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to ban all chemical weapons?

These goals are surely ambitious. But can we afford to be anything less? I do not think so. The President does not think so. And I doubt that the American people think so.

The promise of arms control is frequently exaggerated by some and underestimated by others. It cannot, by itself, resolve the world's problems. We should not burden it with the task of resolving the major political and ideological differences that separate free people from the Soviet Union—particularly its repression at home and aggression abroad. Arms control cannot and was not meant to carry such a load.

But arms control can make a key contribution. It holds out a promise of a world with fewer and fewer nuclear weapons, with less and less overall destructive capability; a promise of greater stability and reductions in the chances of war by error or miscalculation in crisis; and a promise of a better basis for security planning. When all is said and done, it can be one of the foundations for the better world that we all seek.

Arms control, in general terms, represents the embodiment of hope among peoples for a world spared from the kind and intensity of conflict that so deeply marred the first half of this century. These vital efforts deserve everyone's support. As President Reagan and the other summit partners noted earlier this year in Williamsburg, arms control is part of "a vision of a world in which the shadow of war has been lifted from all mankind."

Congressional Conference Report: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 [Extract], November 17, 1983 [1]

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JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2906) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to extend the authorization for appropriations, submit the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

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[1] H. Rept. 98–564, 98th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 5–8. The report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs is printed *ante*, May 16; that of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *ante*, May 23. The authorization itself may be found *post*, Dec. 2.

The Senate amendment struck out all of the House bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text.

The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate with an amendment which is a substitute for the House bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between the House bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clarifying changes.

ENHANCEMENT OF ACDA DIRECTOR'S POSITION ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

The House bill contained a provision which designates the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to be a permanent member of the National Security Council (NSC).

The Senate amendment did not contain a comparable provision.

The committee of conference agreed to a substitute for the House provision.

The action of the committee of conference mandates that the Director of ACDA will attend all meetings of the National Security Council involving weapons procurement, arms sales, consideration of the defense budget, and all arms control and disarmament matters. This action is meant to strengthen the status of the Agency. The conference committee views this action as a reaffirmation of the fundamental principle that arms control is a basic and integral component of U.S. national security. Presently, the Director of ACDA attends NSC meetings only by invitation.

The committee of conference is concerned that the Director of ACDA should be included in National Security Council meetings which may directly or indirectly concern arms control and disarmament matters.

Therefore, the conference committee believes that this mandate which enhances the Director's position on the NSC will facilitate and insure full consideration of the arms control aspects of all issues considered by the NSC. The committee of conference intends to preserve the Director of ACDA's relation to the NSC in order that he will be comparable to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Should the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be made a permanent Member of the National Security Council, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the

U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate will seriously reconsider making the Director of ACDA a permanent member of the National Security Council which will preserve the equilibrium of NSC.

VISITING SCHOLAR PROGRAM

The Senate amendment contained a provision which established a program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The House bill did not contain a comparable provision.

The conference substitute is the same as the Senate provision.

The purpose of this program is to afford specialists in various disciplines relevant to the Agency's activities, such as, but not limited to, the physical sciences, a valuable opportunity for first-hand experience in participation in ACDA's activities and to gain for the Agency the perspective and expertise such scholars can offer. Appointments will be for one-year terms, with a one-year extension permitted. To insure continuity and a non-partisan character, fellows will be chosen by a board chaired by the present Director and including all former Directors. Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for ACDA for the fiscal years 1984 and 1985, the Senate amendment directs that not less than $200,000 be available in each such year to provide initial funding for the program.

In adopting the Senate amendment, the conferees believe that the personnel strictures which the Agency has endured have reduced greatly its ability to do strong analytical work and to support fully current and perspective arms control negotiations. The program for visiting scholars is envisioned both as a source for the Agency, on a temporary basis, of people with the background and expertise to contribute to the Agency's work and as an opportunity for interested scholars to gain practical experience in current arms control and disarmament activities.

SPECIALIST FLUENT IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

The Senate amendment authorized the Director to create up to eight additional permanent personnel positions for specialists in Soviet foreign and military policies, arms control, or strategic affairs, who also demonstrate fluency in the Russian language.

The House bill did not contain a comparable provision.

The conference substitute is the same as the Senate provision.

In taking this action, the committee of conference intends to encourage the Agency to employ a sufficient number of personnel with appropriate backgrounds, as well as skills in the Russian language, to assist at negotiations, and in other arms control activities.

It is not intended that fluency in Russian should substitute for other skills the Agency might seek in its professional employees. The personnel the Director could appoint under this provision would be expected to meet the same standards as others considered for employment. However, it is expected that fluency in Russian should constitute an additional qualification which would give persons with that skill a unique value to the Agency.

The report language in the Senate bill establishes guidelines with respect to the implementation of this program, and it is the intent of the committee of conference that that language will be used to implement this provision of the conference substitute.

REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

The Senate amendment contained a provision which requires the President to submit a report to the Congress on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.

The House bill did not contain a comparable provision.

The conference substitute is the same as the Senate provision.

In taking this action, the committee of conference expects the President to submit a report to the Congress on Soviet compliance or noncompliance with existing arms control agreements to which the Soviets are a party.

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

The Senate amendment contained a provision which creates a new position of "Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations". This position is for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Negotiator, Paul Nitze. The pay level for this position is established at level IV of the Executive Schedule. This is to be the second such position at the Agency.

The House bill did not contain a comparable provision.

The conference substitute is the same as the Senate provision.

The inclusion of this provision does not prejudice the request of the executive branch for further promotions for senior ACDA personnel. The Committees on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives expect to consider the executive branch request for such promotions next year. The committee of conference believes that the Senate provision underscores the importance of the INF talks. This provision is intended to reinforce the desire of the Congress that the INF talks continue beyond the point of initial missile deployments.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
DANTE B. FASCELL
LEE H. HAMILTON
GERRY STUDDS
DAN MICA
WM. BROOMFIELD
HENRY J. HYDE
Managers on the Part of the House

Charles H. Percy
Jesse Helms
Richard G. Lugar
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
Claiborne Pell
J. R. Biden, Jr.
Alan Cranston
Managers on the Part of the Senate

Statement by the Department of State: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, November 18, 1983 [1]

We understand that the Soviet Union has indicated in diplomatic channels that the U.S. negotiator in the INF Talks, Ambassador Nitze, had recently put forward proposals which would allow the Soviet Union to retain a large INF force while providing for zero U.S. deployments. There is no foundation whatsoever to this Soviet assertion. Last weekend Soviet negotiator Ambassador Kvitsinkiy contacted Ambassador Nitze to say that he had received urgent instructions from Moscow. He said that he had been instructed by Moscow to inform Nitze that if the U.S. Government were to propose equal reductions of 572 on each side, the Soviet Government would accept that proposal. Ambassador Kvitsinkiy acknowledged that this would allow the Soviets to retain at least 120 SS-20's with 360 warheads targetted on Europe, plus a comparable number in the Far East, while the United States would have to forego deployment of such systems altogether. Ambassador Nitze responded that he thought it certain that Washington would not convert a Soviet proposal into a U.S. proposal. He undertook, however, to communicate Kvitsinkiy's statement to Washington.

The practical effect of these suggestions would be only a slight reduction in the number of SS-20s deployed in the Western Soviet Union from the number set forth in the October 26 Andropov interview. This would still give the Soviets a large monopoly, with approximately the same number of SS-20s as they had deployed when the negotiations began.

This suggestion is in effect what President Reagan has called the "half-zero" option, under which the Soviet Union maintains large forces, but the U.S. cannot deploy a single system. The Soviets would have over 700 warheads to zero for the U.S.

The Soviets have suggested that, under certain conditions, they might be prepared not to require explicit compensation for British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations. The conditions attached to the Soviet hint are, however, unacceptable. The Soviets insist on retaining their monopoly on longer-range, land-based INF missiles, with some 360 SS-20 warheads threatening Western Europe and an approximately equal number targetted on their Asian neighbors. The Soviets say that they will demand compensation for British and French forces in some other negotiating forum. This essentially amounts to a claim for double compensation in view of their determination to receive *de facto* compensation by maintaining an LRINF monopoly.

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[1] ACDA sources.

We have put forward an important proposal, which as you know calls for an equal global warhead level, at 420 warheads; we have reiterated our readiness to deploy less than our global quota in Europe and our willingness to apportion reductions appropriately between P-11 and GLCM. We think that these proposals provide the basis for an agreement.

We have negotiated for 2 years prior to deployments. We are prepared to negotiate after deployments begin. And, as we have repeatedly made clear, we are prepared to withdraw any systems under an agreement after deployments have taken place.

Interview of the Chief Editor of *Pravda* (Afanasyev): Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, November 19, 1983 [1]

[Text] [2] ***Question:*** On Thursday the Soviet Union declared its readiness to reduce its intermediate-range missiles to 120 and to negotiate at a later time about the French and British missiles. West German Chancellor Kohl concluded from this that the Soviet Union was ready for serious negotiations only after the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles had started.

Afanasyev: I do not think that the deployment of these missiles will alter anything regarding our principled position. It is our seventh proposal, our seventh concession. At first, we proposed to limit these missile systems to 300 on each side; then we proposed to keep only as many as the French and the British have, that is, 162; then Comrade Andropov proposed to go down to 140; and now we have arrived at 120. Then it was suggested to us to make allowance for the number of warheads, and we did do so. They demanded from us not to transfer any missiles to the East, and we accepted that and declared that we would scrap the dismantled missiles. Thus we can say that we have accepted many wishes of the West. But there remain three positions on which we are unshakable:

First, if the missiles are deployed, then the negotiations about these very missiles will stop.

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[1] Vienna *Volkstimme* in German, Nov. 19, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Nov. 21, 1983, vol. III, pp. AA10–AA12. The interview was conducted in Vienna by *Volkstimme* reporter M. Graber.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

Second: We are for maintaining parity. We continue to be for negotiations, but on the basis of a fundamental principle: equal security.

And third, and that is my personal opinion—I was not in Moscow this week—if these negotiations are ended, and this will probably be the case, then there will certainly be negotiations again, but at another level and taking into consideration the fact that the new missiles have been deployed. When such negotiations will take place, and at what level, that I cannot tell you. But there will be negotiations, in the interest of security and detente and because controversies cannot be solved by force but only through negotiations and compromises, and we are ready for that.

And fourth, and that is again our official position, if the new missiles come, there will be countermeasures on our part.

Question: If the deployment takes place now and if the necessary countermeasures are taken, how can one come back to a lower level of parity, considering that the Americans obviously want to have ground-based intermediate-range missiles in Europe?

Afanasyev: Naturally, security in Europe will not be increased by the deployment and by the countermeasures to be taken by us. And the danger of war will increase, not only in Europe but throughout the world. But we have no other way out. And if I, for example, am asked, why do you not want to give the Americans the opportunity to deploy the missiles, what is changed by this?—then please put yourself into our country's position. There will be 572 new missiles, and we cannot overlook them. Let me remind you of the fact that the United States brought the first missile to Europe in 1948, at a time when we did not have any missiles. And it is a fact that we were compelled to catch up again and again.

But we have submitted a number of fundamental proposals:

—For example, we have adopted the commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If all nuclear powers were to adopt this commitment, there could no longer be any question of the danger of a nuclear war. But this proposal submitted by us was not accepted in the West.

—Second, we proposed to discontinue all nuclear weapons tests, which would constitute an important barrier against the further development of new nuclear weapons.

—Third, we proposed to freeze the current missile armament, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Even though this proposal has been rejected by the official circles of the United States and of NATO, it is gaining more and more support in public opinion.

We now find ourselves in a very dangerous situation. These missiles can reach targets in the Soviet Union within between 3 and 8 minutes. It is virtually very difficult to take any countermeasures. These missiles can penetrate the earth to a depth of 30 meters, so that all shelters of our nuclear forces, our military staffs and command centers can be eliminated. The protection of all these centers will be rendered very difficult, nearly impossible. Hence we are compelled, to restore parity, to make the U.S. territory attackable within the same period.

[Question:] Will the Soviet Union maintain the proposals it made prior to the deployment of the U.S. missiles in Europe—renunciation of a first strike, a test ban and the freezing of nuclear armament—even after the deployment and the restoration of parity?

Afanasyev: I think so, yes. There has been a great deal of talk about a Soviet threat. But it is very well understood in the West and the Soviet Union will never be the first to start a war. They regard as the actual danger the Soviet ability to strike back. And that is why they seek to prevent a counterstroke, by deploying new missiles so as to be able to destroy all our command centers. Let me emphasize once more what great danger is inherent in these new missiles, a danger that is barely conceivable.

Question: If new negotiations materialize after the deployment, irrespective at which level, will the Soviet Union then still have to insist that the British and French missiles be included?

Afanasyev: Yes—that is again my personal viewpoint. I also believe that such negotiations could be held on a broader basis, also with Britain and France participating. These negotiations will, for example, also include the problem of nuclear submarines and of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. These negotiations will have to be waged taking all factors into consideration. One cannot say of such negotiations how long they will take, but as long as there are negotiations, there will not be war.

Question: Is the proposal of the Soviet Union, which was reported yesterday, its last offer in Geneva?

Afanasyev: As I have said, I have not been in Moscow for a week now; it may perhaps not be the last one. You have seen how far we have gone in making concessions to the West, but we are not getting appropriate answers.

Article in *Pravda* by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov: "Struggling for Peace and Strengthening Defense Capability," November 19, 1983[1]

[Text][2] The Soviet people are working vigorously and diligently to implement the historic decisions of the 26th party congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums and the instructions of Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, to strengthen our economy, improve well-being, and further improve developed socialist society. The Soviet people are engaged in peaceful, creative labor. Our society's sociopolitical unity is strengthening more and more and the working people's cohesion around Lenin's party is growing.

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[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, Nov. 19, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Nov. 21, 1983, vol. III pp. AA1–AA10.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

In the tense international atmosphere the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government are firmly and consistently pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy and are doing everything possible to preserve and strengthen peace and prevent a nuclear war. "The question of what line to follow in international affairs and in the current acute situation does not arise for the Soviet leadership," Comrade Yu.V. Andropov said in his 28 September statement. "Our course remains geared to preserving and strengthening peace, relaxing tension, curbing the arms race, and expanding and deepening cooperation between states. This is the constant wish of the CPSU and the entire Soviet people. We are convinced that these are the aspirations of all the peoples." [3]

At the same time Comrade Yu.V. Andropov in his statement drew the attention of the Soviet and the other peoples to the growing military threat to the Soviet Union, its allies, and all the world's peace-loving states by U.S. imperialism, pointing out that we will be able to safeguard the security of our country and its friends and allies in any circumstances. The great Lenin taught us to increase political and military vigilance, strengthen defense might, and be on our guard at all times. And the Soviet people are reaching the same conclusion today. Their armed forces are ever ready to deliver a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.

I.

The aggressiveness of ultrareactionary imperialist forces increased sharply when the R. Reagan administration came to power in the United States. They have declared a "crusade" against socialism.

That which the Soviet people defended with unprecedented tenacity during the Great Patriotic War against the Hitlerite aggressors and for which 20 million Soviet people gave their lives in fierce battles is termed the "center of evil" by R. Reagan.

The Washington leaders what [*want?*] to disrupt the strategic military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which curbs their adventurist actions. "Of course, this policy," Yu.V. Andropov stressed, "will not bring the imperialists success, but its adventurism makes it extremely dangerous for mankind."

Its chief danger to other peace-loving states and peoples as well as the socialist states lies in the large-scale, global war preparations of the United States. Quite without foundation—as if there were no boundaries, no standards in international relations—the U.S. Government declares various parts of the world "U.S. security zones." It is interfering in sovereign states' internal affairs everywhere.

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[3] *Ante*; variant translation.

There are various methods of this interference but they are all brazen and aggressive—be they overt armed aggression and the overthrow of the legitimate government by the U.S. Army in Grenada or the savage undeclared war against the Lebanese people under cover of the flag of the so-called multinational force, or the bandit attacks on Nicaragua and Angola organized by the United States with the aid of mercenary gangs and its satellites. In Central and South America, in Africa and Asia the United States is implanting reactionary dictatorial regimes that are odious to the peoples and is creating hotbeds of aggression and conflicts. The United States is seeking to extend the NATO bloc's sphere of action even further.

"We must build peace only on the basis of strength . . . peace must be based on strength . . . peace will be strong if we are strong;" this is how the U.S. President expresses his foreign policy program.[4] Strength, military strength, armed force, nuclear force, air force, naval force—this is the basic vocabulary of speeches by the present Washington leaders.

The White House is openly pursuing a course toward attaining U.S. military superiority over the USSR and NATO bloc military superiority over the Warsaw Pact. This course has become particularly dangerous in connection with the attempts to implement it, with the sharp intensification of the Reagan administration's war preparations. U.S. military expenditures are rising at an unprecedented rate, programs for the deployment of qualitatively new systems of strategic armaments and space weapon systems, for the "upgrading" of NATO nuclear missiles, and the buildup of groupings of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, Asia, and Central and South America are being rapidly implemented. War preparations by the United States and some of its allies have been stepped up in all spheres and in all the main areas of the world.

In peacetime conditions the R. Reagan administration has raised the military budget growth rate to 12–14 percent per annum. In the last 3 years alone the Pentagon has received around $640 billion, some $280 billion have been allocated for 1984, and in the 5 following years (1985–1989) military appropriations will be $2 trillion—almost as much as the Pentagon has spent in the 35 years since the war.

These massive sums will be spent on "rearming America." An "all-embracing strategic program" for the eighties has been adopted, whereby, in the first place, deployment is being stepped up of new systems of stragetic offensive forces: MX and Midgetman ICBM's, nuclear submarines carrying Trident missiles, B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, and the multipurpose Space Shuttle, and long-range air-, sea- and ground-based cruise missiles.

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[4] Cf. *ante*, Mar. 31.

Work is being carried out on a broad scale to create an all-embracing, anti-ballistic missile defense system. Up to $27 billion is being allocated for this in the next 5 years. This "antimissile decision" by R. Reagan is aimed at securing for the U.S. militarists the ability to deliver a first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union with impunity.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly made statements on the particular danger of deploying antimissile systems. As is known, a treaty banning the deployment of such systems was concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1972. [5] The United States has now decided to disregard the existing agreement and to deploy these weapons which are particularly dangerous to the maintenance of international stability.

The intensive development of space warfare systems is also a component of the U.S. military preparations. A command is already in operation designed to administer space systems for military aims. This means in fact that another new direction has been taken in the arms race—the preparation for war in space.

The U.S. Administration's course toward achieving military superiority is also clearly visible in its approach to the nuclear arms limitation and reduction talks. The White House is not interested in achieving positive results. It needs the talks as a means of deceiving the peoples and concealing the arms race that it has begun. At the talks the Soviet Union has encountered the kind of situation in which the U.S. side, trying to deceive the public, pays lip-service to its desire to reach agreement but in fact does not want it and rejects all proposals based on the principle of equality and identical security, the aspiration of finding a rational compromise, and a significant reduction in the two sides' nuclear arsenals. Thereby the United States is deliberately dooming the talks to failure. Let us look at the facts.

President R. Reagan has repeatedly declared that the United States would allegedly submit at the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms new proposals taking the Soviet Union's interests into account. But this does not correspond with the truth. The U.S. position at the START talks continues to be based on a desire to radically undermine the Soviet strategic forces and primarily their foundation—ICBM's. Assent to the U.S. proposals would lead to the liquidation of modern Soviet ICBM's and the necessity to build in their place—in order to preserve an approximate equality—new missile-carrying submarines and heavy bombers.

In the meantime the United States would freely complete its military programs, both the ones being implemented and the ones planned for the future. How can this "justice" be described otherwise than as a desire to gain unilateral advantages?

There will be no accord on such a basis. The Soviet Union will not agree to the breakup [*lomka*] [6] of its strategic forces.

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[5] I.e., the SALT I Treaty. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

[6] These and following brackets are in the source text.

The United States also sticks to unilateral positions at the talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe. All of President Reagan's "zero" and "interim" options are aimed, on the one hand, at the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union, and on the other hand at the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe, at maintaining untouched its forward-based nuclear means, and at omitting Britain's and France's nuclear arms from the balance of forces on the side of the North Atlantic alliance.

The so-called "new initiative" announced by the U.S. President at the end of September,[7] on which the White House administration merely changed the label in November, does not change the essence of their position. The intention is just the same—to deploy in Europe U.S. missiles to supplement the U.S. forward-based nuclear means already there and the British and French missiles. What is offered to us is to discuss the quantity and composition of this deployment. So far the United States has not produced a single basis for a mutually acceptable solution to the problem under discussion as a whole.

The fate of an accord now depends on the solution of fundamental questions: Renunciation of the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe, counting British and French missiles when determining the correlation of forces between the sides, reducing the number of medium-range delivery aircraft, and determining a truly equal level for medium-range missiles and aircraft for both sides in Europe. The proposals by the head of the White House provide no opportunity to resolve these questions and, consequently, no opportunity for agreement. The deadlock remains the same as before. This is not surprising. Everything goes to show that the U.S. goal is to frustrate the talks, while its "initiatives" are just propaganda dummies.

The leaders of the United States and certain other NATO countries, flouting the will of the peoples, are going ahead regardless and despite all kinds of protests with the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in West Europe. Their deployment has actually started in Britain. It appears that the next few weeks will see the start of deliveries and deployment of Pershing II missiles in the FRG and cruise missiles in Italy. In this way the U.S. imperialists obviously intend to test the Soviet Union's firmness. The deployment of the U.S. missiles will provide the material base for nuclear blackmail of the Soviet Union and for the implementation of a policy of strength.

Following the "Grenadian lesson"—armed intervention prepared and executed by the United States without taking into account the opinion of its allies, with whom it did not even consider it necessary to consult in advance—the question of the deployment of the U.S. missiles in West Europe acquires an even more sinister character for the West European countries. The deployment of the missiles contains the danger of involving these countries in a nuclear conflict not only despite their will but also without the knowledge of their peoples and governments.

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[7] *Ante*, Sept. 26.

The West Europeans are being psychologically conditioned in order for these plans to be implemented without hindrance. Attempts are being made to convince them that the deployment of the U.S. missiles will allegedly proceed slowly and that, in the event of an agreement, these missiles supposedly "can be easily cut back or even totally withdrawn." And in order to confuse the West European peoples even further, they are advertising as a "peace-loving" action the U.S. intention to withdraw from Europe in the next 5–6 years about 1,400 nuclear munitions.

All this is disinformation. The United States does not withdraw from areas where it has been given military bases. And in this case we are talking about first-strike weapons in the hands of militarists who have settled down on other people's soil, about Washington acquiring, in the words of former Defense Secretary H. Brown, "a clear military advantage." The Americans and their missiles are settling down in Europe on a large scale [*kapitalno*], seeing the European Continent as the most suitable theater for their military operations in their aggressive plans.

As regards the intended withdrawal of nuclear munitions from Europe, this is a blatant fraud. The outdated charges withdrawn from Europe are being and will be replaced by new incoming nuclear munitions for medium-range missiles, Lance missiles, 155-mm nuclear guns, neutron shells, and new airborne bombs. The total quantity of nuclear weapons in Europe will not be reduced as a result of Washington's "peace-loving" action. For this purpose alone the United States plans to produce in the eighties 17,000 units of nuclear munitions.

The U.S. Armed Forces are being built up in accordance with a military doctrine incorporating the infliction of preventive strikes on the enemy. Their numbers are increasing considerably: About 5,000 new aircraft and over 7,000 new Abrams tanks are being supplied, and the number of warships will be increased to 600. New conventional weapons systems are being developed—high-precision reconnaissance and strike complexes with a long strike range. According to a statement by Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, "the broadest modernization of ground forces in history and their equipping with new equipment has been started" in the United States. Reserve troops are being increased both on the American Continent and on the territory of other NATO countries.

This is a far from complete list of the measures in the "all-embracing program for rearming America." It shows that the program's objective is to make the United States the dominant power in the world in military terms. Then, they dream, it will be possible to embark on the liquidation of socialism as a social system, deal with the people's liberation movements, and establish their domination and system which suits U.S. imperialism in the world.

Of course, the implementation of military programs will not provide the American militarists with the desired results. The Soviet Union will not allow military supremacy over itself. But the arms race unleashed by the United States is very dangerous to the cause of peace.

An agreement on preventing nuclear war was signed between the USSR and the United States in 1973. The sides agreed that "the objective of their policy is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons." [8] The R. Reagan administration, in blatant contradiction with this commitment, is now stating its "right" to inflict a first nuclear strike in the hope of victory.

Attention is drawn by the dangerous nature of the exercises conducted by the United States and the NATO in recent years. They are characterized by the enormity of scale and are becoming increasingly indistinguishable from the actual deployment of armed forces for aggression.

Some 300,000 men and large quantities of arms and combat equipment were put in motion in the "Autumn Forge-83" NATO fall maneuvers which have just ended. The area covered by the maneuvers embraced Western Europe from Norway to Turkey and included the Atlantic.

And this entire show of military force takes place annually and repeatedly in the direct vicinity of the borders of the Soviet Union and the socialist community countries. Are military exercises on this scale necessary for normal troop training? Of course not.

The Washington administration's war preparations are accompanied by shameless anti-Soviet hysteria. Discarding all decency, top U.S. officials are slandering the USSR, its people and policy, and the socialist way of life. Lies, disinformation, juggling with facts, and provocations are being brought into play. It is with the aid of such methods that Washington figures, heating the international situation, are counting on ensuring the unobstructed implementation of their course aimed at an unrestrained arms race. This policy on the part of the White House leaders does not consist solely of emotions or rhetoric. It is a consciously and coldly and deliberately implemented long-term strategy aimed at broadening confrontation and thus increasing the danger of war.

Together with the other peoples of the world, the Soviet people are concerned at the increasing buildup of the arms race, the intensification of international tension, and the lack of progress at the arms talks. "It is our profound conviction," Yu.V. Andropov has said, "that what is currently happening is in direct contradiction to the fundamental interests and aspirations of the peoples of Europe and the entire world. And the blame for this lies with those who gambled on destabilizing international relations and achieving military supremacy over the socialist countries and at the same time all other countries.

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[8] For text of the agreement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 283–285.

II.

Realizing the danger of the aggressive U.S. policy for the cause of peace, the Soviet Union is taking all the measures incumbent upon it to prevent the growth of the war threat, halt the arms race, and achieve real arms reductions, particularly with respect to nuclear arms. The world does not need an increase in arsenals of lethal weapons. It needs a radical reduction in them and the utilization of the funds thus released for economic and social development needs. This is the firm conviction of the Soviet Union and all the socialist community states.

The proposals advanced by the Warsaw Pact states and the Soviet peace initiatives convincingly demonstrate their readiness for cooperation with all states in order to avert the dangerous course of events and to remove the nuclear threat to mankind.

The Warsaw Pact states advocate the most radical reductions of nuclear armaments. They propose the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the subsequent gradual elimination of the stockpiles thereof following the formulation of an appropriate program for phased nuclear disarmament.

In its desire to facilitate an accord on the limitation of nuclear armaments and to take the first step toward their reduction, the USSR has declared its readiness, on the basis of reciprocity, to freeze all nuclear armaments in both the quantitative and qualitative respects; to cease the quantitative buildup of nuclear arsenals; not to deploy new classes [*vidy*] and types of nuclear armaments; to introduce a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapon delivery. And all this is not just fine wishes. The USSR is in favor of immediately translating this program into the language of contractual commitments and implementing it step by step in full measure. A start can be made by the USSR and the United States, having in mind the fact that the other nuclear powers too would act analogously. The Soviet Union submitted this urgent and important question for discussion by the 38th UN General Assembly session.

The USSR assumed unilaterally the historic pledge not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons, and it called on the other nuclear powers to follow this example.

At the talks with the United States on limiting and reducing strategic arms (START) the Soviet Union is steering a line toward reaching a fair accord. We have proposed that absolutely all strategic armaments, not certain arbitrarily chosen types of them, be subject to limitations and reductions. The strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States are substantially different from each other in terms of their structure. Ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles account for 70 percent of the USSR's strategic potential (in terms of charges), but submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) and heavy bombers account for over 80 percent of the United States'. Under these conditions the quest for a mutually acceptable accord can be pursued only via the overall consideration of all types of strategic armaments with the factors determining the strategic situation being taken into account.

What specifically is the USSR proposing? That the overall number of strategic delivery vehicles be reduced in stages by more than one-fourth by 1990, which would lead to the removal of over 1,000 units of such means from both sides' arsenals. The USSR is proposing that the number of nuclear charges also be reduced to equal levels. There can be no doubt that this is a major step along the road of lowering nuclear confrontation. And—this is a fundamentally important point—at all stages of the reductions the USSR and the United States would remain in an equal position from the viewpoint of the safeguarding of their security, and the equality between them in the strategic sphere would be preserved. If the United States desired a START accord, the Soviet Union's position could be the basis for negotiations.

In the sphere of nuclear arms in Europe the USSR is prepared for a genuine zero option whereby Europe would be completely rid of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. We have also submitted other proposals that infringe no one's interests. They are well known. Their implementation would lead to a major quantitative reduction in nuclear arms. Both sides—the USSR and the NATO bloc—would have an equal but minimal quantity of missiles, warheads on those missiles, and medium-range aircraft.

As Yu. V. Andropov has pointed out, given the U.S. abandonment of the deployment of its missiles in Europe and given the equalization of levels in terms of medium-range nuclear-capable aircraft, the USSR agrees to leave only 140 SS-20 missiles in the European zone and to destroy the rest. This would be much fewer than in 1976, when everyone recognized that equality existed; and fewer than in 1978, when the Soviet-West German communique that spoke of equality of forces in Europe was signed.

As is well known, the United States rejected this proposal of ours as well, demonstrating yet again that it does not want any accords. Its posture still boils down to ensuring that the Soviet Union disarms itself, while by contrast the United States and its NATO partners arm themselves.

However, the time has come to decide the question: either an accord and deep cuts, or the deployment of the American missiles and the countermeasures by the USSR and its allies that are inevitable in that event. Hopes that the USSR could be forced by means of pressure to make some kind of unilateral concessions to the detriment of the interests of its security have never had any foundation. They are also futile now.

While they attach priority importance to measures for nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries also persistently and unswervingly advocate the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments and the conclusion of treaties and agreements that would end the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and would ensure the destruction of stocks of them, and would impose a ban on the development and creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to the militarization of space. At the 38th UN General Assembly session it proposed that a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Space be concluded. This would safeguard states on earth from strikes from space and would also safeguard space facilities from the use of force against them.

The USSR has declared that it is prepared to proceed to a radical resolution of the problem of antisatellite weapons—to reach agreement on renouncing tests of any such systems, on prohibiting the creation of new antisatellite systems and eliminating those that the sides already possess, and also on prohibiting the testing and utilization for military purposes—including antisatellite purposes—of manned spacecraft.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership took an exceptionally important decision: The USSR pledged not to be the first to introduce any types of antisatellite weapons into outer space. In other words, it introduced a unilateral moratorium on such launches so long as other states, including the United States refrain from introducing any types of antisatellite weapons into space.

It is clear to any unprejudiced person that the Soviet Union is doing everything within its power to halt the world's dangerous slide toward nuclear catastrophe and turn international relations away from confrontation toward cooperation, including constructive talks on a wide range of disarmament problems and the elaboration of just agreements which would take into account the security interests of all sides. The Soviet Union's proposals are just and realistic. The only thing needed for their implementation is the goodwill of the U.S. and other NATO countries' governments.

Nevertheless, recent events have confirmed yet again that this goodwill is simply absent among them. The U.S. Administration is openly stepping up its war preparations and fanning an atmosphere of war hysteria.

The United States does not want any agreement and is openly pushing matters toward attaining military superiority over the socialist community countries. This, naturally, requires that appropriate measures be taken by our side.

III.

In such a complicated international situation, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are manifesting truly Leninist restraint, firmness, and adherence to principles in implementing a course of preserving peace and ensuring international security. Imperialism's intrigues are countered by the high vigilance of the Soviet people and the consolidation of the country's defense capability. The measures we are taking to consolidate defense capability, as has been repeatedly stressed in Soviet Government statements, are dictated by the situation which is actually developing in the world. "We will continue," Yu. V. Andropov pointed out in his speech at the CPSU Central Committee June (1983) Plenum, "to do everything necessary to ensure the security of our country and our friends and allies and will enhance the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, a mighty factor for restraining imperialist reaction's aggressive aspirations."

The consolidation of the defense capability of the Soviet Union and the states which are our allies under the conditions of the mounting military threat from the United States is an objective requirement of life. The USSR has never threatened anyone, it has not attacked anyone, and does not intend to do so. At the same time, in view of the growth of the military threat from imperialism, the Soviet Union is having to resolve creative tasks of communist building while at the same time resolving a defense task—the defense of socialist gains. The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Government consider it to be their sacred duty to the Soviet people constantly to maintain the country's defense capability and the Armed Forces' combat readiness at a level which reliably safeguards their peaceful labor and the security of the peoples of the socialist community states. And the graver the threat to the socialist motherland's security, the higher our defense capability should be. That is the CPSU's requirement in the defense sphere.

In strengthening our defense capability, we paid great attention to raising the Soviet Armed Forces' combat might and combat capability and we are seeking to ensure that they are always on a level with present-day requirements. Paramount importance here is attached to equipping the troops with modern weapons and combat equipment, maintaining high political morale among the personnel, and ensuring the field, naval, and air training of formations and units.

Armed Forces command-and-political and engineering personnel are constantly working on raising the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces. Soviet military doctrine is of a defensive nature. That means that we will never be the first to use nuclear weapons and military force. But, knowing the imperialists' predatory habits, we state most clearly that our strategic forces are in a supreme state of readiness to deal a resolute rebuff to any aggressor. No "preemptive" [*uprezhdayushchiy*] strike will save the strategists across the ocean from a crushing retaliatory strike. Nothing will save the aggressor from retribution if he is the first to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and its allies.

The most important condition for safeguarding international security and the defense capability of the USSR and the states which are our allies is the maintenance of approximate parity between the Soviet Union and the United States in the strategic nuclear arms sphere. To us the U.S. plans are clear—to try to achieve superiority over the USSR in these arms. Aware of the danger of such actions and of the growth of the U.S. nuclear threat to the cause of peace and to the security of the Soviet people and the peoples of the socialist community as a whole, the Soviet Union will not remain indifferent to them.

We do not strive for nuclear superiority, but neither will we permit the U.S. Administration to use nuclear blackmail to implement a policy of strength against us. The Soviet Union will give a fitting reply to its actions aimed at breaking the existing balance of strategic forces, and it has been forced to create corresponding modern strategic weapons systems, preventing the United States from achieving superiority in this sphere.

As the Soviet leadership has already stated, we will reply to the U.S. side's deployment of new strategic weapons systems with the deployment of our own corresponding systems comprising ICBM's and long-range cruise missiles. Other retaliatory measures will also be taken if necessary.

The United States and NATO are now throwing down an open challenge to the socialist community by completing the preparation for the deployment of the U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe. If this deployment takes place despite the peace-loving proposals of the Soviet Union and the protests of the progressive public throughout the world, the socialist community countries will take effective retaliatory measures. The nuclear grouping of U.S. medium-range systems and nuclear weapons of this type belonging to the other NATO countries in Europe that is being increased by the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles will be countered by our own nuclear systems corresponding to them in terms of combat effectiveness.

If the U.S. missiles are deployed in Europe this will be followed by the abrogation of our moratorium on the deployment of medium-range SS–20 missiles in the European zone. By an agreement with our allies, additional systems will be deployed to create the necessary counterweight to the increasing grouping of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe. Necessary retaliatory measures affecting [*imeyushchiy v vidu*] the territory of the United States itself will be taken so that the Americans will inevitably feel the difference between the situation that existed before the deployment of their missiles in Western Europe and after it.

No one should be left in any doubt now about the socialist community countries' determination to do everything necessary to strengthen their defense capability in response to the deployment of the new U.S. missiles. This was said in a Soviet Government statement and in a USSR Defense Ministry announcement.

This was confirmed with sufficient clarity and firmness at the meetings of Warsaw Pact states' foreign ministers and defense ministers in October.

The sharp aggravation of the international situation is making higher demands on the level of combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, the improvement of their control, and their technical equipping.

We must also draw the appropriate conclusions from the fact the United States has deployed Armed Forces groupings prepared for war near the Soviet Union's borders and has created control systems for these groupings. We have to reckon with the constantly growing scale and dangerous nature of the strategic offensive forces exercises the U.S. Command is conducting and the exercises conducted within the NATO framework. Nor can we fail to consider the fact that ever new conventional arms systems are entering the armed forces of the United States, the FRG, and the other NATO countries.

The USSR has suggested to the United States that no strike weapons should be deployed in space, and it is awaiting a response. If there is no response, then we will be unable to disregard the U.S. intentions to turn space into a war theater by deploying in it strike forces capable of aiming not only at targets in space but also at our entire planet.

No attempts by the U.S. imperialists to make out that our measures in response to their military preparations are an increase in "the Soviet military threat" will mislead the world's peoples as to the real sources of the danger of war. The Soviet Union is doing everything in its power for reason to triumph in international affairs. It will continue to pursue a Leninist peace policy. There is still a possibility of altering the dangerous development of events and diverting them into a healthy channel. The USSR is in favor of seeking a solution to the most complex problems at the conference table on the basis of the principle of parity and identical security. We are firmly convinced that no world problems, and that includes the historical dispute between socialism and capitalism, should be resolved by military means. And all those who are now saying "no" to the Soviet proposals are assuming the gravest responsibility to the peoples of Europe and the whole world.

The strengthening of defense capability is a guarantee of the reliable security of the Soviet state and the other socialist community countries. It objectively serves the cause of preserving peace on earth. The Communist Party and the Soviet people are doing and will continue to do everything to ensure that our motherland's defense might and the Armed Forces' combat readiness are at a high level. The U.S. intentions to achieve military superiority over the USSR are futile. The USSR will never allow it. It will never be unarmed in the face of any threat.

The Soviet Union has sufficient goodwill to proceed step by step toward the consolidation of security and the normalization of the world political atmosphere. We also have the necessary forces to counter any military threat from imperialism.

Thanks to the concern of the CPSU and the Soviet Government the Soviet Armed Forces' potential today is a firm fusion of a high level of technical equipment, martial skill, and indestructible morale. The Soviet Armed Forces are always on guard, always on the alert. No turn of events, including events connected with the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe, will catch us unawares.

The Soviet people can be confident that the USSR's defense might is being maintained at the level necessary to safeguard their peaceful labor. We have all the necessary material, scientific and technical resources for this. "Our country's defense capability," the statement by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, says, "is at a level at which anyone would be ill-advised to organize a trial of strength."

Newspaper Article by Vice President Bush: Deterrence, November 21, 1983 [1]

Washington—Since taking office, I have traveled to 48 states, 3 United States territories and 47 foreign countries. Everywhere I have gone, leaders and ordinary citizens alike have voiced one concern above all others: the need to avoid nuclear war. Our Government has set policies in place that, if adhered to, will keep such a war from ever taking place.

For nearly 40 years—years spanning Republican and Democratic Presidencies—the United States has pursued a consistent, twofold program to maintain nuclear peace.

Our first aim has been effective deterrence. We have made certain that our adversaries understand that a nuclear strike against us or our allies would result in retaliation. That sounds chilling, but by keeping our deterrent forces strong enough to be credible, we have avoided the need to use them. In Europe, where our deterrent efforts have been focused, there has been peace since 1945. In the rest of the world, more than 100 wars have taken place.

Our second aim has been genuine arms control—a persistent, dedicated effort to reach agreements with other nuclear powers that would control the production and testing of weapons. Such agreements include the Test Ban Treaty, [2] signed by John F. Kennedy in 1963, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, [3] signed by Richard M. Nixon in 1972.

Throughout these almost four decades, this program has placed burdens on our nation. We have had to spend large amounts of money on defense, station thousands of troops far from home and learn to live with the pressures involved in maintaining our freedoms in the nuclear age. As protesters march and rally in the days and months ahead, we would do well to remember that despite its costs, this program has succeeded in keeping the peace.

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[1] *The New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1983.

[2] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

The gravest threat to this peace emerged in the 1970's. It was then that the Soviet Union embarked on an arms buildup so vast it lacked any parallel in history—a buildup that continues today. In many categories of conventional and nuclear forces, the Russians have achieved superiority. One such category much in the news is that of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The Russians began to deploy new and threatening missiles in 1977, and today they have more than 1,000 warheads aimed at targets throughout Western Europe. Our European allies were alarmed by the creation of a Soviet nuclear monopoly in this category of weapons. The deployments we are carrying out today, the first in many years, respond to a request from our NATO allies, to which we agreed in 1979.[4]

The Russians have threatened to walk out of the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces, in Geneva, and this they may do. We would remain at the table, ready and willing to negotiate seriously; and we are certain that the Russians eventually would return. They know as well as we that nuclear arms reduction talks must succeed for the sake of us all, Russians and Americans alike.

In addition, we are engaged in three other arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. These cover nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. These are all serious negotiations, to which the United States is committed.

President Reagan has directed the Defense Department to study the feasibility of developing a strategic nuclear defense—one that would destroy hostile strategic nuclear missiles in space. If this defense could be perfected, it could help lift the shadow of nuclear war from everyone.

The President's leadership in each of these initiatives is a reflection of his commitment to arms reductions. Some have voiced doubts about the President's commitment. I, who see him daily, know that it is deep, sincere and abiding. To this end, in 1981 we removed 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe. We have recently decided to remove 1,400 more tactical weapons from Europe in the near future.

I believe President Reagan has the best chance of any recent President to achieve genuine arms reductions.

My own view of war and its horrors first came in the pre-nuclear era. At the age of 19, as a torpedo-bomber pilot, I was shot down in the Pacific and was the only survivor of my plane's crew. That experience, vivid in my memory, has been a constant incentive for me to do all in my power to see that my children and grandchildren can grow up and not have to face the dangers of war—either as combatants or innocent victims.

I am convinced, from all I have seen here and abroad, that our policy of strength, deterrence and serious negotiation holds open the door to lasting peace. There are no "quick fixes" available to us. The price of peace and freedom includes courage and determination and patience. The American people have these qualities in abundance, and I urge you to join us in pursuing the policies of peace and deterrence that have worked so well for so long.

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[4] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

Czechoslovakian Amendments for the U.S. Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Peace and Disarmament Movements, November 21, 1983[5]

1. Add a new first preambular paragraph:

"*Convinced* that the will of the peoples as reflected by the mass peace and disarmament movements for the prevention of nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race should be taken into account by Governments in formulating their appropriate policies,"

2. Add a new first operative paragraph:

"*Urges* the Governments of all nuclear weapon States and other militarily significant States to harmonize their policies with the main demands of the mass peace and disarmament movements, in particular, with regard to the prevention of nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race;"

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Confidence-Building Measures and Prohibitions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, November 21, 1983[1]

The Soviet delegation wishes to explain its votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.5[2] and A/C.1/38/L.21/Rev.1.[3]

The Soviet delegation does not object to the adoption without a vote of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.5, on confidence-building measures. Naturally, we also do not object to continuing the consideration of this question in the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

At the same time, however, we cannot fail to express our disquiet over the fact that in the recent past talks on the need for confidence-building measures have been increasingly used as a means of creating the illusion that that aim can be achieved at a time of an arms buildup as long as it is accompanied by measures having nothing to do with building confidence and in order to establish transparency, predictability, and so forth. In present-day conditions it is more important than ever before that confidence-building measures be established and implemented in connection with concrete measures for military détente, arms limitation and disarmament on specific situations and not in isolation from them.

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[5] A/C.1/38/L.73. The U.S. draft resolution is printed *ante*, Nov. 12. The Czechoslovakian delegation submitted a second amendment, *post*, Nov. 29.

[1] A/C.1/38/PV.34, pp. 9–10.

[2] This draft resolution was subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/73A.

[3] Subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/66.

In the view of the Soviet delegation, this provision, which unfortunately is not adequately reflected in the draft resolution notwithstanding our request to its sponsors in that regard, must be fully taken into account in the course of the future work of the Disarmament Commission.

The Soviet delegation does not object to the adoption by consensus of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.21/Rev.1. The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the task of prohibiting or limiting the use of specific types of conventional weapons which may deemed to be excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects, and it welcomes the coming into force of the relevant international Convention. [4] We fully support operative paragraph 1 in its appeal to all States which have not yet done so to ratify this Convention and its three Protocols.

At the same time I wish to emphasize yet again that the Soviet Union has proposed that further steps be taken to prohibit or limit the use of other types of weapons which may be considered to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects—for example, phosphorus munitions for use against human targets.

With the entry into force of the Convention now, there remain no further obstacles to the holding of talks on negotiations for the conclusion of new additional protocols to this Convention.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Study on Conventional Weapons, World Disarmament Conference, and a Radiological Weapons Ban, November 21, 1983 [1]

My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.4/Rev.1 [2] because we are convinced of the need for a thorough investigation of disarmament questions in the field of conventional weapons. We view our endorsement of this draft resolution to be within the framework of our policy of containing the United Nations budget at its current level. Therefore, it is my delegation's considered opinion that this study should be funded within existing resources, and we reserve the right to pursue this position when the matter is considered in the Fifth Committee.

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[4] The Convention and its Protocols may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 441–452.

[1] A/C.1/38/PV.34, pp. 14–15.

[2] This draft resolution was subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/188A.

My delegation has joined in the consensus adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.17 on the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. [3] Of particular interest to my delegation is the understanding reflected in the third preambular paragraph of this draft resolution that such a conference should be adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, and we note that a similar reference is made in the fifth preambular paragraph and in operative paragraph 1.

The United States believes that, to be successful, a world disarmament conference must take place in a propitious international environment. A premature conference would not, in the view of my Government, serve to enhance our efforts to achieve concrete and verifiable disarmament measures.

My delegation is pleased to have been able to join the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.23 on radiological weapons. [4] Over the past year, the United States has had the honour of co-ordinating the work of the sub-group in the Committee on Disarmament devoted to concluding a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. We are firmly committed to this goal and look forward to continued vigorous efforts during the coming year to complete this treaty. At the same time, the United States continues to be willing to discuss the question of whether additional legal protection is needed with respect to military attacks on nuclear facilities. The United States shares the concerns of many other countries about the potential effects of such attacks. In this context we note that certain protections already exist in the general provisions and specific rules provided for in the international law on armed conflict, in particular the 1949 Geneva Conventions [5] and the 1977 Additional Protocols. [6]

As the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament have made clear, the question of attack on nuclear facilities is a very complex one and may well take longer to answer than should the completion of the negotiations on radiological weapons. For example, the discussions should continue the evaluation of the existing prohibitions and rules, gather additional expert opinion about the adequacy of the current legal protection and continue to bear in mind that there are aspects of the questions which concern rules of combat while others concern arms-control issues.

Accordingly, we believe that the conclusion of the negotiations on radiological weapons must not be held up because of these discussions which involve issues essentially independent of the traditional radiological weapons subject-matter. At the same time, the United States welcomes the continued efforts promptly to resolve the problems involved in these discussions, which should proceed deliberately to achieve consensus on the question of the need for additional legal measures affording protection to nuclear facilities. My delegation of course continues to have an open mind concerning the adequacy of current measures. We shall approach this and other questions relating to the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons with renewed vigour at the Conference on Disarmament next year.

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[3] Adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/186.

[4] Subsequently adopted as G.A. res. 38/188D.

[5] TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365; 6 UST 3114, 3217, 3316, 3516; 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135, 287.

[6] *International Legal Materials*, Nov. 16, 1977, No. 6, pp. 1391 ff.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament, November 21, 1983 [1]

My delegation has asked to be allowed to speak on draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.66 on institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. [2] The Government of the United States will oppose this draft resolution because its negative effects would be twofold: first, it would hamper progress on important work being undertaken in specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system by diluting and detracting the focus of those bodies; and, secondly, it would impede progress towards the adoption of concrete, effective and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament in those agencies and institutions which have competence in this field.

The specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system carry on important work in their respective fields. To overpoliticize these agencies would do a disservice to their noble work—work which could well be held in abeyance should non-germane disarmament matters be introduced for their consideration.

The shared objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control is paramount and necessitates serious consideration in the bodies most appropriately designed and competent to undertake such work. We in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly are seized of such matters, as is the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In addition, the multilateral negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament—soon to be the Conference on Disarmament—is entrusted with important responsibilities as well. Those arrangements were developed during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and set forth in its Final Document. The draft resolution before us is contrary to the understandings enshrined in the Final Document.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.35, pp. 4–5.

[2] This draft resolution later became G.A. res. 38/188J.

For those reasons my delegation will vote "no" on draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.66.

Newspaper Article by Secretary of Defense Weinberger: Nuclear War and Deterrence, November 22, 1983 [1]

Millions of Americans have been frightened, angered, horrified or simply drained by a vision of life "The Day After" a nuclear war. They have come face to face with the terrible reality that I, as secretary of defense but also as a father and grandfather, must live with every day. And they are asking themselves—I hope they are asking themselves—what we as a nation can do to make sure television drama never turns into real life.

We must never become numb to the horror of nuclear weapons. There could be no "winners" in a nuclear war. As President Reagan has said on many occasions, and just recently reaffirmed before the Japanese Diet, "A Nuclear war can never be won, and must never be fought." [2]

But neither can we afford to become paralyzed with fear. It is not, tragically, within our power to put an end to the knowledge that could put an end to us. We cannot banish the discoveries of nuclear physics; neither can we leave these discoveries to other nations which may be less appalled by their prospect.

The ABC film did not try to take us into the minds of the Soviet leaders. And in fact we cannot know if those leaders share our vision of nuclear disaster, or how long they will be leaders. What we do know is that over the past two decades the Soviets have developed more, and more powerful and accurate, nuclear weapons than they could possibly need simply to deter attack. And, with the refiring capability of their weapons, which we do not have, and judging by their extensive military literature on the subject, it appears that they believe a nuclear war can be fought and won. I only wish the Soviet leaders would allow their citizens to see a film like "The Day After."

If we cannot return to the world that existed before the secret of the atom was unlocked, and if it appears that the Soviets do not share our conviction that nuclear war is unwinnable, how can we make certain that these terrible weapons are never used?

Every American president since the dawn of the nuclear age has answered this question in the same way: We must convince any potential adversaries that the costs of aggression by them would be far, far higher than any possible benefit. As President Kennedy said in his inaugural address, "only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed."[3] And history has proved that this strategy works.

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[1] The *Washington Post*, Nov. 22, 1983, p. A21.

[2] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 21, 1983 (vol. 19, No. 46), p. 1563

I often hear the fear expressed that this strategy of deterrence, even if it has prevented nuclear war for almost 40 years, has fueled a dangerous arms race. Well, what we have witnessed for the last 15 years is a one-sided arms race: a race the United States has not entered. In fact, during the 1970s we made a conscious—and public—choice to restrict our nuclear weapons developments, hoping that the Soviets would imitate our restraint. They did not. Today there are 25 percent fewer weapons in our nuclear stockpile than 20 years ago. As recently as two weeks ago, we and our NATO allies agreed to take 1,400 more nuclear weapons out of Europe. By contrast, the size of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile has grown significantly during this same period.

We want the Soviet Union to join us in dramatically reducing both sides' nuclear stockpiles. Overall, the president's START proposals would reduce U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile warheads by one-third below present levels. And while, in the face of the Soviet nuclear buildup, we must upgrade and modernize our existing forces to ensure that they will still pose a believable *retaliatory* threat, this does not mean we are seeking to increase our nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the president has proposed eliminating two ballistic missile warheads for every MX missile warhead we deploy.

A deep reduction in the most terrible weapons ever to threaten mankind is an ambitious but a proper, even noble, goal. And we must accept that the Soviets will test our resolve on this goal. They are tough negotiators. They will not easily give up the hope that we will unilaterally reduce our own strength and allow them uncontested military superiority, which would be the end of peace through deterrence. They will not easily believe that any nation which allows a free and open debate about matters as serious as war and peace can maintain a steady course. We must convince them that we are committed to the pursuit of peace.

In the days after "The Day After," what can each of us do to prevent tragedy on a global scale? We can fight off the temptation to indulge in despair. We can remain strong in our determination to preserve deterrence, and to persevere in our search for genuine, mutual, significant arms reduction. And we can share our conviction that nuclear war has no winners with the individuals whom we most need to convince: the leadership of the Soviet Union. Our petitions and our marches should be directed to that leadership—and quickly.

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[3] *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Nuclear Weapon Test Ban, Nuclear Test Moratorium, and Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes, November 22, 1983 [1]

The Soviet delegation would like to state the reasons that determine our attitude and votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.35, L.37 and L.48. [2]

In determining our attitude to draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.35 and L.48 we base ourselves on the idea that the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is a task of primary importance. The most rapid possible conclusion of an agreement on this would constitute a reliable obstacle to the growing danger of nuclear war owing to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation shares the appeal contained in A/C.1/38/L.48 to all States Members of the Conference on Disarmament to initiate immediately negotiation on this issue.

Aware of its responsibility for the limitation of nuclear weapons and also that it is a depositary State for a number of agreements in this area, the Soviet Union is doing everything incumbent upon it to attribute priority to giving impulse to such negotiations. This goal is served by the Soviet Union's submission of fundamental provisions for such an agreement, considering the degree of agreement achieved in our previous examination of this issue. We are willing to examine constructively also the proposals put forward by other States the purpose of which is to further the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests. Until the conclusion of such an agreement, the USSR is proposing a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

More than once, including at the present session of the United Nations General Assembly, the USSR has confirmed its readiness to bring into effect—of course if the United States of America agrees to it—a Soviet-American agreement on limiting underground nuclear-weapon tests, concluded in 1974, and the agreement on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes of 1976.

Guided by those considerations, the Soviet delegation supports draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.48.

However, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.35, and in particular operative paragraph 6(a), my delegation feels that it does not direct the Conference towards disarmament on the basis of practical negotiations for the purpose of reaching agreement but only requests it to resume its examination of issues relating to a comprehensive test ban. Operative paragraph 6(c) also gives rise to objections, for it clearly demonstrates that here, as in the past, the primary purpose is to study the problem of verification. Such an approach is in contradiction to the will of a clear majority of States that are anxious for a rapid resumption of practical negotiations, as has been brought out during the course of the debates of the General Assembly at its present session. The Soviet Union will therefore abstain in the voting on draft resolution L.35.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.37, pp. 30–31.

[2] These draft resolutions were subsequently adopted by the G.A. as resolutions 38/63, 38/188E, and 38/62, respectively.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.37 on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, the Soviet delegation will also abstain in the voting. As we have frequently stressed, the Soviet Union favours a businesslike approach to the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As one of the first steps in such a process it would be feasible to examine the question of prohibiting the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such a measure could also be part of a freeze on nuclear weapons, as is proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union on this subject. The draft resolution in L.37, however, prohibits the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and, as in the past, begs the question of the solution of the problem of ending and reversing the nuclear arms race. We are convinced that such an approach does not work in the interests of progress in this area.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Freeze on Nuclear Weapons, November 22, 1983 [1]

In connection with the voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.34 [2] and L.43 [3] the Soviet delegation would like to make the following statement.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, a nuclear-weapon freeze, is an important and urgent task in the struggle to prevent nuclear war and to achieve disarmament. The nuclear-arms race, which has accelerated in recent years, has substantially increased the threat of nuclear war. Of particular concern is the circumstance that the unceasing nuclear-arms race in recent years has given rise to obstacles in the way of negotiations to curb it—obstacles which are leading these negotiations into a blind alley. A nuclear-weapon freeze could prevent this arms race and give additional impetus to efforts to achieve agreement on a radical reduction in nuclear-weapons arsenals.

Last year the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on this item, thus responding to the yearnings of the peoples of the world and the unprecedentedly broad movement of world public opinion on behalf of a nuclear-weapon freeze. In responding to the appeal from the United Nations and the demands of world public opinion, on 21 June the Soviet Government, in accordance with a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 16 June 1983, proposed to the Governments of other nuclear Powers that all nuclear-weapon States freeze all existing stockpiles of such weapons, qualitatively and quantitatively.[4] Unfortunately our proposal has not yet encountered any positive response, but this does not necessarily mean that we can set aside the question of a freeze. Quite to the contrary, in our opinion it is necessary to strive even more actively for implementation of this important measure, and the United Nations can play a major role in this respect. It is necessary to call on all nuclear-weapon States to proceed to a freeze, under appropriate controls, of all nuclear weapons they possess, both quantitatively and qualitatively—that is ending the growth in all components of nuclear arsenals, including all types of delivery vehicles and all types of nuclear material, without developing new types of such weapons, and establishing a moratorium on all nuclear-weapons testing as well as on the testing of new types of delivery vehicles. This calls for an end to the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.37, pp. 45–46.

[2] Subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/73B.

[3] Became G.A. res. 38/73E.

In this respect we consider that the Soviet Union and the United States, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, must be the first simultaneously to implement a freeze on their nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis as an example to other nuclear-weapon Powers which the latter should follow by proceeding to a freeze of their own nuclear arsenals as soon as possible. It is also necessary to activate all efforts aimed at the speedy achievement of agreement on substantial limitations—I repeat: substantial limitations—and radical reductions of nuclear weapons, bearing in mind their total ultimate liquidation.

Inasmuch as draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.34 and L.43 on the whole have been included in this cluster along these lines, we shall vote for them. In this respect we should like to state that we consider that the sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.34 relates to States possessing nuclear weapons that not only do not undertake any initiatives with respect to a freeze but also speak out against this important measure.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Loeb) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Freeze on Nuclear Weapons, November 22, 1983[1]

I welcome this opportunity to discuss draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.2, L.34 and L.43 on a nuclear freeze.[2]

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[4] *Ante.*

[1] A/C.1/38/PV.37, pp. 48–50.

[2] Adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/76, 38/73B, and 38/73E, respectively.

Over the past year the issue of a United States-Soviet nuclear-weapon freeze has attracted widespread attention. Resolutions supporting such a freeze have been submitted to the United States Congress and to this body. Nuclear freeze proposals have been on numerous ballots throughout the United States—and that is as it should be, for in open societies such as that of the United States vital questions of nuclear disarmament are openly and freely debated.

The United States Government recognizes that most nuclear-freeze proposals arise out of a profound concern over nuclear war. We fully share that concern. As President Reagan himself has said, "in such a war there can be no winners".[3] We also know that various nuclear-freeze proposals are supported by many who are deeply committed to arms control, and we too share that commitment.

The debate here is not over ends; it is about means. The issue is how to translate good intentions into effective arms control.

My Government believes that various nuclear-freeze proposals—however well intentioned they may be and however attractive they may seem—would not achieve their stated purpose; on the contrary, we believe a freeze would decrease international stability and ultimately increase, not decrease, the danger of war for the following reasons.

First, a freeze is just not good enough. The United States does not want to cap deployments at current levels. We want significant reductions in nuclear arms on both sides. Our START and intermediate nuclear forces proposals should be familiar to all present here today. They offer an opportunity for substantial and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. Despite continued Soviet deployments while both these negotiations have been under way, we have been committed to real reductions. We will remain flexible in our approach. We will not walk away from the negotiating table. The United States has offered a 50 per cent cut in the number of warheads on both sides; the Soviet Union has countered with an approximate 20 per cent reduction in the number of missiles on each side. Shall we ignore those proposals and go backwards to an agreement which even the optimists tell us would take years to negotiate and which would freeze nuclear arsenals at existing levels?

Secondly, a freeze would make significant arms control more difficult. The Soviet Union would have little or no incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms if they could simply freeze the existing military situation. Unilateral United States restraint during the 1970s—which was tantamount to a freeze on our part—did not produce Soviet restraint; on the contrary, the Soviet Union carried out the most intensive conventional and military build-up in peace-time history. In the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviet Union initially refused our offers to negotiate while it steadily deployed hundreds of multi-warhead SS-20 missile systems. The USSR agreed to join us at the negotiating table only when it became clear that we and our allies were prepared—if our much preferred course of substantial arms reductions failed—to take steps to counter the Soviet deployments.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 185–187.

Thirdly, a freeze at existing levels would back the United States and its allies into a position of destabilizing military vulnerability. The freeze would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet build-up over the past decade and a half. For example, almost 75 per cent of Soviet nuclear systems are under five years old and about 75 per cent of comparable United States systems are over 15 years old. To correct this destabilizing and unsafe balance, the United States has offered the build-down proposals, which would significantly reduce the nuclear arsenals of both sides while replacing old, unsafe weapons systems with fewer and safer systems.

Finally, a freeze on all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements which could not be verified. They could not be verified in the absence of special arrangements for that purpose. Unfortunately, given the Soviet attitude towards verification, such arrangements would probably take many years to negotiate. As any policy-maker responsible for his nation's national security can attest, one cannot afford to base national security on trust in his potential adversary.

The United States is committed to equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions in military forces, nuclear and conventional. A nuclear freeze would not promote reductions, equality or verifiability. We can and must do better than a freeze. My delegation will therefore vote against draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.2, L.34 and L.43.

Statement by President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, November 23, 1983 [1]

I deeply regret that the Soviet Union has chosen to discontinue the present round of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations in Geneva. While their decision did not come as a surprise, it is a terrible disappointment. The search for an agreement to reduce nuclear weapons is so important to people everywhere that the effort cannot be abandoned.

Common sense demands that we continue. We have negotiated for 2 years while the Soviets have continued to deploy their SS-20 missiles. There is no justification for their breaking off negotiations just as NATO is beginning to restore the balance. The United States will never walk away from the negotiating table. Peace is too important.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Dec. 5, 1983, p. 1617.

We are prepared to resume the talks at once. The initiatives we have placed on the negotiating table have only one objective: to reach a fair agreement that reduces the level of nuclear arms. The United States and its NATO allies are united in our commitment to succeed.

We have no higher priority than the reduction of nuclear weapons. Arms reductions are the only sound course to a safer future. We seek sound and verifiable agreements that meet the legitimate security interests of both sides.

We are continuing other negotiations with the Soviet Union—on strategic arms reductions, on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, on a chemical weapons ban and, soon, on confidence-building measures aimed at preventing military surprises in Europe.

The people of the world deserve and want our negotiations to succeed. We look forward to the day when the Soviet Union hears their call and returns to the INF negotiating table. Our negotiations have been on the right course. We must persevere if we are to serve the cause of peace.

Question-and-Answer Session With President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, November 23, 1983 [1]

The President. Good morning. Any significance to the fact that you're now on the left of me instead of the right? [Laughter] [2]

Q. That's what we want to know. What do you think of the Soviet walkout, and does this increase the possibility of a nuclear confrontation in the world?

The President. No, I still don't believe there's danger of a nuclear conflict as long as we have the deterrent power that we have. I don't think that I'm surprised by what they did this morning, but I am disappointed. And I can't believe that it's going to be permanent. We'll be ready to continue negotiations at any time that they want to come back.

Let me just point out the two superpowers are the only force that can preserve the peace and maintain peace. And we have, for 2 years, and we were the ones who initiated these discussions about eliminating, if possible, the intermediate-range weapons in Europe at a time when NATO had none. And during these 2 years or so of negotiations and talks, they have continued to add a hundred of their triple-warhead SS-20 missiles to the stock they already had. At the same time, they are proclaiming that we are the aggressors in wanting to accede to NATO's demand and put any missiles at all in Europe, where there are none.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Nov. 28, 1983, pp. 1611–1612.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

Now, we, at present, have plans and are going to continue with withdrawing tactical and theater weapons, 1,400 more than we've already withdrawn. So, I think the evidence is very plain as to which country of the two is sincerely and honestly working toward a reduction of armaments.

Q. What do you think motivated them, and will they put missiles in Eastern Europe?

The President. What's that?

Q. What do you think motivated the Russians, and will they put missiles, their missiles, now directly in Eastern Europe?

The President. Well, they have announced that this is their intention, but I understand that there's also some unhappiness and dissatisfaction on the part of some of the Eastern European countries about their doing that.

Q. Mr. President, do you think they will come back, and how soon?

The President. I don't know how soon. I can't put a time on it. I think they'll come back, because I think they must be aware, as much as we are, that there cannot and must not be a nuclear confrontation in the world by the only two nations that truly have the great destructive capability, nuclear capability. So, I have to believe they'll come back. And I can tell you that we're not going to sit here with false pride. We will do everything that we can to bring them back.

Q. Like what, Mr. President?

The President. What?

Q. Like what? What will you do to bring them back?

The President. Continuing to persuade them that it's to their advantage as well as anyone else's.

Q. Are you investigating your own staff?

The President. I don't comment on any security violations or any investigation of the same.

Okay. Well, happy Thanksgiving.

Statement by the Chairman (Nitze) of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations: Soviet Suspension of the Talks, November 23, 1983 [1]

The United States profoundly regrets the unilateral decision of the Soviet Union to suspend the INF negotiations. This decision is as unjustified as it is unfortunate.

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[1] ACDA Arms Control Bulletin.

The Soviet Union has rationalized the suspension of these negotiations on the grounds that approval by the NATO Parliaments of U.S. missile deployments and U.S. deployment of those missiles makes continuation of such talks impossible. In 1979 when the United States first proposed INF negotiations to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had already deployed some 140 SS-20s globally. The global total of SS-20s now is 360 and this Soviet build-up continues. This continuing Soviet build-up has not prevented the United States from pursuing these negotiations and making every effort to reach an equitable agreement. These negotiations should continue until an agreement is reached.

The schedule for U.S. deployments has never been a secret. Nor has the reason for them. They were mandated by the NATO 1979 decision [2] as a necessary response to the Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles. That decision was mandated as an effort to limit such arms through negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United States remains committed to reaching a negotiated solution which meets the security needs of all concerned. The United States delegation has sought both formally and informally to explore all opportunities for reconciling the differences between the two sides. The United States proposals are flexible and designed to meet expressed Soviet concerns.

The United States stands ready to halt or reverse its deployments if an equitable agreement to reduce and limit or eliminate U.S. and Soviet missiles can be achieved.

For its part the United States remains prepared to continue the INF negotiations until an agreement has been reached and our two countries have thus fulfilled their responsibilities to contribute to the cause of peace.

U.S. Sub-Amendments to the Czechoslovakian Amendments for the U.S. Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Peace and Disarmament Movements, November 23, 1983 [1]

1. Amend the proposed new first preambular paragraph contained in A/C.1/38/L.73 to draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.61 to delete "will of the peoples as reflected by the mass peace and disarmament movements" and substitute "wishes of all people concerned with peace and disarmament and anxious" so that the proposed new first preambular paragraph will read "*Convinced* that the wishes of all people concerned with peace and disarmament and anxious for the prevention of nuclear

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[2] For the NATO decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[1] A/C.1/38/L.78. The Czechoslovakian amendments are printed *ante*, Nov. 21, and the U.S. draft resolution, *ante*, Nov. 12.

war and for curbing the nuclear arms race should be taken into account by Governments in formulating their appropriate policies,".

2. Amend the proposed new first operative paragraph contained in A/C.1/38/L.73 to draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.61 to insert after the word "all" in the first line "States, especially the" and to delete "harmonise their policies with the main demands of the mass peace and disarmament movements" and substitute "redouble their efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and thus to respond to the wishes of their peoples" and to delete in the final line of the English text "war and curbing the nuclear arms race" and substitute "and any other type of war and curbing the arms race, in particular in the nuclear field," so that the proposed new first operative paragraph will read "*Urges* the Governments of all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to redouble their efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and thus to respond to the wishes of their peoples, in particular with regard to the prevention of nuclear and any other type of war and curbing the arms race, in particular in the nuclear field;".

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, November 23, 1983 [1]

The United States delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.6 on the "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". [2] Our vote reflects our support of the concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and in other appropriate regions of the world.

We believe that effective nuclear-weapon-free zones negotiated and supported by the States of the region, cannot only enhance the security of those States but also reinforce non-proliferation goals on a regional basis. My delegation has elaborated, at previous sessions of this Committee, the criteria by which the United States judges the effectiveness of any nuclear-weapon-free zone, so they are all well known. At the same time we wish to point out that our vote is not directed against any particular State in the region.

We believe, moreover, that nuclear-weapon-free-zone arrangements must effectively preclude the conducting of any nuclear explosions. Moves by any State towards the development of nuclear weapons concerns us all equally. In this connection I should like to take particular note of paragraph 2 of this draft resolution, which urges all States in the region to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of the draft resolution. My Government's support for the draft resolution is based on our expectation that the sponsors and those voting in favour of it will demonstrate that they take this provision with the utmost seriousness.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.38, pp. 14–15.

[2] Subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/65.

Let me turn to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/38/L.32 [3] and say that the United States delegation is pleased to announce its intention to support that draft resolution by voting in favour of it and on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71, concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. [4] The United States became a party to that Additional Protocol in 1981. The United States believes that the Treaty on the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, the landmark Treaty on this important subject, constitutes a major contribution to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and presents an example for other regions of the world. We cannot but express our regret, however, that the sponsors of the draft resolution continue to single out but one country for not having become a full party to the Treaty and its additional instruments, when there are countries within the region itself which have not ratified or adhered to the Treaty. Full adherence to the Treaty by all those States would substantially enhance the Treaty's effectiveness in ensuring that Latin America remains a zone free of nuclear weapons, thereby advancing the influence of this significant arms control Treaty to encourage appropriate efforts in other regions.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Condemnation of Nuclear War, November 23, 1983 [1]

My delegation would like to make a few brief remarks on draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.1/Rev.1, on the condemnation of nuclear war. [2]

On 4 [*3*] November, Ambassador Loeb outlined at length my Government's proposal for achieving substantial reduction in nuclear weapons. [3] We did not advance—and will not advance—impractical proposals and rhetorical resolutions. What we did and will propose are concrete and verifiable measures which would effectively reduce the risk of any war, nuclear or otherwise.

One of the melancholy lessons of history is that peace and security are neither easily won nor easily kept. These noble goals were certainly not advanced by pious condemnations of war and professions of peace that preceded the Second World War, the most destructive war in world history. We have seen how those declarations failed to deter powerful and determined totalitarian régimes at that time. Similarly, today unenforceable condemnations cannot replace effective arms control measures in preventing nuclear war.

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[3] Subsequently adopted as G.A. res. 38/61.

[4] For texts of the Treaty and its Protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[1] A/C.1/38/PV.39, pp. 4–6.

[2] I.e., the Soviet draft resolution which the G.A. subsequently adopted as res. 38/75.

[3] A/C.1/38/PV.23, pp. 31–42.

My delegation finds it particularly curious that this draft resolution, sponsored by the Soviet Union and its allies:

> "Condemns the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propaganda of . . . doctrines and concepts . . . to substantiate the " 'legitimacy' for the first use of nuclear weapons . . ." and the " 'admissibility' of unleashing nuclear war." *(A/C.1/38/L.1/Rev.1, para. 2)*

We are all too well aware of the sponsoring States' aversion to free and unfettered public discussion of questions surrounding nuclear and other military issues within their own borders. Clearly, they would now like to extend that control of free flow of information to other countries as well. Moreover, Soviet leaders have been seeking to convince world public opinion that the Soviet Union views nuclear war as unthinkable, but official Soviet documents cast serious doubts on the oft-repeated assertions. Official writings of high-level Soviet military planners make abundantly clear that the Soviet Union adheres to a policy which does not exclude the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, Soviet policy is oriented towards attaining a nuclear-winning capability, which would include resort to nuclear weapons.

For example, Chief of Staff Marshal Ogarkov, the Soviet Union's top-ranking professional military officer, high-lighting the possibility of employment of nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive strike, stated:

> With the development of means of armed combat, the significance of surprise has steadily grown. Since the introduction of nuclear missile weapons, and other powerful means of destruction, its role has increased. Nuclear missile weapons and armed air forces, in combination with high mobility and manoeuvreability of troops, make possible the application of a wide array of methods of surprise actions.[4]

In February 1982, on the occasion of the Soviet Army-Navy Day, Marshal Ogarkov, who had previously concluded that the Soviet Union and its allies possessed "objective possibilities to achieve victory in a nuclear war", published a booklet in which he maintained that the basic principle of training for a modern nuclear missile war was learning to gain victory. Marshal Ogarkov also deplored elements of pacificism among the Soviet citizenry.

These military considerations are not being pursued in isolation from considerations to provide for the safety of the Soviet civilian population in the event of nuclear war. A recent Soviet civil defence handbook again reflects that the attitude of the Soviet Union would be to be able to fight, win and survive a nuclear war.

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[4] Source not found.

The Soviet Union spends massive amounts of money on a civilian defence programme that is many times bigger than the combined programmes of all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. Given this, it is difficult to conclude that the Soviet leadership regards a nuclear exchange as unthinkable, or that it sees its goal in such an exchange as anything other than emerging victorious. The real issue is not "The Day After" but the day before.

Today, the most important task is to achieve results at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiating table in Geneva. In this connection my Government is deeply disappointed that the current round of INF negotiations has been suspended at the initiative of the Soviet Union. We sincerely hope that this action marks only a temporary hiatus in these negotiations. We are pleased that members of the First Committee, both in their statements and their votes yesterday, have called for the continuation of these vital negotiations, and note in this regard the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.63. [5] For our part, we remain firmly committed to reaching an agreement that would lead to greater stability at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons.

As my colleague, Mr. Paul Nitze, said in Geneva this morning:

> For its part, the United States remains prepared to continue the INF negotiations until agreement has been reached and our two countries have thus fulfilled their responsibilities to contribute to the cause of peace. [6]

My government has negotiated, and will continue to negotiate, seriously in order to achieve a world where nuclear war and, indeed, all wars are banished through concrete and verifiable measures. Advancing sterile and unenforceable condemnatory resolutions will not achieve those desired results. Such resolutions can also be dangerous, as they may lull peoples of the world into a false sense of security from potential aggression.

Therefore, my delegation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.1/Rev.1 and other similar draft resolutions.

Statement by Soviet President Andropov: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, November 24, 1983 [1]

The leadership of the Soviet Union has already brought its evaluations of the militaristic policy of the present United States Administration to the notice of the Soviet people and of other peoples and has warned the Governments of the United States and of the Western countries siding with it about the dangerous consequences of such a policy.

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[5] Subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/183 P.

[6] *Ante.*

[1] CD/422.

But Washington, Bonn, London and Rome have not heeded the voice of reason. The deployment of United States medium-range missiles is beginning on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. The appearance of United States Pershing and cruise missiles on the European continent is thus becoming an accomplished fact.

Europe has been living in peace for almost 40 years, longer than ever before in modern history. This has been possible because of the consistently peace-loving policy of the countries of the socialist community, the efforts of the continent's peace-loving forces and also the realistic position of sober-minded politicians in the West. The approximate balance of military forces, including nuclear forces, that has emerged in Europe between the States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty, has objectively served the cause of European security and stability.

Now, the United States and NATO as a whole are taking a step aimed at tipping the scales in their favour. The nuclear missiles that are being deployed near the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies are not intended for the defence of western Europe at all. No one is threatening it. What will grow with the deployment of United States missiles on European soil is not the security of Europe, but the real danger that the United States will bring down catastrophe upon the peoples of Europe.

During the two World Wars, the territory of the United States of America was spared the flames of destruction. Now, too, those in Washington would like to think that by deploying their medium-range missiles in Europe and thereby creating an additional nuclear threat to the socialist countries, they will succeed in diverting the retaliatory strike from their abode. As for the security of the west European allies of the United States, that would seem to interest the United States leaders only to the extent to which the west Europeans would be able, by their lives, by their cities, to lessen the retribution against the United States, should Washington give in to the temptation to unleash a nuclear war in the illusory hope of winning it.

The deployment of United States nuclear missiles in western Europe is by no means a step prompted by a reaction to some allegedly existing concern in the West about the present alignment of forces of the sides in Europe. It has repeatedly been demonstrated on the basis of concrete figures—and this is accepted by many political leaders and experts in the West—that at present a rough parity still exists in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as regards medium-range nuclear weapons, while NATO has a considerable edge in terms of nuclear warheads. Thus, if anybody has cause for concern, it is the

Warsaw Pact countries, which are being threatened by the military machines of the NATO States.

Nor can the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, in evaluating all this, turn a blind eye to the fact that Washington has declared a "crusade" against socialism as a social system and that those who have now issued the orders for the deployment of new nuclear arms on our doorstep are basing their practical policy on this foolhardy premise. It appears that, by deploying the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Europe, the Governments of a number of NATO countries would like to create a concrete nuclear-missile foundation for this adventuristic premise.

Can the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries ignore this danger? No, they cannot. That is why the highest Party and State leaders of seven socialist countries declared at their meeting in Moscow on 28 June 1983 that under no circumstances would they permit military superiority of the NATO bloc over the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.[2]

In confirming their consent to the deployment of United States missiles in their countries, the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy could not but have known that from the outset the United States did not want to reach a mutually-acceptable accord on nuclear arms in Europe and did everything at the talks in Geneva and elsewhere to prevent such an accord. Likewise, they could not but have known that the Soviet Union and its allies would necessarily take the required measures to safeguard their security and would not allow the United States and NATO as a whole to disrupt the existing rough balance of forces in Europe.

It was also clearly stated by us that the appearance of new United States missiles in western Europe would make impossible a continuation of the talks that were being conducted in Geneva on nuclear weapons in Europe.

The decisions taken during the past few days by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy show unequivocally that despite the will of their own peoples, despite the security interests of their countries and despite the interests of European and universal peace, those Governments have given the green light to the deployment of United States missiles. By so doing, they have assumed, together with the Government of the United States, the entire responsibility for the consequences of a short-sighted policy of which the Soviet Union warned in advance.

Having carefully weighed all the aspects of the situation, the Soviet leadership has taken the following decisions:

1. Since the United States has by its actions torpedoed the possibility of reaching a mutually-acceptable accord at the talks on questions of limiting nuclear arms in Europe, and since their continuation in

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[2] *Ante.*

such conditions would serve only as a cover for the actions of the United States and a number of other NATO countries aimed at undermining European and international security, the Soviet Union considers its further participation in those talks impossible.

2. The unilateral obligations assumed by the Soviet Union with the object of creating more favourable conditions for the success of the talks are cancelled. That in turn cancels the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR.

3. By agreement with the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the preparations begun some time ago, as was announced, for the deployment of extended-range operational-tactical missiles on the territory of those countries will be accelerated.

4. Since, by deploying its weapons in Europe, the United States is increasing the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, corresponding Soviet weapons will be deployed in the light of that circumstance in ocean areas and in seas. By their characteristics, these weapons will be commensurate with the threat which the United States missiles being deployed in Europe are creating for us and our allies.

It goes without saying that other measures, too, will be taken to ensure the security of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community.

As we begin to implement the decisions taken by us, we declare that the retaliatory measures from the Soviet side will be kept strictly within the limits that the actions of the NATO countries will dictate. The Soviet Union—and we stress this once again—is not striving for military superiority and we will do only what is absolutely necessary to prevent the military balance from being destroyed.

If the United States and the other NATO countries show readiness to return to the situation that existed before the commencement of the deployment of United States medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union will be prepared to do likewise. In that event, our earlier proposals with regard to limiting and reducing nuclear weapons in Europe would become valid again. In that case—that is, subject to the restoration of the former situation—the unilateral obligations of the USSR in this field would also become effective once more.

The Soviet Union declares most definitely and emphatically that it remains wedded to a policy of principle, that of ending the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and of lessening and ultimately totally eliminating the threat of nuclear war. It will continue to exert every effort for the attainment of these lofty aims.

The Soviet Union, as before, advocates the most radical solution of the problems of nuclear arms in Europe. It repeats its proposal to make Europe entirely free of nuclear weapons, whether medium-range or tactical.

The Soviet leadership calls on the leaders of the United States and the States of western Europe to weigh once again all the consequences threatening their own peoples and the whole of humanity as a result of the implementation of the plans to deploy the new United States missiles in Europe.

We are already living in too fragile a world. That is why responsible statesmen must evaluate what is happening and adopt a rational solution. Human reason alone can and must save humanity from the grave danger threatening it. We call on those who are pushing the world along the path of the ever more dangerous arms race to abandon their unattainable hopes of thereby achieving military superiority in order to dictate their will to other peoples and States.

The Soviet Union is convinced that peace can be strengthened and the security of peoples guaranteed, not by constantly stockpiling and inventing new types of weapons, but rather by reducing existing armaments to immeasurably lower levels. Mankind has too many problems which are not being solved merely because colossal material, intellectual and other resources are being diverted. And in this respect, too, reaching agreements on a radical reduction of nuclear and other weapons would be a boon for all peoples.

The Soviet leadership declares that, in fulfilment of the will of the Soviet people, it will, in future also, do everything to avert the danger of war and to preserve peace for the present and succeeding generations.

Interview of the Head of the Soviet Delegation (Kvitsinskiy) to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations: Suspension of the Talks, November 24, 1983 [1]

The plenary meeting of the Soviet and U.S. delegations on the talks on limiting medium-range weapons in Europe ended here today. During the session, the Soviet delegation announced the end of the present round of negotiations without setting a date for their resumption.

Question: The ending of the present round of negotiations has caused not a little emotion among the numerous journalists who are following these talks. Most of them are asking themselves: What prevented an agreement being reached?

Answer: During this round, as throughout the entire talks, the possibility existed for reaching an agreement. This possibility was created by the far-reaching Soviet proposals proposed by Yuriy Andropov. These proposals opened up real prospects for reducing the level of nuclear arms in Europe and thus for reducing nuclear confrontation on our continent.

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[1] East Berlin ADM International Service in German, Nov. 24, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Nov. 25, 1983, vol. III, pp. AA4–AA5.

In any event, the Soviet Union did everything it could during the course of the entire talks to reach an agreement. But the United States did not wish to make use of these possibilities. Let the United States explain why it appeared more important to them and their NATO allies to begin stationing new missiles rather than agree with the Soviet Union on limiting hundreds of nuclear weapon-carriers in Europe. Let the American side explain how it is that the United States came to the talks on limiting nuclear weapons and for 2 years did not submit a single proposal on dismantling one single nuclear weapon on its side. It was more concerned with discussing how many missiles should be stationed additionally as first-strike weapons against the Soviet Union and its allies.

The United States did not and does not want an honest agreement. It did not and does not want to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe. This is what it is all about. And demonstrated once again—and this must be said in all clarity—is the basic difference between the policy of the Soviet Union, which is based on the ideals of peace and disarmament, and the policy of the West, particularly its leading power, the United States, which is in open contradiction to the striving of millions of people.

Question: One must ask oneself, what will happen now?

Answer: Yes, this is the question now being asked after the talks have ended. But this question should primarily be addressed to the Western side, which has taken the path of disrupting the existing regional strategic balance.

As you know, yesterday the Bundestag decided to give the green light for deploying new U.S. missiles. As far as the Soviet side is concerned, our response is clear: The Soviet Union has always pursued a policy of disarmament, a policy of preserving peace and security, and will continue to do so. As it has done so far, it will continue to fight for the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. And this has been stressed in all clarity in Yuriy Andropov's statement that the Soviet Union is not striving for any kind of military superiority; neither will it allow any military superiority over it. We will continue in future to have all that is needed to protect the peaceful work of our country and our allies.

Revised U.S. Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Peace and Disarmament Movements, November 25, 1983 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that well-informed discussion and debate on all points of view relating to disarmament issues may exercise a positive influence on the attainment of meaningful arms limitation measures, progress in disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

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[1] A/C.1/38/L.61/Rev.1. The original draft resolution was submitted on Nov. 12 (see *ante*).

Convinced that one of the best ways to build trust and confidence and to advance the conditions which contribute to the cause of disarmament is through "the co-operation and participation of all States and by the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinion on questions of arms limitation and disarmament," [2]

Desirous of promoting the freedom of all citizens to participate in an informed and free discussion of such matters,

Recalling that the world disarmament campaign was launched at the twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction that at its twelfth special session the General Assembly called, *inter alia,* for the world disarmament campaign to be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner, for the universality of the campaign to be guaranteed by the co-operation and participation of all States and by the widest possible dissemination of information, for unimpeded access by all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions, and for the campaign to provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 I, adopted without a vote, which approved the general framework of the world disarmament campaign,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 37/100 J;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to permit their citizens freely and publicly to express their own views on disarmament questions and to organize and meet publicly for that purpose;

3. *Expresses regret* that some citizens and peace groups have met with difficulties in engaging in activities promoting peace and disarmament pursuant to resolution 37/100 J;

4. *Encourages* Member States and non-governmental organizations to furnish information to the Secretary-General pertinent to the implementation of the present resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly utilizing the reports submitted by Member States and non-governmental organizations on implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

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[2] Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session (Special Session Devoted to Disarmament) of the General Assembly, Annex V. *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* pp. 426–430.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Batsanov) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Objective Information on Military Capabilities, November 25, 1983 [1]

The Soviet delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.22, concerning measures to provide objective information on military capabilities.[2] The Soviet Union has frequently stated that during the disarmament process the exchange of information on arms and armed forces not only is not excluded but would be desirable and would be possible in a general climate of international confidence. This has been our experience, in particular, in preparing and concluding other agreements on disarmament measures. The only condition is that such exchange of information be directly linked to concrete disarmament measures, not some sort of separate, preliminary step as, in fact, is provided for in draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.22.

The reason for the absence of any progress in the limitation of weapons is not the lack of sufficient military information but rather the fact that in recent years leading Western countries, above all the United States, have embarked on a course of unprecedented arms build-up with the objective of disturbing the existing military equilibrium and achieving superiority for themselves.

The absence of the political will on the part of the United States and other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to end the arms race and their lack of any desire to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement on the basis of equality and equal security cannot be compensated for by a flow of information on weapons or military forces, by any kind of study on the comparability of military information or by any other such things.

For these reasons, the Soviet Union does not consider that the adoption of special measures to increase exchanges of military information would serve any useful purpose, and it sees no reason why a United Nations body—in this case, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies—should be involved in this process.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.40, pp. 5–6.

[2] I.e., the draft resolution that was subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/188 C.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Reporting Military Expenditures, November 25, 1983 [1]

The United States delegation was pleased to support draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.49 [2] calling for openness in reporting military expenditures and for wider adherence to the reporting of military expenditures using the standardized United Nations format.

We also joined in the consensus adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.44 [3] on the reduction of military budgets. However, my Government has certain reservations regarding this draft resolution.

Before expressing them, I should like briefly to discuss draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.49. The United States fully supports the basic point of that draft resolution, namely, that greater openness in reporting on military budgets is an essential part of efforts to create conditions which might allow for negotiations on the reduction of military expenditures. One of the major achievements in this field has been the elaboration and adoption of an international system for standardized reporting of military expenditures, as well as current efforts to work out problems of comparability on national budgets. The United States has contributed actively over the past decade in this area, and since the institution of a standardized reporting system has provided, along with 22 other States, data on military spending. It is clear that if any agreement on the reduction of military expenditures is to become more than a theoretical possibility it is absolutely essential to have available data on national military budgets of States and a method for establishing the comparability of such data.

In this connection we are pleased to note that draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.49 underscores the need for wide participation in the reporting system by States from different regions and representing different budgeting systems. We are gratified at the progress made so far in this important area, but it is evident that much more has yet to be done.

We believe that draft resolutions such as A/C.1/38/L.49 can give an important impetus to progress in this important area of endeavour.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.44, we note with interest the fact that it acknowledges many activities carried out in this field. My delegation understands this reference to include precisely those activities we mentioned earlier, namely, participation in the reporting system and in the efforts aimed at resolving problems associated with the evaluation of data reported.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.40, pp. 8–9.

[2] I.e., the draft resolution that was subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/184 B.

[3] Adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/184 A.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Report of the Committee on Disarmament, November 25, 1983 [1]

My delegation deeply regrets that for the first time since the Committee on Disarmament was established, in 1978, it is compelled to vote against the draft resolution dealing with the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.27 [2] contains many elements which my Government cannot support. Instead of reflecting the consensus on its report within the Committee on Disarmament, it seeks to rewrite the report in order to inject views of individuals or groups of States within the Committee on Disarmament and of some outside that Committee. It thus distorts the true picture of the work of the Committee on Disarmament and establishes a precedent which I find it difficult to imagine that any member of the Committee on Disarmament could accept. This draft resolution bears little, if any, resemblance to the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

The Committee on Disarmament conducts its work by consensus, a decision mandated by paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. [3] It conducts its work on this basis because only mutual agreement and accommodation can lead to progress towards disarmament measures which would ensure undiminished security for all States. Attempts to impose on other States measures they do not judge to be in their overall security interests can only disturb or even impede such progress.

It should be noted that more time was devoted this year than previously to the preparation of the report, which led to many critical remarks in the Committee on Disarmament. A consensus was, admittedly, difficult to achieve, but it was achieved. My Government views the apparent move away from the search for a consensus, which is evidenced both in the substance of the draft resolution and in the way it has been handled, with the gravest concern. Whereas in past years the sponsors of the draft resolution dealing with the report of the Committee on Disarmament had worked with other delegations to develop a generally acceptable text, little or no effort was made this year—or, for that matter, even last year—to do so. As a result, a draft resolution which, given the subject matter it is to cover, should be a non-controversial one, has instead become contentious and potentially counter-productive as regards serious work in the Committee on Disarmament.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.40, pp. 25–26.

[2] The draft resolution that was adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/183 I.

[3] The Final Report is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

My delegation earnestly hopes that this situation will not continue and that the sponsors will in future find a more constructive approach to what should be one of the more important draft resolutions placed annually before this Committee.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Study on Naval Forces and Armaments and the Independent Commission on Disarmament and International Security, November 25, 1983 [1]

The United States delegation wishes to set forth some reasons underlying its negative votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.57/Rev.2 and A/C.1/38/L.59. [2]

I wish to state at the outset that in principle my Government does not object to studies being conducted by the United Nations on subjects in the disarmament field. In fact, we believe that some of such studies undertaken in the past have been useful. In determining its attitude towards proposals for studies, however, my Government applies several basic criteria: First, the subject matter of the proposed study should be sufficiently well defined to provide a focus for careful examination of relevant issues. Secondly, the data base available for a study should be such as to make possible an objective and balanced review of the problem. Thirdly, any proposal for a study should be practicable from the standpoint of the range of expertise required to conduct it. Last, but not least, the proposed study should not overburden the current United Nations budget and thus require allocation of additional funds.

Unfortunately, neither of the two studies proposed in the draft resolutions to which I have referred met those criteria, and in both cases the terms of reference are extremely broad and vague and the underlying concepts lack precision or definition; frankly speaking, some of them even lack justification.

As regards the proposed study of the so-called naval arms race, it is extremely difficult to see how a small number of experts—six, according to the Secretary-General's statement in document A/C.1/38/L.77—could possibly deal in any meaningful way with the vast array of issues to be covered under the proposal, issues ranging from naval arms systems to the legal régime on the high seas to the exploitation of marine resources.

The terms of reference for the other proposed study are even more broad and imprecise. Indeed, they seem to cover any and all matters pertaining to foreign and international security policies of States. Moreover, draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.59, which calls for the study, welcomes the report of a group of private individuals which, to our knowledge, none of the Governments represented here has endorsed.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.40, pp. 33–34.

[2] These draft resolutions were subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/188 G and 38/188 H, respectively.

In this connection, there is another important point which I wish to make regarding draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.59. That draft resolution is a follow-up on last year's General Assembly resolution 37/99 B, which dealt with the report of the International [*Independent*] Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.[3] My delegation joined the consensus adoption of that resolution out of respect for the distinguished members of that privately organized Commission and because of our belief in the value of a free flow of ideas. In so doing, however, we made clear serious reservations on the inclusion in the General Assembly's agenda of reports of private groups, however eminent their membership. During this year's session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, we thought an understanding had been reached that this matter could not be pursued further in the United Nations context. We were therefore puzzled and surprised by the introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.59.

Finally, the question of expenditure is also an important factor my delegation has taken into account. As indicated in the relevant statement of financial implications, both of the proposed studies would require allocation of a significant amount of additional funds. Clearly, if the feasibility of studies is questionable, as we believe it is in these cases, their financial implications weigh all the more heavily.

Unfortunately, our consultations with the main sponsor of the two draft resolutions did not bring about changes in the text indicating that the proposed studies should be carried out within existing resources of the United Nations. This was a very important factor determining our vote.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa, November 25, 1983[1]

The Soviet Union has consistently supported the efforts of the States of Africa to create on that continent a zone free of nuclear weapons. We categorically condemn any attempts on the part of South Africa to acquire nuclear weapons and we share the indignation at the actions of certain Western countries and Israel in encouraging the nuclear ambitions of the racist régime. The Soviet Union is in favour of imposing comprehensive and binding sanctions, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter against the racists in order to close off any channels which promote their military and nuclear activities.

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[3] For the report of the Commission, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 227–256.

[1] A/C.1/38/PV.41, pp. 28–29.

We supported draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.67/Rev.2, [2] as a whole, and in doing so we supported the proposal that the United Nations nstitute for Disarmament Research, in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, should provide data on the continuing development of South Africa's nuclear capability. The Soviet delegation has serious doubts about the formulation used in the operative part of the draft resolution, which presupposes departure from the established system of financing the activities of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research by means of voluntary contributions. The Soviet delegation therefore abstained in the voting on that paragraph.

In connection with the formulation of operative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution, the Soviet delegation would like to state that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa should not be allowed to affect the universally acknowledged norms of international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa, November 25, 1983 [1]

My delegation would like to speak in explanation of its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/38/L.67/Rev.2, on the denuclearization of Africa, and L.68/Rev.2 on South Africa's nuclear capability. [2]

The United States supports in principle the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, consistent with our well-known position on the principles for establishing such zones. The United States firmly believes that an Africa free of nuclear weapons is a goal worthy of our collective energies and co-operation.

The Organization of African Unity deserves great credit for its early recognition of the importance of the denuclearization of the African continent. We believe, however, that these draft resolutions do not serve the purpose of non-proliferation and in fact could discourage South Africa from implementing a non-proliferation policy. We are able to reaffirm our commitment to undertakings relevant to both draft resolutions. We are committed to the effective implementation of the Security Council arms embargo against South Africa. [3] Our restrictions on sales to South African military and police go well beyond the requirements of the Security Council's arms embargo. Since 1975 the United States has had in place strictly enforced restrictions on the sale of nuclear materials and other items that could be used in developing South Africa's capability to produce nuclear weapons. These restrictions have been applied in a manner consistent with our overall policy of discouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. The United States remains committed to banning the sale of fuel or sensitive nuclear materials except to nations which sign the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and accept full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities.

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[2] I.e., the draft resolution that was subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/181 A.

[1] A/C.1/38/PV.41, pp. 29–30.

[2] I.e., the draft resolutions that were subsequently adopted by the G.A. as res. 38/181 A and 38/181 B, respectively.

[3] For the Security Council resolution, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 685–686.

The two draft resolutions before the Committee contain intemperate language, which is unnecessary and potentially harmful to the underlying objectives of these draft resolutions.

Draft resolution L.67/Rev.2 also has financial implications which my Government has pointed out time and time again should be kept within the budgetary limits of the United Nations, and that also influenced our vote, particularly our vote against operative paragraph 8 of draft resolution L.67/Rev.2. Therefore the United States found it necessary, for the reasons I have explained, to abstain in the vote on draft resolution L.67/Rev. 2 and to vote against draft resolution L.68/Rev.2.

Newspaper Article by Congressman Downey: U.S. Armaments Buildup, November 29, 1983 [1]

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger offers the remarkable claim [op-ed, Nov. 22] [2] that "what we have witnessed for the last 15 years is a one-sided arms race: a race the United States has not entered." [3] If this were true, it would mean the Department of Defense has wasted several hundreds of billions of dollars.

In fact, Weinberger is dead wrong. During the past 15 years the United States has been in the arms race, and we've been in it hard. Even a superficial look at our strategic nuclear forces reveals the fruits of an extremely aggressive weapons program. Here are some of the specific steps we've taken in the strategic arms race:

1. Deployed 496 Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the world's first MIRV SLBMs by eight years and the world's first solid-fuel MIRV SLBMs by 12 years.

2. Replaced 192 of these missiles with the still more advanced, more powerful and longer-range Trident I missile.

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[1] The *Washington Post*, Nov. 29, 1983, p. A17.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] *Ante*.

3. Deployed 72 additional Trident I missiles on new Ohio-class submarines.

4. Improved the accuracy of the Trident I missiles, making them the world's only SLBMs with significant ability to destroy hard targets.

5. Launched four and deployed three Ohio-class submarines, the world's quietest and most advanced. (Even the 10 old Polaris subs we recently retired are quieter and more reliable than the other side's newest.)

6. Progressively upgraded and modernized the electronics of the B52 bombers, although not to the limits of today's technology.

7. Equipped B52s for simultaneous quick engine start, improving their ability to escape surprise attack.

8. Completed deployment of the FB–111A strategic bomber. With its fully automatic terrain-following radar and escape capsule, it remains more advanced than any deployed Soviet bomber.

9. Completed deployment of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), carried by both B52s and FB–111As. This missile, for which the Soviets have no counterpart, is for practical purposes immune to any known or expected defense. It frees our bombers from the need to fly through concentrated Soviet air defenses.

10. Deployed more than 200 radar-elusive long-range strategic Air Launched Cruise Missiles, the world's most effective hard-target killers, many years more advanced than any Soviet counterpart.

11. Deployed 550 Minuteman III ICBMs, the world's first MIRV missiles by five years and still the world's only operational solid-fuel MIRV ICBM.

12. Replaced the warheads on 300 of these Minuteman IIIs with improved models giving double the explosive power with no increase in size or weight.

13. Improved the accuracy of all Minuteman IIIs, more than quadrupling their destructive power against hard targets.

14. Tripled the hardness of Minuteman silos.

15. Installed a system for rapid retargeting of Minuteman. In a worst-case situation, with only a few U.S. weapons surviving Soviet attack, rapid retargeting would improve our effectiveness hundreds of times by directing these missiles to the highest-value Soviet targets.

It is true that the Soviets also have raced. Because they started from a much lower base, during the past 15 years they have been able to make more relative progress in strategic weapons than we have. Their ICBMs are now superior to ours in many respects, but their bombers and missile submarines continue to lag substantially behind ours.

Reasonable people can disagree over how best to deal with the arms race. But it would help if we began not with blithe political rhetoric but with the fact that both sides have been racing as fast as their technological and economic limitations will allow.

Czechoslovakian Amendments for the Revised U.S. Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Peace and Disarmament Movements, November 29, 1983 [1]

1. Add the following new first preambular paragraph:

"*Convinced* that the wishes of all the people reflected by the mass peace and disarmament movements for the prevention of nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race should be taken into account by Governments in formulating their appropriate policies,"

2. Add the following new operative paragraph 1:

"1. *Urges* the Governments of all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, and other militarily significant States to harmonize their policies with the main demands of the mass peace and disarmament movements, in particular, with regard to the prevention of nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race;"

3. Renumber the operative paragraphs accordingly.

Bulgarian Amendment for the Revised U.S. Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Peace and Disarmament Movements, November 29, 1983 [1]

Amend the present operative paragraph 1 to read:

"1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 37/100 J of 13 December 1982 and renews its call upon Member States 'to facilitate the flow of a broad range of accurate information on disarmament matters, both governmental and non-governmental, to and among their citizens, with a view to the furtherance of the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign and in order to advance the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control';"

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[1] A/C.1/38/L.81. This is the second Czechoslovakian amendment for the U.S. draft resolution (*ante*, Nov. 12). The first amendment, which was proposed for the original draft resolution, is printed *ante*, Nov. 21.

[1] A/C.1/38/L.82. The U.S. draft resolution is printed *ante*, Nov. 12.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Peace and Disarmament Movements, November 30, 1983 [1]

Several weeks ago my delegation had the honour to introduce on behalf of a number of States a draft resolution on the relationship of peace and disarmament movements to the World Disarmament Campaign. [2] We were prompted to undertake that initiative by our conviction that a free and unfettered discussion of disarmament issues throughout the world would build international trust and confidence and thereby contribute to the development of real and effective arms control agreements. Lack of communication is frequently the true enemy of peaceful relations amongst States and, therefore, a proper target for the World Disarmament Campaign. We believe that the absence of open communication breeds mistrust and misunderstanding and creates forces whose power is protected and nurtured by secrecy and censorship. Our goal in putting forward this draft resolution was to focus on this problem and encourage a free flow of information in implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign.

We have worked with our co-sponsors and other interested delegations in an effort to find consensus language which would reflect our original intention. Regrettably, we have failed in this seemingly modest but by no means unimportant task. In fact, it is now apparent that the amendments to A/C.1/38/L.61 that are now before the Committee would, if adopted, result in a significant change in the focus and intent of the draft resolution. [3] These proposed amendments seek to redirect the draft resolution to such an extent that they pervert its basic objective. Given the customary voting patterns in this Committee, I regret to say there is little doubt that these amendments, despite their destructive character, will be adopted. It is, therefore, with the greatest regret and reluctance that we have decided not to pursue draft resolution A/C.1/38/L.61.

At this moment, I cannot help but observe that the amendments to our initiative have been submitted by some of the most vociferous supporters of the World Disarmament Campaign, who also evidently have the most to fear from a genuinely universal and balanced campaign.

Before concluding, I should like to take this opportunity to thank our co-sponsors and those other delegations which have worked with us in an effort to secure a meaningful resolution. Further, let me assure you that the United States determination to pursue the goal of this draft resolution is not diminished by this regrettable situation, and we will seek in every way and in every appropriate forum ways to press this important issue. It shall not go away, with the consent and abetting of the United States of America.

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[1] A/C.1/38/PV.46, pp. 17–18.

[2] *Ante*, Nov. 12.

[3] I.e., amendments proposed by Czechoslovakia (*ante*, Nov. 21 and 29), and Bulgaria, *supra*.

Fifteenth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, June 1, 1983–November 30, 1983: Confidence-Building Measures [Extract], December 1983 [1]

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Security. The NATO states in February 1981 presented a French proposal calling for the establishment of a conference to take place after the Madrid meeting to deal with military confidence-building measures. [2] The problem of surprise military attack is one uppermost in the minds of many Europeans. The United States joined the Western resolve that the mandate for a conference on surprise military attack had to be carefully structured in Madrid so that it did not become a vaguely worded formula for a "disarmament" meeting in which propaganda speeches rather than constructive decisions would be the major element.

After a long and intensive debate a mandate for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures fully acceptable to the United States was adopted. It meets four essential U.S. criteria:

- The conference will be an integral part of the CSCE process;
- The conference will not interfere with ongoing arms negotiations, such as MBFR (mutual and balanced force reductions);
- The first stage of the conference will deal exclusively with confidence- and security-building measures. This is stated in paragraphs two and six of the mandate which provide that ". . . the first state will be devoted to . . . confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe" and that ". . . a future follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for . . . supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference . . ."; and
- Confidence- and security-building measures agreed at the conference are to be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe.

The extension of the area to the Urals is significant, because the limited confidence-building measures adopted in 1975 exempted the Soviet Union from coverage, except for the first 250 kilometers within Soviet borders. [3]

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[1] Dept. of State Special Report No. 113, pp. 4, 17.

[2] For a U.S. statement on this proposal, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 61–64.

[3] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 305–308.

Document on Confidence-Building Measures

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the act's Documents on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers, military exchange visits, prior notification of major military movements, and prior notification of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO Allies continue their excellent record of implementation of this CBM. The United States and the F.R.G. notified the major maneuver, Confident Enterprise; in addition the F.R.G. notified the major maneuvers Wehrhafte Loewen and Atlantic Lion (which was also notified by the Netherlands), while the United Kingdom notified its major maneuver, Eternal Triangle. Observers were invited to all but the last of these exercises. In addition a number of voluntary notifications were made: Denmark notified Ample Express and France notified Moselle 83.

Among the neutral and nonaligned, Sweden notified the minor maneuver "Ostkust."

During this reporting period the Soviet Union notified two major maneuvers and made its first discretionary Final Act notification of a maneuver involving fewer than 25,000 men. (In addition, Tass reported in May that an exercise involving fewer than 25,000 men would be held in late May–early June. Such a press report cannot, however, be considered a notification under the Final Act.)

All three notifications were made 21 days in advance and specified the number of troops participating, as well as the areas in which the exercises were to take place. This represented a distinct improvement over previous Soviet performance, particularly the U.S.S.R.'s failure to live up to its Helsinki obligations at the time of its last maneuver notification 2 years ago, when it did not specify the number of participants in the major maneuver Zapad 81 as required under the Final Act.

The first of the two major maneuvers was notified on June 8 as scheduled for June 29–July 4 with the participation of about 50,000 men. The second was notified on July 4 as scheduled for July 25–30 with the participation of about 26,000 troops. The Soviet Union's first-ever discretionary notification was made August 15 of an exercise scheduled for September 5–10 involving approximately 23,000 troops. The Soviets invited three NATO countries—Turkey, Greece and Italy—as well as Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Algeria, and Austria, to send observers to this exercise. This welcome step in going beyond minimum requirements of the Final Act must be balanced, however, by failure to invite NATO observers to either of the two major exercises noted above.

Hungary on May 31 notified the maneuver, Kunsag '83, which was held June 6–16 and involved 14,000 troops, all Hungarian. As with the Hungarian notification of Danube '83, in January of this year, this discretionary notification was made without reference to the Helsinki Final Act.

No other Warsaw Pact members made any notifications during this reporting period. It does not appear that any of the exercises which they held involved more than 25,000 men.

Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments: Authorization for Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, December 2, 1983 [1]

AN ACT [2]

Dec. 2, 1983
[H.R. 2906]

To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to extend the Authorization for appropriations.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)) is amended to read as follows:

Arms Control and Disarmament Act amendment.

"SEC. 49. (a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated—

Appropriations authorization.

"(1) for the fiscal year 1984, $20,888,000;

"(2) for the fiscal year 1985, $21,932,000; and

"(3) such additional amounts as may be necessary, for each such fiscal year, for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.

Of the sums authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1984 and 1985, not less than $200,000 shall be available in each such fiscal year only for the program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control and disarmament established under section 28 of this Act. Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended.".

SEC. 2. Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2562) is amended by striking out "He" in the third sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The Director shall attend all meetings of the National Security Council involving weapons procurement, arms sales, consideration of the defense budget, and all arms control and disarmament matters. The Director".

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[1] P.L. 98–202, 97 Stat. 1381.

[2] For the original act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1961,* pp. 482–495.

SEC. 3. Title II of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2561 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"PROGRAM FOR VISITING SCHOLARS

22 USC 2568

"SEC. 28. A program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control and disarmament shall be established by the Director in order to obtain the services of scholars from the faculties of recognized institutions of higher learning. The purpose of the program will be to give specialists in the physical sciences and other disciplines relevant to the Agency's activities an opportunity for active participation in the arms control and disarmament activities of the Agency and to gain for the Agency the perspective and expertise such persons can offer. Each fellow in the program shall be appointed for a term of one year, except that such term may be extended for a 1-year period. Fellows shall be chosen by a board consisting of the Director, who shall be the chairperson, and all former Directors of the Agency.".

SEC. 4. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SPECIALISTS FLUENT IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

22 USC 2591

"SEC. 51. The Director is authorized to create up to eight additional permanent personnel positions at both junior and more senior levels for specialists in Soviet foreign military policies, arms control, or strategic affairs, who also demonstrate fluency in the Russian language.".

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Transmittal to Congress.

SEC. 5. The President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on the record of the compliance or noncompliance of the Soviet Union with existing arms control agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party.

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

SEC. 6. (a) Section 27 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2567) is amended by striking out "a Special Representative" and inserting in lieu thereof "two Special Representatives".

(b) Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking out

"Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following:

"Special Representatives for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (2).".

Approved December 2, 1983.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 2906 (S. 608):

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 98-180 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs) and No. 98-564 (Comm. of Conference).

SENATE REPORT No. 98-144 accompanying S. 608 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 129 (1983):

May 23, considered and passed House.
Nov. 10, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Nov. 17, House agreed to conference report.
Nov. 18, Senate agreed to conference report.

News Conference Remarks by the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (Ogarkov): Nuclear War [Extract], December 5, 1983 [1]

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Question: Recently millions of Americans watched a television film about what the next day after a nuclear war would be like. This is a subject much spoken about in the United States. Has Marshal Ogarkov seen this film?

Answer: Yes, I have, and I think that the danger which is shown in the film really exists. Judge for yourself. The strategic nuclear forces of the USA can fire in one salvo and one launching 12,000 warheads with a total yield of 3,400 megatons. This is 170,000 times more than the yield of the first atomic bomb the Americans brought down on Hiroshima in 1945! 170,000 times! Just think of it.

And this goes for the strategic nuclear forces only. And if we add to this the entire stockpile of the nuclear forces of the United States of America and other NATO countries, the figure will grow several times. However, this still is only one aspect. If we add to this the nuclear systems of the other side, it won't take much to realise that the world has reached the limit when it is high time to put an end to nuclear madness.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Dec. 5, 1983; FBIS *Daily Report*, Dec. 6, 1983, vol. III, p. AA22.

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News Conference Statement by President Reagan: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [Extract], December 8, 1983 [2]

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But I just wanted to say something about this supposed breakoff of negotiations in START and call to your attention that the Soviet Union—this was a regular adjournment; it was scheduled to take place—and the Soviet Union, in departing, simply said that they were not prepared at this time to set a date for resumption of meetings.

But I thought also that it might be a pretty good time to state our own position on this and why we're going to continue attempting these negotiations. It was just 30 years ago today, on December 8th, 1953, that President Dwight Eisenhower made a speech on this very subject of nuclear weapons. And in that speech, he said, "To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you . . . its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." [3] And this administration endorses this view completely, and this is what we are dedicated to.

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Summary of a Progress Report on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations by the NATO Special Consultative Group, December 8, 1983 [1]

Despite an intense, sustained Alliance effort over the last two years, Soviet insistence on retaining their monopoly in longer-range INF missiles has so far prevented achievement of an INF agreement in Geneva. Nevertheless, the basis for an agreement has been laid in the negotiations, and progress has been made towards eventual resolution of major issues. Continued Allied implementation of the 1979 decision [2] remains essential to prospects for arms control, to ensure the security of the Alliance, and to provide the foundation for a more stable and cooperative relationship with the East.

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[2] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Dec. 12, 1983, pp. 1660–1661.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, p. 400.

[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 6 (published in Jan. 1984), pp. 27–28.

Those are the major conclusions of a comprehensive report on INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) prepared for Allied Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers by NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG). [3]

INF has been one of the most significant and intensely debated security programmes undertaken by the NATO Alliance since its formation. The report was released to the public in the conviction that a full accounting of the Alliance's policy on INF, the steps the United States and Allies have taken to achieve an agreement, and the Soviet Union's refusal to date to reach such an agreement, can inform public discussion of these issues.

The report thus provides a comprehensive account of the negotiations in Geneva up until the discontinuation of the talks by the Soviet Union on November 23, 1983. The report recounts developments which led to the 1979 dual-track decision and the principles and criteria which form the foundation of the Allies' policy on INF. It traces the growth of the Soviet LRINF arsenal since the 1979 decision. The report chronicles in detail the six negotiating rounds which have taken place in Geneva. It also reviews the informal discussions which occurred between the U.S. and Soviet negotiators pursuant to Ambassador Nitze's mandate to explore every possible avenue for agreement. The report discusses the status of the principal negotiating issues as they have evolved over the course of two years of negotiation, and concludes with an analysis of the prospects for eventual achievement of an INF agreement.

Among the report's highlights:

— "At the time the Soviet Union suspended the negotiations, all the elements for an equitable agreement were on the table in Geneva", and progress had been made on a number of major issues in the negotiations—the requirement for reductions in LRINF missiles, treatment of aircraft, and the geographic issue.

— "The fundamental premises of the 1979 double decision . . . have proved valid over four years. The Alliance policy has been successful in creating and driving forward a negotiating process in Geneva, which the Soviet Union had initially rejected."

— "The SCG believes that it remains in the Alliance's interest to continue the effort to persuade the Soviet Union to undertake a cooperative endeavour with the United States at the negotiating table to achieve an agreement that would meet the legitimate security concerns of both sides. To this end, the SCG deplores the Soviet decision to suspend the negotiations and believes that talks should resume at the earliest possible moment."

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[2] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[3] *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF): Progress Report to Ministers by the Special Consultative Group*, NATO Information Service, 1110 Brussels, released for publication Dec. 8, 1983.

— "The SCG also notes that continued implementation on schedule of the deployment track of the 1979 decision remains essential to create incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously and to protect Allied security in case an agreement is not reached . . . The SCG also points out that the Alliance repeatedly has made clear its willingness to halt, modify or reverse deployments under an INF agreement, including removal and destruction of all U.S. missiles deployed to Europe if justified by the concrete results achieved in Geneva."

— "Allied unity and firmness in implementing both tracks of the 1979 decision remain critical to success in the INF negotiations. The cornerstone of such unity will continue to be a close and cooperative consultation process . . . The INF issue has led to one of the most intensive and productive consultation processes in the history of the Alliance."

— "In the interest of achieving an agreement at the earliest possible date, consistent with Alliance security requirements, the United States position in the negotiations has over time supplemented the ideal outcome contained in the zero/zero proposal . . . with the valuable but less preferable outcome in the President's interim agreement proposal . . . This stands in sharp contrast to the Soviet position, which has never swayed from the one-sided objective of maintaining a large Soviet monopoly in LRINF missiles."

— "The U.S. and Allies have repeatedly stated their willingness to consider any serious Soviet alternative that would meet the minimum security requirements of the Alliance. The SCG notes with profound regret that in the four years since the 1979 decision the Soviet Union has not once advanced such an alternative, while compiling an unbroken string of rejections of U.S. and Allied initiatives."

— While concrete results have not been achieved so far in Geneva, U.S. and Allied initiatives in the negotiations have laid the basis for an agreement that would substantially reduce, and preferably eliminate, the LRINF missile systems of both sides.

— The key stumbling block in the negotiations is Soviet insistence on retention of a monopoly of LRINF missiles. "Even before December 1979, when the Soviets waged a major campaign to forestall the dual-track decision, the Soviet Union made clear that its goal was retention of a sizable monopoly of LRINF systems. This objective has not changed in more than four years."

— While insisting on its right to maintain a force "of at least 360 LRINF warheads in Europe and a comparable number in Asia", the Soviet Union consistently has rejected any outcome that entails deployments of U.S. missiles at any level. Specifically, it has turned down the informal "walk-in-the-woods" package of 1982, the U.S. interim agreement proposal of 1983,[4] and President Reagan's September 1983 initiatives specifically designed to meet stated Soviet concerns.

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[4] President Reagan discussed this proposal in his statement of Mar. 30, printed *ante*.

— Despite Soviet efforts to make compensation for the British and French independent national deterrents the centrepiece of the public debate on INF, and to portray this demand as a fundamental Soviet objective, "the erosion of the Soviets' position on third-country systems . . . has exposed its primary purpose" as a device to support the Soviet claim for a monopoly.

— "The Soviet negotiating approach is closely coordinated with and linked to the Soviet public campaign, and appears to be designed to position the Soviets so that they can claim credit publicly for flexibility and movement while blaming the United States for a negotiating stalemate . . . The Soviet propaganda effort directed at Western publics has been designed to strengthen the Soviets' hand at the negotiating table by undermining public support for NATO modernization." [5]

North Atlantic Council Declaration of Brussels, December 9, 1983 [1]

We, the representatives of the sixteen member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm the dedication of the Allies to the maintenance of peace in freedom.

Our Alliance threatens no one. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We do not aspire to superiority, neither will we accept that others should be superior to us. Our legitimate security interests can only be guaranteed through the firm linkage between Europe and North America. We call upon the Soviet Union to respect our legitimate security interests as we respect theirs.

We are determined to ensure security on the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. Faced with the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles, the Allies concerned are going forward with the implementation of the double-track decision of 1979. The ultimate goal remains that there should be neither Soviet nor United States land based long-range INF missiles. The deployment of US missiles can be halted or reversed by concrete results at the negotiating table. In this spirit we wish to see an early resumption of the INF negotiations which the Soviet Union has discontinued. [2]

We urge the countries of the Warsaw Pact to seize the opportunities we offer for a balanced and constructive relationship and for genuine détente. In all arms control negotiations progress must be made among the states participating, in particular in:

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[5] The Danish and Greek Governments have expressed their national views in footnotes to the Progress Report. [Footnote in original.]

[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 6 (published in Jan. 1984), p. 24.

[2] Denmark and Greece reserve their positions on this paragraph; Spain, not having been a party to the double-track decision of 1979, reserves its position on this paragraph. [Footnote in original.]

— the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START);
— the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Talks (INF);
— the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR);
— the endeavours for a complete ban on chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament.

We are also resolved to use the forthcoming Stockholm Conference as a new opportunity to broaden the dialogue with the East, to negotiate confidence building measures and enhance stability and security in the whole of Europe.

We shall continue to do our utmost to sustain a safe and peaceful future. We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.

North Atlantic Council Communique [Extract], December 9, 1983 [1]

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8. The successful conclusion of the Madrid Meeting contributes to the strengthening of the CSCE process. Although the Concluding Document agreed in Madrid falls somewhat short of the Allies' proposals, it is nonetheless substantive and balanced. The Allies attach equal importance to the implementation by all the CSCE countries of all provisions of both the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid document, including their humanitarian aspects. An important result of the Madrid meeting was the agreement on a precise negotiating mandate for the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) due to open in Stockholm in January 1984.

9. Since peace can and must be made more secure through equitable and verifiable agreements on disarmament and arms control, as well as through a balance of forces, the Allies have put forward a comprehensive series of proposals in this field. Their commitment to ensure security at the lowest possible level of forces was recently demonstrated by the member countries of the Nuclear Planning Group announcing at Montebello the withdrawal of 1,400 nuclear warheads from Europe, in addition to the reduction of 1,000 in 1980. [2] The resulting

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 31, No. 6 (published in Jan. 1984), pp. 22–23.

[2] *Ante*, Oct. 28.

stockpile will be the lowest in Europe for some twenty years. The Allies urge the Soviet Union to contribute to disarmament efforts in a concrete way and not to substitute declaratory proposals for deeds.

10. Ministers underline that the two-track decision of December 1979 by Allies concerned demonstrates the commitment of the Alliance to preserve peace and stability at the lowest possible level of forces. [3] The Allies concerned reaffirm their commitment to pursue a balance of intermediate-range forces through arms control negotiations with the USSR. The progress report of the Special Consultative Group provides a comprehensive account of United States efforts, on the basis of close consultations with other involved Allies, to achieve such an agreement. [4]

Unfortunately, the negotiations in Geneva have not yet achieved concrete results, due to the Soviet effort to maintain their monopoly of long-range land-based INF missiles. Deployments of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles are thus proceeding in accordance with the December 1979 decision. Building on progress already achieved in Geneva, an agreement eliminating this entire category of United States and Soviet weapons, or at a minimum, limiting them to the lowest possible level, remains attainable. Allies concerned stress their willingness to continue negotiation and to halt, modify, or reverse the deployments now underway, on the basis of such an agreement. These Allies will continue to consult closely on steps directed toward achievement of this objective.

The Allies note with regret the unjustified Soviet decision to leave the negotiating table in Geneva. The United States has negotiated over the past two years while Soviet deployments of SS-20s have grown by over 300 warheads. The Allies believe that the Soviet Union shares an interest with the United States in reducing nuclear weapons through negotiated agreement. The Allies therefore call for bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces to resume as soon as possible. [5]

11. The Allies fully support the United States efforts in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and they welcome the recent American initiatives which provide the basis for a significant build-down of US and Soviet strategic weapons. In particular, the United States has indicated its willingness to discuss trade-offs in areas of each side's particular interest and advantage in order to achieve an equitable agreement which promotes stability. The Allies call on the Soviet Union to respond to these initiatives in a positive spirit. In this connection they note with regret the recent Soviet failure to agree to a specific date for the opening of the next round of the talks.

12. The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) is an important part of the CSCE

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[3] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[4] A summary of this report is printed *ante*, Dec. 8.

[5] Denmark and Greece reserve their positions on this paragraph. [Footnote in original.]

process and provides new possibilities for increasing security throughout Europe. Allied countries will table a comprehensive package of concrete measures, in conformity with the mandate agreed in Madrid, designed to promote military openness in order to increase confidence and security and reduce the risk of surprise attack. They are resolved to negotiate actively for an early agreement on politically binding, militarily significant and verifiable measures which will cover the whole of Europe. As a sign of their determination, Ministers will themselves attend this Conference.

13. The Allies participating in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks reaffirm their determination to work for a mutually acceptable solution to the issues still barring progress. The Western draft Treaty presented last year provides a basis for a sound agreement. These Allies hope that the most recent Eastern statements indicate a new willingness to address the long standing basic issues of the Vienna negotiations and they are reviewing the state of these negotiations also in the light of these statements.

14. In the Committee on Disarmament, the Western participants continue to strive for concrete disarmament agreements. They consider as a priority task for this Committee the elaboration of a verifiable agreement banning the development, production and stock-piling of all chemical weapons.

The Allies remain gravely concerned about strong evidence of continued use of chemical weapons in South East Asia and Afghanistan, in violation of international law, and of Soviet involvement in the use of such weapons. [6] They welcome the fact that the United Nations is continuing to develop procedures to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

In the context of efforts aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Allies have also proposed in the Committee on Disarmament that the existing international law concerning the peaceful use of outer space be reviewed.

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News Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (de Vos) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, December 15, 1983 [1]

The Vienna Talks have reached an important juncture. After 10 years of negotiation which have seen some progress on a number of issues, both sides now have draft agreements on the table. It is therefore incumbent on both sides to reflect on what further needs to be done in order to move the negotiations toward final agreement.

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[6] Greece recalls its position as it has been expressed during the previous Ministerial sessions. [Footnote in original.]

[1] ACDA files.

The draft agreements put forward by East and West both envisage a final outcome with each side having a total of 900,000 ground and air forces in Central Europe. The West has proposed a comprehensive and precise method for reaching this goal. This approach starts from the premise that the two sides first agree on the numbers of forces in the area before reductions begin. Those reductions would take place in stages, with each step in the process carefully verified.

Unfortunately, East and West do not agree on the number of Eastern forces now present in Central Europe and therefore how many men must be reduced to reach the 900,000 level.

The East is not willing to work with us on resolving this basic problem. In place of such agreement the East suggests that each side determine for itself the size of reductions necessary to reach the agreed equal levels. But this approach leaves the total number of forces reduced unknown and it would mean that most verification be postponed until after the completion of reductions. Such an approach raises serious concerns for Western security.

In the interest of making progress, the West proposes that the two sides, without prejudice to their positions on the matter, set aside for the moment the central question of the size of reductions and concentrate instead on issues which offer more promise for progress. For example, the East has suggested that verification of final troop levels could substitute for agreeing in advance on the size of reductions. We have proposed a careful study of the practical implications of the East's own verification scheme. We are prepared to look more closely at a suggestion made by the East for specifying at least some of the reductions. We have also invited the East to suggest its own topics in order to bring the sides closer together. But we cannot accept the preconditions to detailed discussions of certain important issues, such as verification, which the East is insisting on.

We are convinced that our approach can best move the negotiations forward. But we will not know how far this process toward mutual accommodation can go unless the East agrees to join us. We have urged the East to take with us these practical steps toward making progress in Vienna.

In this regard, the Western side has proposed that, in accordance with normal practice in these negotiations, we begin our next round of discussions on January 26, 1984. We regret that the East has neither accepted this proposal nor proposed an alternative date, nor provided any explanation for this procedure.

The East has proposed that we agree on the date for resuming our talks later through diplomatic channels, without any indication of when this would take place. We hope that the East will soon make a specific proposal. For its part, the West stands ready to resume the negotiations, so important to the security of Europe, and will be prepared to do so on January 26, as we have suggested, or any alternative early date suggested by the East.

Statement by the Spokesman for the Warsaw Pact Representatives to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, December 15, 1983 [1]

At the end of the 31st Round of the Vienna Negotiations, the Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Wieland, speaking on behalf of the Warsaw Treaty States, gave an assessment of the current situation in the talks.

He stated, that with the start of the deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe an additional and qualitatively new threat has arisen to the security of the Warsaw Treaty States. By means of such arms drive in the nuclear, and—as has been confirmed by the latest series of NATO meetings—conventional fields, NATO States are launching a new dangerous round of the arms race. They are intensifying it particularly in Central Europe which, on account of the huge concentration of NATO and Warsaw Treaty military potentials already existing there, ten years ago had been designated by the participants in the Vienna Negotiations as an area of future mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments, including nuclear arms.

In the Prague Declaration of 5 January 1983, [2] the Warsaw Treaty States unmistakably pointed out, that the year 1983 would be a decisive one for the Vienna Negotiations. They took this into account in their well-known proposals of 17 February and 23 June, to reach as soon as possible—still in 1983—an agreement in Vienna before this would be rendered difficult, due to the actions of the United States and its allies, and would recede into a dim distance. All the efforts of the socialist countries have been concentrated on that the Vienna Negotiations make the contribution possible for them towards overcoming the present dangerous phase in the international relations.

NATO States, however, have blocked the implementation of all Eastern initiatives aimed at the achievement of progress. The West has not in the least shown preparedness, after the experience of long years of fruitless negotiations, to start searching for a way out on the basis of a new approach proposed by the socialist States. That is why Western attempts at creating the illusion of progress there, where there is none, are bound to fail.

It is a fact that by permanently undermining the mandate of the negotiations and by rejecting all pragmatic possibilities of a settlement, Western States participants have created the acute problem of whether it will be possible at all to preserve the own face [*sic*] of the Vienna Negotiations.

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[1] ACDA files. This statement was read by the spokesman for the German Democratic Republic.

[2] *Ante.*

The socialist countries are always ready for serious, relevant and credible negotiations. They will, however, not consent to the Vienna Negotiations being misused by the West to produce an alibi to the international public, in order to be able to continue its arms projects.

The four socialist States—direct participants in the negotiations have proposed to agree on the date of resuming the negotiations later through diplomatic channels.

Interview of President Reagan With *Le Figaro* Magazine [Extracts], December 22, 1983[1]

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Soviet Military Budget

Q. The Romans used to say: "If you want peace, prepare war." How do you explain the fact that the U.S.S.R., a poor country, has such great military powers, whereas the wealthy United States remains so far back?

The President. No one is more conscious than I that the Soviet Union devotes more than twice as much of its economic resources to the military as the U.S. does, and has been doing so over the past two decades despite relative restraint on the part of the West. Other sectors of the Soviet economy, particularly those devoted to consumer production, suffer as a result.

If the Soviet people had a voice in the matter, the Soviet defense budget would probably be a lot smaller. But the people have no voice in the allocation of national resources. We in the West face the more demanding task of maintaining adequate military strength with the consent of our free peoples.

I would add that, while the continuing Soviet military buildup is a course [*source*?] of concern and requires a substantial U.S. and allied response, talk of the United States being "far back" suggests an alarming state of military weakness in the West that the facts do not warrant. While more still needs to be done, we and our allies have made important strides in the last few years toward restoring the military balance.

NATO Nuclear and Conventional Forces

Q. For example, General Rogers told me recently that NATO had acquired 400 of the latest tanks, whereas the Russian Army had got 1,000 that very same year. Is the free world incapable of arming itself?

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 16, 1984, pp. 14–15, 16. These extracts are from written responses to questions submitted by *Le Figaro*.

The President. I am confident that the Atlantic alliance has the resources necessary to maintain an effective deterrent if they wish. The Warsaw Pact's continuing buildup of both nuclear and conventional forces is of major concern to the alliance. We are responding. The deployment of INF missiles is part of our coordinated response to that threat. The modernization of America's strategic deterrent is another element of our response.

The improvement of NATO's conventional forces is extremely important. In the face of the Soviet Union's relentless military buildup, all of us must do more to strengthen our conventional forces. America's conventional force modernization program is in high gear and involves equipment modernization and improvements in organization and training. America cannot do the job alone, and it is very important for each alliance partner to make every effort to strengthen their own forces.

East-West Arms Balance

Q. You have begun construction of MX super powerful rockets, but the Russians are also coming out with rockets as powerful. How are you planning to catch up with the U.S.S.R.'s military power or even talking of leaving them behind?

The President. Our policy is to create a more stable international balance and, through negotiations with the Soviets, reduce the numbers of arms—especially nuclear weapons—on both sides. Now for many years, throughout the 1970's, the Soviets pursued a massive arms buildup at a time when the United States was exercising restraint. It became clear that the only way to get the Soviets to exercise restraint was to demonstrate that we would restore the balance. The increases in military procurement which this administration has undertaken are meant to restore and preserve an East-West arms balance as we pursue the other half of our policy—to seek deep reductions of arms on both sides through negotiations.

Soviet Compliance With Agreements

Q. You are always talking about negotiating seriously with the Russians whilst we have constant evidence of their breaking off treaties: SALT agreements, [2] Helsinki agreements, [3] United Nations Charter (i.e., Afghanistan's invasion), so why speak of negotiations with such a country?

The President. You are quite right in singling out the issue of Soviet compliance with agreements as a negotiating problem for the West. We have been concerned by evidence of Soviet actions that are inconsistent with existing agreements. One notable example of this is the use of chemical and biological weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in clear violation of existing international treaties.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff., and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[3] For the arms control portions, see *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308. The entire agreement is printed in the *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

Therefore, we insist that any new agreements contain strong verification procedures to ensure Soviet compliance, and we have looked at some existing agreements to see if their verification provisions can be strengthened. Agreements without adequate procedures for verifying compliance are dangerous because they invite violations. But negotiations leading to verifiable agreements are essential if we are to build a safer and more stable world.

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U.S. Commitment to NATO

Q. In February 1981 you declared to *Figaro* magazine that the American people would consider any attack on Europe as an attack on the United States. But since, we have often heard from across the Atlantic statements according to which America was not to risk in any way its survival in war against Russia just to help European troublemakers. What is your opinion on this point today?

The President. My opinion remains completely unchanged: The United States would consider an attack on its NATO allies as an attack on itself. This is a commitment which is enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. It is a commitment which the United States has reiterated many times and enjoys broad support in the U.S. Congress and among the American people. We share common values, a common heritage, and parallel dreams. Europe's security is indivisible from our own. I can hardly think of another aspect of U.S. foreign policy on which there is broader consensus than our commitment to defend our allies against attack.

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News Interview of President Reagan, December 23, 1983 [1]

Q. Mr. President, on a slightly different subject, you mentioned that due to our arms buildup, that brought the Soviets to the negotiating table. And now we've had a breakdown in the arms talks, and there seems to be an increased level of tension. Do you think we are at a confrontation state with the Soviets?

The President. No.

Q. And what do you see as the chance of an arms accord in 1984?

The President. Well, we're going to keep on with that. And, actually, the Soviets have not said no. They said they wouldn't set a date yet for the resumption of these talks.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 2, 1984, pp. 1740–1742.

Q. On INF they just walked out.

The President. What?

Q. On the INF talks they just walked out.

The President. Yes, but since then there have been statements to the fact that they just are not ready and that they're unwilling at this point to set a date. I believe they will be back, and I believe we're further from a confrontation possibility because of the deterrent capability of the United States and our allies at this point. I think there was a far more unstable condition when we had let our own strength deteriorate to the point that there was a window of vulnerability.

And I would like to call your attention to one thing. There have been 19—prior to this, to our talks—there have been 19 efforts since World War II to engage the Soviet Union in talks about arms reduction. There has never been any progress made in those. The SALT talks, actually, were not arms reductions; they were supposed to be setting a ceiling on how many more weapons would be built. And that has not been ratified, the SALT II treaty. [2]

But in these negotiations, even though the Soviets were not as forthcoming as we would like to have had them be, they still did make a couple of offers to reduce the number of their weapons. Now, that is the first time they have ever done that in any negotiations, in all these previous 19 attempts. And I think that now that they see that we are determined to maintain our own ability to defend ourselves, and our allies with us are included in that, I think that they have to see that these negotiations are in their interest as well as ours.

Q. Do you have any signals that they are actually planning to come back? Or are you just looking at it from your—what you see as common sense?

The President. No. I think the things that we have heard. I think that this is, you might say, almost a part of the negotiating process. Their whole principal move over this last year or so has been an effort to stop the deployment of the intermediate-range weapons that were asked for by NATO. And the fact that we're going ahead, this, maybe, could be tied to that as still, you might say, an element of negotiating. But we are going to proceed with the installation of those weapons.

Q. And you don't think it's 3 minutes to 12, the doomsday clock? The scientists seem to think so.

The President. Well—

Q. And they think it's a more dangerous world now.

The President. Well, maybe the scientists know more about science. And from the standpoint of the power of the weapons, yes, they are more powerful; they are more destructive on both sides than they were before. And maybe looking at it from a scientist's viewpoint, that moves up their doomsday clock. But they're not involved in the diplomatic and political end of this as we are.

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[2] The text of the SALT II Treaty is in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

Q. But, sir, you only have 3—really, 3 minutes now to make a decision on war and peace according to the nuclear scientists. There would be 3 minutes on each side.

The President. Well, now, Helen, in the Bible weren't we told that a long period of time was only a moment or even a second to God? I don't know what their 3 minutes refers to. I know it doesn't refer to 3 minutes—

Q. You think it would be a lot longer for you to decide?

The President. Well, I'm wondering. On their doomsday clock, each minute on that clock—is that weeks? Is that months? Is that years? They've never said what it is. But, no, I believe that actually—and I can understand their feeling—all that they hear and, forgive me, but a lot of the editorial content is that, "Oh, there are great tensions." There has been, let's say, more heat in rhetoric. There has not been more heat in the actual relationship. At the time that the rhetoric was being used from both sides, our negotiators were sitting there at the table negotiating.

Q. Mr. President, can I come back on the prospects of these talks, these arms talks? There's a lot of concern, especially in Europe, that with the lack of dialog between West and the East, especially as the U.S. is entering an election year—if you run for reelection—that the Soviets are not likely to help you. How do you see the prospects for some kind of an agreement before the elections?

The President. Well, I would hope that the Soviet Union would remember their failure in trying to influence the German election and decide not to go down that road again. But as far as I am concerned, whoever our candidate may be, I don't think any decisions on a subject of this kind should be made on our part, on our side, on the basis of—as I said the other night—political considerations.

We are going to continue to do everything we can to resume and achieve arms reductions, as sizable as we can make them, and ultimately I would hope total elimination of nuclear weapons. They have no real place in a civilized world. The goal is peace. And I've been a little disturbed by the tendency of so many in this country who seem to feel that somehow we're at fault, when they are the ones who left the table without setting a date for return.

Q. So you're not going to make any proposal before—

The President. Oh, we're in communication. We haven't broken off communications. We're not, as we've been portrayed, that the two superpowers are here separated with no contact at all. No, we're in communication with them. And we want to continue these policies that would lead toward reduction of arms and that would lead toward peace.

I am prepared to say if the Soviet Government wants peace, there will be no war, because I know for a fact that no other country wants war with the Soviet Union. The ball is really in their court. If they want peace, they can have it.

Q. And isn't that, though, what's kept the peace, this mutual terror?

The President. I think the deterrent capability, yes. See, we have a weapon here in the world today, the nuclear weapon, that for the first time in the history of all man's weapons has never resulted in a defensive weapon being created against it. The only thing we have is deterrence. The only thing we have is the knowledge that on both sides the punishment would be more than any nation could afford. If they started it, they would have to be prepared to accept virtually as much punishment as they were administering. And this has kept the peace.

I've had some meetings with young people who brought this very subject up, and they're greatly concerned. And I've asked them a question, and I must say they come up with a pretty sound answer. I've said, "We're the only ones that have ever used a nuclear weapon—in Japan in World War II. Would we have used that weapon if we knew they also had that weapon and could use it back against us?" And without fail, every group I've ever said this to has decided that, no, we would never have used the weapon.

Q. So that's the real deterrent to war.

The President. Yes, yes.

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[3] Reprinted *ante.*

[4] A portion of this report has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

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[5] A portion of this report has been reprinted *ante.*

[6] A statement by ACDA Director Adelman before the Committee on May 3 has been excerpted and printed *ante.*

[7] Testimonies on Feb. 17 by Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle and the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs (Graham) at these hearings have been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[8] Assistant Secretary Burt's statement before the Committee has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[9] Testimony by Amb. Kennedy, U.S. Representative to the IAEA, at these hearings on Nov. 1 has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[10] Secretary of Defense Weinberger's statement before the Committee on May 17 has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[11] Excerpts reprinted *ante.*

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[12] A portion of this report has been reprinted *ante.*

[13] A statement by ACDA Acting Director George at this hearing has been reprinted *ante.*

[14] Statements by ACDA Director Adelman and Under Secretary of Defense Iklé before the Committee on May 18 have been excerpted and printed *ante.*

[15] Testimony by Deputy Secretary of State Dam at this hearing has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[16] Portions of this report have been extracted and reprinted *ante,* Oct 24

[17] An excerpt of this report has been reprinted *ante,* Oct 24

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[18] A statement by the Commission's Chairman (Scowcroft) at this hearing has been reprinted *ante.*

[19] The "Key Conclusions" of the staff report to the Committee have been excerpted and reprinted *ante,* June 15. ACDA Director Adelman's letter to the Chairman of the Committee has also been reprinted *ante,* June 16. President Reagan's letter (May 12) to leaders of Congress on the strategic modernization program, which also appears in this document, has been reprinted *ante.*

[20] Pts. 1 and 2 listed above.

[21] Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eagleburger's testimony before the Subcommittee has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

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[22] The prepared statement at the hearing by Ambassador Kennedy, U.S. Representative to the IAEA, has been excerpted from this document and reprinted *ante*.

[23] Extracts of Secretary Weinberger's report are printed *ante*.

[24] Hardcover or microfiche version available by subscription through National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Department of Commerce (5285 Port Royal, Springfield, Virginia 22161). The Daily Reports are also on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at public and university libraries throughout the United States.

[25] An excerpt of this report has been printed *ante*.

[26] An excerpt of this report has been printed *ante*.

[27] A letter from the GAO Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division to ACDA Director Adelman has been extracted and printed *ante*, Sept. 30.

[28] A letter from the GAO Director of the National Security and International Affairs Division to ACDA Director Adelman has been extracted and printed *ante*, Sept. 30.

[29] An extract of this report has been printed *ante*.

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[30] 1314 Kinnear Road, Columbus, Ohio 43212.

[31] Published for distribution by The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1616 H St. NW., Washington, D.C. 20006 and by the Department of State. English-language edition may be obtained in the United States from:

Bureau of Public Affairs (PA/OAP)
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The Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Advisory Board in 1983 has been issued as document A/38/467.

Committee on Disarmament

The report of the Committee has been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/38/27).

Disarmament Commission

The Report of the Disarmament Commission has been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/38/42).

General Assembly

The resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its thirty-eighth session have been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 47* (A/38/47). Of possible interest is the Soviet critique of *Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan* (A/C.1./37/10),[32] a U.S. report. The Soviet critique was issued as document A/38/86. The letter transmitting the critique has been printed *ante*, Feb. 4. The Soviet critique also commented on a Canadian report on the same subject (A/37/308, June 25, 1982). The Canadian response has been issued as A/38/120.

Secretary-General

The report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organization has been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/38/1).

In addition, the Secretary-General has issued a report on *Implementation of the Program of Activities of the World Disarmament Campaign* as A/38/349 in accordance with the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session (Second Special Session on Disarmament).[33]

He has also issued the following reports in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions:

Resolutions 35/156 of Dec. 12, 1980 and 36/97 A of Dec. 9, 1981—*Study on Conventional Disarmament*, as A/38/437. Its annex contains a letter from the Chairman of the Group of experts requesting further time in which to complete its work.

Resolution 36/92 H of Dec. 9, 1981—*Status of Multilateral Disarmament Agreements*, as A/38/524.

Resolution 37/78 D of Dec. 9, 1982—report on information received concerning activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week, as A/38/144.

Resolution 37/78 F of Dec. 9, 1982—*Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session*, as A/38/562.

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[32] For text of the U.S. report, released both as a report by the Secretary of State and as a First Committee document, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 776.

[33] The text of the Concluding Document may be found *ibid.*, p. 421.

United Nations Materials—Continued
Secretary-General—Continued

Resolution 37/95 B of Dec. 13, 1982—*Views of States on Practical Means of Promoting the Wider Participation of States in the International System of Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures*, as A/38/353, Corr. 1 and Add.1. U.S. views may be found in Add.1.[34] Resolution 37/95 B of Dec. 13, 1982—*Report on Construction of Price Indices and Purchasing-Power Parities for Military Expenditures*, as A/38/354. Resolution 37/95 B of Dec. 13, 1982—*Military Expenditures in Standardized Form Reported by States*, as A/38/434.

Resolution 37/98 D of Dec. 13, 1982—*Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons* (provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol), with Annex I, containing lists from member states of their qualified experts, and Annex II, containing the report of the consultant experts on procedures for investigating reported violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and relevant rules of customary international law as A/38/435.

Resolution 37/99 G of Dec. 13, 1982—Replies received from governments on *Measures to Provide Objective Information on Military Capabilities*, as A/38/368 and Adds. 1 and 2. The U.S. reply is in Add.2.

Resolution 37/99 K III of Dec. 13, 1982—*Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies*, as A/38/467.

Resolution 37/100 F of Dec. 13, 1982—Replies received from governments on *Regional Disarmament*, as A/38/376 and Adds. 1 and 2. The Soviet reply is contained in Add. 2.

Resolution 37/100 G of Dec. 13, 1982—*United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament*, as A/38/533.

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[34] Reprinted *ante*, Nov. 4.

LIST OF PERSONS

Abramowitz, Morton I. U.S. Foreign Service Officer; consular economic officer, Taipei, 1960–62; political officer, Hong Kong, 1963–66; international economist, State Department, 1966–68; special assistant, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, 1969–71; foreign affairs analyst, 1971–73; political adviser to CINCPAC, 1973–74; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, 1974–78; Ambassador to Thailand, 1978–81; Chief U.S. Representative at Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1983–84.

Adelman, Kenneth L. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1976–77; Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, 1977–81; U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1981–83; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983– .

Adeniji, Olu, Director General, Directorate of Intrnational Organizations, Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador to Switzerland and Permanent Representative at the United Nations European Office, Geneva, and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its successor, the Committee on Disarmament, 1977–82; President, U.N. Preparatory Conference on Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 1979–80; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament, 1979–80; Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1980–82; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session, 1982; member, Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 1983– .

Afanasyev, Viktor G. Editor in Chief, *Pravda*, 1976– .

Ahlberg, Mats Umeă (Sc.D.). Head, Analytical Chemistry Section, National Defense Research Institute, Umea, Sweden; consultant expert on CBW on the U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Qualified Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 1983.

Ahmad, Mansur. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the U.N. Office at Geneva; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–81; Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1981– .

Akinyemi, A. Bolaji. Director General, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos; Professor of Political Science, University of Lagos; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Consequences of the Israeli Armed Attack Against the Iraqi Nuclear Installations, 1983.

Akkerman, Robert Jan. First Secretary, Netherlands Permanent Mission to the U.N. Office at Geneva; member, delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982– .

Andrei, Stephan. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Romania, 1978– .

Andropov, Yuriy V. Member, Secretariat, CPSU, 1962–67; head, KGB and candidate member, Politburo, 1967–73; full member, 1973; General Secretary Central Committee, CPSU, 1982–84; Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 1983–84.

Atkins, Marvin C. Executive Secretary, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Azeredo da Silveira, Antonio. Representative of Brazil at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, 1966–68; Ambassador to the United States, 1979–83.

Azzout, Hadj Benabdelkader. Secretary General, Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

Bateman, Herbert H. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., VA), 1969– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology.

Batsanov, Sergey B. Adviser to the Soviet delegation to the First Committee of the 38th U.N. General Assembly, 1983.

Bensmail, Abdelkader. Senior Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

Betancur Cuartas, Belisario. President, Republic of Colombia. 1982– .

Biden, Joseph R., Jr. U.S. Senator (D., DE), 1973– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and Select Committee on Intelligence; headed senatorial delegation to USSR, Aug. 1979.

Blix, Hans (Dr.). Member, Swedish delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, 1961–81; member, Swedish delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1962–78; Legal Adviser on International Law and Head of Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1963–76; Under Secretary of State in charge of international development cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1976–78, 1979–81; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1978–79; Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, Dec. 1, 1981– .

Boehlert, Sherwood. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., NY), 1983– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology.

Boschwitz, Rudy. U.S. Senator (R., MN), 1979– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Bowsher, Charles A. Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1981– .

Brady, Nicholas F. Former Senator from New Jersey; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Bretton, Philippe (Dr.). *Professeur agrégé des Facultés de droit à l'Université d'Orleans*, France; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Qualified Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 1983.

Brezhnev, Leonid I. Member, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1952–82; Politburo member, 1957–82; General Secretary, Central Committee, CPSU, 1964–82; Chairman, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 1977–82.

van den Broek, Hans. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 1982– .

Broomfield, William S. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., MI), 1957– ; ranking Republican, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs; U.S. Ambassador, 22d session of the U.N General Assembly 1967; Congressional Adviser, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1970–74; delegate, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1979–80 (SALT II); delegate, North Atlantic Assembly, 1955, 1960, and 1973–80; 67th Interparliamentary Union Conference, 1980.

Brown, Harold. Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, 1961–65; Secretary of the Air Force, 1965–69; President, California Institute of Technology, 1969–77; U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1977–81; Senior Counselor to the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Burt, Richard R. National security affairs correspondent, the *New York Times*, 1977–80; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1981–82; Acting Assistant Secretary of European Affairs, 1982–83; Assistant Secretary, 1984– .

Busby, Morris D. U.S. Alternate Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982– .

Bush, George. U.S. Senator (R., TX), 1967–70; Ambassador to the United Nations, 1971–72; chairman, Republican National Committee, 1973–74; Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, PRC, 1974–75; Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1976–77; U.S. Vice President, 1981– .

Bykov, Oleg N. (Professor). Deputy Director, Institute for World Economic and International Relations, USSR Academy of Science; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Campins, Luis Herrera. President, Republic of Venezuela, 1978–84.

Caporaso, Vito. General Programming Officer, Defense General Staff, Italian Ministry of Defense; member, U.N, Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–82; Logistics-Administrative Office of the Army Staff, Italian Ministry of Defense Administration Command Corps-Army Staff, Rome; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1983– .

Carney, William. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., NY), 1970– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology and its Subcommittee on Energy Development and Applications.

Cars, Hans Christian. Head of Division, Planning and Budget Secretariat, Swedish Ministry of Defense; Chairman, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–82; Deputy Director, Planning and Budget Secretariat, Swedish Ministry of Defense and Chairman, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1983– .

Ceauşescu, Nicolae. General Secretary, Romanian Communist Party, 1965– ; President, Socialist Republic of Romania, 1974– .

Chandler, Rod. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., WA), 1983– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology and its Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications.

Cheysson, Claude. French Foreign Minister, 1981–84.

Chňoupek, Bohuslav. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 1971– .

Cialowicz, Janusz (Col.). Member, Polish delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1983– .

Clements, William P., Jr. Chairman of the Board, chief executive officer, and founder of SEDCO Inc. Dallas, Tex., 1947–73, 1977; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1973–77; Governor of the State of Texas, 1978–82; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Cobo, José R. Martinez (Dr., Ecuador). General Secretary, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), 1981– .

Colby, William. Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1973–76; partner in firm Colby, Miller and Hanes, Washington, 1977–78, Reed and Priest, Washington, 1979– .

Conahan, Frank C. Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office.

Cranston, Alan. U.S. Senator (D., CA), 1969– ; Senate Democratic Whip, 1977– ; member, Foreign Relations Committee and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

Craxi, Bettino. Prime Minister of Italy, 1983– .

Cromartie, R. Ian T. (Dr., CMG). Ambassador and chairman of the United Kingdom delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1983– .

Cutler, Lloyd N. U.S. lawyer; Counsel to President of the United States, 1979–81; Senior Counselor to Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Dam, Kenneth W. Deputy Secretary of State, 1982– .

Deutch, John M. (Dr.). Member, faculty Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970– , professor of chemistry, 1971– ; chairman, National Defense Scientific Board, 1977; Director, Office of Energy Research, U.S. Department of Energy, 1977–79; acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology, 1979, Under Secretary, 1979; member, Army Science Advisory Panel, 1975– ; dean of science, MIT and member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Dodd, Christopher J. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., CT), 1975–81; Senator, 1981– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Dougherty, James E. (Professor). Department of Politics, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Downey, Thomas J. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., NY), 1975– .

Duarte, Sergio de Queiroz. Deputy Representative of Brazil to the Committee on Disarmament, 1979– ; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–81.

Dubey, Sushil. Director, Indian Ministry of External Affairs; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament, 1980–81.

Eagleburger, Lawrence S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1982–84.

Ekéus, Rolf. Ambassador and head of the Swedish delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1983– .

Ellis, Richard H. (Gen., USAF, ret.). Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 1973; commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, 1975–77; Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, 1977–81; U.S. Ambassador and Commissioner, U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, 1982– .

Encinas del Pando, José A. Professor (on research leave), University of Lima; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–81; also member of his Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–82, 1983.

Ene, Constantin. Ambassador of Romania; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Espriella, Ricardo de la. See Licencidao, Ricardo de la Espriella.

Ezz, Esmat A. (Maj. Gen. Dr., M.B., B.Ch., D.M., Ph.D). Head, Scientific Research Branch, Egyptian Armed Forces; Chairman, U.N. Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, 1982; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Qualified Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 1983.

Fanfani, Amintore. Prime Minister of Italy, 1958–63, 1982–83.

El Farargi Saad. Egyptian Ambassador and Representative to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 1973–77; *Rapporteur* to the Committee on review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament, 1976, *Rapporteur* of the Preparatory Committee for the First Special Session Devoted to Disarmament, 1977; consultant, United Nations Disarmament Center, 1978; head of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1983– .

Farley, Philip J. Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969–73; Deputy to Ambassador at Large Gerard C. Smith, 1978, Senior Research Associate, arms control and research project, Stanford University.

Fascell, Dante B. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., FL), 1955– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations; also member, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs; member, Committee on Government Operations.

Fields, Louis G., Jr. Assistant Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1970–74; Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems, 1974–81; member, U.S. delegation to the First Committee of the 36th session of the

U.N. General Assembly, 1981; Ambassador and head of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982–84.

Figueiredo, João Baptisade. President of Brazil, 1979–85.

Flowerree, Charles C. U.S. Foreign Service Officer, 1958–81; Deputy Director, Department of State Office of Disarmament and Arms Control, 1974–75; Director, Office of International Security Policy, 1975–77; Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 1976–77; Chief, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency International Relations Division, 1977–79; Ambassador and Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1980–81; Alternate Representative at the First Committee of the 35th U.N. General Assembly, 1980; member, Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-Building Measures, Apr. 1980, Aug. 1981; member, Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 1983.

Gallik, Daniel. Senior Economist, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–81; also member of his Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–82, 1983– .

Gandhi, Indira. Prime Minister of India, 1966–77, 1980–84.

García Robles, Alfonso. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mexico, 1964– ; Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1965– ; leader of delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament, 1967– ; head, Drafting Group on "Introduction" in Report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1978; Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament, 1981; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982. Member, Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983. Awarded Nobel Peace Prize, 1982.

Garthoff, Raymond L. Special Assistant, Soviet bloc Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, 1961–68; member, U.S. delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 1962, 1964; counselor for politico-military affairs, U.S. Mission NATO, Brussels, 1968–70; member, U.S. delegation to the U.S.–USSR SALT negotiations, 1969–72; Ambassador to Bulgaria, 1977–81; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Program, 1982– .

Gayler, Noel (Adm., USN, Ret.). Former Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Pacific; former Director, National Security Agency.

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich. Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1974– .

George, James L. Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981–83.

Glenn, John H., Jr., U.S. Senator (D., OH), 1975– ; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs; member, Committee on Governmental Affairs and Democratic Policy Committee.

Glitman, Maynard V. Deputy head, U.S. delegation to the Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe, 1981–84; chief U.S. delegate to the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR), 1984.

Golob, Ignac. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Gorce, François de la. French Ambassador and representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1979– ; representative to the First Committee of the General Assembly, 1979– .

Graham, Thomas, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973–77; Legal Adviser to U.S. SALT delegation, 1974–79; General Counsel, 1977–81; Legal Adviser to U.S. delegation at Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, Aug.–Sept., 1980; Director of Congressional and Public Affairs, Sept. 1981–83; General Counsel and Director of Congressional Affairs, 1983– .

Gregg, Judd. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., NH), 1981– ; member, Committee on Governmental Operations and Science and Technology.

Grinberg, Baruch. Ambassador and Deputy Chief, UNO and Disarmament Department, Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Gromyko, Andrei A. Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1957– ; member, Politburo of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1973– ; First Deputy Premier, 1983– .

Haig, Alexander M., Jr. (Gen., USA, Ret.). Military Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, 1969–70; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1970–73; Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1973; White House Chief of Staff, 1973–74; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, 1974–78; President and chief operating officer, United Technologies Corporation, Dec. 1979–Jan. 1981, U.S. Secretary of State, 1981–82; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83

Hameed, A.C.S. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Harriman, W. Averell. U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1943–46, to the United Kingdom, 1946; Secretary of Commerce, 1946–48; Special Assistant to the President, 1950–51; U.S. representative on Commission to Study Western Defense Plans, NATO, 1951; director, Mutual Security Agency, 1951–53; Governor of New York, 1955–58; Ambassador-at-Large, 1961, 1965–68; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1961–63; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1963–65; Represented United States at Moscow test-ban treaty negotiations, July 1963; Chairman, foreign policy task force advisory committee, Democratic National Committee, 1974– ; U.S. Representative to the U.N. special session on disarmament (Tenth Special Session), 1978.

Hatfield, Mark O. U.S. Senator (R., OR), 1967– ; Chairman (since 1981) Committee on Appropriations.

Helms, Richard. Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1966–73; Ambassador to Iran, 1973–76; consultant, 1976– .

Herder, Gerhard. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the U.N. Office at Geneva; head of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1975–83; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, 1983– .

Hernu, Charles. Minister of Defense, France, 1981– .

Hodel, Donald P. Secretary of Energy, 1983– .

Honecker, Erich. General Secretary, Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman, State Council of the German Democratic Republic.

Husak, Gustav. General Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Iklé, Fred C. Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964–67; head, Social Science Department, RAND Corporation, 1968–73; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973–77; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1981– .

Illeuca, Jorge E. (Dr.). Vice President of Panama; Chairman, Panamanian delegation to and President of the 38th U.N. General Assembly, 1983.

Inman, Bobby R. (Adm., USN, Ret.). Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Staff of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1973–74; Director, Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, 1974–76; Vice Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1976–77; Director, National Security Agency, 1977–80; Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1981–82.

Issraelyan, Viktor L. Soviet Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1968–73; Chief, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973–79; member, Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975– ; leader of delegation to CD, 1979– ; Alternate Representative, U.N. General Assembly, 1979– , Permanent Representative to the U.N. Office, Geneva, 1980– .

Jaruzelski, Wojciech. First Secretary, Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party and Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic, 1981– .

Jones, David C. (Gen., USAF) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979–82.

Kadar, Janos. First Secretary, Central Committee, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 1956– .

Kampelman, Max M. U.S. attorney and Chairman, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Ambassador and Co-Chairman, U.S. delegation to the review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1980–81; Chairman, 1981–83.

Keblusek, Emil. Czechoslovak Ambassador and represenative at the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe (MBFR), 1977–83; Vice-Chairman, IAEA Board of Governors, 1981– .

Kennedy, Edward M. U.S. Senator (D., MA), 1962– ; member, Committee on the Judiciary and Joint Economic Committee.

Kennedy, Richard T. Assistant Director, Deputy Director, and Director, Africa Region, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 1964–69; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Council Planning and senior member, National Security Council staff, 1969–75; Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975–80; Under Secretary of State for Management, 1981– . Ambassador and U.S. Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1982– ; leader, U.S. delegation at U.S.–USSR talks on nuclear nonproliferation, 1982– .

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. (Dr.). Professor, department of government, Georgetown University; U.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1981– .

Kómives, Imre (Dr.). Hungarian Permanent Representative to the U.N. Office at Geneva and Head of Delegation at the Committee on Disarmament, 1980– ; Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, 1981– .

Konstantinov, Borislav. Ambassador and deputy head of the Bulgarian delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1983– .

Kreisky, Bruno. Federal Chancellor, Austria, 1970–83.

Krolikowski, Herbert. State Secretary and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, German Democratic Republic, 1975– .

Kvitsinskiy, Yuliy A. Soviet Ambassador and leader of delegation to the Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF), 1981–83.

Levin, Aida Lusia. United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs; Secretary, CD Working Group on the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament, 1983.

Licenciado, Ricardo de la Espriella. President, Republic of Panama, 1978– .

Lidgard, Curt. Swedish Ambassador and Alternate Leader of the delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1978–82; leader of the delegation, 1982 (Aug. 6)–1983 (thru spring session); Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Comprehensive Program for Disarmament, 1981; senior adviser to delegation at the 37th UNGA, 1982.

Loeb, John L., Jr. Representative of the United States to the 38th U.N. General Assembly, 1983.

Lowery, Bill. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., CA), 1981– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology and its Subcommittees on Energy Development and Applications and Space Science and Applications.

Lugar, Richard G. U.S. Senator (R., IN), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and Select Committee on Intelligence.

Lujan, Manuel, Jr. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., NM), 1969– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology.

Lundin, Johan (Dr.). Director of Research, Swedish National Defense Institute; scientific adviser to Swedish delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1977– .

Luns, Joseph M.A.H. (Netherlands). Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1971–84.

MacEachen, Allan J. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Canada, 1977–79, 1980–83; Senator, 1984– .

Machata, Gottfried (Ph.D.). Head, Chemical Department, Institute of Forensic Medicine, Vienna, Austria; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 1983.

Madero, Castro. (Adm.). President, Argentine Atomic Energy Commission, 1976–84.

Madrid, Miguel de la H. President, United Mexican States, 1982– .

Malone, James L. General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973–77; Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 1981– .

Mason, Sir Ronald. School of Molecular Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, U.K.; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

Mateescu, Stefan O. Senior Economist, Central Statistical Office, Bucharest, Romania; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1983– .

Matsui, Akira. Ambassador and Vice President, Japan Atomic Energy Forum, Tokyo; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Mboumoua, William Eteki. Minister at the Presidency in Charge of Special Functions, United Republic of Cameroon; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

McCandless, Alfred A. U.S. Congessional Representative (R., CA), 1983– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology.

McGrath, Raymond J. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., NY), 1981– ; member, Committees on Government Operations and Science and Technology.

McPhail, D.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the Committee on Disarmament, 1980–83.

Mellbin, Skjold G. Ambassador of Denmark and Chairman of the U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces, 1981–84.

Mica, Dan. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., FL), 1979– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mikhailov, Valerian P. Soviet Ambassador and Chief representative at Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR), Sept. 1981– .

Mitterrand, François. President of France, 1981– .

Mladenov, P. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria.

Morozov, Ivan G. Deputy Chairman, Soviet State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, 1973–83.

Mueller, Manfred (Dr.). Institute for International Relations, GDR Academy for Political Science and Legal Studies, Potsdam; member, U.N. Advisory Board for Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

Murkowski, Frank H. U.S. Senator (R., AK), 1981– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and chairman, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Relations.

Mydral, Alva R. Principal Director, United Nations Department of Social Affairs and Director, UNESCO Department of Social Science, 1949–51. Swedish Ambassador to India, 1955. Leader, Swedish delegation to Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1962–73. Founder and first Chairman, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Member, Swedish Parliament, 1962; Minister of Disarmament, 1966–73. Awarded Nobel Peace Prize, 1982.

Nakasone, Yasuhiro. Prime Minister of Japan, 1982– .

Nazarkin, Yury K. Deputy Director, Department of International Organizations, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; deputy head of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982–83.

Nitze, Paul H. Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1946–53; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1961–63; Secretary of Navy, 1963–67; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1967–69; member, U.S. delegation to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969–74. Self-employed consultant, 1974–81; Head, U.S. delegation to Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (INF), 1981–84; Ambassador, 1982– .

Odeka, Victor O. (Col.). Commandant, Nigerian Army Pay Corps Training School and member, U.N. Secretary-General's *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting, 1979–80; Commandant, Nigerian Army School of Finance and Administration and member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1983– .

Ogarkov, Nikolayev. Principal Military adviser to the Soviet delegation at the first three sessions of SALT I, 1969–70; Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, 1977–84.

Olszowski, Stefan. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Polish People's Republic, 1971–76, 1982– .

O'Neill, Thomas P., **Jr**. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., MA), 1953– ; Majority Whip, 1971–73; Majority Leader, 1973–77; Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1977– .

Ortiz de Rozas, Carlos. Ambassador of Argentina and Minister of External Relations and Worship; Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1977; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session, 1978. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1979–80; Chairman, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament, 1980–81; member, Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Osredkar, Milan. Professor, Jozef Stefan Institute and the Edvard Kardelj University, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Consequences of the Israeli Armed Attack Against the Iraqi Nuclear Installations, 1983.

Parwoto, Benjamin. Deputy Assistant for Planning, Indonesian Department of Defense and Security and member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–82; (AVM Indonesian Air Force), Commanding General Materiel Command (Komatau), Lanuma Hussein Sastranegara, Bandung, and member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1983–

PELL, CLAIBORNE. U.S. Senator (D., RI), 1961– ; U.S. delegate to 25th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1970; member Senate Foreign Relations Committee; member, Democratic Policy Committee and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

PENNER, RUDOLPH G. Director, Congressional Budget Office.

PERCY, CHARLES H. U.S. Senator (R., IL), 1967–85; Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; member, Committee on Governmental Affairs and Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes; member, Republican Policy Committee, 1981–84.

PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR, JAVIER (Peru). Secretary-General of the United Nations, Jan. 1, 1982– .

PERLE, RICHARD. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, 1981– .

PERRY, WILLIAM J. Technical consultant, Department of Defense, 1967–77; Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 1978–81; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

PETROSYANTS, A.M. Chairman, Soviet State Committee on Atomic Energy.

PETROVSKY, VLADIMIR F. Chief, International Organization Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979– ; Alternate Representative at the 37th U.N. General Assembly, 1982.

PRESSLER, LARRY. U.S. Senator (R., SD), 1979– ; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Chairman, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment.

PRICE, MELVIN. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., IL), 1945– ; Chairman, Committee on Armed Services (through 1984).

PROKOFIEV, BORIS P. Deputy Director, Department of International Organizations, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Head of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1981–

QIAN JIADONG. Chinese Ambassador and Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1983–

RASGOTRA, MAHARAJAKRISHNA K. Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

REAGAN, RONALD W. Motion picture and television actor, 1932–66; Governor of California, 1967–74; President of the United States, 1981– .

REED, THOMAS C. Director, telecommunications and command and control systems, Department of Defense, 1974–75; Secretary of the Air Force, 1976–77; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

EL REEDY, S.E. Egyptian Ambassador and head of the delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1981–83 (Aug.), Director General, Egyptian Department of International Organizations, 1983 (Aug.)– .

ROGERS, BERNARD W. (Gen., USA). Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Commander in Chief U.S. European Command, 1979– .

ROSTOW, EUGENE. Dean, Yale University Law School, 1955–65; Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale Law School, 1964; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1966–69; visiting professor, Balliol College, Oxford University, 1970–71; Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale University Law School, 1976; Chairman, Committee on the Present Danger, 1976–81; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981–83.

Rowny, Edward L. (Lt. Gen., USA, Ret.). Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, 1968–69; Deputy Chief of Army Research and Development, 1969; Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee, Brussels, and Chairman, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Group, 1971–73; Joint Chiefs of Staff representative at Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1973–79; Ambassador and Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981– ; leader, U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), 1982–83.

Rumsfeld, Donald. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., IL), 1963–68; Director, Office of Equal Opportunity, 1969–70; Director, Cost of Living Council and Counselor to the U.S. President, 1971–72; U.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative to NATO, 1974–75; Secretary of Defense, 1975–77; Senior Counselor to the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Ruth, Friedrich. Ambassador and Federal Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, Federal Republic of Germany; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

Sakharov, Andrei. Soviet nuclear physicist; with Igor Tamm achieved important breakthrough in field of nuclear fusion leading to development of Soviet hydrogen bomb; formed Human Rights Commission, 1970; won Nobel Peace Prize, 1975.

Sarbanes, Paul S. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., MD), 1971–77; Senator, 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Schlesinger, James R. Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1971–73; Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1973; Secretary of Defense, 1973–75; Secretary of Energy, 1977–79; Senior Adviser, Strategic and International Studies Office, Georgetown University, 1979– ; Senior Counselor to Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Schneider, Claudine. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., RI), 1981– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology.

Schneider, William, Jr. Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, 1982– .

Scoville, Herbert, Jr. Deputy Director, Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency, 1955–63; Assistant Director, Science and Technology, ACDA, 1963–69; director, arms control program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969–71; consultant, 1971– .

Scowcroft, Brent (Lt. Gen., USAF, Ret.). Deputy Assistant Director, Plans for National Security Matters, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Department of Defense, 1969–70; Special Assistant to Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970–71; military assistant to the President, 1972–73; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1973–75; member, President's General Advisory Commission on Arms Control, 1977–81; Chairman, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Segarra, Amada. Representative for U.N. Center for Disarmament; Executive Secretary, Review Conference of the Parties to the seabed arms control treaty, 1977; Executive Secretary, Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1978, 1979; Secretary, Preparatory Committee for the biological weapons convention review conference, 1979; Executive Secretary, U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 1979–80; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 1983.

Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., WI), 1979– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology.

el-Shafei, Omran. Under Secretary of State, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

Shahi, Agha. Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan; Professor Emeritus of International Relations to Universities in Pakistan, and member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Shultz, George P. U.S. Secretary of Labor, 1969–70; Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970–72; Secretary of the Treasury, also assistant to the President, 1972–74; executive vice president, Bechtel Corp., 1974–75, president, 1975–82; Secretary of State, 1982– .

Singh, Siddharth. Counselor, Indian Embassy at Washington, D.C.

Skeen, Joe. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., NM), 1981– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology.

Smith, Gerard C. Assistant Secretary of State and Director, Policy Planning Staff, 1957–61; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969–73; head, U.S. SALT delegation, 1969–72; Ambassador at Large, 1977–79; Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters, 1979–80.

Solarz, Stephen J. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., NY), 1975– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Operations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs; Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs; representative, U.N. General Assembly, 1982– .

Souza e Silva, Ceslo Antonio de. Brazilian Representative to the Committee on Disarmament and to the First Committee of the 34th U.N. General Assembly, 1979; Chairman, Credentials Committee, Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, 1980; Chairman, U.N. Disarmament Commission, May 9–June 3, 1983.

Starodubov, Viktor P. Soviet Ambassador and Commissioner on the Standing Consultative Commission, 1980– .

Stratton, Samuel S. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., NY), 1959– ; member, Committee on Armed Services.

Strulak, Tadeusz. Polish Representative at the Negotiations on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR), 1978–81; Deputy Director, International Organizations Department, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

Studds, Gerry E. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., MA), 1973– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Sujka, Bogumil. Ambassador and Head of Polish Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1979–83.

Sur, Serge. *Professeur agrégé des Facultés de droit à l'Universite de Paris X*, Nanterre, France; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 1983 (from Aug.).

Tabares del Real, Jose A. Ambassador, Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– [unable to attend the 8th session].

Teller, Edward. Hungarian-born American physicist; Emeritus Professor of Physics, 1975– ; senior research fellow, Hoover Institute on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University, 1975– ; Director, Thermo Electron Corporation; member, Science Advisory Board, USAF.

Thatcher, Margaret. Prime Minister, United Kingdom, 1979– .

Theorin, Maj Britt. Ambassador, Member of Parliament and Chairman, Swedish Disarmament Commission; head of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament *ex officio* when in attendance, 1983– .

Thorne, Gaston. President, European Commission.

Tindemans, Leo. Prime Minister of Belgium, 1974–78 ; Minister for External Affairs, 1981– .

Titkov, Nikolai A. Member, State Committee on Atomic Energy of the USSR; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Consequences of the Israeli Armed Attack Against the Iraqi Nuclear Installations, 1983.

Tower, John G. U.S. Senator (R., TX), 1961–84; Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.

Troyanovsky, Oleg A. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations, 1977– .

Trudeau, Pierre Elliott. Prime Minister of Canada, 1968–79; 1980–83.

Tsongas, Paul. U.S. Senator (D., MA), 1975–84; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

Ustinov, Dmitriy F. Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense; member, Politburo, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1976–84.

Vaernö, Oscar. Norwegian Ambassador, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Oslo, and President, Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, 1980; Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister on Arms Control and Disarmament, and member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–82, 1983– .

Vaidya, Kalyan G. Consultant, New York (former Ambassador and leader of Indian delegation to Conference on International Economic Cooperation, Paris, 1976–77); member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Consequences of the Israeli Armed Attack Against the Iraqi Nuclear Installations, 1982.

Van Doren, Charles N. Consultant, Washington, D.C.; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Consequences of the Israeli Attack Against the Iraqi Nuclear Installations, 1982. [Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963; Deputy General Counsel, 1964–73; Special Assistant for Nonproliferation Treaty Implementation, 1974; Deputy Assistant Director, 1975; Deputy Assistant Director for Nonproliferation, 1976; Assistant Director for Nonproliferation, 1977–81.]

Varkonyi, Peter (Dr.). Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hungarian People's Republic, 1983– .

Velikhov, Yevgeniy P. Vice President, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Vos van Steenwijk, Willem J., Baron de. Netherlands Ambassador and Representative at the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks—MBFR), 1974– .

Vraalsen, Tom. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Norwegian delegation to the United Nations, 1982– ; Chairman, First Committee, 38th UNGA, 1983.

Walker, Bob. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., PA), 1977– ; member, Committees on Government Operation and Science and Technology.

Wang Suh. Representative of China to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Warnke, Paul C. General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, 1966–67; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1967–69; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977–78; Ambassador and Chairman, U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and trilateral comprehensive test ban talks, 1977–78; special consultant to the Secretary of State for arms control affairs, 1978–81.

Watson, Thomas J., Jr. President, IBM, 1952–61; Chairman, 1961–71; Chairman Executive Committee, 1971–79; Ambassador to the USSR, 1979–81.

Wegener, Henning (Dr.). Ambassador and head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982– .

Weinberger, Caspar W. Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970–72, Director, 1972–73; Counselor to the U.S. President, 1973; Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1973–75; General Counsel, Vice President, and Director, Bechtel Corp., 1975–81; U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1981– .

Winn, Larry, Jr. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., KS), 1967– ; member, Committees on Foreign Affairs and Science and Technology.

Woolsey, R. James, Jr. Program analyst, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1968–70; adviser, U.S. delegation to SALT, 1969–70; General Counsel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 1970–73; Under Secretary of the Navy, 1977–81; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–83.

Zablocki, Clement J. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., WI), 1943–84; Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Zhivkov, Todor. Chairman, State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 1971– General Secretary, Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 1981–

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